Territorial integrity and confidence-building measures: a discourse analysis of Georgia’s recent policy towards

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Giulia Prelz OltramontiUniversité libre de Bruxelles

PRESENTATION PLAN

• Research background • Two key texts - the Law on Occupied Territories of

Georgia (2008) and the State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation (2010)

• Continuities and discrepancies• A change of discourse versus a change of substance?• Explanatory approaches• Where do I go from here?

RESEARCH BACKGROUND

• PhD research project: Conflict transformation and political economies of stalemates: the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The project tackles an overlooked component of conflict transformation, namely stalemates, through the lens of political economies. It aims at improving the understanding of the dynamics sustaining conflicts and preventing their resolution through the analysis of two case studies. The explored case studies are that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the timeframe between the ceasefire agreements of the early 1990s and the renewed full-scale conflict in South Ossetia in 2008.

RESEARCH BACKGROUND II

Main factors under scrutiny of PhD research project:• Political economies of de facto states and

borderlands• The role of borders, boundaries and borderlands

in conflict transformations Interest in levels of interconnectedness of

stakeholders of political economies of deadlocks and, more broadly, of residents of affected areas.

TWO KEY TEXTS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

• The Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia (2008)

• The State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation (2010)

THE LAW ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND COROLLARY DOCUMENTS

• The Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia was approved and signed on 23rd October 2008 by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili

• Three reports drafted by the three rapporteurs of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission, in its function of the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters

• Information Note issued by the Parliament of Georgia• Opinion on the Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia was

adopted by the Venice Commission at its 78th Plenary Session, which too place on 13-14 March 2009.

THE LAW ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - EXTRACTS

• Georgia is a sovereign, integral and undivided state and, in compliance with the Hague Regulations of 1907, the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 and the norms of common international law, presence of military forces of any other state on the territory of Georgia, without an explicit and voluntary consent expressed by the state of Georgia, shall be deemed illegal military occupation of the territory of a sovereign country.

• Clause 1. Purpose of the Law The purpose of this Law is to define the status of territories occupied as a result of the military aggression of the Russian Federation and to establish a special legal regime on the above territories.

• Clause 11. Legal Force of this Law 1. This Law shall come into force immediately upon its publication. 2. The provisions of Article 5.1, Clause 6 and Clause 8 shall be extended to relations formed since 1990. 3. The legal regime stipulated in this Law shall be effective on the Occupied Territories until full restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia.

THE LAW ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES – EXTRACTS II

Clause 6. Limitation of Economic Activities on the Occupied Territories 1. The following types of activities shall be prohibited on the Occupied Territories: a) Any

economic activity (entrepreneurial or non entrepreneurial), regardless whether or not it is implemented for receiving profit, income or compensation, if under the Georgian legislation a license, permit, authorization, registration or agreement is required for the implementation of such economic activity but it has not been granted; b) Import and/or export of military products or products that have double designation; c) International air traffic, maritime traffic and railway traffic, also international automobile transportation of cargo; d) Use of national resources; e) Organization of cash transfer; f) Financing or any type of support of activities listed in Paragraphs (a) – (e) of this Article.

2. On the Occupied Territories, implementation of activities stipulated in Article 1 of this Clause shall be allowed only in exceptional cases, based on a special permission granted in compliance with the rules stipulated in the relevant normative document of the Georgian Government, in order to protect the state interests of Georgia, promote peaceful resolution of the conflict or serve the de-occupation or humanitarian purposes.

3. Violation of the requirements provided for in this Clause shall lead to criminal responsibility stipulated in the active legislation of Georgia.

STATE STRATEGY ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES – ENGAGEMENT THROUGH COOPERATION

• Unveiled in January 2010• Basic Principles state that: “Georgia opposes the

isolation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and recognizes the negative repercussions of isolating the populations living there”

• It advocates for a large degree of socio-economic integration of the de facto states and their populations

CONTINUITIES AND DISCREPANCIES

• A change of discourse versus a change of substance?

• Isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia versus recognition of the validity of cross-border trade links and economic cooperation as confidence-building measures?

• Change of addressees: political elites and authorities of the de facto states (2008) – residents (2010)

FOUR EXPLANATORY APPROACHES• The perceived or objective position of power of the GoG towards Abkhazia and South

Ossetia has changed as a consequence of the 2008 conflict and the subsequent developments. The State Strategy aims at circumventing the new power balance.

• The 2010 State Strategy was drafted in the light of previous failures in dealing with

cross-ceasefire lines relations. Such failures informed the formulation of the new State Strategy.

• The ideological standpoint on conflict transformation has shifted. Whereas policy in

2004 was dictated by an acceptance of the greed versus grievance discourse, the State Strategy relies heavily on grassroots involvement and confidence-building measures.

• The 2010 State Strategy is dictated by the GoG’s diplomatic interests, which led to the crafting of a policy palatable to Georgian allies, namely the US and EU member states.

CONCLUSION

• Where do I go from here?• How to test the four explanatory approaches?• Necessary fieldwork to deepen the

understanding of the legislative process that has underpinned the creation of both documents