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Teleology and Personal Identity

Matthew Taylor

Christopher J. Kalbach

David Rose

Phineas Gage’s story is familiar. A typical, mild-mannered individual, Gage was a blasting

foreman for a railroad construction company. Having set and ignited a blast, he was distracted

by workers, as a layer of blasting powder ignited, rocketing a tamping iron clean through his

skull. But he survived. A neuropsychological marvel turned moral miscreant.

The story of Gage creates a puzzle for theories of personal identity. Some have claimed

that his case illustrates that dramatic and drastic changes are identity severing (e.g., Searle,

2005), perhaps because the numerical identity of persons consists in a certain magnitude of

similarity between earlier and later individuals (Quinton, 1962; Duncan-Jones, 1968;

Shoemaker,1970). What kind of dramatic and drastic changes are identity severing? Some

philosophers maintain that physical similarity—physical or bodily continuity—between earlier

and later individuals is what the numerical identity of persons consist in (e.g., Ayer, 1963;

Williams, 1970; Thomson, 1997). Yet in many ways pre- and post-accident Gage are physically

similar. Aside from a loss of some pieces of skull and brain matter, Phineas emerged from the

accident almost fully intact. It is thus doubtful that such a small physical change accounts for the

sense that Gage, after the accident, is “no longer Gage” (Macmillian, 2000). Perhaps the drastic

and dramatic changes are instead psychological. Though there are a range of views on what is

required for psychological continuity (Locke, 1690/2009; Parfit, 1971; Shoemaker & Swinburne,

1984; Unger, 1990; Olson, 2003), the dominant view is that psychological continuity consists in

a relation between earlier and later memories of an individual (e.g., Locke, 1690/2009;

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Shoemaker, 1959; Williams, 1970; Parfit, 1971; Perry, 2002; see Bruno and Nichols, 2010 for

empirical evidence). Yet Gage suffered neither dramatic nor drastic memory loss.

What then accounts for the intuition that the individual after the accident is “no longer

Gage”? The leading explanation is that Gage morally deteriorated (Tobia, 2015; see also

Strominger and Nichols, 2014). He went from mild-mannered to impulsive and foul-tempered.

On the ordinary view, moral deterioration is identity severing. But the role of moral

considerations in judgments of personal identity is asymmetric: moral improvement is identity

preserving, moral deterioration is identity destroying (Tobia, 2015; see also Sorensen, 2013).

A wide range of research indicates that the most important feature in judgments of

personal identity is the preservation or destruction of moral features (e.g., De Freitas et al, 2018;

Molouki and Bartels, 2017; Newman et al, 2014; Newman et al, 2015; Prinz and Nichols, 2016;

Strominger and Nichols, 2014; Strominger and Nichols, 2015; Strominger et al, 2017; Tobia,

2015; Tobia, 2016). In contrast to dramatic and drastic changes in perceptual capacities, desires

and preference, personality and memory, changes that result in the acquisition of negative moral

traits have an overwhelming and substantial impact on judgments of personal identity

(Strominger and Nichols, 2014). On the ordinary view, an individual can go blind, radically

change desires, become introverted and forget her past but nonetheless persist through these

changes. Becoming a psychopath, however, is the kind of change that an individual cannot

survive.

Gage may have lost his moral sensibilities. But perhaps he lost something more

important. Perhaps one important thing that Gage lost was his purpose.

A range of research indicates that teleological considerations have a substantial impact on

ordinary judgments about material objects. For instance, whether some plurality of parts serves a

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collective purpose affects whether we think those parts compose a whole object (Rose and

Schaffer, 2017). Further, whether some whole—some object—preserves its purpose plays an

important role in judgments of whether that object persists through alterations to its parts (Rose,

2015; Rose and Nichols, forthcoming; Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming). Some work has

indicated that moral considerations—such as whether an object undergoes moral improvement or

deterioration—affects judgments of material object persistence (De Freitas et al., 2017). But

recent work indicates that moral considerations do not play a direct role in judgments of material

object persistence. Instead, only teleological considerations play a direct role in generating

judgments of material object persistence: moral considerations are screened off by teleological

considerations (Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming).

These findings raise the intriguing possibility that, just like with material objects,

teleology is in the driver’s seat when considering whether a person, after undergoing some

changes, survives or perishes. Thus, our question is whether teleological—not moral—

considerations play a direct role in judgments of personal identity.

But what might people associate with the telos of a person? To answer that, consider

instead a bee and a spider. In recent work by Rose and Nichols (forthcoming), they asked people

“What is the true purpose of bees?” and “What is the true purpose of spiders?” and gave them an

open-ended response. Their results indicated that 82% of participants thought that the true

purpose of bees is to either make honey, pollinate flowers or both. And 77% of participants

thought that the true purpose of spiders is to either spin webs, catch and eat insect or both. In the

case of persons, perhaps people associate the possession of special skills with an individual’s

telos. So just as a spider has, in some sense, a special skill—spinning webs—so too a person

might possess a special skill. And the possession of this special skill might then be associated

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with that person’s telos. Indeed, this is even suggested by Aristotle, who takes as a starting point

in his argument that humans have a telos, the common sense idea that: “For just as for a flute-

player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the

good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function” (Nic. Eth. I 7, 1097b22-24). The strategy

for Aristotle seems to be to start with the idea that we acknowledge that people with special

skills have a telos with respect to that skill. And then we ask whether people have any function

just insofar as they are human (Nic. Eth. I 7, 1097b22-1098a7). Though it is an interesting

question what people associate with the telos of humans, our focus is on individuals. So we take

as our working hypothesis the broadly Aristotelian idea that people associate the possession of

special skills with an individual’s telos.

In Sections 1-3, we pit teleological considerations against moral considerations in

judgments of personal identity, while at the same time distinguishing numerical and qualitative

conceptions of identity. Together, our findings indicate that teleology is the sole driver of

judgments of numerical identity. We then set out, in Section 4, the ordinary view of a person’s

telos. In Section 5, we consider three main objections to our proposal. We trace out the

consequences of our findings in Section 6, suggesting that the role of teleology in judgments of

personal identity might be both normatively and practically significant.

1. Phineas Gage Reassessed

Moral considerations have a surprising asymmetrical effect on judgments of personal identity.

And one of the central cases illustrating this involves Phineas Gage. When given a case featuring

Gage, people are significantly more likely to say that the original person, Phineas, is no longer

the same person after the accident when the person after the accident is described as becoming

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very cruel as opposed to very kind. Our question is whether teleological consideration will

emerge as being in the driver’s seat.

We also aim to address a further question. The leading criticism of extant work on

judgments of personal identity is that typical questions that probe for personal identity may only

elicit judgments about qualitative identity (Berniūnas and Dranseika, 2016; Dranseika, 2017;

Starmans and Bloom, 2018; Schwenkler et al, 2019). For instance, asking whether some person

is the “same person” after the changes might not elicit people’s concept of numerical identity

since it might not prompt people to consider whether the original person still exists after the

changes. A tamping iron through the skull, along with the cascade of changes it brings in its

wake, might—like a shy, introverted person that travels abroad for the first time, only to return

as outgoing, extroverted and adventurous—suggest that Gage is not the “same person.” Yet

Gage, much like the traveler upon return, may still be viewed as continuing to exist, despite the

changes.

We remain neutral on the question of whether judgments that an individual, after

undergoing some change, is the “same person” merely reflect judgments of qualitative identity.

Indeed, there is reason to think that the typical effects found on judgments of whether an

individual is the “same person” aren’t simply best understood as reflecting qualitative identity.

If it did, then we might expect that the preservation or destruction of any property should affect

judgments of whether the individual is the “same person”. Yet, the extant work suggests instead

that changes in moral features have a large and overwhelming impact on judgments of whether

an individual is the “same person”. That said, it could be that moral features are the most

important properties in assessments of qualitative identity. Or it could be that moral features

play a major role in judgments of whether an individual is the “same person” because these

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judgments reflect some independent person related concept such as “true self” judgments (e.g.,

De Freitas et al., 2018; Strohminger, Knobe and Newman, 2017). Our goal is not to settle this

issue. Instead what is important for our purposes is that whatever judgments of “same person”

reflect it is doubtful that it reflects judgments of numerical identity. And what is at issue in

philosophical debates about personal identity is numerical identity, not qualitative identity or

some other person related concept.

So how might one ask about personal identity in a way that evokes people’s concept of

numerical identity? Ask whether the original person still exists after the change. This is typical in

work on material object persistence. In assessing judgments of object persistence, Rose, Schaffer

and Tobia (forthcoming) ask whether the thing still exists albeit in modified form or whether the

thing no longer exists but has been replaced by something new and different. Following this, our

strategy will be to ask whether the original person still exists after the changes. And we will ask

whether the original person is the same person after the changes in order to determine whether

participants treat these two questions differently.

Two hundred and fifty people participated in this study. We recruited people through

Amazon Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com) and tested them in Qualtrics

(https://www.qualtrics.com). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a

2(Telos: Preserved, Destroyed) x 2(Moral: Improvement, Deterioration) design. Here is the case

with variations marked in brackets:

Phineas began working with explosives on farms, mines and quarries as a youth. It was

clear that he was exceptional at his work and by the time he reached adulthood he was

head blasting foreman for a railroad construction company. Indeed his employers said

that he is their most efficient and capable blasting foreman. Phineas knows that his

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penchant for blasting is something very special that’s deep inside him. And he had even

commissioned a custom-made tamping iron—a large iron rod—for use in setting

explosive charges.

One day at work, a newly hired worker carelessly drops some dynamite near the railroad.

The explosion causes a large iron spike to fly out of the railroad. It goes straight into

Phineas’ skull and he is immediately rushed to the hospital. The doctors manage to

remove the iron spike and their patient is fortunate to survive.

[Moral: The man after the accident is now extremely kind/cruel]. [Telos: Yet, the man is

an excellent and accomplished blaster, who starts work a month later as the head blasting

foreman for a railroad construction company./ But/Moreover, the man after the accident

is a terrible, incompetent blaster, who is not the head blasting foreman for a railroad

construction company].

After reading one of the four cases, participants then answered two comprehension questions:

Comprehension: The person in the story was head blasting foreman for a railroad

construction company. (Yes/No)

Comprehension: The person in the story sustained a severe head injury. (Yes/No)

To probe judgments of personal identity, Tobia (2015) introduced two characters, Art and Bart,

who have a disagreement. Art claims that one person experienced some changes but nonetheless

is the “same person.” But Bart claims that the original person no longer exists. That person has

died. Yet Bart goes on to say that the person after the accident is a “different person.” Art

appears to be concerned with non-numerical identity. And though Bart initially appears to be

concerned with numerical identity—as indicated by e.g., “no longer exists”—he also appears to

be concerned with non-numerical identity—as indicated by e.g., “different person.” In light of

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all this, it may be that people naturally construe the dispute as being centered on non-numerical

identity. To distinguish these, we thus asked:

Numerical Identity: Art and Bart disagree over what happened in this story. Art thinks

that after the accident, Phineas still exists though in modified form. Bart disagrees. He

thinks that Phineas no longer exists: he has been replaced by somebody new and

different. (1=Strongly Agree With Art, 7=Strongly Agree With Bart)

Non-Numerical Identity: Art and Bart disagree over what happened in this story. Art

thinks that Phineas before the accident is the same person as the man after the accident.

Bart disagrees. He thinks that Phineas before the accident is not really the same person as

the man after the accident. (1=Strongly Agree With Art, 7=Strongly Agree With Bart)

We also introduced two further questions, one concerning Phineas’ purpose and the other

concerning people’s moral evaluation of the person after the accident:

Purpose: To what extent would you say that the man after the accident fits Phineas’ true

purpose or departs from Phineas’ true purpose (1=he definitely departs from Phineas’ true

purpose 7=he definitely fits with Phineas’ true purpose)

Evaluation: How would you morally evaluate the man after the accident? (1=very bad,

7=very good)

The order of the comprehension questions was fixed. All other variables were randomized.

11 participants were removed for failing one or more of the comprehension questions. Data were

then analyzed from the remaining 239 participants.

A multiple regression model with Purpose, Evaluation, Moral, Telos and a Moral x Telos

interaction significantly predicted numerical identity judgments, F(5, 234)=9.287, p<.001,

R2=.166. Yet, the only variable that had a significant effect in the full model was Purpose (b=-

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.260, t=-3.545, p<.000). We then conducted a separate multiple regression model with the same

variables as predictors of non-numerical identity. The full model was significant, F(5,

234)=34.366, p<.001, R2=.204. Again, the only variable that had a significant effect in the full

model was Purpose (b=-.367, t=-4.908, p<.000). Follow-up t-tests are provided in Table 1. As

Table 1 indicates, there was a large-sized effect of Telos on Purpose and a large-sized effect of

Moral on Evaluation.

Telos

Preserved

Telos

Destroyed

t-value p-value Cohen’s d1

Purpose 4.61 (1.75) 2.67 (1.39) 9.51 <.001 1.22 (large)

Evaluation 4.54 (1.69) 3.85 (1.73) 3.15 <.01 .40 (small)

Numerical

Identity

2.57 (1.62) 3.53 (1.77) -4.33 <.001 .57 (medium)

Non-Numerical

Identity

3.93 (1.84) 4.99 (1.75) -4.55 <.001 .59 (medium)

Moral

Improvement

Moral

Deterioration

t-value p-value Cohen’s d

Purpose 3.94 (1.87) 3.30 (1.78) 2.71 <.01 .35 (small)

Evaluation 5.08 (1.51) 3.25 (1.44) 9.54 <.001 1.24 (large)

Numerical

Identity

2.91 (1.71) 3.22 (1.80) -1.34 .182 .17 (n/a)

1 Cohen (1988) offers the following benchmarks for interpreting the magnitude of effect sizes: d≤.20 is small-sized;

d≤.50 is medium-sized; and d≤.80 is large-sized. Rosenthal (1996) adds that d≤1.30 is very large-sized. We follow

this in interpreting the magnitude of effect sizes.

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Non-Numerical

Identity

4.14 (1.94) 4.81 (1.73) -2.79 <.01 .36 (small)

Table 1: T-tests for Phineas Gage

We then conducted two separate causal searches on the data—one featuring numerical identity,

the other featuring non-numerical identity—using Greedy Equivalence Search (GES).2 The

following models were returned:

2 Roughly, GES operates by considering the possible models available given the different variables. GES begins by

assigning an information score to the null model (i.e., a disconnected graph). GES then considers various possible

arrows (“edges”) between the different variables. It begins by adding the edge that yields the greatest improvement

in the information score (if there is such an edge) and repeats the process until additional edges would not further

improve the information score. GES then considers deletions that would yield the greatest improvement in the

information score (if there is such an edge), repeating this procedure until no further deletions will improve the

score. In all cases, the orientation of the edges is given by edge-orientation rules in Meek (1997). Chickering (2002)

shows that, given enough data, GES will return the true causal model of the data. GES is often interpreted as

returning the best fitting causal model, given the data. For further details and some applications, see Chickering

2002; Rose et al. 2011; Rose and Nichols 2013; Rose and Nichols, forthcoming; Rose 2017; Rose, Schaffer and

Tobia, forthcoming; and Turri et al. 2016.

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Figure 1: Causal Models for Numerical (Left) and Non-Numerical (Right) Identity3

Both models fit the data well, Numerical, X2(5)=6.39, p>.05, BIC=-21.010, Non-Numerical,

X2(5)=5.27, p>.05, BIC=-22.125.

We emphasize three main aspects of our findings. First, we replicated Tobia’s (2015)

original finding indicating that moral considerations affect judgments of personal identity. But

the effect is one on non-numerical identity, not numerical identity (see Table 1). Second,

teleological considerations affected both non-numerical and numerical identity judgments (see

Table 1). This, along with the mean shifts displayed between judgments of qualitative identity

and numerical identity—e.g., Telos, Qualitative (M=3.93 (Preserved)-M=4.99(Destroyed)) and

Telos, Numerical (M=2.57 (Preserved)-M=3.53 (Destroyed))—suggests that people are

distinguishing non-numerical and numerical identity. Third, and most importantly, causal

3 Throughout, the conventions we will use for representing variables in the models will be as follows: Manipulated

variables, Telos and Moral, will not be enclosed in quotation marks nor include a question mark; Measured

variables, Purpose, Evaluation, Numerical and Non-Numerical Identity, will include a question mark and be

enclosed in quotation marks.

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modeling results revealed that teleological and not moral considerations play a direct role in

generating judgments of personal identity. Teleology is in the driver’s seat for both non-

numerical and numerical identity judgments. This coheres with a range of work indicating that

teleological considerations are at the core of our conception of an object, both in our judgments

of whether there is an object (Rose and Schaffer, 2017) and whether there continues to be an

object (Rose, 2015; Rose and Nichols, 2019; Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming). Moreover,

our findings fit with recent work on material object persistence that indicates that teleological

and not moral considerations play a direct role in persistence judgments (Rose, Schaffer and

Tobia, forthcoming).

Our results thus extend the role of teleological considerations to judgments of personal

identity—both numerical and non-numerical—and extend the findings on material object

persistence: teleological and not moral considerations generate persistence judgments. Yet, this

finding could be peculiar to only this case. In addition, it could be that moral considerations

failed to play a causal role in personal identity since the effect of moral improvement and

deterioration was small for non-numerical and non-existent for numerical identity (see Table 1).

In contrast, the effect of teleological considerations on both non-numerical and numerical

identity judgments was medium-sized (see Table 1). Perhaps teleology was advantaged,

amplified in ways that moral considerations were not, and thus it is unsurprising that moral

considerations are swamped out by teleology. We note, however, that as a matter of fact, the

effect of both Telos on Purpose and Moral on Evaluation was large-sized (see Table 1). We thus

doubt that the Telos manipulation was heavy-handed in ways that the Moral manipulation was

not. That said, finding that only teleology plays a role in generating judgments of personal

identity, even when the magnitude of the effect of Telos and Moral on judgments of numerical

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and non-numerical identity is similar would only strengthen our case. To address this and ensure

that our findings are not peculiar to this one case, we conducted another study.

2. Sally the Artist

We again recruited 250 participants and tested them using the same procedures as in study 1.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2(Telos: Preserved,

Destroyed) x 2(Moral: Improvement, Deterioration) design. The case is below with conditions

marked by brackets:

From a very early age, Sally knew there was something very special deep inside of her.

By six, she had uncovered this very special thing about herself: painting. She was

immediately identified as a child prodigy and by thirteen her skill at painting far

surpassed most expert artists. Her paintings are widely regarded as revolutionary.

One day she was hit by a reckless driver and suffered brain damage as a result. [Moral:

The woman after the accident is now very cruel/kind to others.] [Telos: Yet she is an

excellent and accomplished artist who continues to make world-renowned artwork./

But/Moreover she is a terrible and incompetent artist who can no longer make artwork.]

As in study 1, participants were asked two comprehension questions after reading one of the

cases:

Comprehension: The person in the story was identified as a child prodigy. (Yes/No)

Comprehension: The person in the story was hit by a reckless driver. (Yes/No)

They were then given then following (all randomized):

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Numerical Identity: The original person, Sally, no longer exists after the car accident: she

has been replaced by somebody new and different. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly

agree)

Non-Numerical Identity: The person after the accident is not really the same person as

Sally before the accident. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)

Purpose: To what extent would you say that the woman after the accident fits Sally’s true

purpose or departs from Sally’s true purpose (1=she definitely departs from Sally’s true

purpose 7=she definitely fits with Sally’s true purpose)

Evaluation: How would you morally evaluate the woman after the accident? (1=very

bad, 7=very good)

Only one person failed one or more comprehension questions. Data was analyzed from the

remaining 249 participants.

A multiple regression model with Purpose, Evaluation, Moral, Telos and a Moral x Telos

interaction significantly predicted numerical identity judgments, F(5, 244)=8.498, p<.001,

R2=.148. As in study 1, the only variable that had a significant effect in the full model was

Purpose (b=-.258, t=-3.719, p<.001). We then conducted a separate multiple regression model

with the same variables as predictors of non-numerical identity. The full model was significant,

F(5, 244)=17.212, p<.001, R2=.261. Only two variables had significant effects in the full model:

Purpose (b=-.356, t=-5.769, p<.001) and Moral (b=.631, t=2.189, p<.05). Follow-up t-tests are

provided in Table 2. There was a large-sized effect of Telos on Purpose and a very large-sized

effect of Moral on Evaluation.

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Telos

Preserved

Telos

Destroyed

t-value p-value Cohen’s d

Purpose 4.65 (1.67) 2.67 (1.44) 10.01 <.001 1.27 (large)

Evaluation 4.77 (1.58) 4.26 (1.78) 2.40 <.05 .30 (small)

Numerical Identity 3.43 (1.66) 3.93 (1.72) -2.31 <.05 .30 (small)

Non-Numerical

Identity

4.09 (1.60) 4.80 (1.58) -3.49 <.01 .45 (small)

Moral

Improvement

Moral

Deterioration

t-value p-value Cohen’s d

Purpose 4.14 (1.76) 3.14 (1.79) 4.46 <.001 .56 (medium)

Evaluation 5.61 (1.39) 3.45 (1.25) 12.85 <.001 1.63 (very

large)

Numerical Identity 3.25 (1.64) 4.11 (1.66) -4.09 <.001 .52 (medium)

Non-Numerical

Identity

3.97 (1.64) 4.93 (1.48) -4.82 <.001 .61 (medium)

Table 2: T-tests for Sally the Artist

As in study 1, we again conducted two separate causal searches on the data—one

featuring numerical identity, the other featuring non-numerical identity—using GES. Both fit

the data well, Numerical, X2(5)=5.456, p>.05, BIC=-5.066, Non-Numerical, X2(4)=3.419, p>.05,

BIC=-5.102—are in Figure 2.

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Figure 2: Causal Models for Numerical (Left) and Non-Numerical (Right) Identity

These findings indicate that the role of teleological considerations in personal identity

judgments uncovered in study 1 are not peculiar but extend to other cases. As in study 1, we

found that people do indeed distinguish between non-numerical and numerical identity, as

indicated by the mean shifts between judgments of non-numerical and numerical identity (see

Table 2). Our results here also bear on an issue raised by our findings in study 1; namely, that

teleology is amplified, morality is minimized, and that because of this it is thus unsurprising that

only teleology plays a direct causal role in personal identity judgments. Yet, our results in study

2 indicate that the role of teleology in personal identity judgments uncovered in study 1 is not

due to any unfair advantage. As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of Moral on both non-

numerical and numerical identity judgments is medium-sized while the effect of Telos on non-

numerical and numerical judgments is small-sized. In addition, the effect of Telos on Purpose is

large-sized; the effect of Moral on Evaluation is very large-sized. Telos is disadvantaged on two

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fronts. Yet, teleology still generates judgments of personal identity, both non-numerical and

numerical. In contrast to morality, teleology is the dark horse of identity.4

We did find that moral considerations played a direct role in generating judgments of

non-numerical identity in this case. But teleology still plays a role in generating these

judgments. At least in this case, and concerning non-numerical identity, teleological and moral

considerations might enjoy in a joint partnership. Even so, teleology is playing a larger role.5

But, what is crucial for our purposes is that only teleology plays a direct role in generating

judgments of numerical identity.

Both of our studies have so far focused on cases where a person has a purpose that is at

least not used for evil. It might be the case that if somebody uses a purpose for evil, moral

considerations might emerge as a direct driving force in numerical identity judgments. We

predict, however, that moral considerations still won’t end up playing a direct role in numerical

identity. Indeed, in addition to only teleology continuing to drive judgments of numerical

identity, we make a further prediction. When someone uses a purpose for evil, the effect of moral

considerations should reverse: moral improvement should be viewed as more identity severing

than moral deterioration. But the effect of teleological considerations should be such that losing

one’s purpose tends to destroy identity while preserving it tends to maintain identity. We address

this in our third and final study.

3. Stanley the Hacker

4 This also coheres with work indicating that teleology plays a direct role in generating object persistence judgments

even when moral considerations have a larger unconditional effect on both moral evaluations and persistence

judgments (see Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming).

5 This can be seen by comparing the unstandardized coefficients in the model (i.e., -.35 v. -.18).

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We again recruited 250 participants and tested them using the same procedures. Each participant

was randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2(Telos: Preserved, Destroyed) x 2(Moral:

Improvement, Deterioration) design:

From a very early age, Stanley knew that there was something special about him. It was

magic whenever he touched a keyboard, and he could do things with a computer that no

one else could. By six, Stanley was already coding basic computer programs. By thirteen,

he had surpassed all the computer science professors at the local university.

He quickly realized that there was nowhere for him to test his skills like in the world of

hacking, and by fifteen he accomplished the remarkable and almost impossible feat of

hacking into the CIA database. At twenty he was a world leading hacker, who spends

most of his time robbing charities.

One day Stanley was walking home from the supermarket when he was hit by a reckless

driver. He suffered brain damage as a result. [Moral: The man after the accident is now

very cruel/kind to others.] [Telos: Yet he is still a world leading hacker./ But/Moreover,

he is no longer a world leading hacker and now even struggles just to search for basic

things on Google.]

Participants answered two comprehension questions after reading one of the cases:

Comprehension: The person in the story was a hacker. (Yes/No)

Comprehension: The person in the story sustained a severe head injury. (Yes/No)

Participants then answered questions—all randomized—about Numerical and Non-Numerical

Identity, Purpose and Evaluation using the same probes as in study 2, though with “Sally”

replaced with “Stanley”.

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Six people failed one or more comprehension questions and were excluded from data

analysis. As in our first two studies, we conducted two separate multiple regression models with

Purpose, Evaluation, Moral, Telos and a Moral x Telos interaction as predictors of numerical and

non-numerical identity. The regression model for numerical identity was significant, F(5,

239)=4.228, p<.01, R2=.081. Yet again, the only variable that had a significant effect in the full

model was Purpose (b=-.196, t=-2.651, p<.01). For non-numerical identity, the full model was

significant, F(5, 239)=19.301, p<.001, R2=.288, and three variables had significant effects in the

full model: Purpose (b=-.280, t=-4.314, p<.001), Telos (b=.402, t=1.331, p<.01) and Evaluation

(b=.333, t=-5.043, p<.001). Follow-up t-tests are provided in Table 3. It indicates that there were

large-sized effects of Telos on Purpose and of Moral on Evaluation.

Telos

Preserved

Telos

Destroyed

t-value p-value Cohen’s d

Purpose 4.76 (1.35) 3.12 (1.64) 8.48 <.001 1.09 (large)

Evaluation 3.16 (1.77) 4.06 (1.68) -4.05 <.001 .52 (medium)

Numerical Identity 3.33 (1.71) 4.01 (1.76) -3.03 <.01 .39 (small)

Non-Numerical

Identity

3.83 (1.75) 5.18 (1.48) -6.441 <.001 .83 (medium)

Moral

Improvement

Moral

Deterioration

t-value p-value Cohen’s d

Purpose 3.81 (1.69) 4.09 (1.72) -1.27 .205 .16 (n/a)

Evaluation 4.55 (1.58) 2.65 (1.45) 9.731 <.001 1.25 (large)

Numerical Identity 3.76 (1.76) 3.56 (1.76) .856 .393 .11 (n/a)

20

Non-Numerical

Identity

4.75 (1.71) 4.22 (1.78) 2.36 <.05 .31 (small)

Table 3: T-tests for Stanley the Hacker

We again conducted two separate causal searches on the data. The models returned are in Figure

3.

Figure 3: Causal Models for Numerical (Left) and Non-Numerical (Right) Identity

The Numerical Identity Model fit the data well, Numerical, X2(6)=8.42, p>.05, BIC=-

24.589, while the Non-Numerical Identity Model fit the data marginally well, X2(4)=10.77,

p=.029, BIC=-11.244.

For the Non-Numerical Identity Model, Purpose was connected to Non-Numerical

Identity but the direction of the edge could not be oriented. Yet, Telos played a direct role in

Non-Numerical Identity. Curiously, Non-Numerical Identity played a direct role in Evaluation.

Reversing or removing the edge resulted in very poor fitting models. The Non-Numerical

Identity Model, though somewhat complicated, nonetheless positions Telos as a direct cause of

21

Non-Numerical Identity. That said, the real model of interest is the uncomplicated and simple

Numerical Identity Model, which, in line with each of our studies, indicates that Purpose is the

sole direct cause of Numerical Identity.

In addition to finding that only teleological considerations generate judgments of

personal identity, we also found evidence that the role of moral considerations in personal

identity can be reversed. As can be seen in Table 3, moral improvement is more identity severing

than moral deterioration when someone puts their purpose to ill. This reversal obtains in

judgments of non-numerical identity and though it is non-significant in the case of numerical

identity, the trend is one of reversal. So here we have found that the effect of moral

considerations on identity can be reversed while leaving the effect of purpose intact. Despite the

reversal, teleological considerations still generate judgments of personal identity.

4. Teleology: From Objects to Persons

Across three different studies, our findings indicate that teleological and not moral

considerations play a direct role in generating judgments of personal identity. This occurs in one

of the key cases illustrating the role of moral considerations in judgments of identity, the Phineas

Gage case (study 1), extends to other cases (study 2) and even obtains in cases where the effects

of moral considerations on identity are reversed (study 3). Our findings also indicate that there is

a stable way of contrasting numerical and non-numerical identity. Extant empirical research has

mainly focused on whether some individual after undergoing some change is the “same person.”

One of the leading criticisms is that this may only evoke judgments of qualitative identity.

Asking whether the individual, as we suggested, still exists after undergoing some change is one

way to elicit judgments of numerical identity (e.g., Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming; see

22

also Dranseika, 2017; Schwenkler et. al., 2019; Starmans and Bloom, 2018; Taylor and

Maranges, forthcoming; Weaver and Turri, 2018). People across each of our studies made

different judgments on these two ways of probing identity judgments. And though teleological

considerations consistently affected numerical identity judgments, moral considerations, in study

2, also affected numerical identity judgments (see Table 2). So, it’s not that the effect of moral

considerations, as some have suggested (e.g., Starmans and Bloom, 2018), is merely an effect on

judgments of qualitative identity. Moral considerations do sometimes affect judgments of

numerical identity. Even so, teleology and not morality generates judgments of numerical

identity. This coheres with work on material object persistence that indicates that teleological,

and not moral, considerations generate persistence judgments (Rose, Schaffer and Tobia,

forthcoming) and extends this pattern beyond material objects to persons. Thus, teleology

extends from our conception of an object into our conception of a person. But one main question

is what people associate with the telos of an individual.

Our findings suggest that the folk associate the possession of special skills with an

individual’s purpose. Phineas possesses a special skill: blasting. When Gage lost the special skill

that he once possessed, he lost his purpose.

Like most of us, Gage’s purpose, as manifest in his special skill, is partly individuating

and yet utterly ordinary. Sally, a child prodigy turned world renowned artist, displays a highly

individuating, exceptional skill, a purpose of the kind that is reserved for only a select few. In

this way, the exceptional nature of her purpose is on par with, for instance, titans such as

DaVinci and Warhol. But like the loss of the less individuating, more ordinary purposes that

most of us have, losing a highly individuating, exceptional purpose is at least partly identity

severing. Sally, much like DaVinci or Warhol, might become a jerk or especially kind. But that,

23

on its own, doesn’t destroy her purpose. But losing her special skill is to partly destroy her

purpose. And destroying her purpose is to partly destroy her.

Purposes, whether ordinary or exceptional, can be put to good or bad use. Stanley, for

instance, puts his code cracking abilities to bad use, ripping off people who have put their efforts

to better ends. But regardless of whether one’s purpose is used for good or evil, the destruction

of one’s purpose is to partly destroy that person.

Our finding across all studies indicate that there are dramatic differences in judgments of

the extent to which an individual preserves or loses her purpose support this. Preservation or loss

of Telos had, in every single case, a large sized-effect on judgments of whether the person after

the accident fit the true purpose of the original (see Tables 1-3). To lose a special skill, whether

ordinary or exceptional, is to lose one’s purpose. It is this notion of purpose that, on the ordinary

view, plays a key role in judgments of personal identity.

Our claim isn’t that skill is the only feature associated with an individual’s purpose.

Indeed, our own findings indicate that moral considerations also affect purpose judgments. The

effect of moral considerations on purpose judgments is considerably smaller than the large,

robust effect that preservation or loss of skill has on purpose judgments. It could thus be that

people operate with a normatively laden conception of the purposes of individuals. This appears

to be the case in object persistence (Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming). A normatively

laden conception of the purposes of objects might then extend into our conception of a person.

Indeed, recall that Aristotle takes as a starting point in his argument that humans have a telos, the

common sense idea that: “For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general,

for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the

function” (Nic. Eth. I 7, 1097b22-24). We suspect that people operate with a broadly Aristotelian

24

conception of an individual’s telos, where the “good” is thought to reside in the function, the

special skill. Thus, our findings might then be viewed as integrating both the role of teleological

and moral considerations in our view of the purposes of both objects and persons while at the

same time putting teleology in the driver’s seat both in our conception of objects and persons.

It could be that there are yet other factors that people associate with the purpose of an

individual. Our findings certainly can’t rule that out. But whatever these further factors may be

we would note that the preservation or destruction of an individual’s skill is likely to be central

to our notion of the purpose of an individual. In every single case, the preservation or

destruction of an individual’s skill has a large, substantial impact on purpose judgments. It thus

appears that, whatever further factors people might associate with the purpose of an individual,

skill is perhaps the most central.

5. Objections

Our claim is that teleology plays a central role in judgments of numerical identity. Moreover,

people operate with a normatively laden conception of the purpose of individuals with the

possession of special skills playing a central role in our conception of a person’s telos. Here we

consider three main objections to our proposal.

The first objection is that the role of teleology in judgments about whether an individual

still exists may not elicit judgments of numerical identity. This could either be due to people

reading our question about existence in an unintended way or it could be that people use

existence to express some person related concept which is disconnected from numerical identity.

If so, our findings that teleology drives existence judgments tell us nothing about how people

think about numerical identity. Fortunately, there is at least one reasonable way to determine

25

whether teleology is tracking numerical identity: utilize a teletransporter case. So, we ran a

small study, with 30 people, giving them the following case:

In 3026, teletransportation is used for traveling long distances. The way this works is

that the sending unit makes a precise scan of every atom in a person’s body. In the

process, the person’s body is destroyed. However, the information recorded in the scan is

sent to a second device, the receiving unit, that builds an atom-for-atom copy of the body

that was destroyed.

John is a highly skilled, world leading basketball player. He also likes to spend some of

his free time volunteering at homeless shelters. One day John decides to use a

teletransporter for travel. He steps into the sending unit and after the device makes an

atom-for-atom scan of his body, his body is destroyed. The receiving unit receives the

information recorded in the scan. However, the receiving unit malfunctions and makes

two atom-for-atom copies of John’s body. Copy A is a highly skilled, world leading

basketball player who never volunteers at homeless shelters. Copy B is a terrible,

completely incompetent basketball player who frequently volunteers at homeless shelters.

After reading the case, people were asked two comprehension questions:

Comprehension Check: The sending unit destroyed John’s body. (Yes/No)

Comprehension Check: Copy B is a highly skilled, world leading basketball player who

never volunteers at homeless shelters. (Yes/No)

They were then asked: Which copy is John? They were given two options to select from, Copy A

and Copy B. Seven people failed one or more of the comprehension questions. Of the

remaining 23 people, 19 (82%) said that Copy A was John. This then appears to provide some

convergent evidence that the role of teleological considerations in existence judgments is indeed

26

tracking numerical identity. But perhaps it might be objected that the moral properties in this

case weren’t particularly salient. Since teleology was salient then that explains the results. And

thus it remains doubtful that the role of teleology in existence judgments is indeed tracking

numerical identity judgments.

To address this, we again ran a small study, this time with 25 people. We gave them the

first and second paragraphs from the above teletransporter story but replaced the first sentence of

the second paragraph with: John is a highly skilled, world leading basketball player, who is also

very generous and likes to help people whenever he can. They were then told that, “Copy A is a

very selfish and highly skilled, world leading basketball player. Copy B is very generous and a

terrible, completely incompetent basketball player.” People were asked similar comprehension

questions and three people missed at least one. Of the remaining 22 people, 14 (64%) said that

Copy A is John. So though the emphasis on moral properties reduces the extent to which people

select Copy A, people are still overall inclined to say that Copy A is John. We thus take these

findings to suggest that the role of teleology in existence judgments is indeed tracking judgments

of numerical identity.

A second objection is that in all of our studies the individual undergoes some kind of

change that is externally imposed, whether that involves a brain injury or machine malfunction.

It could thus be that if the change was the result of a choice then teleological effects on

judgments of personal identity would disappear. We agree that it is natural to expect that if the

change was the result of a choice then there wouldn’t be teleological effects. But this is because

tele can be possessed yet unfulfilled. As Rose and Nichols (forthcoming) note, “A spider could

be externally prevented from spinning webs, which would frustrate its end. But it wouldn’t

thereby cease to be a spider, provided it still possessed the telos” (p. 14). So suppose that Sally

27

decided to stop making world-renowned art altogether. It is natural think that she would still

persist. That’s because she still possesses the relevant skill, the telos. So we actually predict that

the choice wouldn’t have a major impact on identity judgments, provided the individual still

possessed the telos.

The third and final objection is that skill is only associated with an individual’s purpose

when people view that as being valuable. If that’s right, then people don’t really associate the

possession of skills with an individual’s telos. We aren’t denying that people operate with a

normatively laden conception of the purposes of individuals and indeed we take our findings to

support such a view. But what this objection amounts to is that if there were a case where the

skill was not viewed as being valuable, then skill wouldn’t play a role in people’s judgments of

the purpose of that individual. We view this as a further empirical question but note that our

own findings begin to suggest that this is not the case. It is doubtful that Phineas’ skill at

blasting is viewed as especially valuable or, at least, the value associated with blasting likely

pales in comparison to the value involved in the kind of skill required to be a world-renowned

painter. Yet, the preservation or destruction of Phineas’ blasting skill plays a large role in

judgments of his purpose, just as the preservation and destruction of Sally’s exceptional, and

arguably more valuable, painting skill does. Moreover, it is not at all clear that, for instance,

Stanley’s hacking skill is viewed as especially valuable. We thus think it is doubtful that skill is

only associated with an individual’s purpose when that skill is viewed as being valuable.

So we take our findings to indicate that teleology plays a central role in judgments of

numerical identity and that people operate with a normatively laden conception of the purpose of

individuals with the possession of special skills playing a central role in our conception of a

person’s telos. And we thus claim to have added a new view to the space of theoretical options,

28

a view that hasn’t even been considered in philosophical debates about personal identity. But in

so adding this view to the space of options, this raises the question of whether it should play a

serious role in philosophical theorizing on personal identity.

6. Implications

Sometimes the role of teleology in ordinary judgments shouldn’t be taken seriously in

philosophical theorizing. The role of teleology in some ordinary judgments might support

debunking arguments. For instance, the leading view of the role of teleological considerations is

judgments of composition—whether some plurality of parts is an object—and persistence—

whether some object persists through alterations to its parts—is that to the extent that the folk

view of composition and persistence is infused with teleology it is thereby infused with

benighted superstition and should thus be treated as debunked (see e.g., Rose, 2015; Rose, 2017;

Rose, forthcoming; Rose and Schaffer, 2017; Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming; Schaffer,

2016). Concerning metaphysical questions about the nature of material objects, such as

composition and persistence, teleology should be dismissed. This should then have a liberating

effect on the metaphysical debates about when composition occurs or how objects persistence,

since the acceptability of these theories should not be beholden to folk intuitions. On these

matters, the folk should be ignored.

So in some cases, the role of teleology in our judgments might be viewed as supporting

debunking arguments, such as in cases involving object composition and persistence. But in the

case of personal identity, it might be natural to think that teleology tells us something important

about how we think about ourselves, about what matters to us. And so in this case, teleology

might be viewed as theory shaping. We trace out two possibilities.

29

The first is that personal identity is at least practically significant. It is first-personally

important, playing a role in future-directed concerns for ourselves. If, for instance, Gage’s telos

is associated with his blasting skill, he would presumably structure his life and make plans that

placed weight on having that telos in the future. And indeed some evidence does indicate that

personal identity plays a role in our future directed concerns. The literature on temporal

discounting, where a person forgoes a large benefit in the future for a smaller, more immediate

benefit supports this. It has been found that the extent to which people expect to be more

psychologically connected to their future self predicts the extent to which they are likely to

overcome temporal discounting and thus hold out for larger, future benefits (see e.g., Bartels,

Kvaran, & Nichols, 2013; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Bartels & Urminsky, 2015). But, of

course, this raises the question of whether people do indeed associate telos with their own view

about what’s involved in their persisting in the future. All of our cases only involve other people

so perhaps there is an asymmetry: telos matters for the persistence of others but not for one’s

own self.

There is some evidence indicating that there isn’t an asymmetry in first- and third-person

judgments of personal identity. For instance, both Prinz and Nichols (2016) and Nichols and

Bruno (2010) find that moral considerations similarly affect both first- and third-person

judgments of personal identity. But perhaps teleology doesn’t play a role in first personal

judgments. To find out, we ran a small study with 25 people that was the same as our second

teletransporter study above except that people we asked to imagine that they were the person in

the story and has stepped into the teletransporter. Then they were asked the same two

comprehension questions as used above and asked: Which copy is you? The options were Copy

A and Copy B. Four people missed one or more comprehension checks. 13 people (62%) said

30

that they would be Copy A. This suggest that teleology is first personally important, playing a

role in our future directed concerns for ourselves.

The second is that the concept of a person is, at least in part, a social concept and thus it

can be analyzed in terms of patterns of reaction and treatment. For instance, Locke famously

claimed that “person” is a forensic term. It has a kind of normative significance in our ordinary

practices of praising, blaming, punishing and rewarding. If our ordinary practice of attributing

(or withholding) legal and moral responsibility is focused on and presupposes the persistence of

persons, then these social practices play an important normative role in personal identity. Thus,

insofar as teleology plays a role in personal identity, then teleology has a kind of significance—

both practical and normative—that doesn’t arise when considering, for instance, material object

persistence. So, teleology has different import for different philosophical issues. In some cases,

such as object persistence, teleology might be viewed as problematic. In other cases, teleology

might be theory shaping. And so those who would dismiss the ordinary view of personal identity

may indeed be missing what really matters.

7. Conclusion

Our findings indicate that teleological considerations, and not moral considerations, play a direct

role in generating judgments of personal identity. Moreover, our findings indicate that people do

distinguish numerical and non-numerical identity, and that the effect of moral considerations on

judgments of personal identity may have mainly been on judgments of qualitative identity. But

the philosophically relevant notion of personal identity is that of numerical identity. And here

only teleology plays a direct role. We thus view ourselves as having put teleology on the map

while at the same time downgrading the role of moral considerations in personal identity.

31

We then traced out the metaphysical consequences of our findings and suggested that the

role of teleological considerations in judgments of personal identity might be both normatively

and practically significant. If that’s right, then those who would dismiss our ordinary view of

personal identity may be overlooking something of critical importance to us in matters of

personal identity.

Teleology may be defective in considering the question of how some plurality of parts

composes a whole object or how some material object persists through alterations to its parts

(Rose, 2015; Rose, forthcoming; Rose and Schaffer, 2017; Rose, Schaffer and Tobia,

forthcoming; Schaffer 2016). But teleology may not always support debunking. In the case of

personal identity, teleology may indeed be illuminating. This leads to the surprising conclusion

that teleology has different import for different philosophical issues. Moreover, if that’s right,

then findings in cognitive science may play a broader role in debates in metaphysics. Most calls

for a role of cognitive science in metaphysics have focused on the role of empirical findings in

supporting debunking explanations (see e.g., Goldman, 2015; Rose, forthcoming; Schaffer,

2016). But, as we hope to have illustrated, the role of cognitive science can play a broader role in

metaphysics. In addition to debunking, cognitive science might support illumination. We take

ourselves to have identified one such case.

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