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Critical communications for all professional users
22Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms
Welcoming words
Tony Gray, TCCA CEO
Critical communications for all professional users
33Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms
Cyber Security Workshop 19th May
Objectives
• Understand the meaning of Cyber Security in Critical Communications context
• Identify current gaps
• Agree next steps to address them
Critical communications for all professional users
4
Agenda
Setting the scene• Definition of terminology
• What is already being covered by TCCA SFPG
Search for cyber security solutions and gaps• Network vendor view
• Public safety operator view
• User agency challenges
Search for best ways to address gaps• Open discussion
Next steps
Mika Laitinen, TCCA SFPG
Partik Wikberg, Ericsson
Harald Loktu, Nødnett, DSB
Anthony Leather, Westlands Advisory
Critical communications for all professional users
6
Cybersecurity WorkshopTerminology
Mika Laitinen
Critical communications for all professional users
7Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 7
Many related terms – Can you tell the difference?
Data
Information
Information Security
ICT Security
Cybersecurity
Critical communications for all professional users
8Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 8
Data to Information
‘Data is processed, stored, or transmitted by a computer.‘
‘Information is data with meaning.‘
Critical communications for all professional users
9Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 9
Information security
'The state of being protected against the unauthorized use of information, especially electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this.‘ LEXICO - Oxford English and Spanish Dictionary
Critical communications for all professional users
10Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 10
Cybersecurity
'The state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this.‘ LEXICO - Oxford English and Spanish Dictionary
Critical communications for all professional users
11Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 11
Cybersecurity vs. Information Security
'Cyber security goes beyond the boundaries of traditional information security to include not only the protection of information resources, but also that of other assets, including the person him/herself.‘
Published in Computers & Security, Oct 2013From information security to cyber securityR. V. Solms, J. V. Niekerk
Critical communications for all professional users
12Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 12
Three terms – different meanings
Published in Computers & Security, Oct 2013From information security to cyber securityR. V. Solms, J. V. Niekerk
Information Security
Information & Communication
Technology Security
Cybersecurity
Information based assets stored or transmitted
NOT using ICT
Information based assets stored or transmitted
using ICT
Non-information based assets that are VULNERABLE
to threats via ICT
Critical communications for all professional users
13Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 13
Conclusion
Data - 2804
Information – 2804 Mika's birthday → Classification → PII →Privacy → GDPR
Information Security – Protect Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability of Information
ICT Security – Protect transmitted data in electronic format
Cybersecurity – Protect data in electronic format in addition to other assets including person himself/herself
Critical communications for all professional users
16Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 16
Role of SFPG - Mission
The TCCA Security and Fraud Prevention Group (SFPG) provides solutions to:• technical issues and • operational issues in the area of security and fraud prevention in critical communication systems.
Critical communications for all professional users
17Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 17
Role of SFPG – Critical Communication Systems
The critical communication systems:
• involve interests of critical communications system operators, manufacturers and government bodies;
• are relevant to national solutions;
• are not, or cannot be, managed within the open standards.
Critical communications for all professional users
18Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 18
Role of SFPG – Operational
Operational issues to be solved include:• Security of the critical communications network (incl. TETRA and BB systems)
• End-to-End security
• Key management
• Use and management of Smart Cards
• Secure interworking of critical communications systems
• Physical and information security
• Potential operational threats and fraud
Critical communications for all professional users
19Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 19
Role of SFPG – Tasks
Tasks of the SFPG include:• Producing SFPG Recommendations for security procedures in, and secure
interworking of, critical communications equipment and systems
• Advising on the management criteria for TETRA standard algorithms
• Proposing work items for further standardisation
• Identifying threats in such systems and recommend solutions as appropriate
• Liaising with ETSI TC TCCE to develop and enhance critical communications security
• Seminars, papers, liaisons, etc.
Critical communications for all professional users
20Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 20
Role of SFPG – Publications
• Rec 01 – Key distribution
• Rec 02 – End-to-end encryption
• Rec 03 – Threat analysis
• Rec 04 – Implementation and use of security features
• Rec 05 – Secure Cross Border TETRA Operation
• Rec 06 – Management of Static Cipher keys in DMO
• Rec 07 – End-to-end encrypted SDS
• Rec 08 – Using a smart card for end to end encryption
• Rec 09 – Guidelines for physical security of TETRA equipment
• Rec 11 – End-to-end encrypted packet data
E2EE Recommendations
Critical communications for all professional users
21Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 21
Role of SFPG – Publications cont.
• Rec 14 - Security of interworking between TETRA and 3GPP MC systems (published)
• Rec 15 - Key Management in Mission Critical Systems (published)
• Rec 16 - Secure implementation of Mission Critical Systems (target late 2021)
The access to these documents is for TCCA membersNon TCCA members can have access to the SFPG Recommendations, if their request is supported by an TCCA member
NDAs for SFPG Recommendations from [email protected]
Critical communications for all professional users
22Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms 22
Role of SFPG – Active Members 2021
Manufacturers:
• Airbus
• Ericsson
• Motorola Solutions
• Sepura
• Thales
Operators & Government bodies:
• BDBOS (Ger)
• Erillisverkot (Fin)
• MSB (Swe)
• NCSC (UK)
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Agenda
Technology shift createschallenges and opportunities 1What a Vendor can do to improve Network Security2What should you require from a Vendor3
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Ever-evolvingsecurity threats
Critical infrastructureand increased risks
New deployment scenarios and use-cases
Increasing regulatory requirementsDynamic and distributed networks
Increasing number of connected devices
Factors increasing importance of security
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Building secure mobile networks
Secure approach
Secure products
Security deployment
Security operations
Secure product development
Deployment and configuration of
security functions
3GPP security as foundation
Protect assetsDetect threats & vulnerabilities
Respond
Operator
Operator
Vendors
3GPP
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Threat actors often leverage vulnerabilities that are avoidable with sound security measures
Organized cyber criminals
Politically-motivated actors
Hacktivists, e.g., “Anonymous”
Terrorist organizations
Insiders
Security policy not enforced or monitored
Operational procedures prone for mistakes
Lack of visibility, control & continuous monitoring
Lack of hardening & insecure configuration of
the network
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Mobile network attack vectors
Radio Access Network
Transport Network
Core Network
Management Core Network of other operators
Interconnect Network
User equipment
Public Network
User dataControl Signalling Management traffic
Examples of common attacks
Eavesdropping
Denial of Service (DoS)
Software manipulation/malware
Man-in-the Middle
Physical attack
Insider attackIntentionalUnintentional
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Agenda
Technology shift createschallenges and opportunities 1What a Vendor can do to improve Network Security2What should you require from a Vendor3
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Building secure mobile networks
Secure approach
Secure products
Security deployment
Security operations
Secure product development
Deployment and configuration of
security functions
3GPP security as foundation
Protect assetsDetect threats & vulnerabilities
Respond
Operator
Operator
Vendors
3GPP
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Secure productsSecurity Reliability Model: The Ericsson framework for securing products and solutions
CustomersDeliverDevelopSourceSuppliers
Security Reliability Model
Functions
— Reqs. for products
— Reqs. for 3PP and FOSS
— Other requirements e.g. for solutions
Assurance
— RA, VA, PIA
— Hardening
— Secure coding
— Design rules and principles
— 3PP assurance
Compliance & Documentation
— Security User Guide
— Privacy User Guide
— Declarations
— E.g. GDPR, NESAS test reports, NIST auditability, IoT
Deployment & Operations
— Requirements for secure aaS, SI, SD
— Incident management
— Vulnerability mgmt
— E.g. reqs. for ISMS, ISO certification
https://www.ericsson.com/en/security/ericssons-security-reliability-model
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Example: Ericsson Vulnerability Management ProcessVulnerability monitoring
PSIRT
Mapping / Alerting
Product data register
EVMS
Vulnerability analysis
Product units
Critical Severity Cases
Internal Communication
Customer CommunicationSecurity Alert
Delivery unit
SW delivery
Product unit
SW update
PSIRT
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Building secure mobile networks
Secure approach
Secure products
Security deployment
Security operations
Secure product development
Deployment and configuration of
security functions
3GPP security as foundation
Protect assetsDetect threats & vulnerabilities
Respond
Operator
Operator
Vendors
3GPP
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Security operations evolution
Poor securityvisibility
End-to-endSecurity Visibility
Automated security
processes
Security for dynamic and distributed networks
From To
Focus on setting security parameters once at initial deployment
Manual security configurations, compliance checks, and reactive detection & response
Security constantly evolving to match the changing network and threat landscape
Security automation tools for protect, detect and respondaugmented by AI/ML
Security designed for a static network
Manual securityprocesses
Lack of complete and up-to-date view of the security posture
Security visibility of a multivendor environment in real time
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Security operations evolution
Poor securityvisibility
End-to-endSecurity Visibility
Automated security
processes
Security for dynamic and distributed networks
From To
Focus on setting security parameters once at initial deployment
Manual security configurations, compliance checks, and reactive detection & response
Security constantly evolving to match the changing network and threat landscape
Security automation tools for protect, detect and respondaugmented by AI/ML
Security designed for a static network
Manual securityprocesses
Lack of complete and up-to-date view of the security posture
Security visibility of a multivendor environment in real time
Ericsson SecurityManager (ESM)
Solution
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Ericsson Security Manager
Data feedsSecurity
enforcement
PROTECT
Automation of security
configuration and
compliance
DETECT
Timely detection of
known and unknown
threats
RESPOND
Automation of security
workflows and incident
response
Security
response
SECURITY ORCHESTRATION
Dynamic risk and trust management
Ericsson Security Manager (ESM)
Security management
automation layer
Security function
and data layer
Business Context
TelcoPrivate
NetworksIoT
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Agenda
Technology shift createschallenges and opportunities 1What a Vendor can do to improve Network Security2What should you require from a Vendor3
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
NESAS and SCAS compliance
Ericsson Security Reliability Model
GSMA
Equipment
Vendor
Auditor Accreditation
Body
audits
Test Laboratory
Network
Product
builds
3GPP SA3
defines
defin
es
Evaluation
Report
writes
Mobile Network
Operator
Procedure
descriptions
Test
specifications
Audit Report
accre
dits
provided to
appoints
applie
d
applied
writes & signs
Conformance
Claim
provided to, by agreement
NESAS high level overview
NESAS - Network Equipment Security Assurance SchemeSCAS - SeCurity Assurance Specifications
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Security automation requirements1. The network and service architecture includes functionality related to security management automation and security monitoring
2. Security management solution complies with the principles of the ETSI NFV SEC-013 and will be aligned with ETSI NFV SEC-024 when approved
3. Security management solution helps to fulfill the principles of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
4. Security management solution provides a complete catalog of security policies in accordance with the most common industry standards (i.e. ISO, NIST, CIS, etc.)
5. Security management solution can import network element information from other network management systems
6. Security management solution can configure security policies to network elements according to industry standards (i.e. ISO, NIST, CIS, etc.)
7. Security management solution supports physical and virtualized network elements
8. Security management solution supports network element and/or domain specific security policy definitions and configurations
9. Security management solution can in real-time monitor state of the security policies on network- or domain-level
10. Security management solution can automatically re-enforce security policies to the network elements when deviations are detected
11. Security management solution provides a dashboard view in order to real-time display the general state of security and key security events
12. Security management solution includes analytics functionality for detecting security events e.g. analyzing logs and traffic information collected from network elements
13. Security management solution includes pre-defined threat rules relevant for telecom network elements
14. Security management solution includes analytics functionality which uses machine learning and artificial intelligence in threat detection in near real-time
15. Security management solution includes functionality that can loop-back security analytics results to the management and monitoring of security policies.
16. Security management solution includes functionality to replace manual processes with automated workflows and to link workflows to incident management processes
17. Workflows for a security management solution can be defined to be fully automated or include manual steps which are assisted/operated by a security expert
18. Security management solution includes functionality to track/monitor vulnerability information related to network elements
19. Security management solution includes functionality for using external threat and vulnerability information sources
20. Security management solution includes reporting functionality/interface that can be used to generate reports about the security status for a specific time period
21. Security management solution supports automated risk management
2021-05-19 | Ericsson Security Solutions
Mastering complete 5G network security
Ericsson has released guide for Mastering complete 5G network security
Security is critical for successful 5G business with an ecosystem of cloud native and distributed networks, private networks, network slices and IoT devices
Automation of security deployments and operations will be key to manage increasing the security complexity and risks
Download the guide:
https://www.ericsson.com/en/digital-services/core-network-automation/guide#networksecurity
TCCA Webinar on
Cybersecurity
An TETRA operator view
Harald Loktu,
Head of Technology management and development, DSB
86 %area coverage
Ca. 100 %population coverage
110indoor installations
99,92 %availability last month
27railway tunnels with Nødnett
installations
2 078TETRA base stations
414road tunnels with Nødnett
installations
The Mission Critical Network – Nødnett (brand!)
233control rooms
60 281subscriptions
1 488 040calls last month
1 023organizations
9 700talk groups
Major Cyber attacks in Norway
Target: National
assembly administration
Target: Regional hospital
Target: Major tech
industry company
Threat Landscape for Nødnett• Intelligence Report Summary (2019)
– Intelligence operations from state actors, is the most comprehensive and offensive security challenges against Norway and norwegian interests
– Digital operations initiated by state actors, represents an ever lasting threat against norwegian values. Such operations are cheap, effective and continously being improved
• DSB’s evaluation concludes that the threat landscape encountered by commercial mobile operatores, largely show significant similarities with that of Nødnett
– Due to use of the same basic IT technology and architectures, weakness and vulnerabilities are inherited
What is there to be defended in Nødnett?
Nødnett base station
Nødnett radiolink
Nødnett Core Network
& Functions
Nødnett Core Network
& Functions
Fire Control
RoomsPolice Control
Rooms
Health Control
Rooms
Backbone
Access Network
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
Cybersecurity frameworks
• A systematic approach based on agreed best practice
• Alternatives considered
– NIST (US based)
– ISO 27001
– National basic principles for ICT security
• Broad approach adopted
– Used elements from several frameworks
– Adopted National basic principles as overlay for all activities
3. Detect2. Protect and
maintain1. Identify
and survey
4. React and
restore
Establishing insight on current status of Nødnett
• Cybersecurity revision by National Security Authority
• Indentification of critical assets in Nødnett
– Data&information, systems, services
– Which are the most valueable assets to protect?
– How critical are they with respect to confidentiality, integrity and availability?
• Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
– Security risk analysis of Nødnett and Fire agency control rooms
– Analysis of phycial security at selected location
– Specific gap analysis of the Nødnett systems and operations compared to NIST framework.
Some examples on measures taken
• Site locations and vendors
– Closing gaps on location security
– DSB has conducted security revisions and signed security
aggrements with selected vendors
– DSB has conducted vendor clearance of major vendors
• Solutions and services
– Connection to Norwegian digital border defence
– New high security data centre taken into use
– Regulare updates/upgrades of Nødnett systems
Nødnett base
station
Nødnett
radiolink
Nødnett Core
Network &
Functions
Nødnett Core
Network &
Functions
Fire Control
RoomsPolice Control
Rooms
Health
Control
Rooms
Backbone
Access
Network
Major upgrade of core network & functions
«Brains» of Nødnett – manages all traffic
• Reduce risk for
national and regional
loss of service
• Full hardware and
software refresh
allowing for new
security functions and
improve operations
Detecting and managing cyber attacks• To handle cyber attacks, they should be detected as early as possible,
managed accordingly and allow for restoration of operation back to normal, with minimum damage
– To achieve this, a common prerequisite is to have updated information on ongoing «activities» in relevant systems
• To support this requirement, a common approach is to establish 24/7 security monitoring
– Central logging database with tools for integration
– Monitoring of digital incidents in relevant systems
– Analysis of data related to digital incidents to detect if they are indicators of cyber attacks
• Establish capabilities for handling intended digital incidents – Professional support from subject matter expertss
– Have a team of trained staff to run a dedicated response team
• DSB is signing an agreement shortly, to provide these capabilities in operation of Nødnett
Over the next 20 minutes…
Increasing and evolving threats
A changing operational environment
Challenges and issues
Areas of focus and what should be addressed
61
62
Source; Westlands Advisory analysis of CVE Details
Threat IncidentsRisk
Source; Westlands Advisory analysis of IT Governance
Cyber Risk Continues to Grow
0
500 000 000
1 000 000 000
1 500 000 000
2 000 000 000
2 500 000 000
Data Records Lost by Month
2017-2019
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Vuln
era
bili
ties
Vulnerabilities 2000-2019
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
2018 2019
Changing Attitudes to Cyber Risk, UK
2018-2019
% of businesses who conducted a risk assessment
% of businesses investing in threat intelligence
% of businesses where staff have been to training courses
% of businesses with cyber GRC policy
% of businesses with cyber ownership at board level
% of businesses with cyber policy for third party suppliers
Source; UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019, UK Government Official Statistics, DCMS
• There is a gradual improvement in
organisational approaches to risk.
• The cyber threat and vulnerabilities remain
high.
1 2 • Cyber incidents are an important driver of
investment in cyber security.
3
Threat landscape continues to evolve...
63
99.9% of accounts
compromised do not have
multifactor authentication
There are Ransomware
victims every 11 seconds
$2.7 billion lost to victims
of cyber crime in 2018
196 days on average to identify
a data breach
65% of targeted attacks use
spear phishing
On average, only 5% of a
company’s folders are properly
protected
Sources: Symantec, Internet Crim Compliant Center, Microsoft, Varonis, IT Governance
Examples of attacks reported in 2020 and 2021
64
Ransomware attack on
Universal Health Systems
diverted ambulances and
surgery delayed
Attacks on pharma to
steal COVID -19 vaccine
DDoS on New Zealand
Stock Exchange
Spanish railway firm Adif
lost 800GB of data
through a ransomware
attack
Seven semiconductor
vendors in Taiwan
targeted including source
code, and chip design
SCADA systems on wind
turbines in Azerbaijan
targeted
Multiple attacks on
airlines to steal passenger
data, including easyJet
Mitsubishi targeted and
8,000 PII data
compromised as well as
partner businesses.
Australia subject to
sustained state actor
attack on government
agencies
Three telecom companies
in Pakistan had IT systems
compromised
DarkSide attacks Colonial
Pipeline taking operations
offline and theft of
sensitive data
Hundreds of thousands of
police departments files
leaked online
Growing focus on resilient systems to address the changing dynamic
Recover
Physical
Cyberspace
Respond Protect
RESILIENT
SYSTEMS
Identify
Detect
Develop an organizational understanding
to manage security risk to operations,
systems, people, assets, data, and
capabilities.
Develop and implement appropriate
safeguards to ensure delivery of
critical services, protection of
people, infrastructure and
information.
Develop and implement appropriate activities to identify
the occurrence or potential occurrence of a security
event in the shortest time possible.
Develop and implement appropriate activities to
take action regarding a detected security to reduce
any threat to life and limit any disruption or
damage.
Develop and implement appropriate activities
to maintain plans for resilience and to restore
any capabilities or services that were impaired
due to a security incident
Source: WA Analysis, NIST Framework, NCSC Cyber
Assessment Framework
Legacy
Equipment
New
Tech
Policy &
Legislation
Growing
Security
Industry
Increasing adoption of digital technology across operations
PEOPLE
Engage
OPERATIONS
ImproveINFRASTRUCTURE
Enhance
Information Sharing
Training
Communication
Streamline
Prioritise
Deliver
Identification of Threats
Data Centric
Digital replaces analog
Connectivity
TECHNOLOGY
Enabler
Digital approach to operations provides a better
service to the public
Data aggregation, workflow integration and visualisation 1 New operational and enterprise value2
Driving better operational performance but creating potential vulnerabilities
Artificial
IntelligenceData
Digital
Ecosystems
Virtual &
ImmersiveCommunications Computing
User Experience Productivity
Security & RiskPerformanceOperational
Financial
Resilient Systems at the Core of Operations
Command &
Control Layer
Operations
Reporting
Analytics
Integration
Access Control
Video
Surveillance Critical
Communication
Networks
Vehicles
Data Storage
RMS
PNDGIS, CAD, PSAPCloud
Biometrics
Unmanned Systems
Services
Connected Officers
Body worn
video
Voice Emails Online Social
Media
SensorsVideo Images Text
Cyberspace
RESILIENT
SYSTEMS
Recover
Protect
Identify
Detect
Asset Discovery &
Management
Governance, Risk &
Compliance Platforms
Cyber Security Awareness &
Training Platforms
Vulnerability and
Penetration Testing
PlatformsThreat Intelligence
Identity & Access
Management (IAM)
Vulnerability (VM) & Threat
Management
Data Security
Unified Threat Management
(UTM)
Application Security
Cloud Security
Mobile & Endpoint Security
Anomaly Detection
User Behaviour Analytics (UEBA)
Deception Technologies
Threat Hunting
Security Information & Event
Management
Security Orchestration &
Automated Response
Managed Detection &
Response Platforms
Incident Response &
Forensics
Business Continuity
Platforms
Information Security Requirement versus Operational Requirement Shapes the Ecosystem
The IT security triad of CIA must evolve to meet the safety critical requirements of process industries. Security must ensure CIA of operational data without compromising safety,
reliability or performance of critical systems.
Confidentiality
Availability
Information
Integrity
Information Requirement Operational Requirement
Reliability
Safety
Products &
Processes
Performance
OT Security Requirement
Protecting operational data whilst
ensuring reliable, safe and high
performance operations.
Focus Areas for the Foreseeable Future
70
IDENTITY AND
AUTHENTICATION
NETWORK AND
ANOMALY DETECTION
ASSET DISCOVERY DATA AND CLOUD
SECURITY
THREAT INTELLIGENCE ZERO TRUST
Critical communications for all professional users
75
Thoughts based on network view
• Is there a difference in security policy between critical communications vs. Business/Enterprise sectors?
• Are there particular vulnerabilities for critical communications? How about hardening aspects?
• What is the impact of dynamic updates on different layers?
• Is there anything critical communications specific that should be included in NESAS / SCAS?
• Do we need a cyber security related procurement guide?
Critical communications for all professional users
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Thoughts based on public safety operator view
• What would be the requirements for 3rd party access network/backbone for critical communications?
Critical communications for all professional users
77
Thoughts based on user challenges
• Is some guidance to take legacy equipment into account required?
• How to share information (of mixed confidentially levels) between stakeholder in a cyber secure way?
• How can these low-tech threats / vulnerabilities be closed off effectively?
• Critical communications cyber security training needs?
• How to bridging the gap between IT and OT cybersecurity?
Critical communications for all professional users
7878Presentation on behalf of TCCA www.tcca.info @TCCAcritcomms
Gaps
Information sharing and training – why & what
Identify additional vulnerabilities & threats
How to address dynamic updates impact?
Industry best practises for critical comms
What does zero trust mean in critical communications?
Ways to optimise information classification
How to build a plan? Evaluate relevant directives
Critical communications for all professional users
80
• Is a new TCCA Working Group / Task Force(s) or similar format required to address these and related issues?
• If so is there volunteer support to contribute to such a group?
• Is there interest to contribute to the identified gaps?
Critical communications for all professional users
81
Tero Pesonen
TCCA Vice Chair & Director, CCBG chair
E-mail [email protected]
Mobile +358 50 544 7347
fi.linkedin.com/in/teropesonen
Facebook www.facebook.com/tandcca
Twitter @tandcca
YouTube www.youtube.com/user/tandcca
TCCA CCBGhttps://tcca.info/broadband/critical-
communications-broadband-group/
Find TCCA also onLinkedIn www.linkedin.com/company/tcca-critical-communications/Facebook www.facebook.com/tccacritcomms
Twitter @TCCAcritcomms
YouTube www.youtube.com/user/tandcca
Critical communications for all professional users
82
Key items coming up in Q2/21
• May/June:• Session on Critical Communications 3GPP Rel 18 common view
• CCBG Task Force launches • Callout
• MC (massive) video
• CCBG white paper reviews• Broadband applications
• Device API
• Device Procurement
• 15th June ETSI FRMCS plugtests – observer program
• 2nd July: TCCA Legal and regulatory working group kick-off