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Chapter VI
STRATEGY OF THE LTTE
Having studied the organisation of the LTTE, its various sources of
support, and its strengths and drawbacks we now move to an examination of
its strategy in greater detail.
Many of the tactics it adopted have been dealt with in earlier chapters.
For instance, the build up of the organisation and its external network were
crucial parts of the LTTE's strategy and contributed in substantial measure to
its capacity to fight a protracted war. This chapter will examine other tactics
used by the LTIE to establish its hegemony over the Tamil movement and to
achieve Tami£ ll.am. The LTTE's strategy will be compared with that of other
armed struggles to understand the extent to which it has been influenced by
them.
HEGEMONY OF THE TAMIL STRUGGLE
One of the most important objectives for the L TTE is acquiring the
status of sole spokesman of the Tamils. The tactics it has employed to achieve
this are outlined below.
a) Opportunistic Alliances with Rivals
In order to build up its own strength, the L TIE entered into brief
alliances with the other Tamil groups. For instance, it teamed up with TELO
in operations like the Neerveli bank robbery. 1 It joined the Eelam National
Liberation Front (ENLF, an India-initiated coalition of EROS, TELO, and
1 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Diary of Combat (1975-1984): A Historical and Chronological Sketrh of the Armed Resistance Campaign of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (n.p., n.d.), p.28.
HH
EPRLF) to prevent its own marginalisation. 2 Its understanding with EROS
endured throughout the 19.80s and culminated with the absorption of the
faction led by Balakumar in 1989-90.3
b) Discrediting of Rivals Through Propaganda
While the LTTE was aligning with the other Tamil groups it was
simultaneously destroying their credibility and portraying itself as the sole
protector of Tamil interests. Tiger propaganda has been critical of rival
militant groups from the beginning. 4 The PLOT was criticised for its wrong
approach to the struggle, the TULF was condemned for its betrayal of the
people's mandate and TELO and EPRLF were attacked for their anti-social
activities and subservience to lndia.5
LTTE propaganda has also maintained that only the Tigers have
sacrificed for the cause and it is the only organisation which has consistently
fought the Government. Hence it was entitled to be the sole representative of
2
3
4
5
See LTTE, Political Committee, India and Eelam Tamils Crisis: A Factual Explanation Submitted with Love and Respect to All Eelam Tamils (n.p., n.d.), pp.B-9.
The LTTE tolerated EROS because it never challenged the Tigers. Even when the LTTE massacred the other Tamil groups, the EROS did not blame the LTTE. See for instance, EROS's comments in llanatu (Jaffna), 14 May 1986 and Muracoli (Jaffna), 15 December 1986~ ·
See Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart, 1994), pp.142-4.
See for instance, "Urpyaviratam: PLOTi!J. Ufaialka[" (Hunger Strike: The Blabbering of PLOT), Vitutalaip Pulikal (Madras), no.1, 15 March 1984, pp.10-I2; "Ml!J.tum Varukir.arka{!(?)" (They Are Coming Back Again), Tami!i!am (n.p.), vol.4, no.l, 1988, pp.4-5.
192
the Tamils.6 By portraying everybody else as 'traitors', the LTTE has sought
legitimacy for its hegemony over Tamil politics.
c) Physical Liquidation of Rivals
More potent than the LTTE's propaganda campaign against its rivals
has been its physical liquidation of them. In May 1986, TELO was wipPd out
by the LTTE.7 A few months later, the LTTE ordered PLOT to suspend its
activities.8 In December that year, EPRLF cadres were massacred.9 Ever
since then such operations have become a trend and massacre of its rivals has
been the single, most important tactic responsible for its rise and dominance
of the struggle.
The LTTE has justified such massacres as pre-emptive actions, 10 or
as operations against anti-social elements. 11 However, it is the emergence of
challenge to its hegemonistic ambitions which has motivated these campaigns.
6
7
8
9
10
11
For an analysis of the validity of the LTTE's claim for sole spokesman status, see Ram Manikkalingam, "Tigerist Claims: A Critique", Pravada (Colombo), vol.1, no.7, July 1992, pp.11-12.
Edgar O'Ballance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88 (London, 1989), p.81 and Anita Pratap, "Sri Lanka: When Tamils Killed Tamils", Sunday (Calcutta), vol.13, no.30, 1-7 June 1986, p.64.
Sri Lanka News, 21 January 1987. Cited in C.H.S.Jayewardene and H.Jayewardene, Terror in Paradise: The Battle for Eelam (Ottawa, 1987), p.62.
For an account of the tension between the LTTE and EPRLF in 1986 and the LTTE operation against the EPRLF, see T.S.Subramanian, "The Gap Remains", Frontline (Madras), vol.3, no.26, 27 December 1986-9 January 1987, p.111 and p.l13.
LTTE, Political Committee, n.2, p.12.
ibid., p.9.
193
In liquidating its rivals, the L TIE fully exploited their internal
contradictions and attacked them when they were most vulnerable. The attack
on TELO came a month after fighting broke out between Sabaratnam and Das
(TELO's Military Commander). Likewise, the offensive against EPRLF followed
the rift between Padmanabha and Douglas Devananda.12
In addition to liquidating rival cadres, the LTTE has ensured that none
of the other groups has a credible leadership. In 1982, TELO leaders
Kuttimani, Thangaturai and Jegan were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy on
information allegedly provided by Prabakaran.13 Sabaratnam was killed in
1986 and the L'ITE was behind the assassinations of the TULF leaders,
Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran in 1989. In June 1990 Padmanabha and the
entire Central Committee of the EPRLF was gunned down in Madras by the
LTIE. This systematic annihilation of its rivals ensured that by 1990 none of
them could function in the North.
d) Suppression of Criticism
In addition to this the L'ITE has also silenced its civilian
critics.'Lamp-post killings' and 'necklacing' are popular methods of executing
'traitors'.14 These have served to deter people from informing about the
12
13
14
Rajan Hoole and others, The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka- An Inside Account (Claremont, 1990), p.84. Sources in TELO agree that Sabaratnam's style of functioning and Das' death made the decimation of TELO an easy task. G.Srikantan (Spokesman, TELO), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role oflndia's Intelligence Agencies (Colombo, 1993), p.151 and Srikantan, ibid.
In 'lamp-post killings', the victim was tied to a lamp-post and then shot dead. 'Necklacing' involved the placing of a burning tyre around the victim's neck. The bodies were left in public view, with a note stating that the victim was a 'betrayer'. 'Sivapackiam' (Resident of Nallur), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
194
Tigers or collaborating with their enemies. 15
It is pertinent to note at this point, that while Mao had warned against
the use of terror against the people as counterproductive, the L 'ITE (like the
Viet-Minh and Viet-Cong) has resorted to such terror. External support and
the militaristic nature of its struggle have perhaps made the L 'ITE less
mindful of mass sentiment.
Such elimination of rival opinion and silencing of dissenting voices has
undoubtedly made the struggle more 'unified' but this has been at the cost of
internal democracy. This 'unified' voice does not signify a consensus, achieved
through negotiations and debate with other Tamil parties, but one achieved by
brutal suppression of alternative opinion. 16
e) Gaining Legitimacy as the Sole Spokesman
The LTTE regards itself as the sole representative of the Tamil people
and has insisted on being recognised as such by Colombo and New Delhi. Since
1987, the LTTE has insisted on being the only party with which negotiations
should take place, for recognition by India and Sri Lanka of its sole
spokesman status will legitimise its hegemony over the Tamil struggle. But
the L'ITE has not been recognised as the sole spokesman of the Tamil struggle.
15
16
The L'ITE has mainly adopted a military strategy to establish its
For an account of how the LTTE dealt with those who 'collaborated' with the IPKF and the NEPC Government, see "The Psychopaths" - A Booklet on the Conditions in LTTE Prisons (n.d.) (English Translation). Also see "Turokikafaiyum, Cantarpavatikafaiyum I !J:an.kaf!pom" (We Shall Identify Traitors and Opportunists), Vitutalaip Pulikal, no.14, 15 May 1990, p.5. · ·
Manikkalingam, n.6, p.12.
195
hegemony. It has not used political means like elections to prove its political
standing or dominance that it has acquired militarily. Manikkalingam
contends that like the LTIE, the PLO too claims to be the sole representative
of the Palestinians. However, the PLO's claim has been legitimised by the
Palestinian National Council (the Parliament in exile of the Palestine
people).17 Moreover, despite dominance of Al-Fatah within the PLO and
numerous instances of fratricidal fighting, decisions are made in the Council
after debate.l8 This definitely has not been the case with the LTTE, which
has given little importance to debate among Tamil groups and has achieved
dominance only by militarily decimating others.
The LTTE's strategy of achieving the status of sole representative of the
Tamils has therefore met with mixed success. While it has succeeded in
marginalising other Tamil groups and has been recognised as the dominant
group, it has not been recognised as the sole spokesman of the Tamils.
TOWARDS TAMIL fLAM - -In the following discussion, the L TIE's strategy for the creation of a
sovereign Tamil l[am will be examined chronologically, emphasising the
salient features of its strategic thrust in a particular period. The focus of this
analysis is on how the L TIE manouvered out of difficult situations.
Preparation for Protracted War, 1976-1983
In its early years, the L TIE faced challenges of inadequate resources
and publicity, threat from dissidents and informers, and the counterinsurgency
17
18
ibid.
Ram Manikkalingam, "Tigerism", Pravada, vol.l, no.4, March-April 1992, p.7.
196
operations. Consequently, its objectives were to publicise the organisation's
achievements, deal severely with traitors, and above all build up the
organisation in preparation for a protracted war.
a) Military-Focus Strategy
While militant groups like PLOT and EROS were opposed to cutta
iranuva kannottam (pure military outlook) and were involved in political . . . mobilisation of the masses, 19 the L TTE went directly into armed struggle as
it was assumed that adequate support for the Tamij; l{am cause already
existed; the TULF having even won a mandate for it. 20
The L TTE, however, did recognise the importance of popular
support,21 and it did undertake extensive propaganda. But unlike the other
groups, it carried out military operations from the very beginning. For the
LTIE, ''por'iittam porattamumaki porattatukCina piraccCiramum akukiratu" .. .. . . (The struggle not only constitutes the struggle but also the propaganda for the
struggle).22 Perhaps the LTTE assumed that support would follow military
success.
19
20
21
22
Taraki, "The Evolution of the Tiger", The Island, 31 December 1989. Reproduced in Taraki, The Eluding Peace (An Insider's Political Analysis of the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka) (Sarcelles, 1991), pp.20-21.
D.B.S. Jeyaraj, "Battle for the Hearts and Minds of Jaffna", The Island (Colombo), 17 January 1988 and ibid.
Tamillfa Vifutalaip Pulika[, Ko{kai Parappu, Ve[iyi~~up Pirivu, Cocalicat Tamililattai Nokki .... (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Propaganda and Publications Division, Towards a Socialist Tarnil /j_am .... ) (n.p., 1980), p.60.
Kasi Anandan (Member of Political Wing, L TTE), interviewed in Madras in May 1993.
197
The L TIE's decision to go in directly for armed struggle and concentrate
on its military aspects is similar to the Guevara's foco strategy. It was neither
the urban proletariat. (as in Lenin's strategy) nor the rural populace (as in
Mao's strategy) which was the vanguard of the Tiger struggle. But, as
advocated by Guevara, it was the LTTE itself which as the foco was the
vanguard of the struggle. It was both the political and military centre of this
struggle.
b) Protracted Guerrilla War
However, unlike the strategy ofthe Bolivian struggle or of the JVP, the
LTI'E opted for a protracted war. The failure of the JVP in 1971 was
attributed by the LTTE to the former's military unpreparedness vis-a-vis the
State, and its failure to evolve a long term strategy.23 The LTTE concluded
from the JVP's failure that the war would involve a series of blows on the
State, over a long period of time rather than a single crushing one. 24 It
therefore emphasised on a gradual build up of its military infrastructure to
wage a long war.
The LTTE opted for guerrilla warfare as it was "the classic method for
the weak and unarmed Tamil people" to fight the State's oppression. The LTI'E
maintains that its struggle began as a "defensive measure" and later became
offensive to contain State terrorism.25
23 Tami{i!_a Vitutalaip Pulikal, Kolkai Parappu, Veliyittup Pirivu, n.21, pp.62-63. . . . . ..
24 Anandan, n.22.
25 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, n.1, pp.10-11.
198
Throughout this initial phase, the attacks of the L TIE were primarily
of a hit-and-run nature. While m~litarily it resulted in victories for the Tigers,
it left civilians vulnerable to Army reprisals.
c) Violence Against the State and its Machinery
The attacks of the LTTE against the State consisted of spectacular
violence and assassinations. These gave the Tigers the publicity they wanted.
With the blowing up of an Air Lanka Avro in 1978 for instance, the LTTE
came into the limelight.26 Assassination of persons like Duraiappa,
Bastiampillai, Nadarajah and Kanagaratnam were part of its campaign to
remove 'collaborators' and 'informers', who were disrupting the L TIE's
activities in the North.27
d) Raids on Banks and Police Stations
In addition to individual killings the L TTE raided police stations and
banks. Requiring funds to sustain the movement and lacking sources which
could provide them with finances, the Tigers claimed that they were "compelled
to appropriate State funds" by raiding banks. This was justified as the State
instead of developing Tamil areas was collecting taxes from the people.
According to the Tigers it was this money that they were taking back. 28
Unlike the LTTE, the EROS and EPRLF refrained from robbing banks as they
were opposed to taking money belonging to Tamils.29
26
27
28
29
ibid., p.24.
ibid., pp.ll-12, pp.15-l 6 and p.18.
ibid., p.ll.
M.R.Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (Delhi, 1994), p.l04.
199
e) The Retreat of the Tigers
Though the LTTE made spectacular assaults on the State in the North,
the counterinsurgency operations did take their toll on the LTTE. While some
Tiger units remained on the island to demoralise the enemy with occasional
ambushes, a major part of its cadres retreated to Tamil N adu for sanctuary to
build up the organisation in the late 1970s. It was during this period that the
L TTE started laying the foundation for its vast network overseas, for arms,
training, and support.30
Till1983 therefore, the moves made by the Tigers were ad hoc rather
spontaneous and not very methodical. Its achievement during this period was
its survival in difficult circumstances and its systematic preparation for the
long struggle ahead.
Mobile Warfare, 1984-July 1987
This period saw a greater mix of political and military tactics in the
LTTE's strategy.From a conservation of military strength the LTTE's strategy
was now one ofvicious attrition, designed to bleed and weaken the enemy. As
a result of this change the Sri Lankan Government became increasingly
defensive and more concerned with protecting its position rather than
pursuing the militants.
a) Exploitation of Contradictions
During this period, the LTTE started displaying a tremendous capacity
of exploiting differences between various agencies within India and also
between Colombo and New Delhi. The best example of this is the way in which
the L TTE used the rivalry between the Intelligence Bureau (I B) and RAW to
30 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, n.l, p.28.
200
procure assistance. It is believed that when RAW did not include LTTE in its
training programme the Tigers meet IB officers in Pondicherry. According to
Nedumaran it was IB which initially armed the LTIE.31
Again, when New Delhi ordered raids against militants groups in 1986,
Prabakaran turned to MGR to secure a return of the seized equipment.32
Then, following a distancing from India, the L TIE entered into direct talks
with Colombo in end-1986. Aware that Colombo was desperate to dilute India's
role in the negotiations, the Tigers at the same time also laid down conditions
for direct talks with the Sri Lankan Government.33
b) Cordial Relations with Powerful Sections
An important feature of the LTTE's strategy has been the avoidance of
confrontation with powerful and useful sections of society. How this thinking
helped it to consolidate support from the Ve??a?ars has been discussed earlier.
Another section whose support it has nurtured carefully and with whom it has
had cordial relations is the Catholic community. 34
The calculations behind the LTTE's wooing of Catholics are many. As
discussed earlier, Catholics constitute a significant proportion of the population
ofMannar and Mullaittivu which are crucial regions in the LTIE's perception.
Many Karaiyars of which the LTTE has a significant number among its
31
32
33
34
P.Nedumaran (Leader, TNP), interviewed in Madras in November 1993. Also, see T.S.Subramanian, "A Role Unveiled: On India and Sri Lankan Militants", Frontline, vol.9, no.1, 4-17 January 1992, p.85.
S.H.Venkatramani (Journalist, The Pioneer), interviewed in New Delhi in January 1995.
The Hindu (Madras), 28 November 1986.
Tamil Times (Surrey), vol. 13, no.12, 15 December 1994, p.7.
201
members are Catholic. Further, as some respected priests endorse its cause,
support from the Catholic clergy has increased the LTTE's legitimacy.
Moreover, it is also alleged that links with the Church has given the LTTE
access to the World Council of Churches and tu its vast funds. 35
c) Widening of Area of Operations
Prior to 1983, most of the LTTE operations were confined to the North.
Thereafter, the LTTE started attacking in the East and South as well and the
choice of its tactics varied according to its strength in the area.
As the L TTE was stronger in the North (having gradually taken control
over it after the ceasefire in 1985),36 its tactics here progressed from hit-and
run attacks to defending territory. But in the East the STF operations limited
its activities and so it still relied on hit-and-run tactics in this area.
The LTTE did not attack the Sinhalese in the South till1985. However,
when the army launched operations in Valvettiturai, the LTTE hit back in the
Sinhalese heartland at Anuradhapura. In 1986 and 1987, a series of
devastating explosions occurred in Colombo to offset reverses that the L TTE
suffered in the peninsula. 37 The explosions in the South showed that the
L TTE was capable of striking anywhere on the island.
35
36
37
Rajan Hoole (Faculty Member, Jaffna University), interviewed m Colombo in June 1993.
During the ceasefire, the Army was confined to the camps. With the breakdown of the Thimpu Talks, the militants preserved the confinement of the soldiers in the camps by mining the surrounding area. Malini Parthasarathy, "Bulldozing the Tamils", Frontline, vol.3, no.8, 19 April - 2 May 1986, p.19.
Dayan Jayatilleka, "Burying the Eelam Struggle", Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.12, no.3, 1 June 1989, p.ll.
202
d) Primacy of Jaffna Peninsula
Despite the widening of its area of operations, the J affna peninsula was
accorded importance in the L TTE's strategy for a number of reasons. For one,
the LTTE had tried to build up its base in Vanni but since it had a Jaffna
centric image it was unable to counter the Vanni regional sentiment.38 Then
the peninsula's proximity to the rear base in Tamil N adu and the
infrastructure it provided for sea operations made control of the Jaffna area
crucial in a protracted war.39 Further, the LTTE believed that a guerrilla
struggle required solid mass support and this was forthcoming only in
Jaffna.40
Consequently, consolidation in the North was important before moving
to the East. The significance of Jaffna peninsula to the LTTE is clearly evident
from the defence it has put up to hold it.
e) Defense of the Peninsula
Prior to May 1986 the situation in the peninsula was that of a military
stalemate. The militants were unable to dislodge the Army from the Jaffna fort
and the Army was unable to break the LTTE's hold over the rest of the
38
39
40
Taraki, "The Struggle for the Wanni", The Island, 7 January 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.l9, p.23.
Taraki, "The LTTE Fails to Get a Rise from Jaffna", The Island, 23 September 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.l9, p.68.
In contrast, PLOT felt that the predominantly middle-class nature of the Jaffna populace made it an unreliable support base. Therefore, PLOT worked among the peasants in Vanni. Taraki, "The LTTE's '.Jaffna First' Policy", The Island, 23 December 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.19, pp.84-85.
203
peninsula. 41 The peninsula became the focus of the Army offensives from
mid-1986 onwards.
i) The L TIE's Defence in ·Operation Short - Shrift'
The L TIE's strategy during the Army's 'Operation Short-Shrift' was
simple - restrict the enemy's movement. The Tigers prevented reinforcements
from reaching beleaguered troops in camps by blowing up crucial culverts and
bridges. 42 For instance the Thondamanaru bridge, a crucial link between
camps at Valvettiturai, Point Pedro and Palali was destroyed. Then, movement
of armoured cars was restricted by placing sandbag barricades across roads
which were then blown up. Tiger sentries posted outside Army camps kept
soldiers confined by exploding mines.43
Though the Tigers had limited fire power and were handicapped by the
lack of anti-aircraft weaponry they were able to repulse the Army attack,
through tactical skill.
ii) The Weakening of Tiger Resistance
By 1987 however, the LTTE's capacity to take on the Army had become
much less. Unable to engage in direct combat with the Army, the Tigers
abandoned their camps and took cover. By avoiding unequal encounters the
Tigers were able to reduce some of their losses 44 but it was now clear that
41
42
43
44
Mervyn de Silva, "Operation 'Turnaround' or Turnabout?", Lanka Guardian, vol.9, no.3, 1 June 1986, p.3.
The Hindu, 25 May 1986.
Malini Parthasarathy, "A Military and Political Misadventure", Frontline, vol.3, no.11, 31 May- 13 June 1986, pp.18-20.
The Hindu, 17 February 1987.
204
the Tigers were at the receiving end. The situation on ground in the North
(outside Jaffna peninsula) was fast approximating that in the East where the
LTI'E continued to operate but in difficult circumstances.
Clearly, the military balance had shifted away from the militants. The
LTI'E resistance had weakened because of the destruction of TELO, EPRLF,
and PLOT by the LTTE. While this policy of annhiliation of rival groups served
to eliminate all challenges to the LTTE's dominance, it simultaneously
weakened the L TIE's capacity to challenge the State. 45 That the Tigers were
'on the run' became evident in May 1987.
iii) Operation Vadamarachchi and the Retreat of the LTTE
On 28 May 1987, the Army launched 'Operation Vadamarachchi'.
Valvettiturai was subjected to a savage aerial attack. After Valvettiturai the
Army took control of Valigamam, Achuveli, Uduppiddi and Nelliady. Jaffna
city however, remained under LTTE control.46
The LTI'E's resistance collapsed under this massive offensive and the
Tigers anxious to avoid face-to-face combat with the troops fled. There was
little serious opposition encountered from the LTI'E. Most of the Army's
casualties were due to mine and booby trap explosions.47 Finally it was
India's intervention in June, that saved the Tigers.
45
46
47
Earlier, soldiers encircling a Tiger camp would find themselves surrounded by militants of other groups. Such joint operations were now not possible. Inter-group rivalry and Muslim hostility reduced Tiger mobility in the East. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, "Sri Lanka Forces Aim at Gaining Ground", Lanka Guardian, vol.9, no.21, 1 March 1987, p.8. Also, see Jayatilleka, n.37, pp.ll-13, p.l8.
R.Shankar (Leader, EROS), interviewed in Colombo in .June 199:-3.
O'Ballance, n.7, and Lanka Guardian, vol.10, no.3, 1 June 1987, p.8.
205
f) The Take - Over of Civilian Institutions
Alongside its effort to defend the peninsula militarily, the LTTE also
attempted to gain control over the society. Just how Jaffna society was brought
under Tiger control provides useful clues to understanding the nature of the
L'ITE.
According to a former member of the NLFT, the L'ITE did not interact
with civilian organisations. It either assimilated them or influenced the
formation of committees.48 In this context, the fate of the Mother's Front
(MF) is illustrative. Formed in 1984-85 to protest against arbitrary arrest of
Tamil youth by the Army, the MF sought to retain its independence from the
militant groups .. In 1986, when MF merely expressed "concern over Tamils
killing fellow Tamils", Kittu informed the MF that the LTTE was "unhappy"
with the Front. Thereafter, the LTTE increased its pressure on MF and Tigers
advised it on the agenda for its meetings. Unable to function under such
pressure, the MF became defunct. When it was revived later by the L TTE, all
its members were pro-Tiger. Citizens' Committees suffered a similar fate when
the L 'ITE began influencing its elections. 49
The cultural arena too came under Tiger pressure. Staging of plays like
Ma'! Cumanta Meniyar (Men Who Bore the Burden of the Soil) which dealt
with infighting among the groups, and Annai Itta T[ (The Fire Lit by Mother) . . . . which focussed on psychological problems of war were banned by the
L'ITE.so
48
49
50
'Mukundan' (Former Member, NLFT), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
'Vasuki' (Former President, MF [Jaffna]), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
Sithralega Maunaguru (Former Faculty Member, Jaffna University), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
206
It was therefore by coopting every aspect of social and cultural life in
Jaffna that the LTIE took control of Jaffna society.
g) The Establishment of Parallel Hierarchies
In addition to assimilating civilian institutions, the LTTE also took over
the administration of the peninsula by setting up parallel Government
structures. 51
From 1986, the LTIE gradually took over and then established its own
judicial and taxation systems, and law and order machinery. Tiger tribunals
dispensed justice on disputes ranging from family quarrels and personal
tussles to legal issues. 52 Tiger justice though quick is however harsh and
arbitrary. There is neither a hearing nor a defence. Mere speculation and
rumour have sometimes been sufficient evidence to sentence a man to
death. 53
In the field of law and order the LTIE has banned black marketing,
brewing of illicit liquor, and screening of pornographic films.54
Taxation has been elaborately organised in the peninsula. Businessmen
make monthly contributions. Levies have to be paid on vehicles leaving and
51
52
53
54
See V.J ayanth, "A Parallel State: The Pillars of the L TIE Power Structure", Frontline, vol.11, no.21, 8-21 October 1994, pp.38-40.
D.B.S. Jeyaraj, ''View from Jaffna", Frontline, vol.3, no.23, 15-28 November 1986, p.123 and Iqbal Athas, "Reconquest of Jaffna by the 'Tigers"', Tamil Times ,vol.9, no.4, 15 March 1990, p.11.
Hoole and others, n.12, pp. 73-7 4.
Indian Express (New Delhi), 4 January 1987 and The Hindu, 7 September 1987.
207
entering the peninsula. Tamils emigrating have to surrender their houses or
pay in gold, and entry to Jaffna requires an LTTE-issued 'visa'.55
With such an elaborate administrative system in the 'liberated areas' the
L TIE has attempted to impress the world that it is not only an efficient
fighting force but also a capable administrator. The LTTE's parallel hierarchy
has been the most visible evidence to the world of the extent to which Tiger
writ runs in the peninsula.
July-October 1987: The LTTE's Response
With India's intervention in June 1987 as an actor in the crisis, the
L TIE's prime concerns in this phase were breaking India's hold over the
struggle and consolidating its (the LTTE's) dominance. This is evident from the
moves it made with regard to three issues- Prabakaran's visit to New Delhi,
the acceptance of the 1987 Agreement, and its subsequent rejection. The
reasons for the LTIE making these moves are discussed below.
a) Prabakaran's Visit to New Delhi
Prabakaran's visit to New Delhi on the eve of the signing of the India
Sri Lanka Agreement has been attributed to various reasons. Tiger supporters
like V.Gopalaswamy claim that Prabakaran was pressurised to go to Delhi. 56
This has been contradicted by J.N. Dixit who maintains that on being briefed
in Jaffna by H.S.Puri (First Secretary, Indian High Commission, Colombo)
about the impending Agreement, Prabakaran insisted on meeting Rajiv
55
56
'Santhan' (Resident of Nallur), interviewed in Colombo in July 1993; Indian Express, 16 August 1987; Tamil Times, vol.9, no.3, 15 February 1990, p.13 and vol.9, no.5, 15 April 1990, p.10.
V.Gopalaswamy (Member of Rajya Sabha, Formerly m DMK), interviewed in Madras in November 1993.
208
Gandhi. 57
According to Gopalaswamy, Prabakaran went to New Delhi expecting
to be conferred the status of sole spokesman of the Tamils. 50 This is also
evident from Prabakaran's own comments. In Jaffna, he claimed that he was
now recognised as the sole spokesman of the Tamils. 59 In Madras too, his
chief concern was India's recognition of the L'ITE's status.60 It was only on
finding out that the other militant groups were also being consulted that
Prabakaran became intransigent61 since the main motive of going to New
Delhi for consolidating his position of sole representative of Tamil interests
was not being fulfilled.
b) Impression of Accepting the Agreement
While eager to avail of India's recognition, the LTTE did have
reservations about the provisions of the Agreement. In Jaffna as well as
Madras, the Tigers conveyed their apprehensions on the propos a 1 to Indian
officials. They were assured that the issues they were raising could be sorted
out during discussions with Rajiv Gandhi. 62
57
58
59
60
61
62
If the LTTE had reservations on the Agreement, why did it agree to
J.N.Dixit (Indian High Commissioner, Colombo, 1985-89 and Foreign Secretary of India, 1991-94), interviewed in New Delhi in March 1994.
Gopalaswamy, n.56.
Shankar n.46.
The Hindu, 25 July 1987.
Cho Ramaswamy, "It Is a Pity the Opposition Adopted Pirabhakaran's Outbursts As Its Opinion", The Telegraph (Calcutta), 21 August 1987.
Dixit, n.57.
209
cooperate with its implementation? Gopalaswamy alleges that Prabakaran was
pressurised to give his consent.63 However, according to the LTTE it was
Rajiv Gandhi's assurances about its apprehensions that made the L TTE
reconsider its stand and agree to cooperate.64
While pressure from India and Rajiv Gandhi's assurances may have
played a crucial role in bringing around the recalcitrant Tigers, some other
factors also influenced the decision. The current mood of the people in Jaffna
was one for peace and a rejection of the Agreement would have made the
LTTE very unpopular. Moreover, the Agreement was going to be signed
anyway. Further, the other Tamil groups had expressed their reservations and
then given their consent. 65 If the L TTE had rejected the Agreement outright,
it would have brought the LTTE in direct and immediate confrontation with
India. Given the LTTE's much weakened position at that time, the LTTE had
no option but to give its consent to the July Agreement.
The LTTE therefore gave an impression of cooperating with the
Agreement. Consequently, in his public address on 4 August, Prabakaran
stressed that the LTTE would cooperate with the Agreement despite his
misgivings about it. Emphasising the LTTE's love for India and its people, he
maintained that the LTTE would never deploy its weapons against Indian
63
64
65
Gopalaswamy, n.56.
LTTE, Political Committee, A Nation Betrayed: Liberation Tigers' Critique on Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (n.p., 1988), p.16.
Apparently, Prabakaran sent messages to the other leaders asking them if they were willing to reject the Agreement. They replied that the LTTE should respond to the Agreement in the way it wanted to and not be concerned about their response. Srikantan, n.12.
210
soldiers. He also announced his decision to lay down arms. 66 A few days later
the Tigers began surrendering arms and displayed considerable camaraderie
towards the IPKF officers. 67
However, this camaraderie was but an interim phase, for the LTTE was
anxious to expedite the departure of the IPKF.
c) Peace Counterproductive to the LTIE
Prabakaran was anxious for the withdrawal of the IPKF because in the
first place the LTTE had accepted the 1987 Agreement only because it had no
option but to do so. If the IPKF was withdrawn the Agreement's collapse would
be quick. Moreover, with the arrival of the IPKF the LTTE was finding itself
marginalised.68 It was also bothered by the increasing rapport between the
people and the IPKF.69
Above all was the fear of losing control over the people. A crucial
element of the L TTE's strategy has been controlling the people by exposing
them to the horrors of war. It has wanted to convince them that for their
survival they need the Tigers to protect them. By denying the people the option
of a negotiated peace, the L TTE has given them only two options - rule by the
LTTE or by the Army. Confronted by such a choice, the masses have opted for
66
67
68
69
LTTE, Political Wing, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: Prabhakaran's Statement (Prabhakaran's Public Address at Jaffna [Suthumalai] on 4.8.87) (n.p., n.d.).
Hoole and others, n.12, p.155.
Prabakaran felt that with the arrival of the Indian forces the political dominance of the LTTE over Jaffna ended. P.S.Suryanarayana, The Peace Trap: An Indo- Sri Lankan Political Crisis (Madras, 1988), p.21.
Depinder Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka (Delhi, n.d.), p.67.
211
the L TTE and this has been projected as support for the Tigers. Consequently,
it is just when peace seems possible that the Tigers have broken off
negotiations and resumed fighting. 70
This is precisely what happened from July to October 1987. The LTTE's
loss of control over the people could not be offset by any monetary
compensation or assurances from India. Consequently, it was necessary to
resume the war.
d) Provocation of IPKF
The war was to be resumed by inciting the IPKF through a series of
moves which would be so "fine-tuned" as to not raise suspicion of the LTTE's
intentions. 71 This inciting of the IPKF began from August 1987.
i) Anti-India Moves
During this time, Tiger propaganda denigrated the IPKF and its
intentions. Picketing of Government · offices was organised. Crowds were
mobilised to protest against the IPKF.72
The hunger strike undertaken by Thileepan ostensibly to focus on
grievances was used to mobilise public sentiment against India. During the
fast, the L TTE skillfully built up an emotionally charged atmosphere. In
rousing speeches made at the venue, Tiger leaders held India responsible for
Thileepan's condition and subsequent death. While the hunger strike is
70
71
72
Manikkalingam, n.l8, p.8. The LTTE's repeated attempts at aborting negotiated solutions is examined in Dayan Jayatilleke, "Obstacles to Peace in Sri Lanka", Lanka (Uppsala), no.5, December 1990, pp.224-6.
Suryanarayana, n.68, p.22.
Singh, n.69, pp.71-73 and Hoole and others, n.12, pp.168-9.
212
essentially a nonviolent means of protest, the LTTE used it to build up a
scenario fraught with violence and anti-India sentiment.73
Even while the fast was on, negotiations were in progress between India
and the L TIE, and an Agreement was almost worked out. Yet the fast was not
called off. 74 Thileepan had to die because India had to be blamed for the
death of a 'nonviolent' Tiger.
ii) Reneging on the lAC Agreement
However, it was by reneging on its commitment to the lAC that the
LTIE provoked India the most. The LTIE's attitude towards the lAC showed
clearly that it had no intention of making the proposal work.
During the negotiations the LTTE insisted on having its way, whether
it was on the composition of the lAC, the LTIE's role in it, or on the exclusion
of rival groups. On all these issues its demands were conceded, and the LTTE
agreed to cooperate in the implementation of the lAC proposal and the July
Agreement.75 Yet the LTIE went back on its commitment.
73
74
75
According to Mahthaiya, the LTIE did so because while choosing the
Hoole and others, ibid., pp.159-73.
Dixit, n.57.
The LTIE was given majority representation. The 12 member Council would consist of 5 Tigers, 2 TULF members, 2 Sinhalese, 2 Muslims (one of whom would be a Tiger nominee). The Chairman would be chosen by the President, out of a panel of 3 Tiger nominees. There was no representation for EPRLF, ENDLF, PLOT, etc. See Agreed Minutes of Discussions Held Between His Excellency, The High Commissioner of India, Shri J.N. Dixit and His Delegation and Mr.V.Prabhakaran, Leader of the L TTE and His Delegation on 23, 26 and 28 September 1987. (See Appendix-Enclosure 1)
213
panel from the L TTE's list of nominees President J ayewardene tried to divide
the Northern and Eastern Tigers by not appointing anyone from the East.76
However, it was the LTTE which was not really interested in making
the lAC function. As pointed out by one of the nominees to the lAC, the L TTE
nominated and insisted on Padmanathan's name deliberately. Given his
previous conviction under the PTA it knew that Colombo would not accept
him. Colombo acted the way the LTTE expected it to and gave the LTTE an
opportunity to back out on grounds of betrayal. 77 That it was only
Jayewardene who ignored the Eastern Tigers was untrue. The Tiger
nomination list itself was biased against the East.78 Only one out of three
persons nominated for the post of Chairman and two out of a panel of nine for
the Council, were from the East. Even if Jayewardene had appointed
Padmanathan as well as both Kasi Anandan and Romesh (the Eastern Tigers),
the East would have been underrepresented.
The LTTE possibly negotiated and signed the Agreement because it was
keen to avail of the status this gave the Tigers. The 29 September Agreement
clearly recognised and legitimised the LTTE's dominance in Tamil politics. The
LTTE was well aware that this was clearly the maximum it could squeeze out
from Colombo and Delhi. Politically having got as much as it could from the
proposal it opted out.
76
77
78
D.B.S.Jeyaraj, "A View from the Tigers", )'he Hindu, 28 October 1987.
'Vigneswar' (Tiger Nominee to the lAC), interviewed in Colombo in July 1993.
S.H.Venkatramani, "Sri Lanka: Tiger by the Tail", India Today, vol.12, no.20, 16-31 October 1987, p.35.
214
iii) The Tiger 'Suicides' and Savage Response
From the day the Agreement was signed, the Tigers pointed out that
since they had handed over their arms to India, India was now responsible for
the life of every Tamil. 79 When India failed to prevent the moving of 17
arrested Tigers to Colombo, and the subsequent death of 12 of them after they
swallowed cyanide, the T ,TIE blamed India. 80
While India was blamed for the death of the Tigers, their death
occurred in fact, at the behest of the LTIE leadership, for Mahthaiya had met
them the previous day when he must have passed on the capsules to them. 81
The arrested Tigers had to die to justify the L TIE's return to armed struggle.
To avenge the death of the 12 Tigers, the L TIE went on a savage killing
spree. It executed 8 soldiers in its custody and massacred 150 Sinhalese in the
East. Pressure mounted on the IPKF to either stop the violence or to quit. On
10 October 1987, the IPKF launched operations against the LTTE.
The strategy of confrontation that the L'ITE adopted from August which
led to the outbreak of hostilities, enabled the LTTE to return to armed
struggle. However, by withdrawing from its commitment to the Agreements of
July and September, the LTTE threw away its gains from the lAC proposal.
It also forfeited the support from India +hat it had enjoyed so far.
79
80
81
How the L'ITE coped with the superior military might of a conventional
L 'ITE, Political Wing, n.66.
For details of the incident, see Sugeeswara Senadhira, "The Cyanide Drama that Brought Referee Rajiv into the Ring: The Inside Story", The Sunday Times (Colombo), 1 OctobE:r 1989.
Singh, n.69, p.83.
215
Army is the subject of the discussion below.
The Battle for Jaffna, October-December 1987
The L TIE's efficiency as a fighting force is best demonstrated in the
battle for Jaffna. Despite the fact that the Tigers were up against an Army
vastly superior in numbers and fire power, the defence they put up was
commendable.
a) Preparation for the Battle
Since early 1987, the Tigers had converted Jaffna-into an urban fortress.
It was heavily defended in successive tiers.82 Bunkers in houses overlooking
the approach roads were linked by trenches to houses with additional sandbag
protection.83 All approaches to the city were heavily mined. 84 Sniper
positions were set up in buildings and trees and Tigers from outlying areas
were called in to defend Jaffna.85 Undoubtedly the Tigers had taken the
defence of Jaffna seriously.86
b) The LTTE's Defence of Jaffna University
The LTTE's political headquarters was situated in the J affna University
Campus. It is believed that the LTI'E leadership was here on the night of 10-
82
83
84
85
86
ibid., pp.92-93.
Manoj Joshi, "Jaffna: End of the Siege", Frontline, vol.4, no.22, 31 October- 13 November 1987, pp.8-9.
Dilip Bobb and others, "A Bloodied Accord", India Today, vol.12, no.21, 1-15 November 1987, p.34.
O'Ballance, n.7, p.100.
In contrast, the IPKF plan to capture Jaffna showed little preparation. See Shekhar Gupta, "Operation Pawan: In a Rush to Vanquish", India Today, vol.13, no.2, 16-31 January 1988, pp.72-73.
216
11 October 1987 when the IPKF launched its operation here.
As the Sikh Light Infantry was heli-landed into the field, they were
confronted by gun-fire. Since their helicopters were hit, only 30 soldiers of the
Sikh Light Infantry could be landed. The radio operator was one of the first
casualties. The vital communication link of the Sikh Light Infantry was
severed. The following day, the Tigers began attacking the trapped platoon and
only one soldier survived. Meanwhile, the paracommandos were misled by a
local who had offered to direct them to the leader's hideout.
The IPKF missiOn was a failure. Apparently, the LTI'E had been
listening in on the IPKF radio communications and were waiting in ambush
for the commandos.87 The LTTE's advance information about the mission
contributed considerably to their success in defending their political
headquarters.
c) The Tigers Resistance Crumbles
In the subsequent weeks, fighting in Jaffna was bitter. The LTTE used
its knowledge of the layout of Jaffna to the utmost. While the Tigers operated
from fortified houses and from bunkers, the Indian soldiers had to expose
themselves in order to advance. Moreover, the Tigers enjoyed anonymity by
mingling with the civilians. They used human shields (i.e. fighting from
behind civilians) and launched attacks from civilian institutions like schools,
hospitals, and temples. 88
87
88
Shekhar Gupta, "Commando Assault: The Lost Offensive", India Today, vol.13, no.2, 16-31 January 1988, pp. 74-75 and Singh n.69, pp.98-100.
Sumir Lal, "The Fall of Jaffna", The Telegraph, 1 November 1987 and V.Jayanth, "The Battle for Jaffna", Frontline, vol.4, no.2:2, 31 October-13 November 1987, p.14.
217
Eventually however, the LTTE resistance gave way. The battle for
Jaffna exposed the L'IYfE's weakness in positional warfare, as the Tigers were
unable to stand and fight a conventional Army.89 Initially, as the IPKF had
pushed towards Jaffna the LTTE had stood and fought it at Urumpirai,
Kokkuvil, Koppai North, and Marathanamadam. But its losses at such direct
encounters were heavy.90 At Urumpirai for instance, 110 Tigers were killed
in 2 days of fighting. 91 Clearly, the Tigers had overestimated their fighting
capacity.
d) The Retreat
By 25 October 1987, the LTTE resistance had collapsed completely. The
Tigers lost about 700 of their cadres. However, the leadership and hundreds
of cadres slipped through the IPKF cordon to regroup in the jungles. The
fighting in the next two years proved that the capture of the citadel of the
guerrillas was not the end of the armed struggle. It only marked the end of one
phase and the beginning of another. The Tigers now reverted to classic
guerrilla warfare.
However by taking on the IPKF, the L TTE had made a serwus
miscalculation. The Tigers had envisaged that outbreak of hostilities would
lead to protest in India and a quick pullout of the IPKF from the island. This
however did not happen. There were no significant protests in Tamil N adu
89
90
91
T.S.Subramanian, 11Crumbling Resistance 11, Frontline, vol.4, no.22, 31
October-13 November 1987, p.10.
Manoj Joshi, 11 Beyond Jaffna", Frontline, vol.4, no.2:3, 14-27 November 1987, p.20.
Subramanian, n.89, p.12.
218
against the IPKF operations.92 A demoralised LTTE now had to continue the
war from the jungles.
The LTI'E's 'Long March', November 1987-March 1990
The objectives of the Tigers during this phase were survival of the
organisation and hastening the exit of the IPKF from the island. For its
survival, the L TIE cadres retreated to the jungles, regrouped there and
avoided direct encounters with the IPKF. To hasten the exit of the IPKF they
began inflicting heavy losses making it expensive for India to continue
operations ..
a) Reversion to Guerrilla Warfare
Mter the capture of Jaffna, the Tigers resorted increasingly to sniping
and mine explosions. The tactics which were adopted varied according to the
physical environment and mass support in an area.
Jaffna peninsula's indented coastline, numerous lagoons, offshore
islands, and shallow waters provided the Tigers an ideal environment to
operate in. Support for the Tigers being solid here, the militants also enjoyed
human cover and could blend with the population.93 Here the Tigers struck
at the IPKF from behind 'human shields' or in busy civilian areas. While the
IPKF, by virtue of its large numerical presence was able to restrain the LTIE
in the peninsula,it was unable to wean away mass support for the LTIE in the
92
93
Suryanarayana, n.68, p.29.
Shankar Bhaduri and Afsir Karim, The Sri Lankan Crisis (New Delhi, 1990), pp.40-41.
area, despite all its efforts at winning the hearts and minds of the people.94
The reverse was true however in the East. In Batticaloa, the LTTE
suffered a lot, losing most of its leadership in the area. Since the LTTE had
limited support in Batticaloa, it was forced to operate among a relatively
hostile population which included EPRLF supporters, Muslims, and Sinhalese.
Unlike Jaffna, the LTTE could not depend on human cover here.
The L TTE therefore attempted to first 'neutralise' the EPRLF and win
over the Muslims. 95 Further, the long Batticaloa lagoon and the narrowness
of the district imposed restrictions on the movement of the Tigers. When
pursued by the IPKF, the Tigers, sandwiched between the water and Sinhala
areas had nowhere to go. Similarly, in Amparai Tamil villages were few and
separated by paddy fields. The demographic and human environment was
unsuitable for sustaining a guerrilla war.96
94
95
96
Colonel Arjun Katoch (Incharge of Special Operations, Served in Jaffna and Trincomalee from September 1987- September 1988), interviewed in New Delhi in August 1993.
Lieutenant General A.S. Kalkat (General Officer Commanding, Land Forces, IPKF), interviewed in New Delhi in February 1995. For a detailed study ofthe LTTE's tactics in Batticaloa, see G.M. Nair, "IPKF Operations in Ratticaloa", Combat Journal (Mhow), vol. 17, no.3, November 1990, pp.47-50.
Brigadier D.S. Chauhan (Served in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa from November 1987 -February 1990), interviewed in New Delhi in August 1993. In Batticaloa, the IPKF operated like a guerrilla army and this was effective in crippling the L TTE. Major General T.P.Singh (Commanded 57 Division in Batticaloa Sector till end- 1988), interviewed in New Delhi in August 1993. Also, see Anita Pratap, "Sri Lanka: A Winning Strategy", India Today, vol.13, no.11, 1-15 June 1!:188, pp. 98-99 and p.101.
220
After the fall of J affna, the strategic importance of Vanni increased as
it was here that the leadership remained till March 1990. In the sparsely
populated Vanni, where PLOT and ENDLF retained some influence, it was the
thiL:kjungle which provided the LTTE with cover. Here the LTIE operated as
a military outfit. 97 Camp defences were organised in concentric tiers with
each tier having its own weaponry and surveillance. When an IPKF patrol
encountered a camp, the Tigers did not resist the attack till the soldiers had
reached the core and by the time they reached there most of the Tigers had
escaped.98
In the Vavuniya sector, the LTIE usually ambushed on routes
frequented by the IPKF. Rail and road axes which had to be opened, cleared,
and secured by the soldiers were frequently ambushed by the LTTE. Beaten
paths in jungles which soldiers had to traverse, given the thick vegetation
elsewhere, were also heavily mined and were responsible for a large number
of casualties. 99
Through their innovative use ofiEDs, the Tigers not only inflicted heavy
casualties on the IPKF but also dealt a severe psychological blow on the troops.
Fear of IEDs among the soldiers was so intense, that movement by foot was
avoided. This reduced interaction between the IPKF and the people thus
97
98
99
Kalkat, 11.86.
S.C.Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna (New Delhi, 1992), pp.33-34.
Major General J.N.Goel (Commanded 4 Division in Vavuniya), interviewed in New Delhi in August 1993. For details of the tactics used by the Tigers in the Vavuniya sector, see L.S. Sundaram, "OP Pawan: A Frank Appraisal", Combat Journal, vol.17, no.3, November 1990, pp.38-39.
221
benefitting the LTTE.100
While inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, the Tigers took care to
conserve their own strength. Consequently, they avoided direct encounters and
defence of territory; exceptions being the initial fighting in Jaffna and the
encounters at Nithikaikulam.101
b) Propaganda Warfare
Dislodged from the North and on the run in the East, with their
communications disrupted and supplies restricted, the Tigers now began
emphasising the political aspect of the politico-military struggle.
Almost as important as military warfare in the North and East, was the
propaganda war launched both locally and abroad by the LTTE. Propaganda
among the locals aimed at destroying support for the IPKF. It consisted of
rumours of IPKF atrocities and the similarity in the operations of the Sri
Lankan Army and the IPKF.102 Abroad the LTTE drew attention to alleged
human right violations, rapes, and aerial bombing of civilian areas by the
IPKF.103
Despite its immense efforts at propaganda, pressure from the Indian
public on the IPKF was not as much as that of the American public on the US
100
101
102
103
Sardeshpande, n. 98, p.31.
Kalkat, n.95; Goel, n.99 and Katoch, n.94.
Sailendra Rao, "Psychological Operations during Counter-Insurgency Operations - Sri Lanka", Combat Journal, vol.l7, no.3, November 1990, p.44.
For instance, the LTTE publication The Satanic Forces is a compilation of anti-IPKF articles.
222
forces in Vietnam.
c) Talk-Fight Tactics
An important feature of the LTTE's strategy has been to keep talking
about peace even while it is engaged in fighting. Prabakaran sent frantic
messages to New Delhi calling for ceasefire and negotiations.104 In early
1988, he wrote to Rajiv Gandhi promising to lay down arms as soon as an
interim administration with a majority role for the LTTE was established. He
agreed to cooperate with the implementation of the Agreement if Tamil
interests and Tamil people were protected.105 However, the LTTE refused
to lay down arms or accept any conditions from India. Clearly, the LTTE's
enthusiasm for negotiations was only tactical - to gain a respite from fighting.
d) Switching Tracks on Elections
The LTTE used the electoral system, albeit indirectly, in 1989. During
the Parliamentary elections, the LTTE initially called for a boycott of the polls.
However, the average Tamil was keeri to participate in the electoral process
and anxious to have Tamil representation in Parliament. 106 Moreover, the
L TTE's adversaries, the EPRLF and TULF were contesting. Allowing them to
win the elections would strengthen their position in the PC. Hence, the LTTE
104
105
lOG
Letter dated 14 October 1987 from V. Prabakaran, Leader, LTTE, to the Indian Prime Mini~ter Rajiv Gandhi. Also, see "Abandon Military Operation. Initiate a Dialogue to Create Conditions for Peace and Normalcy" - L TIE's Appeal to the Government of India. Press Statement issued by LTTE, Political Committee, m Jaffna on 25 January 1988.
Letter dated 13 January 1988 from Prabakaran to the Indian Prime Minister. Cited in Suryanarayana, n.68, pp.30-31.
Mervyn de Silva and Shy am Tekwani, "Sri Lanka: Ballots vs Bullet~··, India Today, vol.14, no.5, 1-15 March 1989, p.l23.
223
changed its posture. From a position of boycott and opposition to the polls, it
moved to a tacit support of the EROS list. 107 Formally though, it did not
retract from its position of boycotting the polls.
This was a brilliant move. By backing EROS and helping it emerge as
the largest group, the legitimacy of the EPRLF -led PC Government became
questionable. Moreover, without itself having compromised on the election
issue, it now had a mouthpiece in the EROS in the Parliament.
e) Absence of a United Front
An important feature of the LTTE strategy has been the absence of a
'united front' (advocated by Lenin and Mao) with Sinhalese opposition parties.
However, prior to the 1988 Presidential election, the LTTE sent messages to
Kumar Ponnambalam expressing interest in meeting the SLFP leadership and
in aligning with the Democratic People's Alliance (DPA). The LTTE
subsequently backed out, claiming disinterest in elections. 108
The LTTE contended that alliance with the Left parties was impossible
because of their chauvinism.109 There was some interaction between the Sri
Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP) and LTTE in 1986, but with the SLMP
107
108
109
However, later the LTI'E attacked the EROS for "false propaganda" [sic] that the LTI'E was supporting it in the election. See LTTE, Political Wing, Election Results: Peoples Verdict against the Betrayers of Tamil Nation (n.p., n.d.).
Kumar Ponnambalam (Leader, TC), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
In contrast, the other militant groups were not averse to cooperation with progressive sections among the Sinhalese. EPRLF favoured links with the Communist Party (CP), NSSP and conditionally the LSSP and Nava Janata Vimukti Peramuna (NJVP), but not the JVP. HellmannRajanayagam, n.4, p.98.
224
supporting the Agreement and moving closer to the EPRLF, relations turned
sour.110 Despite the convergence of thinking on several issues, the LTTE
was unwilling to even allow the Nava Sarna Samaja Party (NSSP) to function
in Jaffna.111 As for the JVP, the LTTE described it as an organisatio11
governed by the extremism of the majority. It criticised the JVP for not
recognising the Tamils' right to separation. 112 Despite both of them being
anti-systemic, the JVP and LTTE did not align to fight the State.113 Any
collaboration between the L TTE and JVP was informal, at a local level,
confined to border areas, and restricted to shelter for fleeing cadres. 114
While there was a clear reluctance to align with the opposition parties,
the L TTE was willing to negotiate with the UNP for tactical gains.
f) Negotiating with the 'Enemy'
The LTTE had been pushed to the corner by the IPKF and EPRLF,
militarily since the fall of Jaffna and politically since the PC elections. It then
110
111
112
113
114
Chandrika Kumaratunga (Former Member of SLMP, Currently President of Sri Lanka), interviewed in New Delhi in September 1992.
Thirunavakarasu (Politbureau Member and Jaffna District Organiser, NSSP), interviewed in Colombo in June 1993.
Tamili£a Vitutalaip Pulikal, Kolkai Parappu, Veliyittup Pirivu, n.21, pp.9-i4. . . . . . .
Reports in the Indian media alleged that the L TTE shared weapons with the JVP in return for its arms cargo being smuggled in through Colombo harbour, which was then under JVP control. S.H. Venkatramani, "A Closed Sanctuary", Economic Times (New Delhi), 3 June 1991. However, sources in Colombo deny this as Colombo harbour was not controlled by the JVP. Jayadeva Uyangoda (Faculty Member, University of Colombo), interviewed in June 1993.
Kalkat, n.95.
225
manoeuvered skillfully to wrest the initiative from its opponents. What made
this resurrection of the LTTE possible was a tactical shift in its policy. In April
1989, in response to President Premadasa's offer of unconditional talks the
LTTE after initially rejecting it as an "exercise in futility" agreed to
negotiate.115
Opposition to the IPKF presence in the North-East brought the LTTE
and Colombo to the negotiating table.116 The L TTE used the negotiations
as a propaganda platform to highlight the atrocities of the IPKF and demanded
dissolution of the NEPC. It also wanted fresh elections in the NEP and steps
to halt the build up of the Citizens Volunteer Force (CVF).117
Above all, the LTTE requested and received arms and ammunition from
Colombo to "counter the activities" of the TNA. 118 Citing sources in
Premadasa's administration, Gunaratana maintains that Premadasa ordered
the issue of 2,000 T-56 weapons, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, vehicles,
cement and other supplies to the LTTE. Further the import ofweapons by the
LTTE through Colombo was sanctioned. The L TTE also received several
millions of rupees from the Government apparently for the development of the
115
116
117
See Letter dated 11 April 1989 to President Premadasa, released by the Political Committee, LTTE (London), reproduced in The Hindu, 13 April 1989.
Bradman Weerakoon, "Once Bitten Twice Shy", Counterpoint (Colombo), vol.2, no. 4, October- November 1994, p.7.
For the minutes of the confidential talks held in Colombo between the Sri Lankan and Tiger delegations on 24 June 1989, see The Hindu, 28 Julv 1989.
North-East. 119
Talking to Colombo worked to the L TTE's advantage. Being the sole
group negotiating with Colombo, it gave the L TTE a "political boost and
legitimacy as the sole representative of Tamil interests in Sri Lanka." 120
Moreover, in June 1989, Premadasa ca lied on India "to complete the
withdrawal of the entirety of the IPKF troops by the end of July" .121 Prior
to the talks, the L TTE had been confined to the jungles and was on the
defensive. It was also under pressure from India and the EPRLF -led
administration. But once the talks began the balance shifted decisively in
favour of the Tigers. Without making any concessions the LTTE succeeded in
expediting the IPKF pullout and shaking the NEPC.
A Quasi-Conventional Strategy, April-December 1990
With the exit of the IPKF the LTTE's strategy entered a new phase.
Though it continued to function as a guerrilla force, the LTTE now increasingly
displayed a capacity for conventional warfare. Its commitment to armed
struggle, was also clearly emphasised when it resumed hostilities against the
State.
a) Negotiations of Limited Value in LTIE Strategy
119
120
121
From March to June 1990, the LTTE functioned as the de facto power
Gunaratna, n.13, pp.293-4, pp.303-4 and pp.299-300.
S.D.Muni, "Premadasa and LTTE: Strange Bed-Fellows", Times oflndia (New Delhi), 21 April 1989.
"Speech made by the President His Excellency R.Premadasa at the Pinnacle Unveiling Ceremony at the Chittavivekashramaya Wickremasinghapura, Battaramulla on 1 June 1989", in Sri Lanka. Information Division of High Commission, New Delhi, Sri Lanka News Letter (New Delhi), vol.9, no.3/89, May and June 1989,p.6.
227
in the North-East but in June it resumed hostilities with Colombo once again.
The LTTE's decision to resume armed struggle proved once again that
peace is perceived by the L'ITE as counterproductive to its struggle. It should
be kept in mind that the L'ITE is not fighting merely for greater rights for the
people or more regional autonomy. Its struggle is for a TamiJ Ilam and one in
which it has complete hegemony. A comment in a pro-LTTE paper is
illuminating in this regard. On Premadasa's willingness to give the Tamils
ellam (meaning all, in Tamil) but not Bam, the Tamil Nation remarked that
... no ruler anywhere can concede anything that is not in his power to give. New nation states are never given, they are always taken. The General Yahya Khans and Bhuttos could not have ¥}ven Bangladesh; it was taken from them. (Emphasis in the original)1
Tamil !!:_am, the Tigers envisage will never be given to them at the
negotiating table. They will have to take it by using force. Negotiations
therefore have limited value for the L TTE.
While the LTTE has had some tactical gains through negotiations, peace
itself, as discussed earlier is counterproductive. This calculation was perhaps
crucial in the resumption of hostilities by the LTTE in June 1990.
b) Decisive Battles and Conventional Warfare in the North
An important development in the LTTE's strategy in the North from
July 1990 was its emergence as a conventional Army which showed a growing
willingness and capacity to engage the enemy in decisive battles. In its official
paper Vi~utalaip Pulika!, the L TTE claimed that it had become a conventional
Army.
122
After 15 years of guerrilla warfare the LTTE now progressed to
S.Sivanayagam, "Territory the Issue, Not Multi-Ethnicity", Tamil Nation (Surrey), vol.1, no.18, 15 May 1991, p.l.
228
conventional warfare with the capacity to enter into direct, face-to-face combat
with the enemy and to destroy strong military regiments.123
In the peninsula, the Tigers laid siege on the Jaffna fort attacking the
besieged garrison with mortars and bulldozers for three months. 124 Whether
the subsequent abandonment of the fort by the Army was as claimed by the
Government, a strategic move or a retreat under a determined Tiger assault,
as maintained by the LTIE, is unclear.125 However, what is evident is that
the LTTE was able to sustain a long campaign and survive a high casualty
rate.
Although the siege of the fort and its subsequent fall to the LTIE were
perhaps not militarily decisive for Colombo's entire war making potential, it
did inflict a stunning blow to the morale of the Army. The other crucial
victories for the Tigers were the capture of the Army camps at Kilali in July,
and Mankulam in November 1990.126
The Mankulam camp was targeted after a careful consideration of the
enemy's strategic priorities and thinking and not because it was merely
possible to capture it. 127 Similarly, descriptions by the LTIE of the siege of
123
124
125
126
127
"Tami[IigCutantirap Par" (Tamil !lam Liberation War), Vi!utalaip Pulikaf, no.17, 1990, p.6.
See Rita Sebastian, "Three Month Battle for Jaffna Fort", Tamil Times, vol.9, no.10, 15 September 1990, p.4.
"The Truth about the Jaffna Fort!", Tamil Nation, vol.1, no.5, 1 November 1990, p.l.
Times of India, 26 and 27 November 1990.
Taraki, "The LTTE is Now a Conventional Army", The Island, :2 December 1990.Reproduced in Taraki, n.l9, p.81.
229
Jaffna fort revealed that the LTTE was now using concepts of conventional
warfare.128 While the LTTE functioned like a conventional force in its
offensive operations it was like the Army, unable to effectively resist a frontal
attack. Commenting on the situation, an analyst remarked that it seemed to
be a conflict between two guerrilla forces with one retreating when the other
attacked and vice versa with neither being able to hold territory effectively
against a determined assault by the other.129
The LTTE could enter into conventional warfare at this time because of
sophisticated weapons provided to it by Colombo and those it had seized from
the TNA. It also had an extensive build up of bunkers and an increased
recruitment of cadres. But the L TTE also continued to use guerrilla tactics as
well. When confronted by a frontal attack the L TTE still preferred to retreat.
c) A Failed Strategy for the East
From statements and preparations made by the L TIE in the East it
seems that the LTTE expected to fight a conventional war in this area as
well. 130 With the outbreak of fighting in June in the East the LTTE was
able to put the Army on the defensive in the beginning. But within a few days,
the Army's counteroffensive successfully pushed the Tigers out of the
towns.131 Unable to resist, they retreated to the jungles and to the
128
129
130
131
See Yal Kottaiyai Evvitam Kaipparrinom (How We Captured Jaffna Fort), (MadT·as, 1990). -- -
Thomas Abraham, "The See-Saw War", Frontline, vol.7, no.25, 8-21 December 1990, pp.32-33.
Taraki, "LTTE between Positional and Guerrilla Warfare", The Island, 29 July 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n. 19, p.59.
Thomas Abraham, "Out of Hand?'', Frontline, vol.7, no.14, 7-20 July 1990, p.18.
230
peninsula to fight a guerrilla war.
The LTTE failed to hold the East because in consonance with its 'Jaffna
first' policy, the leadership immediately moved men and weapons from the
East to defend the peninsula.132 Moreover, its hold over the East had
become extremely tenuous especially after the collapse of its relations with the
Muslims. From 1987-90, the survival of the LTTE in the East (especially
Amparai), was possible only because of support from the Muslims. But for
them, the Tigers would have starved in the jungles.133 This crucial support
was however alienated when Muslims were massacred in the East and evicted
from the North.
That the massacre of Muslims would mean the sacrifice of support from
a valuable constituency must have entered the calculations of the L TTE's
strategic thinkers.l34 It is likely that this loss must have been offset by
some substantial gain. It is believed that the LTTE may have received massive
supplies of weapons in return for targeting Muslims possibly at the behest of
Israel. 135 Growing links between Muslim militant groups in the East and
Islamic fundamentalist regimes abroad have also been reported. 136 In the
132
133
134
Taraki, n.40, p.84.
Taraki, "The LTTE and the Muslim Phenomenon", The Island, 27 October 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n. 19, p.71.
The LTTE not only alienated Muslims in the island but also in Tamil
light of this and because of the increasing cordiality between Israel and the
LTIE this possibility cannot be ruled out.
Another possible motivation for the LTTE's massacre of Muslims could
be its decision to go along with the outlook of its Eastern leadership which was
in favour of responding to the sentiments of the Tamil villagers. The Tamils
in the East apparently wanted the Tigers to defend them from Muslim
attacks.137
By portraying itself as their protector the LTIE probably aimed at
consolidating support among the Eastern Tamils. It perhaps reckoned that
anyway the Muslims would never wholly back the LTTE and were hence
dispensable.
The question of Muslims not backing a merger in any possible
referendum or voting for the LTTE in an election, does not bother the LTTE,
for its strategy affords no role for referenda or elections in the near future.
The L TIE's failure to come to grips with the complexity of the Muslim
question has been at the root of its genocidal policy towards Muslims. Its
failure to hold the East has been an outcome of its inability to carry the
support of not only the Muslims but also of the peace hungry Tamils as well.
d) Deployment of Suicide Squads
While the LTTE's Suicide Squad began operating from July 1987 its
operations became militarily decisive only from 1990. For instance, the Black
137 Taraki, "Why the LTTE is Gunning for the Muslims", The Island, 19 August 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.l9, pp.61-62.
232
Tigers were pressed into action in November 1990 to dislodge the soldiers
defending the Mankulam camp.138
The gains from a Suicide Squad operation in a military campaign are
tremendous. For one, it inflicts a very severe blow to the enemy, in terms of
manpower and morale. In contrast, the loss in manpower to the organisation
is much less. Moreover, suicide squad operations have tilted the balance
decisively in favour of the Tigers. With the willingness, motivation and
capacity to launch suicide operations being a LTTE monopoly, the Tigers have
been able to destroy any target of their choice.
e) Political Mobilisation Assumes Importance
Mobilisation of the masses, an activity that was left to other groups,
gained emphasis in the LTTE strategy from 1990 onwards. Contrary to what
the LTTE had always claimed, Tamil nationalism and Tamilfiam had to be
nurtured carefully and could not be taken for granted, especially after periods
of peace when the populace turned apathetic. The observation of Mavzrar Nal,
veneration of martyrs, and glorification of Tamil culture, now became
necessary to keep up the tempo of nationalist fervour and were vital
components of the mobilisation. 139
Moreover, education in the North was restructured to inculcate a Tamil
!£am identity among an entire generation of Tamils. The level of commitment
that is possible through education far outstrips that which can be achieved by
mere indoctrination. The L TTE probably envisages that even if the
138
139
Times of India, 27 November 1990.
Taraki, "LTTE Sustaining the Tempo", The Island, 25 November 1990. Reproduced in Taraki, n.19, pp.79-80.
233
Government were to defeat the Tamils militarily, it would be impossible to do
so politically.140
Thus, in the post-IPKF strategy of the LTIE, political mobilisation of
the people was highlighted. But as earlier, it is still more in the nature of
propaganda than in political work among the masses.
APPRAISAL
The L TIE's strategy reveals that it has neither permanent friends nor
permanent enemies but only permanent interests; the interests being Tami£
l{am and domination by LTIE of the Tamil movement and thereafter, of the
setup in ll.am. In pursuit of this, the LTIE is ready to align with anyone,
including its enemies and fight anyone, including its mentors. Its strategy
consists of using any and all means to remove obstacles in its pursuit ofl!:_am.
The L TIE has sought to make administration of Tamil areas and the
war against the Tigers unbearably expensive for the enemy. Through
hit-and-run attacks, ambushes and suicide operations, the LTIE has
attempted to 'bleed the enemy white', break the morale of the soldiers and the
will of the regime to carry on the war.
The L TIE however has not restricted the fighting to merely that on the
battle field. It has engaged in serious propaganda warfare in order to isolate
the regime from its donors. Negotiations are indulged in for purposes of
legitimacy that participation accords. Among the political tactics,
administration of'liberated areas' has perhaps carried forward the struggle the
140 For details of the changes introduced in the syllabus of schools in the Tamils areas, see Taraki, "Tigers as Pedagogues", The Island, 17 November 1991.
234
most, and given 'TamiliLam' a more concrete shape and reality.
While the LTTE has been influenced by other guerrilla movements it
has not adopted their strategies in toto. Like the Chinese struggle, the L TTE
has emphasised that war should be protracted; Political mobilisation has
however been of less importance to the LTTE. Further, external support,
conspicuous by its absence in the Chinese struggle, has played a crucial role
in the Tamil struggle. Then, Mao had cautioned guerrillas against engaging
in decisive battles. The L TTE - like the Vietnamese guerrillas - has
increasingly engaged in decisive battles.
The LTIE's strategy shares many common features with Guevara's
strategy. The focus on military action, the primacy accorded to the guerrilla
organisation, and the subservience of all to this organisation, are found in both
the strategies.
There are two vital points which the LTTE has learnt from Guevara's
failure. One, the LTTE appears to have realised that Guevara's strategy will
succeed only against a crumbling regime. It has consequently sought to
undermine the Sri Lankan regime through propaganda and economic
sabotage. Further, the L TTE has acknowledged that political mobilisation
must be undertaken when popular support wanes and this popular support has
to be nurtured.
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