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Examining Humanitarian Interventionon the Climate-Conflict Nexusin Myanmar, Syria, and Sudan

TA M A R C O L O D E N C O , K R I S T E N C A L I L L E A N D Z A R I N A N U R M U K H A M B E T O VA

ABOUT THE PROJECTThis study was commissioned by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). The work was conducted and recognized in partial fulfillment for the “Policy Labs” course within the School of Public Policy at Central European University.

Policy Labs are part of the MA curriculum and give an opportunity for small teams to work for external clients producing and presenting policy relevant research that will be used for advocacy, assessment and development. Clients are civic organizations, donors, research centers and international organizations. The Policy Lab focusing on this project for UN OCHA was mentored by Andrew Cartwright from the Center for Policy Studies in collaboration with Rodolpho Valente from UN OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch. The administrative and coordination support for the course was provided by Pinar Donmez.

ABOUT THE AUTHORSTamar Colodenco, Kristen Calille and Zarina Nurmukhambetova were students in the Master of Arts program of the School of Public Policy at Central European University during the 2015-2016 Academic Year.

TERMS OF USE AND COPYRIGHTThe views in this report are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central European University or the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the Policy Lab Research Report series, the year and the publisher.

CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIESCENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITYNador utca 9.H–1051 Budapest, Hungarycps@ceu.eduhttp://cps.ceu.edu

Table of Contents

Introduction

Myanmar Risk of Vulnerability

Cyclone Nargis: Extreme Weather Events and Conflict

Policies

Recommendations

Syria Compounding Factors

Mitigating the Conflict

Humanitarian Involvement

Recommendations

Sudan Darfur

Policies

Recommendations

Conclusion

References

Introduction

The world is becoming less peaceful and more vulnerable to intensifying forces of nature. As a

result, increasingly more people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. At the start of 2016,

humanitarian organizations estimated that nearly 88 million people in 37 countries will be targeted

for aid (Global humanitarian overview (GHO) 2016). In just a matter of several months, the figure

grew by 8 million people (GHO mid-year review 2016). More people than ever are on the run,

fleeing war and disasters, with dim prospects of ever going back to their homes. However, while

natural disasters are becoming more frequent and more intense, it is armed conflict that causes

most of the misery today (GHO 2016).

In the past decade, enough evidence has amassed to argue that conflict is linked to adverse climate

change effects. While the link is not direct, changing rainfall patterns, droughts, as well as overall

environmental degradation can take a toll on people’s coping strategies, often pitting communities

against each other to compete for dwindling natural resources. In 2005, a study of rainfall patterns

in Darfur, Sudan found that each cycle of drought was soon followed by intercommunal violence

(Suliman 2005). In 2007, the United Nations acknowledged the link following a report on post-

conflict environmental assessment of Sudan by the United Nations Environment Programme

(UNEP) which found that “peace and people’s livelihoods in Darfur as well as in the rest of Sudan

are inextricably linked to the environmental challenge” (UNEP 2007, 5). Since then, more

countries have been added to the climate-conflict nexus, including most notably and recently the

biggest humanitarian crisis today – Syria.

Most recently, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA) partnered with the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) to produce a quantitative

analysis of 157 countries to identify their vulnerability to the “climate-conflict nexus” which is

understood as “the intersection between two key factors: weak institutions and pre-existing social

fragility, as well as climate change vulnerability” (OCHA PDSB 2016, 7). The study, entitled

“Understanding the climate-conflict nexus from a humanitarian perspective: a new quantitative

approach”1, concurred with current literature on the matter that climate change acts as a stress

multiplier, building on and exacerbating pre-existing conditions such as poor resource

1 Central European University’s Center for Policy Studies cooperated with UNOCHA in

research, identification and preparation of country case studies to illustrate the study’s findings.

management, political marginalization of certain groups or entire areas in a country and regional

and internal instability, eventually leading to violent conflict.

Three countries were selected as a result: Myanmar, Syria and Sudan. All three countries are highly

dependent on rainfed agriculture, with as many as 70 per cent of Myanmar’s and Sudan’s rural

populations reliant on land as their livelihoods. All three countries have had extensive

humanitarian operations with a common humanitarian appeal. Syria is the world’s least peaceful

country, having produced the largest share of refugees and displaced people (IEP, 2015).

The present brief extends the case studies included in the OCHA/IEP study, going into detail on

the pre-conflict context and tracing climate change effects on each country. While similar patterns

of mismanagement, poor governance, and environmental discrimination (differentiated access to

resources) can be discerned, each case shows how varied manifestations of climate change can

propel countries into conflict.

Each country case study includes an overview of the situation and the current response policies.

At the end of each case study, recommendations are elaborated in the hope of building on the post-

World Humanitarian Summit momentum to revise the current humanitarian approaches towards a

more environmentally aware and proactive system.

Myanmar

Risk of Vulnerability

The Global Climate Risk 2016 report ranked Myanmar as one of the countries most affected by

extreme weather events during the 1995-2014 period (Kreft et al., 2016). The Global Peace Index

Report 2015 also found that the country showed a negative trend compared to 2014, placing the

country’s overall score in the “moderate risk” category (IEP, 2015). The country was ranked at

very low 130th out of 162 countries in the index. Myanmar’s susceptibility to climate hazards in

combination with the prevalence of several forms of social and political tension resulted in

heightened vulnerability with regards to the climate-conflict nexus.

Due to its geographical location, Myanmar is constantly exposed to climate threats such as

cyclones, strong winds, landslides, flooding, and earthquakes. The 2007 report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) presented evidence of “increasing

tendency in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in Asia over the last century

and into the 21st century” (IPCC 2007, p. 473). Furthermore, the authors found strong evidence

showing climate change directly linked to a decline in the region’s crop yield, an increase in

temperature and rainfall variability, sea-level rise, loss of biodiversity, droughts, and soil

degradation. These consequences, in turn, are very likely to cause stress to agricultural

productivity, increase pressure on natural resources, and adversely affected human health. These

critical climate stressors only worsen preexisting problems from existing policy failures and

ongoing internal conflicts.

Although the whole Asian & Pacific region is prone to climate-related stress, Myanmar has

characteristics that heighten the vulnerability of its territory and population. Before 2011,

Myanmar’s economy was one of the least developed in the world with very slow GDP growth

(UNEP & PMT 2012, p. 17). With 66% of the population living in rural areas and more than 75%

depending on agricultural activities for their livelihoods, every climate event that takes a toll on

natural resources is bound to trigger severe economic crisis. The situation slightly improved after

policy reforms, -that included economic liberalization, fiscal reforms, trade and investment

promotion, decent labor laws and improvements regarding freedom of speech and internet

censorship- were introduced in the last five years. However, resource constraints and policy

failures are still an obstacle to the implementation of new plans and programs (LSE, 2013). The

weak economy is also linked to poor public health infrastructure and services. Vector borne

diseases are widespread (yellow fever, cholera, influenza, malaria, dengue fever, among others),

access to clean water is limited, and underweight and stunted growth is common in as much as

40% of children under the age of 5 (UNEP & PMT 2012, p. 21). Myanmar’s government also

admits to limitations in terms of “technological capacity to prepare for the impacts of climate

change or the consequences of climate change related events” (UNEP & PMT 2012, p. 30).

Deforestation and overexploitation also increase the negative effects of climate-related events. Due

to resource mismanagement and a lack of monitoring mechanisms for these activities, Myanmar

has wiped out more than 3% of its forest ecosystems only in the last two decades. The United

Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Project Management Team (PMT) that jointly

developed Myanmar’s National Action Plan on Climate Change found the situation not only

destructive to the environment, but also obstructive to future use of the land and other natural

resources. Illegal and uncontrolled logging is causing substantial damage to Myanmar forests at

alarming rates, risking exhausting natural resources for surrounding communities as well.

Similarly, unsustainable traditional farming practices is resulting in soil degradation, erosion, and

the depletion of essential minerals that, in turn, considerably reduce farm productivity (p. 24). This

combination of negligent and unsustainable exploitation of resources has “reduced the quantity of

water available for use by local communities and jeopardised agricultural practices (floating

gardens, fishing activities), tourism and recreational activities” (p. 25). Thus, Myanmar stands out

as a particularly vulnerable country where the exploitation of its natural resources intensifies its

climate variability as a whole.

Cyclone Nargis: Extreme Weather Events and Conflict

Manifestations of climate change in the country take the form of extreme climate events. Figure 1

shows the increase in temperatures from 1960 to 2005. This trend has been found to be linked with

the increasing prevalence of droughts and with heat-related disorders and deaths (UNEP & PMT

2012, p. 26). Studies also found that in the last five decades, there has been increases in intensity

and frequency of cyclones, rainfall variability including record-breaking intense rainfall events,

and occurrences of flooding and storm surges (UNEP & PMT 2012, p. 27). In the last 20 years,

these extreme climate events had a direct impact on Myanmar’s economic activity. Cyclones

damaged crops and infrastructure, intense rains contributed to soil erosion and crop damage, and

heat waves worsened the prevalence of vector borne diseases by reducing water availability.

Figure 1: Departure from

the mean temperature

over the period 1960 to

2005 (Heat Index-black

line) indicating: i) more

frequent hot years since

1976; and ii) a linear

increase in temperature

over the time period

(Linear– Blueline)

Source: UNEP & PMT

2012, P. 26

In 2008, a devastating cyclone hit the Irrawaddy Delta in Myanmar. It soon became one of the

deadliest humanitarian disasters ever in the region, killing more than 140,000 people and

obliterating entire villages. The cyclone destroyed thousands of heads of livestock, shrimp and

crop farms, as well as critical water infrastructure (WFP, 2008).

The country was already experiencing severe grievances stemming from poverty and land tenure

issues prior to the storm. Afterward, poverty rates averaged an unprecedented 26%, yet can be

twice as high in rural areas (UNDP, 2016). Weak land tenure security is one of the most critical

issues since more than 70 per cent of Myanmar’s citizens living in rural areas rely on agriculture-

related activities for their livelihoods (Adelphi, 2015). Access to land has been constrained due to

confiscation and land expropriation by the military junta that was in power until 2015, and has left

between 50-70 per cent of the rural population essentially landless, depending on the proximity to

the cyclone’s path (Adelphi, 2015; Baver et al., 2013). Landlessness and land grabbing threw

populations into a vicious circle of poverty and extreme vulnerability to the negative impacts of

climate change. Although land grabbing by the military ceased after the military rule ended in

2015, land disputes still remain unresolved and the newly elected government is yet to returned

the confiscated land to the villagers.

In the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, the composite effect of climate stressors, poverty, and land

scarcity led to a spike in food prices, an increase in the number of displaced people, and intensified

ethnic conflict (G7, 2014). In addition, the military government obstructed international aid efforts

and hindered the humanitarian community’s ability to deliver impartial aid, further exacerbating

grievances among different ethnic and religious groups (John Hopkins et al., 2009). Cyclone

Nargis showed how climate change can become a threat multiplier that can add more stress to an

already fragile context where poverty, competition for resources, and interstate violence paint a

worrisome picture.

Policies

At the international level, Myanmar signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and ratified it in 1994. The Kyoto protocol was also ratified in 2003.

Although there is no specific national legislation on climate change, two laws that were recently

enacted address the issue. The Environmental Conservation Law (2012) regulates environmental

management while introducing the concept of environmental emergency to refer to any “situation

which may affect the safety and health of the public or the environment and ecosystem if natural

or man-made disaster or pollution is not taken action immediately”. It establishes the creation of a

Conservation Committee whose duties are, among others, the protection of endangered ecosystems

and the promotion of public awareness in relation to environmental conservation. The Myanmar

Disaster Management Law (2013) describes natural disasters as “destructions to the life and

property, livelihood, infrastructures, safety education and health of the public or to the

environment due to natural or man-made accidents or negligence (...)” and includes tsunamis,

floods, landslides, earthquakes and droughts among the occurrences. The law establishes the

Natural Disaster Management Committee responsible for devising emergency response plans,

guidelines, and policies. The committee also works with humanitarian organizations to distribute

provisions and assess needs from a monitoring and screening centre.

In 2012, the government also launched the “National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)

to Climate Change” in accordance with the UNFCCC article 4b, which mandates countries to

“formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional

programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change (...)” (UN General Assembly, 1994).

It identifies farmers, fishers, retail businessmen, poor households and women and children as the

most vulnerable to climate-related events as they rely on “climate-sensitive income or livelihood

sources” (UNEP & PMT 2012, p. 30). The program puts forward a set of adaptation projects in

different areas like agriculture, forests, early warning systems, public health and water resources.

The plan was drafted with assistance from UNEP, the implementing agency, to increase the chance

of receiving international support. Funding mainly comes from UN agencies (most notably,

UNDP) and bilateral cooperation, with Australia, Japan and Korea as big donors.

Besides UNEP and UNDP, many UN agencies, like UN-Habitat and the UN Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), already have a permanent presence and ongoing

projects in Myanmar. Although some progress has been made with the recent policy framework

developed by the national government and UNEP, there are still more than a million people that

need urgent assistance, with more than 400,000 being directly affected by the devastating floods

of 2015. OCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016 estimates the necessary humanitarian

strategy for Myanmar would cost an additional 190 million dollars just for that year (OCHA,

2016). Along with highlighting the positive impacts of the political transition that led to the first

freely contested elections in 2015, the report also examines ongoing tensions and calls for careful

optimism. OCHA’s proposed plan focuses on: (1) meeting life-saving needs, (2) access to basic

services and livelihoods opportunities and (3) early recovery and durable solutions. The strategy

strongly recommends working closely with the newly elected Myanmar government and searching

for durable solutions that can reduce aid dependency and increase resilience long term. Now that

the country seems to be improving its economic situation, capacity building is key. By maintaining

assistance and funding during the transition, it convinces the humanitarian community and other

donors that Myanmar is still a priority for international cooperation while helping strengthen the

state’s capacity regarding environmental management and sustainability.

Recommendations

- Improve coordination between international agencies and government

Myanmar’s government is opening up to the world after years of isolation. International

organizations should act cautiously but quickly to establish robust partnerships with the

government. The jointly drafted National Action Plan on Climate Change is a good

example of how international organizations can contribute valuable input on processes

conducted by public officials.

- Assist national policy-makers with implementation and evaluation challenges.

With constraints in economic and in-kind resources as well as limited technological

capacity, implementation of ambitious plan and policies are bound to be challenging and

could prolong the effects from poverty and other grievances. The international community

could help speed up the recovery process by showcasing best practices following a natural

disaster, facilitating training opportunities, and enabling technological and scientific

bilateral cooperation. Building technological capacity is also fundamental to develop

effective early warning systems.

- Develop and maintain sustainable farming practices

Farmers should receive education and tools to engage in more sustainable practices. At the

same time, the government should focus on improving regulation and monitoring capacity

to bring private sector into compliance with environmental sustainability standards.

- Focus on resilience and reduction of aid dependency

While working towards maintaining foreign aid following Cyclone Nargis, the

humanitarian community could help Myanmar diminish its aid dependency in the long run

by focusing its efforts on long-term solutions, like preventing illegal logging, developing

reforestation programs, and building climate-resistant infrastructure.

Syria

Compounding Factors

The Global Peace Index ranked Syria as the least peaceful country in 2015, just 4 years after the

Syrian government violently reacted to a politically-charged protest, marking the beginning of

Syria’s armed conflict (IEP, 2015; “Chronology of Reports: Syria,” 2016, 6). The anti-government

protests sweeping across the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring, had reached Syria. Among

more prominent social, economic, and political contributors that defined the movement, the role

of climate change on Syria’s ongoing conflict remains largely ignored.

Though human contribution to the drought in the Middle East is debated (Joodaki, 2014), a report

from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration attributes them to anthropogenic

climate change with greenhouse gases accounting for roughly half of the decline in precipitation

within countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea (NOAA, 2011). A study published in the

Water Resources Research journal used observations from gravity-measuring satellites to provide

groundbreaking accuracy in measuring water reserves found above and below the ground (Voss et

al., 2013). By comparing these water levels from 2003 to 2009, the differences show an alarming

decrease in water reserves since the onset of the drought in 2007, exposing a grim forecast of

limited future water availability.

Figure 2: A satellite image

from NASA shows degrees of

water loss where red

represents the greatest loss in

water storage. Syria’s upper

right area displays bright red

despite being near the Tigris-

Euphrates river basins;

Source: NASA, UC Irvine,

and NCAR, 2013

Recent prolonged

drought conditions due to

climate change were

exacerbated by two main

factors; a lack of

transnational water allocation rights and poor water governance in Syria. In 1967, Israel seized

bordering mountain range, Golan Heights (shown in Figure 3), from Syria during the end of the

Six-Day War and while the annexation is not internationally recognized, the territory is continually

brought up during Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks to this day. The Peace Talks typically halt when

discussing the border placement, each side vying for the valuable resource at stake. Not only does

the Golan Heights catch a great deal of rainfall in its rocky plateaus, but the land is fertile for

growing crops and raising livestock. Now, this territory provides Israel with one third of its water

supply. Though half of Golan Heights’ residents are Syrian, Syria still has no claim to its water

due to the lack of transnational water allocation rights, or legal agreements between countries

regarding access to a shared body of water (“Golan Heights Profile,” 2015).

Figure 3: “Map of Syria” with Golan Heights and Euphrates River annotations

Source: United Nations, 2012. Syrian Arab Republic. Map No. 4204 Rev. 3. Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations,

Cartographic Section.

Voss et al. (2013) explored how differences in interpreting international water law, including water

practices for both surface water and groundwater, “limit the potential for any agreement for legal

allocations or management policies for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers” (pg 904; United Nations,

1997). Even if treaties include water rights, the wording is often vague, allowing countries to

assume more water governance during droughts or use water as leverage during political

disagreements (Pearce, 2014; Mazlum, 2009). Since the 1970’s, good-intentioned frameworks

with promises of increased levels of cooperation fail to include specific water amount allocations,

giving upstream countries an unfair advantage in making these decisions based on their needs

(Mazlum, 2009). Turkey’s initiation of its Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), which included

22 dams and 19 hydropower plants along the Tigris-Euphrates river system, raised tensions as it

undermined its downstream neighbors’ water flow (Bayazit and Avci, 1997). This ongoing

infrastructure development project has already drastically disrupted the Tigris-Euphrates river

system, reducing Syria’s water flow by 40 per cent due to Turkey’s capability to hoard more water

during the drought, which greatly reduced Syria’s crop yields (UNEP, 2008; USDA, 2011).

In order to keep up with agriculture and domestic needs, Syria began pumping groundwater from

aquifers. Yet, unrestricted water extraction resulted in a rapid decrease of groundwater levels and

the largest observed water loss covered in the study, as evident in Figure 2 (ibid). NASA scientists

deduced that along with the prolonged drought, reductions in groundwater attributable to human

activity kept Syria’s water resources from replenishing (NASA, UC Irvine, and NCAR, 2013). The

exploitation of groundwater accelerated Syria’s water loss deeply affected its agriculture-

dependent population and economy (Salman and Mualla, 2003). Journalist Suzanne Saleeby points

to the ‘‘the regime’s failure to put in place economic measures to alleviate the effects of drought

[as] a critical driver in propelling such massive mobilizations of dissent’’ (Saleeby, 2012). Without

having the capacity to adapt to changes in natural resources, Syrians became extremely vulnerable

to the effects of climate change.

Figure 4: In 2011, groundwater collected from private

wells account for over half of the water used in flood

irrigation Source: Adapted from UN FAO, GSAR, and

WFB, 2012

Figure 5: More than 80% of Syrians used flooding,

which is considered the least inefficient irrigation method

Source: Adapted from UN FAO, GSAR, and WFB, 2012

Historically, Syrians predominantly made a living from growing water intensive crops, like cotton

and wheat, where the irrigated water is heavily subsidized by the government and thus,

inefficiently irrigated (see Figures 4 & 5). This unregulated and wasteful use of shared natural

resources not only contributed to water shortages, but also damaged arable soil, resulting in crop

failure and desertification (Femia 2012). As a safeguard for groundwater depletion, the Syrian

government started requiring licenses to dig agricultural wells in 2005. These licenses were hard

to procure, especially in regions with a Kurdish majority, and with little enforcement, didn’t inhibit

the growth of illegal wells.

As a result of the water scarcity, 1.3 million people in Syria were affected and 800,000 people

became severely vulnerable, losing 90% of their income and source of livelihood, according to a

report published by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2010).

With so many facing food and economic insecurity, it triggered a mass migration to urban areas

(Solh, 2010). Alongside an influx of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees, Syria’s urban population

growth led to increased competition for jobs, leading to unemployment, inequality, poverty, and

crime. This rapid urbanization coupled with unreliable support from the government also placed

an enormous strain on infrastructure and government services like water, energy, and

transportation.

As Syria’s civil and economic health deteriorated with most facing extreme hardship, underlying

sociopolitical grievances heightened. The Arab Spring movement allowed those who identified

with these injustices a channel to voice their concerns and demand reform. Unfortunately, the

Syrian government met peaceful protests with gunshots, further aggravating claims of tyranny and

disregard. Those disheartened by the Syrian regime’s actions abandoned peaceful protests to join

the Free Syrian Army, which faced even more brutally violent suppression. This led to further

marginalization and hostilities between the different religious and ethnic groups, leaving regions

vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups. Now ravaged by civil war, the politically volatile

and dangerous environment not only made it impossible for humanitarian organizations to provide

aid, but caused the largest influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in the world

(IEP, 2015).

“I’m not telling you

that the crisis in Syria was caused by climate change,

but the devastating drought clearly

made a bad situation

a lot worse.”

- John Kerry, COP21 Paris - Credit: Laure Chadraoui. OCHA. 2014

Policy Failures

In 2003, Syria’s agricultural sector accounted for one quarter of its GDP. Just one year of

extreme weather due to climate change decreased this portion by one third (Mohtadi, 2012). The

Carnegie Middle East Center produced a report linking climate change to unexpected

consequences, like how “the shrinking role of the agricultural sector will take a toll on key

health and nutrition indicators as more people are fed less because of diminishing food

stocks” (2015). With little economic diversification, Syria’s government also faced cutbacks,

weakening its ability to provide welfare, healthcare, and other public services.

Unlike its Middle Eastern neighbors, Syrian food security policies steered the country toward

self-sufficiency by restricting food imports and heavily subsidizing its agriculture sector, yet had

insufficient safeguards in case of extreme weather or economic slumps. Furthermore, policies

were deemed unsustainable by the international community. In 2001, the World Bank warned,

"the Government will need to recognize that achieving food security with respect to wheat and

other cereals in the short-term as well as the encouragement of water-intensive cotton appear to

be undermining Syria's security over the long-term by depleting available groundwater

resources." The World Bank continues that the price of crops “need to become more aligned with

international market prices in order to provide the right incentives to farmers” (World Bank,

2001, pg. xi). As previously mentioned, the Syrian government heavily subsidized irrigated

water and energy since the country’s food security hinged on farmers’ slim profit margins. Yet,

the reduced areas of cultivation due to water scarcity combined with the barely manageable

financial conditions for both farmers and the Syrian government led to the failure of Syria’s self-

sufficient food model and a deepening economic decline.

Syria’s lack of emergency preparedness also deepened the effects felt by the prolonged

drought. The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction’s Global Assessment Report on Disaster

Risk Reduction deemed Syria’s drought management “ineffective because response [was]

untimely, poorly coordinated, and poorly targeted to drought stricken groups or areas

(Erian, Katlan, and Babah, 2010, pg. 16). Decisions made during the most recent drought

were clearly unsustainable, with a “total annual water withdrawal as a percentage of internal

renewable water resources reaching 160%” where Turkey used only 20% in the same year

(Breisinger, Ecker, Al-Riffai, and Yu, 2012). By sustaining non-drought water usage during a

drought, the Syrian government demonstrated how inflexible its water policies are to drought-

like conditions.

Right before the conflict, a confidential cable appealing to donor countries explained how dire

the situation in Syria was becoming, coining it the “perfect storm.” The UN Food and

Agriculture Organization’s representative in Syria advised how the most recent drought along

“with other economic and social pressures [...] could undermine stability in Syria” and the Syrian

Minister of Agriculture admitted how the social and economic repercussions from the drought

was "beyond our capacity as a country to deal with" (Connelly, 2008). These warnings could

have been acknowledged by the Syrian government, but another confidential cable revealed its

aversion to identifying it as an “emergency” or even an “appeal” for help. The UN was forced to

re-name its previous appeal to donors as the “Syrian Drought Response Plan”, which only

garnered one fourth of the requested financial aid (Hunter 2010). Syria’s drought strategy

included establishing an early warning system for droughts as well as food and animal feed

distributions by humanitarian actors. Unfortunately, the strategy was too late as conflict thwarted

these alleviating measures. The Syrian government’s denial of its country’s growing instability

kept the humanitarian community from understanding the severity and thus potentially

preventing the conflict early on.

As these droughts become more frequent and structural in Syria’s climate, there needs to be

long-term climate change strategies. In order to plan for the future, Syria needs to incorporate a

precautionary measures into its policies.

Recommendations

· Continue working with the Syrian government in order to establish safe supply routes for

humanitarian aid convoys

Providing aid during an ongoing war is dangerous, but vital in preventing potentially larger

crimes against humanity, like forced starvation and rampant disease.

· Combine resources with regionally trusted NGOs

In order to strengthen humanitarian efforts during conflict-intense periods, the international

community can maximize its efforts through capacity-building with regional NGOs that are

more experienced navigating Syrian territory.

· Allocate refugee funding for vocational training in refugee camps

While waiting for the conflict to end in Syria, foreign aid could start mitigating the present-

day hardships beyond food and shelter at refugee camps. By offering vocational training

aimed at diversifying skill sets of refugees, especially those in the agriculture sector, it would

improve their employment chances and overall success when starting over in a new country.

· Prevent unsustainable farming practices in Syria after the conflict ends

Some Syrians have hopes of returning home after the war. Since building resilience is key to

their longevity, post-crisis relief could enlist the humanitarian community to help encourage

sustainable farming practices, like advise importing instead of growing water-intensive crops,

establish fair transnational water allocation rights surrounding the Tigris-Euphrates river

system, provide more water-efficient farming equipment and technology, and prevent

groundwater overdraft from aquifers through regulation of all existing wells.

· Incorporate a safety net into agriculture policies

Syria needs to lift its restrictions on crop imports in order to diversify its food supply. This

would lessen the pressure on farmers to grow water-intensive produce and help its

inhabitants keep a balanced, healthy diet.

· Build drought-resistant infrastructure

New buildings with water-sensitive design that use grey water would maximize Syria’s finite

water supply.

Sudan

Darfur

It has been over a decade since the war in Darfur displaced millions and left hundreds of thousands

people dead, and the region is still a humanitarian crisis with 3.3 million people in need of aid

assistance (OCHA, 2016). In 2015, fighting in Darfur forced tens of thousands of people to flee

the area in search for safety (OCHA and UNEP, 2016). So far in 2016, several intercommunal

conflicts flared up between pastoralists and farmers over resource access and control

(Humanitarian bulletin 2016). The situation has been exacerbated by the negative effects on nearly

5 million people across Sudan from particularly strong El Nino storms (FAO, 2016). With another

cycle of La Nina looming over the country in 2016, the end to Sudan’s woes are nowhere in sight.

Figure 6: Map of Sudan

Source: United Nations, 2004. Sudan. Map No.

3707 Rev. 7. Department of Peacekeeping

Operations, Cartographic Section.

The link between the crisis in Darfur and climate

effects is not limited to the 2015-2016 El Nino

but is argued to have been one of the many

drivers and contributing forces that brought about

one of the worst humanitarian crises in the history

of humankind (ki-Moon, 2007). Since the mid-

2000s, various studies and experts have studied

the link between conflicts and climate change.

Today few deny climate’s relevance to inciting

violence. In 2007, the United Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP) said that

“peace in Darfur [is] inextricably linked to the

environmental challenge” (UNEP, 2007, 5). This

was followed by the UN Secretary General’s

reaffirming that the conflict in Darfur “began as

an ecological crisis” (ki-Moon, 2007). In 2014, a report by the UN Convention to Combat

Desertification stated that “40% of intrastate conflicts over a 60-year period were associated with

land and natural resources” and that in 2007 alone “80% of the major armed conflicts that affected

society occurred in vulnerable dry ecosystems” (UNCCD, 2014, 10-11).

However, the introduction of climate change into the discourse on the root causes of conflict in

places like Darfur has run into some opposition from critics. The concern is that conflicts are

political in nature and thus require political solutions (Livingstone, 2015). Some warn that at the

heart of the conflict was the issue of environmental discrimination – access to resources – not

purely environmental degradation. To understand the role of climate change in the mix of factors

behind the Darfur crisis, it is therefore important to consider the country’s historical background

and context.

Some 70 per cent of the population in Sudan are farmers and pastoralists, dependent on land’s

fertility and productivity (Government of Sudan, 2015). Historically, conflicts between pastoralists

and sedentary farmers in Darfur had been common but manageable. Although Darfur is ethnically

and linguistically diverse, the conflicts occurred along these occupational differences and were

resolved locally with the help and authority of local chiefs through a host of traditional mechanisms

(Sikainga, 2009). However, in the early 1970s, the central government of Sudan banned the tribal-

based Native Administration in Darfur (Edwards, 2008). This undermined the role of local chiefs

not only in conflict mitigation but also in land management (Akasha, 2013). While the policy of

weakening the power of local chiefs was nothing new in post-colonial Africa, in economically

marginalized Darfur it was a turning point that doomed ensuing small-scale skirmishes to simmer

and unresolved grievances to accumulate. Meanwhile, changing climate conditions and

environmental degradation aggravated these otherwise low-level conflicts.

In 2005, a study found that between 1950 and 1990 internal conflicts in Darfur erupted after

periods of low rainfall and coincided with drought (Suliman, 2005). Each consecutive wave of

drought was followed by more violent and longer conflicts, culminating after the third spell of

drought in the 1980s (see Figure 7). By then, resources had already become scarce due to the two

preceding droughts and the overall environmental degradation (Suliman, 2005). In an attempt to

cope with the changing climate conditions, some four million Sudanese, mainly from the North,

took off in search for more favorable conditions (Reuveny 2007). These conditions were to be

found in southern areas where agricultural land was the main source of livelihoods.

Figure 7: Rainfall data for the

region of northern Darfur 1950-

1990 against conflict intensity

Source: Suliman, 2005

Changing climate conditions had

other negative effects. As rainfall

dropped by dramatic 40 per cent and

temperatures continued to rise,

shrinking fertile land and dwindling

resources pushed more pastoralists

to divert from agreed routes and also

left many farmers with no choice but

to switch to animal husbandry, all the while increasing tensions between traditional pastoralists

and farmers over access to land and resources (Faris, 2007; Sikainga, 2009). Nevertheless, it was

not solely the absence of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that caused the 2003 conflict.

By the time the Darfur crisis erupted, Sudan could be classified as a “hotspot for climate security

vulnerability”, which means that insecurity follows from a confluence of factors and processes,

including physical exposure, population density, household and community resilience, and

governance and political violence (Busby et al., 2014). This once again points to the irrelevance

of independent factors leading to violent conflicts, but rather highlights climate change’s

amplifying power in the presence of other destabilizing factors.

The conditions in Darfur were not acknowledged at the time of ongoing peace negotiations

occurring between the North and the South Sudan, where the civil war stemmed from wider

regional volatility (the situation in neighboring countries of Libya and Chad), history of

marginalization of Darfur, and chronic underdevelopment. Moreover, the central government’s

response to the violence that set off the conflict in Darfur was that of manipulation and suppression

rather than mitigation (Sikainga, 2009).

Thus, climate change effects formed some of the backdrop to the war in Darfur, affecting

resources, changing lifestyle patterns, forcing migration, increasing population density and

pushing the competition for resources. Notably these developments were occurring within a rather

short span of time, further constraining the ability of the people to properly adapt to the new

realities (Reuveny, 2007).

Policies

Given the new evidence on the role of climate change in adding fuel to intercommunal grievances

in Darfur, this paper is concerned with the role of the humanitarian community. Humanitarian

actors are just one set of actors operating in Sudan and in the states of Darfur. Other important

responders are peacekeeping forces and development actors. In addition, a host of other approaches

are tried in helping the country and the region get past the crisis towards recovery and sustainable

development, including natural resource governance, anti-desertification, and sustainable land

management. Therefore, coordination with these actors is key to humanitarian actors. In order to

streamline environmental guidelines, UNEP was called in to “advise the UN family on how to

reduce their environmental impact” (“UNEP: About us”). UNEP works in the three major

intervention areas – peacekeeping, humanitarian and development – by means of screening joint

strategic plans, offering advice, guidance and training. As such, UNEP is supposed to improve

coordination on environmental issues among the often disjointed response operations.

On the humanitarian front, UNEP screens the humanitarian response plan (HRP) in Sudan - a joint

strategic and funding mechanism issued on behalf of over one hundred humanitarian organizations

working on the ground. UNEP’s key contribution is the development and application of an

environmental marker that ensures humanitarian projects do not have a negative impact on the

environment (OCHA and UNEP, 2016). Humanitarian actors consider application of

environmental marker the first step to integrating environment into humanitarian response (HRP

2015). Projects that may have some negative consequences must include mitigation measures and

all projects shall consider enhancing benefits for the environment. Every cluster in the HRP

includes environmental provisions, such as environmentally-friendly materials and techniques,

promotion of environmentally sustainable activities, and use of fuel efficient technologies.

In Darfur, UNEP advises humanitarian agencies to particularly pay attention to projects that can

impact further desertification, deforestation and water scarcity – the key environmental concerns

for Sudan and Darfur, in particular (UNEP, 2016).

However, the effectiveness of these efforts across regions with different challenges remains of

concern. The humanitarian response plan while exhibits the awareness of the environmental

concerns, is mostly vague about specific approaches. Of the 10 clusters, 1-2 clusters include

environment-specific activities in their yearly plan, with the rest of clusters only mentioning in the

overall strategic description their intention to streamline environment. Moreover, a comprehensive

assessment of UNEP’s activities in 2005-2013 noted that as a self-assessment tool, the

environmental marker was “not very comprehensive or thorough” and lacking in monitoring of

compliance (Bennett, et al, 2013, 3). UNEP’s purely advisory role is reflected in its

“[encouragement] to eliminate or mitigate negative impacts as much as possible” (OCHA UNEP

2016). The lack of sanctions and the vague language on requirements threaten the effectiveness of

the current approaches. The UNEP assessment report concluded that in the years under review,

UNEP did not manage to achieve sizable results due to a lack of financial aid and human resources

(Bennett et al., 2013). This is troubling since UNEP is supposed to be the bridge linking

development, humanitarian, and peacekeeping in one united fight against climate change effects

in Sudan.

Ahead of the Paris climate talks in 2015, the government of Sudan submitted its Intended

nationally determined contributions (INDCs), demonstrating its willingness to set the country on

a more environmentally-aware and adaptive path. Under these commitments, Sudan intends to

raise forest area by 25 per cent by 2030. Since 2007, the country’s main climate change adaptive

measures have been conducted under the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). The

document remains of key importance as Sudan will work to achieve the Paris commitments. While

the government of Sudan has worked closely with the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) on NAPA and climate issues, UNEP did not develop strong partnerships with UNDP. If

UNEP is to ensure consistency across response actions in Sudan, it should partner with UNDP in

collaboration with the government.

Recommendations

· Provide UNEP with institutional capacity and ensure reliable and sufficient funding

UNEP will then be empowered to become the key agency in linking major actors from

peacekeeping, development and humanitarian fields on environmental issues.

· Continue to financially support joint long-term environmental programs

(akin to DFID’s “Adapt!” 10 million euro grant to UNEP)

· Include environmental objectives in all humanitarian cluster plans under each cycle of HRP

In particular, the cluster on coordination and common services, responsible for streamlining

environmental issues, should emphasize environmental work.

· Improve monitoring and evaluation of operations for environmental objectives

By sharing lessons learned, humanitarian partners will be better prepared for the challenges

surrounding capacity building.

· Provide incentives for humanitarian partners to be more proactive on environmental issues

Every call for proposals and grants should stress the importance of environmental guideline

streamlining, as well as mitigation and adaptation measures.

· Enable more local actors and communities to play an active role in environmental projects and

policy dialogue

Conclusion

After examining the effects of climate change and its relationship to conflict, findings show that

humanitarian involvement often overlooks environmental concerns in order to respond to the

conflict’s more pressing consequences, such as saving lives and providing relief as quickly as

possible. The case studies point towards a common theme, that climate change stress is just one of

the many contributing factors of conflict, which include history, weak governance, heavy

economic reliance on natural resources, mismanagement of natural resources, and other underlying

socioeconomic upheavals. Thus, predicting conflict depends on the degree of climate change’s

effects coupled with the total presence of the above factors. Incorporating a specific climate change

component in research and policy analysis of conflicts and humanitarian assistance can contribute

to more robust prevention and preparedness plans.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the link between climate change and conflict

is not an easy one to establish. The attempt to make the connection can lead to insightful findings

but it can also yield spurious results. How can we be sure that a natural disaster is indeed related

to climate change? How can we be certain that a conflict was made worse by climate factors and

was not only the outcome of weak governance and mismanagement of resources? Why do

countries in the same region have differing conflict prevalence? In order to answer all these

questions, humanitarian actors need to start thinking seriously about research design and

methodology. Collaboration with academic and research institutions becomes ever more important

in undertaking this task.

Further research could help establish the robustness -or lack thereof- of the climate-conflict nexus.

In this sense, comparative analysis of countries with similar climate patterns but different conflict

incidence rates, could help in explaining the role of climate change in unstable societies. Long-

term series and case-control studies, although more demanding and time-consuming, would be

ideal in assessing the weight and relevance by isolating different variables when predicting

conflict.

The case studies in this brief are only a small window into a very big and complex puzzle. They

show how current events point towards a climate-conflict nexus, but the results are not definitive.

The matter is, however, crucial for the effectiveness of the international humanitarian community.

Hopefully, a partnership between academia, international organizations, local governments, and

donors can successfully establish the need to conduct more research and engage more actors in

preventing further conflicts.

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