Thayer Burma Military Rule and Ethnic Minorities

8/9/2019 Thayer Burma Military Rule and Ethnic Minorities

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BackgroundBrief:

BurmasEthnicMinorities

CarlyleA.Thayer

June27,2010

[clientnamedeleted]

Do you foresee any trouble at themomentbetween ethnic groups like the Shan

StatearmyandtheWapeople?Orbetweentheethnicgroupsandthegovernment?

Thingsseemtobequietaheadofelections.Thererepo0rtsthatawaveofRohingya

refugeesisscheduledtoarriveinMalaysiaaheadoftheelectionsbecausewhilethey

areallowed

to

vote

the

government

does

not

want

them

to.

That's

their

argument.

CanyouecommendreadingforethnicgroupsaroundMandalay,MagwayandShan,

inBurmaparticularlythelatestintermsofethnicdisputesandtrouble.

ANSWER: The Kokang problem was related to the SPDCs attempt to integrate

militaryforcesintonationalarmypriortoelections.ThiswouldaffectWaandShan.

Wa have got out ofmethamphetamines, Shans havemoved in a big way. It all

dependsonwhattheTatmadawdoes.

S t d b k d t i l

Thayer ConsultancyABN # 65 648 097 123


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Suggested background source material

2

MaryP.Callaghan, Cracks in theEdifice?MilitarySocietyRelations inBurmaSince

1988, in Morten Peterson and Emily Rudland, eds., Burma: Strong State/Weak

Regime.

Sydney:

Crawford

House,

2000.

22

51.

MaryP.Callaghan,DemocracyinBurma:TheLessonsofHistory,NBRAnalysis(May

1998),9:3,526.

MaryP.Callaghan,MakingEnemies:WarandStateBuildinginBurma.Ithaca:Cornell

UniversityPress,2003.

MaryP.Callaghan, JuntaDreamsorNightmare?ObservationsofBurmasMilitary

since1988,BulletinofConcernedAsianScholars(1999),31:3,5258.

MaryP.Callaghan,MakingEnemies:WarandStateBuildinginBurma.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2003.

Mary P. Callaghan, On Time Warps and Warped Time: Lessons from Burmas

DemocraticEra,inRobertRotberg,ed.,Burma:ProspectsforaDemocraticFuture.

Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitution,1998.,4967.

Mary P. Callaghan, The Sinking Schooner:Murder and the State in Independent

Burma, 19481958, in Carl Trocki, ed., Gangsters, the State and Democracy in

SoutheastAsia.Ithaca:SoutheastAsiaProgram,CornellUniversity,1998.,1737.

MaryP.Callaghan,StateFormationintheShadowoftheRaj:Violence,Warfareand

PoliticsinColonialBurma,SoutheastAsianStudies(March2002), 39:4,513536.

Mary P. Callaghan, When Soldiers Kill Civilians: Burmas Crackdown in 1988 in

Comparative Perspective, inAudreyKahin and James Siegel, eds., SoutheastAsia

OverThreeGenerations:EssaysPresented toBenedictAnderson. Ithaca: Southeast

AsiaProgram,CornellUniversity,2003.331346.


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3

Stephen McCarthy, Prospects for Justice and Stability in Burma, Asian Survey

(May/June2006),46:3,417436.

DonaldM.

Seekins,

Burma

and

U.S.

Sanctions:

Punishing

an

Authoritarian

Regime,

AsianSurvey(May/June2004),45:3,437452.

JosefSilverstein,Burmasstrugglefordemocracy:thearmyagainstthepeople,R.J.

MayandVibertoSelochan,eds.,TheMilitaryandDemocracyinAsiaandthePacific.

Bathurst:CrawfordHouse,1998.6987.

MaungAungMyoe,BuildingtheTatmadaw:TheOrganisationalDevelopmentofthe

ArmedForcesinMyanmar.Canberra:StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,1998.

Maung Aung Myoe, The National Reconciliation Process in Myanmar,ContemporarySoutheastAsia(August2002),24:2,371384.

MaungAungMyoe,OfficerEducationandLeadershipTraining in theTatmadaw:A

Survey,Working PaperNo. 346. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,

2000.

AndrewSelth,Burma and Weapons of Mass Destruction,WorkingPaperNo. 334.

Canberra:StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,1999.

AndrewSelth,BurmasOrderofBattle:An InterimAssessment,WorkingPaperNo.

351.Canberra:StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,2000.

JosefSilverstein,Burma:MilitaryRuleandthePoliticsofStagnation.Ithaca:Cornell

UniversityPress,1977.

AshleySouth, PoliticalTransition inMyanmar:ANewModel forDemocratization,

ContemporarySoutheastAsia(August2004),26:2,233255.

David I Steinberg Burma The State of Myanmar Washington D C Georgetown


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4


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Military Rule in Burma

(Drugs and Security Annex)

Professor Carl Thayer


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Background

Precolonial Crown ServiceGroup

Colonial: Brish Indian Army World War 2 Brish

recruitment from hill tribes

Burmese naonalism lowland Burman


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Force Composion

Brish Burma Army 1941Force Size Percent

Regular Army 9,879 35.3%Garrison Coys 1,391 0.49%Auxiliary 3,368 12.0%Territorial 3,272 11.7%Frontier

10,073 36.0%

Total 27,981 95.5%


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Ethnic Minories:

Kachin G, FF, RA

Shan G

Chin FF, G, RA

Karen A, FF, RA

A= Auxiliary, G = Garrison, FF =

Froner Force, RA = Regular Army


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Ethnic Composion

Brish Burma Army (all forces) 1941

Ethnic Group Number Percent

Burmans 3,742 13.4%Karens 4,782 17.1%Kachins 2,125 7.6%Chin 2,607 9.3%Shans 1,080 3.8%Indians 10,259 36.7%Chinese

368 0.01%

Others British, etc. 2,896 10.3%


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Ethnic Composion

Brish Burma Army (regulars) 1941

Ethnic Group Number Percent

Burmans 1,893 19%Karens 2,797 28%Kachins 852 .09%Chin 1,258 13%Yunnanese 32 -Indians 2,578 26%Chinese 330 .03%Others - British etc. 137 0.01%


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Thirty Comrades

Ba Maw Aung San Ne Win


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Burma Independence Army 1941

Burma Defence Army 1942

Burma Naonal Army 1943


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Burma During Second World War

Military Academy established atMingaladon 1943BIA officers v Academy graduates

1943 Japanese grant independenceSecret contact with Brish SOE Force 136

Name change: Peoples Army Rebellion against Japan (March 27, 1944)

Supported by socialist and communist officers


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Burma a]er Second World War

SouthEast Asia Command Kandy Agreement between Lord Louis

Mountba_en and General Aung San

Formaon of new army of two partsTroops from regular Brish Burma ArmyFormer BNA troops now renamed Patrioc

Burmese Forces to be organised into ethnic

ba_alions.Under Brish commander and military

law


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Burma: Towards Independence

AnFascist Peoples Freedom League(AFPFL) anBrish naonalist movement

Polical PBF officers joined AFPFLCommunists expelled October 1946

Peoples Volunteer Organisaon (PVO)Paramilitary force allied to AFPFL

July 1947 Aung San assassinated Independence January 4, 1948


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Burma: Civil War, 194852

Praetorianism

March 1948 Burma Communist Party revolts Socialists and communists split over

appointment of Minister of Defence 3 army ba_alions muny, join communists Largest PVO unit goes underground December 1948 Karen Naonal Defence

Organisaon revolts


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Burma Civil War, 194852

Praetorianism

February 1949 1st Kachin Rifles munies andseizes Mandalay briefly

5060% of all government troops now in a state ofrebellion

Government crisis (March 1949) socialists quit AFPFL government

10,000 KMT troops enter Burma Senior Karen officers who remained loyal were

relieved of their commands by General Ne Win


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Burma: Civil War, 194852

Burmese military forced to be selfreliantArmy takes over control of many districts,

engages in civic acon

Army makes substanal claim on naonal budgetfor internal security leading to armysindependence from government

Post1952 civil war confined to remote areasArmy does fighngPolicians connue to bicker


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Military Professionalism and

Subjecve Civilian Control

Shakeout of civil war led to smaller andmore experienced officer corpsOfficer corps now more cohesive ethnically

BurmanArmy restructured on basis ofnonethnic

ba_alions

Defence Services Academy establishedCode of corporate solidarity and subservience

to central civilian control under theconstuon


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Burma: Background

1952 Elecons won by AnFascist PeoplesFreedom League (AFPFL)

Socialist ideology guided policy Growing policaleconomic crisis 1956 AFPFLs electoral support declines AFPFL leadership splits Amnesty policy towards guerrilla groups Crisis and government deadlock


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Burma:Background

195860 caretaker government General NeWin replaces U Nu as Prime Minister

Military Staff Council replaces CabinetMassive reshuffle of government and public

service posts, military assumes wide authority

Constuon observed Crisis overcome Naonal elecons held 1960

U Nus facon of AFPFL wins 159 of 237 seats


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Burma:Background

Return of civilian government results inparliamentary deadlock

Ethnic minories demand more autonomy oreven separaon

Civilmilitary fricon develops Police removed from army Army economic administrators to resign commissions

Faconalism emerges in military over role inpolical and economic ma_ers

General Ne Win reorganises top army leadership


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Burma: March 1962 Coup

General Ne Win headscaretaker government195860

Returns power toelected civiliangovernment

Connued policaleconomic crisis

Seizes power


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Polical Overview

196274 Revoluonary CouncilGeneral Ne Win

197488 Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma(renamed Union of Burma 1989)

198897 State Law and Order RestoraonCouncil

1997 State Peace and Development Council


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Caretaker government, 195860

The Naonal Ideology and the Role of theDefence Services (October 1958)order and stability, restoraon of peace and rule of

law, democracy (ancommunism), socialisteconomy

Dharma in Danger (1959)Use of Buddhism to oppose communism

Defence Services Instutebanking, department stores, construcon, marime

shipping, fishing


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Coup detat March 1962

Born 1910 died 2002

1941 one of Thirty Comrades

194648 CO 4th Burma Rifles

194972 Armed Forces Chief of StaffPrime Minister 195860, 196274

Head Revoluonary Council 196274

President Socialist Republic of theUnion of Burma 197478

Chairman Burma Socialist ProgrammeParty 196288

General Ne Win


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Revoluonary Council, 196274

Military under Ne Win replaces civilians Constuon suspended Parliament dissolved Polical pares banned The Burmese Way to Socialism (1962)

Central command economyEliminaon of foreign ownership in business


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Revoluonary Council, 196274

Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)Leniniststyle polical party 1962

The System of Correlaon of Man and HisEnvironment (1963)

BSPP ideology codified 1963 Amnesty offered to communist and

ethnic minority insurgents

1964 polical pares banned


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From Revoluonary Council to

Union of Burma

BSPP transformed into mass party 1971 Civil administraon in hands of PM and Cabinet Ne Win reres from the military Power shi] from Army command to party secretariat

New Constuon 1974 Peoples Councils 4 year term Increasing ri] between civilians and regular military

officers over power arrangements naonally and in

local areas 1981 Ne Win steps down as President


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Collapse of Ne Win Regime

July 1988 BSPP Extraordinary CongressNe Win and other top leaders resignMulparty elecons promised

Student demonstraons in Rangoon 8888Tatmadawintervenes thousands killed

September 18, 1988 Tatmadawseizespower in name of State Law and OrderRestoraon Council (SLORC)


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State Law and Order Restoraon Council

Maral Law under SLORCGeneral Saw Maung named chairman1974 Constuon suspendedDeclares mulparty general elecons will be held

Paral Economic reformsOpen market, correct financial weakness

Burmanisaon Myanmar, Yangon


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State Law and Order Restoraon Council

Opposion Naonal League for Democracysweeps 1990 elecons

Militarys Naonal Unity Party does poorly Military refuses to accept results

Aung San Suu Kyi placed under 5year housearrest

Mass detenon of opposion leaders

Prodemocracy supports flee to border area


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2nd Major Transformaon

2nd phase of military transformaon andstatebuilding

SLORC had to rebuild collapsed regimeStability and order highest priorityMilitary used to reassert central control over

polical, economic and administrave power


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Ministry of Defence reorganized 1990 Command and Control reformed Bureau of Special Operaons created

Control over most combat units New army garrisons New naval bases and air staons Military industrial base expanded Privileges: health, welfare, educaon


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From 186,000 to 370,000 (19881996) Two mobile light infantry divisions Specialised engineer, armour and arllery units

US $1 billion force modernizaon program 140 new combat aircra] 30 naval vessels 170 tanks, 250 APCs Rocket launch systems, anaircra] arllery, infantry

weapons, telecommunicaons surveillance equipment


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StateBuilding

Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) Iniate and coordinate policies: economy, drug trade,

ethnic minority affairs, foreign relaons

Regional Commands (N = 12) Daytoday authority over economic and polical affairs Eliminate polical dissent, dismantle older socialist state

and party organs

Effect new administrave and economic arrangements Amassed enormous wealth and power


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StateBuilding: Finance

Military spending 40%60% of naonal budget So] loans from China Off budget sources:

Foreign exchange profits Tax on opium and methamphetamine trade

Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. Jointly owned by Directorate of Defence Personnel (40%)

and rered and acve duty military (60%)

Registered capital US $1.4 billion Largest indigenous firm gem trade and all foreign

investors


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General Saw MaungSLORC Chairman 198892

General Than Shwe

Military CommanderGeneral Khin Nyunt

Secretary One

Declaraon 10/92 April

24, 1992

Rivals


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General Khin Nyunt, Secretary1

Negoated ceasefires with ethnicminories1994 created Office of StrategicStudies (OSS) in MOD

Advocated Myanmars entry intoASEAN

Set up Polical Affairs Commi_ee(18 Sept 1998) to guide polical

transion

Author of 7 Step Road Map forDemocrac Transion (Aug 2003)


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End of Maral Law (198992)

JuneJuly 1992 SLORC iniates dialogue with policalpares

534 polical prisoners freed But high profile leaders among 1,500 sll held

Aug 1992 Universies and colleges reopened Lecturers and teachers retrained

10 Sept 1992 curfew ended 2 Oct 1992 Commission for Naonal Convenon

convened


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Negoated Ceasefires 198995

Wa Kokang Palaung Lisu Akha PaO Shan State Army Shan (other)

Kayah Arakanese Kachin Independence

Organisaon Mon Karenni [16 groups by 1995 [17 groups by 2001


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From SLORC to SPDC

Asian Financial Crisis (July 1997) State Peace and Development Council (Nov 1997)

Purge of most corrupt Cabinet members Regional Commanders kicked upstairs to ministerialposions in Rangoon Younger general officers given Regional Commands and

placed in top SPDC leadership

New Order Indonesia a model Unresolved problem of polical opposion andlack of internaonal support


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Internal Power Struggle

Sr-Gen Maung AyeSPDC Vice Chairman

Army CommanderLt. Gen. Khin Nyunt SPDC

Secretary 1 & Head of Military

Intelligence & Office of

Strategic Studies

Rivals


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SPDC Vacancies Filled March 2002

Lt. Gen Soe Win Secretary 2 andLt. Gen. Khin Nyunt SPDC Secretary 1

General Shwe Mann Military

Affairs

[Gen. Maung Aye recovering

from surgery in Singapore


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Cabinet Reshuffle (Aug 25, 2003)

Khin Nyunt

Prime Minister

Lt. Gen Soe WinSecretary 1

Lt Gen Thein SeinSecretary 2


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7Point Road Map to Democracy

1. Reconvene Naonal Convenon2. Naonal Convenon to draw up principles for

a new Constuon

3.

Dra] a new Constuon4. Hold a referendum for new constuon5. Hold free and fair elecons6. Convene Hlu_aw (parliament)7. Form a new democrac government


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Naonal Convenon Objecves

Dra] principles for a Constuon Nondisintegraon of Union Naonal sovereignty Mulparty system

Parcipaon ofTatmadawin leading role ofnaonal polics of the state

700 delegates from 135 ethnic and funconalgroups convened January 9, 1993

Suspended 19962004 a]er NLD boyco_ Reconvened May 2004


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Purge of Khin Nyunt and Directorate of

Defence Services Intelligence

Dismissed fordisobeying orders and

corruption 19 Oct 2004 DDSI (intelligence)purgedConvicted by a specialtribunal on corruptioncharges and sentenced to

44 years in prison


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Sr-Gen Than ShweChairman, Chief of State,

CIC Defence ServicesSPDC

Leadership

Sr-Gen Maung AyeSPDC Deputy ChairmanDCIC Defence Services

Army Commander in Chief

Gen Shwe Mann Joint Chief of StaffArmy, Navy and Air

ForceLt Gen Thein Sein

Prime Minister


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Shi] to Naypyidaw

NovemberDecember 2005


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SPDC Crack Down on 26 Sept 2007

31138 killed and 1,0006,000 arrested


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Constuon

Creaon of bicameral legislature Chamber of Depues (440seats)

Township constuencies 25% of seats reserved for military

Chamber of Naonalies (224 seats) Seven regions and seven states

Military to select: Head of State, Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and

Border Development

Referendum May 10, 2009


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Cyclone Nargis, May 2, 2008[referendum held anyway


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Major Problems

Ethnic minories entrenched in regions17 negoated ceasefire agreements (19891996)Ethnic groups retained their arms and now police

their own territory

Former rebel armies now funcon as privatesecurity forces to protect legal and illegal

business operaons

Deadline for conversion of ethnic milias toBorder Guard under central control


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Conclusion

Military Fissures CentrePeripheryRegional Commanders parcularly powerfulEmerging gap in professionalism of officer corps

Disciplinary problems in expanded Army200,000 added to ranksRecruitment drive based on quotas led to intake

of criminals and young toughs

Naonal elecons 2010


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Drugs and Security

Drugs are used to fund criminal acvies Gun running, forgery, money laundering, bribery,

trafficking in persons

Corrupon of police, security, customs andjudicial officials

Lowers quality of governance, weakens the state Decreases governmental legimacy Undue influence of drug lords in polics Skews and diverts government funding Enables transnaonal criminal networks


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Opium Producon: Afghanistan,

Myanmar and Laos


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Drug

Trafficking:The Golden

Triangle

Thailand,

Burma and

Laos


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Opium Producon in Myanmar


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Opium Producon in Laos


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Opium

Growing Areas

in the Shan

State

The Shan Stateproduces 89%

of Burmas

total opiumcrop


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Opium Producon Inside Myanmar


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Shan State Army South


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Ch i l d


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Chemical Drug Producon Factory


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From opium to

morphine to heroin


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AmphetamineType

Smulants (ATS)and Heroin

Refineries in the

Shan State


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Methamphetamine

Producon inBurma


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Methamphetamines

shabu ice or

yaba

Documents

Thayer Burma Military Rule and Ethnic Minorities