Teoria Evolutionista a Lui Childe

8/13/2019 Teoria Evolutionista a Lui Childe

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The Evolutionary Theory of V. Gordon ChildeAuthor(s): Henry OrensteinSource: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer, 1954), pp. 200-214Published by: University of New MexicoStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3628826Accessed: 09/10/2009 17:15

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THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE1

HENRY ORENSTEIN

OAS AND HIS STUDENTS were credited, earlier n the present century,with dethroning he ideas of cultural evolution and progress rom the domi-nant position n anthropology which they enjoyed n the latter half of the preced-ing century. After a period of disgrace, however, these ideas have returned toprominence nd have recently acquired onsiderable cceptance nd support amonganthropologists. t appears, on looking back at the earlier dispute about the mat-ter, that the criticisms which Boas and his associates evelled at evolutionist heorywere neither thorough enough nor constructive nough to convince a later genera-tion of students that the theory was untenable. Kenneth Bock remarks, with

reference o one of the more articulate of the present day evolutionists, The factthat White's position has not received the summary refutation that might havebeen expected or a completely defunct and disproved heory estifies hat he raisesissues that have not been satisfactorily explored and resolved, 2 nd this observa-tion applies with equal force to many other contemporary ynthesizers.

Of all the present day evolutionists, Vere Gordon Childe is probably he most

sophisticated, he most empirical, and among the most insistent. Furthermore, eis an outstanding prehistorian, nd, as such, controls unusually well the archae-

ological data of long-range ultural history. If there is any value in evolutionarytheory, any evidence for the idea of progress, hen it should be apparent n hiswritings. Primarily his paper s an attempt to analyze Childe's use of the conceptsof evolution and progress o see to what degree hey are dependent on his data andto what degree he has simply imposed hem on his material. The beliefs of a fewother evolutionists will also be touched upon, but only lightly and usually paren-thetically.

Childe's ideas have changed from time to time as those of any productivescholar presumably would, but I shall ignore these changes and any seeming ncon-sistencies which

mayresult with the intention of

concentratingn the

evolutionaryideas as such, rather than chronicling Childe's personal ntellectual history. The

evolutionary deas found in Childe's work are also found in the writings of other

1 I am indebted very much to John H. Rowe for his many constructive suggestions on boththeoretical and stylistic matters in the preparation of this paper.

2 Kenneth E. Bock, Evolution and Historical Process (American Anthropologist, vol. 54,pp. 486-495, 1952), p. 486.

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SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Both authors speak as if this distinction answers he objections by critics ofevolution that evolutionary heory does not fit the facts of cultural histories. Butthe anti-evolutionists re not answered. Abstractions re made from

particulars.f

progress s a scientific aw, f it actually describes historical developments in theabstract, hen it must have some relation o the events of history and prehistory.Childe repeatedly efers to discrete historical phenomena n expounding he theoryof progress. But the question s whether he particulars presented actually do sup-port the generalization; and whether so many facts have been ignored that the

statement of the universal subsumes only a very few exceptional cases. Pro-

ponents of this type of theory must point to some body of data, some area of his-torical reality which can serve as convincing evidence for it or accept the charge

that it is an a priori construct, attractive hiefly because t puts our own culture atthe top of the pyramid.In adducing empirical vidence n support of their theories, evolutionists often

deal with different units of study. They sometimes peak of evolution as obtainingin culture as a whole, i.e., their approach s what Steward has called UniversalEvolutionism. 8 f the sequence of stages is meant to apply to the totality of cul-ture, then its empirical upport must be found in this unit, and it can be applicableto this unit only.

However, n other contexts we find evolutionists eferring not to the totality of

culture but to the development f particular ultures. When the sequence s meantto be applicable o all cultures, we may call the theories Unilinear Evolutionism.Such schemes, f they are to be valid for particular ulture-histories, must be de-rived from a comparison f the historical developments f a sizeable sample of theworld's cultures. On the other hand, if an evolutionary cheme refers to a limitedclass of cultures, hen the data need only refer to a convincing ample of the classin question. In such cases we may apply Steward's erm Multilinear Evolution-ism.

Strange to say, one can discern n the writings of Childe suggestions of each ofthe three types of evolutionism. As with so many evolutionists, he speaks incon-sistently of one type and then the other without distinguishing etween hem. Eachof these three types, as Childe employs hem, includes some notion of the idea ofprogress, hough the idea is much ess noticeable where he practices multilinear vo-lutionism. We shall discuss each in turn.

8 Julian H. Steward, Evolution and Progress (in A. L. Kroeber, ed., Anthropology To-day, pp. 313-326, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 315. The body of this paperwas written before reading Steward's article on the subject. We arrived at the same classificationof evolutionism as Steward and will use his terms.

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EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE

At times explicitly and more often implicitly, Childe refers to culture as awhole for evidence for his theory of progressive tages. Sometimes he contendsthat cultures are not isolable. He

speaksof the illusion .. of a

multiplicityof

'civilizations,' ny of which can be isolated from forerunners and contemporariesand still continue to behave as a living organism. 9 His position, indeed, empha-sizes diffusion.

The discoveries nd inventions mplicit n metal working are so abstruse nd complexthat independent rigin at several points .. is excluded as fantastically mprobable;knowledge f the essential echniques n the Old World have been diffused rom somecentre.10

All cultures, he insists, are interdependent arts composing a single whole-Cul-

ture.Even a comparative ociology iming at the establishment f general rules and a gen-eral scheme recurrent n many instances he differences between which can beignored .. can make little headway. On the one hand the number of observed ndobservable nstances s very limited; on the other hand it is questionable ow far anyhuman ociety s really comparable o any distinct orpse and not rather o some organor member f one body.1l

There seems little question hat progress s thought of as occurring n cultureas a whole. Each

step maybe taken

by anyone of the societies on

earth;the inven-

tion can then be diffused to another society which can, in turn, take the next step.Thus, first labeling the traditional hree ages as simply stages in the developmentof cultures, as having no reference o particular imes; he goes on:

If the whole long process disclosed n the archeological nd literary ecords be sur-veyed, a single directional rend s most obvious n the economic phere n the methodswhereby he most progressive ocieties ecure a livlihood. n this domain t will be pos-sible to recognize adical and indeed revolutionary nnovations.... These revolutionscan ... be used to mark off phases or stages n the historical rocess....12

With our purposes n mind, it would be wise to neglect the vagaries and moralconnotations of the term progress. We may then agree that something ike thisprocess has occurred n the history of technology-if the unit of study is cultureconsidered as a totality. Inventions occur in the course of specific histories and

9 Vere Gordon Childe, The History of Civilization Antiquity, ol. 15, pp. 1-14, 1941),p. 3.

10 Vere Gordon Childe, The Bronze Age (Cambridge: niversity Press, 1930), p. 10.11 Vere Gordon Childe, History (London: Cobbett Press, 1947), pp. 2-3.12 Childe, What Happened n History, p. 17: emphasis mine. For a similar tatement ee

Childe, Archaeological ges as Technological tages, p. 1.

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diffuse to different cultures taking part in the development. nvention and diffu-sion are concrete phenomena; nd the over-all direction n technology has been to-ward greater complexity and efficiency. One could hardly deny this. But the

important methodological decision s what is to be done with the general proposi-tion. If it stimulates inquiry nto the determinants f technological nvention anddiffusion, then the concept of progress n technology may be said to serve as a

springboard or scientific historical research. t may be said to compose one prob-lem-center bout which numerous specific historical nvestigations might cluster.13From this perspective we estimate ts value as greater n proportion as the investi-

gations yield pertinent conclusions. Childe does attempt to use the concept of

progress n this way, and we shall review his conclusions hortly.

But,on the

other hand, the definition of progress ouldbe understood

bysome theorists as one end of research. And Childe appears o accept this position,too. For example, n advocating the Comparative Method for ethnology he saysthat this method offers the brightest prospect for reaching general laws indica-tive of the direction of historic progress. 4 nd again:

One [of the functions f archaeology nd history] s surely o define progress. To askhave we progressed s of course, meaningless-the question an only be answered n

the affirmative. t is for history o say what this progress as consisted n and to pro-vide standards or determining t.15

If this is one of the goals of anthropology, f we are prone to stop when suchinformation s gathered and ordered, hen our aspirations are indeed meager forthe data of history. The law of progress when considered as an end in itself islittle more than a cultural conceit, an ethnocentric ationalization.

Here we come to the nature of such schemes. The less progressive ocietiesof our day are as much a part of the totality of culture as is Euroamerican ulture.Each society has changed, each in its own way. Certain changes which have oc-curred n the history and prehistory of mankind as a whole can be considered as

steps toward the present condition of each and every culture on earth. This mustbe granted f one admits that all cultures have histories. If cultures have changedin some respects, hen if each society were interested, t could find a trend ex-

tending from the beginning of man's history-granted that it were known tothem-to their present tate. For, given the entire ife-history of the whole of man-

13 This point has been well made by Melville Jacobs (Further Comments on Evolutionismin Cultural Anthropology, American Anthropologist, vol. 50, pp. 564-568, 1948, p. 565).

14 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 251.15 Vere Gordon Childe, Changing Methods and Aims in Prehistory. Presidential Address

for 1935 (Proceedings, Prehistoric Society, n.s., vol. 1, pp. 1-15, Cambridge), p. 11.

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kind, t seems ikely hat each culture an have ts own criteria or progress ndits own evolution, nd can place tself always at the pinnacle f the cultures nearth-if it wishes. Societies nterested n

cycleswould select facets of culture

whichwould give hem yclical arratives. ut if the interest s in progress, hena simple-to-complex evelopment s the outcome; with appropriate efinitions f

simple nd complex. he sequence eed only pass from what s most unliketheir own culture, hrough hose that are similar o it, up to the apex, whetherHopi, Hottentot, r Hollywood.

But, it might be said that from such work one can predict n inexorable u-ture-a condition oward which man s drawn against is will. '6 A disciplinewhosepurpose was this would be quite peculiar, ndeed. Like astrology nd palm-

istry t could amuse a fairly arge following; ut it would advance man's knowl-edge of the world and his control ver t very ittle, if at all. However, f we dogrant his purpose, what kind of predictions an we make?

Given he present tate of our knowledge, e can say practically othing boutthe future. Because echnology as become more complex in the long run, andtaking ulture s a whole,we can conclude hat at some undetermined uture date,at some unknown laceon earth, echnology ill become omewhatmore omplexthan t is now. For all we know we might be faced with another hree housandyear Mesolithic efore he process s consummated. nd, most important, his

rather uninformative rediction s not likely o be improved pon so long as wecontinue o work n long runs and to study the progress f culture as oneunit. Such a prediction ould have been made n Thomsen's imesor before. Theonly difference s that the prediction must be made with essprecision ow; for atthat time prehistorians id not have the Mesolithic r other rregularities o dis-turb heir notion of progressive evelopment. o it seems hat the precision f theevolutionary rehistorian's redictions s likely o be inversely roportional o themagnitude f his accumulated ata-hardly a very progressive tate of affairs.

We mustrepeat

hat Childe does notsay

that an elucidation fprogressivetrends s the only goal for archaeology nd history. There can be no doubt hat

the statement f technological rogress eads him to ask a further question. tleads him to inquire nto the conditions nder which echnological dvances avetaken place. The Three-Age cheme erves s a heuristic evice. n this context hediscussion f progress n culture s a whole s more egitimate nd more useful.

Childe attempts o solve the problem with a Marxian nalysis. He contends

16 This is Leslie White's position (The Science of Culture, pp. 330-359). Childe explicitly

denies that this can be done (History, pp. 82-83).

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that each stage in the history of mankind s marked off by a revolution.17 Andcontradictions, e implies, are necessary ntecedents f revolutions.

At a certain tage in their development he productive orces of a society come intocontradiction ith . . the property elations within which they have worked before.... In such circumstances, o allow of further technical progress, . . Marx andEngels held, a revolution was necessary . in the sense of desirable r essential orfurther progress.18

In interpreting he data of history according o the Marxian formula, Childefrequently employs a rather common belief involving population and economicsurplus. Behind the contradictions onstructed by the author, one always findsthe notion that population will increase and continue ncreasing until limited by

the subsistence economy or other external factors. Thus, the Palaeolithic contra-diction involved a limitation on the size of the population mposed by the econ-omy. Too much wealth was devoted to supporting he magicians and too little tothe subsistence economy.l9 The Neolithic contradiction entailed in part an in-crease in population. Geographical xpansion became necessary and war was theinevitable outcome.20 The contradiction n the Bronze Age economy is seen asthe outcome of a concentration f wealth in the hands of a few men. The popula-tion increased o a size greater han could be supported by the subsistence conomyand again geographical xpansion and war resulted.21 These propositions are ap-parently ntended to explain the destruction of high civilizations.

In proposing hese explanations Childe has recourse o rather tenuous esti-mates of fluctuations n the populations of prehistoric imes. Actually we know

very little about the magnitude of prehistoric opulations and at present have few,if any, accurate methods for making appraisals. Childe's method seems to be, attimes, to infer population size from social and economic conditions, e.g., theexistence of cities.22 Such inferences end little credibility o explanations of thedestruction of these same social and economic conditions n terms of populationfluctuation.

However, even if we ignore the absence of good evidence for the computationof populations, we still have a questionable ssumption ound up in Childe's efforts

17 Childe, What Happened in History, p. 17.18 Childe, History, pp. 72-73.19 Childe, What Happened in History, pp. 37-38.20 Idem, p. 59.21 Idem, p. 177.22 Vere Gordon Childe, A Prehistorian's Interpretation of Diffusion (in Independence,

Convergence and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art, Harvard Tercentenary Publica-tions, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937),

pp.15-16.

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at explanation. What concrete evidence would lead us to believe that populationsdo in fact continually press the limits of their available provisions? It is quitelikely that such conditions have prevailed n many areas at many times. But thenature of the relationship between demographic actors and cultural ones, includ-ing technics, s not too clear. Before this relationship an be used in an explanatoryproposition t must be clarified and confirmed.

Not only is the attempted explanation of the decline and fall of high civili-zations open to doubt, but we find that Childe fails to come to grips with theirascension. He asserts hat each age of prehistory was enabled to appear by virtueof an antecedent revolution; and these in turn occur when men are faced witheconomic and social contradictions. ut he does not in fact explain revolutions. Heseems to assume some

relationship etween he hypothetical ontradictions nd thesucceeding revolutions. He nowhere actually attempts to establish such relation-ship. Contradictions, ndeed, often have a different locale from associatedrevolutions. For example, the Bronze Age contradiction occurred n Egypt andMesopotamia primarily,23 while the revolution which supposedly ushered in theIron Age started in Greece, Phoenicia, and Etruria.24 n order to comply withChilde's theory, the alleged contradiction n the organization of Egyptian societywould have had to induce a revolution n Greece.

In reality, Childe never does explain the appearance f the stages of technol-

ogy. He only states that revolutions are essential in order to allow of furthertechnical progress. 25 But this is the very point: why does technical progressoccur? Is it due to an assumed instinct or progress? Is there an instinct im-

pelling men to reorganize heir society when faced by a contradiction n theirsocio-economic rganization, hus permitting a more progressive ystem to pre-vail? Of course, the author would not openly espouse such an absurdity.

He does argue that major inventions n the history of technology appear n anecessary rder.

Progresss an individual whole n which he invention f a new

wayof

haftingan ax

formed a necessary relude o the invention f the steam-engine r the aeroplane. nthe first nnovations he germs of all subsequent mprovement ere atent .. 26

He claims that the sequence of historical events involved in the progressionfrom the Palaeolithic to our contemporary culture . . . not only did but also

23 Childe, What Happened n History, Chapter , pp. 184.185.24 Idem, Chapter .25 For complete uotation, ee p. 206 of this paper.26 Vere Gordon Childe, The Dawn of European Civilization 4th ed., New York: Alfred

A.Knopf, 1948), p.

xv.

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must, ucceed ne another n just this order. Each nvention s determined ndconditioned y preceding vents. The sequence s necessary nd its necessity sintelligible. 27

First we should ote hat he necessity f the order f stages s a matter f dis-pute. Each tep may not always e a necessary recondition or the following ne.Kroeber as argued onvincingly hat the invention f bronze asting before roncasting wasnot unavoidable; ather t seems o have been an accident f history.8

But even f weagree hat he order f the inventions as necessary, ne shouldnot think hat this gives an explanation or technological dvance. Childe s notexplicit s to whether e believes his.) For, a necessary equence an give us onlynecessary ntecedents or inventions; e do not thereby scertain he sufficient

conditions or their occurrence. We can only conclude hat the causes of tech-nological dvance avenot yet been revealed.29Childe s not interested n explaining nly technical rogress.He also wishes

to enhance ur understanding f some characteristics f the non-material spectsof culture. Having discovered, o his satisfaction, he processes nvolved n the pro-gressive evelopment f technology nd the necessary rder f change herein, egoeson to uphold he primacy f technology n history. t is, he says, he founda-tion of history, ecause the possibility f historical hange depends n ... themeans of production. 30 All ... so called spiritual esults of man's historical

activity re in the long run determined y the material orces of production. 31The relations f production, hilde oncedes,must be transformed nto ideas andideals-and when hus transformed hey acquire certain ndependent istoricalreality. entiment may hus mpede progress, nd the relation f ideology othe productive orces may be rather emote. ut Childe nsists hroughout hatchanges n ideology are ultimately based on technology.32

27 Childe, History, p. 10.28 A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 726-728.29 There is one further type of explanation of technical inventions which may be involved

in some of Childe's assumptions. It is in some respects similar to the explanation of the destruc-tion of high civilizations by reference to population expansion which we discussed on pages206-207 of this paper. In this instance, the continuous pressure of population growth on economicresources s supposed to create a need for economic innovations. This need, in turn, impels theinvention of technical devices. Such typically functional explanations of inventions have beenfairly popular in anthropology. One of the best refutations was put forward, ironically enough,by the arch-functionalist, Durkheim (Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, G. E.G. Catlin, ed., S. H. Solovay and J. H. Mueller, translators, 8th ed., Glencoe: Free Press, 1938;reprinted 1950), pp. 90-92.

30 Childe, History, pp. 69-70.31 Idem, pp. 71-72: emphasis mine.32

Idem, pp.75-76.

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The hierarchical arrangements f cultures constructed by the nineteenth cen-tury anthropologists were often based on an implicit assumption of economic ortechnological determinism. Childe has performed for us the service of openlyarguing for the conception. But he offers ittle evidence or convincing argument nits behalf. He appears o base his belief on the fact that to be able to act at allmen must live, and the 'means of production' at the disposal of society . . con-stitute the equipment hat enables human beings to procure [all the things] neces-sary for life and the reproduction nd multiplication of our species. 33

His contention seems to be that technology s the most significant casual ele-ment in society because t is absolutely necessary f men are to live. But, it hasnever been demonstrated hat the greatest necessities n life are the most efficaciousfactors

inducingcultural

change or stability. Further, we may assume his, and stillonce a necessity s complied with, there s no reason o assume hat it will dominateman's social life. What a sociologist has had to say about economic determinismis pertinent here:

Certainly we are justified n assuming . . that some degree of economic urplus snecessary or any kind of achievement n culture. But, once this minimum ondition smet we are likely to find that different anks of circumstances-moral, ocial, psycho-logical-tend to become crucial and that these may exist, variably, n settings ofrelative conomic misery or prosperity.34

Even if there were a society living on a sub-human ubsistence evel, the proposi-tion would not be relevant. Sexual reproduction, t least, is another prerequisitefor societal survival; and one could make a case for sexual determinism on thislogic as easily as for technological determinism.

Childe's a priori argument for economic determinism s not convincing. Fur-ther, we contend that the position s one that cannot be validated, even where em-pirical documentation s used, if definition is imprecise and methodology acksrigor. The ordinary narrative methods of historical and prehistorical ynthesis will

not suffice. For example, Childe and other Marxians often state that the technol-ogy or the economy s the determinant n the long run35-and the long run can bemade just as long as is necessary o prove he proposition. Each change in anyof the aspects of a culture is always preceded by changes in other aspects whichhave occurred at some time in the culture's history. The aspect which the student

33 Idem, p. 70.34 Robert A. Nisbet, Review of The Rise and Fall of Civilization: an Inquiry into the Re-

lationship between Economic Development and Civilization by Shepard B. Clough (AmericanJournal of Sociology, vol. 57, pp. 524-526, 1952), p. 526.

35 See page 208 of this paper.

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believes o be causal can, therefore, always be confirmed s causal by simply ex-

amining a larger portion of the historical record. One can go as far back in timeas one likes to show that the chosen behavior s ultimately primary. Such methodsneither prove nor disprove. They are the ritual incantations of cultists. Their out-come can not be scientific aws, but faiths.

Though Childe's Marxian explanation of the stages of prehistory does notmeasure up to scientific standards, his does not mean that the question must re-main moot. Further inquiry into geographic, demographic, conomic, and otherfactors may eventually give a solution. The problem s meaningful and significant.But we must understand hat it is but one problem or scientific history. Emphasison it to the exclusion of other historical esearch will narrow he scope of historical

inquiry excessively.Each time

anyculture of the world takes a

step beyondthe

technological evel achieved by any culture up until then, it is recorded as progressfor culture as a whole. Meanwhile, n the history of this unit innumerable hangesmay have taken place. Some particular cultures can change radically as respectstheir cosmologies. Some may have violent changes n art style. Other societies mayrearrange heir kinship systems, alter child-rearing ractices, adopt new religions,accept different foods, alter funerary customs, change their patterns of sex rela-

tions; or, in fact, they may accept a basically new economy, political system, orsocial organization. But if none of these changes s the sort which Childe defines

as progressive hey are not included as data for his theory. The scope of histori-cal inquiry s thus greatly restricted. Research annot be so restricted f we are toachieve an understanding f the past in its relation o the present conditions of life.

A crucial ambiguity n the theory of progress nvolves the nature of the unitof observation o which the abstract law of progress llegedly refers. We have

just reviewed Childe's case for the idea of progress conceived as pertaining o thewhole of culture. In different parts of his writings he refers not to Culture, but tothe histories of particular cultures or regions. When he takes this position he ofcourse accepts cultures as isolable.

Mankind does not form one society oday but is divided nto many distinct ocieties;all the available vidence uggests hat the division was not less but even greater n thepast as far as archaeology an penetrate. Each society . has preserved, ransmittedand built up its own peculiar raditions.36

The system of progressive ges is now intended o refer to many distinct histories.On the basis of material emains rchaeologists ave built up a classification f cul-

36 Childe, What Happened in History, p. 12.

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tures n technological tages that do follow one another n the same order n quite anumber f regions; hey are everywhere omotaxial ut not necessarily ontemporary.37

The concept of homotaxis, borrowed rom biology, is meant to indicate that thesequences are the same all over the globe ; but it did not follow that they must

everywhere ccupy the same positions if aligned according o the series of solar

years. 38Such statements as these are not quite clear; one could possibly construe hem

as a type of unilinear evolutionism not much different from that practiced by thetheorists of the preceding century. Certainly Childe has nowhere explicitly distin-

guished this position from the earlier heorists' beliefs. And yet, when we keep inmind that Childe is intimately acquainted with the data of prehistory, t seems in-

conceivable hat he should believe that any of the suggested sequences are actu-ally ubiquitous and invariable. His position only becomes clear when we considerfurther statements.

The key to the difficulty ies in his interpretation f the concept of homotaxis.In Social Evolution he says that ages are everywhere omotaxial n that each ..

always occupies the same relative position in the sequence wherever he full se-

quence is available. (In New Zealand, for example, the sequence s incomplete,since the Bronze Age is missing.) 39

In this light we can see that the derivation f the Three-Age or any other classi-fication from a comparison of many cultural histories s not meant in the samesense as that intended by the early unilinear evolutionists. The Three-Age sequencemay be confirmed without our having to observe the passage of each and every

civilized culture through all three ages-because incomplete sequences are

excepted. One may phrase he argument as follows: that whenever both the Bronzeand Iron Ages obtained n the history of a culture, then the Bronze Age alwayspreceded he Iron Age. Similarly with all of the categories: whenever any two, orall three, of the stages in the Stone-Bronze-Iron ierarchy have obtained in the

history of a culture, hen the lower stage always precedes he higher one. Thus onlywhen substantially modified can we say that the sequence s a valid historical gen-eralization. f we are to avoid ambiguity and unnecessary issidence, we must becareful clearly to differentiate such generalizations rom those proposed by thenineteenth century systematizers.

37 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 249.38 Childe, Archaeological Ages as Technological Stages, p. 1.39 Vere Gordon Childe, Social Evolution (London: Watts, 1951), p. 20: emphasis mine.

For a similar statement see page 29, same book.

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There is one point in his theoretical work where Childe turns to inductive em-

piricism; he actually compares cultural histories. Here the approach s that ofmultilinear evolutionism. He does not deal with the

allegedorder of the

majorstages of culture growth. Rather, he examines nformation available on culture

change within stages or, if you will, types of cultures and attempts o discern regu-larities. He first summarizes in a very abstract way successive teps through whichbarbarian ultures actually passed on the road to civilization n contrasted nviron-ments. 40 The sequences are compared, and he finds that the start and finish ofeach display some similarities; .g., the same species of cereals were used at thestart, and an effective concentration f economic and political power obtained nthe final result. But the intervening teps in development do not exhibit even ab-

stract parallelism. ... They cannot therefore be used to define stages common oall sequences examined. 41 However, they do display what Childe calls the pro-cesses of divergence and convergence. Divergence is explained as adaptations ofone type of rural economy o different natural environments. Convergence s ex-plained by the facts of diffusion.42 t involves the addition of similar traits todifferent societies and the integration of the traits into the respective societies.Thus, the societies become more alike without losing their distinctive ndividuali-ties.43

When the author does not attempt to defend a thesis, and instead empiricallyattempts o derive a hypothesis, his conclusions re much more in keeping with thedata to which they pertain. Here we have revealed no sequences, no regularities nthe accumulation f traits, but rather repetitive processes f history.

However, there are some deficiences. For one, his interpretation f divergencerequires modification. Childe contends hat the process s due to variation n habi-

tat, a surprising oversimplification or one so well versed in archaeological act.Some differences between cultures which display over-all similarities an be under-stood by examining variation n natural environment; ut certainly he entire pro-

cess of divergence n art style, religion, social organization, tc. cannot be so un-derstood. t is probable hat some aspects of divergence are due to diffusion fromdifferent ources. And further, we may state with confidence hat there will remain

40 Idem, Chapters VI-XI. For one area Childe does not have an actual sequence. The cul-tures were more or less contemporary, but are arranged in a series in accordance with their com-plexity. See pages 119-120 for this unfortunate methodological lapse in an otherwise acceptablestudy.

41 Idem, pp. 161, 162.42 Idem, pp. 161-163, 173.43

Idem, pp.166-167.

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a residue of differences after diffusion and the environmental actor have ac-counted for their share of cultural differentiation; his too will require xplanation.

A further defect of Childe's generalizations s theirvagueness.

Greaterspe-cificity would be much more enlightening. For example: Can the two processes be

distinguished n terms of the types of cultural milieux in which they take place?Are there differences n and between the rates of convergence and divergenceunder different conditions? These questions, f answered, will help to place histori-cal anthropology on firm theoretical oundations.

Our examination f Vere Gordon Childe's evolutionism has yielded both posi-tive and negative results. The Thomsen categories, he Morgan scheme, and the

more common archaeological classification can be applied to the past withoutqualification nly if the histories of all cultures are considered as a single unit. Inthis case, the classificatory ystem acts as a guide for investigators. t sets up a

specific problem or solution: Under what conditions did the particular tages in

question come to be ? Though Childe's dialectical materialist approach s unsatis-

factory, the problem is an important one which requires further research and

analysis. Thus, the present practice of classifying culture as a whole into ages orstages is valuable heuristically and should be maintained.

None of the systems s valid, however, f they are intended as summaries f all

or most of the histories of the world's cultures. For in this case, the histories do notconform to the classificatory chemes. The Three-Age system can be construed asa historical generalization only when substantially modified, only when incom-

plete sequences re excluded. But neither this nor the other sequential classifica-tions are tenable as statements of invariant sequence-or for that matter, as uni-versal generalizations o which only a few exceptions an be attributed.

Childe's comparison of culture histories within the Barbarian stage isanother matter. The elucidation of such processes as these is one of the majorgoals of historical anthropology.

There is one overall objection o Childe's work; the information upon which herelies in theory construction s unfortunately restricted as to area. He tends to

slight historical sequences n the Far East and almost totally ignores the facts ofNew World cultural developments. Whatever the evolutionary ramework-uni-versal, unilinear, or multilinear-these data are pertinent, particularly o in thecase of the Americas which give us presumably ndependent nstances of historical

sequences.In spite of their faults, Childe's evolutionary heories can be said to contain

valuablensights

and usefulhypotheses.

But we mustkeep

in mind that there are

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214 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

other problems o be solved and other approaches o employ n the scientific tudyof history. The work of Crawford and Fox on ecological factors n culture history

is illustrative. The methodological uggestions of Taylor appear valuable n manyrespects. Hodgen's studies of diffusion are excellent historical anthropology. Kroe-ber and Richardson's work on fashion change and the acculturation tudies of theethnohistorians, Herskovits or instance, are other examples of promising methods.These methods, nvolving rigorous nductive work in the historic and prehistoricrecords, hould be pursued alongside he more intensive hort-range tudies by thesocial anthropologists. t is by these means that we will achieve an adequate gen-eral theory of culture change.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

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Teoria Evolutionista a Lui Childe