20
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers Sponsored for CME Credit by Rush University Medical Center Release Date: April 1, 2005 Expiration Date: March 31, 2007 and T errorism D isaster WHAT CLINICIANS NEED TO KNOW

Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    4

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

Viral HemorrhagicFevers

Sponsored for CME Credit byRush University Medical Center

Release Date: April 1, 2005Expiration Date: March 31, 2007

andTerrorism

DisasterWHAT CLINICIANS NEED TO KNOW

Page 2: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

andTerrorism

DisasterWHAT CLINICIANS NEED TO KNOW

SERIES EDITORSRush University Medical CenterChicago, IllinoisStephanie R. Black, MD*Assistant Professor of MedicineSection of Infectious DiseasesDepartment of Internal Medicine

Daniel Levin, MD*Assistant ProfessorGeneral Psychiatry Residency DirectorDepartment of Psychiatry

Gillian S. Gibbs, MPH*Project CoordinatorCenter of Excellence for BioterrorismPreparedness

Linnea S. Hauge, PhD*Educational SpecialistDepartment of General Surgery

AUTHORSRush University Medical CenterChicago, IllinoisStephanie R. Black, MD*Assistant Professor of MedicineSection of Infectious DiseasesDepartment of Internal Medicine

Daniel Levin, MD*Assistant ProfessorGeneral Psychiatry Residency DirectorDepartment of Psychiatry

Uniformed Services UniversityHealth SciencesBethesda, MarylandDavid M. Benedek, MD, LTC, MC, USAAssociate Professor of Psychiatry

Steven J. Durning, MD, Maj, USAF, MC*Associate Professor of Medicine

Thomas A. Grieger, MD, CAPT, MC, USN*Associate Professor of PsychiatryAssociate Professor of Military & Emergency MedicineAssistant Chair of Psychiatry for Graduate & Continuing Education

Molly J. Hall, MD, Col, USAF, MC, FS*Assistant Chair & Associate ProfessorDepartment of Psychiatry

Derrick Hamaoka, MD, Capt, USAF, MC, FS*Director, Third Year ClerkshipInstructor of Psychiatry

Paul A. Hemmer, MD, MPH, Lt Col, USAF, MC*Associate Professor of Medicine

Benjamin W. Jordan, MD, CDR, MC, USNR, FS*Assistant Professor of Psychiatry

James M. Madsen, MD, MPH, COL, MC-FS, USA*Associate Professor of Preventive Medicine and BiometricsScientific Advisor, Chemical Casualty CareDivision, US Army Medical Research Institute of Clinical Defense (USAMRICD), APG-EA

Deborah Omori, MD, MPH, FACP, COL, MC, USA*Associate Professor of Medicine

Michael J. Roy, MD, MPH, FACP, LTC, MC*Associate Professor of MedicineDirector, Division of Internal Medicine

Jamie Waselenko, MD, FACP**Assistant Professor of MedicineAssistant Chief, Hematology/OncologyWalter Reed Army Medical CenterWashington, DC

Guest FacultyRonald E. Goans, PhD, MD, MPH*Clinical Associate ProfessorTulane University School of Public Health &Tropical MedicineNew Orleans, LA

Sunita Hanjura, MD*Rockville Internal Medicine Group Rockville, MD

Niranjan Kanesa-Thasan, MD, MTMH*Director, Medical Affairs & PharmacovigilanceAcambisCambridge, MA

Jennifer C. Thompson, MD, MPH, FACP*Chief, Department of Clinical InvestigationWilliam Beaumont Army Medical CenterEl Paso, TX

Faculty Disclosure PolicyIt is the policy of the Rush University MedicalCenter Office of Continuing MedicalEducation to ensure that its CME activitiesare independent, free of commercial biasand beyond the control of persons or organi-zations with an economic interest in influ-encing the content of CME. Everyone who is in a position to control the content of aneducational activity must disclose all relevantfinancial relationships with any commercialinterest (including but not limited to pharma-ceutical companies, biomedical device manu-facturers, or other corporations whose prod-ucts or services are related to the subjectmatter of the presentation topic) within thepreceding 12 months If there are relation-ships that create a conflict of interest, thesemust be resolved by the CME CourseDirector in consultation with the Office ofContinuing Medical Education prior to theparticipation of the faculty member in thedevelopment or presentation of course content.

* Faculty member has nothing to disclose.

**Faculty disclosure: CBCE Speaker’s Core for SuperGen.

Page 3: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

ACCREDITATION & DESIGNATION STATEMENTRush University Medical Center is accredited by the Accreditation Council for ContinuingMedical Education (ACCME) to provide continuing medical education for physicians.

Rush University Medical Center designates this educational activity for a maximum of 1credit of category 1 credit toward the AMA Physician’s Recognition Award. Each physicianshould claim only those credits that he/she actually spent in the activity.

This CME activity was planned and produced in accordance with the ACCME Essentials.

CME credits are available free of charge through March 2007.

DISCLAIMERThis project was funded by the Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council (MCHC)through a grant from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).

The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors and are notto be construed as official or as representing the opinion of Rush University Medical Center,the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force,Department of Defense, MCHC or HRSA.

FDA Approved Drug and Devices Assurance StatementIn accordance with requirements of the FDA, the audience is advised that information pre-sented in this continuing medical education activity may contain references to unlabeled orunapproved uses of drugs or devices. Please refer to the FDA approved package insert foreach drug/device for full prescribing/utilization information.

INSTRUCTIONS The questions that appear throughout this case are intended as a self-assessment tool. Foreach question, select or provide the answer that you think is most appropriate and compareyour answers to the key at the back of this booklet. The correct answer and a discussion ofthe answer choices are included in the answer key.

Note: These self-assessment questions are not intended for CME credit. To apply for CMEcredit, you must complete the CME Test at the back of this booklet and submit it accordingto the directions provided.

In addition, a sign is provided in the back of this booklet for posting in your office or clinic.Complete the sign by adding your local health department’s phone number.

Design and layout © 2005 Rush University Medical Center. The text contained herein falls under the U.S.Copyright Act of 1976 as a “U.S. Government Work” and is therefore considered Public Domain Information, however Rush University Medical Center reserves the right to copyright the design and layout of that information.

Viral HemorrhagicFeversCASE AUTHORS: Steven J. Durning, MD, Maj, USAF, MC

Michael J. Roy, MD, MPH, FACP, LTC, MC

1

Page 4: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

CASE HISTORYA 32-year-old newspaper reporter with no significant past medical history presents

to your office complaining of a 2-day history of fevers, diffuse myalgias, and severepharyngitis. He also complains of vomiting and bloody diarrhea that began this morn-ing. On physical examination, his vitals are T=102.8˚F, BP=100/80, HR=80, RR=15.He has marked edema of the posterior pharynx, as well as a nonpruritic maculopapu-lar eruption over his chest and back. He has not had recent travel overseas, exposureto pets, or recent outdoor recreational activities. He received an influenza vaccinationearlier this year. He states that two of his coworkers have been absent from work and had been referred by the Tribune’s health insurance provider to your office forevaluation.

Two of your practice partners confirm that recently they each have seen a workerfrom the Tribune who presented with fevers, diffuse myalgias, and pharyngitis. Onepatient was a 40-year-old editor with a history of diabetes. Her most prominent find-ings on presentation were conjunctivitis, facial flushing, and new onset of non-dependent edema. Initially, she was sent home with close follow-up. The other

INTENDED AUDIENCE Internal medicine, family medicine, and emergency medicine physicians, and otherclinicians who will provide evaluation and care in the aftermath of a terrorist attackor other public health disaster

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVESUpon completion of this case, participants will be able to:

• Describe the natural and intentional sources of transmission and spread of viralhemorrhagic fevers (VHF), including use as a biologic weapon.

• Discuss the initial presentation and clinical manifestations of VHF, includingmethods for confirming this diagnosis.

• Outline important strategies for infection control for healthcare workers caringfor patients with cases of suspected VHF.

• Describe processes for communication with public health authorities and mediaabout VHF.

• Describe the current recommended therapy for patients with VHF.

Viral HemorrhagicFeversCASE AUTHORS: Steven J. Durning, MD, Maj, USAF, MC

Michael J. Roy, MD, MPH, FACP, LTC, MC

2

Page 5: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

patient was a 24-year-old photographer whose examination was remarkable forhypotension, relative bradycardia, somnolence, oropharyngeal bleeding, and petechiaeover his chest and abdomen. He was transferred to a nearby hospital immediately.Like your patient, neither of these 2 people reported other sick contacts, overseastravel, exposure to unusual pets, or recent outdoor recreational activities. They also allreported receiving their annual influenza vaccination.

QUESTION 1You are called to the emergency room to evaluate a patient with suspected Ebolavirus infection. The presence of which of the following should raise concernregarding a potential bioterrorism-related outbreak?

a. No history of travel to Africa b. News of an outbreak of pharyngitis among local children on a school tripc. Temporal cluster of patients presenting with fever and increased vascular

permeability on examinationd. Abrupt onset of fever and signs of increased vascular permeability on exame. a and c only

Reminder: You can find the Answer Key & Discussion on page 9.

COMMENT: This case vividly illustrates the varying typical presentations of Ebola or Marburghemorrhagic fever syndrome, two of the several etiologies of VHF. The VHF agents are a diverse groupof RNA viruses that present with common clinical characteristics known as the VHF syndrome. TheEbola and Marburg viruses are specific etiologies of VHF in humans (see Table 1).

VHF syndrome can manifest as an acute febrile illness similar to influenza (characterized by prominentnonspecific findings such as malaise, myalgias, and prostration), but patients with VHF are also at riskfor virus-induced endothelial damage that increases vascular permeability. Early signs of this processmay include conjunctival injection, flushing, and petechiae or ecchymoses; later signs of vascular per-meability include hypotension, shock, or disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC). VHF should besuspected in any patient presenting with a febrile illness accompanied by evidence of vascular involve-ment (ie, flushing, nondependent edema, hypotension, petechiae, and/or hemorrhagic diathesis), whohas traveled to an area where a hemorrhagic fever virus is known to circulate (see Table 1) and/orwhere evidence suggests a possible bioterrorism-related outbreak. In this case, the near simultaneouspresentation of 3 individuals who work in close proximity and lack other likely etiologies for theirsymptoms should immediately raise the possibility of a bioterrorism-induced outbreak. This concernshould be further heightened given their work in the media environment, which was targeted in theanthrax attacks in the fall of 2001.

The Filovirus hemorrhagic fevers, Marburg and Ebola, share similar pathologic and clinical features andhave specific findings that facilitate their differentiation from other forms of VHF. Ebola virus, namedafter a small river in northwest Zaire, is morphologically similar to, but antigenically distinct from,Marburg virus, which is named after the city in Germany where it was first identified. These two virus-es cause necrosis of parenchymal cells in the liver, spleen, lung, kidney, skin, testes and other organs.Highly suggestive findings of Filovirus hemorrhagic fever include severe posterior pharyngeal edemathat can cause dysphagia or dyspnea, and an evanescent nonpruritic maculopapular rash that is fol-lowed by desquamation of the affected skin.2 Previous case reports and experiments in primates haveshown that neutrophilia, lymphopenia, and abnormalities of platelet number (thrombocytopenia) andfunction often occur early in the illness.5,6 Evidence suggests that lymphopenia is due to early virus-induced apoptosis, while thrombocytopenia is often a manifestation of DIC that can occur with Ebola

3

Page 6: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

and Marburg hemorrhagic fever. Anemia may also be seen in the setting of DIC, however, the hemoglo-bin is usually normal on presentation; hemoglobin may alternatively be increased in the presence ofconcurrent dehydration. Elevated liver transaminase levels, with AST greater than ALT, are common.5

Proteinuria has also been reported with these agents and typically occurs early in the course of disease.Several subtypes of Ebola virus have been identified, and all but one have originated in Africa andbeen highly pathogenic to humans (case lethality rates up to 88%). Devastating outbreaks of Ebolawere documented in central Africa in 1976. A U.S. Army SWAT team was called in to quell a 1989 out-break in a laboratory in Reston, Virginia that was traced to monkeys imported from the Philippines forresearch purposes — an event that was described so compellingly by Richard Preston in his book, TheHot Zone.7 There have been numerous cases of Ebola in Gabon and the Republic of Congo in recentyears, attributed to handling infected gorilla, chimpanzee, or duiker carcasses.8 The initial Marburgvirus outbreak was traced to monkeys imported from Uganda. Marburg hemorrhagic fever has subse-quently been reported in South Africa and Kenya. The natural reservoirs of Ebola and Marburg viruseshave not been determined.8

The differential diagnosis of VHF is quite extensive and includes other infections associated with fever,rash, and hemorrhage such as falciparum malaria, acute African trypanosomiasis, typhoid fever, lep-tospirosis, pneumonic plague, and bacterial septicemia.

You obtain the following lab results for your patient:

Complete blood count: WBC=2,000/mm3, hemoglobin=15.1gm/dL,platelets=100,000/mm3.

Serum chemistries: Sodium=141mEq/L, potassium=4.0mEq/L, chloride=100mEq/L,bicarbonate=20mEq/L, BUN=22mg/dL, creatinine=1.1mg/dL.

Liver panel: AST=80U/L, ALT=60U/L, albumin=4.1mg/dL, total bilirubin=1.5mg/dLAlkaline phosphatase=100U/L.

Urinalysis: 1+ protein with 0 RBCs, 0 WBCs, and no sediment findings.

Similar laboratory findings were present in his two coworkers, and the one who wassent to the hospital also had schistocytes on his peripheral blood smear, indicative ofDIC.

QUESTION 2Given these laboratory findings, what is the most appropriate next step?

a. Send the patient home and advise him to drink plenty of fluids.b. Contact local public health officers due to concern for a potential

bioterrorism-induced outbreak, and admit to hospital.c. Arrange for immediate air transport to a nearest tertiary care hospital

and contact local public health officers.d. Administer an empiric course of doxycycline.

4

Page 7: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

5

Table 1. Recognized Causes of VHF in Humans*

Virus Genera Disease Natural Distribution Vector/Exposure Incubation Period (days)

Arenavirus Lassa fever Africa Rodent‡ 5-16Argentine HF† South America Rodent 7-14Bolivian HF South America Rodent 9-15Brazilian HF South America Rodent 7-14Venezuelen HF South America Rodent 7-14

Phlebovirus Rift Valley fever Africa Mosquito§ 2-5

Nairovirus Crimean-Congo HF Europe, Asia, Africa Tick 3-12

Hantavirus Hantavirus Renal Asia, Europe, likely Rodent 9-35syndrome worldwide

Hantavirus Pulmonary North & South Rodent 3-28Syndrome America

Filovirus Marburg Africa Unknown¶ 3-16Ebola Africa Unknown¶ 2-21

Exposure to Carcasses#

Flavivirus Yellow fever Africa, South America Mosquito 3-6Dengue HF Asia, Americas, Mosquito Unknown

AfricaKyasanur Forest disease India Tick 3-8Omsk HF States of the Tick** 3-8

former Soviet Union

* Data from Jahrling 1, Isaacson2, Rigquelme3, and Peters4.† HF = Hemorrhagic Fever‡ Nosocomial transmission is a less likely source of human infection than the listed vector.§ Domestic animal slaughter is a less likely source of human infection than the listed vector.Domestic animal slaughter and nosocomial transmission are less likely sources of human infection than the listed vector.¶ Nosocomial transmission is uncommon.# Gorilla, chimpanzee, or duiker carcasses**Muskrat contaminated water is a less likely source of human infection than the listed vector.

The local health department instructs you to place the patient in isolation while wait-ing for a mobile laboratory that will be sent from the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention (CDC) to assist with handling of blood and body fluid specimens from thepatient.

QUESTION 3Which of the following is not an accepted means to confirm the diagnosis ofEbola or Marburg virus?

a. Demonstrating IgM or a 4-fold rise in IgG antibodies titers for the virusb. Electron microscopyc. Viral isolationd. Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assaye. Toxin isolation

Page 8: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

COMMENT: Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) is required for laboratory work with dangerous and exoticagents of VHF, such as Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley Fever, and hantavirus, because these viruses pose ahigh individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease. Laboratorypersonnel should be verbally notified that VHF is a diagnostic consideration, and specimens shouldremain in the custody of a designated individual until testing is completed. Laboratory staff that workunder this Biosafety Level have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous infec-tious agents; they also understand the primary and secondary containment functions of the standardand special practices, the containment equipment, and the laboratory design characteristics. BSL-4 lab-oratories are typically located within a dedicated, specially structured building, or in the instance of alaboratory building that is used for other investigations, within a controlled area which is completelyisolated from all other areas of the building. Entry into a BSL-4 area is through an airlock fitted withairtight doors. Personnel who enter a BSL-4 area wear a one-piece positive pressure suit that is venti-lated by a life-support system protected by HEPA filtration. A chemical shower is provided to decontam-inate the surface of the suit before the worker leaves the area.

All suspected cases of infection with VHF should be reported immediately to local and state healthdepartments and to the CDC. The CDC can be contacted 24 hours a day by calling the emergencyresponse hotline at 770-488-7100. Specimens for virus-specific diagnostic testing should be sent tothe CDC as rapidly as possible, following CDC instructions. Given the potential for spread with contactwith blood, laboratory testing should be kept to the minimum required for the immediate care of thepatient until a mobile CDC laboratory arrives. Further, all specimens submitted to the laboratory shouldbe labeled as biohazardous material.

QUESTION 4Given your high clinical suspicion of Filovirus hemorrhagic fever, you place thepatient in isolation as instructed by the local public health official and the CDC.Which of the following isolation precautions should be instituted?

a. Place the patient in a private room; universal precautions for hospital personnel

b. Place the patient in a private room with negative pressure; barrier precautionsfor hospital personnel

c. Place the patient in a private room with negative pressure; Biosafety Level 4for hospital personnel

d. Transfer the patient to the CDC mobile unit as soon as possible; BiosafetyLevel 4 for all contacts

COMMENT: As the Filovirus hemorrhagic fevers are lipid containing RNA viruses, they are readilyinactivated by disinfectant solutions to include 0.5% sodium hypochlorite, glutaraldehyde, and phenolicdisinfectants. Likewise, soaps and detergents also induce viral inactivation and thus should be used lib-erally. Further, patients with Filovirus hemorrhagic fever should use a chemical toilet, by autoclaving ortreating with several ounces of bleach for more than 5 minutes,5 before flushing or disposing in a drainconnected to a sanitary sewer.

Disinfectant solution should also be copiously applied to the outer surface of airtight bags for all mate-rials used by the patient (such as disposable linen and pajamas), disposable items worn by caretakers,and the outside and inside of containers in the patient’s room, such as disposable sharps containers. Ifavailable, an anteroom for putting on and removing protective clothing is useful.5

6

Page 9: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

If an individual is exposed to potentially infected material (eg, through an injection or a cut on thehand) the individual should immediately wash the affected area of the skin, apply a disinfectant solu-tion, and notify the VHF patient’s physician. These individuals should be considered high-risk contactsand placed on surveillance.

Spills of potentially contaminated fluids should be liberally covered with disinfectant and left to soakfor a minimum of 30 minutes.5 The contaminated area should then be wiped up with an absorbentmaterial that is likewise soaked in disinfectant.

QUESTION 5Your patient expresses concern for his family. He has a 10-year-old son and hiswife is 20 weeks pregnant. He reports that they are both feeling well, with nosymptoms of illness. What should you do regarding his family’s care?

a. Isolate both his wife and 10-year-old sonb. Isolate his wifec. Conduct daily medical surveillance of family members without isolating themd. Admit his wife and son to the hospital

COMMENT: The levels of contact risk are summarized in Table 2, and details on the definitions ofcontact risk are as follows:

1. Casual contactsPersons who have remote contact with the suspected case of VHF. Individuals in this category includepeople who sat next to the suspected case of VHF on the bus or metro, stayed in the same hotel as thesuspected case, or shopped in the same mall as the suspected case. Since the agents of VHF are notspread by such casual contact, no special surveillance is indicated.

2. Close contactsPersons who have more than casual contact with the patient. Close contacts include persons livingwith the patient, those caring for the patient (eg, nurses, physicians), and/or those who have shookhands with or hugged the patient. State and local health departments should identify close contacts assoon as VHF is considered to be a likely diagnosis.

Once the diagnosis of VHF is confirmed, close contacts should be placed under surveillance. This requiresclose contacts to record their temperature twice daily and report any temperature over 101˚F or anysymptom of illness. Surveillance should be continued for 3 weeks after the person’s last contact withthe index case. If a fever ≥101˚F and/or symptoms of illness develop, the patient should be immediatelyplaced in isolation and treated as a VHF patient.5

3. High-risk contactsHigh-risk contacts are individuals who have had mucous membrane contact with the patient, such askissing or sexual intercourse, or have had a needlestick or other penetrating injury involving contactwith the patient’s blood and/or other body fluids. These patients should be placed under surveillance assoon as VHF is considered a likely diagnosis in the index case. Again, if a high-risk contact developsfever ≥101˚F and/or other symptoms of illness, the patient should be immediately placed in isolationand treated as a VHF patient.5

7

INFECTION CONTROLPRECAUTIONS WITH SYMPTOMATICVHF PATIENTS• Patient placed in private negative

pressure room (with an anteroom,if available)

• Caretakers of patient use barrierprecautions: gloves, gowns, N-95masks, eye protection, leg covers,shoe covers

• Disinfectant solution applied toouter surface of airtight bags forall materials used by the patient,disposable items worn by caretak-ers, and the outside and inside ofcontainers in the patient’s room

• Mark all patient blood and/orother body fluid specimens asbiohazards

• Face shields or masks with eyeprotection should be worn to prevent contact with blood, bodyfluids, or respiratory secretionsthat may be rendered airborne by coughing or sneezing

Page 10: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

QUESTION 6The CDC mobile laboratory calls you because they have confirmed a diagnosis of Ebola virus. Which of the following statements best describes the currenttherapy for Ebola virus?

a. Supportive care onlyb. Supportive care + ribavirinc. Supportive care + immunoglobulind. Supportive care + vaccine

COMMENT: Treatment of Ebola virus is supportive, as there is currently no definitive treatment forEbola virus. Aspirin and other antiplatelet agents or anti-clotting factor drugs should be avoided, asthey may potentiate hemorrhage. Secondary bacterial infections are relatively common and should beaggressively sought and treated. Intravenous lines, catheters, and other invasive techniques should beavoided unless clearly indicated given the concern of diffuse hemorrhage. The diffuse nature of vascularinvolvement often leads to multi-system organ failure.

The management of bleeding in VHF patients is controversial. Uncontrolled observations supportadministration of fresh frozen plasma, clotting factor concentrates, and platelets. Corticosteroids maybe helpful, but remain an untested modality for treating shock due to Ebola virus.1 Patients withhypotension and shock, due to advanced capillary leak syndrome, often respond poorly to fluid resusci-tation and develop pulmonary edema. Judicious use of saline solution and consideration of dopaminemay be helpful for persistent hypotension. Alpha-adrenergic agents have not been shown to be helpfulexcept in rare cases when emergent intervention to treat refractory hypotension is needed.

Ribavirin is ineffective against the Filoviruses. Immunoglobulin therapy for experimental animals infect-ed with Ebola virus has been disappointing. In a small, uncontrolled trial, transfusion of blood frompatients convalescing from Ebola virus infection resulted in a markedly lower case fatality rate (13%)among 8 transfused patients in comparison with the overall case fatality rate of 80% during a 1995epidemic; however these patients were transfused late in the course of their illness, when they maywell have survived without the transfusion.

8

Table 2. Risk Categories for Contacts of Patients With VHF* Risk Category Description Surveillance†

Casual contacts Remote contact with index case, VHF not spread by casual contact,eg, stayed in same hotel no special surveillance required

Close contacts More than casual contact, eg, living Place under surveillance once index with contact caretaker, shook hands case is confirmedwith contact

High-risk contacts Mucous membrane contact, eg, kissing, Place under surveillance as soon as or penetrating injury involving contract consider diagnosis of VHF in index casewith index case’s blood (needlestick)

*CDC Update: Management of patients with suspected viral hemorrhagic fever—United States5

†Surveillance should be continued for 3 weeks after the person’s last contact with the index case. If a fever >101˚F and/or symptoms of illness develop, the patient should be immediately placed in isolation and treated as aVHF patient.

MANAGING PUBLIC FEARIt is important to clearly convey riskcategories to the lay press once anoutbreak is identified due to theheightened concern and possiblefear that can be connected with theidentification of VHF. It is also impor-tant to discuss these categories toeducate the public regarding risk andto prevent rumors. The media canalso be used to provide emergencyinformation about personal protec-tion or evacuation. Ongoing com-munication with the media is neces-sary. Establishing and maintaininggood relations with the media andidentifying internal media liaisonsshould be part of hospital and publichealth center disaster preparednessplans.

Page 11: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

9

ANSWER KEY & DISCUSSION

QUESTION 1You are called to the emergency room to evaluate a patient with suspected Ebolavirus infection. The presence of which of the following should raise concernregarding a potential bioterrorism-related outbreak?

a. No history of travel to Africa b. News of an outbreak of pharyngitis among local children on a school tripc. Cluster of patients presenting with fever and increased vascular permeability

on examinationd. Abrupt onset of fever and signs of increased vascular permeability on exame. a and c only

ANSWER: The correct answer is e. Given the fact that this patient has not traveled to a regionwhere the Ebola virus is endemic, and that there is a cluster of people presenting with similar symp-toms, the possibility of a bioterrorism attack should be considered and the local health departmentshould be notified immediately according to your emergency preparedness and disaster plan.

QUESTION 2Given these laboratory findings, what is the most appropriate next step?

a. Send the patient home and advise him to drink plenty of fluidsb. Contact local public health officers due to concern for a potential

bioterrorism-induced outbreak, and admit to hospitalc. Arrange for immediate air transport to a nearest tertiary care hospital

and contact local public health officersd. Administer an empiric course of doxycycline

ANSWER: The correct answer is b. As previously discussed, this patient’s presentation is consistentwith VHF syndrome. You also have reasonable evidence that 2 close contacts may have the same ill-ness. Given that this patient and his coworkers have neither a history of travel to an area endemic forVHF or exposure to exotic animals, you should be very concerned that this may represent the deliberatedissemination of VHF. Given the prominent rash and pharyngeal findings on physical examination, youshould be particularly concerned about an Ebola or Marburg virus or Lassa fever outbreak. Therefore,you should contact local public health officials immediately.

There are no current vaccines available against Ebola virus, however two recent vaccine candidatesraise great hope. The first is a DNA-based vaccine, and the second is a harmless Ebola virus-like particle(VLP); they have been shown to evoke good humoral and cellular response, and are now in Phase 3human studies.9,10

Yellow fever virus is the only VHF for which vaccine is available. Yellow fever is endemic in Africa andSouth America and vaccination should be considered before traveling to these regions. A vaccine hasbeen licensed in the Republic of Korea for Korean Hemorrhagic Fever, and investigational vaccines arebeing studied for other VHF.

CASE CONCLUSIONThe 3 patients described in this case scenario survived with aggressive supportive care.They had no physical long-term sequelae due to their illness.

Page 12: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

VHF agents are characteristically stable viruses that are highly infectious fine-particle aerosols. Sendingthe patient home may lead to further spread of VHF to close contacts. Unnecessary transport should be avoided in patients where the diagnosis of VHF is suspected. In particular, air transport should beavoided since changes in ambient pressure with flight can further damage fragile capillary beds, result-ing in pulmonary hemorrhage. Doxycycline is not effective therapy for VHF and may exacerbate thealterations in liver function tests.

QUESTION 3Which of the following is not an accepted means to confirm the diagnosis of Ebolaor Marburg virus? a. Demonstrating IgM or a 4-fold rise in IgG antibodies titers for the virusb. Electron microscopyc. Viral isolationd. Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assaye. Toxin isolation

ANSWER: The correct answer is e. Scientists have not developed an assay to detect toxin proteinsin Ebola or Marburg virus infections to date. Choices a-d are all acceptable means for making a diag-nosis of Marburg or Ebola virus, and each of these tests will discriminate between the two Filovirushemorrhagic fevers. Appropriate precautions should be observed in collection, handling, shipping, andprocessing of blood and/or other body fluid diagnostic samples. Due to the potential risks associatedwith handling these infectious materials, laboratory testing should be the minimum necessary for diag-nostic evaluation and patient care. Clinical laboratory specimens should be placed in plastic bags thatare sealed, and then transported in clearly labeled (as biohazardous material) durable, leakproof con-tainers directly to the specimen handling area of the laboratory. Care should be taken not to contami-nate the external surfaces of the container.5 Viral isolation should not be attempted without maximumBiosafety Level (BSL-4) containment. RT-PCR identification of VHF agents may grow in use due to theneed of maximum biosafety with viral isolation, time lag with IgM assay (need acute and convalescentsera) and equipment, as well as technical expertise needed with electron microscopy.

QUESTION 4Given your high clinical suspicion of Filovirus hemorrhagic fever, you place thepatient in isolation as instructed by the local public health official and the CDC.Which of the following isolation precautions should be instituted?

a. Place the patient in a private room; universal precautions for hospital per-sonnel.

b. Place the patient in a private room with negative pressure; barrier precau-tions for hospital personnel.

c. Place the patient in a private room with negative pressure; Biosafety Level 4for hospital personnel.

d. Transfer the patient to the CDC mobile unit as soon as possible; BiosafetyLevel 4 for all contacts.

ANSWER: The correct answer is b. The patient was vomiting. Patients with symptoms such asprominent cough, vomiting, diarrhea, as well as hemorrhage, should be placed in a negative-pressureroom, given the potential for aerosolization of the virus and possibility of infecting other individuals.This being said, the available evidence indicates that the majority of reported nosocomial VHF cases,including Filovirus hemorrhagic fever, have been acquired by inoculation with virus-contaminatedinstruments or by direct contact with blood or body fluids from infected patients.

10

Page 13: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

11

In addition to isolation in a negative pressure room, the caretakers of symptomatic patients should usebarrier precautions to prevent skin or mucous membrane exposure to blood, other body fluids, or secre-tions. All persons entering a VHF patient’s room should wear gloves and gowns to prevent contact withsurfaces that may be contaminated. Further, face shields or masks with eye protection should be wornto prevent contact with blood, body fluids, or respiratory secretions that may be rendered airborne bycoughing or sneezing. Leg and shoe covers should also be worn to minimize the risk of transmissionoutside of the room.

Patients with suspected VHF who do not have a prominent cough, vomiting, diarrhea, or hemorrhagecan be placed in a private room with institution of universal precautions.5 Individuals attempting virusisolation or cultivation must institute Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) precautions. Specimens in clinical labo-ratories should be handled in a class II biological safety cabinet following BSL-3 practices. Routine procedures can be used for automated analyzers and should be disinfected per manufacturer's recom-mendations. Serum used in laboratory tests should be pre-treated, though 100% inactivation of virusshould not be assumed.5

QUESTION 5Your patient expresses concern for his family. He has a 10-year-old son and hiswife is 20 weeks pregnant. He reports that they are both feeling well with nosymptoms of illness. What should you do regarding his family’s care?

a. Isolate both his wife and 10-year-old sonb. Isolate his wifec. Conduct daily medical surveillance of family members without isolating themd. Admit his wife and son to the hospital

ANSWER: The correct answer is c. A contact is an individual who has been exposed to an infected person or to an infected person’s secretions, excretions, or tissue within 3 weeks (conservativeincubation period) of the patient’s onset of illness. Contacts can be divided into 3 levels of risk: casualcontacts, close contacts, and high-risk contacts. The patient’s wife and son are high-risk contacts. Thepatient’s wife and son should be placed under surveillance, given the clinical suspicion of VHF.

QUESTION 6The CDC mobile laboratory calls you because they have confirmed a diagnosis of Ebola virus. Which of the following statements best describes the currenttherapy for Ebola virus?

a. Supportive care onlyb. Supportive care + ribavirinc. Supportive care + immunoglobulind. Supportive care + vaccine

ANSWER: The correct answer is a. The only current treatment of Ebola is supportive care. Aspirinand other antiplatelet agents or anti-clotting factor drugs should be avoided, as they may potentiatehemorrhage. Secondary bacterial infections are relatively common and should be aggressively soughtand treated. Intravenous lines, catheters, and other invasive techniques should be avoided unlessclearly indicated given the concern of diffuse hemorrhage. The diffuse nature of vascular involvementoften leads to multi-system organ failure.

Ribavirin is ineffective against the Filoviruses. Immunoglobulin therapy for experimental animals infected with Ebola virus has been disappointing. There are no current vaccines for Ebola virus.

Page 14: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

REFERENCES1. Jahrling PB. Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. In: Sidell FR, Takafuji ET, Franz DR, eds.

Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biologic Warfare.Washington, DC: Borden Institute; 1997:592-601.

2. Isaacson M. Viral Hemorrhagic Fever hazards for travelers in Africa. CID.2001;33:1701-1712.

3. Riquelme R, Riquelme M, Torres A, et al. Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome,Southern Chile. EID. 2003:1438-1443.

4. Peters CJ. California Encephalitis, Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome, andBunyavirid Hemorrhagic Fevers. In Mandell GL, Bennett JE, Dolin R, eds.Mandell, Douglas and Bennett’s Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases.Edinburgh, UK: Churchill Livingstone; 2000:1850-1855.

5. CDC Update: Management of patients with suspected viral hemorrhagic fever—United States. MMWR. 1995;44:475-479.

6. Fisher-Hoch SP, Platt GS, Neild GH, et al. Pathophysiology of shock and hem-orrhage in a fulminating viral infection (Ebola). J Infect Dis. 1985;152:887-894.

7. Preston R. The Hot Zone: A Terrifying True Story. New York, NY: Random House;1995.

8. Leroy EM, Rouquet P, Formenty P, et al. Multiple Ebola Virus transmissionevents and rapid decline of central African wildlife. Science. 2003;303:387-397.

9. Balter M. On the trail of Ebola and Marburg Viruses. Science. 2003;290:923-925.

10. Vastag B. Ebola vaccines tested in humans, monkeys. JAMA. 2004;291:549-550.

SUGGESTED READING1. CDC Update: Outbreak of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever—Uganda, August 2000-

January 2001. MMWR. 2001;50:73-76.

2. CDC Update: Filovirus infection associated with contact with nonhuman primates or their tissues. MMWR. 1990;39:404-405.

3. Geisbert TW, Marty A, Jahrling B. Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. In: Roy MJ, ed.Physician’s Guide to Terrorist Attack. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press; 2003:221-242.

4. Dieter Klenk H, Feldman H. Symposium on Marburg and Ebola Viruses. VirusRes. 2001;80:117-123.

5. Thacker PD. An Ebola epidemic simmers in Africa. JAMA. 2003;290:317-319.

12

Page 15: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

EVALUATION FORM TERRORISM AND DISASTER: WHAT CLINICIANS NEED TO KNOWViral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHF)

Participant Information

Name/Degree

Address

City

State Zip

Telephone

Instructions for Physicians Receiving CreditThe questions that follow may be used to obtain continuing medical education credit. To obtain 1 hour of Category 1 credit towardsthe AMA Physician’s Recognition Award, read this case study, which will take one hour of your time, circle the correct answer to each ofthe CME questions, complete the evaluation form, and return both the CME question page and the evaluation form via mail or fax to:

Rush University Medical Center Office of Continuing Medical Education600 South Paulina Street, Suite 433 AAF Chicago, Illinois 60612Fax: (312) 942-2000

Practice setting: o Hospital/In-patient o Outpatient/Clinic o Other

Email

Clinical Specialty

Signature

Date

13

1 2 3 4 5 6o o o o o o

o o o o o o

o o o o o o

o o o o o o

o o o o o o

o o o o o o

o Yes o No

A. ___________

B. ___________

C. ___________

1. Accredited CME activities must be “free of commercial bias for or against any product.” In this regard,how would you rate this activity? If you perceived any bias, please provide specific comments below.

__________________________________________________________________________

2. How well did the case study satisfy your purpose for reading it?

3. To what extent were the stated objectives of the case study achieved?

4. In general, was the case study well organized and presented?

5. To what extent has this CME activity improved your preparedness to recognize and care for victims of aterrorism attack or other public health disaster?

6. What was your overall rating of this case study?

7. I would recommend this case study to a colleague.

8. Based upon your review of this case, what specific action(s) could you take to enhance disaster preparedness in your workplace?

A. ________________________________________________________________________

B. ________________________________________________________________________

C. ________________________________________________________________________

oPlease check this box if you prefer not to be contacted for follow-up about the impact of this activity on your clinical practice.

Case Study EvaluationPlease rate this case study according to the following scale: 1=Very Poor 2=Poor 3=Fair 4=Good 5=Very Good 6=Excellent

Please estimate the probabilitythat you will act on this item (0-100% where 100% = certainty)

Page 16: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

QUESTIONS FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION

1. A technician sustains a needlestick injury from a syringe containing the blood of a patient with suspected Ebola virus hemorrhagic fever. Given thisinformation, what is the most appropriate next step?a. Place the laboratory technician into isolation b. Place the laboratory technician under surveillancec. Admit the laboratory technician to a private room with negative pressured. Administer ribavirin therapy and place the patient into isolation

2. Which of the following is not an etiologic agent of VHF?a. Ebola virusb. Hantavirusc. Dengued. Omsk viruse. SARS

3. A patient is admitted to your service with VHF syndrome. Which of the following statements best describes the current therapy for VHF?a. Supportive care onlyb. Supportive care + immunoglobulinc. Supportive care + vaccined. Supportive care + corticosteroidse. Supportive care + platelet transfusion

4. You admit a patient with suspected Marburg virus hemorrhagic fever. Which of the following statements best describes the role of communicationwith the press?a. Educate public on risk of disease transmission b. Prevent rumorsc. Provide information on evacuationd. All of the abovee. a and c only

5. An approved vaccine is available for which of the following causes of VHF?a. Dengue b. Ebolac. Yellow feverd. Hantaviruse. Lassa fever

14

Page 17: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

NOTES

15

Page 18: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

16

NOTES

Page 19: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS

Rush University Medical Center faculty, in collaboration with facultyfrom the Uniformed ServicesUniversity of the Health Sciences(USUHS) authored a case series to provide continuing medical education (CME) for terrorism preparedness and other public health emergencies.

A series of 14 case studies was devel-oped to provide innovative learningopportunities for health professionalsto problem-solve issues related toterrorism or other public healthemergencies. Due to the complicat-ed and volatile nature of a terroristevent, the case studies were designedto expand outside the clinician-patient interaction and involve:

• deploying outside resources • notifying appropriate officials • coordinating a response team• dealing with media and

concerned public • initiating emergency/disaster plans

Each case provides the CME userwith decision-making challengeswithin his or her discipline, alongwith scenarios that address broaderinterdisciplinary issues. This inter-disciplinary approach is particularlyimportant in disaster preparedness,when health professionals will likelybe called on to work outside theirday-to-day experiences.

andTerrorism

DisasterWHAT CLINICIANS NEED TO KNOW

Authored by experts in the field,each self-paced case includes athorough case history, questions totest your knowledge, a resource listof additional readings and relevantwebsites. One-hour CME andCEU credit is available for eachcase, following the successful com-pletion of the CME questionsincluded with each case. The CMEand CEU credit is available free ofcharge through March 2007.

The cases in the series include:

MEDICINE

The medicine cases address recognitionof the agent, diagnosis, treatment, andmedical case management.• Pneumonic Plague• Radiation Attack• Sarin• Smallpox • Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B • Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

PSYCHIATRYThe psychiatry cases address issues of disaster psychiatry. • Emergency Mental Health

After a Suicide Bombing• Psychiatric Sequelae in a

Survivor of 9/11• Psychosocial Management

of a Radiation Attack

INTERDISCIPLINARYThe interdisciplinary cases addressbasic medical management,generaldisaster planning, communicatingwith the media and concerned public, and psychosocial case management.• Inhalational Anthrax • Pulmonary Toxicants• SARS• Smallpox• Viral Encephalitis

For more information or to orderyour free copy of any of the casesin this series, please contact:

Office of Continuing Medical Education

Rush University Medical CenterSuite 433 AAFChicago, Illinois 60612Telephone: (312) 942-7119Facsimile: (312) 942-2000E-mail: [email protected]

Page 20: Terrorism andDisaster CLINICIANS