TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION:A THEORY OF DELINQUENCY

GRESHAM M. SYKES DAVID MATZA

Princeton University Temple Univers i ty

I N attempting to uncover the roots ofjuvenile delinquency, the social scientisthas long since ceased to search for devils

in the mind or stigma of the body. It is nowlargely agreed that delinquent behavior, likemost social behavior, is learned and that itis learned in the process of social interaction.

The classic statement of this position isfound in Sutherland’s theory of differentialassociation, which asserts that criminal ordelinquent behavior involves the learningof (a) techniques of committing crimes and(b) motives, drives, rationalizations, andattitudes favorable to the violation of law.’Unfortunately, the specific content of whatis learned-as opposed to the process bywhich it is learned-has received relativelylittle attention in either theory or research.Perhaps the single strongest school ofthought on the nature of this content hascentered on the idea of a delinquent sub-culture. The basic characteristic of the de-liquent sub-culture, it is argued, is a systemof values that represents an inversion ofthe values held by respectable, law-abidingsociety. The world of the delinquent is theworld of the law-abiding turned upside downand its norms constitute a countervailingforce directed against the conforming socialorder. Cohen 2 sees the process of developinga delinquent sub-culture as a matter ofbuilding, maintaining, and reinforcing a codefor behavior which exists by opposition,which stands in point by point contradictionto dominant values, particularly those of themiddle class. Cohen’s portrayal of delin-quency is executed with a good deal ofsophistication, and he carefully avoids overlysimple explanations such as those based onthe principle of “follow the leader” or easygeneralizations about “emotional distur-

bances.” Furthermore, he does not acceptthe delinquent sub-culture as somethinggiven, but instead systematically examinesthe function of delinquent values as a viablesolution to the lower-class, male child’s prob.lems in the area of social status. Yet inspite of its virtues, this image of juveniledelinquency as a form of behavior based oncompeting or countervailing values and normsappears to suffer from a number of seriousdefects. It is the nature of these defects anda possible alternative or modified explana-tion for a large portion of juvenile delin-quency with which this paper is concerned.

The difficulties in viewing delinquent be-havior as springing from a set of deviantvalues and nonns-as arising, that is to say,from a situation in which the delinquentdefines his delinquency as “right’‘-are bothempirical and theoretical. In the first place,if there existed in fact a delinquent sub-culture such that the delinquent viewed hisillegal behavior as morally correct, we couldreasonably suppose that he would exhibitno feelings of guilt or shame at detection orconfinement. Instead, the major reactionwould tend in the direction of indignation ora sense of martyrdom.3 It is true that somedelinquents do react in the latter fashion,although the sense of martyrdom often seemsto be based on the fact that others “get awaywith it” and indignation appears to bedirected against the chance events or lackof skill that led to apprehension. More im-portant, however, is the fact that there isa good deal of evidence suggesting that manydelinquents do experience a sense of guilt or

1 E. H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology,revised by D. R. Cressey, Chicago: Lippincott, 1955,pp. 77-80.

2 Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys, Glencoe,III.: The Free Press, 1955.

3 This form of reaction among the adherentsof a deviant subculture who fully believe in the“r igh t fu lnes s” of their behavior and who arecaptured and punished by the agencies of thedominant social order can be illustrated, perhaps,by groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, early Chris-tian sects, nationalist movements in colonial areas,and conscientious objectors during World Wars Iand II.

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TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION 66.5shame, and its outward expression is not tobe dismissed as a purely manipulative gestureto appease those in authority. Much of thisevidence is, to be sure, of a clinical natureor in the form of impressionistic judgmentsof those who must deal first hand with theyouthful offender. Assigning a weight to suchevidence calls for caution, but it cannot beignored if we are to avoid the gross stereo-type of the juvenile delinquent as a hardenedgangster in miniature.

In the second place, observers have noted. that the juvenile delinquent frequently ac-cords admiration and respect to law-abidingpersons. The “really honest” person is oftenrevered, and if the delinquent is sometimesoverly keen to detect hypocrisy in those whoconform, unquestioned probity is likely towin his approval. A fierce attachment to ahumble, pious mother or a forgiving, uprightpriest (the former, according to many ob-servers, is often encountered in both juveniledelinquents and adult criminals) might bedismissed as rank sentimentality, but atleast it is clear that the delinquent does notnecessarily regard those who abide by thelegal rules as immoral. In a similar vein,it can be noted that the juvenile delinquentmay exhibit great resentment if illegal be-havior is imputed to “significant others” inhis immediate social enviormnent or to heroesis the world of sport and entertainment.In other words, if the delinquent does holdto a set of values and norms that stand incomplete opposition to those of respectablesociety, his norm-holding is of a peculiarsort. While supposedly thoroughly committedto the deviant system of the delinquentsubculture, he would appear to recognizethe moral validity of the dominant norma-tive system in many instances.4

In the third place, there is much evidencethat juvenile delinquents often draw a sharpline between those who can be victimizedand those who cannot. Certain social groups

4 As Weber has pointed out, a thief may recog-nize the legitimacy of legal rules without acceptingtheir moral, validity. Cf. Max Weber, The Theoryo f Social and Economic Organization (translatedby A.-M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons), NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 125. WCare arguing here, however, that the juvenile de-linquent frequently recognizes both the legitimacy

Of the dominant social order and its moral “right-ness."

are not to be viewed as “fair game” in theperformance of supposedly approved de-linquent acts while others warrant a varietyof attacks. In general, the potentiality forvictimization would seem to be a function ofthe social distance between the juveniledelinquent and others and thus we find im-plicit maxims in the world of the delinquentsuch as “don’t steal from friends” or “don’tcommit vandalism against a church of yourown faith.“” This is all rather obvious, butthe implications have not received sufficientattention. The fact that supposedly valuedbehavior tends to be directed against dis-valued social groups hints that the “wrong-fulness” of such delinquent behavior is morewidely recognized by delinquents than theliterature has indicated. When the pool ofvictims is limited by considerations of kin-ship, friendship, ethnic group, social class,age, sex, etc., we have reason to suspect thatthe virtue of delinquency is far from un-questioned.

In the fourth place, it is doubtful if manyjuvenile delinquents are totally immune fromthe demands for conformity made by thedominant social order. There is a stronglikelihood that the family of the delinquentwill agree with respectable society that de-linquency is wrong, even though the familymay be engaged in a variety of illegalactivities. That is, the parental posture con-ducive to delinquency is not apt to be apositive prodding. Whatever may be theinfluence of parental example, what mightbe called the “Fagin” pattern of socializationinto delinquency is probably rare. Further-more, as Red1 has indicated, the idea thatcertain neighborhoods are completely de-linquent, offering the child a model fordelinquent behavior without reservations, issimply not supported by the data.’

The fact that a child is punished byparents, school officials, and agencies of the

5 Thrasher's account of the “Itschkies”-a ju-venile gang composed of Jewish boys--and theimmunity from “rolling” enjoyed by Jewishdrunkards is a good illustration. Cf. F. Thrasher,The Gang, Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress, 1947, p. 315.

6Cf. Solomon Kobrin, “The Conflict of Valuesin Delinquency Areas,” American Sociological Re-view, 16 (October, 1951, pp. 653-661.

666 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

legal system for his delinquency may, asa number of observers have cynically noted,suggest to the child that he should be morecareful not to get caught. There is an equalor greater probability, however, that thechild will internalize the. demands for con-formity. This is not to say that demandsfor conformity cannot be counteracted. Infact, as we shall see shortly, an understand-ing of how internal and external demandsfor conformity are neutralized may be crucialfor understanding delinquent behavior. Butit is to say that a complete denial of thevalidity of demands for conformity and thesubstitution of a new normative system isimprobable, in light of the child’s or adoles-cent’s dependency on adults and encircle-ment by adults inherent in his status in thesocial structure. No matter how deeplyenmeshed in patterns of delinquency he mayhe and no matter how much this involvementmay outweigh his associations with the law-abiding, he cannot escape the condemnationof his deviance. Somehow the demands forconformity must be met and answered; theycannot he ignored as part of an alien systemof values and normsI n short, the theoretical viewpoint thatsees juvenile delinquency as a form of be-havior based on the values and norms ofa deviant sub-culture in precisely the sameway as law-abiding behavior is based onthe values and norms of the larger societyis open to serious doubt. The fact that theworld of the delinquent is embedded in thelarger world of those who conform cannotbe overlooked nor can the delinquent beequated with an adult thoroughly socializedinto an alternative way of life. Instead, thejuvenile delinquent would appear to be atleast partially committed to the dominantsocial order in that he frequently exhibitsguilt or shame when he violates its pro-scriptions, accords approval to certain con-forming figures, and distinguishes betweenappropriate and inappropriate targets forhis deviance. It is to an explanation for theapparently paradoxical fact of his delin-quency that we now turn.

As Morris Cohen once said, one- of themost fascinating problems about humanbehavior is why men violate the laws inwhich they believe. This is the problem that

confronts us when we attempt to explainwhy delinquency occurs despite a greateror lesser commitment to the usages of con.formity. A basic clue is offered by the factthat social rules or norms calling for Valuedbehavior seldom if ever take the form ofcategorical imperatives. Rather, values ornorms appear as qualified guides for action,limited in their applicability in terms oftime, place, persons, and social circumstances.The moral injunction against killing, forexample, does not apply to the enemy dur-ing combat in time of war, although acaptured enemy comes once again under theprohibition. Similarly, the taking and dis-tributing of scarce goods in a time of acutesocial need is felt by many to be right,although under other circumstances privateproperty is held inviolable. The normativesystem of a society, then, is marked by whatWilliams has termed flexibility; it does notconsist of a body of rules held to be bindingunder all conditions.’

This flexibility is, in fact, an integralpart of the criminal law in that measuresfor “defenses to crimes” are provided inpleas such such as nonage, necessity, insanity,drunkenness, compulsion, self-defense, andso on. The individual can avoid moral cul-pability for his criminal action-and thusavoid the negative sanctions of society-ifhe can prove that criminal intent was lack-ing. It is our argument that much delin-quency is based on what is essentially anunrecognized extension of defenses to crimes,in the form of justifications for deviance thatare seen as valid by the delinquent but notby the legal system or society at large.

These justifications are commonly de-scribed as rationalizations. They are viewedas following deviant behavior and as pro-tecting the individual from self-blame andthe blame of others after the act. But thereis also reason to believe that they precededeviant behavior and make deviant behaviorpossible. It is thii possibility that Sutherlandmentioned only in passing and that otherother writers have failed to exploit from theviewpoint of sociological theory. Disapprovalflowing from internalized norms and con-forming others in the social environment is

‘Cf. Robin Williams, Jr., American Society,New York: Knopf, 1951, p. 28.

TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION 667

neutralized, turned back, or deflected inadvance. Social controls that serve to checkor inhibit deviant motivational patterns arerendered inoperative, and the individual isfreed to-engage in delinquency without seri-ous damage to his self image. In this sense,the delinquent both has his cake and eatsit too, for he remains committed to thedominant normative system and yet so quali-fies its imperatives that violations -are"acceptable" if not “right.” Thus the de-linquent represents not a radical oppositionto law-abiding society but something morelike an apologetic failure, often more sinnedagainst than sinning in his own eyes. Wecall these justifications of deviant behaviortechniques of neutralization; and we be-lieve these techniques make up a crucialcomponent of Sutherland’s “definitions fav-orable to the violation of law.” It is bylearning these techniques that the juvenilebecomes delinquent, rather than by learningmoral imperatives, values or attitudes stand-ing in direct contradiction to those ofthe dominant society. In analyzing thesetechniques, we have found it convenient todivide them into five major types.

The Denial of Responsibility. In so faras the delinquent can define himself as lack-ing responsibility for his deviant actions, thedisapproval of self or others is sharply re-duced in effectiveness as a restraining influ-ence. As Justice Holmes has said, even adog distinguishes be een being stumbledover and being kicke , and modern societyis no less careful to draw a line betweeninjuries that are unintentional, i.e., whereresponsibility is lacking, and those that areintentional. As a technique of neutralization,however, the denial of responsibility extendsmuch further than the claim that deviant actsare an “accident” or some similar negationof personal accountability. It may also beasserted that delinquent acts are due toforces outside of the individual and beyondhis control such as unloving parents, badcompanions, or a slum neighborhood. Ineffect, the delinquent approaches a “billiardball" conception of himself in which he seeshimself as helplessly propelled into newsituations. From a psychodynamic viewpoint,this orientation toward one’s own actionsmay represent a profound alienation from

self, but it is important to stress the factthat interpretations of responsibility arecultural constructs and not merely idio-syncratic beliefs. The similarity between thismode of justifying illegal behavior assumedby the delinquent and the implications of a“sociological” frame of reference or a “hu-mane” jurisprudence is readily apparent.*It is not the validity of this orientation thatconcerns us here, but its function of deflect-ing blame attached to violations of socialnorms and its relative independence of aparticular personality structure.9 By learningto view himself as more acted upon thanacting, the delinquent prepares the way fordeviance from the dominant normative sys-tem without the necessity of a frontal as-sault on the norms themselves.

The Denial of Injury. A second majortechnique of neutralization centers on theinjury or harm involved in the delinquentact. The criminal law has long made a dis-tinction between crimes which are ma& inse and mala prohibita-that is betweenacts that are wrong in themselves and actsthat are illegal but not immoral-and thedelinquent can make the same kind of dis-tinction in evaluating the wrongfulness ofhis behavior. For the delinquent, however,wrongfulness may turn on the question of.whether or not anyone has clearly beenhurt by his deviance, and this matter isopen to a variety of interpretations. Van-dalism, for example, may be defined by the’delinquent simply as ‘mischief”-after all,it may be claimed, the persons whose prop-erty has been destroyed can well afford it.Similarly, auto theft may be viewed as“borrowing,” and gang fighting may be seenas a private quarrel, an agreed upon duelbetween two willing parties, and thus of noconcern to the community at large. We arenot suggesting that this technique of’ neu-tralization, labelled the denial of injury,involves an explicit dialectic, Rather, weare arguing that the delinquent frequently,

*A number of observers have wryly noted thatmany delinquents seem to show a surprising aware-ness of sociological and psychological explanationsfor their behavior and are quick to point out thecausal role of their poor environment.

9 It is possible, of course, that certain person-ality structures can accept some techniques of neu-tralization more readily than others, but this ques-tion remains largely unexplored.

668 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

and in a hazy fashion, feels that his behaviordoes not really cause any great harm despitethe fact that it runs counter to law. Just asthe link between the individual and his actsmay be broken by the denial of responsibil-ity, so may the link between acts and theirconsequences be broken by the denial ofinjury. Since society sometimes agrees withthe delinquent, e.g., in matters such as tru-ancy , “pranks ,” and so on, it merely reaf-firms the idea that the delinquent’s neu-tralization of social controls by means ofqualifying the norms is an extension ofcommon practice rather than a gesture ofcomplete opposition.

The Denial of the Victim. Even if thedelinquent accepts the responsibility for hisdeviant actions and is willing to admit thathis deviant actions involve an injury orhurt, the moral indignation of self andothers may be neutralized by an insistencethat the injury is not wrong in light of thecircumstances. The injury, it may be claimed,is not really an injury; rather, it is a formof rightful retaliation or punishment. By asubtle alchemy the delinquent moves him-self into the position of an avenger and thevictim is transformed into a wrongdoer.Assaults on homosexuals or suspected homo-sexuals, attacks on members of minoritygroups who are said to have gotten “out ofplace,” vandalism as revenge on an unfairteacher or school official, thefts from a“crooked” store owner-all may be hurtsinflicted on a transgressor, in the eyes of thedelinquent. As Orwell has pointed out, thetype of criminal admired by the generalpublic has probably changed over the courseof years and Raffles no longer serves as ahero; 10 but Robin Hood, and his latter dayderivatives such as the tough detective seek-ing justice outside the law, still capture thepopular imagination, and the delinquent mayview his acts as part of a similar role.

To deny the existence of the victim, then,by transforming him into a person deservinginjury is an extreme form of a phenomenonwe have mentioned before, namely, the de-linquent’s recognition of appropriate andinappropriate targets for his delinquent acts.In addition, however, the existence of the

10 George Orwell, Dickens, Dali, a n d Others,New York: Reynal, 1946.

victim may be denied for the delinquent, ina somewhat different sense, by the circum-stances of the delinquent act itself. Insofaras the victim is physically absent, unknown,or a vague abstraction (as is often the casein delinquent acts committed against property), the awareness of the victim’s exis-tence is weakened. Internalized norms andanticipations of the reactions of othersmust somehow be activated, if they are toserve as guides for behavior; and it is pos-sible that a diminished awarenes of thevictim plays an important part in determin-ing whether or not this process is set inmotion.

Tke Condemnation of the Condemners.A fourth technique of neutralization wouldappear to involve a condemnation of thecondemners or, as McCorkle and Kom havephrased it, a rejection of the rejectors.” Thedelinquent shifts the focus of attentionfrom hi own deviant acts to the motives andbehavior of those who disapprove of hisviolations. His condemners, he may claim,are hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or im-pelled by personal spite. This orientationtoward the conforming world may be ofparticular importance when it hardens intoa bitter cynicism directed against thoseassigned the task of enforcing or expressingthe norms of the dominant society. Police,it may be said, are corrupt, stupid, andbrutal. Teachers always show favoritismand parents always !‘take it out” on theirchildren. By a slight extension, the rewardsof conformity-such as material success-become a matter of pull or luck, thus de-creasing still further the stature of thosewho stand on the side of the law-abiding.The validity of this jaundiced viewpoint isnot so important as its function in turningback or deflecting the negative sanctionsattached to violations of the norms. Thedelinquent, in effect, has changed the subjectof the conversation in the dialogue betweenhis own deviant impulses and the reactions ofothers; and by attacking others, the wrong-fulness of his own behavior is more easilyrepressed or lost to view.

11 Lloyd W. McCorkle and Richard Korn, “Re-socialization Within Walls,” The Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science,293, (May, 1954), pp. 88-98.

TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION 669The Appeal to Higher Loyalties. Fifth,

and last, internal and external social controlsmay be neutralized by sacrificing the de-mands of the larger society for the demandsof the smaller social groups to which thedelinquent belongs such as the sibling pair,the gang, or the friendship clique. It isimportant to note that the delinquent doesnot necessarily repudiate the imperatives ofthe dominant normative system, despite hisfailure to follow them. Rather, the delinquentmay see himself as caught up in a dilemmathat must be resolved, unfortunately, at thecost of violating the law. One aspect of thissituation has been studied by Stouffer andToby in their research on the conflict be-tween particularistic and universalistic de-mands, between the claims of friendship andgeneral social obligations, and their resultssuggest that “it is possible to classify peopleaccording to a predisposition to select oneor the other horn of a dilemma in role con-flict." 12 For our purposes, however, the mostimportant point is that deviation from certainnorms may occur not because the norms arerejected but because other norms, held tohe more pressing or involving a higher loy-alty, are accorded precedence. Indeed, it isthe fact that both sets of norms are believedin that gives meaning to our concepts ofdilemma and role conflict.

The conflict between the claims of friend-ship and the claims of law, or a similardilemma, has of course long been recognizedby the social scientist (and the novelist) asa common human problem. If the juveniledelinquent frequently resolves his dilemmaby insisting that he must “always help abuddy” or “never squeal on a friend,” evenwhen it throws him into serious difficultieswith the dominant social order, his choiceremains familiar to the supposedly law-abid-ing. The delinquent is unusual, perhaps, inthe extent to which he is able to see the factthat he acts in behalf of the smaller socialgroups to which he belongs as a justificationfor violations of society’s norms, but it is amatter of degree rather than of kind.

“ I didn’t mean it.” “I didn’t really hurt

12 See Samuel A. Stouffer and Jackson Toby,“Role Conflict and Personality,” in Toward a Gcn-eral Theory of Action, edited by Talcott Parsonsand Edward A. Shils, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1951, p. 494.

anybody.” “ They had it coming to them.”“Everybody’s picking on me.” “ I didn’t do itfor myself.” These slogans or their variants,we hypothesize, prepare the juvenile for de-linquent acts. These “definitions of the sit-uation” represent tangential or glancingblows at the dominant normative systemrather than the creation of an opposingideology; and they are extensions of patternsof thought prevalent in society rather thansomething created de novo.

Techniques of neutralization may not bepowerful enough to fully shield the individualfrom the force of his own internalized valuesand the reactions of conforming others, foras we have pointed out, juvenile delinquentsoften appear to suffer from feelings of guiltand shame when called into account fortheir deviant behavior. And some delinquentsmay be so isolated from the world of con-formity that techniques of neutralization need

not be called into play. Nonetheless, wewould argue that techniques of neutralizationare critical in lessening the effectiveness ofsocial controls and that they lie behind a largeshare of delinquent behavior. Empirical re-search in thii area is scattered and fragmen-tary at the present time, but the work ofRedI, 13 Cressy,l4 and others has supplied abody of significant data that has done muchto clarify the theoretical issues and enlargethe fund of supporting evidence. Two linesof investigation seem to be critical at thisstage. First, there is need for more knowl-edge concerning the differential distributionof techniques of neutralization, as operativepatterns of thought, by age, sex, social class,ethnic group, etc. On a priori grounds itmight be assumed that these justificationsfor deviance will be more readily seized bysegments of society for whom a discrepancybetween common social ideals and socialpractice is most apparent. It is also possiblehowever, that the habit of “bending” thedominant normative system-if not “break-ing” it-cuts across our cruder social cate-gories and is to be traced primarily topatterns of social interaction within the

13 See Fritz Redl and David Wineman, ChildrenWho Hate, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956.

14 See D. R. Cressey, Other People's Money ,Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953.

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familial circle. Second, there is need for a from clear and stands in need of moregreater understanding of the internal information.structure of techniques of neutralization, as In any case, techniques of neutralizationa system of beliefs and attitudes, and its appear to offer a promising line of researchrelationship to various types of delinquent in enlarging and systematizing the theoret-behavior. Certain techniques of neutraliza- ical grasp of juvenile delinquency. As moretion would appear to be better adapted to information is uncovered concerning tech-particular deviant acts than to others, as niques of neutralization, their origins, andwe have suggested, for example, in the case their consequences, both juvenile delinquencyof offenses against property and the denial in particular, and deviation from normativeof the victim. But the issue remains far systems in general may be illuminated.

A MEASURE OF ALIENATION

GW Y N N NE T T L E R

Community Council of Houston

T HE idea of “alienation” has a long his-tory but a recent vogue and, as withany such familiar concept refurbished

for scholarly purposes, its adopters are usingit variously.

Hegel first suggested the term as descrip-tive of what happens to socialized man; hebecomes detached from the world of nature,including his own nature. He is Adam whosecommunity with all other natural things hasbeen broken by knowledge. To knowledge,Marx added labor as an alienating factorand, a fortiori, the division of labor, whichcreates “ . . . a conflict between the interestof the single individual . . . and the commoninterests of all individuals.“l Durkheim’sanomie resides here, of course, but it wasMarx’s conception of the state as necessaryto reconcile the conflicting interests conse-quent upon man’s laboring that showed thepossibility of another source of alienation:that ". . . man’s own accomplishments turninto a power alien and opposed to hi, whichcome to subjugate him instead of being con-trolled by him. ” 2 And this idea is cousin toFreud’s Civilization and Its Discontents.

Once these ideas were imbibed- thatknowledge (self-consciousness) and laborseparated man from all other “natural”

1 Karl Marx, “Deutsche Ideologie: Feuerbach,”Der Historische Materialismus, e d i t e d b y S .Landshut and J. P. Mayer, Leipzig: Kroner, 1932,p. 23.

2 Ibid.

things-it became possible to add other es-tranging factors and to see fractures notmerely between man and nature, but withinman, and between man and his institutions,and between man and man. Thus, as bothsymptom and cause of our alleged estrange-ment, writers have pointed to machinery,art, language, Original Sin, the lack of re-ligion, and even sociology.3

Fromm makes alienation central to thethesis of hi Sane Society and, for him, thehallmark of the alienated is his “marketingorientation,” his regarding the world andhimself as commodities to which monetaryvalues may be assigned and which may bepeddled.* Warner and Abegglen implicitlyrelate such a marketing orientation of thebig business leader to the more customaryconception of alienation as isolation fromothers. They say, “. . . all of these mobilemen, as a necessary part of the equipmentthat makes it possible for them to be mobileand leave people behind without fear or re-gret, have difficulty in accepting and im-posing the kinds of reciprocal obligations thatclose friendship and intimate social contacts

3 For example, see Colin Wilson, The Outsider,Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1956, Erich Kahler,The Tower and the Abyss, New York: Braziller,1957; Paul Tillich, Existence and the Christ, Chi-ago: University of Chicago Press, 1957; J. W.Krutch, " I f You Don’t Mind My Saying So . . .,"The American Scholar, 26 (Winter, 1956-57, p. 91.

4 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society, New York:Rinehart, 1955, p. 124.

A MEASURE OF ALIENATION 671

imply. They typically are isolated men." 5Grodzins defines alienation as ". . . the

state in which individuals feel no sense ofbelonging’ to their community or nation.personal contacts are neither stable nor sat-isfactory.” 6 Grodzins sees the alienated per-son as the “potentially disloyal citizen” andsuggests that alienation will more probablyoccur in certain types of personalities andat certain levels of society.

Srole 7 finds substantiation of the possiblestatus-positioning of the alienated in a nega-tive correlation of .30 between his eunomia-anomia scale and an index of socioeconomicstatus.

Bowman 8 associates scholarship with"some degree of isolation” and sees intellec-tuals, particularly sociologists, as generallyalienated from bourgeois culture? Griswolddissents by distinguishing between the scholarand the intellectual. He then holds that thescholar, presumably including the sociologist," . . . is Man Thinking. Man Thinking isnot the member of a race apart.” 10 Furst 11agrees with Griswold, on more empiricalgrounds, that the “professional thinker” isno diierent from everyman and does notnecessarily bear the stigmata of alienation.For a limited range of “knowledge” and opin-ion Nettler,12 like Furst, found no difference

5 W. L. Warner and J. C. Abegglen, Big BusinessLeaders in America, New York: Herper, 1955. p. 90..-

6 Morton Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal,Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 134.

‘Leo Srole, “Social Integration and CertainCorollaries: An Exploratory Study,” American So-ciological Review, 21 (December, 1956), pp. 709-116.

8 C. C. Bowman, “Is Sociology Too Detached?,”American Sociological Review, 21 (October, 1956),DD. 564-568.. 9 This requires verification. It seems to me thatthere are two breeds of professional sociologist:bourgeois man and marginal man. For another viewof the provenience and attitudes of professors ingeneral, cf. C. Wright Mills, White Collar, NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. 129-136.

10 A W Griswold, “Better Men and Better. .Mousetraps: The Scholar’s Business in AmericanSociety,” Saturday Review, (November 10, 1956),P. 10.

11 T. M. Furst, Jr., “ 'Anti-Intellectualism' andthe Left Intel l igentsia ,” unpublished doctoral manu-script, in process, Department of Political Science,Universi ty of California , LOS Angeles .

12 G. Nettler, “A Test for the Sociology ofKnowledge,” American Sociological Review, 10(June, 1945), pp. 393-399.

between a sample of the “intelligentsia” andlay thinkers.

Van den Haag is one of the many who seethe mass media as alienating “. . . peoplefrom personal experience and, though appear-ing to offset it, (intensifying) their moralisolation from each other, from reality andfrom themselves.” l3

Not merely the definitions, but also theevaluations of the alienated man vary withwhat he appears to be estranged from, andhow: if he is a foreigner to himself, this isusually “bad,” although this may be called“good” if he loses himself in an approvedmanner as through religious ecstasy or art.If, however, he is discomfited by his own so-ciety, this is called “good” or “bad,” depend-ing upon the society, or the critic, or whetherthe estrangement leads to “creative insights”or to immersion in the mass media, and, al-legedly, it does both.

The above uses of the term “alienation”are sufficient to indicate some commonground of definition while yet allowing forconfusion of conception and assumption. Ob-viously, what one discovers about the al-ienated will vary with his picture of such aman. Must he, for example, suffer the “mar-keting orientation”-except by definition?Is he necessarily unhappy and goalless?Value-judgments, as always, have entered toobscure description, and what should belearned from observation has been assumedtautologically.

The task at hand is to clarify by definingand measuring at least one form of aliena-tion. At the outset it will be useful to separatethree related but non-identical ideas: thoseof alienation, anomie, and personal disor-0ganization. Anomie, according to Durkheim,refers to a societal condition of relative norm-lessness, alienation to a psychological stateof an individual.14 As used here an “alienated

13 E. van den Haag, “Of Happiness and ofDespair We Rave No Measure,” in B. Rosenbergand D. M. White (eds.), Mass Culture, Glencoe:The Free Press, 1957, p. 529.

14 Williams s u g g e s t s t h e same distinction:"Anomie as a social condition has to be definedindependently of the psychological states thoughtto accompany normlessness and normative con-flict.” (R. M. Williams, Jr., American Society, NewYork: Knopf, 1951, p. 537.) Marvin Opler, how-ever, has recently contributed to the confusion of