Taylor's Philosophy Excerpts

Freedom & Determinism - I

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Chapter 5: Freedom and Determinism

• At each time t the world is perfectlydeterminate in all detail.

- Let us grant this for the sake ofargument. We might want to re-visitthis perfectly reasonable assumptionafter our brush with quantummechanics.

• That is, at each time t the world is in adefinite state.

- Notice that this may be true, withoutthe world being perfectly determinateat t.

• Why is the world in some given state at t?

• Because it is in some other state just beforet.

• And so on, forward (and backward) in time.

• The past antecedent conditions of ourpresent state cannot be changed, since onecannot change the past.

• [Comment: This arguments supposes thatthe basic laws of nature connecting states doso in a unique fashion. But what if a basiclaw says only that, given a state of the worldat t1, various later states follow only with a


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certain probability (< 1). In this case, thebasic laws are indeterministic rather thandeterministic. Chance is admitted, asopposed to necessity.]

∴ “Things [now and in the future] could not beother than they are.” That is, the present stateof the world cannot be other than it is. But asimilar argument applies to any other state aswell.

Taylor says that this conclusion is “an exactstatement of the metaphysical thesis ofdeterminism.” (36)

This fits well with a classic discussion of thenotion by William James in “The Dilemma ofDeterminism”. Let me insert a bit:

Determinism “professes that those parts ofthe universe already laid down absolutelyappoint and decree what the other parts shallbe. The future has no ambiguous possibilitieshidden in its womb: the part we call thepresent is compatible with only one totality.Any other complement than the one fixed frometernity is impossible. The whole is in each andevery part, and welds it with the rest into anabsolute unity, and iron block, in which there


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can be no equivocation or shadow of turning.”(569-70)

Indeterminism “says that the parts have acertain amount of loose play on one another,so that the laying down of one of them doesnot necessarily determine what the others shallbe. It admits that possibilities may be inexcess of actualities…. Of two alternativefutures which we conceive, both may now bereally possible; and the one become impossibleonly at the very moment when the otherexcludes it by becoming real itself….[Indeterminism] says there is a certainultimate pluralism in [the world]; and, sosaying, it corroborates our ordinaryunsophisticated view of things.” (570)

[NB: The denial or opposite of determinism isindeterminism. James is right about this.]

Indeterminism involves chance, “and chance[some say] is something a notion of which nosane mind can tolerate in the world.” (572)

But James argues that chance is a useful,negative concept. “All you mean by calling[something] chance is that this is notguaranteed, that it may also fall out otherwise.


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For the system of other things has no positivehold on the chance-thing. Its origin is in acertain fashion negative: it escapes, and says,Hands off! coming, when it comes, as a freegift, or not at all.” (572-73)

Now back to Taylor… He thinks of determinismas a (conscious or unconscious) datum. Wealways act as if this thesis is true. We supposethat events or changes have causes, and weoften seek to know the causes.

But in the rest of the section called“Determinism” Taylor says that “the principleof determinism” is the principle that all eventshave causes.

Since a (complete) cause is often taken to be asufficient condition for its effect, there is atemptation to conflate these ideas.For instance, on page 37 Taylor remarks: “Bythe thesis of determinism, however, everythingwhatever is caused, and not one single thingcould ever be other than exactly what it is.”

Since, as Taylor says, I am part of the world,his thesis of determinism applies to me and tomy behavior. If determinism as characterized


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by Taylor is true, then it is supposed to followthat

1. I cannot in any circumstances or at any timeact in any way other than the way I actuallydo, did, or will act.

2. Since one is held morally responsible onlyfor actions that one has voluntary controlover, for actions that could have beenotherwise, [“Ought implies can.”], wecannot be held morally responsible for anyof our actions (since none of our actionscould have been otherwise).

Taylor starts his investigation from thefollowing two pieces of data. [Remember, thatdata are starting points and may eventually begiven up in a more considered final view.]

1. I sometimes deliberate about what to do.

2. It is sometimes up to me what I do.

I can deliberate about my own future behavioras long as (1) I do not already know what I amgoing to do in the given situation and (2) whatI do in the given situation is “up to me”.


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An action is “up to me” if it is within my directcontrol, like moving my finger in one directionor another. I can (normally) move my finger tothe left, says Taylor, and I can move it to theright. These actions are possible, but notmerely in the sense of logically possible. It’slogically possible that I move my finger to theleft, even when it’s in a cast so that (in therelevant sense) I can’t move it at all.

What this shows is that logical necessity (orpossibility) is not the only kind of necessity (orpossibility), and not the kind of modality that’smost important for discussions of determinism.There is at least one alternative sort ofmodality, one that Taylor calls causal necessity(or possibility). Others may call this nomicnecessity. [Indeed, one might think of ‘can’ assystematically ambiguous, depending on therange of assumptions that one takes to becompossible in the given situation.]

To say that an action is “up to me” is to saythat I am free to do it or to refrain from doingit. This, in turn, presupposes that there is noobstacle that prevents me from doing it and noconstraint that forces me to do it.


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If this is all there is to freedom, then freedomis compatible with determinism (= causallydetermined).

In Taylor’s view, philosophers are often led tomake too much of this compatibility and toespouse a view that he calls (following James)soft determinism. Soft determinism involvesthe following three theses:

1. The thesis of determinism is true…. Allhuman behavior is caused and determined.

2. Voluntary behavior is free to the extent thatit is not externally constrained (forced,coerced) or impeded.

3. Such voluntary behavior is caused by certainstates of the agent—volitions (or acts ofwill), choices, decisions, desires, and so on.

But now, argues Taylor, ask a soft deterministthis question: in a given situation, could I haveacted otherwise? Yes, they will say, if myvolitions or desires, etc. had been otherwise.

Well, could my volitions or desires have beenotherwise? By (1), determinism, they werecaused. So they were determined by


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antecedent conditions to be what they wereand could have been different only if thoseconditions had been different… And so on.

But, given determinism, none of theseconditions could actually have been otherwise.So none of my actions (or the volitions,desires, decisions, etc. that were causallysufficient for them) could have been different(actually, rather than conditionally). So howcan I be held responsible for them?

This argument is buttressed by the example ofthe “ingenious physiologist” who can implantvolitions. The subject of these implantings fitsthe soft determinism definition of a free agentyet is in reality a mere puppet of thephysiologist.

Taylor believes he has shown, then, that bothhard and soft determinism are views that haveconsequences that are very difficult to accept.The only alternative left seems to be what hecalls simple indeterminism but he finds thatunacceptable too. Simple indeterminism is theview that some of our actions (or some of themental acts that lead to our actions, like ourvolitions or decisions) are uncaused.


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But that is to say that they are a matter ofchance (cf., James) or are random. Consider,urges Taylor, the picture one gets of one of myarms or legs just spontaneously (becauseuncaused) moving in some direction or otherfrom time to time. Is this a picture of a freeperson? No, says Taylor. “[T]he conceptionthat now emerges is not that of a free person,but of an erratic and jerking phantom, withoutany rhyme or reason at all.” (48)

So simple indeterminism also seemsincompatible with our normal sense of self andwith attributions of responsibility. Suppose, forinstance, that certain movements of my armare uncaused or chancey.

…[N]either I nor anyone else can tellwhat this arm will be doing next. Itmight seize a club and lay it on thehead of the nearest bystander, no lessto my astonishment than his. There willnever be any point in asking why thesemotions occur, or in seeking anyexplanation for them, for under theconditions assumed there is noexplanation. They just happen, from nocauses at all. (48)


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How, then, could I (or anyone) be heldresponsible for these actions over which I hadno control (or, which were not “up to me”)?

At this point, Taylor briefly recapitulates theproblems with the three views discussed so far.I’d like to highlight one remark of his: “But ifdeterminism is true, then there are alwaysconditions existing antecedently to everything Ido, sufficient for my doing just that, and suchas to render it inevitable.” (49) Notice that,officially speaking, to say that some conditionC is sufficient for (say) an action A is to assertthe material conditional: C ⊃ A.

So we have the following argument, which isvalid: C, C ⊃ A ∴A.

The premises seem warranted by the thesis ofdeterminism, but the conclusion is just that Aoccurs or takes place, not that it is inevitable.To say that A is inevitable, a modal notion, isto say something like: � A or ~~A. How isthe introduction of a modal notion supposed tobe justified? That is, the argument C, C ⊃ A∴� A is not valid.

The following is true: � [(C & C ⊃ A) ⊃ A]. Thatis, here is a conditional sentence that is a


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necessary truth, because it is a logical truth.But it does not follow from the truth of thissentence that A is “inevitable”.

There is one more possible view regardingdeterminism (Taylor thinks), the theory ofagency.

“The only conception of action that accordswith our data is one according to whichpeople—and perhaps other things too—aresometimes, but of course not always, self-determining beings; that is, beings that aresometimes the causes of their own behavior.”(51)

This view presupposes a couple of remarkablemetaphysical theses:

(i) I am a self or person—a self-moving being.(ii) A substance (e.g. a self) can cause

(originate, initiate) an event, withoutanything (else) causing it to do so.

[It also presupposes the denial of Laplaceandeterminism as defined by Earman. At least, Ithink this is implied when Taylor says: “In thecase of an action that is free, it must not onlybe such that it is caused by the agent who


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performs it, but such also that no antecedentconditions were sufficient for his performingjust that action.” (51)]

According to Taylor,

• The theory of agency avoids the absurditiesof simple indeterminism by conceding thathuman behavior is caused.

• The theory of agency avoids the difficultiesof determinism by denying that every chainof causes and effects is infinite.

Nevertheless, Taylor wonders whether thetheory of agency is, when fully considered, soodd that one might not wish to go back andquestion the data he began with. It is an oddview, and R. E. Hobart, I believe, got to thebottom of what is odd about it.

For the moment, however, consider thefollowing problem. Consider some action A thatI perform at some time t. I, my self, typicallyhave existed for a long before and after theaction A at t. So the existence of my self (orSelf) is not sufficient for the occurrence of A,though it may be necessary.


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What, then, completes the set of standingnecessary conditions at (or just before) t sothat A occurs at t? That triggering condition is,presumably, something dated, something thathappens at a time—that is, a change or event.But it is exactly this event that is left out of thetheory of agent causation even thoughtypically a triggering event in a set of standingconditions is singled out as “the cause” of whatfollows, as striking a match is considered thecause of its lighting.

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