Telangana Movement Revisited

8/3/2019 Telangana Movement Revisited

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DISCUSSION

Telangana Movement Revisited

K Balagopal

I AM neither a social scientist nordo I have the courage to describe

mys elf a ' re vol ut i ona ry socialist ' ,

in other words, I belong nei ther to

the category in wh ic h Dhanag are

(December 18, 1982) ga l la nt ly i n

cludes B ar r y Pav ier (an d gets an

unpleasant rebuk e in re tu rn ) nor

to the ca tegory in wh ic h Ba rr y

Pavier makes bold to inc lude him

self. If, nevertheless, I am chanc

ing my ar m in commen t ing upon

Pavier 's caval ier t ract on Tel an-

gana ("The Telangana Mov emen t,

1944-51") and his presumptous

comments on Dhanagare 's review

of the book (March 5), that is out

of a fear that nobody with bet ter

credentials is going to do so. The

fear is prompted by the fact that

Dhanagare, the acknowledged aca

dem ic ex per t on Telanga na, is so

unsure of himself that he manages

to render 'v et t i ' as bond ed labo ur

and suggests wi t h an insuffer able

politeness that perhaps Pavier

has not give n enough import ance

to i t in t rying to understand Telangana. Such politeness, to paraphrase

a historian of mathematics speak

ing of Spinoza, would be engaging

were i t not exasperat ing.

I am entirely in agreement with

the second par agr aph (an d per

haps on ly the second parag raph)

of Pavier's comm ents on Dha na-

gare 's rev iew . To express mys elf

in a language tha t w i l l match (bu t

not outdo) Pavier 's own, his book

is ne ith er socia l science no r sci

ence of an y ki nd , bu t a polemi cal br ew concocted out of

Trotskyis t theore t ica l prescr ipt ions

and poli t ical proscr ipt ions. Li ke

al l bad polemics his arg umen t

begins at the end and runs in re

verse seeking i ts way through his

tory by picking up convenient facts

and stat istics. Whe re nei t her is

available, the gap is fil led in with

a sk il fu l use of evocative and

sugges tive phrases and for cefu l

assertion,

The Telangana peasant uprisingwas a fai lure. The quest ion is: why

d id i t fa i l ? I t i s wi th a p refab r i -

cated answer to this quest ion that

Pavier starts, and not, as Dhanagare inno cent ly imagines , w i t h a

desire to understand why Telan

gana happened. There is and has

been a world capi tal ist system

of which Hyderabad was an inte

gral part . The Hyderabad economy

was subject to the ebb and flo w

of the crises of the world capita

l ist system and the ir resolu t ion.

The specific li nk was the expo rt

of gro und nuts and castor fr om

Telangana (and cot ton from Mara-

thwada), which grew apace since

the start of this century. This l ink

imp or ted the Great Depression

into Hyderabad and led to a severe

fal l in prices, cul min ati ng in the

' f i rst crisis ' faced by the peasantry

of Telangana as a resul t of which

th eir indebtedness incre ased and

they lost much land to the Desh-

mukh s . The Deshmukhs themsel

ves wanted this land to cul t ivate

groundnut and castor which again

became rem un er ati ve after 1934.

The 'second' crisis came w i t h the

inflat ion and food shortage of theSecond World War period. It led

to fu rt he r indebtedness on the

part of the peasantry and further

al ien at ion of their lan d by the

Deshmukhs who used i t to cul t i

vate peanuts and castor which had

appreciated t remendously in value

due to the lubrication needs (I sup

pose) of warring Europe. This set

the stage for the Telangana pea

sant uprising.

Upto thi s point there i s nothing

uniquely Trotskyist about i t , s ince

capital-fetishism is a disease com

mon to a wide spectrum of radical

intel lect uals. Bu t at this poi nt

Tr ots ky ism enters Pavier 's argu

ment in a predictable manner. The

capital is t Deshm ukhs had thei r

cou nter par ts in the ri ch peasants

wh o resented the wa y the Desh

muk hs cornered al l the develop

ment a l infras t ru c ture pro vid ed by

the Nizam's government . They also

resented the fact that they alone

had to contribute to the grain levycollected by the state in the 40s,

wherea s the Des hmu khs escaped

the bur den using the ir influence.

They were, therefore, ra ri ng to

figh t the Deshmu khs, and alon g

came the communists to help them.

Ar me d wi t h the class-collabora

t ionis t Sta l in-Mao theory of Popu

la r Front (genera l ly re ferred to asUnited Front these days) they in

cluded this rural bourgeoisie in the

Front , which inevi tably led to i t s

fai l ure. N o w one on ly needs to

work this logic backwards to rea

l ise how the point of departure

pean uts and castor - is necessitat

ed by the pre-conceived explana

t ion.

Land-Grabbing

Unt i l t he Admini s t ra t ive re

forma of Salar Jung I (ini t iated inthe 1870s) the Deshmukhs appear

to. have been reven ue farme rs. Th e

reforms consisted in giving pat tas

on land to individuals (not neces

sari ly cul t ivators) and set t l ing land

revenue w i th them . The Desh

muk hs wer e giv en 'vatans ' of a

few vi l lages in pr opo rt i on to the

revenue they had earlier collected.

But , no t sat isfied w i t h that , the

Deshm ukhs used their influen ce to

grab large chunks of land during

the survey set t lement . This started

the process of land-grab in Telan

gana, much before the cul t ivat ion

of expo rtabl e crops. The fi r st

ro un d of the settl ement came to

an end by the turn of the century,

and by that t im e mu ch of the

monopol i sa t ion of l and was com

plete. Al o ng w it h this the state

started col lect ing land revenue in

cash, wh ic h intr odu ced inde bted

ness of the peasantry and probab

ly fu rth er increased lan d al iena

tion. I say 'probably' because it is

doubt ful in the ext reme tha t l anda l iena t ion thro ugh for mal debt

was an import ant medi um of l an d-

grabb ing by the landlords . Ma ni

pula t ing land records , forc ible

occupation on vario us pretexts,

al legat ion of tax defaul t and such

li ke misd emean our s these are

general ly hel d to have been the

most important means used by the

landlord s. (Us ing the te rm Desh-

mukh indiscr imina te ly i s mis lead

ing. Th ou gh the biggest landlo rds

were Deshmukhs, there wereothers, bo th revenue-sharers l i ke

makhte dars, and those w h o wer e

not shares of reve nue bu t ow ed

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their domination to occupation of

huge quanti t ie s of land. ) Am on g

the var ious prete xts used, one

cou ld be non -pa yme nt of some

petty loan, but even that was not

a formal cash loan on land security

of the kind that gets recorded in

government reports. Basing himself

on Kesava Iyengar 's repo rt ol

1929-30,

1

Pavier himself commentsthat in the 12 villages surveyed in

Warangal distr ict , only 9 per cent

of the la nd had changed hands

during the previous 25 years, and

(as a look at the report reveals)

on ly 2 per cent was alie nate d

against debt. Secondly, the Desh-

muk hs and other landl ords were

not the most imp ort ant mone y

lenders. The report shows that out

of th e 48 cases of debt on la nd

security, by far the most frequent

ly incident class of money-lender

was K o mt i (bania) shahuk ar (10

cases), and what is described as a

Telanga raiyat ' (24 cases) . Reddy

raiy ats and shahuk ars occur in

on ly 5 cases. (Sinc e Red dys are

mentioned separately, the Telanga

raiyats ' , whoe ver the y ma y be

cou ld not have been land lord s,

almost al l of whom were Reddys.)

If it is thought that even if the

landlord himself is not the money

lender, the land may be alienated

to him in order to obtain cash for

pay me nt of the debt, the repo rt

negates such a sup posi tio n, since

it sho ws tha t by far the large st

recepients of alien ated la nd are

indivi duals belonging to wh at are

called 'c ul ti va ti ng classes'. Once

again, whoever these persons

mi gh t have been, the y cou ld not

have inc lud ed among themselves

the landlords, who were non-cult i

vating if nothing else.

Act ual ly , the most im por t ant

mec han ism of Jand-grab by the

landlords was the periodic survey

set t lements dur ing which land

freshly brought under cul t ivat ion

by the peasantry as well as un

cult ivated land was grabbed using

the i r in f luence wi th the o f f ic i a l -

dom. Added to this was the forci

ble seiz ure of peasants' la nd , for

which non-payment of tax, refusal

to do ve tt i, defa ult on loan, or

in ab il it y to pay the fine imposed

by the landlord ( in his capacity as

arbiter of vil lage disputes) , or any

such alleged 'misdemeanour ' could

be used as an excuse. I doubt that

Pavier is unaware of this, but his

whole thesis is so tied up with the

cash crops-international capital ist

cr isis- indebtedness-alienation syn

dro me th at he cannot afford to

note it. B ut let us purs ue Pavier's

argument fur ther .

Rega rdin g the Depression of

1930, Pav ier notes th at bet wee n

1930 and 1939, indebt edness i n

creased by 89 per cent in Telan-

gana, He has no est imat e of th eland ( i f any) alie nated against i t .

On the other hand, speaking of the

same crisis, Sundarayya- says that

the lan dlo rds di d gra b peasants'

land during the period, but men

tions as the most important cause

the peasants ' in ab il i t y to pay the

revenue demand. As a supplemen

tary cause he adds the grain loans

giv en by the landl ords against

which they grabbed large chunks

of land. About the second World

War crisis, Pavier 's information is

that indebtedness increased by 120

per cent in Tela ngan a; this ti me

he is able to give an estimate of

lan d alienated against this debt,

but the figure he quotes is disas

trous for his argument. For only 7

per cent of the land changed hands

during 1934-49, and only 1 per cent

due to indebtedness. Bu t wh at

happened to the de bt ? If it was

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY April 30, 1983

not redeemed wi th land, what did

the peasants pay again st i t ? Th e

answer i s, anything , inc l udin g

their freedom. The mantle of cash-

crop entrepr eneurs tha t Pavi er

hangs on the Des hmu khs makes

him search for land al ienat ion, but

the Deshmukhs themselves grabbedal l mann er of objects gra in,

cattle, gold, ornaments, usable

goods of any kind. If nothing was

avai lab le th e peasant wo ul d sel l

his freedom and become a bonded

labourer (bhagela, jeetagadu). In

deed, the report of Kesava Iyen

gar quoted above shows that whene-

as debt on land security amoumti-

ed to ju st 12,000 rup ees, de bt on

non-land secur i ty amounte d to

more than Rs 2 lakh. Of this the

most frequent is personal security

(about 50 per cent of the cases),

and the next is crop security (25

per cent).

Let me no t be mis tak en. It is

far from being my content ion that

the landlords did not grab land.

They certainly did. But the con

nect i on that Ba rr y Pavi er seeks

to establ ish between land-gr ab,

cash crops, internat ional capi tal ist

crises, and indebtedness (some

t imes explici t ly, sometimes by

suggest ion, and general ly by treat

ing these four aspects to the ex

clusion of every thing else that is

relev ant to the und ersta ndin g of

Telan gana ) needs som ethi ng mor e

credible than a revolut ionary so

cial ist' s say-so if it is to be con

vin cin g. Th e landlords .started

gr ab bi ng la nd in the 1870s and

ke p t g ra bb i ng l a nd r i g h t t h rough

to th e 1940s, cri sis or no cri sis ,

castor or no castor. Crises might

have increased the pheno menon,

but to treat them as the genesis

is misl eadi ng. Econ omic crises,leading to a greater inabi l i ty to pay

taxes, to pay the fines im

posed by the landlords, to bear

one's share of the cost of ceremo

nial celebrat ions in the landlords '

household, and so on, would make

the peasantry vul ner able to dis

possession fr om , lan d on var iou s

counts. But they were nei ther the

or i gin of the phenomenon, nor

even demonstrably the ' last st raw';

they merely contributed to a pro

cess Inherent in the structure offeudal Telangana. Nor did the pro

cess ha ve an y vis ibl e conne ction

w i t h cash crops. The land lord s

grabbed cul t ivable land to extract

rent (cash, kind, and labour rent)

from the peasantry; they grabbed

forest and bush lan d to extr act

graz ing rent (pu l la r i in Te lu gu) ;

and they grabbed mar gin a l ly cul

t ivable land to prevent the land

less from acquiring land a prerequisi te for feudal social domina

t io n. It cert ainl y takes a rem ark

able capiitsal-fetishiim. to believe

that land is grabbed only to grow

crops. This unstated assumption is

so st ro ng in cer tain rad ica l aca

demic circles that they w i l l no

doubt soon enshrine it as a dogma

(to replace 'St alin ist ' dogmas, of

course) that peasants cannot rebel

if ther e are no exp ort able cash

crops aro un d. R S Rao is quo ted

by a fr ie nd as hav ing said that

our academics have gone where-

ever cap ita l has gone. No t onl y

that, wh ere ver they hav e gone

they have hunt ed out capi tal ,

weig hed i t , measured i t , label led

i t , and al l but cul tur ed i t , and

conv ince d themselves an d each

other that they have understood

the world. Much of the confusion

arises fr om the im pl ici t bel ief

that pre -cap ital ist societies and

social relat ions have no int ern al

dyna mics capable of lead ing to a

rupt ure, but on ly the pene trat i onof capital can achieve change.

But let us take a more detailed

look at the connec tion betwee n

cash crops and land-grab.3

Pavier

gives detail s sh ow in g tine increase

of .acreage unde r gr ou nd nu t bet

ween 1939 and 1945 (page 35 of his

boo k). Ac tu al ly , the increase was

much more radical between 1935 and

1939, and affected not cnly ground

nut , bu t also castor, bu t Pav ier

is interested only in the increase in

the later period since that appearsto have been at least partly at the

expense of foodgrains thereby tying

in w i t h hi s thesi s of indJebtendness

and lan d al ienat ion. Bu t between

1935 and 1939 acreage under gro

undnut increased nearly three-fold,

by 1,27,000 acres in Waragal, and

by 1,42,000 acres in Na lg on da . In

contrast, the increase was on ly

30,000 acres in Wa ra ng al an d

90,000 in Nalgonda, between 1939

and 1945. Where did this increase

come from? Did the landl ordsbr ing into cul t iva t ion land c lass i

fied as 'cul t ivable waste ' but actu

al l y unde r the cul t iv at i on of the

poor, thereby dep riv ing the m of

land? Or did they grab the pat la

lan d of peasants ? Be fo re we come

to ei th er conclusion, let us note

that compar ed to the 1 la kh and

odd increase in acreage un der

groundnut , fa l low land (much of

i t landlords ' land) ranged from 3to 6 lakh acres in Warangal and 4

to 8 lak h acres in Nal gon da. I n

deed, consistent ly during the three

yea rs 1935, 1939 an d 1945, f a ll o w

lands were l arge r in acreage th an

culturable wastes, on occasion even

up to 4 t imes in magnitude. In Nal

gonda both cul turable wastes and

fallow land, increased between 1935

and 1939. Consequently, w i t h such

amounts of fal lo w land on hand

(ranging from 7 to 20 per cent of

total surv eyed land ) i t is dif fic ul t

to believe that the increase in acre

age under groundnut (2.5 per cent

of surveyed land in Warangal and

3.5 per cent in Nalgonda) must

have entailed aggressive alienation

of peasants' land. The lands mono

polised by the Des hmu kh s and

other landl ord s inc lud ed rocks,

stones, bushes, forests, sandy was

tes, ta nk beds, st re am beds, and

of course dry land and margina l ly

cul t iva ble l and. Mu ch of i t was

never cul t iva ted. Speaking of A d i -

labad, the anthropologist Heimen-dorff ment ions tha t the non-t r iba l

land lord s wh o grabbed thousands

of acres of land kept nearly 70 per

cent of i t uncult ivated. The land

lords of Wara nga l and Nalgond a

were no different . If they wanted

to grow peanuts they could have

fo und ple nty of sui table la nd in

the ir ow n possession. Co nt ra ry to

Dhanagare 's assertion (app aren t ly

his ow n inference fr om Pavier 's

thesis), the landl ords never bro

ught ' 'a l l the fel lo w lan d undercastor and groundnut cul t ivat ion",

nor even much of it . The landlords

of Telangana wer e plun dere rs in

w ho m i t is dif fic ul t to recognise

the anesthetised capit alis t ver sio n

manufac tured by Ba rr y Pavier .

They lived, not on profit, but on

rent on monopolised land, and a

var iet y of feudal exact ions, the

most characte ristic of wh ic h is

vetti , the bane of feudal Telan

gana.

V e t t i

Ve tt i is not bonded labour; i ts

sanction lies not in usurious debt,

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as in the case of debt-bondage, but

in custo m and br ut e force. It is

not even corvee as understood in

European feudal i sm, whe re the

peasant had to pe rf or m labou r

service on the landl ord 's fields .

Vetti included that , but went well

beyon d i t , A l l the to i l in g castes of

the village had to supply free of

charge to the landlord whatever

prod ucts or services the y pr od u

ced. I w i l l not describe it in de-

tail since there is a good descrip

t ion in Sundarayya'a book. In ad

dit ion the lan dlo rd wou ld sit in

jud gem ent over vi l la ge disputes

and collect fines from the offend

ing par ty (of ten f rom both par

t i es) . He would demand gi f t s f rom

the villagers on special occasions,

and con tri but ion s to the coat of

ceremonia l func t ions in hi s fami ly.

Mor e genera l ly , any thi ng in the

vi l lag e that at t rac ted the lan dlord's eyes had to be handed over

to hi m. Fr om a l l these the r i ch

peasants wer e no mo re exe mpt

than anybody else. Those who re

ca ll those days say th at it wa s

not the Deshmukh's mono poly of

the capi ta l provi ded by the Ni zam

tha t anger ed the r i ch peasants,

but the fact that they, more than

anybody else, were l ikely to pos

sess things wh ic h the lan dl or d

would grab. They did not dare to

bu y a stu rd y pai r of bul lock s,bui ld a good house, or even grow

a lush crop. Plunder, and not pro

f i t , was the wa tc hw or d of the

feuda ls of Telen gana . borne esti

mate of i ts magnitude can be had

from recent exper ience . Afte r the

start of the Karimnagar peasant

struggle in the last decade, the

people of some vi l lages computed

the amounts the i r l an dl or d ha d

plund ered f ro m th em in thi s

fashion, and ca me u p w i t h totals

li ke Rs 2 to 3 lak h! Consi dering

tha t Kari mnag ar ' s l andlords of

yes te r-years would look pe t ty

compared to the landlords of the

fort ie s, the amou nts the lat ter

plu nd ere d can on ly be guessed

a t . A l l the debts recorded in Ke -

sava Iyengar ' s report s would not

add up to a fra cti on of it A n d

wha t connect ion thi s loo t (e i ther

in i t s magni tude or var ia t ion) had

with the international capital ist

crises is yet to be demonstrated.

These feudal exactions and thefeuda l t en ur ia l re la t ions ( toge ther

wi th bonded labour , or the bha-

ge la sys tem) cons t i tuted the twin

oppressions that crushed the peo

ple of Telangana for about seven

ty years . W i th ou t unders tand ing

the nature, the contradict ions, and

the dyn amic s of thi s oppression

we cannot understand the impact

(however much or l i t t l e ) tha t the

so-ca l led inte rna t iona l capi ta l i s t

system ha d on the economy of

Telangana. To take it as a dogma

that the only dynamics i t could

have i s what the inte rna t iona l sys

tem imp art ed is of li tt le use in

unders tanding why Telangana

happened.4

I do no t wi sh to comm ent on

Barry Pavier 's conclusions regard

ing the fa i lure of the movement

The conclusions are in her en t in

his premise since the premise is

ac tua l ly deduced from the conclu

sions. Perhaps the signal virtue of

Pavier ' s non-cont r ibut ion i s to re

mind us that the job of unders tanding Telangana s t i l l remains

unf i n i s he d A l l t he books t ha t

have appeared t i l l now are par t ly

descr ipt ive and par t ly polemica l ,

Pavier 's is no excepti on, tho ug h

his polemics i s di f fe r ent f r om

those of the co mm un is t leaders

wh o preced ed hi m, an d th e des

c r ip t i on i s o f t he k i nd tha t w i l l

i mpre s s un i ve r s i t y - t r a i ne d i n t e l

lectuals who are taught to bel ieve

that on ly those social relat ions

can change the world which arecapable of bei ng tab ula ted and

stat i st ica l ly analysed . In pre

capit alist societies, th e "relat ions

tha t me n enter in to in th e social

product ion of their l i fe " are im

mensely var ied . Mu ch of i t re

mains in the me mo ry of those

wh o l iv ed thr ou gh those days ,

many of whom are s t i l l a round.

We should perhaps be grateful to

Barry Pavier for reminding us tha t

they w i l l not be a round for ever

and at least now a serious attempt

shou ld be mad e to unde rstandTelangana.

Notes

[I am gra tef ul to A Bo bb il i forhelpful discussions.]1 ' 'Econ omic Inve st iga t ions in the

Hyderabad State, 1929-30".2 P Sun dara yya, "Tela ngan a

People's Str ugg le an d It sLessons".

3 The inf orm at io n giv en be low ist aken from the Sta t i s t i ca l Year-Books of the Hyderabad government for the years Fasl i 1344,1348 a n d 1354 ( A D 1935, 1939and 1945).

4 For example, tak e th e sharp i n crease in th e acreage un de r

cash crops be tw een 1935 and1939 . The ' obv i ousc a use i s t here v i va l o f we i n t e rna t i ona l ma r -ket after the depression of theearly thirt ies. But a second lookat the Year-Books referred to earner s hows th at th e same perio dwitnessed another rem ark abl echan ge' Bert ween 1935 an d 1939there was a massive resumptionof inams by the Nizam's gove

r nm en t The a rea resumed was6,15,000 (about 80 per cent) inWar an gal i an d 6,75,000 acresabout 84 per cent) in Nalgoncta,

This was obvious ly promoted bya desire to au gme nt th e treasury. N o w since the i namswere mainly he ld by big landlords w ho kep t mu ch of theirland fa l low. the resucrpt ion i t

fol lowed By given pat tas to peasants , wo u ld na tu ra l ly giv e r i seto an increase in dry- land cul t i vat ion . Of course, i t is no t mycontent ion tha t thi s i s what rea l ty happened. There is not enoughassertions.

France's Austerity Measures

FR AN CE ha s i n t roduc e d a b roa d

rang e of au ste ri ty measures to

accompany the devaluat ion of the

Fre nc h f ra nc e i n c onne ct i on wi t h

the European Mon eta ry Sys tem

re al i gn men t of Ma rc h 21, 1983.

The measures are expected to re

duce domest ic dem and by some

bi l l i on f rancs and to a lmost ha lve

the t rad e defic i t in 1983, wh il e

br ing ing i t in to ba lance by the

en d of 1984. The pr og ra mm e also

foresees a reduct ion in the Central

governme nt ' s budget def ic i t , or i -

ginailuy pu t at F 118 bi l li o n for

1983, by about F 20 bi l l ion through

a com bin at i on of spendi ng cubs

and new taxes, including, in par

t icular, an increase in the duty on

gasol ine in l i ne w i t h the decl ine

in oi l pr ices . In addi t ion, the def i

ci ts of public enterprises and local

auth ori t ies are to be redu ced by

a bout F 11 b i l l i on t h rough i n

creases in ele ctr ici ty, gas, tele

phone, and rai l rates of an avera

ge of 8 per cent , and through slow

down s in inv est men t and stock-

bu il di ng in these sectors. To hel p

finance the social securi ty system,

the plan also provides for the in

tr od uc t i on of a ne w lev y of 1 per

cent on taxable incomes and for

increases in the duties on alcoho

lic beverages and tobacco. In addi

t ion, the government i s int roduc

ing a number of measures intended to Increase savings, voluntary

and enforced.

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Documents

Telangana Movement Revisited