Technology Assessment Text

PART 1: Technology Assessment: Technology, Society, Sustainability

Editors: dr.ir. K.F. IVlulder, ir J.N. Quist

Section Teclnnology Assessment Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management Delft University of Technology

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Table of Contents

PART 1: Reader Technology Assessment: Technology, Society, Sustainability Chapter 1: What is Technology Assessment 1 Chapter 2: Technological prediction and classical TA methods 13 Chapter 3: The formation of new technologies 27 Chapter 4: Economic Approaches to the formation of new technology 41 Chapter 5: From "Impact Assessment" to "Managing Technology in Society" 55 Chapter 6: Why do we need sustainability 70

PART 2: Texts on Philosophy of Science and Technology Text 1: "Scientific Explanations". In: Samir Okasha (2002), Philosophy of Science: A very Short Introduction; Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 3 (pp. 40-57). 79

Text 2: "Technical Artefacts" and "Technological Knowledge". In: Pieter Vermaas, Peter Kroes, lbo van de Poel, Maarten Franssen, and Wybo Houkes (2011), A Philosophy of Technology: From Technical Artefacts to Soclotechnical Systems, Ft Collins/Princeton/Bonita Springs/Seattle: Morgan & Claypool, Chapters 1 and 4 (pp. 5-20 and 55-66) 89

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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

L W H A T I S T E C H N O L O G Y A S S E S S M E N T ? 1

1.1 THE TRADITIONAL IMAGE OF TECHNOLOGY 1 1.2 TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING 1 1.3 SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY 2 1.4 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DEFINITIONS 3 1.5 T A ORGANIZATIONS 5 1.6 TA , NEW STYLE 7 1.7 TA, A VERITABLE MENAGERIE 9

2. T E C H N O L O G I C A L P R E D I C T I O N A N D C L A S S I C A L T A M E T H O D S 1 3

2.1 PREDICTABILITY 1 3 2 .2 METHODS 1 3

2.2 .1 Monitoring 1 4 2 .2 .2 the Delphi method 1 5 2 .2 .3 Cross Impact Assessment 1 5 2 .2 .4 Social-technical maps 1 6 2 .2 .5 Checklist 1 7 2 .2 .6 Scenarios 2 3

2.3 PROBLEM: THE CONTROL DILEMMA 2 4 2.3 .1 Introduction 2 4 2 .3 .2 New criteria for the design phase 2 4 2 .3 .3 Elements hindering flexible design 2 5

3. T H E F O R M A T I O N O F N E W T E C H N O L O G I E S 27

3.1 INTRODUCTION 2 7 3.2 AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM28 3.3 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY 3 0 3.4 TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AS SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 3 5

3.4.1 The electrical system 3 6 3 .4 .2 Technological systems 3 6 3 .4 .3 Phases in system development 3 8 3 .4 .4 Example 3 9

4 . E C O N O M I C A P P R O A C H E S T O T H E F O R M A T I O N O F N E W T E C H N O L O G Y 4 1

4 .1 THE NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 4 1 4 .2 LONG WAVES 4 4 4 .3 'PUSH-PULL'DEBATE 4 4 4 .4 THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 4 5

4 .4 .1 Regime and trajectory 4 5 4 . 4 . 2 Selection environment 4 6 4 . 4 . 3 Quasi-evolutionary theory 4 7 4 . 4 . 4 In conclusion 4 7

4 .5 VHS, MS-DOS, QWERTY, TWISTS OF FATE 4 8 4 .5 .1 Increasing returns 4 9 4 . 5 . 2 End-game strategy 5 0 4 . 5 . 3 Licensing politics 5 1 4 . 5 . 4 Ruining the market 5 1 4 . 5 . 5 Tremendous interests 5 2 4 . 5 . 6 Breaking standards 5 2

4 .6 THE FORMATION OF TRAJECTORIES: POSITIVE FEEDBACK 5 3

5. F R O M ' I M P A C T A S S E S S M E N T ' T O ' M A N A G I N G T E C H N O L O G Y I N S O C I E T Y ' 55

5.1 CONSTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ( C T A ) 5 5 5.2 CTA FROM AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 5 6

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Table of contents

5.3 NETWORK APPROACHES TO C T A 57 5.4 LEARNING PROCESSES, ARTICULATION OF DEMAND AND STRATEGIC NICHE MANAGEMENT 5 8 5.5 METHODS gg

5.5.1 Manipulation of social networks 59 5.5 .2 Social experiments 6 0 5.5 .3 Social simulation g.^ 5 .5 .4 Participative T A 52 5 .5 .5 Consumer CTA 53 5.5 .6 Consensus conference/public debate 6 7

5.6 BACKCASTING " QJ 5.7 DISCUSSION 6 8

6. WHY DO WE NEED SUSTAINABILITY? 70

6.1 INTRODUCTION 7 0 6.2 EASTER ISLAND 70 6.3 UNSUSTAINABLE SOCIETIES COLLAPSE 71 6.4 BUT HOW ABOUT us? 72 6.5 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT? '.. ' ....^.. ' '^'. ' ' . ' .^73 6.6 WHAT MEANS SUSTAINABILITY MORE CONCRETE? 74 6.7 THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY: FACTOR X '''^'^''"'1 75 6.8 QUESTIONS, DISCUSSION AND EXERCISES .'..^^...'.^^.^.^ 7 6

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1. What is Technology Assessment?

Why do things so often go wrong between "technology" and "society"? Are technologists insensitive to social demands, or are protesting citizens insensitive to rational arguments? Or is something more complicated going on? The need for Technology Assessment will be illustrated using a few examples. Technology is developed because it provides an advantage for the people involved. However, for society as a whole the advantages don't always outweigh the drawbacks. Technology Assessment was created to help providing the social judgment of pros and cons. Definitions of TA from the ' 6 5 - ' 7 5 period will be treated. Short references will be made to the most important classical TA methods, effects analysis and a cost/benefit analysis. Subsequently will be described the evolution the concept of TA has experienced to the modern Constructive Technology Assessment.

1.1 The traditional image of technology

Many social conflicts stem from the problem of dividing resources: problems in which must be determined who will benefit from natural resources and the yields of economic production. The answers to the most important problems of division therefore form the core of many political ideologies. Technology and technological innovation don't play any part therein, or so they are thought to do. Technology is even most often seen as the tool, which increases the bounty to be divided. A common view of technological development:

Although some individuals may be disadvantaged by the introduction of a new technology, when the advantages and disadvantages of this new technology are carefully reviewed it will be evident that society as a whole will always benefit from it.

In other words this view implies: the development of new technology isn't a 'zero-sum game', socially speaking, but something society benefits from - a 'positive-sum game'. Using this line of reasoning the content of new technologies was undebatable: you simply couldn't oppose them; technological innovation was a part of the "advancement" of society. Similar lines of reasoning were generally accepted up into the sixties.

'Zero sum game': activity where the sum of output factors equals the sum of input factors 'Positive sum game': activity where the sum of output factors is greater than the sum of input fartnre;

1.2 Technology forecasting

So technology was viewed in the past as a blessing for society, 'Manna from Heaven'. This made research into the social effects of new technology unnecessary. What was interesting to the government and the business sector however was to know in which technological areas breakthroughs were imminent, which would open up new and interesting commercial or military perspectives. Already before the Second Wodd War 'technological forecasting' was being done on a faidy large scale. The purpose of this was to chart technological advances on the short- or medium term. Technological forecasting was only geared towards explonng the possibilities that were presented by technology itself The

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2 1. What is Technology Assessment?

consequences of those possibilities remained undebated, as did the social consequences of any technological innovation. The view on technology, which stood behind this, was hence a deterministic one: Technology is a major driving force changing the world; its creation itself is independent from social developments. The major think tanks RAND and HUDSON, which explored many technologies, almost always interpreted the technological developments foreseen by them as having no problematic effects whatsoever. Yet there clearly were some exceptions. In 1944 Theodore Von Karman formulated the report Towards New Horizons in which he propagated the development of the jet aircraft as a clear technological mission. This mission wasn't only Inspired by the expected capabilities of the jet engine, but also by the political necessity to give some new Impulses to the US Air Force when the Second World War was drawing to a close.'

1.3 Societal effects of technology

In the sixties a surge of criticism against 'technology' occurred. In particular the book Silent Spring by Rachel L.Carson and L.Darling^ had a big influence In it. Other Influencing factors on an International level were the (nuclear) arms race in which science and technology played a major role, the threatening of unemployment and of decreasing privacy by computers and the advent of nuclear power generation with its risks of unprecedented accidents and unresolved waste problem. Technological Forecasting was met with Increasing resistance since the sixties. Forecasting was seen as the ultimate sign of the 'technocratlzing' society: planned cities, landscapes, roads etc. Resistance was bred against this from a humanistic and soclal-democratically onented perspective (Extreme left-wing did not resist this Increased planning tendency as Marxism always had opted for more rigid state planning)^ The rigidity of a technologically deterministic view in relation to social factors was further emphasized by the apparent fact that technological development carried disadvantages of Its own. The 'positive sum' game wasn't always valid and that Introduced the matter of who should pay the price and who should reap the rewards of technological development. If this were to be known beforehand it could be used In policymaking. In other words, the social pros and cons of a technological development should be assessed before deciding whether to implement it or not.

Cost-Benefit analysis of technology: an The making of such a analysis of all effects, both positive and negative cost/benefit analysis turned (^^^ quantified as well as possible), which will out to be troublesome In ^e brought about by the Introduction of a new most cases. Also, In cases technology In society. where the assessment was ^ possible at all It turned out to be more often wrong than not. This was because the technology under scrutiny often was controversial, hence making It difficult even to reach consensus on the expected effects. Moreover the social effects of technology were generally unpredictable. If those unpredlcted effects turned out to be unwanted too, a major problem would ensue: the pest control compound DDT turned out to be accumulating in the food chain only to end up in the fat tissue of mammals and humans, cars enabled more mobility but because of their huge numbers ended up constricting it and were damaging the (urban) environment,

' A.M.J.Kreykamp, H.Van Praag, B.Van Steenbergen (editing), 1972, Toekomstonderzoek, theorie en praktijk (1.2.2.), November, Deventer: Kluwer. " Rachel L.Carson, L.Darling, 1962, Silent Spring, Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass. ' Waskow, cited in A.M.J.Kreykamp, H.Van Praag, B.Van Steenbergen (editing), 1974, Toekomstonderzoek, theorie en praktijk (supplement 10, 1.5.2.), November, Deventer: Kluwer.

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1. What is Technology Assessment? 3

lead catalysts in petrol turned out to be harmful to humans and the environment, birth control methods not only provided birth control but also changed the sexual morals which In turn led to Increased transfer rates of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, the non toxic Chloro Fluoro Carbon refrigerants turned out to deplete the ozone layer, etc. etc. Those effects of technology were often hard to predict because they often entailed higher-order effects. First- ^ order effects consist of First-order effects are a direct result of the effects, which are a direct intended use of the technology. Second- and consequence of the higher-order effects coincide with changes in intended use of the human behavior s a result of the introduction of technology. Second- and the new technology. higher-order effects pertain to the changes In human behavior as a consequence of the Introduction of the new technology. First-order effects are generally easy to predict. Second- and higher-order effects are much harder to foresee, but can have effects many times more Important than the primary effects.

An example: When the databases of different governmental organizations are coupled

a better degree of control Is maintained on the collection of taxes and the execution of regulations. This Is a direct or first-order effect. But the balance of power between government and civilians also changes because social servants now have more information at their disposal. This can tempt the legislator Into refining the laws and complicating them. This can make the civilian feel powerless against the all-seeing, all-knowing governmental organizations and get alienated from politics. These are Indirect or higher-order consequences.

Another example: The use of information technology In health care has the desired effect

of being able to perform better diagnostics on patients, which can hence be treated in a better way (direct effect). More diagnostic tools could Increase the reliability and accuracy of a diagnosis by a doctor. But this can make the patient feel like being solely dependent on technology, the relationship between doctor and patient can change because of this and the patient can get the feeling of being treated like a 'case'. It Is possible that this also influences our thinking on the nature of humans: 'humans are machines, like all the others'.

Unexpected negative consequences of technology often are second- or third-order effects, effects that are a consequence of the change In behavior of people Involved with It. These changes often aren't foreseen because they are the result of vastly different events coinciding In time. Also the sheer number and diversity of the stakeholders Involved makes second-order effects hard to predict.

1.4 Technology Assessment, definitions

The Increasing public attention for the negative consequences of technology created In the USA a need for a new kind of assessment which would warn of unwanted effects of new technology, and which would provide possible solutions for controlling the course of development: Technology Assessment.

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Technology Assessment is an attempt to establish an early warning system to detect, control, and direct technological changes and developments so as to maximize the public good while minimizing the public hsks.'^

In this definition TA was mainly considered an instrument benefiting the public. However, in alternate definitions the political tight spots, which were hidden herein, were explicitly left for the policymakers to worry about:

Technology Assessment is the systematic identification, analysis and evaluation of the potential secondary consequences (whether beneficial or detrimental) of technology in terms of its impacts on social, cultural, political, economic and environmental systems and processes. Technology Assessment is intended to provide a neutral, factual input into the decision-making process.^

... a class of policy studies, which systematically examine the effects on society that may occur when a technology is introduced, extended or modified. It emphasizes those consequences that are unintended, indirect or delayed.

These definitions bear a strong resemblance to a definition of TA used in the business wodd:

The evaluation of the effects of [the application of] a new technology using muitidisciplinary research... where the company process [i.e. people and resources], products and services, market and customer base, social aspects, costs and yields are studied in relation to each other.^

Emilio Daddario, who submitted the bill for instating the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment in the US, defined TA mostly as a policy-making instrument:

Technology Assessment is a form of policy research, which provides a balanced appraisal to the policymaker Ideally, it is a system to ask the hght questions and obtain correct and timely answers. It identifies policy issues, assesses the impact of alternative courses of action and presents findings. It is a method of analysis that systematically appraises the nature, significance, status, and merit of a technological program.^

Although these definitions differ greatly in setting the boundary between TA and political decision-making they also have a common base regarding the limitation of technology forecasting.

'' Marvin J.Cetroii, Lawrence W.Connor, 1972, "A method for planning and assessing technology against relevant national goals in developing countries", in: Marvin J.Cetron, Bodo Bartoclia, The Methodology of Technology Assessment, New York. ' Vaiy T.Coates, cited by Ruud Smits, 1984, "De hernieuwde belangstelling voor Technology Assessment", Wetenschap & Samenleving, no. 1, pp. 16-25.

Joseph F.Coatcs, cited in: Alan L.Porter, Frederick A.Rossini, Stanley R.Carpenter, A.T.Ropcr, 1980, A Guidebook for Technology Assessment and Impact Analysis, New York/Oxford: North Holland. ' M.van Mens, 1989, "Toepassing van Technology Assessinent bij de NMB", in: A.Simonse, W.Kerkhoff, A.Rip, (edit), Technology assessment in ondernemingen, Deventer: Kluwer, pp. 54-78. * E.Q.Daddario, in Subcommittee on Science, research and Development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, US House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Ser. 1, (Washington DC, US Govemment Priming Office, Revised August 1968), p. 10.

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TA differs from technology forecasting in two ways:

TA isn't primanly concerned with the development of the technology itself, but in the development of technology in relation to society, to wit the way in which social choices have been made (and will be made) in the development process and the appreciation of the (im)possibilities of this new technology by stakeholder groups.

It is more or less geared toward the pointing out of possibilities in influencing technological development, both in the positive and the negative sense, and not towards predicting the future with respect to technology as accurate as possible. Whether TA should impose a norm itself (minimizing public risks) or whether it should fit into the norms imposed by decision makers is still debated.

1.5 TA organizations

Often, governments were developers of technology themselves. Any strategic information with respect to the consequences of technological developments therefore mainly played a part in territorial conflicts between the legislature (padiaments) and administration (government and its institutions). Information on societal consequences of technological developments was very important to padiaments because it enabled them to adjust its course on legislation eady on. For the government this was often an undesirable course of action, because information, which normally had no place in padiamentary decision-making, would now get involved in political debates. This is why it was faidy obvious that the padiament holding the strongest position in the technologically most advanced country was the first to found a TA organization: the Office of Technology Assessment which became a department of the U.S. Congress. In legislation and debate the following requirements for TA became apparent:

1- TA was to be a new type of research differing from existing research programs with Congress.

2- TA would have to deliver information relevant and important to the decision-making process.

3- TA had to be 'anticipating' and carry out an eady warning function for Congress.

4- TA had to identify policy options and show consequences. 5- These consequences had to be evaluated. 6- Social, economical and political consequences of policy options had to be

charted. 7- TA had to be objective and unprejudiced. 8- TA had to be managed by individual people and involve the general public in

making assessments. 9- TA had to inform the general public on consequences of government policy. 10- TA wasn't to make policy, but deliver the necessary information for it. 11- TA had to contribute to the regain of public trust in Congress decisions. 12- TA had to help in predicting public reactions on Congress decisions to

prevent those from having to be revoked under public pressure afterwards. 13- TA had to contribute to the reasonability and rationality of Congressional

debates.

Linked to the founding of the OTA is the name of Senator Emilio Q. Daddano, who not only managed to get the bill passed, but also became the first OTA director in

' Lewis Gray, 1982, "On 'Complete' OTA Reports", Technological Forecasting and Social Change 22, 3 and 4, pp. 299-319.

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1972. Initially, his efforts weren't particularly successful because he continually tended to avoid politically controversial subjects so as not to upset mennbers of Congress on which the OTA depended for its survival.'" He took one side in the dilemma that every political adviser faces: If you take stand in a controversy, you make enemies, if you avoid all controversies, you become superfluous. Later on the OTA (under new management) built up quite a good reputation.

Technology Assessment in most European countries (and the EU) only got going in the eighties. There had been initiatives in the seventies, but failed because in the European parliamentary tradition (where the distinction between Legislature and the Executive power is hardly present) TA often was considered as a reinforcement ofthe parliamentary opposition, (i.e. the governing party could get all the information it needed from their friends in the administration, a TA institute would therefore help the opposition). This made opposition parties in favor of TA, while ruling parties generally opposed it. TA thus often got a chance to catch on after a change in governments." In the Netherlands in 1986 the Rathenau Institute'^ was founded, named after Prof. Rathenau who led the fist major TA research program on the societal consequences of the introduction of microelectronics around 1980. In Europe the following TA institutes, more or less bound to political decision-making, currently exist: Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS, EU institute, Seville)'^ Scientific and Technical Options Assessment (STOA, European Parliament, Luxembourg)'*, Office Parlementaire d'Evaluation des Choix Scientifiques et Technologiques (OPEGST, France)'^ ITA (Austria)'^ Vlaams Instituur voor Wetenschappelijk en Technologisch Aspectenonderzoek (Flanders parliament)'^ Bro fr Technologiefolgen Abschatzung beim Deutschen Bundestag (TAB, Germany)'^ Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST, Great Britain)", Teknologi Radet (Denmark)'" and several others''. For an assessment of Technology Assessment Institutes see Smits''.

TA also attained a standing in the business sector. Several causes attributed to this: Forecasting often turned out to be insufficient. Slowly the realization dawned that not all of technological progress translated to items and products, which were viable for making a profit. Often, new technologies were very complex and their subsequent success on the market depended on a lot of factors. For instance, the Concorde turned out to be technically feasible. The advent of the 'wide body' aircraft allowed ticket prices to drop, and the climbing oil prices spelled disaster for the gas-guzzling Concorde. Furthermore, landing rights were hard to obtain for the craft because of its high noise level. This made the Concorde into a commercial mishap. All of these developments could in fact have been predicted. This was one of the clearest examples that showed the necessity for expanding technological

'" D.Dickson, 1984, The new politics of science, Pantheon New York. For ways of e.xecution in OTA see: Fred B.WoocI, 1982, "The Status ofTechnology Assessment, A view from the congressional Office of technology assessment", Technological Forecasting and Social Change 22, 3 & 4, pp. 211-222. " Ruud Smits, Jos Leyten, 1991, Technology Assessment, waakhond of speurhond? Naar een integraal technologiebeleid, Zeist, Kerckebosch. '~ Ruud Smits, Arie Rip, 1988, "De opkomst van TA in Nederland", Wetenschap & Samenleving 40, no. 5, pp. 7-16. Maarten Evenblij, 1989, "Technology Assessment", Intermediair 25, nr. 7, februari 17th, pp. 33-37. " http:/Avww.jrc.es/home/index.html " http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/default_en.htm

http://www.assemblee-nat.fi-/documents/index-oecst-gb.asp "'http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/welcome.htm " http://www.viwta.be/ '* http://www.bundestag.de/blickpkt/l 996/tab2.html ''' http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_offices/post.cfm

http;//www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?page=statisk/uk_about_us.htm&language=uk&toppic=aboutus http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/www.htm

" R.E.H.M.Smits, 1990, State of the art ofTechnology Assessment in Europe, A report to the 2nd European Congress on Technology Assessment Milan, 14-16 November 1990.

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forecasts in such a way that social and economical developments could also play a part.'^ With TA in businesses it was mainly a matter of charting the societal consequences of company products and possibilities for developing new products that would meet new demands or could create them. Also the prediction of governmental action, shortage situations in supplies, and demographic developments were important. Besides that it was also often important to note internal consequences for the company as a result of introducing new technologies: what effects does a certain technology have on work environment and the balance of power between different groups within the company? This form of TA was practiced in almost complete silence. With the 'normal' version of TA the main goal was usually to clarify technological developments towards politicians and the public involved so they would be able to determine their stance on the subject. With TA in businesses the emphasis was not on involving more people in decision-making through the spreading of information, but the gain of competitive advantage by getting ahead in obtaining new information.'''

1.6 TA, New Style

About halfway through the eighties the claims which were implicit in the definitions of TA most widely used turned out to be unattainable: serious doubts arose as to whether it was even possible in principle to set up a reasonably reliable early warning system for technological developments. Moreover the performing of a completely objective TA study (by charting all consequences of a technology) proved to be impossible. The predicting of societal consequences of technological developments (including 3rd and 4th order effects) especially proved impossible because of the sometimes rapidly changing social environment. In this way the oil crisis invalidated a lot of TA analyses. As a reaction to this the goals of TA studies were often dramatically reduced in scope. However, this was a political choice and thus TA had to dismiss the pretence of neutrality (the prediction of all societal consequences). Objectivity had been a difficult matter from the start, because of the strongly political environment In which TA was practiced.

Goals more limited in scope for TA arose. One of them was the stimulation of public debate on technological developments: not all consequences of a new development could be foreseen, but that wasn't a prerequisite for being able to publicly debate the consequences that were known. In the American situation a strong public debate was seen as a means to come to well-thought out and stable decisions. Public controversies were admittedly a nuisance to decision makers, but of high importance to the democratic quality of the decision-making process. Controversies stimulated a kind of 'informal' TA (because for instance in the controversy claims involving risks had to be supported more and more solidly) and hence improved the clarity of the subject among the public.'^ Cambrosio and Limoges even were of the opinion that controversies were a deciding factor in the application of TA studies and their limitations. They therefore considered public controversies the central element to each TA study."^

Harry Jones, Brian C.Twiss, 1978, Forecasting technology for planning decisions, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London/Basingstoke.

A.Siinonse, W.Kerkhoff, A.Rip (edit), 1989, Technology assessment in ondernemingen, Deventer, Kluwer. J.G.Wissema, 1977, Technology Assessment, aspectenonderzoek in het spanningsveld van technologie en samenleving, Deventer, Kluwer.

See for example: Allan Mazur, 1985, The dynamics of technical controversy, Communications Press, and Arie Rip, 1986, "Controversies as informal technology assessment", in: Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, tJtilization 8, p. 350.

A.Cambrosio, C.Limoges, 1991, "Controversies as governing processes in technology assessment", Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 3, pp. 377-396.

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TA not only reduced its pretences. Often was concluded that TA studies generally yielded answers, which were already obvious, and therefore had limited usefulness in political decision-making. A newer, more active form of TA was needed that would place less emphasis on objectivity and more on its practical use in political decision-making. Smits and Leyten discerned between traditional TA and a new form of TA. The differences were pictured as follows:^'

TRADITIONAL

Science plays the dominant role

High-strung expectations with respect to the abilities of TA

Output TA = report

Definition of problem is of lesser importance

One single TA organization

Instrumental use of information in a rational decision-making process

TA results are automatically weighed in with decision-making

Technology is considered autonomous

NEW

Equal interest between researchers and users

Modest expectations with respect to research results

Output = report + discussion

Problem definition plays major role

Many different TA organizations

Conceptual use of information in political decision-making process

High level of attention to incorporation TA in decision-making process

Technology is considered man-made and hence steerable

Smits and Leyten arrived upon a new definition of 'new-style TA' that matched the old definition by Daddario in many ways but had less pretence. TA is considered instrumental in Smits and Leyten's view, but is also integrated in the political decision-making process on a high level: TA is a process consisting of analyses of technological developments and their consequences and the discussion following from these analyses.

R.Sinits, J.Leyten, 1988, "Key issues in the institutionalization of TA", Futures, february.

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The goal of TA is to provide information that helps people involved in technological developments to determine their strategic policy, and helps to define further subjects for TA research. The main gripe with this definition is that TA is made completely subject to government policy. In this way, the independent role TA would have had (as an early warning system for undesired developments, stated in eariier definitions) is denied.

It's pretty clear that a definition of TA isn't that easy to put into one sentence. A number of elements have to be included:

TA focuses on the interaction between technological and societal developments (and so not in a direct fashion but indirectly on the technology-environment connection)

TA consists of analysis and design. Therefore it is rather an engineering discipline than a scientific activity.

TA needs an ethical perspective, which indicates the relative importance of norms and values that play a role in relation to technological and societal developments.

TA only states demands for consistency and clear formulation of the specific research question and on the ethical basis, which is used within the research for the judgment of consequences. There is no single unchanged ethical perspective, which should form the basis of every TA subject.

The ethical perspective of a TA study doesn't necessarily coincide with the perspective held by the government or with the ethical perspective held by the individual researchers.

TA attempts to show intervention possibilities based on its analyses. TA has (contrary to Technology History) a perspective geared towards the

future. TA studies specify the methods used in their course that make their results

reproducible and verifiable. TA researchers have to indicate how they have established the boundaries

of their research subject (if not all consequences of a technology are considered, why have only specific ones have been studied? How are higher-order effects taken into account, which may result from non-considered first-order effects?).

1.7 TA, a veritable menagerie

The execution of a TA study can have various different functions: Smits and Leyten discern the following functions of TA:^'

1. Reinforcement of the positions of stakeholders in the decision-making process

2. Providing support for the actual policy 3. Initiation and development of a future policy 4. Providing an eariy warning (especially for negative consequences) 5. Broadening of decision-making concerning stakeholders (involving more

people) 6. Development of desirable technological adjustments 7. Promoting the acceptance of technology by the public 8. Promoting the societal responsibility of scientists

R.Sniits, J.Leyten, 1991, Technology Assessment, waakhond of speurhond? Naar een integraal technologiebeleid, Zeist, Kerckebosch.

Ruud Smits, Jos Leyten, 1991, Technology Assessment, waakhond of speurhond? Naar een integraal technologiebeleid, Zeist, ICerckebosch, p. 268.

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TA not only reduced its pretences. Often was concluded that TA studies generally yielded answers, which were already obvious, and therefore had limited usefulness in political decision-making. A newer, more active form of TA was needed that would place less emphasis on objectivity and more on its practical use in political decision-making. Smits and Leyten discerned between traditional TA and a new form of TA. The differences were pictured as follows:''

TRADITIONAL

Science plays the dominant role

High-strung expectations with respect to the abilities of TA

Output TA = report

Definition of problem is of lesser importance

One single TA organization

Instrumental use of information in a rational decision-making process

TA results are automatically weighed in with decision-making

Technology is considered autonomous

NEW

Equal interest between researchers and users

Modest expectations with respect to research results

Output = report + discussion

Problem definition plays major role

Many different TA organizations

Conceptual use of information in political decision-making process

High level of attention to incorporation TA in decision-making process

Technology is considered man-made and hence steerable

Smits and Leyten arrived upon a new definition of 'new-style TA' that matched the old definition by Daddario in many ways but had less pretence. TA is considered instrumental in Smits and Leyten's view, but is also integrated in the political decision-making process on a high level: TA is a process consisting of analyses of technological developments and their consequences and the discussion following from these analyses.

R.Sinits, J.Leyten, 1988, "Key issues in tlie institutionalization of TA", Futures, february.

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The goal of TA is to provide information that helps people involved in technological developments to determine their strategic policy, and helps to define further subjects for TA research. The main gripe with this definition is that TA is made completely subject to government policy. In this way, the independent role TA would have had (as an early warning system for undesired developments, stated in earlier definitions) is denied.

It's pretty clear that a definition of TA isn't that easy to put into one sentence. A number of elements have to be included:

TA focuses on the interaction between technological and societal developments (and so not in a direct fashion but indirectly on the technology-environment connection)

TA consists of analysis and design. Therefore it is rather an engineering discipline than a scientific activity.

TA needs an ethical perspective, which indicates the relative importance of norms and values that play a role in relation to technological and societal developments.

TA only states demands for consistency and clear formulation of the specific research question and on the ethical basis, which is used within the research for the judgment of consequences. There is no single unchanged ethical perspective, which should form the basis of every TA subject.

The ethical perspective of a TA study doesn't necessarily coincide with the perspective held by the government or with the ethical perspective held by the individual researchers.

TA attempts to show intervention possibilities based on its analyses. TA has (contrary to Technology History) a perspective geared towards the

future. TA studies specify the methods used in their course that make their results

reproducible and verifiable. TA researchers have to indicate how they have established the boundaries

of their research subject (if not all consequences of a technology are considered, why have only specific ones have been studied? How are higher-order effects taken into account, which may result from non-considered first-order effects?).

1.7 TA, a veritable menagerie

The execution of a TA study can have various different functions: Smits and Leyten discern the following functions of TA:' '

1. Reinforcement of the positions of stakeholders in the decision-making process

2. Providing support for the actual policy 3. Initiation and development of a future policy 4. Providing an early warning (especially for negative consequences) 5. Broadening of decision-making concerning stakeholders (involving more

people) 6. Development of desirable technological adjustments 7. Promoting the acceptance of technology by the public 8. Promoting the societal responsibility of scientists

R.Sniits, J.Leyten, 1991, Technology Assessment, waakhond of speurhond? Naar een integraal technologiebeleid, Zeist, Kerckebosch.

Ruud Smits, Jos Leyten, 1991, Technology Assessment, waakhond of speurhond? Naar een integraal technologiebeleid, Zeist, Kerckebosch, p. 268.

9


r ? l e r * g , " e v * p m e n , in which a TA s , . d , is perfornne.

S t r l e n s i o n s a number of different forms of TA can be distinguished.

ATA Awareness TA, also called early warning TA: forecasting of P f f |^ '

Forecasting methods, such as Delphi, play an important role herein.

STA Strateqic TA is meant to inform a specific stakeholder about his strategic o p t t ^ f w t h ' esject o technological possibilities. It doesn't limit its analysis to stakeholder analysis but analyzes an entire sector wherever possible. Contains.

Analysis of possibilities/threats . Goals to which the possibilities can contribute . Boundary conditions which apply to this case Limits within the system

T.sVor:;"trc.tr:rSran. . oen i n , r . a , conduce , w , . * . o . government and businesses.

CTA, Constructive TA, is geared towards influencing the process of technological change. In this type of approach it is tned to make technological development conform to social needs and wishes. To this end it is sometimes attempted to build up social relations between different parties or to stimulate debate in the media or between more specifically involved parties. CTA thus mainly influences the social aspect of technological development, and doesn't directly define which technologies are socially desirable. Ways to do this are, among others:

. Contribute to the formation of a social infrastructure pertaining to the technology involved;

Perform experiments and test projects to promote learning effects and debate; i^ ,n inn

. Gaiher information on relevant experiments to contribute to learning effects.

" u v 1 " a " b e valued absolute,, ,non-subiec.ive,y): on sonte issues ^o fXof agreement can be reached whatsoever and hence can t provide

. me'lsn't a dialogue present In Interaction processes and so

social demand and financial strength).

Awareness TA, forecasting of possible societal consequences of a certain technology to make government or the public aware of opportunities and threats.

Strategic TA, is meant to inform a specific stakeholder on his strategic options with respect to technological possibilities.

CTA, Constructive TA, is geared towards influencing the process of technological change. In this approach it is tried to make technological development conform to social needs and wishes.

Backcasting. This is a form of TA where the desired future social situation is defined. The backcasting study then plots a route towards arriving at this situation.

10


Backcasting. This is a TA study with a very specific goal: A situation is defined which is considered desirable to reach at some specific time in the future. According to this situation a way to reach this situation is analyzed: which social relations need to be constructed, which technological developments are desired/required, which ones aren't. The degree in which the defined future situation differs from the present situation determines the number of possible ways to attain this change.

11

13

2. Technological prediction and classical TA methods

In this chapter several methods will be treated with which can be attempted to chart future technological developments and their consequences. With that the matter of how much can be predicted in a certain situation will also be discussed. Finally the 'control dilemma' will be treated: in the phase when the influencing of technological development is still possible, we aren't sufficiently (or not at all) aware of the social consequences. When we finally do know these consequences, the technology has set beyond the possibility of adjustment.

2.1 Predictability

How can we make sure that predictions (or in the more general sense: statements being predictive in nature) are more dependable than making a bet in the casino? Predictions have been made for millennia in the past. Sometimes they were religious in nature. Their pretence to truth usually wasn't irrational, but extra rational, which means their claim to truth exceeded the boundaries of rationality (oracles, revelations, visions etc.). These predictions invariably had the character of 'fate' in the sense that they would certainly come true and couldn't be influenced by any actors. Although belief in the 'customization' of society has drastically reduced in the past twenty years, no valid reason exists to reduce it to 'zero'. However, the kinds of predictions involving fate are unacceptable to us for two reasons:

The predictions are to have a rational foundation, meaning a plausible insight must be given into causal relations, including possible feedback loops, on which the prediction is based.

Predictions are to have a conditional character, meaning they should indicate the conditions under which the consequences (possibly) will occur and hence also possibilities to influence the course of future events.

Predictions must be useable. Useable in this context means: answering a question with a relevant answer, which is credible and communicable and is given at the right time.

These demands on predictions can also be imposed upon TA studies. Another demand for TA studies is balance. This pertains to the ethical standards relevant to the subject of research - these are to be clearly described. Choices are to be prevented where possible and where they occur nonetheless should be explicitly stated.

2.2 Methods

There is no such thing as a perfect TA method because the relations on which the prediction is to be based often hold an empirical or inductive character (meaning extrapolations from observed relations in the past). It is hence principally uncertain whether these relations are to remain valid in the future. It can even be a case of a clearly measured relation between two variables only turns out to be a coincidence of environmental factors. Therefore a study should preferably adhere to a 'theoretical framework', which indicates under what boundary conditions the empirical relations used are valid. There is no method that leads with utmost

13

2. Technological Prediction and classical TA methods

certainty to crystal-clear predictions; only methods that lead towards verifiable conclusions. In TA research and Forecasting mistakes often occur. Common mistakes are-

o research hypotheses aren't stated explicitly and aren't made credible This can for instance lead to circular reasoning; a conclusion has been implicitly stated in the research hypothesis,

o observations are too readily considered undebatable. Every observation depends on the conceptual framework of the observer and can always be debated in principle. Researchers should acquaint themselves with this especially when it concems the observation of social phenomena This holds quite often for the judgments of experts, especially where they are judging technologies that threaten 'their own field'

In the past a number of methods and resources were used for TA studies None of these methods is adequate to base an entire study upon; combinations were practically always used and required the addition of literature studies and

ZTZ'Ir ' commonplace that they won t be discussed extensively ,n this section. However, some tips are important

o Never blindly act based upon the opinion of one single expert. Experts have interests of their own which makes them have a specific vision. Also they sometimes give advice on subjects that they aren't experts in at all

o The memory of people interviewed is often rather limited. Sometimes they can proclaim fallacies with the utmost certainty. Therefore, always keep a critical eye on statements made in interviews.

o Ask for specialist advice on the literature study. The number of databases is so large that it would be impossible to find all the relevant data within a reasonable time span.

2.2.1 Monitoring

IWonitoring: the continuous observation of all public information on a technological area consisting of channels like publications, trade fairs, lectures, annual business reports, patents etc.

In monitoring an eye is continuously kept open for all signals, which may play a role in developments under interest. This includes for instance magazines, subject literature, media coverage,

^ fkr^ '^""^ '^ "^' ' ^ P ^ ' ' advertisements, annuals, databases etc n l n i o . ^""^ ' '^^ "^"'^^ ""^f"'- Specifically 'gatekeepers', meaning peop e who receive information from lots of different angles, are of importance Monitoring a technology in this way is very intensive. A special way of ZiSg"s d p l n n ' n screened using specially .^o^ .hil'rr Technological trends can appear from patent files

n S t h ' ' " ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ shifting of the focal analyzed These methods form a useful tool for detecting trends but can hardiv say anything about their meaning.^" u ^ DUX can nardly

l^ZrZt^^rr' - ' ^ - ' " ^ ^ - - k e n n i n g e n inventansatie en selectie van

1 4

2. Technological Prediction and classical TA methods 15

2.2.2 the Delphi method

The Delphi method is a method using which the expectations of experts on the development of a certain technology can be charted. With a Delphi a number of experts are required to answer a series of questions on the development of a specific technology in writing. The response should contain a judgment involving a timescale and an estimate as to the probability of future developments. A project leader gathers all responses and poses a new, more specific series of questions to the people interviewed. In this new round the matters on which consensus hasn't been reached are the most important. The participants get to review the arguments and estimations of the other participants anonymously. In an iterative process It is attempted to reach a consensus among the experts. Using this a more solid foundation is gained for a vision of the future. These rounds force the experts into refining and supporting their argumentation. No face-to-face discussions take place, but the matter is treated in writing to prevent verbal trickery from being used and to keep status from playing a role. In practice usually no further convergence of opinions occurred after about 4 rounds. Sometimes a forum discussion was organized between participants because of waning response. The Delphi method is particularly suited to TA research in which the opinion of experts plays a major role, such as with awareness TA where not much is known about the technology yet. Methodologically a Delphi comes with its own pitfalls. How can be prevented that a bias occurs because of lack of response from a particular group, for instance industrial experts? How can it be prevented that experts try to contact each other outside of the study, in worst cases even to discuss on the answers they will both give in the interviews, to consolidate their own interests (for instance more funding or prestige for their work, or the sweeping under the rug of problems which can lead to unwanted government interference)? Moreover a Delphi takes a lot of time, both for the analysts and for the people interviewed. In fact, Delphi in its original form is more of a forecasting method than a TA method, because only the experts are being consulted and the social aspect of the technology is hardly considered. It seems questionable to involve Delphi participants from different interest groups. In a conflict of interests rational arguments don't play the leading role. Is consensus still attainable in that case? Are the participants still using the same standards?

In a Delphi a number of experts are interviewed in writing on the development of a specific technology. The experts subsequently are presented with the arguments and estimates of the other participants (anonymously). Afterwards they are again interviewed, especially regarding the Items they showed disagreements on. Usually a consensus is reached after about 3 rounds.

2.2.3 Cross Impact Assessment

A variation on Delphi is the Cross Impact Assessment method, which was first used by the American aluminum company Kaiser, mainly in decisions on the introduction of new products. For the company 60 developments were identified which might happen at some stage. In constructing these, various experts were involved to chart risks in terms of technology, competitor and client behavior, etc. They weren't only asked to estimate the chance on such a possibility happening, but also on what the chance on its occurrence would be if some other event had

1 5


happened before. The result was a matrix of chances. This matrix could be calculated using a Monte Carlo procedure, which made it easier to assess the risks following from a decision in a certain complex situation. Using the Cross Impact Method risk-avoidance measures could also be devised. This method appears to be suitable mainly for strategic TA because it isn't so much about exploring a new area as to reduce the complexity of a problem. Cross Impact Assessment can in principle also be done using other elements besides the opinions of experts.

Example of a limited events matrix regarding the introduction of the fax machine on the market

Probability of event becomes:

If this event happens:

Increasing taxes/costs

Negative legislation

Replacement technology

Market saturation

Increasing costs/taxes on transmission (0,70)*

1,00 P(1|1)

0,40 P(1|2)

0,70 P(1|3)

0,51 P(1|4)

Negative legislation 0,20 1,00 0,38 0,31 (0,40)* P(2|1) P(2|2) P(2|3) P(2|4) Development of replacement technology (0,60)*

0,90 P(3|1)

0,72 P(3|2)

1,00 P(3|3)

0,33 P(3|4)

Market saturation (0,45)* 0,33 P(4|1)

0,35 P(4|2)

0,05 P(4|3)

1,00 P(4|4)

* Initial marginal (ceteris paribus) probability.

2.2.4 Social-technical maps

To not only be able to predict technology but also give information on social effects, more tools are needed. The views of groups and organizations, which are relevant, form the basis for social-technical maps for specific technological developments. Below a list Is stated using which such a map can be formed.

0. Bounding of the technical system (will it be a map of the car, the engine or for instance the electrical engine) and time frame.

1. Construction of a crude tree showing hierarchy of technical alternatives and mechanisms, which determine the selection between them, plotted against time, meaning which alternatives are being worked on and what choices are made in the process. Attention is also paid to alternatives that didn't make the grade, but can be developed on separate tracks in other developments.

The social-technical map shows:

The state of development of a technology,

The dynamics in development of this technology,

The different stakeholders involved in this technology,

The views and interests the stakeholders have regarding this technology.

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2. Characterizing the alternatives according to contents (cognitive) and origins (social). Which stakeholders are trying to get which items onto the agenda? In the characterization of contents attention is also paid to expectations, links between alternative technologies (for instance coupling to base technologies) and any missing knowledge. In the characterization of origins also focused upon are relationships between stakeholders generating alternatives and the identity of the relevant stakeholders.

3. Does trajectory (subsequent technologies are all based on the same basic design/knowledge base, like C-MOS technology) formation occur? Trajectory formation is often linked to expectations regarding technological progress, which results in disregard for alternative technologies. Trajectory forming occurs together with entrenchment, the 'nesting' of technologies in our society). This means that various different actors (legislators, research organizations, or even consumers) get involved in the project and adapt themselves towards this development.

4. What are the (environmental) effects of the different alternatives? When has who acknowledged these effects, and how are they taken into account?

5. Are there critical episodes visible in the technological development? How can those fractures be characterized in both a cognitive and social way? Through which process did the fractures occur? What roles do the different stakeholders play in this? Was it a matter of anticipation by technologists, or external pressure? How was the social environment affected by the technology? In what way were the technologists put under pressure by their social environment? Were there specific actors linking the technology and its social environment?

6. In the periods where no fractures were present (developing episodes), were there attempts to bring about fractures? By whom, and why did they fail? What difference is there with the critical episodes?

2.2.5 Checklist

The making of a social-technical map often takes a rather large amount of time. The technology has to be monitored intensely and a large number of interviews are needed to chart the positions of the different stakeholders. Often a quicker check is wished for, to see if there should be cause for concern and to come up with subjects for further research. The checklist presented here consists of three parts (unequal in weight):

o research and development work o product o production process

'Product' in this case means that which is the intended final result (and usually is sold), 'production process' means the steps taken to produce this product and 'technology' signifies the product, production process and knowledge incorporated into these.

A: l-low acceptable is the research and development work that accompanies the formation of the new product and its production process?

1) Do counteracting social forces exist against the methods used in the research and/or development work or against the collection and storage of certain data?

2) Is the research and development work scientifically interesting or does the development of this technology provide a special contribution to (a) technical and/or scientific discipline(s)?

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3) Can it be foreseen that investing in the development of a technology at this moment could prevent a better alternative from being developed in the future?

A1) These points can be considered in this case: o Safety of the research for researchers and people living in the neighborhood

regarding for instance the release of poison, manipulated organisms, radiation etc.;

o Abuse of test animals or test subjects (people); o Possible forms of abuse of research data for socially controversial ends

such as weapons of mass destruction, gaining access to private information, race-based discrimination etc.;

o Mistrust towards researchers, which are carrying out the research (a so-called Faustus, Jekyll, Strangelove or Buikenhuisen complex).

A2) Disconnected from the eventual results a research or development project can sometimes provide a powerful stimulus to other technologies and disciplines. Many examples are known. For instance, the construction of the closeable Oosterschelde dam in the Netherlands yielded new knowledge and technology, which could be used for other goals. This effect was also to be seen with the SDI project. These effects are usually called 'spin-off effects' when coming from military technology.

A3) This problem occurs quite often: investing in an improved waste-incineration process that prevents the forming of dioxins makes developing a more environmentally friendly alternative to PVC later on less attractive. Investing in a more efficient petrol engine means that the development of the electrical car will suffer as a result.

B: How acceptable is the new product in itself?

Ethically:

1) Are any social values connected to the product in itself, or the product that it replaces?

2) Is the product considered unacceptable in the ethical system of specific religious or cultural factions?

B1) People don't judge products based solely on their own interests; they also rate the product in terms of their social opinions. Products can expect to receive a certain amount of positive appreciation when they can be coupled to social developments/changes, which are considered to be positive. In this way many people in the neighborhood of Medemblik in the Netherlands held a positive attitude towards the construction of a new 1 MW windmill because they expected a positive environmental contribution from it. A similar coupling is suggested for the appreciation of 'atomic electricity'. Here, two conflicting social values were in play: economic growth and safety/health. Analyses show that many of the differences surrounding the use of nuclear energy corresponded to views held with respect to these social values. A negative appreciation could for instance exist for products which can be related to negatively valued social phenomena such as:

o Unemployment (this was an issue when the computer became hugely popular);

o Forms of opulence and waste (probably the reason for the failure of the electric toothbrush in Holland in 1973 by Philips, and their subsequent decision not to introduce an electric corkscrew);

o Animal cruelty (fur coats);

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o Usurping of traditional culture (replacement of windmills by engine-driven pumps in the nineteen-twenties and thirties).

B2) This particularly pertains to protests made by religious factions, for instance against certain kinds of foodstuffs, preparation methods, contraceptives, medical treatments and animal products. Such protests don't necessarily have an influence on acceptance by the majority of the population (for instance the Roman-catholic protests against the birth control pill).

Social acceptance

3) Will the costs of the new product be likely to attract criticism?

4) What effects on the environment will the product have? Which changes in behavior will the product cause, and what environmental effects result from that?

5) What are the risks the use of the product entails, both for the user and others?

6) Does the use of the product clash with habitual behavioral patterns of large groups of people?

7) Are there financial or psychological barriers which hinder acceptance of the product?

B3) The cost is partly a technical/economical boundary condition. For some products it can be economically acceptable to have a higher selling price than the one they currently have (for a product of equal value) because for instance legal measures can be taken to limit competition, or because competition is hardly possible at all. However, not every price that can be set market-wise (especially concerning products that can be monopolized) is also socially acceptable. Often social values play a role in this, such as in the debates on the price of university and school fees.

B4) Readily visible environmental effects stem from the use of energy by the product (and the change in it compared to that of an existing product). However, change in behavior is also important: consider an increase/decrease in car use, etc.

B5) Items here include damage to health, economical damage, psychological damage as a result of the improper functioning of the product. In this case the appreciation of risks differs: Voluntarily taken risks are much more acceptable to people than risks imposed on them by others. See for an example the famous study by Nader (1965) about the lack of safety in cars.

B6) Here, the change of commonly accepted behavior is the issue, for instance in the case of the introduction of bio-bins and glass containers. In both these cases this went fairly smoothly because people were motivated for a higher value (concern for the environment). The Unilever product 'Dentabs' failed however, because it infringed upon the deep-routed habit of teeth brushing which was instilled in the Dutch population by way of commercials. Brown milk bottles (which were less transparent to light) failed because consumers couldn't see whether the bottles were clean anymore. Also, a new product can have 'hidden' deficiencies that only show up later, after prolonged use (e.g. many people find it uncomfortable to read long texts from a microfilm or a screen). Common habits are hard to change, even if a change would be beneficial.

19

20 2. Technological Prediction and classical TA methods

B7) New products can sometimes pose advantages but nevertheless have difficulty being accepted because the customer's inhibition towards using it is too great. This inhibition can consist of a course required to get acquainted with use of the product (typing courses and new software spring to mind), the necessity to purchase special equipment before the product can be used, or psychological bamers. This was in a sense the issue with new aramide-reinforced car tires which had to compete against the 'Stand on Steel' campaign by Michelin when they were introduced in the seventies.

Secondary social effects

8) Does the product permit new (economic or otherwise) activities? How should these activities be judged?

9) Does the product threaten existing activities, which hold a certain social or cultural value?

10) Does the product influence the social structure? (private life, local community cultural region)

11) Does the product have any other (possible) uses than the one primarily intended for it?

B8) New products can sometimes lead to a host of new possibilities which promote the acceptance of the product. Copiers not only replaced carbon paper

^ ""^^^ '"""'^^^^ ^"^^"t f copying done - something IBM hadn t anticipated. In this way it is to be expected that new and improved products not only replace existing ones but also introduce increased functionality and with it a broader acceptance.

B9) A new product can lead to a decrease in demand for other products This can cause the market for those products to become too cramped. Sometimes these products are considered too valuable to disappear: think of reduced theater visits as a consequence of the use of television, or a reduction in the use of public transport as a consequence of increased car use. The community considered these products (theaters, public transport) so important that they were often subsidized.

B10) Many products exert an influence on the way people live together and communicate. Where once the latest rumors were exchanged at the pump in the village square, there now is the local cable TV network. This means for instance the introduction of a partial news monopoly and the loss of a part of the local social structure. The television also meant an attack on family life. Also consider computer widows', scientists who daily email with their colleagues and commute etc.

Often these drawbacks of a new technology pose no problem towards its acceptation: the decision to accept is often individual (as are the advantages)- the drawbacks (the dereliction of social communities) are usually collective.

B11) Especially base products often have many possibilities of use Polyethylene or instance was originally developed as an insulator for submarine cables This

later only formed a fraction of its total use.

C: How acceptable is the production of the new product?

In itself:

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1) Are any ethical standards and/or values threatened in production?

2) Are the working conditions in the production process acceptable?

C l ) Consider for instance (miss-) use of animals or people, and religiously inspired protests against the use of holy ground and violation of the rest on religious celebration days. Also to be considered are forms of resistance against production processes that mainly stem from negative associations and emotional responses. This plays a part In for instance food conservation processes in which radiation plays a role. Next to very concrete arguments on the effect radiation has on food, ethical values on the value of life, creation and future generations also play a role in this case. Ethical standards and values also crop up in the acceptance of food, which has been produced by means of genetically modified organisms. Cheese, which is produced using chymosine obtained through genetic modification, is identical to cheese produced using rennet obtained from calves' stomachs. Yet the 'Gist-Brocades' company is unable to sell chymosine because (mainly German) consumers don't wish to eat cheese produced in this way.

C2) Here attention has to be paid both to the physical and the psychological work environment. Workload, safety, stress, exposure to hazardous substances, continuous shifts, possibilities for employees to be involved in the organization.

Local environment:

3) Which are the physical effects of the production facility on the environment?

4) Which are the expected (primary and secondary) effects of the production on

employment? What level of schooling is required for personnel?

5) What other consequences does the product have for the local environment?

6) What are the social implications of the production for the local community?

7) Does a potent breeding ground for local activism exist?

8) Can choosing a suitable location drastically reduce negative effects? C3) This case concerns itself with the environmental impact which doesn't play a big role in the overall environmental picture, but can lead to severe problems locally, such as the emission of polluting substances into the air (it's mainly the 'stench' factor in this case), surface water or soil, a local garbage disposal problem, noise, use of precious space, 'horizon pollution', interference of electromagnetic signals, depletion of ground water, lack of safety (think of sabotage too), disruption of animal life.

C4) There are both employment effects directly related to production (both for new as well as disappearing employment) as well as indirectly related effects. Examples of indirect effects include: farmers losing their land, the building contractor building houses for his workers, a chips stand in front of the factory gates, etc. New production activities can also draw other industries into the area. The level of education of the personnel needed often is very important regarding the possibilities of local employment and the migrations caused because of it.

C5) Here secondary effects like transport and traffic risks as a result of supplies and distribution on the location of production come into play, but also possible cooperative use of the infrastructure built for the production facility. This cooperative use can lead to an improvement of the traffic situation or to better public facilities. Also waste products (like waste heat) are sometimes useable by

21


the local community. These effects can't be very clearly categorized at an early stage, normally.

C6) In this case can be thought about the consequences of migration and industrialization on the local culture. Does the local community have an 'open' culture? Here the existence of a local industrial or trading tradition to which the new activity can add is important. Also, the effects of migration on the local housing market can be of importance. Other local consequences can be found in the area of public amenities and local taxes.

C7) Local acceptance of nuclear power plants In the American situation was linked to certain social-economic and political characteristics of the area. Particularly the already present environmental lobbying activity appeared to be directly linked to the strength of opposition against nuclear power plants and a higher living standard (high average income, few welfare-supported) appeared to be inversely proportional to it.

C8) Some of the negative effects of production will be negligible when the production takes place within for instance a large industrial area. A major urban agglomeration also offers different possibilities from a rural area. On the other hand some rural areas may offer the best environment for new production.

Society:

9) Which (either existing or planned) economic activities are threatened by production?

10) Is the existing balance of power influenced by new production? Consider the following relations:

1- between employees (or unions) and employers; 2- between different producers; 3- between producers, clients and suppliers; 4- between government and industry branch; 5- between different governmental institutions.

11) What does new technology mean for the development of third-world countries? Are relations between global trade blocks influenced by production?

C9) Items to consider here are unemployment, destruction of capital (both private and public) in this and other sectors. Reduction of employment opportunities and/or investments can lead to powerful protests when it concerns groups that are well organized. When current employment opportunities can be maintained and the destruction of capital can be avoided, these protests can be soothed.

CIO) Technologies sometimes can radically change the balance of social power. This is related to C4, also. The position of employees or the union can be undermined when tightly organized professions become obsolete (such was feared in the graphics sector), the government gains power over the civilian (and often also over lower-level governments) by the linking of databases, and a company can sometimes reinforce its position regarding its suppliers or clients. This can lead to resistance within the groups losing their position of power. Infamous is the resistance of British unions against some technological changes (for instance in the mining industry).

C11) New technology can spell the death-knell for the development of regions in the Third World. A more economical use of resources born of environmental considerations (or a replacement by other resources such as was the case with phosphates in detergents) can often lead to a dramatic reduction in resource

22


exports from the Third World. New technology can also have consequences in trade politics.

2.2.6 Scenarios

Scenarios are often mentioned as one method. Constructing a scenario however can hardly be called a method of forecasting because the future data that scenarios present are produced by other means. Scenarios would be better described as a way of presenting technology forecasting than as a method. In a scenario it is attempted to plot the choices, or alternative events expected and to translate the consequences of a choice or event to later choices or events (a choice often involves the elimination of a later possibility). There are always multiple scenarios possible. The determination of a limited number of scenarios which are more likely to occur than others is to be done using a different method, as should the analysis of which choices would eliminate each other. The most important goal of scenarios however is not to predict, but to 'wake people up' and make them aware of possible changes:

During stable times, tiie mental model of a successful decision maker and unfolding reality match... In times of rapid change and increased complexity, however, the manager's mental model becomes a dangerously mixed bag: rich detail and understanding can coexist with dubious assumptions and illusory projections^^

Trend scenarios show developments that are in line with our current ideas. They are also called 'surprise-free scenarios' because they do not incorporate any sudden and unexpected events. The scenarios are normally shown as surrounding a most probable scenario (which often represents 'business as usual'). Scenarios often make complex problems clearer to policymakers. Shell often works with three distinct scenarios: 'business as it used to be', 'frustration and conflict', and 'realism and restraint'^^. Framework-determining scenarios are meant to show possibilities for reaching an ultimate situation that is not an extrapolation of current developments^^ (for instance the trend-breaking scenario of traffic and transport of 1988^'*). Beside these methods a great number of other tools and methods exist to make more quantitative predictions. They are treated more extensively in the course 'Technology and the future' (WM0908).

In a scenario a possible future is portrayed for an organization, nation, discipline or technology. The scenario should be credible and tantalizing as a possible development and should therefore be consistent and sufficiently detailed. The goal of a scenario usually isn't to make plans for future events, but to stimulate creative thinking about the future.

PieiTe Wack, 1985, Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead, Harvard Business Review, September October. -^ P.Rademaker, 1981, "Toekomstverkenning in het bedrijfsleven". In: Van Doom/Van Vught, pp. 170-189.

" Joseph van Doorn, Frans van Vnglit, 1978, Forecasting, methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek, Van Goreum, Assen/Amsterdam.

Th.J.H.Schoemakcr, H.C.Van Evert, IVI.G.Van den Heuvel, 1988, Trendbreukscenario vervoer en verkeer, TU Delft, P.iM.Peeters, 1988, Schoon op weg, naar een trendbreuk in het personenverkeer, Amsterdam, Milieudefensie.

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2.3 Problem: the control dilemma

2.3.1 Introduction

In his bool< The Social Control of Technology' David Collingndge^^ treats the problem of Icnowledge (insufficient, inaccurate Icnowledge) connected to the development of technologies. According to Collingridge the developers of technologies are caught in a 'control dilemma':

... attempting to control a technology is difficult, and not rarely impossible, because during its early stages, when it can be controlled, not enough can be known about its harmful social consequences to warrant controlling its development; but by the time these consequences are apparent, control has become costly and slow. (19)

One of two major ways to solve this problem is by attempting to gain Control dilemma: The development of a insight in the design phase into side technology can be steered quite well in its effects occurring later on. This is, eady stages; at that time the knowledge to according to Collingridge, a dead determine why, where and how to adjust is end. Histoncal examples show the lacking. When a technology is widespread prediction of side effects is doomed in society we finally know all to fail. Collingndge hence proposes consequences of it. Control and steenng an alternative way, which gears of that technology, however, has become itself towards the design phase and quite difficult by that time. attempts to integrate the realization that decisions have to be made based on (partial) ignorance.

2.3.2 New criteria for the design phase

Concretely, Collingridge proposes to bear in mind the following aspects in the development of new technologies.

a. Correctability of decisions Starting from the knowledge that negative effects will keep appearing, decisions in the design phase of technologies have to be constructed in such a way, that it is possible to correct them afterwards. A decision made under ignorance should be combined with a forward-looking notion of responsibility and a willingness to revoke the onginal decision should it turn out to be wrong. With every decision should go a pro-active monitoring process to investigate the possible 'wrongness' of the decision. Also, decisions should be investigated for their monitor response time - this is the minimum time-span between the time of decision and the time at which its possible error can be recognized. Collingridge pleads for the development of technologies in which the monitoring in the design phase is cheap and the monitor response time is as short as possible.

b. Control of systems In case of ignorance investment should be done into systems with a high degree of controllability. The ideal case is a technology with a high degree of controllability and which yields low costs in cases of any errors, which means that the cost of dysfunctions stay low and they can be controlled in a timely manner. However, there always remains a degree of tension between the degree of controllability (design decision) and the costs of control (economical factors).

David Collingridge, 1980, The Social Control of Technology, Pinter Publishing.

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c. Flexibility The relative number of options to which a designer has access in a decision can be defined as the 'flexibility' of that decision. The flexibility of a technical design or system is inversely proportional to the control costs and the time needed to perform correctional measures. The greater the degree of ignorance, the more should be strived for decisions with a high degree of flexibility. One of the possibilities on a company or government level to reinforce this flexibility is not to put all eggs in one basket, but to develop and stimulate multiple different designs and/or technologies at the same time. In this way, agncultural development shouldn't only be done in the direction of genetically modified crops, but at the same rate in integrated farming- and biological agricultural techniques. If transgenic crops would turn out to be more expensive than thought before (for instance because of environmental damage), a quicker transition can be made to a different technological approach which doesn't have to be researched from scratch.

d. Insensitivity to errors Choosing for decisions, which are highly correctable or flexible, or investing into a system, which is easily controlled, also means choosing for decisions, which are relatively insensitive to errors or mistakes. In this last case the costs of a wrongful decision (which can be quickly corrected) are lower and don't differ greatly from the costs made in case o fa 'correct' decision.

2.3.3 Elements hindering flexible design

Collingndge strongly realizes that implementing the criteria mentioned above in the design phase isn't easy. He discerns five reasons why technological developments are so hard to control:

1. Entrenchment The introduction of a new technology also has consequences for existing technologies, which have to adapt (e.g. because the new technology is cheaper). If the newly introduced technology has to be amended, these other technologies also have to be adapted. This makes control difficult, slow and expensive. Entrenchment has a lot to do with the interconnections and dependencies of technologies in high-tech societies. New technologies complement other, older technologies (for instance in a transportation system) and change the structure of the system. The eventual transition from classic to electnc-powered cars would require a huge adaptation of other technologies in the 'car transportation system' (oil refineries, electrical power plants, battery producers, transition of petrol stations to 'charging stations', etc). But also even the transition from leaded to unleaded petrol can't be realized by merely developing engines which run on unleaded petrol. The production machinery for the old engines (using leaded petrol) have to keep being used until they are written off economically, the petrol stations have to be amended, etc. Entrenchment means that the time required to pass on structural changes is faidy long in all cases. At the same time it has consequences regarding the debate on the changing of technical systems: it gives the proponents of the status quo an unfair advantage (because changes always cost money). Entrenchment plays the biggest part in technologies, which are 'invariable' and 'very valuable'. The value

Entrenchment is the phenomenon of technological products and processes being hard to change, because they are carefully attuned to other technologies and/or organizations, and a lot has been invested in them (financially or by means of education).

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26 2. Technological Prediction and classical TA methods

can for instance be determined by calculating the costs caused by failure of the system (take for example the failing of the electrical power supply).

2. Competition Technologies are almost always developed in a competitive context, often in the economical sense. This reduces the flexibility of decisions made in these technologies. Companies can't afford to lose 'the race' and will therefore be inclined to follow the technological developments of other companies. Competition against technologies of other companies forces them to make quick decisions. Also a company may develop a technology sometimes merely to 'be ready' for when another company decides to market the same technology. All this while the company may not even have any special need for this new technology or when the investment costs are quite (too) high. In this way competition forces companies to invest more into the development of new technologies.

3. Positive feedback

4. 'Lead time' Technologies requiring a long development time ('lead time') are difficult to control, even without there being economic competition involved. A characteristic of technologies involving long development times is a long-running learning experience, with all the errors it entails. Only after a technology is through the entire development phase any mistakes made become apparent. In that stage it is too costly to still adjust the design or discard it. A clear example of this is the nuclear breeding power plant at Kalkar (Germany), which never operated but cost billions of euros. An efficient prospective technology policy is only possible when knowledge exists about the societal costs of certain technologies (possible to deduce from the costs in case of system breakdown, for instance) and a clear vision of the future is present. Both of these requirements are problematic. Firstly, the costs only become apparent when the technology is implemented and integrated into the web of other technologies and social patterns. Secondly, a clear image of the future is always hard to obtain: unexpected events (market price fluctuations e.g. in the oil crisis, accidents like Chernobyl) can have a great influence on the future course of events.

5. Scale The large scale of certain technical systems (for instance the 'car transportation system', the electricity grid) is a major barrier working against any attempt to change it or replace it with another system. Collingridge observes a tension between smaller production units (which provide options for control and steering of the system) and large-scale production units, which often tend to be more economical. Choosing lower steering costs (smaller production units) often means operating at higher economical costs which isn't always possible in a competitive environment:

... a production system of small units with short lead-time is more controllable and more flexible than a system of large units of long lead-time. ... Control costs, the costs of buying and operating new units and scrapping old ones, will, however, generally favor large units because of economies of scale. This is to be expected, as flexibility usually has to be paid for in some way.

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3. The formation of new technologies

What consequences does a new technology have for society, and what consequences does society have for technology? In this section an overview of approaches is presented with which the relation between technology and society can be conceptualized. Using these approaches it will be shown why technologies often are so resistant to social wishes to change them, and which can be interfacing points for the social influencing of technological developments.

3.1 Introduction

We can ask ourselves the question of how the process of technological development works exactly. Knowledge of this development process and the different relevant factors in it may give us a better insight in the possibilities of influencing the development of technology in the future. This can help an engineer better understand his own position. It can also be useful when we want to steer a certain course in developing technology, enabling us to reach specific goals or to avoid negative effects. Within several scientific disciplines interests toward innovations and technological development exist. After the Second World War these interests had a strongly economic orientation. This stemmed from the problems economists encountered when attempting to explain the post-war economic growth: it wasn't explicable using macroeconomics alone. The economic influenc

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