ThePrestigeDisaster€¦ · / The Prestige Disaster: One Year On/ 5 Never again another Prestige Far away from the press headlines, an almost silent battle is being fought between

The Prestige DisasterOne Year On

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 2


The Prestige Disaster. One Year On

A report written by María Jose CaballeroOceans Campaign. Greenpeace SpainNovember 2003


Executive Summary pág. 6

Impact upon organisms and marine communities pág. 11

Impact upon the fishing industry pág. 15

Commercial effects pág. 16

Food safety pág. 18

Repercussions for the tourist sector pág. 20

Social repercussions: the case of the Galician coast pág. 21

Solutions for the recovery of the coastal and marine ecosystemsaffected by the Prestige oil spill. pág. 24

The vulnerability of the coastline affected by the Prestige pág. 30

Proposal for the protection of marine and coastal areason the galician atlantic and cantabrian coasts pág. 31

Solutions aimed at preventing new catastrophes pág. 35

Measures to improve the safety of maritime traffic pág. 35

Safety measures to fight pollution and catastrophes pág. 38

The elimination of threats in the coastal region pág. 40

The Prestige demands solutions pág. 23

Repercussions of the Prestige oil slick pág. 9

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 4


Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 5

Never again another Prestige

Far away from the press headlines, an almost silent battle is being fought betweenthose who profit from the business of transporting hazardous substances by sea andthose of us who defend drastic measures to prevent new oil slicks. Ever since thePrestige began to pour lethal fuel into the Atlantic one year ago, little has changedin legal terms. Although the European Union has forbidden the entry of single-hulledships carrying heavy fuel into European ports, this type of fuel represents onlyaround 5% of all the oil products that enter Europe. Nevertheless, the InternationalMaritime Organisation (IMO) has already hit the roof over this timid initiative.

A change in the regime of responsibility has not even been contemplated by theEU or the IMO. With things as they are, unlimited responsibility in accidents suchas that of the Prestige continues to sound like a Utopia. Where is CrownResources today? Once again, people and the environment have paid and willcontinue to pay a high price whilst those that profit from the traffic of crude oilhide behind unapproachable legal structures.

One year after the catastrophe, we now know that the European coastline hadnever before suffered so much as the result of an oil slick: over 2,000 kilometresof coast affected, hundreds of thousands of birds covered in oil and, one yearlater, the fuel continues to reach our shores. The figures are staggering and noteven the tireless propaganda efforts of certain leaders have managed to convinceus that “nothing happened here”.

With this report, Greenpeace looks back, once again, and reviews the year thathas passed since the Prestige. However, above all, we want to look forward andpropose specific measures that will prevent another Prestige from happening.Our proposals are ambitious but indispensable and range from the protection ofcoastal areas in order to ensure their recovery to changes in the preventive inter-national maritime legislation. It would be shameful if, after so much damage,nothing were to change.

The next oil slick is waiting to happen. The question we ask ourselves is not whe-ther or not it will happen, but when and where. We want to stop asking this ques-tion. We want things to change. That is the reason behind this report. That is thereason behind the proposals it contains. We hope that they do not fall on deaf ears.

Juan López de UraldeExecutive Director of Greenpeace Spain

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 6


1The North Atlantic coast encompasses the Cantabrian and Galician coasts.2El Impacto del Prestige. Análisis y Evaluación de los daños causados por el accidente del Prestige y dispositivos para la regeneracióny recuperación económica de Galicia. Instituto de Estudios Económicos de Galicia. Pedro Barrié de la Maza.

Executive Summaryt 3.15 p.m. on 13th November2002, the 26-year-old, single-hulled oil tanker Prestige,flying the Bahamian flag andloaded with 77,000 tonnes ofresidual heavy fuel oil, sent outan SOS at a distance of 28miles (50 kilometres) from

Finisterre, Galicia, Spain. At five o’clock thatafternoon, the first litres of crude oil began topollute the Atlantic Ocean.

Studies such as “El Impacto del Prestige”2,carried out by scientists from Galicianuniversities, reveal a particular concern about thecurrent situation. The authors, who also studiedthe repercussions of the sinking of the Mar Egeoship off the coast of A Coruña in 1992, estimatethat the damage caused by the Prestige is evengreater. The enormous loss of bird life, between250,000 and 300,000 specimens according toestimates by the Spanish Ornithology Society(SEO/BirdLife), indicates that we are talking ofthe greatest catastrophe of this type eversuffered in Europe and the second most seriousin the world after the wildlife deaths caused bythe Exxon Valdez in Alaska in 1989. The researchdone by these experts indicates that, from aneconomic point of view, the Prestige disasteractually exceeds that of the Exxon Valdez sincethe cost of the cleaning and recovery work couldtotal 2,500 million euros, compared to the 1,800million spent in Alaska.

According to the predictions of expert scientistsin this area, the socio-economic andenvironmental repercussions of the oil slick willcontinue to be felt for at least a decade along

the 2,000 kilometres of coast that have beenaffected. The entire Cantabrian and GalicianAtlantic coasts have seen their shores seriouslydamaged by the arrival of countless waves ofcrude oil. The spill has blackened beaches andcliffs, eliminated some of the marine life, eitherdirectly (due to mortalities) or indirectly (manyfree-moving organisms fled when faced withthe presence of the hydrocarbon). It has alsojeopardised the quality of the waters, which willtake many years to recover the characteristicsnecessary for marine life to develop as it wasbefore the environmental disaster.

Despite this serious situation, the Spanishgovernment has still not presented acomprehensive recovery plan which would serveto speed up the environmental, economic andsocial recovery of the affected coastline.Furthermore, there has been no change in theinternational global regulatory regime whichcould prevent similar accidents in the future.

The Prestige disaster must serve as a salutarylesson and lead to a change in direction. This ishow it must be understood by those thatmanage economic and environmental resources.The Cantabrian and Galician coasts have been asource of wealth for hundreds of years, both interms of resources and employment. Now theyare more vulnerable than ever and their verystructure and function are under threat.

We must use all the expertise and resourcesnecessary in order to prevent such a huge-scaledisaster from ever happening again. The Spanishgovernment must understand the role that themarine environment plays in the naturalbiological balance and must give priority to theenvironmental, economic and social recovery ofthe affected area as a whole.

A fair measure of the Spanish government’sscarce interest is the amount of money investedin evaluating the catastrophe caused by thePrestige. The Ministry of Science andTechnology has implemented researchprogrammes which total, according to severalsources close to the government, less than 10million euros. The amount spent by the North

a

One year later, the remains of the slick,the sadly famous “chapapote”, “pichi”or “galipote”, depending on the stretchof coast where it comes to shore,continues to appear like a never-endingtide on the Atlantic coast1

oo

a

American government in evaluating andmonitoring the oil slick caused by the ExxonValdez came close to 400 million dollars. Fortytimes the budget for the Prestige.

This would require the development of anenvironmental monitoring system for the affectedecosystems. The measures put forward so far bythe government are partial and fragmentary andin many cases they completely overlook thenatural areas that have been affected. This is trueof the so-called “Plan Galicia”, a combination ofcostly infrastructures (ports, roads and railways)which are totally unrelated to the recoveryprogrammes needed by the Galician andCantabrian coasts.

In order to prevent new oil slicks in coastalareas, it is essential to force the shippingindustry to operate with the greatest safetyguarantees, to control maritime traffic,strengthen safety measures and controlpollution from the land.

Together with these measures, the recovery of theareas affected by the pollution must not be furtherdelayed . The Spanish government, in collaborationwith the scientific and fishing community, mustprepare a comprehensive plan by which to restorethe affected areas. Scientific and technicalknowledge must be employed to lessen the effectsof the spill and accelerate the recovery of thedamaged coastal ecosystems, something whichwill, without doubt, benefit those economies thatare linked to the marine environment.

In the scientific world, there exists a generalconsensus regarding the beneficial effect ofprotecting areas of particular biological value.

This protection will accelerate the recovery ofthe damaged natural environment, as well asall its inhabitants.

Currently, along the 2,000 kilometres of coastaffected by the Prestige, there are only twoprotected marine reserves: the Islas Atlánticas,which have the protected status of a NationalPark, and a small area on the Basque coast, theprotected biotope of Gaztelugatxe. The lack ofprotected marine reserves must be remediedquickly, as was demanded by the EuropeanUnion in a report recently presented to theEuropean Parliament.

The Spanish government, and some other EUStates did propose that the InternationalMaritime Organisation (IMO) establish aParticularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) thatwould help protect the area from dangerousships in the Atlantic. A dozen countriesbelonging to the IMO have expressed theiropposition to this proposal, therebydemonstrating the scarce importance that thesegovernments give to environmental issues.

The final decision regarding this proposal forprotection will be taken in October 2004. Even ifthe measure is finally approved, it is clearly not

Greenpeace believes that urgent actionis necessary in order to preventcatrastrophes like that of the Prestigefrom happening again on our coasts.To achieve this, it is essential forsolutions to be implemented which willprevent new disasters. Greenpeace alsoconsiders the complete recovery of theaffected ecosystems to be urgentlynecessary.

oo

©G

REEN

PEAC

E/ P

.ARM

ESTR

E

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 7

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 8


enough to ensure the recovery of the areaaffected by the oil slick since other threats willremain, as is acknowledged by many countries,even those that oppose the declaration of aprotected marine reserve. The Spanishgovernment has a duty and obligation toimplement all necessary measures within itssphere of activity, where it cannot be denied theright to create protected areas which will helpto prevent new catastrophes and will benefitthe environmental and economic recovery of theaffected areas.

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)is the UN body charged with the task ofprotecting the oceans and human life from theactivities of the shipping industry. Following thesinking of the Prestige, and earlier the Erika,there was a recognition among the public andsome authorities that the current regulationswere inadequate to ensure protection of theenvironment, lives and livelihoods. It is clearthat a range of measures need to beimplemented urgently which would increase thequality of shipping. These include:

The regime of responsibility that arises froman accident. The current compensationsystem is based on the limited financialresponsibility of the owner of the vessel,according to the tonnage of the ship. Underthe current system, this responsibility isrestricted exclusively to the shipowner whilstthe managers, charterers, operators andowners of the load (which, in the case of oilslicks, are usually large multinational oilcompanies) are entirely exempt of allresponsibility. Following the case of theExxon Valdez (property of Exxon-Mobil) andthe Erika (property of the company TotalFina), in which the affected countriesdemanded that the oil companies acceptedtheir responsibility for the oil slick caused,the reaction of these companies did not leadto an increase in safety but instead quite theopposite. The large oil companies havegradually reduced their safety measures inorder to evade their responsibilities. Althoughgovernments and industry should fully

comply with the polluter pays principle, thereality is that the financial liability paid bycommercial interests is absurdly low. The realcost is The international community fulfilsthe requirement that “he who pollutes,pays” but forgets to mention that theamount paid is absurd and that the rest ofthe cost is borne by the citizens and theenvironment on which they and theirlivelihoods depend. In this context, itbecomes clear that the interest in investingto improve ship safety is minimal.The rapid phase out of single-hulled tankersworldwide.The establishment of Particularly SensitiveSea Areas (PSSAs) for the most vulnerablecoastlines.A more robust and transparent inspectionand maintenance regime including thepublication of classification society surveyresults.Closure of loopholes such as the use of Flagsof Convenience whereby shipowners canavoid their responsibilities by flagging avessel with a county in which the standardsare lowest.

These are some of the measures which need tobe implemented globally by the IMO. However,in the absence of any moves by the IMO, theEU has taken some steps, albeit limited, incalling for an early phase out of single-hulledtankers carrying heavy fuel oil. The EU has alsoproposed certain Marine Protected Areas.While neither of these measures go farenough, they are at least more than has beentaken by the IMO.

o

o

Greenpeace demands the creationof a network of protected marinereserves along the entire length ofthe coast affected by the Prestigedisaster, as one of the solutions toenable the recovery of the ecosystemsaffected by the oil spill.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 9

il slicks are occasional but intensecases of pollution. The short-termeffects, obvious and spectacular, arefollowed by other medium- and long-term effects which are less visible butgenerally more important from anecological and economic point of view3.

One year after the accident involving thePrestige, the impact caused by the spillage isclear. The serious pollution of almost 2,000kilometres of coast is not a fleeting occurrencethat can be forgotten.

Images of the sea, beaches and cliffs covered inblack are not merely pictures engraved in ourminds. Their consequences cover a series ofeconomic, health-related, social andenvironmental issues which must be taken intoaccount.

In the report “Prestige: Seis meses después”(Prestige: Six months afterwards) Greenpeaceprotested at the lack of information about theimpact of the spillage on the affectedecosystems. Six months on, we cannot say thatthe situation has improved noticeably. Very littleis known about the studies that are beingcarried out by the administration to assess therepercussions of the oil slick. Nor has it madepublic any recovery plans or measures dealingwith the issues and sectors affected, such asfood safety, tourism or social repercussions.

The sectors that are directly related with themarine environment, fishing, shellfishing andtourism, are already suffering the effects of thePrestige oil slick. However, they are not alone,since the economy and well-being of all theaffected communities have suffered indirect effects.

An evaluation is necessary of the health of thevolunteers who collected the remains of the oilslick, as well as that of the coastal populationwhich has suffered the impact of the fuel. Inaddition to public health, food safety alsorequires great attention. Analyses have shown

that the fuel oil spilled by the Prestige ishighly toxic. Its composition includes substancesthat are classed as being highly dangerous forhuman health, such as polycyclic aromatichydrocarbons (PAHs), for which neither Spainnor Europe has yet decreed limits regardingtheir presence in food. These limits have onlybeen established by the Galician AutonomousGovernment, however they have not beenconverted into regulations and are not,therefore, official4.

ORepercussions of the Prestige oil slick

3Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambiental da marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños e osrecursos pesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi do Prestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectos doafundimento do Prestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa).4Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambiental da marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños e osrecursos pesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi do Prestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectos doafundimento do Prestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa).

“Without doubt, those who haveexaggerated the consequences of the Prestige oil tanker spillagehave acted in bad faith.The sea is very large and candefend itself”.Manuel Fraga. President of the Galician AutonomousGovernment. La Vanguardia. 12/09/03

©G

REEN

PEAC

E/ M

ABEL

URI

BES

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 10


5Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism Committee. Informe sobre el refuerzo de la seguridad marítima tras el naufragio del petrolero Prestige(2003/2066 (INI)). 15 July 2003.6El Suceso Prestige. Ministry of the Environment. http://www.mma.es.7Statement made by Elvira Rodríguez. Minister for the Environment. Ideal Newspaper. 12/08/03.

At the end of February, Greenpeace demandedthat the Ministry of Health carry out anepidemiological study which would allow therisks for human health to be evaluated. In mid-March, the Ministry announced that it would doso, however it appears to have forgotten itspromise since the study has still not beenperformed.

The deterioration of the coastal areas andmarine environment cannot be ignored. It is notenough to fill the beaches with machines thatwill clear away the lumps of fuel. The effectssuffered at all levels of the ecosystem must bestudied and evaluated and measures must betaken to speed its recovery.

An analysis of all these repercussions is the firststep in preventing another Prestige fromhappening. It is essential that a seriousevaluation be made of the affected ecosystems.From a biological point of view, a reduction incertain species and a decline in the marinehabitat has been observed, as acknowledged inthe report on the Prestige catastrophe thatwas presented to the European Parliament inSeptember5.

When it came to evaluating the effects, theadministration clearly chose to marginalise thescientific community, right from the very start.The scientific work that has been carried outuntil now has not been framed within acomprehensive recovery plan organised by thepublic administration.

The impact of the Prestige accordingto the ministry of the environment/

Until now, the Ministry of the Environment has only offeredinformation regarding the number of beaches affected,which has totalled 1,064 since the start of the disaster.According to these figures, on the 2nd October, 1,053 ofthese beaches were considered to be completely clean, 9had remains of hydrocarbons on rocks and/or in underlyinglayers and 2 had fuel remains on the surface.With regard tothe waste collected, by that same date 83,751.28 tonneshad been removed from the 1,900 kilometres of affectedcoastline. The Ministry of the Environment deals with theIslas Atlánticas National Park separately. In this area, by19th September, 4,589.9 tonnes of waste had been remo-ved from the land and 1,593.5 tonnes had been extractedfrom the seabed6.

Nothing is said about the effects of this pollution on theaffected coastal ecosystems, information is only givenabout the presence or absence of fuel. As of now, noinformation whatsoever has been provided referring to stu-dies that are being carried out to analyse the impact andrepercussions in the short, medium and long term.

Some of the steps taken by the Ministry, such as the deci-sion to open the Islas Atlánticas National Park to touriststhis summer, call into question its interest in restoring theaffected environment. Shortly after it was opened, theDirector of the park, Emilio Rodríguez Merino, himselfadmitted that the decision had been hasty and that 3,000visitors each day were not what the islands needed inorder to recover.

The Ministry of the Environment has assured that it willcarry out a detailed study over three years to evaluate theexact impact of the oil slick on various parts of theGalician coast, in order to adopt, where necessary, appro-priate measures7.

The information obtained by Greenpeace limits these“various parts” to the Islas Atlánticas National Park, twoother protected nature reserves in Galicia and one in eachof the affected autonomous regions: Asturias, Cantabriaand the Basque Country. There is no doubt that these stu-dies will be insufficient to provide an overall understan-ding of the phenomenon. The Ministry of the Environmentannounced that it would be contracting assistance inorder to complete the studies, however these contractshave still not been awarded despite the fact that the pro-posals were presented in August. One of the proposalscame from a company chaired by Carlos del Álamo, whowas removed from his post as Regional Minister for theEnvironment in the Galician Autonomous Government dueto his poor conduct during the oil slick. To the surprise ofmany, the Ministry of the Environment later appointed DelÁlamo as President of the Islas Atlánticas National Park.

Heavy fuel oil from the Prestigecontinues to reach the coasts ofGalicia, the North of the Iberianpeninsula and the French Atlantic,going beyond Brittany and eventhreatening the English coastline.European Parliament report on reinforcing maritime safetyfollowing the sinking of the Prestige oil tanker. 15 July 2003.

o

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 11

8Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambientalda marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños e os recursospesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi doPrestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectos do afundimento doPrestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa).9Ott. R., C. Peterson & R.Rice. Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) legacy: Shiftingparadigms in oil ecostoxicology.

o The ecological effects of a hydrocarbon spilldepend essentially on the type of habitataffected. In the case of the Prestige, the routefollowed by the ship before it sank combinedwith the location of the area in which it liessubmerged, mean that practically all marinehabitats have been and are still in danger.

One must remember that pollution is not evenlydistributed in a marine context. Therefore, if welook at the ecosystem vertically, the amount ofhydrocarbons increases as we approach theseabed, whereas in horizontal terms, theconcentration increases as we head towardscoastal areas.

Hydrocarbon spills cause different physiologicaland biochemical problems in the affectedorganisms which have consequences for theirviability and reproductive success, whilst alsoprovoking genetic alterations. As a result ofthese processes, their populations undergodemographic changes.

The effects of spill pollution on organisms maybe classified in the following way:

Direct lethal effects: caused by fuelimpregnation or asphyxia.

Direct sublethal effects: caused by directcontact between the pollutant and theorganism, without causing death.Nonetheless, genetic, biochemical orphysiological alterations do occur which mayreduce viability and biological efficiency.

Indirect effects: disruption of the ecosystem.The main processes to be affected includealterations in the habitat, changes in therelationship between predators and their preyand between competitors, alterations inproductivity levels and, lastly, changes in thetrophic network.

In general, there is not a lot of evidence of thedirect effects of oil slicks, except in the case ofcatastrophic seabird mortalities, the smotheringof coastal flora and fauna especially sedentaryspecies. The other effects are much more difficultto detect, above all in the case of ocean regions,since these are habitats which are difficult toobserve and in which the concentration of spilthydrocarbons tends to be low. It is somewhateasier to identify direct effects in coastal areaswhere the consequences may be very serious,above all in the case of small populations.

The characteristics of the Prestige oil slickmake it reasonable to suppose that the maineffects will appear in the medium and longterm, since the continued presence of pollutantsubstances in the ecosystem means that theywill enter most organisms via the food chain.

Impact upon organisms and marine communities8

Oil slicks: direct and indirecteffects/

In 1978, the Amoco Cádiz oil slick in theBrittany region of France caused almost totalmortality in the first age class of various flatfish species (those born in 1978). Their naturalhabitat consists of sandy areas in shallowwaters and a large part of the hydrocarbon wasdeposited in such areas, reducing their popula-tions to minimal levels.

The work carried out in the case of the ExxonValdez concentrated on marine mammal, birdand fish species due to their economic and/orecological value. The results showed that verylow concentrations of pollutants had toxiceffects on fish larvae and embryos, with effectssuch as reduced growth, increased mortality oreven genetic alterations which caused dama-ged in following generations9. In the case ofmarine mammals or birds, it was shown that thecause for the high level of pollutants was due tothe fact that the diets of the species analysedcontained other marine species which hadbeen affected by the oil spill. At the same time,a reduction in reproductive success and/or anincrease in mortality was observed.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 12


OCÉAN

DEEP OCEAN ABYSS

CONTINENTALSHELF

COASTALZONE

CONTINENTAL SLOPE

CONTINENTAL RISE

PilchardAlbacoreMackerelHorse mackerel

HakeRed goatfishAnglerfishCommon sole

OctopusRoosterLobster

ClamCockleSpider crabRazor clamBlue ling

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 13

The evidence that has been gathered until nowindicates that the level of hydrocarbons isrelatively low throughout the Galician continentalshelf. Samples taken in December 2002 detectedhigh values only in very specific locations (southof the Vigo Ria and in certain parts of the Costada Morte), which could lead one to believe thatthe situation is one of practical normality.

However, data provided by the SpanishOceanography Institute regarding the level ofpolycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) insediments and the presence of fuel on theseabed show very high levels of pollutants overa large part of the Galician continental shelf.

Similar patterns have been observed in thesediments of coastal areas10.

During the month of September, the CoastGuard carried out an exploration project toinvestigate the Asturian, Cantabrian andBasque sea beds. The results showed that nofuel had been found, although thoseresponsible specified that this did not meanthat no fuel remained, simply that they hadbeen unable to find it11.

Initial data about the distribution andabundance of PAHs in marine organisms isbeginning to become available12.

Clam Coastal area HighCockle Coastal area HighMackerel Pelagic (surface) LowShrimp Coastal area MediumSpider crab Coastal area MediumNorway lobster Continental shelf MediumConger eel Coastal area MediumSea urchin Coastal area HighPouting Coastal area MediumElephant Fish Continental shelf Medium-LowHorse Mackerel Pelagic (surface) LowSea bass Coastal area MediumMussel (seed) Coastal area Very highHake Continental shelf LowRazor shell Coastal area HighVelvet Swimming Crab Coastal area Medium-HighCommon Ormer Coastal area MediumGoose barnacle Coastal area Very highOctopus Coastal area MediumHorned Octopus Continental shelf Medium Monkfish Continental shelf Medium-LowTurbot Coastal area MediumSardine Pelagic (surface) LowCuttlefish Coastal area Medium

Source/ Impacto ambiental de la marea negra del Prestige: efectos sobre los ecosistemas marinos y los recursos pesqueros

DEGREE OF EXPECTED EFFECT ON CERTAIN COMMERCIAL SPECIES/SPECIES HABITAT DEGREE OF EXPECTED EFFECT

10Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambiental da marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños eos recursos pesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi do Prestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectosdo afundimento do Prestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa). 11“No hallan fuel en los fondos marinos del Cantábrico”. Gara.net. 3/09/03.12Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambiental da marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños eos recursos pesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi do Prestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectosdo afundimento do Prestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa).

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 14


©G

REEN

PEAC

E/ P

.ARM

ESTR

E

The case of the goose barnacle/

The goose barnacle provides an example of thehuge impact caused and the complex reactionof organisms in response to an oil spill.

Each bed of goose barnacles forms a localpopulation whose growth and reproductionrates depend on the environmental conditionsand the population’s density. Goose barnaclelarvae are released from different parts of thecoast (and, therefore, from different beds) inorder to form one single larval populationalong a considerable length of the coast. Oncethey are fully developed, the individuals attachthemselves to rocky habitats. This attachmentis mainly done by fixing onto adult individuals,rather than directly onto the rock. Later on,they gradually move and position themselveson the rocks. If there are many adults, there isgreat competition for the substrata and theyoung barnacles do not develop.

Studies carried out on populations affected bythe oil slick show that the level of polycyclicaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) is very high,although it has not produced catastrophicmortalities. However, the morphology of goosebarnacles makes them act like a “trap” for thefuel and it is therefore likely that the degree ofcontamination will not diminish or will only doso very slowly.

This data highlights a situation in which thegoose barnacle population presents a highlevel of pollutants and a high density of speci-mens, since their extraction has been forbid-den for a long period of time. The high level ofpollutants will probably jeopardise their reco-very and mean that their larva production islower than normal.

For food safety purposes, their commercialcollection should be forbidden for a very longperiod of time. Nonetheless, active recoverywork should be carried out in order to selecti-vely extract the affected goose barnacles inorder to allow the development of new non-contaminated individuals.

These results show high levels of pollutants insessile or sedentary coastal animals (bivalves,barnacles, sea urchins) in the geographic areasaffected. These animals are at the base of the foodchain, therefore their contamination will enter therest of the chain when they are consumed byother predators. The organisms situated at highertrophic levels, such as fish, decapod crustaceans orcephalopod molluscs, are affected to a lesserdegree than sedentary organisms, but nonethelessthey have high values in the affected area. Lastly,the results for fish and cephalopods from thecontinental shelf show similar patterns to those incoastal areas, although the level of pollutants islower. It is foreseeable that the level of pollutantsin predators will increase during the coming years.

The characteristics of the Prestige oilslick make it reasonable to supposethat the main effects will appear in themedium and long term

oo

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 15

13“El Gobierno mantiene sus planes de apertura pese al rechazo de las cofradías”. 18 March 2003. http://www1.lonxanet.org.

The administrative authorities responsible forthe management of marine resources (theGalician Autonomous Government for interiorwaters and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheriesand Food for exterior waters) reacted quicklywith regard to the establishment of fishing andshellfishing bans in the areas affected by thearrival of the Prestige oil spill.

Thus, the suspension of fishing and shellfishingactivities along the Galician coast was graduallydecreed between 16th November and earlyDecember 2002. Later on, the other autonomousregions (Asturias, Cantabria and the BasqueCountry) were affected by the arrival of crude oilon their waters and coasts and were also forcedto temporarily close their fishing grounds.

The suspension of fishing activities lasted untilFebruary, at which time a gradual process wasbegun by which fishing areas were openedaccording to the fishing method and zone. Thisoperation ended on 8th October. In most of theaffected areas, fishing and shellfishing has nowbeen resumed, in some cases against the wishesof the fishermen and -women themselves. On7th October, the ban on shellfishing in the laststretch of the Galician coast was lifted, meaningthat fishing and shellfishing activities were onceagain resumed along the whole of the coastaffected by the Prestige spill.

This situation contrasts with that experiencedin France following the Erika catastrophe.Despite the fact that the spill was much smaller

than that of the Prestige, fishing andshellfishing activities were suspended for 18months, whereas in this case, fishing wasresumed after 3 months. There is no doubt that,in the case of the Prestige, the decision torecommence fishing activities, although basedon scientific considerations, had afundamentally political component.

However, we must take into account that thistype of gradual re-opening process brings withit the concentration of fishing efforts in specificareas which may quickly become over-exploited.At the same time, the precautionary moratoriumconstitutes a complete ban on fishing activitieswhich should have positive effects since itallows the growth and recovery of stocks, manyof which are already in a prior state of over-exploitation. This positive side effect is thereforesuperimposed upon the negative biologicaleffects caused by the oil slick, making the endresult difficult to predict.

“The re-opening order is untouchable”Seven senior skippers from Galician fishermen’sguilds travelled to Madrid in March to attend aninterview with the General Secretary for Fisheries,Carmen Fraga, and express their outright rejectionof the renewal of fishing activities due to the hasti-ness of the measure. The response given by the fis-heries representative was categorical: the order isuntouchable. The fishing skippers also expressedtheir opinion: “This is the path of absurdity, there isno criteria. It is sheer nonsense” .13

oImpact upon the fishing industry

The case of the octopus/

The octopus provides a good example of theside effects of the moratorium on fishingactivities.

This species has a very high growth rate and,given the suspension of its capture, one mayexpect an increase in its overall biomass cau-sed by the growth of individuals and the birth ofnew generations, added to a reduced mortalitydue to the absence of fishing activities.

When fishing recommenced, a considerableincrease was observed in the size of the cat-ches and the body size of the animals themsel-ves. However, these initially large catchesrapidly diminished in the areas that were opento fishing (where a great amount of fishing acti-vity was concentrated). Within a few weeks, thesize of the catches had reached all-time lows.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 16


o Commercial effectsNo market research has yet been publishedreflecting the repercussions of the Prestige oilslick on the consumers of sea products and,therefore, the market.

Despite this, there are a series of repercussionswhich can be observed since an oil slick isperceived by consumers as a sudden pollutionincident which affects the products theytraditionally consume.

The first predictable consequence of acatastrophe of this type is, therefore, an initialdistrust among consumers towards the productin question. Until this initial mistrust iseliminated (which depends on both theevolution of the oil slick and theadministration’s transparent management), thedemand for these items may drop considerably.

A second consequence may involve a change inthe variety of goods supplied and consumerpreferences, due to the appearance ofalternative, substitute products:

Commercial species already known to theconsumer but from a different geographicalorigin. This could include the Scottish velvetswimming crab, French spider crabs, Moroccanoctopuses and sardines, etc.

Preference for new species, whose quality andlow prices may make them attractive to consumers.

The appearance of aquaculture products in themarketplace, which undermine the demand for“wild” products.

Another point that must be taken into accountis that many sea products are recognised, atboth a national and international level, ashigh-quality products and are, therefore,intended for a high-priced market based onconsumers of this type of product (which inmany cases explains the profitability of thefishing industry). It is possible that the seriouspollution caused by the Prestige may hugelydamage these products, something whichwould provoke a serious crisis in the sector.

o

o

o

©GREENPEACE/ JUAN FELIPE CARRASCO

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 17

14“La marea negra provoca una drástica caída de los créditos”. http://www.masmar.com/articulos/art/113,1534,1.html15Galician Chambers of Commerce. Informe sobre los sectores afectados por el Prestige: Problemas empresariales y propuestas de situación. 2003. Thefigures come from the data provided by the Regional Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs and the Report for the European Union Classification ofGalicia as a Region Highly Dependent on Fishing.16The figures come from the data provided by the Regional Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs and the Report for the European UnionClassification of Galicia as a Region Highly Dependent on Fishing.

The seriousness of the crisis will varyaccording to the importance of the fishingsector. Without doubt, Galicia will be the mostaffected, due to the extent of the oil slick’simpact and the importance of the fishingsector in its economy.

The Galician fishing sector’s productionrepresents one third of national production.This percentage increases to 40% if we look atthe economic value of the product. It supplies64% of molluscs and 30% of fish. Employmentin its fishing sector provides more than half ofthe fishing jobs in the country. The totalnumber of Galician boats represents around50% of the Spanish fleet. 51% of thetraditional Galician fleet, the fleet mostaffected by the temporary ban on activities asa result of the pollution caused by the oil spill,is to be found in A Coruña, the area whichhas, in turn, suffered most due to thePrestige oil spill.

The fishing sector is less important in the otherregions affected by the oil slick, however theyall have a strong fleet which provides wealthand employment. In Asturias, the traditionalfleet consists of 464 boats which produce 39million euros per year, to which one must addthe income earned by other activities such asaquaculture, shellfishing, canning, themarketing sector and other associatedactivities. The situation of Cantabria and theBasque Country is similar. In the latter, thetraditional inshore fleet consists of 325 boatswhich provide direct employment to more than2,300 people and produce 91 million eurosper year.

The official figures of the Galician AutonomousGovernment estimate that the Galician GDP willfall by 0.5% in relation to the previous year14.

©G

REEN

PEAC

E/ P

EDRO

ARM

ESTR

E

The initial figures produced by the Pontevedra Chamber ofCommerce have estimated a loss of 1,390 million euros in theGalician fishing sector and processing industry15.

The losses are distributed in the following way16:

Shellfishing: 90% loss (54 million of the 60 predicted)Extractive fishing: 80% loss (176 million of 220 predicted)Aquaculture: 75% loss (90 million of 120 predicted)Marketing sector: 40% loss (700 million of 1,750 predicted)Canning industry: 30% loss (255 million of 850 predicted)Frozen-food industry: 10% loss (70 million of 700 predicted)

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 18


17Yender R., J. Michel & C. Lord (2002). Managing seafood safety after an oil spill. Seattle: Hazardous Materials Response Division. Office of Responseand Restoration, NOAA.18The Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs lists 8 PAHs to determine the suitability of olive pomace oil for consumption, establishing a maximum limitof 2mg/kg of oil for each individual compound and 5 for the compounds in total.19Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambiental da marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños eos recursos pesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi do Prestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectosdo afundimento do Prestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa).20Repercusiones del vertido del Prestige en la Seguridad Alimentaria (2003). Spanish Food Safety Agency. Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs.http://www.msc.es

o Food safety

An important number of the living organismsdirectly affected by the oil slick form part ofthe food resources that humans have exploitedfor many generations in order to obtain food.

The magnitude of the Prestige catastrophemakes it impossible to cover all the relatedfood safety issues, therefore it is essential toincrease the analytical and control efforts inthose areas or resources which are, by nature,more likely to be contaminated.

Following the oil spill caused by the ExxonValdez in Alaska in 1989, the U.S. Food andDrug Administration (FDA) drew up a protocolfor risk assessment, as well as a set ofrecommendations about the condition of thefood resources in the affected area, withregard to the level of dangerous pollutantssuch as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(PAHs) to be found in their tissues17.

The existing legislation on safe PAH limits infood, particularly fish and seafood in bothSpain and the European Union, is extremelylimited, whereas in other countries such as theU.S. and Canada considerable progress hasbeen made both in terms of prevention and thedevelopment of oil slick managementstrategies which include food safety issues.

In the case of Spain, there exists only onelegislative reference, made in relation to olivepomace oil18. Although this is the only nationallegislation that exists regarding limits for PAHsin food, it represents official recognition of itspotential toxicity.

As a result of the Prestige disaster, theGalician Autonomous Government has begunto monitor PAHs in marine resources and hasestablished criteria regarding safety limits19.

These coincide with those used in theEuropean Union but do not include 10 of the16 compounds that are classified as potentiallycarcinogenic by the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA).

Between 8th January and 5th June 2003, theSpanish Food Safety Agency20 carried out astudy of the presence of polycyclic aromatichydrocarbons (PAHs) in fishing products fromthe entire length of the coast affected by theaccident. The results of the analysis show thatsome of the fish, crustacean and cephalopodsamples contain toxic substances whichprohibit their consumption, thereby reducingfishing sector profits even further. Nonetheless,the results obtained are amazingly good.

The results of the study show that in Cantabria30.23% of the fish, crustacean and cephalopodsamples analysed contained higher amountsthan the maximum limits allowed for humanconsumption. The analysis carried out onsamples of bivalve molluscs (clams, mussels,oysters, limpets, etc) showed that 3.77% of thetotal exceeded the maximum limits established

PAHs represent 46.4% of the composition ofthe 77,000 tonnes of fuel stored in thePrestige. The International Cancer Agencyclassifies PAHs as type “2b”, which meansthat there exists sufficient proof of theircarcinogenic effect on laboratory animalsbut the proof of carcinogenic effects onhumans is insufficient.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 19

21Maximum PAH limits: 0.2 mg/kg of dry weight for PAH total in molluscs, crustaceans and cephalopods and 0.02 mg/kg of dry weight for fish.

Sou

rce/

Spa

nish

Foo

d Saf

ety

Age

ncy

GALICIA ASTURIAS CANTABRIA BASQUE COUNTRY

PRESENCE OF PAHs IN FISHING PRODUCTS/

100%below maximumauthorised limit

7,8%above maximunauthorised limit

BIV

ALV

EM

OLL

USCS

NO DATA



30,2% above maximunauthorised limit

100% below maximumauthorised limit

100%below maximumauthorised limit

Finisterre

Pontevedra

SanSebastián

FIS

H,

CR

USTA

CEA

NA

ND

CEPH

ALO

PO

DS

MAXIMUM PAH LIMITS:0.2 mg/kg of dry weight forPAH total in molluscs, crustaceansand cephalopods and 0.02 mg/kgof dry weight for fish.

SPECIES ANALYSED:Mussel, cockle, oister, limpet, clam,goose barnacle, octopus, horsemackerel, mackerel, mergrim,rooster, blue whiting, turbot,pilchard, hake, sea urchin, crab,spider crab and fiddler crab.

A Coruña

GijónSantander

Bilbao

for PAHs2121. However, in Galicia, the regionmost affected by the toxic spill, only 7.87% ofthe fish, crustaceans and cephalopodsanalysed contained traces of fuel greater thanthose allowed, whereas 100% of the bivalvescontained no notable remains of polycyclic

aromatic hydrocarbons. In Asturias, 14.5% ofbivalve molluscs had a PAH content higherthan the guide values. In the Basque Country,no fuel remains were found in any species.These results are official, however this doesnot make them any less surprising.

o o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 20


The tourist sector is possibly, together with thefishing industry, one of the sectors worstaffected by the environmental disaster. Theimportance of this sector is by no meansinsignificant, since overall it represents 12% ofSpain’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The statistics for this summer represent the firstindications of the repercussions for the touristsector. They show that tourist figures have notbeen good in the coastal regions that have beenaffected by successive oil slicks from thePrestige. The general tendency of the regionalgovernments has been to minimise and evendeny the existence of any “Prestige effect” onthe tourist sector, despite, for example, directlywitnessing the withdrawal of all the blue tourist“blue flags”22.

If one compares the figures provided by theNational Statistics Institute for the months ofJuly and August of this year and 2002, adecrease in hotel occupancy levels can beobserved. The autonomous region that has mostsuffered is Galicia, followed closely byCantabria. Asturias has experienced a lesssignificant decrease and the Basque Countryhas been the least affected.

The figures provided by the State Departmentfor Commerce and Tourism regarding thearrival of foreign tourists show an even

sharper decline. Almost all of the regionsaffected by the oil spill have lost foreignvisitors this year. The worst affected wasAsturias, with a 19.2% fall in relation to 2002,followed by Galicia with 10.2% and Cantabriawhich suffered a drop of 10.1%. Only theBasque Country registered an increase of12.1% upon the previous year, following thesame tendency as the rest of Spain whichexperienced an overall increase of 2.4%.

PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TOURISTSDIFFERENCES BETWEEN 2002 & 2003

Asturias and Cantabria have asked thegovernment to develop a strategic plan for thetourist sector, however the centraladministration has not yet presented any suchdocument.

Asturias Galicia Cantabria Basque Cty. Spain-19,20 -10,2 -10,1 12,1 2,4

22The Blue Flag Campaign is owned and run by the Foundation for Environmental Education (FEE). The award of a European Blue Flag beach is based oncompliance with 27 criteria (water quality, environmental education and information, environmental management, safety and services).

July August AVERAGE July August AVERAGE DIFFERENCE2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 %

ASTURIAS 45,76 70,91 58,34 43,43 69,94 56,69 - 1,65CANTABRIA 53,95 74,71 64,33 49,98 71,51 60,75 -3.58GALICIA 43,48 64,33 53,91 39,45 60,22 49,84 -4.07EUSKADI 54,19 66,65 60,42 53,80 64,52 59,16 -1.26

Source/ National Statistics Institute

HOTEL OCCUPANCY LEVELS IN THE COASTAL REGIONS AFFECTEDBY THE PRESTIGE OIL SPILL/

-19,20

-10,2 -10,1

12,1

2,4

o Repercussions for the tourist sector

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 21


23Antonio García-Allut. (2003) “O Prestige e As Comunidades Pesqueiras”. Humanities Department, University of A Coruña.24Regional Fisheries Ministry of the Galician Autonomous Government. 2002.

Of the 2,750,000 inhabitants of Galicia, oneand a half million live next to the sea in littleover 10% of the territory. The inhabitants of thecoastal communities were those to be first andmost affected by the Prestige catastrophe.

The fishing sector that works along the Galiciancoast has suffered the most, in both social andeconomic terms. In Galicia, fishing has anenormous economic, social and culturalimportance. For each fisherman or woman whoworks on the sea, three more jobs are createdin other related activities. In total, this involves120,000 people and represents 12.2% of allemployment in Galicia24.

The Galician inshore fleet consists of over 6,000vessels, most of which are less than 10 metresin length. This fleet performs its work along a1,200 kilometre stretch of coast, going from theintertidal area to a distance of 25 miles, in acoastal ecosystem that is characterised by itsgreat biodiversity, variability and spatialcomplexity. This is reflected in the classificationof extractive activities which range from fishing,in its strictest sense, to harvesting activities,which include a wide variety of trades:shellfishers who work on the beach, in shallowwaters or from boats, barnacle collectors, razor-shell collectors, sea urchin collectors, musselseed collectors, polychaete collectors andgatherers of various seaweed species. In termsof fishing activities, the fishermen/womenalternate various methods throughout theyearly cycle in order to catch a wide variety ofspecies. In total, over 40 different methods areused to catch approximately 135 fish species.

The crews of the coastal fishing vessels rangebetween one and four fishermen/women whoare usually related in some way. This patternfurther worsens the repercussion of acatastrophe such as that of the Prestige sinceit weakens the mutual help network andconcentrates the effects of the impact indomestic units with family ties.

The socio-economic balance of many fishingcommunities depends directly on fishing andshellfishing activities and in many of them thisrepresents the main source of employment.

It is clear that in the case of many Galicianfishing communities, the repercussions of thePrestige oil spill on the social and economicstructure will take their toll over time. Theproblem is greater in those cases where noalternative employment exists.

Right from the start of the crisis, the publicauthorities provided the affected fishermen andwomen with a financial aid system to lessentheir hardship during the period of inactivityimposed as a result of the hydrocarbon spill.The shellfishers and sailors received 40 euros aday. These subsidies came to an end when thefishing areas were re-opened. Although thisassistance lessens the economic effects in theshort term, it does not resolve them or preventthe deterioration of the marine ecosystem andthe market from taking its toll. Indeed, not longafter returning to work, the fishing communitycomplained of the scarcity of the catches andthe small size of the animals caught.

For various reasons, traditional inshore fishingconstitutes a socially, politically andeconomically dismembered sector. The greatspatial dispersion of the fishing communitiesalong the length of the coast makes it difficultfor them to interrelate. The sector’s problemsare perceived locally and this leads to solutions

The greater the dependency of thepopulation on the affected naturalresources, the more vulnerable thesocio-economic structure of thefishing community becomes

o

oSocial repercussions:the case of the Galician Coast23

o


that are created within and for a specificlocation. The diversity of the methods used andthe species caught generates internal frictionand conflict.

Local problems are dealt with by each of the 63Galician fishermen’s guilds. Each one functionsas an autonomous and separate entity inrelation to the others, thereby complicating thejoint resolution of common problems that affectthem all. The guilds are organised intoprovincial federations but there is no Galicianfederation of guilds to unite them all.

However, when faced with the Prestigecatastrophe, the sector’s initial reaction was tojoin forces in fighting the problem. A few daysafter the disaster, a Committee of AffectedGuilds was created to defend the interests of theaffected fishermen and women. This currentlyencompasses 48 guilds. A further seven guildsare in the process of constituting another co-ordinating body. The rest do not considerthemselves to be affected by the oil slick.

The objectives of the committee of guildsfocussed first and foremost on defending theeconomic and social interests of those affected.They presented a claim to the IOPC Funds, the

organisation responsible for compensating thoseaffected by hydrocarbon spills. The amountrequested (130 million euros) was calculated onthe basis of the income that all the fishermenand women would cease to earn during theperiod of inactivity. This amount did not take intoaccount the intangible aspects of the disaster,such as social costs, the impoverishment of thecoastal ecosystem or the repercussions ofpollution on the future of the fishing industry. Inorder to avoid any delay in the payments, theCommittee reached an agreement with theAdministration according to which the latterwould advance the stipulated amount to thesector and later negotiate with the IOPC Fundsor make a legal claim against those responsible.

Together with the claim, the Committee signed aseries of collaboration agreements with theUniversities of A Coruña and Santiago deCompostela in order to obtain independentscientific information regarding the level ofpollution in the affected species, as well as anevaluation of the economic and social damagedcaused by the spill. Likewise, it participated insocial revitalisation and environmental recoveryprojects intended to encourage the developmentof the fishing sector and a rational andresponsible use of resources.

©G

REEN

PEAC

E/Ca

ndan

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 22

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 23

25Freire J, L Fernández, E González-Gurriarán & R Muiño (2003). Impacto ambiental da marea negra do Prestige: efectos sobre os ecosistemas mariños eos recursos pesqueiros. Papel da comunidade científica na resposta á crise. En, ¿Qué foi do Prestige?, Balance ecolóxico e social sobre as causas e efectosdo afundimento do Prestige. J. Cabrera & A García-Allut (eds.). Ed. Sotelo Blanco (en prensa).26Paine R.T., J.L. Ruensink, A.Sun, E.L.Sounlanille, M.J.Wonham, C.D.G.Harley, D.R. Brumbaugh & D.L. Second (1996). Trouble on oiled waters: Lessonsfrom the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 27: 197-235.

An oil slick provokes an environmental crisisthat affects a huge number of economic sectorsand mobilises extremely diverse social forces. Italso requires fast responses which will minimiseits effects, a rigorous evaluation of the damagecaused and the restoration of the affectedecosystems.

The Prestige catastrophe has highlighted theabsence of contingency plans or, at least, thelack of capacity to carry out such plans. The factthat this situation has arisen in an area whichhas already suffered several serious oil-relatedcatastrophes is, without doubt, an aggravatingfactor which is hard to explain to the thousands

of people affected. The slowness of the responsegiven by the different administrative bodies doesnot help to lessen the effects of the catastrophe.Solutions must be implemented without delayand must cover all relevant aspects.

The only plan so far put forward by theAdministration, the so-called “Plan Galicia”, hasnothing to do with the Prestige. It is aninfrastructures plan that proposes roads, trainsand ports which will be of no use in helpinggoose barnacles, razor shells or octopuses toreturn to their oil-affected habitats.

The other measures presented by the Spanishexecutive during the year that has passed sincethe start of the catastrophe have been aimed atreducing the environmental impact in areasaffected by the hydrocarbon pollution. However,none of them deal with the urgent need torestore (a much more complicated concept thanthat of cleaning) the 2,000 kilometres ofcoastline damaged by the Prestige spill.

The apathy shown by the public administrationbecomes clear if one examines the efforts madein terms of financing. According to several sourcesclose to the government, the funding for theresearch carried out by the Ministry of Scienceand Technology to evaluate the catastropheamounts to less than 10 million euros25. In thecase of the Exxon Valdez oil slick,26 the evaluationcosts totalled 214 million dollars, besides another180 million that was invested in research andmonitoring. In other words, forty times the budgetallocated for the Prestige oil slick.

The Prestige demands solutions

o

The only plan so far putforward by the Administration,the so-called “Plan Galicia”,has nothing to do with thePrestige. It is an infrastructuresplan that proposes roads, trainsand ports which will be of nouse in helping goose barnacles,razor shells or octopuses toreturn to their oil-affectedhabitatso

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 24


27Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism Committee. Informe sobre el refuerzo de la seguridad marítima tras el naufragio del petrolero Prestige(2003/2066 (INI)). 15 July 2003.28“Galicia ha superado los daños del Prestige” (Galicia has overcome the damage caused by the Prestige). Xosé Antón Orza, Regional EconomicsMinister for the Galician Autonomous Government. ‘Expansión’ newspaper. 17/10/03.29El Impacto del Prestige. Análisis y Evaluación de los daños causados por el accidente del Prestige y dispositivos para la regeneración medioambientaly recuperación económica de Galicia. Galician Economic Studies Institute, Pedro Barrié de la Maza.30For more detailed information about international agreements regarding protected marine reserves, see Appendices.

pro tecc ión a toda cos ta

he recovery of the coastal andmarine ecosystems affected bythe Prestige disaster cannotsimply be left in nature’s hands.There exist many studies,research projects and actionprotocols taken from similarcases of oil slicks throughout the

world. The fundamental steps to be taken are asfollows:

Evaluation of the impact caused by thePrestige oil slick.Environmental monitoring of therepercussions in space and time.Protection of the most valuable areas inorder to speed up recovery.

The report on the Prestige27 that waspresented before the European Parliament lastSeptember underlines the need to carry out anevaluation of the impact caused by theaccident, placing special emphasis onenvironmental recovery. One year after thedisaster, this European Union demand has stillnot been undertaken by the Spanishgovernment, which attempts to avoid itsresponsibilities at all costs by affirming that thecatastrophe has been “overcome”28.

However, a study carried out by over 40professors and doctors from Galicianuniversities estimates that it will take 10 yearsfor the areas affected by the Prestige oil spillto return to normal, whilst a return to biologicalnormality could take until the year 201529.

Despite these alarming figures, no recoveryplan has been announced for the areasaffected by the Prestige spill. We are notreferring to the cleaning away of the mostvisible hydrocarbon waste but rather therestoration of all damaged areas and the

recovery of the animal and plant populationsthat were devastated by the oil slick,something which would doubtlessly contributeto the recovery of the economic and socialsectors whose existence is linked to the coast.

The protection of areas of great biological valuewill speed up the recovery of the ecosystem asa whole. There exists widespread scientificconsensus regarding the beneficial effect ofestablishing protected marine reserves. They aremore and more frequently used as one of themost powerful tools with which to fight theenvironmental deterioration suffered by oceans.This conservation and management methodbecomes even more necessary when dealingwith a disaster as serious as that caused by anoil slick on the Atlantic and Cantabrian coasts.At an international level, there exist a numberof treaties and conventions which provide forthe establishment of protected marinereserves30.

The International Convention for the Preventionof Pollution from Ships, otherwise known asMARPOL 73/78 and signed by Spain in 1979,aims to limit the amount of hydrocarbon wastethat enters the sea and ensure that portspossess suitable facilities for dealing with oil

Solutions for the recovery of the coastal and marineecosystems affected by the Prestige oil spill

TtIt is crucially important todevelop an environmentalmonitoring system which allowsreal-time data to be gatheredabout the evolution of the slickand the affected ecosystems, withadequate spatial and temporalcoverage in order to predict theevolution of the pollutants andtheir ecological effect

o o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 25

31United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea. Spain has formed part of this convention since 1982. 32The International Maritime Organisation is a Specialist Agency of the United Nations which is responsible for ensuring maritime traffic safety andprotecting against marine pollution from ships. Web page: www.imo.org

waste. This convention is approved by theInternational Maritime Organisation andspecifies the establishment of “special areas” inwhich, for technical reasons related tooceanographic and ecological characteristics, aswell as the maritime traffic that they withstand,obligatory regulations for the prevention andcontrol of sea pollution must be implemented.Nine areas have so far been designated: theBaltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea,the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf area, the Gulf ofAden, the Antarctic Ocean, the North Sea andthe Great Caribbean area. These special areasbenefit from stricter regulations and it isforbidden for any kind of ship to dumphydrocarbons or oil mixtures in their waters.

The Oslo and Paris Convention for the Protectionof the Marine Environment of the North-EastAtlantic, known as OSPAR, includes among itsareas of work a Strategy on the protection of theecosystems and biological diversity of themaritime area. The aim of this strategy is toprotect and conserve marine ecosystems whichare, or could be, affected by human activities. Tothis end, the members of this convention,including Spain, have proposed the creation of anetwork of protected marine reserves within theOSPAR area. This network will also include areasthat the European Union member statesdesignate as Special Areas of Conservationaccording to the EU Birds and HabitatsDirectives. The timescale for adopting thisnetwork of protected marine reserves is 2010.

The United Nations’ International MaritimeOrganisation (IMO)32 establishes the so-called“Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas” (commonlyreferred to as PSSA) for areas which require

special protection because of their importance,due to ecological, scientific or socio-economicreasons, and may be susceptible to damagecaused by international maritime activities.Currently, there exist six: the Great Barrier Reefin Australia (1990), the Sabana-CamagüeyArchipelago in Cuba (1997), the Malpelo Islandin Colombia (2002), Florida Keys in the UnitedStates (2002), the Wadden Sea in Denmark,Germany and Holland (2002) and the ParacasNational Park in Peru (2003). The Nordic andBaltic transport ministers recently backed theproposal to designate the Baltic Sea as theseventh “Particularly Sensitive Sea Area”, withthe aim of “preventing oil slicks in the area suchas those caused by the Erika and thePrestige”.

In April 2003, the Spanish government, togetherwith five other countries (the United Kingdom,France, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium) presentedthe Marine Environmental Protection Committeeof the International Maritime Organisation withan initiative for the establishment of aParticularly Sensitive Sea Area from the southcoast of Portugal to the north of the ShetlandIslands in Scotland. This area therefore includesthe Galician and Cantabrian coasts. The “WestEuropean PSSA” also includes two importantpassageways for international shipping traffic,the Faeroe Islands’ channel, to the north of theUnited Kingdom, and the English Channel,between the United Kingdom and France.

The proposal seeks to ban the passing of single-hull tankers which transport heavy crude oil,heavy fuel oil, bitumen, tar and their emulsionswithin the boundaries of the protected sea area.Countries such as Russia, Greece, NewZealand, Panama, Brazil, Liberia and Argentinahave strongly opposed this declaration,claiming that the specified area is sensitive tomany other threats besides that of single-hulled shipping traffic.

Another argument used to oppose this protectedsea area is that it will affect the routes followedby tankers and will force them to alter theircourse and sail through areas of great ecologicalvalue, thereby increasing the risk of disasters.

Article 194 of the Law of the Sea31

states the need to take the measuresthat are necessary in order to protectand conserve special or vulnerableecosystems, as well as the habitats ofspecies and other forms of marine lifewhich have been decimated,threatened or are in danger.

oo


Other nations such as India, Canada, theUnited States, Singapore, Norway and Cubahave also expressed their reluctance todesignate this stretch of the Atlantic as aprotected sea area, both due to its vastdimension and the risk that it involves for

other coastal countries since it wouldincrease the number of dangerous ships thatpass along their coasts33. The decision of theInternational Maritime Organisation inrelation to this proposal will be announcedin 2004.

The discrepancies between all these countriesserve to demonstrate the scarce importance thatcountries give to the environment, as well as thehypocrisy that surrounds internationalagreements and agencies. In the case in hand,some countries (including some recognised flagsof convenience) prefer not to protect an areathat is seriously threatened by oil slicks, arguingthat there exist other threats or that the area tobe protected is too large, despite being aware ofthe risks involved. However, they avoid dealingwith the root of the problem and say nothingabout those who are really to blame: thethousands of ships that sail all around the world

33This is a recurring problem. When the Exxon Valdez accident took place in Alaska, the United States toughed its laws to ban the passing of single-hulltankers through its waters, which meant that this kind of vessel moved to Europe.

The Black Sea

The Persian Gulf area

The Red Sea The Gulf of AdenThe Great Caribbean area

Florida Keys

The Malpelo Island

The ParacasNational Park

The Antarctic Ocean

The Baltic SeaThe North Sea

The Wadden Sea

The GreatBarrier Reef

The Mediterranean Sea

Special area MARPOL

Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) - (IMO)

The Sabana-CamagüeyArchipelago

The IMO considers expelling Greenpeace/The IMO must accept its responsibilities and protect theplanet’s seas and oceans from all the threats that arecurrently posed by maritime traffic. Greenpeace has formedpart of the IMO, as an observing body, since 1991. In Juneof this year, following complaints presented on behalf of theindustry and certain countries (not clearly identified) regar-ding the environmental protest activities that Greenpeacehas been carrying out for over 30 years, the InternationalAgency considered its expulsion. The final decision will betaken in a meeting which will be held at the end ofNovember.

o

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 26

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 27

34This Directive designates Special Protection Areas for Birds or SPABs.35Later modified by Directive 97/62/EC, concerning the conservation of Natural Habitats and Wild Fauna and Flora.36This Directive designates Sites of Community Importance or SCIs.37The Natura 2000 Network should have been in operation since 2000, as its name suggests, but the delays suffered by practically all countries inproviding a list of important sites and the presentation of incomplete lists has hugely delayed the implementation of this European network of protectedareas.38Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism. Informe sobre el refuerzo de la seguridad marítima tras el naufragio del petrolero Prestige (2003/2066 (INI)). 15July 2003.

and whose deplorable conditions turn them intogenuine time bombs ready to ruin the way of lifeof thousands of people. The InternationalMaritime Organisation establishes protectivemeasures but the member states do not want toimplement them if this will affect the hugeinterests that control the world-wide traffic ofhazardous substances, even when this has justcaused an episode of environmental, economicand social destruction along 2,000 kilometres ofcoast in the Iberian Peninsula.

We do not know what decision the InternationalMaritime Organisation will take, but even if thisprotected marine area is approved in October ofnext year, the measure is insufficient to recoverthe area affected by the oil slick, since the otherthreats will continue to exist, as is acknowledgedby many countries. The Prestige serves as agood example to demonstrate that the distancingof maritime traffic is not, in itself, a solution tothe problem. Despite the fact that the ship sank130 miles away from the peninsular coast, thisdistance only meant that the area affected wasmuch greater than if the accident had occurred ina closed bay. Moreover, when a ship finds itself indifficulty at a great distance from the coast, ittakes longer to go to its rescue and the likelihoodof a disastrous outcome becomes greater.

In this case, it would only give a legal status tothe regulatory measure established by theEuropean Union to forbid the entry of single-hulled ships transporting certain substances intoits ports. What is more, the protective measurefor the area has not been agreed with the fishingcommunity nor with scientific bodies. Nor havethe most valuable natural areas which mustbenefit from strict protection been identified.

The Spanish government has a duty andobligation to implement all necessary measureswithin its sphere of activity, where it cannot bedenied the right to create protected areas whichwill help to prevent new catastrophes and willbenefit the environmental and economicrecovery of the affected areas.

At an international level, the European Unionprovides for the establishment of protectednatural areas, but there exists no specific ordistinct status to protect marine areas.

The regulations referring to protected marineareas are contained within two directives:Directive 79/409/EEC, concerning theconservation of wild birds34 and, above all,Directive 92/43/EEC35 concerning the conservationof natural habitats36, whose objectives are tocontribute to guaranteeing biodiversity throughthe conservation of natural habitats, wild floraand fauna in the European territory of themember states. The practical implementation ofthese two Directives for Birds and Habitats hasled to the creation of a European environmentalnetwork called “Natura 2000”,37 consisting of theso-called “Special Protection Areas” (SPAs).

The importance of the areas that constitutethe Natura 2000 Network is explained in thereport about the Prestige38 that was presentedin the European Parliamentin September, which demands an evaluationof the negative environmental repercussions,placing special emphasis on the sites proposedfor inclusion within the Natura 2000 networkand natural areas of environmental interestwhich lie within the area affectedby the oil slick.

Similarly, the European Parliament report:

Requests the immediate fulfilment of theDirective relating to habitats in areas ofenvironmental interest located in thecorresponding coastal regions of the EU andtheir immediate inclusion in the Natura 2000network.

Furthermore, if the declarationof a protected sea areais not accompanied by othertechnical measures then it willnot provide any real protectiono

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 28


Reiterates the requests approved in itsresolutions of 21st November 2002 regardingthe Prestige oil tanker catastrophe off thecoast of Galicia and 19th December 2002regarding the catastrophe caused by thePrestige oil tanker, to create sensitiveEuropean fishing-maritime areas, chosen asa result of their great fishing and shellfishingwealth and the high dependency of theirpopulations on these resources.

Despite this request, Spain has still notannounced any proposals for evaluation,recovery and protection in this sense.

We can affirm that, in general, the protected seaareas strategy is not in very good health due tothree factors: the scarce number of protectedmarine reserves, which makes it impossible toprovide effective protection, the small size ofmany of the protected areas, a limiting factorwhen it comes to enjoying the benefits providedby protected marine reserves, and the lack ofreal protection provided for them, since in manycases there barely exists any form of surveillanceor control and the protection that theysupposedly receive is not enforced.

At the end of 2002, Spain possessed 87439

protected areas, of which only 19 correspondto protected marine reserves. The creation ofprotected marine reserves in Spain has notbeen the result of an objective analysis ofconservation and management needs, it hasinstead been the consequence of opportunisticmotives, in an attempt to avoid sociallyconflictive situations.

The combination of coastal laws affecting theland environment and those affecting themarine environment creates a complexlegislative situation in which the responsibilityfor certain territories is assigned to differentadministrative authorities (fundamentallyregional and national). These legislativedivisions do not coincide with the maritime-coastal ecoregions and create “artificial”administrative divisions within the existingenvironmental units.

Another fact to bear in mind is that themajority of marine areas with some form oflegal protection are to be found in the

Mediterranean and, to a lesser degree, in theCanary Islands. In contrast, the protected areason the Atlantic coast are much fewer innumber and much smaller in size, despite theIslas Atlánticas on the Galician coast beingdeclared a National Park in the year 200240.

This geographical imbalance in the degree ofprotection is not based on ecological worth,since that of the Atlantic and Cantabriancoastline equals or exceeds that of theMediterranean. We must seek an explanationfor this disproportion in social, economic,political and administrative areas. Differences inhow and to what extent protected marinereserves are used and an understanding of theirusefulness as a management and conservationtool have created a socio-economic andadministrative context in the Mediterraneanand the Canary Islands which favours theprotection of coastal and marine areas.

The administration should have been aware ofthis inequality and should have taken steps toequal the balance, however it has permitted asituation in which the Atlantic, a coastal areawith many fishing grounds, has not one singlemarine reserve.

Without doubt, the vulnerable situation of thiscoastline has been aggravated by the impact ofthe Prestige oil slick, whose fuel oil hasburied a good part of some exceptionallyvaluable marine and coastal ecosystems ofgreat natural wealth and biodiversity.

The Spanish government has not presented asingle proposal for the protection of naturalmaritime and coastal areas affected by the oilslick, despite the international scientificcommunity’s recognition of the benefits thatthis protection would provide.

Existing scientific information justifies theestablishment of protected marine reserveswith total protection as a key management toolfor coastal and marine ecosystems. Theprotection of the most valuable areas from allthe threats that they face would bring about asubstantial improvement in their natural stateand would allow them to act as true “Noah’sarks”, exporting biodiversity to the othercoastal and marine areas affected.

39EUROPARC-España yearbook on the condition of protected natural areas 2002.40The Islas Atlánticas National Park includes the marine areas that surround the following islands: Cíes, Ons, Sálvora and Cortejada.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 29

SPANISH MARINE PROTECTED AREAS/

2

3

4

57

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

21

9

10

8

6

1

18

19

20

1 Illes Medes (Girona-Catalunya)2 Cap de Creus (Girona-Catalunya)3 Ses Negres (Girona-Catalunya)4 Masía Balanca (Tarragona-Catalunya)5 Bahía de Palma (Mallorca-Balearic Island)6 Nord de Menorca (Balearic Island)7 Migjorn de Mallorca (Balearic Island)8 Freus d´Eivissa I Formentera (Balearic Island)9 Llevant (Mallorca-Balearic Island)10 Archipiélago de Cabrera (Balearic Island)11 Islas Columbretes (Castellón-C. Valenciana)12 Cabo de San Antonio (Alicante-C. Valenciana)13 Isla de Tabarca (Alicante-C. Valenciana)14 Cabo de Palos-Islas Hormigas (Murcia)15 Cabo de Gata-Níjar (Almería-Andalucía)16 Isla de Alborán (Andalucía)17 Gaztelugatxe (Bizkaia-Basque Country)18 Isla Graciosa e Islotes del Norte de Lanzarote

(Canary Island)19 Punta de la Restinga-Mar de las Calmas

(El Hierro-Canary Island)20 Isla de la Palma (Canary Island)21 Islas Atlánticas (Galicia)

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 30


41Data provided by Biosfera XXI, Estudios Ambientales, S.L.

2.653 Km

1.685 Km

Coast longitude

Coast longitude

Priority habitats(Habitats Directive)

SCIs designated Protected NaturalAreas

Priority habitats SCIs designated Protected NaturalAreas

2.336 Km

1.183 Km

449 Km100% 88%

44,5%16,9%

86%

GALI

CIA

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

49%

13%

299 KmCoast longitude

Priority habitats SCIs designated Protected NaturalAreas

100%

CANT

ABRI

A

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

45%

23%


SCIs designated Protected NaturalAreas

80%

BASQ

UE C

OUNT

RY

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

67%

48%


Priority habitats SCIs designated v

96%

ASTU

RIAS

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

013% 10%

Priority habitats

oThe vulnerability of the coastline affectedby the Prestige

An analysis of the coast affected by thePrestige oil slick enables us to observe thevulnerability of this 2,653 kilometre-longcoastal region. Of this stretch, 88% (2,336 km)constitutes priority habitats according to theHabitats Directive, of which 1,183 kilometres

have been designated Sites of CommunityImportance (SCIs) but only 449 km have beendeclared to be Protected Natural Areas41. Inother words, only 16.9% of the entire coastaffected by the oil slick currently receives realprotection.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 31

Despite the essential role played by the marineenvironment in the ecological balance, neitherthe Spanish government nor the regionalauthorities have taken particular interest inprotecting the marine environment. Thissituation is particularly clear in the case of themaritime-coastal region along the Cantabrianand Galician Atlantic coasts.

Greenpeace demands the creation of aneffective network of protected areas along theCantabrian and Galician Atlantic coastline. Thisprotection would greatly speed up therecovery of the coastal ecosystems that havebeen affected along the 2,000 kilometrestretch of coast. This network must cover aconsiderable area in order to provideprotection against new catastrophes and laythe foundations for a sustainable use ofmarine resources in the future, compatiblewith the recovery of those areas affected bythe Prestige. A sustainable use that was farfrom being a reality before the oil-tankeraccident occurred.

However, no governmental department has putforward any proposals in this respect, despitethe European Union’s specific requestexpressed in the report about reinforcingmaritime safety after the sinking of thePrestige oil tanker, presented before theEuropean Parliament in September42.

The creation of new protected marine reserveswill, without doubt, benefit the environment,economy and society. In such areas, theconservation strategies established must bebased on an integrated management methodwhich analyses all the uses, resources andservices that are offered by the varioushabitats and geographical locations. Inaccordance with this information, the differentareas must be divided into zones, for whichthe permitted intensity and nature of humanuse must be defined.

On the basis of these ideas, Greenpeace putsforward the following proposals for protection:

Estuaries and coastal wetlands: Allareas of this type must be protected andincluded within the European Natura 2000network, as was recently demanded by theEuropean Parliament43. In these areas, theuse of destructive fishing methods(particularly different forms of dredging andtrawling) which disturb the characteristicsedimentary habitat must be forbidden.Surrounding urban development must belimited and activities that affect theecological balance must be prevented(pollution, eutrophication, alterations towater flow or sediments).

Islas Atlánticas National Park: Thenumber of areas included must be extendednorthwards, as was requested by severalbodies at the time of its creation: IslasSisargas, Islas Loberías and adjacent coastalareas, as well as other smaller islands andneighbouring areas of open coast.

One Year On

42Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism. Informe sobre el refuerzo de la seguridad marítima tras el naufragio del petrolero Prestige (2003/2066 (INI)). 15July 2003.43Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism Committee. Informe sobre el refuerzo de la seguridad marítima tras el naufragio del petrolero Prestige(2003/2066 (INI)). 15 July 2003.

o Proposal for the protection of marine and coastalareas on the Galician Atlantic and Cantabrian coasts

The protection of these areas is doublyimportant due to their ecological valueand their usefulness in the recoveryprocess

o

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 32


Chain of exposed coastal areasalong the entire coastline: Theexposed sea areas along the Galician andCantabrian coast possess great biodiversityand are highly important as habitats forcertain fishing resources (goose barnacles,mussel seeds and diverse fish species, forexample). Many of the species that live inthese habitats consist of restricted localpopulations and their reproductive successdepends on their interrelation with othernearby populations. This type of ecosystemhas been severely affected by the recent oilslick caused by the Prestige. What ismore, the impact has been extensive.

These facts make it reasonable to supposethat the recovery of the affected populationswill be slower than that observed in previousdisasters of this type since, in this case, all thelocal populations have been destroyed alonglong stretches of the coast.

Thus, the administration should begin adesign process for this network of protectedareas. The process should be open to all usersand interested parties, including fishermen

and women, the scientific community andsociety in general. The involvement offishermen and women is of vital importancesince decades of centralised fisheriesmanagement have clearly shown that iffishermen and -women are not involved in thedecisions that affect the management ofnatural resources, it is very difficult to ensurethat they are carried out effectively.

44Proposal for coastal protection: "Arcas de Noe". Dr. Elsa Vázquez Otero and Dr. Jesús Souza Troncoso. Department of Ecology and Animal Biology,University of Vigo

pro tecc ión a toda cos ta

Noah’s Arks to recover the coast affectedby the Prestige44

Among the studies carried out in the areaaffected by the Prestige disaster, there existsa coastal protection proposal prepared by theDepartment of Ecology and Animal Biology ofthe University of Vigo which suggests thecreation of a network of special-interest areascalled “Noah’s Arks” along the entire Galiciancoast.

The aim of this network is to protect a group ofvaluable areas that have been affected by theimpact of the oil spill. These areas have been

chosen on the basis of their ecological value aswell as technical criteria such as accessibilityand closeness to pollution-fightinginfrastructures. The objective of theestablishment of a network of protectedmarine reserves is twofold:

to guarantee the reproduction of organismsthat have survived the oil slick.

to repopulate the areas damaged by fuel,once they have been cleaned.o

o

o

oThe Spanish administration shouldbegin a design process for a network of marine protected areas

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 33

From A Guarda to Cabo SilleiroPunta dos Picos (A Guarda)Rocks surrounding Santa María de Oia Cabo Silleiro

Vigo RiaRocky area to the left of Playa AméricaRocks between Monteferro and the left side of Patos beachPunta SobreiraPunta BorneiraPunta Robaleira & Cabo Home

Pontevedra RiaCabo UdraPunta Fagilda in Sanxenxo

Arousa RiaPunta Aguieira on the O Grove peninsulaPunta Centolleiro in Aguiño

Muros & Noia RiaCastro de BaroñaPunta Insua in Lira

From Monte Louro to CaiónPunta de CaldebarcosPunta Carballino to the south of O PindoRocks between Fisterra & Caión

Golfo ÁrtabroPunta Langosteira in ArteixoIslas de San Pedro in A CoruñaPunta Herminia in A CoruñaPunta Bufadoiro in Mera Punta Corbal (Lorbé) on the left side of the Ares-Betanzos RiaIslas Mirandas in Ares-Betanzos RiaPunta do Segaño in Ferrol RiaCariño in Ferrol RiaPunta del Castro opposite Illas Gabeiras

From Cabo Prior to Estaca de BaresRocks to the right of ValdoviñoRocks on the outer side of Cedeira harbourPunta do Castro on the outer side of Cariño harbourPunta dos Prados on the outer side of Espasante harbourIlla Coelleira in Estaca de Bares

Lugo CoastPunta Padiñas in Viveiro RiaPunta Roncadoira in PortoceloPunta de Morás in San CipriánBetween Cabo Burela and Playa de Marosa (right side)Punta do Cabo in FozRocky outcrop in RinloRibadeo Lighthouse

THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD IN THIS SCIENTIFIC STUDY IS AS FOLLOWS/

1

2

3

4

5

6

78

910

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2930

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 34


1

2

3

4 5

6

78

9

10

12

13

14

1516

17

18 19 20

22

23

2425

26

27 28

2930 31

32

3334

35

3637

38

21

11

This proposal, drawn up by scientists, could be the starting point for a much larger networkwhich would cover the whole of the affected coastline.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 35


he recovery of coastal andmarine areas affected by the oilslick caused by the Prestigewill not be sufficient ifgovernments and theInternational MaritimeOrganisation, responsible for thesafety of maritime traffic

throughout the world, do not strengthen theregulations to prevent oil slicks. Theseregulations should also ensure that thosewhich cause spills do not escape financialresponsibility. Together with the reinforcementof maritime safety, the Spanish government

must work to provide the measures and plansthat are necessary in order to fight oil slicksefficiently. The shortcomings that werewitnessed during the Prestige accident madethis very clear.

The fight against pollution from the land mustbe another objective. Besides large andspectacular oil slicks, coastal waters receivevast amounts of pollution every day in theform of industrial and urban sewage anddumping of all kinds, which relentlesslydeteriorate the quality of the marineenvironment.

The recent report that was presented in theEuropean Parliament about the reinforcementof maritime safety following the sinking ofthe Prestige oil tanker considers itnecessary to prepare specific emergencyplans in areas of heavy maritime traffic45.Similarly, it asks for protection, preventionand surveillance programmes to beimplemented for maritime transport routes inthose areas which are most vulnerable andare exposed to the risk of chemical and oilaccidents. The report asks the Commissionand the European Council to present a co-ordinated proposal to the InternationalMaritime Organisation for the declaration ofsensitive maritime routes along the coasts ofthe European Union which contemplates theneed to establish a “zero” level of pollutingdischarges, as well as a ban on thetransportation of dangerous products.

The member states of the European Unionmust take their role in the InternationalMaritime Organisation seriously. The

European Union is an observer at the IMO, itis the states that are full members, hence aninitial move should be that the EU itself gainsfull member status. The EU and its memberStates need to argue the case for strongermeasures within the IMO. The toughening ofmeasures in European waters alone will onlyserve to move the current fleet of‘rustbuckets’ towards countries in the South.

45Regional Policy, Transport and Toursim Committee. Informe sobre el refuerzo de la seguridad marítima tras el naufragio del petrolero Prestige(2003/2066 (INI)). 15 July 2003.

Solutions aimed at preventingnew catastrophes

Tt

oMeasures to improve the safetyof maritime traffic

Until now, the demands made bythe European Union have not beentake into account by theInternational MaritimeOrganisation, which has made noprogress on issues relating tomaritime safety despite the factthat a year has passed since thePrestige catastrophe

oo

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 36


One of the first aspects that the IMO shouldmodify is the regime of responsibility thatarises from an accident. The currentcompensation system is based on the limitedfinancial responsibility of the owner of thevessel, according to the tonnage of the ship.In the case of the sinking of the Erika oiltanker off the French coast three years ago,responsibility was limited to 13.5 millioneuros, despite the fact that the damageaccumulated as a result of the oil slicktotalled almost 1,000 million euros. What ismore, under the current system, thisresponsibility is restricted exclusively to theshipowner whilst the managers, charterers,operators and owners of the load (which, inthe case of oil slicks, are usually largemultinational oil companies) are entirelyexempt of all responsibility.

Following the case of the Exxon Valdez(property of Exxon) and the Erika (property ofthe company TotalFina), in which the affectedcountries demanded that the oil companiesaccepted their responsibility for the oil slickcaused, the reaction of these companies didnot lead to an increase in safety but insteadquite the opposite. The large oil companieshave gradually reduced their safety measuresin order to evade their responsibilities. Overthe last decade, they have done away with alarge part of their crude oil transportationfleet and have chosen to transport theirhazardous products in cheap vessels hiredfrom intermediary companies. Thus, in theevent of an accident, responsibility isdispersed. There is no better example thanthat of the Prestige, in which the cargo-owning company, the Swiss firm CrownResources, legally vanished after the accident.

Greenpeace has demanded a change in thesystem, in order that responsibility beextended to the entire transport chain,including the owners of the cargo. This wouldmean that the use of ‘rustbuckets’ for thetransportation of products would no longer belucrative. However, one year after the accidentinvolving the Prestige oil tanker, theInternational Maritime Organisation has takenno steps to change the current regime ofresponsibility and continues to allow hundredsof “profitable” time bombs to sail the oceansand seas of the entire world.

Another of the issues often related to oilslicks is the so-called flags of convenience. ThePrestige was registered in the Bahamas, oneof the nations which awards flags without anyconcern for the fulfilment of internationalregulations, including those referring tomaritime transport safety. Flags ofconvenience are a common factor in a largenumber of shipping accidents in that theyprovide a loophole through whichdisreputable shipping companies and ownerscan avoid their responsibilities. Despite this,the International Maritime Organisation hasnot introduced any changes in the regulationsto prevent their use or sanction thosecountries that violate the legislation withabsolute impunity.

Lastly, another common factor in many oilslicks are single-hulled tankers, which providemuch lower levels of safety than thoseequipped with a doublehull. The hiring ofthese vessels for the transportation of allkinds of products is very common since theyare, generally, cheaper. The reality of thesituation shows that they are more likely tosuffer accidents. The International MaritimeOrganisation has done nothing to preventthese ships from transporting hazardoussubstances all around the world.

However, in the absence o any moves by theIMO, the European Union has taken action,albeit limited, in this area. It has modified theregulations in order to ban the entry of single-hull tankers in European ports from 20thOctober onwards. Despite being important,this measure is insufficient since it does not

Greenpeace has demandeda change in the system,in order that responsibilitybe extended to the entiretransport chain, includingthe owners of the cargoo

o

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 37


prevent ships like the Prestige from sailingthrough European waters (it only forbids themto dock in its ports) and nor is it useful infighting oil slicks such as that caused by theExxon Valdez, a double-hulled oil tanker, inAlaska. The EU has also proposed certainMarine Protected Areas. While neither of thesemeasures go far enough, they are at least morethan has been taken by the IMO.

The European Union must do more to preventsafety policies from being determined by theoil companies. The regulations decreed by theEU are reduced to promises and a selectivetoughening of the rules, clearly adapted tocertain commercial interests which do not giveas much importance to protecting the marineand coastal environment.

Although governments and industry should fullycomply with the polluter pays principle, thereality is that the financial liability paid bycommercial interests is absurdly low. The realcost is borne by the citizens and the environmenton which they and their livelihoods depend. Inthis context, it becomes clear that the interest ininvesting to improve ship safety is minimal.

IMO: ACT NOW!It is clear that a range of measures needs to be implemented urgently which would increase the quality of shipping. These include:

A liability regime which can both act as an incentive to use high quality ships and crews and which is more consistent with the polluter pays principle.This means that the charterers (i.e. the oil companies in the case of tankers)should not be excluded from liability as is currently the situation.

The rapid phase out of single-hulled tankers worldwide.

The establishment of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) for the mostvulnerable coastlines.

A more robust and transparent inspection and maintenance regime including the publicationof classification society survey results.

Closure of loopholes such as the use of Flags of Convenience whereby shipowners can avoidtheir responsibilities by flagging a vessel with a county in which the standards are lowest.

!

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 38


46El Impacto del Prestige. Análisis y Evaluación de los daños causados por el accidente del Prestige y dispositivos para la regeneración medioambiental yrecuperación económica de Galicia. Galician Economic Studies Institute, Pedro Barrié de la Maza.47El libro blanco del Prestige. Fundación Alternativas. 2003.48Note 299 of the Ministry of Public Works. La Seguridad Marítima en los PGE-2004. http://www.xunta.es49“El Gobierno presupuesta más de mil millones para arrancar el Plan Galicia” (The government budgets over one thousand million to start the PlanGalicia). La Voz de Galicia. 8/10/03.

Despite having suffered successive incidents ofserious pollution on our coasts as the result ofshipping accidents, Spain still has no resourcesor contingency planning to lessen the effects ofa catastrophe of this type. Despite the opinionsexpressed by the government stating theopposite, prevention is fundamental. Wecannot continue to believe that oil slicks areinevitable, something we have heard from thelips of more than one official, and that littlemore can be done than to trust that the windwill take the spilt cargo far away.

Ignorance of the natural processes that takeplace in different parts of the world may leadone to believe that nature is unpredictable.However, the true situation demonstrates thatan ever more exhaustive understanding ofthese processes allows their evolution to befully explained and, to a certain degree, allowsnatural phenomena to be predicted46.

The Ministry of Public Works is responsible forapplying and implementing the ContingencyPlan to fight sea pollution, required by both the

Law on Ports and the Merchant Navy and theMARPOL Convention, in order to control shipsand their spillages. Despite this legal mandatefor the creation and implementation ofcontingency plans which would make itpossible to fight accidental sea pollution in allthe maritime areas of the coastal regions ofSpain, not a single plan is currently operative inSpain. The basic regulations for their creationwere not even developed until the year 200147.

The Galician Autonomous Government wasplanning to approve a Decree with a BasicContingency Plan for Sea Pollution at the startof September, to guarantee the co-ordinationbetween competent bodies during pollutionincidents and predict the resources and servicesnecessary in the event of another oil slick.However, this has not yet come into being.

Spain lacks the tugs and anti-pollution barriersnecessary to deal with oil slicks. Despite this,the Ministry of Public Works has assignedthousands of millions of euros to theInfrastructures Plan, many of which have beengiven by the European Union, to continuefinancing the transformation of the naturalenvironment via the construction of ports,airports, dual carriageways and motorways.

In October 2003, the Ministry of Public Worksannounced that in 2004 it would spend 123.5million euros on a programme for maritimetraffic safety and coastal surveillance inGalicia48. This figure sharply contrasts with the1,045 million euros that it will invest ininfrastructures in this region, as part of the so-called “Plan Galicia”49.

In the report about the Prestige prepared by theEuropean Parliament, a request is made for theCommission to include the establishment ofUrgent Intervention Plans for all European coastal

o Safety measures to fight pollutionand catastrophes o

1.200

1.000

800

600

400

200

0

Plan Galicia Maritime safety P.

SPANISH GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT FOR 2004(MILLIONS OF EUROS)/

1.045

123,5

Source/ General National Budget 2004

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 39


areas within the agenda of the VI Research andTechnological Development Framework Programmefor the year 2004. These plans would make itpossible to face all kinds of risks and catastrophes,as well as the design and construction of new shipstechnologically developed for collecting andcleaning toxic sea spills and the promotion of newtechnologies for environmental recovery and thetreatment of waste.

However, the Spanish administration cannot sitback and wait for the European Union to comeand solve the problems that occur on ourcoasts. The Spanish government must promotethe development of European actions whilst atthe same time taking immediate measures toprotect the coast, since this is exclusively andsolely their responsibility.

It is therefore necessary to establish protocolsfor action in the event of different types ofaccidents in the various maritime regions ofSpain. Equally, refuge or shelter areas must becreated which are specially equipped to harbourdamaged ships, with the aim of spatially limitingthe effects of the accident.

One of the projects envisaged in the Plan Galiciais the construction of a new exterior port in ACoruña which some officials have attempted tojustify as a “port of refuge”.It is clear that an exterior port is completelyunsuited to the function of a shelter area andthat a port of refuge must be exclusively devotedto this task and is therefore incompatible withthe activities of a commercial port.

Another necessary measure is the redefinition ofpowers regarding the protection andconservation of the maritime-coastalenvironment in order to guarantee animmediate and co-ordinated response andefficient management which would give priorityto safeguarding the environment, over andabove commercial or corporate interests.

Both ports and oil companies must be obligedto have sufficient anti-pollution resources in

order to deal with the pollution caused by thesubstances that are being transported, loaded orunloaded, in the event of an accident.

The state must also invest in anti-pollutionresources:

Anti-pollution ships with the capacity toabsorb and store polluting substances,permanently located in areas of greatestmaritime traffic: Bay of Biscay, Galicia,Andalusia, the Mediterranean and the CanaryIslands.Anti-pollution barriers to fight serious casesof pollution in the worst possible sea andweather conditions, also distributedthroughout the various maritime areas, withthe resources necessary for their installation.

The current increase in general-purpose ports,apart from the 43 existing ports, which competeamongst themselves to attract new maritimetraffic in order to survive, does nothing butincrease the risks, to the detriment of ourthreatened coastline.

“Princess Eva” versus “Prestige”/

In January 2003, “Princess Eva”, loaded with55,000 tonnes of crude oil entered Donegal Bay inIreland, with cracks on the deck as the result of aviolent storm. Ireland took the decision to keep theboat in the bay, accepting the risk that an oil spillcould occur. Once inside the bay, the Marine SafetyDirectorate, together with the Irish Coast Guard andthe Marine Survey Office demanded that the ship-ping operator transfer the cargo to another shipand provisionally repair the “Princess Eva” inIreland. The ship left Ireland a few months later,with the cracks on the deck welded and her tanksempty.

In November 2002, the “Prestige”, loaded with77,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, sent out an SOS ata distance of 28 miles from Finisterre, in Spain. Acrack on its starboard side meant that it was losingsome of its cargo. Spain took the decision to sendthe “Prestige” far from its coast, out to sea, whenthe boat was already losing oil and had beenseriously damaged by the sea’s actions. What hap-pened was inevitable: the boat split in two andsank. The rest of the story is well-known.

Gre

enpe

ace/

The

Pre

stig

e D

isas

ter:

One

Yea

r O

n/ 40


The Prestige disaster has aggravated thepoor situation of the marine and coastalenvironment along the affected coast.However, it is not the only cause of thisdeterioration. The destruction of habitats,pollution and the effects of climate changeare the most obvious results of a series ofactivities that have been identified for sometime now: overfishing, oil and gasprospecting, maritime transport, theaccumulation and transportation ofhazardous substances, waste dumping,excessive port infrastructures and sand andgravel extraction.

The spills which originate from ships,accidental or otherwise, are not the onlysource of pollution for the maritime-coastalenvironment. They represent 25% of thepollution that reaches the coast and sea. Therest comes from the land.

The lack of knowledge about marine andcoastal ecosystems and the benefits that canbe obtained by preserving them in goodcondition is reflected in the inconceivable,

arbitrary and thoughtless decisions that aretaken regarding the location of industries,landfills, exterior ports, etc, which altermarine hydrodynamics, destroy animal andplant communities and pour all kinds ofwaste into the sea, promising to convertcertain coastal areas into sewers.

The control of pollution from the land andfrom ports located along the length of thecoast must become a reality as soon aspossible, in order to completely prevent allwaste materials from entering the sea.

oThe elimination of threatsin the coastal region

Hydrocarbon research licences in the bay of biscay,opposite the Asturian coast/

On 24th October of this year, the cabinet ministers approved a Royal Decree by which five researchlicences were awarded to the company Repsol Investigaciones Petrolíferas, S.A. giving it the exclusiveright to search for hydrocarbons during a period of six years in an area of 478,863 hectares locatedopposite the Asturian coast.

Drilling activities and the future installation of oil platforms will in no way contribute to improving thecoast affected by the Prestige oil slick. However, this does not seem to matter to the Spanish govern-ment, which allows a dangerous activity to be carried out along the damaged coastline without evenhaving presented a recovery plan for the area. Instead of eliminating existing threats, they are addinggreater uncertainty to the coast’s future.

The Prestige disaster hasaggravated the poor situationof the marine and coastalenvironment alongthe affected coast

oo

Documents

ThePrestigeDisaster€¦ · / The Prestige Disaster: One Year On/ 5 Never again another Prestige Far away from the press headlines, an almost silent battle is being fought between