Thailand Transport Security Master plan: Phase 1 ... · PDF filePhase 1 as a planning measure in support of the National Preparedness ... Prevention and Impact Mitigation: ... These

Prepared by

November 2015

Khon Kaen University Prince of Songkla University Chiang Mai University

Thailand Transport Security Master plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning Summary Report Executive

Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning Ministry of Transport

Executive Summary

Thailand Transport Security Master plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

Prepared by

Khon Kaen University Prince of Songkla University Chiang Mai University

November 2015

The only way to be secure is never to feel secure. Anonymous (c. 500 BCE)

ทางเดียวที่จะเกิดความม่ันคง คือต้องไม่รู้สึกมั่นคง อย่างเด็ดขาด นิรนาม

Executive Summary Report Preface

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page i

Preface

The Ministry of Transport (MOT) has assigned the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) the task of preparing a Transport Security Master Plan Phase 1 as a planning measure in support of the National Preparedness Strategy (2014–2018) which is part of the National Security Policy (2015 – 2021) and the National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan, 2015. The said national -level plans establish the administrative structure and strategies required for the handling of threatening incidents arising from natural disasters or terrorist assaults. The occurrence of such a threat may de-stabilize the nation’s transport infrastructure and disrupt the facilities for passenger and freight transport on all modes – road, rail, water and air – which is the domain of MOT’s responsibilities.

The Transport Security Master Plan Phase 1 has as its purpose a call for all units under MOT to be fully prepared with the necessary resources for tackling any threat to the security of our transport systems; and for the capability to effectively defuse it while keeping our mobility free from disruption. Each of the MOT units shall be required to prepare a Transport Security Action Plan to match its scope of duties and responsibilities. An action plan shall be furnished with key work plans, tasks, programs, measures, budget allocations, as well as resources planning in terms of personnel and provisions for countering threats from natural disasters or human-induced ones. It should address three key stages of preparedness, as follows:

1. Prevention and Impact Mitigation: These are measures to be taken before a threat has taken place.

2. Response: This involves immediate actions to take upon the incidence of a threat in order to contain it, or prevent major disruptions to our transport systems.

3. Recovery: This involves efforts to restore normalcy immediately after the cessation of a destructive or violent incident.

Details of the steps required are laid out in the Transport Security Master Plan.

All units under MOT are thus required to prepare their versions of the said Transport Security Action Plan based on the scope of their functions and assessment of

Executive Summary Report Preface

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page ii

the likelihood of the threats involved, including the risk of natural disasters and human attacks that may take any of the following forms: earthquake, flooding, tsunami, infectious outbreak, bombing raid, and cyber-attack. To plan for the three components of prevent, respond and recovery, a unit may base its criteria upon the estimated scale and severity of a threat, the time frame for advance warning, the need for coordination internally and externally, etc, in order to effectively protect our transport systems from harm or disruption. The said plan should include provisions for work programs, budgeting and personnel so required, as well as programs for training and systematic evaluation of its performance.

Bureau of Safety Planning, Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP)

Executive Summary Report Acknowledgements

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page iii

Acknowledgements

The Consultants wish to express our deep appreciation to the Project Steering Committee for their invaluable help and guidance throughout the project, especially their suggestions for the preparation of this Final Report. The names of the committee members are respectfully listed herein: Khun Peraphon Thawornsupacharoen (Director of OTP, as chair of the committee, the current position - take a position of the Deputy Permanent Secretary) and Khun Chaiwat Thongkhamkhun (Deputy Director of OTP); Khun Saritpong Boriboonsook (Director the Office of Safety Planning, OTP); Khun Chotirat Komaradat (Foreign Affairs Ministry); Khun khajornsak janpanich (Public Health Ministry); khun Thongchai Hillprasiththlphr (National Security Council); Colonel Tanongsak Tannarat (Counter-terrorism Operations Center); Colonel Surapong Youphrom (Army, Department of the Army Battle) Group Captain Panchayaphark Prathomsut (Department of Defense mobilized), Police Colonel Pitaya Garaket (Criminal Investigation Bureau, Royal Thai Police); Khun Pailin Subhakornkosai (Customs Department); Khun Nonglak Wongsuksiridacha (Land Transport Department); Khun Phithak Wattanapongphisal (Marine Department), Khun Narong Aroonpakmongkol (Civil Aviation Department); Pol.Lt.Col.Anusilp Sirivejchapan (MRTA); Khun Pisit Thesta (SRT); Lieutenant Chamnan Chaiyarit and Khun Charan Chaloumchavalit (PAT); Khun Suksri Laungaram (AOT); Khun Pornchai Pattanapongsatid and Dr.Chatchawal Simaskul (OTP). Together with the inspection committee, as well as many other officers of OTP, they have generously provided assistance for this project. The Consultants extend many a sincere thanks to them all.

Our heartfelt thanks are also extended to the various public and private organizations cited above, and others too numerous to mention herein, including their operating units in the provinces, as well as many charitable organizations and transport operators who participated in the project’s hearing sessions, discussion groups and training seminars. A number of specialists have helped to explain to us the workings of their organizations. They are: Khun Danai Moosa, Colonel Tanongsak Tannarat, Khon Sujin Mangnimit, Police Lt. Col. Anusilp Sirivejchapan, Khun Narong Aroonpakmongkol, Khun Kannika Dechatiwongse, Vice Admiral Chumpol Lumpinikanon, Khun Charan Chaloumchavalit, and Khun Anant Pansakun. Their sharing of practical experiences and helpful suggestions are a priceless part of this project.

Executive Summary Report Acknowledgements

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page iv

Finally, we should very much like to thank Associate Professor Chusak Limsakul, rector of Prince of Songkla University, and the Faculty of Engineering for their enduring support throughout the project. The Consultant Team November 2015

Executive Summary Report The Consultant Team

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page v

The Consultant Team

1. Prof.Dr.Pichai Taneerananon Project Manager 2. Asst.Prof.Dr.Pongrid Klungboonkrong Deputy Project Manager 3. Assoc.Prof.Lamduan Srisakda Deputy Project Manager 4. Col.Asst.Prof.Dr.Thai Charnkol Specialist in Safety and Security 5. Dr.Pipat Thongchim Specialist in Safety and Security 6. Dr.Kerati Kijmanawat Specialist in Transport Planning 7. Dr.Preda Pichayapan Senior Transportation Engineer 8. Dr.Noppadol Kronprasert Assistant Transportation Engineer 9. Dr.Piti Chantruthai Specialist in Prevention and Mitigation 10. Assoc.Prof.Sirirat Taneerananon Specialist in Public Relations and Information Dissemination 11. Dr.Manop Promchana Expert in Laws

Supporting Personnel

1. Mr.Narabodee Salatoom Assistant Engineer 2. Dr.Chalat Tipakorn Assistant Engineer 3. Aj.Sulkiflee Mama Assistant Engineer 4. Aj.Chuthamat Laksanakil Assistant Engineer 5. Miss.Chonnipa Puppateravanit Assistant Engineer 6. Mr.Purim Srisawat Researcher (Chiang Mai University) 7. Mr.Waranyu Auttsa Researcher (Khon Kaen University) 8. Miss.Janmanee Saeteaw Secretary

Executive Summary Report Contents

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page vi

Contents

Page

Preface i Acknowledgements iii The Consultant Team v Contents vi List of Tables viii

List of Figures ix

1. Introduction 1 2. Objectives 2 3. Scope of Study 2 4. Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws 4

4.1 Policies Plans and Strategies 4 4.2 Summary of Transport Related Legislation 4 4.3 Related Laws and Plans in use overseas 8

4.3.1 The United Kingdom (UK) 8 4.3.2 United States of America 8 4.3.3 Australia 8

4.4 Mobility and Security Theories 9 5. Situation of Threats to Transport Security 9

5.1 Definition of terms 9 5.2 Situation of Security Threats 11 5.3 Threats to the security of Transport 12

6. Causes and Risks and Their Effects on Transport Security 15 7. Current Situation of Transport Security 16

7.1 SWOT analysis of the transport sector 16 7.2 Role of MOT 19 7.3 Roles of Security Agencies 20

8. Transport Security Master Plan 21 8.1 Conceptual Framework 21


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page vii

Contents (Continued)

Page

8.2 Vision, Missions, Purpose, Targets 25 8.3 Transport security strategy covering the three modes 26

8.3.1 Land mode (road and rail) 26 8.3.2 Water Transport 30 8.3.3 Air Transport Sector 34

9. Guidelines for Implementation of Transport Security Plan 37 9.1 Transport Security Center 37


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page viii

List of Tables

Page

Table 1: Threats to the security of Road Transport 13 Table 2: Threats to the security of Rail Transport 13 Table 3: Threats to the security of marine and coastal Transport 14 Table 4: Threats to the security of Water Transport on inland waterways 14 Table 5: Threats to the security of Air Transport 15 Table 6: SWOT analysis of land-mode security (pax and freight) 17 Table 7: Analysis of water-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT 18 Table 8: analysis of air-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT 19


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page ix

List of Figures

Page

Figure 1: Integrating Transport Security Plan Phase 1 with national and ministerial 7 policies, strategies and plans Figure 2: MOT’s role within the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561) 23 Figure 3: The conceptual framework for the Transport Security Master Plan 24

Executive Summary Report

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page 1

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

1. Introduction OTP has commissioned the Consultant – a team of consulting engineers and academics from the Prince of Songkla University, Chiang Mai and Khon Kaen Universities – to undertake the Phase 1 of the preparation of a Master Plan for Thailand’s transport security.

This Executive Summary Report encapsulates the Consultant’s efforts which, after exhaustive reviews, investigations and discussions with the parties engaged in security activities, have culminated in a Master Plan whose objective is to serve as the integrated framework for security-related strategies, plans and measures for the effective management of Thailand’s transport security.

Aviation security and maritime security are regulated, respectively, by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). ICAO Annex 17 stipulates that member countries must comply with its stringent aviation regulations, and the IMO similarly exercises strict controls over member countries. Given that the air and sea modes are already regulated internationally, for this study the Consultant shall therefore focus more on land transport security issues. These are the precautions the Thai Government must undertake to combat security threats to passenger and cargo transport domestically and within ASEAN. It should be noted that: although Thailand may not be a prime target of terrorism; but given the fact that it receives large volumes of tourists all year round — a condition that could present itself as target — the country is still vulnerable. Terrorists seek weaknesses where they can attack, and that can be found in a country with a lower level of vigilance and preparedness, less so in those that are vigorously equipped against attacks, such as the US, UK or Australia. Terrorists may strike anywhere when it serves their desire for media publicity and recognition of their purpose. Thus, Thailand must upgrade its level of vigilance and preparedness to international standards in order to overcome those weaknesses. An oft-quoted aphorism is: the only way to be secure is never to feel secure.


page 2 Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

2. Objectives

2.1 To prepare a transport security master plan that covers a range of measures to international standards for the prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery in the event of a terrorist attack or public disaster on any of the transport modes – land, air and water.

2.2 To formulate transport security strategies that serve as framework and guidelines for concerned agencies under MOT, as well as other related agencies, to enable the seamless integration and alignment of their efforts in ensuring transport security.

2.3 To design a special training course in transport security to provide the knowledge thereof for the staff of MOT as well as other agencies.

3. Scope of Study

The Consultant has studied the key components for the Transport Security Master Plan Phase I. The focus of this phase is on the safety of land transport systems including rail and road infrastructure along with the man-made hazards likely to befall them. Topics covered in the study are:

3.1 Legal Issues

Review of related laws, regulations, protocols and strategic plans: National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018. National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015. Ministry-level Integrated Action Plan for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation in the

transport sector. UK, US, and Australian transport security plans. Laws and regulations pertaining to maritime security, and relating to those

regulated internationally by, for example, the IMO. Domestic and international maritime security strategies. Laws and regulations concerning hazardous materials and dangerous goods. Laws and regulations on aviation and inter-relating to those regulated

internationally by, for example, the ICAO. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“The Hague

Convention”, 1970) Convention on Plastic Explosives Marking for the Purpose of Detection, 1991.

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html


Project Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page 3

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (“Montreal Convention”, 1971)

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation; Supplement of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (This extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety, 1988.)

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988.

Other important laws

3.2 Organization Situation Analysis The 5C Analysis and SWOT Analysis were employed to appraise the status of risk management within MOT and outside. In addition, focus groups were conducted to gather ideas, suggestions and share experiences.

3.3 Risk Assessment The Consultant is to assess transport security risks, in particular the risks that may arise from acts of terrorism, by investigating the weakest security link in each transportation mode. Two aspects of such risks are to be assessed: 1) Extent of damage in the event of an attack; and 2) The probability of such an event. Outcome of the assessment shall be the key factor to take into consideration when recommending guidelines for effective responses to threats. Accordingly, an accurate risk assessment is of a crucial importance in the preparation of the transport security master plan.

3.4 Preparation of the Transport Security Master Plan The Transport Security Master Plan is to be prepared as the framework for all security-related undertakings by agencies under MOT. The plan shall outline four stages of action to be taken, namely, Prevention & Mitigation – Preparedness – Response – Recovery, all of which shall conform to the National Preparedness Strategy (2014-2018) of the National Security Council, as well as related laws, as listed below.

3.5 Formulating the Transport Security Strategy Security Strategies on Transport Systems, prepared to international standards, are to be employed as guidelines by all divisions under MOT in a coordinated effort to combat terrorism. These strategies are:

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_civil_aviation.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_civil_aviation.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_airports.html






Land Transport Security Strategy Water Transport Security Strategy Air Transport Security Strategy

3.6 The Training Curriculum

The Consultant has prepared a technology-transfer curriculum with training sessions designed to provide knowledge on transport security for officials and personnel of MOT and related agencies, as well as public individuals.

4 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws

A summary of the Consultant’s review of existing laws and plans relating to transport security for Thailand is given below:

4.1 Policies Plans and Strategies An investigation of security-related plans was carried out. For Phase 1 work, our review

focused on existing policies and plans for the land transport mode, as shown below:

1. National Security Policy, B.E. 2558-2564 2. National Preparedness Strategy, B.E. 2557-2561 3. Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan, B.E. 2558 4. Internal Security Master Plan for B.E. 2558-2560 5. Communications Ministry Development Strategy, 2011–2015 (Amendment) 6. Transport Infrastructure Development Strategy, 2015–2022 7. Communications Ministry Action Plan for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 8. Integrative Resources for Homeland Defense Plan

4.2 Summary of Transport Related Legislation The following security related laws were reviewed by the consultant.

4.2.1 For Surface Transport 1) Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2464 2) Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2477 3) State Railway of Thailand Act, B.E.2494 4) Highway and Bridge Toll Setting for motor vehicles Act, B.E.2497


Project Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page 5

5) Motor Vehicles Act, B.E. 2522 6) Land Transport Act, B.E.2522 7) Land Traffic Management Commission Act, B.E. 2522 8) Highways Act, B.E.2535 9) Property Expropriation for Mass Transit Use Act, B.E. 2540 10) Toll Road Concessions Act, B.E.2542 11) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2543 12) Land Traffic Act B.E.2522 with Amendment for Volume VII, B.E. 2550 13) Notification of the Revolutionary Council No. 290 (Express Transit Auth)

4.2.2 For Rail Transport 1) Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2464 2) Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2477 3) State Railway of Thailand Act, B.E. 2494 4) Property Expropriation for Mass Transit Use Act, B.E. 2540 5) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2543

4.2.3 For Water Transport 1) Vessel Detainment Act, B.E. 2534 2) Merchant Marine Promotion Act, B.E. 2521 3) Maritime Freighting Act, B.E. 2534 4) Vessel Mortgages and Preferential Rights Act, B.E. 2537 5) Vessel Collision Prevention Act, B.E. 2522 6) Thai Vessels Act, B.E. 2481 7) Thai Vessels (Vol. 6) Act, B.E. 2540 8) Port of Thailand Authority Act, B.E. 2494 9) 5) Port of Thailand Authority (Vol. 5) Act, B.E. 2543 10) Vessel Operation in Thai Territorial Waters Act, B.E. 2456 11) 15) Vessel Operation in Thai Territorial Waters (Vol. 15) Act, B.E. 2540 12) MOT Regulation on structuring of the Marine Department, B.E. 2558 13) Laws pertaining to maritime security and the IMO,

4.2.4 For Air Transport 1) Aviation Act, B.E. 2497



2) Aviation Act (Vol. 10), B.E. 2542 3) Response to Unlawful Aircraft Use Act, B.E. 2519 4) Response to Unlawful Aircraft Use (Vol. 2) Act, B.E. 2522 5) Airports Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2522 6) International Air Transport Act, B.E. 2558 7) Certain Aviation Offenses Act, B.E. 2558 8) MOT Regulation on the establishment of Civil Aviation Dept B.E. 2558 9) Altogether 12 international conventions and protocols on the prevention and

suppression of terrorism.

The inter-relationship of all transport security plans with the strategic framework of all governing bodies is shown in Figure 1



Figure 1: Integrating Transport Security Plan Phase 1 with national and ministerial policies, strategies and plans

page 7


Transport Infrastructure Development Strategy, 2015–2022 (1) Creating stability and security in travel and

transport. And contributes to sustainable development and friendly environment

Policy plans to synergies of forces and resources to defense Plan of Power to be sealed

(4) Developing the operational plans for civil servant, state enterprise, and private sector to respond the demand in manpower, munition, infrastructure facilities, medical and public health services, transportation communication, supply and maintenance, and public utility management as needed before, during, and after unusual events.

National Preparedness Strategies 2014-2017 Strategic plans for managing all types of security threats from both natural and manmade threats by mobilizing resources from all sectors and efficiently coordinating to protect, improve, alleviate and recover the threats and their consequences to the nation

National Internal Security 2015-2017 3) Security threats and transnational crime 4) Special security affairs 5) Southern Insurgency in the Three Border Provinces

National Prevention and Mitigation Plans 2015 Missions of Department of Transport under the National Prevenand Mitigation Plans 2015 are 1.Providing supplementary plans for operations and management during

emergency according to the national prevention and mitigation plans 2. Improving transport routes and networks to support security supplies

and missions as well as rehabilitating transport routes to protect and lessen the impacts of the threats

3.Providing the additional routes, alternate routes, or temporary routes as well as recovering and improving transportation infrastructure and facilities to support the operations of the local and national prevention and mitigation staff

4.Supporting the evacuation process of the people from the threat areas or risk areas

5.Supporting travel and traffic information to the people about the evaluating routes and evacuation areas

6.Restoring and recovering transport routes that being damaged to be ready for use as fast as possible

7.Developing the resource database systems for preventing and mitigating transport security treats

8.Providing supports in traffic operations and management in responsible routes that being harmed

9.Providing emergency response call services for security threats and coordinating with other transport agencies, other relevant agencies, and the public

National Security Policy 2015-2021 (6) Managing national maritime protection and enforcement (8) Strengthening internal security (13) Developing national preparedness systems to ensure

countrywide security

National Maritime Security Plan (B.E. 2558-2564) ( 3 ) Strategic plan for enhancing security and managing enforcement of national maritime

Operation and Integration Plans of Ministries for Prevention and Mitigation of Security Threats

(Current: Supplementary Operational Plan during a state of emergency in transport systems) Proposing operational and action plans among relevant agencies before, during, and after the event to support the main agencies under the respective missions and responsibilities

Legislations related to land, maritime, and air transportation

Examples of Transport Security Plans in UK, USA and Australia

Transport Security Plan Phase 1

Strategies for Department of Transport 2011-2015 (amended) (1) Developing network connection of transport

systems both domestic and international (2) Advancing the safety standard of transport

system



4.3 Related Laws and Plans in use overseas

Plans and laws relating to transport security are reviewed for three countries – the UK, USA and Australia. Findings of the review are described below. 4.3.1 The United Kingdom (UK)

For the UK, the responsibility for regulating transport security lies with the Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate, or TRANSEC, which belongs under the International Networks and Environment Group (INE) of the country’s Department for Transport. TRANSEC sphere of work covers the security for all transport modes including the London Underground and the Docklands Light Rail and the Glasgow Underground, the Chanel Tunnel, as well as the transport of dangerous goods via road and rail. The agency also regulates the workings of transport industry bodies and transport operators.

4.3.2 United States of America The U.S. transport security plan has been established through the collaboration of

agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These agencies are Transport Security Administration (TSA), the major agency with authority over the transport security of the nation; U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the branch of the U.S. Armed Forces operati ng under DHS to ensure maritime safety, security, and stewardship; and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to ensure transport security. The missions of national strategy for transport security are four aspects.

1) Prevent and deter acts of terrorism against the transport systems 2) Promote preparedness and management of all types of threat to all transport

modes 3) Improve cost-effectiveness of resource uses for transport security 4) Increase public awareness and collaboration in securing transport systems

The legislation on transport security is contained in Section 49 of the United States Code, which regulates the transport sector of the U.S. It consists of 9 subsections .

4.3.3 Australia

Australia divides its security apparatus into two spheres: one for surface transport, and the other for air and maritime transport. The former sphere is accounted for by individual





states within the commonwealth; while the latter, under the jurisdiction of the Transport Security Committee, (TSC) which in turn is under the federal government’s Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. Security undertakings within the two spheres are governed by the following agreements and strategies:

1) Intergovernmental Agreement in Surface Transport Security, IGA 2) National Surface Transport Security Strategy, NSTSS 3) National Air Transport Security 4) Maritime Security

4.4 Mobility and Security Theories

A demonstration of the tension between mobility and security is the common experience of air travelers as they undergo airport screening at checkpoints operated by transportation security officers. In recent years the list of prohibited items in airplanes has grown, along with types of screenings performed.

The government of a democratic society walks a tightrope between working to alert its populace against threats and striving to maintain their reasonable expectations of safety through its security control mechanisms. The tightrope is strung tenuously among principles defined by three theories:

deterrence theory, terror management theory, and protection motivation theory.

Each theory puts forth that unless a population is mobilized against a threat, or are constantly placed in a psychological state of hyper-vigilance, its members become complacent — a situation that encourages terrorism.

5. Situation of Threats to Transport Security This chapter provides a brief description of the threat to the security of nations and an assessment of the risks faced by the transport sector.

5.1 Definition of terms Related terms, such as “safety”, “security”, “disaster” and “security threat”, are defined

below:



Safety: In general, safety means the condition of being free from harm. In the context of transport engineering, the term is used to mean safety from accidents, or the need to prevent or protect travelers from injuries or loss of life due to transport accidents, e.g. road-vehicle or aircraft crashes. Devices employed for the purpose include helmets, belts or airbags.

Security: In its broadest sense, security may refer to ‘national security’. In the US, it is used in referring to national defense and international relations, or the protection against attacks from an enemy, or protection afforded by military forces, as well as the maintenance of sensitive information of national importance. It connotes the military superiority over another country or group of countries; or friendly relations between countries, or the state of an effective countermeasure to a hostile attack. In this context, ‘security’ refers to the effort to protect a nation’s assets (physical, intellectual and people) from all forms of deliberate, hostile attack including assaults from terrorists or the common criminals. Today, the term is also used to mean the protection from harm arising from natural disasters or technical failures.

According to the National Preparedness Policy, the terms “disaster” and “threat to security” are defined as follows.

Disaster: shall mean any of the naturally-occurring or human-induced catastrophes that affect

the wider public. A disaster typically results in loss of life, physical harm, or damage to property – private or state-owned – as defined by laws pertaining to the prevention of harm to civilians.



Threat to Security: shall mean a perilous or violent incident having impacts on national security as defined by laws pertaining to national defense and civic protection, for example: acts of sabotage, terrorism, deployment of explosive devices, attacks on aviation services, rioting and civil unrest, acts of war, etc. In the context of transport security, emphasis is placed on those threats that are human-induced.

In short, “security” refers to the state of being protected from all forms of threat. In transport security context, the term shall refer to protection against harm from deliberate acts of terrorism or sabotage attacks as distinct from harm from an accident.

5.2 Situation of Security Threats

Acts of terrorism, as well as the devastation from natural disasters, have become a threat of global scales to the security of transport systems. Of particular relevance to this study are the ever-present threat from global terrorism that in recent years has evolved in sophistication in terms of the methods and technologies employed by the perpetrators of violence. Transport systems are vulnerable targets of terrorist acts which are designed to inflict high victim casualties in order to maximize public anxieties and significant damage to economies.

The Global Terrorism Index for 2014 put Thailand’s vulnerability to attacks at ranking 10 out of 162 countries assessed globally for the year.

Most of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Thailand were directed at military/police personnel or installations and private properties; only a small proportion of such attacks were aimed at the country’s transport systems. Nonetheless, many of such attacks have caused severe damage leading to high levels of anxieties among the public including the regular users of transport systems. The wider repercussions of a violent terrorist incident may be felt locally and internationally thereby producing negative impacts on the country’s tourism as well as its general economy.

Natural disasters pose another kind of threat whose occurrence and severity are difficult to forecast. Damage caused by a natural disaster may be so severe and widespread that an entire economy may be seriously affected. For Thailand, major floods have often caused extensive damage to the country’s communication infrastructure and related disruption to transport systems.

Disaster risk mitigation measures are drawn up according to the results of risk assessment which, in turn, is based on the consideration of the likelihood and estimated impact of a



disaster. The need for risk control and mitigation measure(s) is thus determined by the likelihood of the threat under consideration. Disaster control and mitigation measures are recommended for cases where the perceived threat level is Very High, High and Medium. Where the perceived threat level is Low, some control and mitigation activities may be specified. And where the perceived threat is Very Low, no control measures are needed. Based on historical disaster statistics, the level of threat to Thailand’s transport sector has been in the Very High category. It is thus necessary to install a range of risk control and management measures for the sector. As for the threats of destruction from natural phenomena, the risk of cyclone storms is very high for Thailand. Outcome of the Consultant’s risk assessment is employed in the preparation of various sector strategies which are contained in the Transport Security Master Plan.

Apart from the threat of terrorist attacks and the devastation brought about by natural disasters, a new form of threat is rapidly spreading across the globe. Cyber attacks are now posing a threat to the security of nations as vital computer networks can be attacked remotely by such weapons as hacking, planting of insidious bugs, e.g. spyware, malware, Trojan horse, logic bomb, or DoS/DDos attacks or the use of BOTNET or Robot Network, and the clogging of systems with spam and worms.

The cyber threat is ranked fourth on the 2014 World Economic Forum’s list of ten worrisome trends requiring the attention of the international community. Thailand’s current cyber security rating is at ranking 50 out of 162 countries. Thailand also has the highest occurrences of Web Defacement in the ASEAN region. What is worrisome internationally is that cyber attacks are not confined to computers, but they can be perpetrated on many infrastructure systems, which are remotely controlled by interlinking networks, whose workings may be the targets of a sabotage. It is therefore crucial for the Transport Security Master Plan to address this issue with effective strategies for the timely prevention, preparation and response in the event of a cyber attack.

5.3 Threats to the security of Transport

Assessments of the threats to the security of Land Transport are tabulated in Tables 1 and 2 which show the results for the road and rail modes respectively.



Table 1: Threats to the security of Road Transport Component

affected Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Transport Terminal

Storm, Flood, Earthquake, Sabotage attack

Bomb Threat, Sabotage attack, Arson, Infectious epidemic

DLT, Local government, The Transport Co. (TC)

Road, Bridge, Tunnel

Storm, Bombing, Flood, Earthquake, Protest with road closure

Sabotage attack, Infectious epidemic

DOH, DRR, EXAT, Transport operators, vehicle drivers

Traffic signal control center

Storm, Floods, Cyber threat DOH, DRR, Local government

Bus, Van, Car Arson, Tsunamis, Storm, Protest with road closure, Earthquake, Flood,

Bomb Threat, DLT, TC

Dangerous-goods carrier

Arsons, Tsunami, Storm, Protest with road closure, Earthquake, Flood,

Sabotage attack DLT, Private sector

Table 2: Threats to the security of Rail Transport Component affected

Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Train station Flood, Bomb threat, Sabotage, Fire hazard, Earthquake

SRT, MRTA, SRT-ET

Track, Bridge, Tunnel

Flood, Earthquake Sabotage, Earthquake SRT, MRTA, SRT-ET

Rolling stock Accident, Fire hazard, Flood

Bomb threat, SRT, MRTA, SRT-ET

Train operation control center

Flood, Earthquake Sabotage, Fire hazard, Cyber threat

MRTA, SRT-ET

Electric train maintenance depot

Flood, Earthquake Sabotage, Fire hazard, Cyber threat

MRTA, SRT-ET

Threats to security of water transport are divided into those affecting marine and coastal shipping activity and those impacting the passenger and freight boats on inland waterways, as shown in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.



Table 3: Threats to the security of marine and coastal Transport Component


Cargo wharf, passenger pier

Storm, Tsunami, Chemical leakage

Bomb threat, Sabotage, Fire hazard,

Marine Dept, PAT

Marine environment Storm, Chemical leakage

Sabotage Marine Dept, PAT

Water traffic control center

Strom, Flood Cyber attacks Marine Dept, PAT

Passenger and freight boats

Fire hazard, Tsunami, Storm, Accident

Bomb threat, Sabotage

Marine Dept, PAT, Private sector

Table 4: Threats to the security of Water Transport on inland waterways

Component affected

Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Cargo Pier Passenger Pier

Flood Bomb threat, Sabotage Fire hazard,

Marine Department, Private sector

River environment Flood, Drought Torts, Threat from toxic substances

Marine Department,

Passenger and freight boats

Accident, Fire hazard,

Bomb threat, Sabotage

Marine Department, Private sector

Outcome of assessment of threats to air transport security are shown in Table 5 below.



Table 5: Threats to the security of Air Transport Component


Airport Flood, Protest rally Bomb threat, Sabotage Fire hazard, Epidemic outbreak, Unlawful seizure of aircraft at an airport

AOT, Airports Department, CAAT, Airline owning the craft

Cargo terminal Storm, Flood Sabotage, Fire hazard, AOT, Airports Department, CAAT, Other companies

Aircraft Flood, Bombing, Storm

Bomb threat, Sabotage, Epidemic outbreak, Unlawful seizure of aircraft at an airport

Thai International Airways

Control tower Protest rally Bomb threat, Cyber-attack Aeronautical Radio of Thailand

6. Causes and Risks and Their Effects on Transport Security

The security of transport systems is vulnerable to two types of threat – one from human action and the other from natural disasters. Human attacks against transport infrastructure and services can be prevented and mitigated to a satisfactory extent provided necessary precautions have been instituted beforehand. The threat of destruction by natural forces, however, is difficult to predict, such as the occurrence of earthquakes, landslides or flash floods. Nonetheless, certain preventive measures may be introduced that would help to minimize the impacts of a natural disaster, for example, the use of quake-resistant building design, safe materials, or even well thought-out measures to aid recovery in the aftermath of a disastrous event. Strategies to address such security issues should thus be incorporated in a Transport Security Master Plan in order to engineer the preparedness for tackling all forms of threat. At present, security concerns for Thailand’s land transport (road and rail modes) are still in a nascent stage. This could have been due in part to the absence of international regulations for the modes. By contrast, the air transport mode is rigorously regulated by ICAO in all aspects of safety and security operations; and the water transport mode is similarly controlled by IMO. Accordingly, new plans and strategies to be formulated for this Transport Security Master Plan shall focus on regulating the land transport mode, while those for the other two modes shall follow the relevant stipulations of ICAO and IMO. It should be



mentioned that compliance with the aforementioned international bodies are crucial, a failure of which can lead to a loss of international confidence on the country’s aviation or shipping operations. Upon the commencement of the AEC, which is scheduled for the end of 2015 , there will be increases in the movement of people and goods across borders. A greater level of collaboration between MOT and units of other ministries to cope with such increases will be necessary. MOT departments – Land Transport, Highways, and Rural Roads – will need to closely liaise with agencies such as immigration and border-control units, i.e. the Foreign Affairs Division, Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior; the Royal Thai Police (Immigration Bureau); Department of Consulate Affairs, Foreign Affairs Ministry; Customs Department, Finance Ministry, and so on. In view of the expected complexity, it is crucial that a preparedness in resources — personnel, technologies and equipment — be made ready in order to ensure the highest degree of transport security. The security and safety requirements for a transport station shall meet or exceed a set of internationally-prescribed minimum standards. Such standards, to be derived from international codes with appropriate adjustments to suit Thai environment, will be described in Chapter 6: Transport Security Master Plan.

7. Current Situation of Transport Security

7.1 SWOT Analysis of the transport sector

The Consultant carried out a situation analysis of MOT’s structure and its transport security strategies using the technique of SWOT Analysis. The ministry’s level of preparedness for managing security threats is assessed, and the outcome of the assessment was employed in the preparation of this Transport Security Plan.

The appraisal of situational factors affecting the operations of units under MOT was performed on areas relating to the MOT’s internal and external environments, and how they measure up as strengths (Strengths) (Weaknesses) (Opportunities) and (Threats)

Based on the outcome of the SWOT Analysis of the three transport modes, the Consultant hereby summarizes their review of MOT’s strategic plans and action plans. The summary is presented below:



7.1.1 Land Transport modes (road and rail)

The SWOT analysis of the security of these two modes, covering passenger and freight operations, is shown in Table 6 Table 6: SWOT analysis of land-mode security (pax and freight)

Strengths Weaknesses Operating units like SRT and MRTA already have

security plans (safety plans). Training and response drills are on-going for some

agencies. Affiliated units across the country; hence agility for

response actions in an emergency. Possess skills in building tracks and infrastructure;

also automotive repairs. Some agencies (e.g. MRTA) are capable of system-

wide control. Safety precautions are in place; hence easy to add

security measures.

Security considerations not included in corporate missions or objectives.

MOT is without a security plan. Supply Chain is without contingency plans for

disasters e.g. flooding. Resource levels (manpower and revenue) are

inadequate; hence unavailability of resources for security work.

SRT infrastructure in poor condition from prolonged use (vulnerable to threats).

Passenger terminals are open structure; vulnerable to crimes/terror attacks.

Absence of protection plans and readiness. Opportunities Threats

MOT is keen to promote transport security. SRT has skills in detection and surveillance,

monitoring of workers and passengers in vulnerable regions, or skills for operational security.

Heightened collaboration with the authorities, in intelligence sharing.

Way to encourage public participation. Rail mode is being promoted nationally. With higher

patronage, security issues will get more attention. Cooperation from other countries due to AEC. Availability of new technologies, e.g. GPS RFID

SCANNER, plus social media to aid security work. Increase strength and resiliency to infrastructure.

Land mode is open system, offering easy access to users; hence vulnerable to attacks on and or hazardous goods.

Source of harm can come from overseas with cross-border operations.

Natural disasters Vulnerable to terror attacks and labor

stoppages. Increased pax density can mean greater

damage from an attack.



7.1.2 Water Transport mode

The SWOT analysis of the security of this mode covering passenger and freight operations is shown in Table 7. Table 7: Analysis of water-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT

Strengths Weaknesses MOT agencies, like Marine Department, PAT

and CPOS, possess the preparedness required. Operating units, like PAT, already have

security plans (safety plans). Training and response drills are on-going.

Transport routes on waterways and coastal channels are open facilities; offering easy access for unlawful activities.

MOT is without a security plan. Absence of contingency budget for emergencies;

hence possible delays in responding to threats (esp. oil spills).

Thailand’s long coastline Storms, rough seas and shallow shipping lanes may

pose obstacles. Opportunities Threats

The handling of threats is receiving attention. Availability of help from agencies outside MOT.

IMO International cooperation (e.g. from IMO); availability of standardized methodologies for security work.

Water mode is open system (except at pier), offering easy access to users; hence vulnerable to attacks on and or hazardous goods

Source of harm can come from overseas with cross-border operations.

Increased incidence of terror attacks and piracy on freight carriers.



7.1.3 Air Transport

Thailand’s aviation industry is growing. Domestic airports are regulated by the Civil aviation Department; international airports, by AOT. The SWOT analysis of the security of this mode covering passenger and freight operations is shown in Table 8. Table 8: analysis of air-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT

Strengths Weaknesses Transport operators, e.g. AOT and commercial

airlines, possess the preparedness required. Already equipped with safety/security plans;

convenient to adapt to international practices. Training and response drills are on-going. Largely a closed system; hence easier to control

security. A national civil aviation safety plan is in the process

of enactment.

MOT is without a security plan. Shortages of properly trained staff, e.g. for

pax screening. High costs of pax screen equipment; and

some are of doubtful efficacy. Even with standardized controls, some

loopholes or laxness may be overlooked.

Opportunities Threats Control of threats to this mode is national policy. International cooperation, e.g. ICAO, TSA of United

States, OTS of Australia and availability of standardized security practices (ICAO Annex 17).

A preferred target for terrorist attacks. Rapidly rising trends of pax, baggage and

cargo make it difficult for the mode to cope.

7.2 Role of MOT 7.2.1 Impact from Natural Disasters

The National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2558 has prescribed MOT’s role in providing transportation support to emergency aid agencies during a disastrous incident. MOT is to help in 9 activities listed below:

1. Set out plans to facilitate works in a transport emergency situation. The plans shall comply with the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan.

2. Carry out improvements on transport routes and networks to support supply missions, and road relocations/realignments to mitigate disaster impacts.

3. Install alternative routes, bypasses or temporary access roads, together with maintenance/rehabilitation and adaptation of transport facilities to support the tasks of the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Command Center, and those of its local counterparts.



4. Facilitate evacuation of people from disaster sites or areas vulnerable to hazards. 5. Provide information on traffic routes and diversions from hazardous areas. 6. Reinstate and/or restore communication routes that have been damaged. 7. Set up a resources database on transport disaster prevention and mitigation 8. Support traffic operations on affected routes. 9. Coordinate and maintain communications with MOT divisions, related agencies, and

with the public, regarding hazards/disasters, security matters, and emergency situations.

Furthermore, MOT has the responsibilities as assigned by the National Preparedness Strategy 2557–2561. The five areas of responsibility are:

1. The preparedness of all parties for handling situations of harm. 2. Promote the capability and resiliency of people and society. 3. Promote cooperation with other countries 4. Integrate the plans of work units at all levels 5. Directedness and effectiveness of management

From the table above, it can be gleaned that MOT is required to develop its own strategies and plans for the protection against security threats. Doing so is a proactive move that will render for the ministry a good measure of preparedness to tackle any threat, any time. 7.3 Roles of Security Agencies

7.3.1 Counter-terrorism Operations Center (CTOC) CTOC is a unit of the Thai military operating under the supervision of the Thai Military

Supreme Command. In response to rising threat from terrorist assaults, the Supreme Command, in 1997, set up a Joint Operations Command-106 as a taskforce directly responsible for anti-terrorism work. Six years later, in 2003, its name was changed to “Counter-terrorism Operations Center” (CTOC). Two tiers of administration are assigned to the center as a Committee for Policy and Planning against International Terrorism, which is chaired by the Prime Minister; and a Subcommittee for Rectifying Issues in International Terrorism, chaired by the military supreme commander. CTOC is engaged in the planning, execution and coordination of operations to combat international terrorism.



7.3.2 Operations Coordinating Center for the Protection of National Maritime Interests (OCPMI)

The OCPMI, established in 1997, is directly responsible to the National Security Council. It functions as a coordinating body for operations relating to the protection of Thailand’s off-shore assets, helping to streamline maritime activities, sharing security information and preventing work duplication and so on. Undertakings of the unit are largely performed by the Thai Navy in collaboration with other maritime agencies, such Water Police, Marine Dept, Fishery Dept, Marine and Coastal Resources Dept (DMCR). Work is divided between two operating divisions.

8. Transport Security Master Plan 8.1 Conceptual Framework

The Plan is to offer sector strategies for all three transport modes – land, water and air – to serve as the conceptual framework for all security undertakings of agencies under MOT. The strategies cover the key aspects of security operations, including the concept of preparedness, prevention and response to threats, and measures to aid the recovery after an incident of attack. In addition to measures for handling human-induced threats, plans are included for the management of threats arising from natural disasters as well.

For the preparation of the Phase 1 Plan, the Consultant has conducted document reviews of international practices in order to obtain relevant information for incorporating into our conceptual framework. All of the measures proposed for the framework are compliant with the Thailand’s National Security Policy B.E. 2558-2564, National Preparedness Strategy B.E. 2557-2561, National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan B.E. 2558, and the Integrated Resources for National Defense Plan.

Within the context of the above national plans, MOT’s role will be to support and interconnect with the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561) wherein MOT is required to develop the security preparedness for the conduct of the three transport modes. Therefore the current Transport Security Master Plan shall be a part of MOT’s master development plan.

The TSMP shall be prepared using the 4-step approach as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report. The four steps are repeated below:



1. Investigate related national-level policies/strategies/plans involving the type and extent of the security threats, including man-made hazards and natural disasters.

2. Determine the causes of disasters and degree of risk. 3. Appraise existing capability to counter such threats at all levels — national,

ministerial (MOT), and related agencies; together with an analysis of international security practices.

4. Develop strategies for handling security threats (Closing the Gap.)

MOT’s role within the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561) is shown in Figure 2; and the conceptual framework for the Transport Security Master Plan in Figure 3.



Figure 2: MOT’s role within the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561)

page 23


Policy/Strategy/Plan Government Policy National Security Policy

Government Security Policy

Develop Secure Performance

Development of National Alertness System

Governmental Plan

Governmental 4-Year Plan

Governmental Annual Plan

Security Plan

Security

Plan/Project

Development Plan Civil/State Enterprise/

Private/Local Local & Community Development Plan

District Plan

Disaster

Develop National Alertness System

Development of Army Performance

Preparedness Strategy

Prevention and Correction Strategy

Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan

Defense Plan

Province Plan Preparedness Plan

(Civil/State Enterprise/Private)

Ministry of Transport

Transport Sector

Disaster (14 Types)

Security (4 Groups)

Ministry Plan Synergistic Plan



Incident Framework for Transport Security Master Plan Guideline to study

Threats

1. Definition 2. Theory 3. Case study

Security Management

Strategy

1. Preparedness Policy 2. Preparedness Strategy 3. National Security Plan 4. National Prevention and

Mitigation Plan 5. Emergency Guideline 6. Synergistic Plan 7. Mitigation Plan, Ministry of

Defense 8. Prevention and Mitigation

Plan, Ministry of Transport

Related Department

Road Vehicle Road Rail Port Airport DLT BMTA TC DOH DRR DLT MRTA SRT SRT-ET MD PAT DCA DA CAAT Thai Airways Aero Thai CATC

Army Royal Thai Police Ministry of Public Health CTOC ONCB The Customs Department DDPM Office of the National Security Council

The Thai Red Cross Society Special Branch Royal Thai Police The Rajaprajanugroh Foundation Public Charitable Organization / Foundation / Private Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356) Thailand Maritime Enforcement Center The Prime Minister's Office & Other Ministry

Office of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission

1. Classification and Relationship under Transport Sector

2. Integration between department

3. Develop Transport Security Plan

4. Unit responsible for action plans and measures for countering threats

Final Report

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

Figure 6.2: The conceptual framework for the Transport Security Master Plan

Disasters in Transportation

Tsunami

Human Epidemic

Fire Earthquake Drought

Tropical Storm

Flood Animal Disease Pest Emerging Infectious Diseases

Community radio

Security threats in Transportation

Exploration

Protestation / insurrection

Floating Lantern

Wildfire Technology Hazmat Hijack Terrorism

PREVENTION and PREPAREDNESS

RESPONSE RECOVERY

1. Small Scale / Local Director

Level of Transport Hazard Management

2. Medium Scale / Provincial Director

3. Large Scale / Director of Prevention and Mitigation

Prevention Impact Reduction

Improvement

Mitigation

Response

Regeneration 4. Very Large Scale / Prime Minister

Adaptation Preparation



8.2 Vision, Missions, Purpose, Targets

Vision: “Security and safety to international standards, for Thailand’s transport sector.”

Missions: 1. MOT is to engineer transport security to international standards. 2. MOT is to encourage the development of legislatures and regulations to match all

transport security plans, and to establish work units under the ministry for the supervision of transport security.

3. The personnel of all units under MOT shall possess the awareness of security requirement, and work toward implementing the security plans to achieve the level of preparedness necessary for the handling of security risks arising from human action as well as those caused by natural disasters.

Objectives: 1. Prepare plans for the prevention, mitigation of, and preparedness for handling

threats to the transport sector from terrorist acts and other forms of disturbance, and to reduce the number of “soft targets” vulnerable to such attacks.

2. Prepare incident-management and response plans to impart to officers, as well as volunteers, the knowledge on the proper handling of threats to transport security.

3. Prepare fast recovery plans for the quick revival of the transport sector in the aftermath of an attack.

4. Prepare flexibility plans for the transport sector to enable the interoperability of systems in the case of failure happening to a system under attack.

5. Prepare security strategies for all modes of travel (land, rail, water and air).

Targets: 1. The capability to prevent and contain all forms of threat to transport systems. 2. Enhance the preparedness for tackling all forms of threat to transport systems. 3. Upgrade the efficiency of resources deployment in the keeping of security and

safety for transport systems. 4. Build up the awareness and understanding in all areas of security-related

coordination.



8.3 Transport security strategy covering the three modes This topic involves the preparation of transport security plans covering the three modes of conveyance: land (road and rail), water and air. The plans are to address the strategic issues and discuss the purposes, approaches, activities, and responsible agencies. For this study, we shall focus on the security plans for the land transport modes. At present, only some seasonal plans are in use, whose coverage is limited to the activities during high travel seasons. In view of this, the Consultant herein proposes new plans for sustained operations to ensure security all year round. In addition to the sustained effort to provide security, measures shall be introduced that are designed to enable the quick resumption of a service after an incident of attack. A brief discussion is also given on measures to be established for operations in the water and air modes in order to help upgrade their capacities to international standards. 8.3.1 Land mode (road and rail)

8.3.1.1 Plan for road transport security Strategic Issue 1: Impact prevention and mitigation

Purpose: To ensure security for road transport components involving roads, vehicles (inclusive of passenger buses and hazmats carriers), bridges, tunnels and bus stations.

Approaches 1) Establish standards for work in appraising risks and ways to mitigate risks.

Cooperation will be sought from stakeholders in government and the private sector in order to compile and streamline the procedures for risk assessment systems, clarification on the nature of threats and expected impact on those components.

2) Review of existing security plans. The Consultant shall work with the stakeholders involved in transport activities; in compiling physical data, operational data, property data, emergency and training practices. The information thus compiled shall be disseminated to relevant agencies.

3) Prepare a list of security implementations. The Consultant shall work with the government and private stakeholders involved in road transport activities; in specifying and listing measures to monitor security, and in developing a handbook for appraising the effectiveness of security measures.

4) Prepare a handbook for the operators’ self-appraisal on safety measures.



Strategic Issue 2: Preparedness Purpose: To increase the vigilance on the general users and operators’ staff.

Reports of suspect behavior of the high-risk groups shall be used to guide subsequent drafting of rules and regulations and their enforcement.

Approaches: 1) Training to encourage awareness and need to abide by the law. - Training

sessions to be staged in cooperation with academia, government agencies and local administrative bodies aiming primarily at creating awareness and willingness to operate for security among the drivers of passenger buses freight trucks.

2) Increase the confidence level in driver’s ability to assess a threat and his skill at avoiding it. More stringency is required in checking driver’s records and background in his application for a license to drive passenger buses or hazmats carriers.

3) Implement programs for building the capacity for security and emergency management. These can take the form of training sessions for public and private-sector transport personnel who are involved in Risk Assessment, Emergency Operations, and Evacuation Planning.

4) Training and drills pertaining to the execution of safety plans around a transport station.

5) Invite public participation, for example by using stickers with wording like “See anything suspicious, Call 911”, or by disseminating brochures or other publicity materials.

6) Change the previous security codes of Very Low, Low… to Very High to an easier system, e.g. “not expected, possible, probable, expected, certain”.

Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency

Purpose: Encourage the sharing of knowledge and data among the agencies involved with the transport sector, especially the information on issues crucial to the improvement of our security keeping systems.



Approaches: 1) Set up a Command Center to act as the focal agency for directives and

efficient coordination during an emergency using ICS and having clearly defined Rules of Engagement.

2) Verify data and interface with high-potential units – e.g. military units and trained charitable organization – for rescue or aid-giving operations in an emergency.

3) Joint rescue operations by highly-trained rescuers from the government, private sector or local organizations.

4) Equipped with efficient communications devices for emergency uses.

Strategic Issue 4: Post-Incident Management Purpose: To have the capability for the quick reinstatement of transport system

components; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches:

1. Enable the quick, equitable aid to victims without unnecessary work duplication.

2. Harmonize and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well as the collection of data for future use.

3. Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite the allocation of budgets and aid items.

8.3.1.2 Plan for rail transport security Strategic Issue 1: Impact prevention and mitigation

Purpose: To promote security of the rail transport mode, which comprises SRT trains (rolling stock, bridges, tunnels, signaling, train station); MRT systems (rolling stock, tunnels, Operations Control Centre, Substations, Maintenance Depots, MRT stations)

Approaches 1) Prepare standard procedures for risk assessment and guidelines for impact

mitigation. Cooperation shall be required from stakeholders (public and private sectors) for the upgrades of risk assessment systems, and for the clarification of threats and their effects upon key components of the rail mode



including rollingstock, tunnels, Control Centre, Substations, Maintenance Depots, MRT stations. Personnel and specific approaches for each agency must be streamlined for work efficiency and avoidance of duplication.

2) Prioritize the security activity for MRT systems; increase the level of precaution to match threats. Ensure the preparedness to tackle emergencies.

Strategic Issue 2: Preparedness for tackling threats

Purpose: Extend the circle of cooperation to enhance security operations, and to sustain the development of fundamental security procedures.

Approaches 1. Initiate close cooperation between all involved entities, e.g. between

government agencies and provincial authorities in order to sustain our security and safety processes.

2. Cooperation between the government and units tasked with security keeping of SRT and MRT operations in order to better harness the resources of both organizations to create a greater level of security.

3. Establish guidelines and procedures for security keeping in order to upgrade the fundamentals of security practices.

4. Use of technology and training regimens to create preparedness. Technology is the first precautionary step that assists the detection and blocking of terrorist attacks on transport systems.

5. Invite public participation, for example by using stickers with wording like “See anything suspicious, Call 911”, or by disseminating brochures or other publicity materials.

6. Change the previous security codes of Very Low, Low… to Very High to an easier system, e.g. “not expected, possible, probable, expected, certain”.

Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency

Purpose: the coordinated management of an incident involving rail transport-related government and private sector agencies. Encourage the knowledge sharing relationship among the agencies with a view to improving related security apparatus.



Approaches 1) Set up a Command Center to act as the focal agency for directives and

efficient coordination during an emergency using ICS and having clearly defined Rules of Engagement

2) Verify data and interface with high-potential units – e.g. military units and trained charitable organization – for rescue or aid-giving operations in an emergency.

3) Joint rescue operations by highly-trained rescuers from the government, private sector or local organizations.

4) Equipped with efficient communications devices for emergency use.

Strategic Issue 4 : Post-Incident Management Purpose: To ensure the capability for the quick reinstatement of rail transport

systems; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches

1) Enable the quick, equitable aid to impacted persons without unnecessary work duplication.

2) Coordinate and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well as the collection of data for future use.

3) Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite the allocation of budgets and aid items.

8.3.2 Water Transport Two components of water transport security are looked into: 1) Security of transport on

inland waterways and coastal areas; 2) Security of sea transport which is regulated by an international body with a range of regulations pertaining thereto. For Thailand, the Port Authority of Thailand is the country’s governing body for sea transport. A Port Facility Security Plan is administered by PAT along the directives of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code: ISPS Code, which in turn is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The ISPS Code contains the following strategic issues:

Strategic Issue 1: Impact prevention and mitigation Purpose: To prevent and mitigate the threats to the security of water transport

affecting water vessels (passenger and freight) and wharfs (passenger and freight).



Approaches Monitor and implement measures to match the required Security Level. “Security level” shall mean the level of risk arising from attempts to disrupt, or an incident posing threat to, the security of this mode. The Marine Department is the organization to determine the security level based on information obtained from related safety agencies.

1. Security Level 1 refers to the fundamental safety measures which are to be maintained at all times for preventive purposes. Such measures include the following:

- Restricted areas and Control areas. - Access authorization for people and vehicles - Intruder Detection System - Body and vehicle search before entry to restrict zone - Security of service vessels, such as pilot boat, fresh-water and other

supplies vessels and garbage collection boats. - Servilities of restricted areas (CCTV, lighting devices) - On-foot patrol - Radio communications (testing and maintenance of internal

communications; contacts with sea-going vessels and outside agencies) - Car parking areas - Protection of water areas.

2. Heighten vigilance and implement safety measures level 2, which requires intensified efforts over the wharf and vessels to the match the increased likelihood of threat to safety and security:-

- Increased access screening (more stringent checking of gate passes and verification of lost passes).

- Safety precautions over restricted and prohibited areas (entry & exit points should be closed)

- Access to restricted areas (more stringent person and vehicle searches) - Install Intruder Detection System. (better records and inspection of

system alarms). - Install additional checkpoints at restricted areas, if necessary.



- Install CCTVs and additional surveillance. - More frequent on-foot patrolling. - Segregation passengers. - More security guards. - More frequent radio contacts internally and with ships. - Stricter control of car parking spaces; or parking restrictions

Strategic Issue 2 : Preparedness to tackle threat Purpose: Implement the highest level of precautions upon alerts for Level 3

measures, which calls for intensified efforts to the match the very likely occurrence of a threat. In addition, some preventive safety measures are need for a certain period of time:-

Approaches Increase stringency in the following tasks: 1. Access control and entry passes. More thorough checking of passes; and care

when collecting returned passes. 2. More stringent precautions required to secure restricted and prohibited areas. 3. Inspection searches, records of entries, additional checkpoints, more thorough

search on passengers, visitors, pass bearers, staff, crew of ships, cargo, etc. 4. Details of on-foot patrols, more water area patrols, procedures for proper

responses during an incident. 5. More security guards. Details of the additional staff. 6. Area closure and halt of work upon being directed by the traffic control

center. Prepare procedures for closing off areas, halting of wharf operations, and other emergency tasks.

7. Contact and report to the maritime incident coordinating center, and the Marine Department.





Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency Purpose: Emergency management and coordination among the various

concerned agencies in the water transport sector according to the procedures set out under Section 7 of the Emergency Response and Contingency Plan

Approaches 1. Emergency task and communication control:- Nominate a commander with

the authority to issue orders; and to communicate internally and externally. 2. Conduct drills on response action, reception of alerts or bomb threats,

analysis of the emergency, and necessary steps to take to secure the situation. 3. Look for suspicious objects; prepare guidelines for suspicious object search. 4. Conduct drills on people evacuation, the steps and routes for evacuation,

safe areas. 5. Conduct drills on response to fire hazards on a ship; prepare emergency plan

for dealing with fire hazards on the wharf. 6. Conduct drill on emergency response to oil, gas or chemical leakage on

waterway or sea. Prepare plans for dealing with similar leakage on the wharf. 7. Conduct drills on emergency response to other forms of threat to wharf

security.

Strategic Issue 4: Post-Incident Management Purpose: To have the capability for the quick reinstatement of transport system

components; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches

1. Enable the quick, equitable aid to victims without unnecessary work duplication.

2. Harmonize and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well as the collection of data for future use.

3. Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite the allocation of budgets and aid items



8.3.3 Air Transport Sector The security strategies for the air transport sector are based on the minimum

requirement of ICAO standards as prescribed under Annex 17 for the prevention of unlawful interferences to commercial aviation activity.

Strategic Issue 1 : Impact prevention and mitigation Purpose: To ensure security for the air transport sector, including airports, aircraft,

cargo terminals and control towers. Approaches

1. Establish an Airport Security Programme to mesh with the National Civil Aviation Security Programme.

2. Install preventive security measures to the prescribed standards of the ICAO Annex 17 for the following aspects.

2.1 Access Control:

Determine airport restricted areas

Establish security pass issuing system requiring the proper background check on the applicants for security passes. safety -

Define entry and exit points of restricted areas and arrange guards to conduct checks and searches of people, baggage and vehicles accessing the areas.

2.2 Airport security measures:-

Lighting along perimeter fence of airside area, and parking apron.

Regular watch over the parking aprons, on foot and vehicular patrols and CCTVs

2.3 Passenger and Baggage Screening:

Use of equipment such as Walk-Through Metal Detector, Hand-Held Metal Detector. For more stringent measures, employ the Full Body Scanner.

Use of Explosive Trace Detector, or ETD. 2.4 Baggage screening using X-ray devices and the ETD. For heightened

screening measures, use the Computed Tomography X-ray (CTX), which is employed at the Suvarnbhumi Airport.



2.5 Regarding the screening of cargo, airmail and other packages, the following measures are to be observed.

Establish security measures for the Catering chain, from the kitchen until the catered products are delivered into the plane.

Install X-ray screening measures to check air cargo, mail packages that are to be loaded into the plane.

Install measures to prevent any unlawful tampering of the inspected cargo and mail packages while they are being conveyed and loaded into plane.

Install protection measures covering the work areas of Catering and Cargo services; e.g. establish access control and regular patrols of the areas. safety

Establish regular inspections of all publicly accessible locations within the airport using on-foot patrol and vehicular patrol and CCTV coverage according to pre-defined schedules and areas.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Canine): A joint detection taskforce, consisting of AOT’s security staff, police and military officers, may be set up to perform ad hoc inspections over airport premises using explosive ordnance disposal techniques and bomb sniffing dogs.

3. Airport operation-specific security controls are listed below: 3.1 Screening of Passenger and Cabin Baggage — Thorough screening of

passengers and baggage. Unauthorized persons are prohibited for trespassing into the inspection area.

3.2 Screening of Checked-Baggage — An “inspected” sticker is affixed to every piece of checked baggage; and it shall be protected from tampering while in transit to the loading plane.

3.3 Control of Screened-Passengers — Screened passengers must be segregated from un-screened passengers so as to prevent any furtive passing of concealed weapons or hazardous objects between them.

3.4 Control of Cargo/Mail/Courier/Operator’s Stores — Carriers and vehicles for the transfer of these items must be subjected to body search and identity check before being allowed access to restricted areas.



Inspectors are authorized to request the opening of any suspicious packages.

3.5 Protection of Aircraft — Any aircraft being reported as a likely target for unlawful interferences shall be served with a notification to that effect and an inspection of threat is to be carried out. The airport authority may order a special watch of the plane on request.

3.6 Authorized Carriage of Weapons — Especially firearms, for these to be carried aboard plane, prior approvals form airport authorities must be sought.

3.7 Access Control — Restricted areas to persons and vehicles, with pre-determined access channels controlled by security guards. Visitors must be subjected to body and vehicle searches.

3.8 Surveys and Inspection — These involve regular checking of the existing precautionary measures to spot any shortcomings or loopholes, which, if found, shall be immediately rectified.

Strategic Issue 2 : Preparedness

Purpose: To ensure the adequacy of security maintenance to the standards prescribed by ICAO. Implement an Aviation Security Quality Control Programme and carry out the requirement of the plan in key areas such as Survey, Audit, Inspection and Test.

Approaches 1. Sharing of intelligence with security agencies and the National Intelligence

Center in order to obtain information to aid security assessment, to adjust security precautions where needed, and to upgrade the efficiency of airport safety practices.

2. Intelligence sharing and coordination with intelligence agencies of foreign nations, such as the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Australian Office of Transport Security (OTS).





Strategic Issue 3 : Management of an Emergency Purpose: Emergency management and coordination among the various

concerned agencies in the air transport sector according to the Emergency Response and Contingency Plan

Approaches 1. Prepare airport Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan to the standards

prescribed by ICAO 2. Conduct emergency drills at regular intervals as per ICAO’s requirement,

including Full-scale, Partial and Table-top Exercises. 3. Determine the level of security preparedness of each airport to the required

standards of the National Security Council. The level of preparedness shall be based on the degree of risk assessment of the individual airports.

Strategic Issue 4 : Post-Incident Management

Purpose: To have the capability for the quick reinstatement of transport system components; and collection of data for future reference.

Approaches 1. Enable the quick, equitable aid to victims without unnecessary work

duplication. 2. Harmonize and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well as the

collection of data for future use. 3. Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite the

allocation of budgets and aid items.

9. Guidelines for Implementation of Transport Security Plan

9.1 Transport Security Center

At present, severity of threats have intensified across the country. They significantly cause social and economic impacts and losses. The establishment of national transport security organization to oversee the transport security management is one of the efficient stages to react against security threats. Specifically the comprehensive management of the threats attacking the transport sectors is very essential because transport sectors play an important role in the social and economic development of the nation. Therefore the efforts to establish the organization responsible for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery against



transport security threats is the most effective implementation plan to upgrade the capability of national transport security management. The study reviews and analyzes the structure of the security administration and management organization around the World including the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. The study then recommends the most suitable structure of the transport security organization in Thailand. The structure of national transport security organization is proposed in three options.

1. As the Ministry of Homeland Security – The idea conforms to the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the major organization overseeing the national security. It puts forward the security plans and oversees all security agencies to launch the security strategic plans and collaborate with external agencies.

2. As the Office or Department of Transport Security under the Ministry of Transport – The idea conforms to the establishment of TRANSEC in UK and Transport Security Committee in Australia without having a special department. The organization assigns the responsibilities to different security sectors. This organization is the Office or Department under the Ministry of Transport to oversee transport security.

3. As the Transport Security Center – The idea underlines the feasibility of implementation. The proposed organization is low-level under the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning. It is responsible for developing plans and guideline for security operation and management as well as being a mean to coordinate among other relevant agencies.

After comparing and analyzing the pros and cons of each organization option, the most suitable option is to be as the Office of Transport Security under the Ministry of Transport, which is similar to that in Australia and the U.K. However, the organization is proposed to be as the Board of Committee which consists of the Head/Director of various security organizations of the country and other agencies who are dealing with security administration. The Committee Chairman will be the Minister of the Ministry of Transport, while the Secretary is the Director of the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning. The nominated committee is responsible for designating transport security policies which conform to national prevention plans; defining guidelines for operation; sharing ideas and recommending to the Minister. Moreover, it should develop the transport security strategic plans for all transport sectors through sub-committees for each mode of transport, such as subcommittee for roads, for rails, maritime and civil aviation.



The launch of transport security organization will improve the performance of both national and international transport systems. In particular, the Transport Security Committee (TSC) will avoid the duplication of roles and responsibilities among agencies, minimize the costs and resources because it utilizes the available resources of each agency and maximize the utilization. This is indeed the integrated transport security services. It is easy to coordinate with other agencies to react to threats since the Heads/Directors of all relevant agencies are the members of this committee and they are willing to support, if needed. Nevertheless, Transport Security Committee (TSC) may have a limitation on the continuation of work because most of the committee members will administer the department within a specific term. It is essential to specify the scope of work clearly so that each committee can administer and manage constantly and efficiently.

Documents

Thailand Transport Security Master plan: Phase 1 ... · PDF filePhase 1 as a planning measure in support of the National Preparedness ... Prevention and Impact Mitigation: ... These