rationality

In 'Rationality', Charles Taylor argues against the relativist view that we rationality cannot make transhistorical judgments of other cultures. Rather, Taylor argues that it is in fact possible to adopt a criterion for rationality that can be cross-culturaly adopted. The relativist position as embodied by Peter Winch, holds that we cannot make judgments on other cultural activities that are not comparable to those of our culture. He claims that Taylor's position simply begs the question. This essay will focus on outlining the relativist position and how Charles Taylor attempts to counter this position. I will also attempt to explain why Taylor's attempt to criticize and overcome the relativist position ultimately falls prey to the very ethnocentricity that both Winch and Taylor try to avoid.

"Rationality", Charles Taylor explores what it means to be irrational. He believes that rationality is often defined as logical consistency. We claim someone is irrational if he acts against his intended goals. To be irrational one must be aware that he is frustrating his goals because "our imputation of irrationality depends on our attributing unconscious knowledge to him" (172). Should it remain that he is not aware that he is frustrating his own goals then this is not be considered inconsistent but rather "the knowledge we attribute to him may be of a rather special kind" (172). Therefore, for a person to be called inconsistent he should be aware of the ends and the means in which he intends the end to happen. Taylor claims therefore that there is more to rationality then simple logical consistency.

The second notion of rationality comes from our theoretical understanding of the world. To explore the theoretical understanding of reality Charles Taylor gives examples presented by Peter Winch in his article "Understanding a primitive society". Taylor's goal is to see whether a single notion of rationality can be applied across all cultures. Taylor uses the information presented by Winch regarding the Azande people. The Azande people mostly located in central Africa believe in witchcraft and oracles. The Azande are able to discover after most-mortem examinations whether a person is in fact a witch or what not. Evans-Pritchard believes that they are committing a contradiction here. Winch who is a relativist believes that the Azande "are engaged in a quite different language game: 'Zande notions of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical system in terms of which Azande try to gain quasi-scientific understanding of the world.' So it is a misunderstanding to try and press Zande thought to a contradiction here"(88). Our theoretical understanding of witchcraft is not the same understanding that the Azande possess. The language game is such that when the Azande grants someone witch status it is not the same pseudo-scientific definition that we attribute to the word witch. We cannot equate our witch with that of the Azande. Taylor's point in mentioning the Azande study is to show that the practices performed by some cultures are incommensurable to that of our culture. Taylor explains that in our culture we have no activity, which is comparable to the Azande's with respect to witchcraft. Hence there is no basis of comparison when the same language which on the surface is alike actually conveys two different conceptual realities.

Taylor then examines what theoretical understanding entails. Theoretical understanding "aims at a disengaged perspective"(89). In other words there is an understanding of the world, which is outside of our understanding, goals and pre-conceived representation of reality. "…And it gives us a picture of reality which is not simply valid in the context of our goals"(89). Theoretical understanding is seen as a "higher view of reality" because it sets aside our pre-existing knowledge that we acquired through the years and

seeks to understand reality under one single perspective that can be understood across all cultures.

A theoretical understanding implies real knowledge of the world. The concept of real knowledge dates back to Plato, where he equates knowledge with 'reason' and being able to 'give an account' of it. To be rational one must be able to articulate. "We have a rational grasp of something when we can articulate it, that means, distinguish and lay out the different features of the matter in perspicuous order"(90). To give an account of something is what the Greeks understood as knowledge. According to Taylor the best account is that from the disengaged perspective. "This offers a broader, more comprehensive grasp on things. Thus one might say: the demands of rationality are to go for a theoretical understanding where this is possible."(90). There are some things which aren't amenable to theory and that cannot be articulated but he claims that the disengaged perspective offers at the least the most rational understanding of reality.

Unlike the Azandes, we live in a theoretical culture and the problem is that we tend to adopt an ethnocentric view where we judge other cultures to be less rational then ours. We can easily determine whether someone of our culture commits a contradictory behavior because we both have the same theoretical knowledge. Taylor has already determined that there is more to rationality then logical consistency or contradiction. When we return to our examination of the Azande culture, Winch believes that it is wrong for a theoretical culture to judge an atheoretical one to be irrational. The problem is that the activity that the Azande call "magic" is incommensurable to any activity performed in our culture. For one, Western thinkers have the "tendency to understand magic as a kind of proto-technology, an early attempt to get control over nature by less effective means than scientifically-informed technique"(92). This western outlook on magic can make the Azande practice of magic seem inconsistent. By looking at it this way we are committing ethnocentrism.

Winch concludes that we cannot judge an atheoretical society to be irrational based on our theoretical understanding, because such activities as magic practiced by the Azandes are different to any activity practiced by our theoretical society. Taylor however claims that we can in fact make transcendental judgments about such cultures because of technological awareness.

Some activities such as magic as practiced by the Azande people, may be impossible to assimilate to a theoretical culture practices. We can describe the activities as 'symbolic or expressive activity' when compared to activities performed by theoretical societies. Taylor claims that this distinction is but another form of ethnocentrism, because, for example, the Azandes would not understand what our definition of symbolic expression would mean. Comparing primitive society's use of magic with symbolic activities performed by our culture is ethnocentric. "For it describes the difference between the two societies in terms of contrast between activities that makes sense to us in virtue of our form of life, but would be unintelligible to the people whose form of life we are trying to understand."(94).

A feature of theoretical societies is the adoption of scientific practices and research and the abandonment of symbolic and expressive ways of life. Atheoretical societies have to suppress and purge symbolic expressiveness. Taylor gives an account of what separates theoretical societies from atheoretical ones. He writes: "I think this becomes understandable if we can see understanding the universe and coming into attunement with it as inseparable activities."(95). Taylor uses Plato's understanding of rationality as the understanding of the order of things and our place in it, as the basis for this explanation. "We don't understand the order of things without understanding our place

in it, because we are part of this order. And we cannot understand the order and our place in it without loving it, without seeing its goodness, which is what I want to call being in attunement with it."(95). Taylor's point in showing this 'pre-modern tradition of thought', is to show that theoretical societies have moved away from this with the help of scientific knowledge. This type of knowledge can only be further developed once we abandon this ancient pre-scientific notion of reality.

Having acknowledged the above, Taylor argues that it is possible to explain incommensurable activities based on rational criteria and further make judgments about rationality cross-culturally. A relativist like Winch would argue "such judgments were likely to be very dubious, because standards of rationality can differ greatly. And they differ because the activities concerned are different."(99). If we simply called magic as 'purely expressive activity', then we would be able to compare it with some or our expressive activities like singing national anthems. But because we don't have anything which compare to primitive society's use of magic we are not able to. We do not already have a category for what the Azande's practice "not because their magic is concerned with ends quite foreign to our society, but rather because the ends defined in it cut across ours in disconcerting ways."(99)

Even though these activities are incommensurable we can still make transcultural judgments of rationality according to Taylor. We must realize that "incommensurable activities are rivals; their constitutive rules prescribe in contradiction to each other. Only where two activities are simply different is there no question of judging one to be an inferior version of the other, and perhaps in some cases inferior in rationality."(99) Unlike Winch who simply claims that they are different, Taylor claims that the activities in question are incommensurable and this means that we are able to make judgments on which one is right. Even though the activities are incommensurable they "still have their distinct internal criteria of success; that therefore each is bound to come off best by its own standards; and hence that one cannot make any non-ethnocentric judgments of relative superiority"(100). The relativist might argue that this argument begs the question.

The argument begs the question in that it is our theoretical culture that value technology and therefore we must be superior since we have technological control. "So we still don't seem to have a reason why a Renaissance sage…ought to listen to us."(100) Because based on his criteria of wisdom they would score higher then us. Each incommensurable activity would be impossible to attack. But Taylor sees this relativist rebuttal as deceptive and misinformed.

The main argument that Taylor presents in defending the possibility in non-ethnocentric judgments about rationality is with respect to technological advancement. "There is an inner connection between understanding the world and achieving technological control which rightly commands everyone's attention, and doesn't just justify our practices in our own eyes"(101). Failing to adopt more effective practices with the help of science proves that you or anyone else is not making any advances. To be aware of technological advances and not adopting them is irrational. He explains that a lot of our pre-scientific language "identifies the objects surrounding us by their standard functions and uses in our lives"(101). Because we are beings that are able to succeed better at attaining things or to succeed with technological advances it is impossible not to see that

these facilitate the way we live. Refusing to adopt technology that facilitates the way in which we live seems irrational. Adopting these new methods is proof that one has a superior understanding of reality and that technological pay-off "cannot be ignored once realized in practice."(103) From this argument Taylor claims that it is possible to make valid judgments of superiority cross-culturally.

Taylor then concludes "it may be that considerations which we in theoretical cultures can no longer appreciate so overweigh the balance in favor of the pre-theoretical ones as to make them offer the overall superior form of life"(104). Taylor's logic can be summarized and distilled to the following; if we discover technological advance it would be irrational not to incorporate it into our life. Since our theoretical culture values such advances more than non-theoretical societies we can acknowledge the plurality of other cultures yet assess them notwithstanding many activities may be incommensurable using a standard of rationality which somehow transcends cultural activity. What is this standard? It is the ability to achieve ' a more perspicuous order than another."(p.104) Taylor's reasoning here is nothing short of circular! Technological payoffs are so numerous in our theoretical society that they cannot be ignored by other cultures. To do so would be irrational according to Taylor. Hasn't Taylor simply taken one facet or characteristic of our theoretical culture used it to judge and evaluate other cultures. What if we treated 'attunement' rather technological progress as the ultimate criteria to evaluate other cultures? Or if we treated environmental harmony viewing the earth as an organism which we are part of as the ultimate criteria? Both these alternative criteria would lead to different conclusions. The judgments of superiority would emanate from a different set of principles than that, which emanates from the criteria inherent in Taylor's theoretical society. Modern science and technologic advancement is but one set of criteria, which is not universal, or transhistorical. Taylor's circular reasoning goes as follows: 1. Cross-cultural comparisons using ethnocentric criterion fail to avoid ethnocentricity. 2. Such cross-cultural comparisons of incommensurable activities such as magic are worthless. (He agrees with Winch however does not agree that judgments with respect to ways of life are necessarily impossible) 3. This acknowledgement of the incommensurable nature of some activities does not lead to relativism. 4. This is so because there are certain criteria, which allow us to evaluate all cultures which are not ethnocentric. 5. These criteria are " a culture's ability to adopt a more perspicuous order". 6. To evaluate societies we can take the tenets of modern science and technological advancement to do so. What Taylor has done is to return to #1 by simply putting ethnocentric judgments on a different plane. There is no latent superiority to modern science. At least one should not presumed it simply because it has superficially allowed us to advance technologically. This advance may very well have the seeds of its own demise. The advance of mankind may mean the elimination of the species, the atmosphere, the oceans etc. It may mean the proliferation of mankind and greater demand on resources such that our present "more perspicuous order" does not lead to "a prima facie convincing argument in favor of the superiority of modern science". (p.102) Taylor's argument merely displaces ethnocentricity to a higher plane where modern science doesn't merely evaluate cultural activities such as magic but evaluates whole cultures based on his view that modern science is superior in that it has allowed us to adapt better to the world. However our use of the world in so doing has become a problem which the paradigm of "progress" and "technological advancement" has led us to treating the universe as some laboratory to experiment without regard to its wider implications. Maybe Azande culture and its magic are more harmonious and with nature now and in centuries to come where the earth is not constantly threatened by our scientific experiments and consumerism all in the name of progress and technological advancement. Taylor's transhistorical judgment is but a thin veil masking a blind superficial and dangerous ethnocentricity.