TALIBAN AS AN ELEMENT OF THE EVOLVING GEO-POLITICS: REALITIES, POTENTIAL AND

POSSIBILITIES

Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad), Quarterly Journal, Vol. XVIII, Number 2, 2000

The Evaluation Framework

Taliban, who had surprised the world with their sudden emergence as a force to reckon with in Afghanistan in September 1994, have by now completed over half a decade of their existence. Though during this period they had alternate spells of flashing successes and shocking military setbacks, yet their rise to the current state of power has been fairly systematic, in which varying phases of ups and downs are obviously natural.

During 1994, in their flashing victories, they captured Spin Boldak close to the Pakistani border (September), Kandahar (November), and Helmand and Zabul (December). The spate of their victories continued during 1995. They captured Ghazni- and also beat back a counter-attack by Hekmatyar ---- in January. They seized the provinces of Paktia and Paktika the same month. The towns of Maidan Sheher and Khost, the province of Logar and Hekmatyar’s headquarters at Charasyab fell to them in February. The Taliban even gained a marginal foothold in Kabul through an arrangement with the Shiite Hizb-i-Wahdat (March). At that juncture, however, they tasted their first military setback when the battle-hardened troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud thwarted their efforts to enter Kabul (in fact, they were later thrown out even from that marginal foothold in Kabul by Massoud’s forces). Finding the defences of Kabul too hard a nut to crack, the Taliban changed their operational strategy, which helped them capture Herat and Jalalabad in September. During this period, they also did try many a time to breach the defences of Kabul but failed.

September 1996 saw another surprising event when Taliban walked into Kabul at the heels of the retreating forces of Massoud facing almost no resistance (this event was no surprise for those who have studied Afghans and are familiar with the tendency of shifting loyalties of Afghan field commanders at a worthwhile price). After the capture of Kabul, the Taliban have surged northward a number of times, once going as far as the northern post of Hairatan. However, on at least two of such occasions they failed to retain the captured territory and were beaten back to the northern defences of Kabul with a fair amount of casualties. Their most recent offensive in the north and north-east came in July-August this year, yielding some gains. Nevertheless, Ahmad Shah Massoud remains a formidable foe.

The current situation, therefore, is that while the Taliban are in complete control of almost 90 per cent of Afghanistan including Kabul, their government has failed to gain diplomatic recognition from the international community with exception of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It has also not been able to get Afghanistan’s seat in the UN which still remains with the ousted Rabbani government.

The original US policy of positive acquiescence in the rise of Taliban took a visible change in 1997 with the appointment of Madeleine Albright as secretary of state and the induction of

her senior aides. During her visit to an Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan in November 1997 Albright openly criticised Taliban on various accounts. This was followed by a campaign in the US and the West, depicting Taliban as ‘medieval Islamic fundamentalist curds’ inflicting serious human rights repression specially against women; and that media campaign is still continuing. The anti-Taliban US thrust then went on to the extent of attacking Afghanistan with cruise missiles to pressurise Taliban into extraditing of Osama bin Laden. Subsequently the Americans also engineered imposition of UN sanctions against Afghanistan to press their demand(s).

A minor but important change from this ‘Taliban bashing’ was, however, clearly visible during the handling by Taliban of the late-1999 hijacking of the Indian airliner, when not only the UN agreed to send its representative to Kandahar to assist Taliban, but Taliban’s handling of that dicey and difficult situation was also appreciated by US, UN and most of the world powers.

It will thus be seen that many an aspect of the whole episode of Taliban’s rise to power, as also the reaction to it of US and its allies, still remains hidden in the mist created by lack of realistic appraisal. It was with the purpose of seeing through this mist that William Maley edited his book Fundamentalism Reborn?(1) in January 1998. The purpose of that book in his own words was to study certain aspects and to answer a number of questions, like, "Are the Taliban a transient phenomenon, or a permanent feature with which the international community will have to deal for years to come? Do they reflect intransigent ‘fundamentalism’, are they a recrudescence of tradition, amenable to reform by persuasion and example, or are they simply a manifestation of the totalitarian drive to subordinate the whole of private life to public control?… whether the Taliban represent the rebirth of fundamentalism?" besides examining "the prospects for postwar reconstruction in Afghanistan and the likely course of Afghanistan’s social and political future. …"(2) Many an aspect of the ground situation relevant to any analysis for answering such questions, has, however, undergone discernible changes in about two years (1998-1999). Some of these have been mentioned by Suzanne Goldenberg in her article, "Anti-US Sentiments Sustaining Taliban Despite Global Isolation" (December 1999). She says public opinion is rallying behind the Taliban stand on Bin Laden, and also, more importantly, there are signs of positive changes in some of the harder internal policy stances taken earlier by Taliban.(3)

The important task, therefore, remains to realistically endeavour to discern the part Taliban are likely to play in the evolving geo-politics, casting its influence which will not only be highly relevant to the regional countries but also to certain matters at the international level. For that purpose, this study presents a resume of the realities of the Taliban phenomenon, its potential and projected possibilities, based upon an analytical evaluation of nine factors. These are: the origination (of Taliban), their socio-psychological texture, the religious question, Taliban’s strengths and weaknesses, their achievements and failures, development of their political structure, the US factor, effect of time factor, and effects of UN sanctions. Having thus presented the actualities related to these factors, this study also presents a brief commentary upon the various misperceptions related to this subject which are being projected through the media and are adversely affecting the formulation of Afghan policy in various countries of the world.

The Origination

Much has been written about how the Taliban originated and came into being as a force to reckon with. On the whole, however, the answer(s) to this question provided by most authors and media personnel can generally be grouped into two theories: the ‘Islamic theory’,

basically highlighting the rise of Islamic fundamentalists; and the ‘US theory’, purporting a repeat of the behind-the-scenes US manoeuvre to assemble and utilise a mujahideen type armed force of Muslim fundamentalists to counter the emerging threats to US interests in Afghanistan.

According to the ‘Islamic theory’, the Taliban (students of ‘Deeni Madaris’ or Islamic seminaries, in southern Afghanistan) were first to come together as a force under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Mullah Omar was already a well-known and respected mujahid leader of the area, and had successfully fought against the Soviets, as well as the local bandits like Ismat Muslim. After the fall of the Najibullah regime, he had returned to his religious role as the head of a madrisa. However, as is well known, most of the mujahideen factions had gradually degenerated ---- during the period 1992-1994 ---- into groups of bandits, extorting forced taxes from the population and transiting vehicles, committing highway robberies and even excesses against women. That unleashing of savagery on the general public was highly disturbing for many including Mullah Omar. And what followed then is better explained by Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby. In their words, "… the chaos and lawlessness of the local warlords, bandits, and drug dealers disgusted him (Mullah Omar) and a number of like-minded mullahs and former mujahideen. Finally aroused by a particularly brutal highway robbery in July 1994 that involved an assault on women, Mullah Omar gathered a force of his taliban and former mujahideen to defeat and dispense summary justice to the miscreants. The effect of his action was electrifying to public opinion, and other local commanders rallied to these taliban. They captured the Afghan border town of Spin Boldak in October and Kandahar itself in November, having been invited by the residents".(4) This theory further goes to explain that as Mullah Omar and his taliban swept from victory to victory in different parts of Afghanistan, they were voluntarily joined by the taliban not only from Afghanistan but also from the same chain of deeni madaris located in the NWFP and Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Besides, their ranks were also voluntarily joined by a number of ex-mujahideen of different factions, and even many of the personnel of the former pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan. The avowed objectives of taliban for this armed struggle were to rid Afghanistan of the lawlessness and banditry and bring peace to the country as enshrined in the Islamic Sharia. As for the accumulation of weaponry by taliban, the theory suggests that many large dumps of weaponry, light and heavy, were voluntarily handed over to them by some of the ex-mujahideen commanders, and some were captured by them during the spate of their victories and disarming campaigns.

As for the "US theory, it is generally believed that the US factually masterminded the origination and employment of taliban for serving its own purposes in Afghanistan almost on the similar pattern which it employed in raising and employing the mujahideen to oust the Soviet influence in, and later the occupation of, Afghanistan. On its own part, however, the US officially denies this theory. But, then, that pattern of the US denial is remarkably the same as was its refutation of any links with mujahideen during the initial years (1970s) of their struggle.

This theory is, however, credibly sustained by Richard Mackenzie, Editor-in-Chief of Global News Service and a regular visitor to Afghanistan, who in his paper, "The United States and Taliban," has succinctly presented many a reality relating to behind-the-scenes US policy regarding Taliban. He points out that the US official stance of professed general ignorance, regarding the identity and origin of Taliban at the time of their emergence, "today appears ridiculous".(5) He also asserts that "long before the Taliban began the thrust towards Kabul, US officials had high aspirations" for them. They hoped the taliban would serve US purposes in Afghanistan, which included:(6)

a. Elimination of opium trade.

b. Serving as a bulwark against Russian and Iranian interests in Afghanistan.

c. Restoration of order in the country.

d. Elimination of terrorist training camps in the country.

e. Paving the way for the return of the former king, Zahir Shah.

f. Provision of an overland route to the Central Asian Republics (CARs).

g. (Most importantly and unrecognised at that time) facilitating construction of oil and gas pipelines for US oil companies (UNOCAL and Delta) connecting CARs to the international market through Pakistan rather than Iran.

Mackenzie further maintains that a change in US policy relating to Taliban became discernible shortly after Taliban’s capture of Kabul. He lists the following five factors as reasons for this change:(7)

a. Taliban’s incapability of rapidly extending their control over Afghanistan.

b. Taliban’s failure to eradicate cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan.

c. Taliban proved markedly less sensitive to US political interests than some in Washington had hoped.

d. Taliban’s treatment of women as publicised by the western media.

e. Appointment of Madeleine Albright and her team (early 1997), replacing the previous team.

It is, however, interesting that Mackenzie still emphasises that, "Notwithstanding such strong words, UNOCAL continues to show no hesitation in reaching out to the Taliban".(8)

Though on the face value both these theories appear to be mutually at variance, yet a thorough scrutiny of the facts clearly shows that there is a fair amount of truth in both.

Almost all researchers on this subject are unanimous on the fact that Mullah Omar, along with a small number of his taliban and other supporters, initiated the armed struggle against the local warlords to eliminate the widespread banditry and lawlessness which had reached unbearable proportions for the helpless Afghan masses. However, the (subsequently) quick swelling up of taliban’s ranks, their acquisition of huge quantities of weaponry (including even tanks, APCs, rockets, etc) and their technical and tactical training in the use and employment of that weaponry, are aspects which require realistic analysis. The explanation given in this regard by a number of authors, that a large number of local field commanders (of different Afghan factions) voluntarily handed over their huge dumps of weaponry to Taliban

and also joined the taliban along with their militias purely under the influence of the Islamic spirit accentuated by the taliban, does not stand the test of deeper scrutiny.

There is no denying the fact that both the US and the former Soviet Union had not only heavily supplied their respective Afghan allies with weaponry, but had also created huge dumps of weaponry for use by those allies after the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. The quantum of the weaponry thus supplied and dumped in Afghanistan ---- still in greased packages at places ---- can be gauged from the fact that the Soviet expenditure related to this aspect had risen from an initial $ 1.25 million during the period from 1956 to 1978, to a peak of $ 5 billion during one of the invasion years; and the US (and US-sponsored) aid which had commenced at a scale of $ 30 million per year (1980) had reached the peak of $ 1.3 billion (1989).(9) It is also well known that the US had ensured that none of the weaponry (except Stingers) supplied by it to the mujahideen in Afghanistan was of the US/Western origin. All that weaponry thus supplied was of eastern origin, purchased by CIA from different countries.

The point to note, however, is that the view that a large number of Afghan field commanders of different factions voluntarily handed over such weapon dumps to Taliban stands in stark contrast to the Afghan psyche. All of those scholars who had travelled in Afghanistan or researched on Afghan people during the last two centuries have clearly mentioned that Afghans are too possessive to part with their belongings, and that too their weapons. List of such scholars is very long; however, prominent amongst them are H. W. Bellew (he served in British Indian army’s contingent in Kabul in mid-19th century, researched and wrote extensively on Afghan people, and became a member of The Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, London, in 1891), Colonel G. B. Malleson of British Indian army, Lt. Gen. George Mac Munn of British Indian army, William F. Stone, and Louis Dupree.

As for the scholars who have written on the psyche of the Afghan people probably one of the most credible was the aforementioned H. W. Bellew who presented his well-recognised treatise on Afghan ethnography in 1891.(10) In another of his books he has discussed the behaviour of Afghan people in detail; and in that context, he has highlighted that the brave Afghans can fight savagely to safeguard their interests; but they can also violate any religious or ethical code if handled tactfully and paid a competitive price for promoting their personal or group interests.(11) This contention has not only been fully supported by a large number of scholars, but has also been thoroughly proved during the Afghanistan War 1978-1989. This particular aspect of the Afghan psyche clearly shows that the handing over of weaponry dumps and joining in of the field commanders along with their militias, at least in most cases, ought to be ascribed to the payment of its cost ---- mostly paid in US dollars during the CIA-sponsored war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

As for the US connection, the pattern of raising and employment of mujahideen for an armed struggle against the Soviet influence in, and occupation of, Afghanistan provides a very clear lead. For that purpose CIA had established its operational set-up in Pakistan for the first time in 1973. Some of the details of that operation were published by Lawrence Lifschultz in 1989.(12) That operation was initiated by the CIA to coerce Sardar Daud into submission, because he was clearly tilting towards the Soviet Union. Since Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI) was then in a nascent form, CIA helped in the formation of a special team headed by Maj. Gen. Naseerullah Babar assisted by Lt. Col. Kallu and Lt. Col. Abdul Hafeez. CIA operated successfully in conjunction with that team.(13) This arrangement subsequently developed to the well-known details of CIA’s war in Afghanistan (1978-1989) in conjunction with the (by then) expanded ISI. Keeping this background in view the fact should not be ignored that just prior to the emergence of Taliban, the same Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Naseerullah Babar ---- this time the interior minister but also the sole person in charge of Pakistan’s

Afghan policy ---- was again active in visiting Afghanistan and developing his contacts there. In fact soon after one of his visits to Afghanistan, the Taliban emerged as a force and commenced the course of their victories by first capturing Spin Boldak, which is close to Pakistan’s border town of Chaman.

If all these pieces of credible evidence are kept in view, the rapid swelling of Taliban’s ranks, acquisition of massive weaponry by them, and their military training, all find a logical explanation. In the final analysis, therefore, it is established that at least in its origination, the emergence of Taliban’s armed struggle in 1994 bears unmistakable similarity to the emergence of mujahideen’s armed struggle in the 1970s. In the 70s small group(s) of Afghans rose against the brutal repression widely unleashed by Daud, and they were quickly picked up, armed and trained by CIA for their employment in armed operations at a much larger scale, to safeguard US interests in Afghanistan. Then again, in 1994 a small group of taliban and its supporters under Mullah Omar again rose to fight against the widely unleashed brutal banditry in Afghanistan; they were also (from all angles of logical reasoning) quickly picked up to be developed into a large, well-equipped and trained force to eliminate lawlessness and bring peace in Afghanistan, and in the process serve US interests as enumerated by Richard Mackenzie (quoted earlier in this study). Incidentally, establishment of law and order in Afghanistan is also in the interest of all the regional countries; and opening of a trade route connecting CARs with the port of Karachi is obviously of high interest to Pakistan.

Socio-Psychological Texture

While analysing the socio-psychological texture of Taliban, with a view to discerning their likely role in the evolving geo-politics, a number of factors have to be considered.

First, Taliban have emerged as a well-defined country-wide entity at a time when Afghanistan was suffering not only from the absence of a really effective country-wide leadership, but also from the breakdown of its societal structure ---- which was rather systematically destroyed during the reigns of Daud, Taraki, Amin, Karamal, Najib, and the Soviet occupation army, as also by the subsequent infighting of the mujahideen factions.

According to the last available data, quoted from the record of Afghan government’s ministry of planning, by Leon B. Poullada,(14) the overall socio-ethnic stratification of Afghanistan was as follows:

a. The elite ---- including the royal family (about .02 per cent of the population): overwhelmingly Pushtun.

b. The intelligentsia ---- including senior government officials (about .09 per cent of the population): Predominantly Pushtun, but also a substantial number of Tajik.

c. Urban middle class ---- (about 18 per cent of the population): predominantly Tajik, but many Uzbek and Pushtun.

d. Lower class urban proletariat ---- (about 0.18 per cent of the population): mostly Tajik, but also a substantial number of Pushtun.

e. Lower class service personnel ---- (about 0.9 per cent of the population): mostly Pushtun and Tajik, but also a large number of Hazaras.

f. Rural class ---- (about 81 per cent of the population): out of these about 72 per cent were cultivators (mostly Pushtun; a large number of Hazaras, Uzbek and Turkmen, and about 8 per cent were nomads (almost all Pushtun, with a few Turkmen).

This data clearly shows that, even during the days of the royal family’s rule, the actual power rested with the tribal chiefs who among themselves commanded the vast (about 81 per cent) majority of the Afghans. Those tribles, according to their deeply entrenched traditions, were always ready to take up arms against any other tribe and even against the government at the call of their tribal chief. Besides, they generally preferred a status quo and rather indifference to the politics at Kabul as long as their core socio-economic interests were not threatened by the government policies. Neither the elite nor the intelligentsia, therefore, had any real ingress in the rural class, either for establishing a proper and centrally controlled system of governance or for introducing wide-ranging socio-cultural reforms.

However, the process of destruction of even that loosely knit social fabric commenced with the advent of Sardar Daud to power in 1973. Grant M. Farr says that Daud systematically crushed all those political parties or groups ---- specially Islamists ---- who did not match his thinking; killing, torturing and imprisoning a large number in the process.(15) That process continued till the fall of Daud in 1978. The pro-Soviet government of Nur Mohammad Taraki, which came to power after Daud in 1978, unleashed its own reign of terror, destroying its opponents in a way that assumed the proportions of massacres when Taraki introduced his reforms,(16) attempting to change almost all traditional socio-cultural aspects of Afghan life. It were these reforms that ignited the revolt. (Some of the details of these massacres have been quoted by Rossanne Klass).(17) Subsequently in a bloody tussle for power, Taraki was got killed by Amin, who took over the government but was himself killed when Soviet forces finally invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and installed Babrak Karmal as the new head of the government. The scale of destruction of Afghan people during the period of just two years can be gauged from the data provided by Mark Sliwinski who says that about 40,000 and about 80,000 Afghans died due to internal strife during the years 1978 and 1979 respectively.(18) That destruction of Afghan people and their societal structure was then continued by the Soviet occupation army which concentrated on the killing and ejection of Pushtuns, and on the destruction of Afghanistan’s agricultural potential. As a result the demographic pattern of Afghanistan was totally altered, reducing the original 39 per cent population of Pushtuns to 22 per cent, and raising the Tajik’s percentage to 34.(19)

When the pro-Soviet government of Najibullah finally fell to mujahideen, the Afghan masses expected a return of normalcy in their country; and Afghan refugees in Pakistan also began returning to their homes. However, the infighting of mujahideen groups did not take long to start, and soon most of these groups turned to open banditry.

It was in that scenario that Mullah Omar and his taliban took up arms to eliminate the bandits and bring peace to the country under the Islamic laws which are professed by the overwhelming majority of Afghans. The response of the Afghan people, deprived of peace, normalcy and personal security for over two decades, was quite naturally enthusiastic.

Second, as for the composition of Taliban, Suzanne Goldenberg describes it as "comprising ideologues, guerrilla commanders, tribal chieftains, free-booting warlords and even former

communists".(20) William Maley also has a somewhat similar view about the composition of Taliban.(21) The point to note, however, is that the predominant majority of Taliban is Pushtun; and out of those, the majority belongs to the teachers-cum-commanders and students of the Deobandi deeni madaris located in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This fact provides for the most important aspect of the ethno-religious unity in the vast majority of the group known as Taliban. The somewhat secular Pushtuns who have joined Taliban in large numbers also gravitate towards them at least due to ethnicity. The other elements, including former communists, being too small in proportion, have therefore negligible leverage for creating any internal dissension in the Taliban group.

Third, though as admitted by Abdul Hakim Mujahid, Taliban’s representative in New York, that there were conservatives and ultra-conservatives among Taliban,(22) it has been observed during the past half decade that even the ultra-conservative have on occasion, on the demand of a critical situation, tended to be rather moderate. Besides, as Abdul Hakim Mujahid has clarified, the Taliban "aim to run a durable, stable Islamic state that would not interfere with its neighbours",(23) this particular aspect of their policy is an important point to note while studying the psycho-social texture of Taliban.

Fourth, it is also important to note that the vast majority of Afghans, despite their much proclaimed adherence to Islamic Sharia, actually prefer to go by their traditional code of conduct (Pushtunwali) which in certain cases is at variance with the codes of Sharia,(24) especially when their individual, family, or tribal honour is at stake. It may, therefore, be fair to interpret that in the geo-political context, the Taliban government may be expected to reflect the Afghan dynamism by entering into dialogue on any matter, except for those which endanger their honour, national sovereignty, or any of the important codes of Pushtunwali like Melmestia (hospitality).

Fifth, despite their dynamism and certain points of strength in their textural context, at least for the present Taliban suffer from a major weakness, i.e. lack of manpower trained and experienced in various aspects of governance. For that purpose for the time being, therefore, Taliban will have to willy-nilly depend upon their small component of the former communist technocrats who have served in various capacities in the previous governments.

The Religious Question

Some years after the rise of Taliban, a media campaign was launched by the West depicting Taliban as a social terror. That campaign is still continuing, trying to convince the world that the Taliban are guilty of administering brutal justice and abusing the human rights, especially of women. For this purpose, the usual focus is on showing the bearded Taliban moving around with gun in their hand, and the Afghan women wearing burqa or clad in a chadari. To all those people who have no idea of the traditional life of the Afghans, photographs, etc, of such scenes are highly startling. They fear that Taliban are enforcing the medieval way of life on Afghan people. They usually term it the revival of medieval Islamic fundamentalism; and fear that it will not only be ‘exported’ to the regional countries, but its effects will also reach out to the pockets of the Muslim communities in the West and the region of the former Soviet Union. Actually, the point these people miss is the fact that carrying a weapon is a deeply entrenched traditional sign of honour for Afghan men, and wearing burqa or chadari by the Afghan women is a sign of honour for them. Besides, according to the same entrenched traditions, Afghan women feel more comfortable and honourable in participating in those spheres of social life which are exclusively assigned to women. These traditional values are still fully adhered to by more than 90 per cent of the Afghans. These facts relating to the Afghan women’s own sense of honour and dignity, in using burqa or chadari and remaining in

the exclusively women’s social sphere, have also been endorsed with detailed explanations by Nancy Hatch Dupree. wife of the eminent Western expert on Afghan affairs Louis Dupree who is herself a well-known scholar based in Peshawar.(25) In fact, if the video movies, etc, of the West ---- where the wave of liberalism has almost erased the dividing line between morality and obscenity ---- are shown to Afghan masses, they will be startled in the same way as the westerners are startled by the above referred media projections of the Taliban. The problem, therefore, is the lack of understanding of the deeply entrenched socio-cultural traditions of Afghans, and not of any ‘revival of Islam’.

The next point to understand in this regard relates to the question whether religious institutions facilitate mobilisation for organised protests as well as violence, or do they support status quo or quietism. Many scholars have attempted to answer this question. The literature on religion and conflict provides a more comprehensive discussion of how religious institutions facilitate mobilisation. However, in this context the findings of Johnston and Figa(26) and Sahliyeh(27) are quite informative. They have clarified the following seven points in this regard. First, and most simply, churches, mosques, and temples provide convenient places to meet. Second, it is often safer to organise within the context of religious institutions because such institutions are less likely to be targeted by the opposing group or government. In fact, religious institutions are often the only legal place for large groups to meet under oppressive regimes. Third, religious institutions often have access to the media which can be vital to any opposition movement, legal or illegal. Furthermore, the church media is often the only uncensored media under authoritarian regimes. Fourth, religious institutions can provide legitimacy to a movement. Fifth, religious institutions can provide a unifying effect, serving as a common ground or a bridge between groups that would otherwise be at odds. Sixth, religious institutions often provide social service at little or no cost. This strengthens the role of these organisations in the community, increasing their ability to mobilise the populace for political action. Finally, political social, and economic hardship often lead the clergy to assume the leadership of a political protest movement.

Besides, the literature on religion and violence, though varying in context, generally supports the theory that all religions have within them violent and revolutionary tendencies in addition to the quietist tendencies, the potential to be peaceful and support the status quo. In that context, various authors like Berryam(28) and Sprinzak(29) have also provided details about the violence supported by Catholicism and Judaism.

However, probably one of the best pieces of literature on this subject is a detailed research conducted by Jonathan Fox of Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University of Israel.(30) In addition to its research value, it is also important that it has been conducted in a university of Israel, the country which has itself emerged through a violent ethno-religious movement and is now facing a similar violent movement of its opposition. It is an empirical research, based upon the research data collected from 105 ethno-religious minorities. Following are two of its most important conclusions:(31)

a. The factors that do seem to motivate religious institutions to facilitate rebellion are secular. The first such factor is the presence of political discrimination. The second is the grievances over autonomy. When these grievances are high, religious institutions tend to facilitate mobilisation for rebellion.

b. "The conclusion that the decision taken by the leaders of religious institutions on whether or not to support ethno-religious mobilisation for rebellion is independent of religious

considerations but, rather, is based mostly on worldly factors, runs counter to the conventional wisdom. Unfortunately, it is beyond the ability of the data used here to determine why this is the case".

The aforementioned factualities of the rather overbearing influence of the deeply entrenched Afghan culture on the Afghan masses, as also the findings of the researchers and scholars regarding the actual cause(s) of the otherwise ‘religion-oriented’ looking armed uprising by the masses, clearly highlight the point that neither the origination nor the subsequent stance(s) of the Taliban have anything to do with religion. The overriding point of their agenda has always been the eradication of the then widespread banditry and to bring law and order to the country, with a view to facilitating its reconstruction. This aspect stands well-proven during the last over half decade of the overall conduct of the central leadership of Taliban. However, when they talk of the re-establishment of law they naturally mean the application of the codes of Islam which is the faith of almost all the Afghans. So using the words of the Israeli and other researchers, the real factor(s) responsible for the uprising and subsequent sustenance of Taliban is (are) secular or worldly rather than religious. And, even an allusion to linking the upsurge of the Taliban to any revival or resurgence of religion is certainly bound to lead any study of the Taliban to a completely wrong direction.

Taliban’s Strengths and Weaknesses

The potential strength of the Taliban government can be gauged from a number of factors. However, five of these are specially noteworthy. First, the geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always been a traditional arena for influence competition between the neighbouring countries or the extraregional powers. Details of that competition between Iran and Mughal India, between Russia and British India, and subsequently between Soviet Union and US are well known. That competition has always been the cause of major problems for the Afghan rulers. However, the same competition had also provided some bargaining leverage to the Afghan rulers; and some of them were also shrewd enough to draw whatever benefits they could from the competing powers. In the present scenario, however, this competition has become multi-faceted, in which most of the neighbouring countries and extraregional powers are now vying for the goodwill of Afghan government for the development of their intra-region economic activities (passage of pipelines, trade routes, etc) using the Afghan territory. This particular aspect provides strength to the Taliban government in regional and international diplomacy. Second, the predominance of Pushtuns in the Taliban ranks. As is well known, Pushtuns have always dominated as the ruling authority in Afghanistan. Their numerical and authoritative dominance in Afghanistan is so deeply entrenched that for the last over two and a half centuries only the Pushtuns have ruled over Afghanistan ---- with the brief interludes of about nine months of the Tajik Bacha-i-Saqao during the British colonial era and the recent brief Rabbani government ---- and this factor has gone into the psyche of the Afghan people. The predominance of Pushtuns among Taliban, therefore, provides an important aspect of psycho-traditional strength to the Taliban government. Third, unity of political authority. This was one of the weakest points of the mujahideen in their struggle against the then pro-Soviet governments in Afghanistan. It was of such high intensity that the disunity of the mujahideen had become proverbial and was the cause of most of their failures. Surprisingly, however, the same human material now grouped under the Taliban has displayed, and is sustaining, political unity of a high degree which has certainly helped the Taliban in becoming such an indomitable force. Fourth, unity of military command. This was again one of the major weaknesses of the mujahideen details and

consequences of which are well known. On their part, Taliban have done remarkably well in this respect also and their unity of military command has undoubtedly proven to be the battle winning factor in many cases. Fifth, the traditional Afghan dynamism and wisdom. This has repeatedly been displayed by the Taliban government. In that context, the handling of their problem with Iranians, and their tackling of Indian airliner’s hijacking are of particular significance. In the case of Iranians, the Taliban kept their cool in the face of mounting tension on the Iran-Afghan border in September 1998. The cause of this new heightened tension was the killing of nine Iranian diplomats following the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif to Taliban and the subsequent large-scale military deployment by Iran along the border. The Taliban helped defuse the situation by responding to the intervention of the ‘two plus six’ group (comprising US, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). About a year later (Nov. 21, 1999) the border was reopened for trade and now the Taliban are entering a phase of cordiality and are also likely to open trade with Iran. There wise handling of the airliner hijacking case is also well known. This track record clearly reflects Taliban’s capability in ultimately finding their feet in the regional and international diplomacy in a positive manner.

As regards their weaknesses, three factors merit consideration. First, the negative aspect of a ‘Revisit of the Great Game’. It is noteworthy that despite the aforementioned positive (economic related) competition of the regional countries and major powers in Afghanistan, the negative aspect of the vestiges of the ‘Great Game’ has not been totally removed from the Afghan scene. And this aspect has always been, and still is likely to be, the cause of a de facto division of, and internal strife in, Afghanistan. Second, the present state of the country. As is well known, at present Afghanistan is a completely war-ravaged country whose reconstruction will require a colossal sustained effort. Third, lack of trained manpower. As explained earlier, the Taliban government has a very small element of technocrats, administrators, etc, capable of working at the various tiers of government. This problem will continue as a drag on the government at least for some time.

These points of strength and weakness clearly show that while the present weaknesses of the Taliban government are daunting, their strengths are also immense ---- though at present in potential form in many cases. On the balance, therefore, the Taliban government is certainly capable of transforming Afghanistan into a stable and peaceful country. The time taken for that change may be even as short as a decade or so in case the Taliban government is given a helping hand ---- economic and technological assistance, non-interference in their affairs ---- by the world powers and regional countries. However, if some of the world powers choose otherwise, even then the intrinsic aspects of their strength and the geo-economic compulsions of the regional countries are bound to help the Taliban government in turning Afghanistan into a stable country and a venue of regional economic activity, though it may take a bit longer in materialising.

Taliban’s Achievements and Failures

While listing the achievements and failures of Taliban Suzanne Goldenberg paints a rather dim picture. She says: "The list of Taliban’s achievements since seizing Kabul is brief: restoring electricity for 36 hours out of 84, re-tarring a few roads, putting away Kalashnikovs that were seen once everywhere in Kabul. It does not include feeding the people of Afghanistan, or rebuilding the parts of the city where only the shells of the buildings remain".(32) She further laments over the problems faced by the UN aid agencies in carrying out their work in Afghanistan. Incidentally, this is the picture of Taliban’s achievements and failures which is mostly projected through the Western media. However, the people of the West, being thousands of miles away from the ground realities of Afghanistan, generally

under-rate the most important achievement of the Taliban which in fact holds the key to bringing stability and peace in the country, i.e. (in the words of Suzanne Goldenberg) "putting away the Kalashnikovs that were once seen everywhere in Kabul". In fact disarming of the members of all factions and completely establishing law and order in about 90 per cent of Afghanistan under Taliban’s control was the one singular requirement without which return of normalcy to the country was just not conceivable. And, this was not an ordinary achievement in any case (in the case of Pakistan, which suffered only from an outflow of Kalashnikovs from Afghanistan, this still remains a serious problem). On the balance, therefore, Taliban may be credited with the laying down of the foundation of peace and stability in their country; which will certainly facilitate further reconstruction and development measures with the passage of time.

Development of Political Structure

Any movement of some major consequence ---- like attainment of independence, or overthrow of the existing ruler(s) to establish a new government ---- launched by a people has to have a number of essential ingredients in its matrix. Three of those are especially important, viz the cause, readiness of the people to sacrifice for the attainment of that cause, and the leadership which enjoys complete confidence of the people in directing and controlling the movement. Since these three elements of the movement are its real force providers during the initial phase when ‘spate force’ of the movement is at premium, other aspects like political structure, etc, of the movement generally attract lesser attention of the leaders and the people. However, after the fulfilment of the cause, the movement has to go through a number of transformation measures. The cause has to be replaced with well-defined national objectives, covering the vast spectrum of the internal and external national policy spheres (social uplift including education, administration of justice, economy, industrial development, trade and commerce, diplomacy, etc). And, obviously, all such national objectives have to be defined keeping in view the socio-cultural make-up of the people and their national aspirations, as also the ground geo-economic and geo-political realities affecting the country. The readiness of the people to sacrifice for the attainment of the cause has to be carefully moulded into their readiness to work for and bear the hardship for the attainment of these national objectives ---- which being multifarious as compared to the singular cause may not have that much unanimous consent of all segments of the people. The role of the leadership will remain the same; however, it has to broaden its composition base so as to enhance participation of various segments of society. A fourth, and highly important aspect, i.e. a comprehensive political structure for governance and administration, has to be added at this stage. For that purpose the central leadership has to develop, organise, and control properly selected political cadres covering all the tiers of governance from the higher to the lowest levels.

When the Taliban launched their movement they had all the three aforementioned essential ingredients. They have now entered the transformation phase. However, a cursory glance shows that their speed of transformation is quite slow.

In terms of their national objective(s) they still lay emphasis on ridding the country of lawlessness, gun culture, drug trade, etc. They have also initiated some policy measures for commencing market-economy type trade with neighbouring and other countries and organisations (Iran, Pakistan, UNOCAL, etc). In the field of education, they have taken initial measures to re-establish educational institutions both for boys and girls, albeit with the provision of opening separate institutions for girls and that too on the return of normalcy to the country. In the field of diplomacy also they have taken some initiatives, like sending their representatives to European countries, etc, to highlight the reality of their moderation (rather than fundamentalism) in their external relationing. As for the response of the people to these

slowly emerging national objectives or policies brought forth by the Taliban government, it should not be forgotten that traditionally the rural Afghans ---- about 80 per cent of the population ---- do not interfere with Kabul government policies as long as their own interests are not threatened. And it is obvious that the national policies so far enunciated by the Taliban are more likely to be supported even by the rural Afghans because measures like establishment of law and order and opening of trade and commerce will be beneficial to them also. As for the urban Afghans, obviously they are most likely to support such policies.

There is no doubt that so far the Taliban have demonstrated their capability of constituting and retaining a strong central leadership; rather, in the words of Ralph H. Magnus, "In contrast to what had become the usual pattern of Afghan leadership during the jihad, the Taliban instituted a truly collective leadership, although Mullah (now Mawlana) Omar is the head of the council".(33) However, their process of establishing their political structure downwards to grass-roots level is certainly slow; and that is the reason for the occasional acts of violence and indiscipline, including punishment to women, by certain sections of the Taliban rank and file.(34) This is certainly the aspect which merits greater attention of, and speeding up by, the Taliban.

The US Factor

For understanding the US factor relating to Taliban, a reference to the previous Afghan policies of British India and US is of significance. It may suffice to mention that both British India and US had adopted such Afghan policies which barred the way of social and industrial development and modernisation of Afghanistan. Intriguingly, these policies were adopted by both these powers despite the fact that for most part of its past, especially from 1933 to 1953, Afghanistan government was consistently conservative and pro-West, as also after the Second World War its choice of needed counsel and aid was US. These facts have been endorsed among others by Sir Lt. Gen. Mac Munn,(35) and Rossanne Klass.(36)

Looking from the hindsight, the probable reason for such Afghan policies was the British desire to keep Afghanistan as a desolate buffer (without much modern infrastructure) between British India and Russia; and the much quoted fear psychosis of that segment of US policymakers who do not wish an ‘Islamic Afghanistan’ to develop and modernise. The important point which such US policymakers missed, however, was the fact that by adopting that policy they pushed the otherwise pro-West "creative minority" of Afghans into an anti-West stance. This particular fact was testified ---- in an indirect manner ---- by former US president Nixon while expressing his views on why many countries tilted away from the West and became pro-Soviet. In that context Nixon has mentioned that former French president Mitterrand (himself a stern anti-Soviet) had emphasised upon him that the left-wing movements in the Third World were not at the outset explicitly communist or creation of the Soviet Union, rather they adopted Marxist philosophy or aligned themselves with Moscow because the West opposed them.(37) It was probably under the influence of the same fear psychosis that when US perforce had to raise and operate the mujahideen to evict Soviet influence from Afghanistan, it had designed the whole scheme in a manner that after the eviction of the Soviet influence the ‘Islamic’ mujahideen should also not be able to establish their own government in Afghanistan. This was mentioned as a US national interest by the then US ambassador in Kabul in a classified message to the then US secretary of state, who, in a subsequent classified massage reminded the ambassador that he should not mention such sensitive matters even in classified messages. Incidentally these two classified messages were amongst those which were captured from the US embassy in Tehran during the 1979 revolution and published in book form under the title Isnadlanah Jasoosi.(38)

Coming to the present scenario, the most probable reason for the US re-intervention in Afghanistan was the Moscow-Delhi-Kabul-Tehran nexus which had not only developed but was also strengthening with the passage of time under the Rabbani government. It is obvious that while the US could afford to accommodate Indian influence in Kabul ---- which was not much in any case ---- Washington was certainly not prepared to allow the re-entry of Moscow’s influence without hard bargaining, and was least prepared to accept any entry of the Iranian influence in Kabul. This fact provides credence to the scholars who believe that the US factually masterminded the organisation and employment of Taliban to destroy and evict that nexus from Afghanistan, on the same pattern in which it raised and operated the mujahideen earlier. In that context, the details of the possible US purposes have been amply clarified by Richard Mackenzie (covered in this study under the subheading ‘The Origination’). The important aspect, however, is the apparent change in US policy relating to Taliban. Mackenzie has also provided his thoughts on this point (also covered earlier in this paper). However, the most important point which appears to have played the key role in changing the previously friendly US policy into a quasi-hostile policy, is the fact that unlike the mujahideen who fell to disarray and infighting and failed to establish their own government, the Taliban have consistently shown their ability to remain united and have already established their de facto government in Afghanistan. This aspect appears to have emerged contrary to the original US plan; and they now see the establishment of an ‘Islamist government’ in Afghanistan becoming reality. And, most probably it is under the influence of the same fear psychosis that the US wants to remedy this unexpected development by invoking the inner weakness in the Taliban government. For that purpose the US had even bombarded Afghanistan as a coercive measure to pressurise Taliban to extradite Osama bin Laden, who is a declared guest of Afghans and whose handing over to the Americans will be a direct contravention of melmestia (the deeply entrenched Afghan tradition). It is obvious that if the Taliban make the mistake of handing over Osama bin Laden to US, their power base in the Afghan masses will immediately start crumbling. And, therefore, as Suzanne Goldenberg puts it, "It is also a political impossibility for the Taliban".(39) As a further measure to break the will of the Taliban government, the US has also engineered UN sanctions against Kabul. However, all these measures are only proving counter-productive, as reported by Suzanne Goldenberg: "As public opinion rallies behind the Taliban stand on Bin Laden, others are sceptical of Washington’s charge that Bin Laden is the mastermind to an Islamic terrorist network that extends around the globe. But even more important, few Afghans believe there can be any gain in giving in to the US demands. They argue Washington’s insistence that the regime hand over Bin Laden is a pretext to strike at the source of the movement’s strength: militant Islam. For Afghans, whose rare moments of unity come mainly in the face of a foreign enemy, that is unacceptable."(40)

Effect of Time Factor

While studying the effect of the time factor on the Taliban phenomenon, a reference to the two similar case studies ---- of Israel and Iran ---- is of relevance.

In the case of Israel, the ethno-religious movement of the Israelites was so violent ---- up to the creation of their country, and even for a number of years afterwards ---- that the unleashing of extreme brutalities by the Israelites upon their opponents is still proverbial. Some cooling off of their violence started becoming discernible since the mid-1970s, under certain moderating compulsions. However, due to the post-Cold War peculiarities of regional and international geo-political compulsions the pace of moderation in Israeli policies relating to the Arabs has become comparatively faster; and a stage has now reached where a vast segment of Israelis themselves is pressurising their government to further moderate its Arab policies.

In the case of Iran, the hardline Iranian policies commenced at the pitch of declaring US the ‘biggest satan’ and the avowed Iranian national objective of ‘exporting’ its revolution to other countries. Details of the operation of summary courts and dispensation of death sentences through summary trials ---- at times as short as of one day’s duration ---- are also well known. However, the world has also witnessed that the post-Cold War geo-political compulsions have influenced Iran at the same comparatively faster pace as they had affected Israel. And, during the span of just over one and a half decades, the political structure of Iran is now completely dominated by the moderates after the recent elections, as also the Iran-European relationing is well on the track of mutual accommodation and interaction.

However, while acknowledging the moderating effects of time under the influence of the current geo-political environment, the fact should not be missed that this moderating effect is more related to those aspects of originally hard-line national policies which do not materially contradict the deeply ingrained psyche of the people ---- because any attempt to mould the psyche of the people obviously requires gradual efforts, taking care that no sudden change is attempted to be induced; any forcible attempt for change will certainly result in retaliation and will be counter-productive. That is the reason that while undergoing moderation, the ingrained psycho-traditional textures of the Israelis and Iranians still remain the same, and have to be taken into consideration as such while dealing with them in any political, diplomatic matter, etc.

The same pattern of the effect of time applies to the Taliban. However, it should also be noted in their case that they have eradicated the widespread violence, curbed rampant lawlessness and established peace in the country, as acknowledged by their friends and foes alike. The Western media blames them for imposing such harsh policies like public execution of killers, imposing purda on women and banning their education, and failing to eradicate poppy cultivation in the country. The point to understand in this context, however, is that all these aspects ---- public execution of the killers, barring women from education, and poppy cultivation ---- are part of their centuries old traditions and, most importantly, these are in complete contradiction to the codes of Islamic Sharia. But, then, the extremely traditional Afghan masses are too deeply attached to these traditions; to force them to part with these under the sudden promulgation of any reform ---- even if based upon the codes of Islamic Sharia ---- and all such attempts (whether in the name of modernisation, or else) are going to only result in revolt and anarchy. The failure of such attempts made by King Amanullah in 1929, Daud in 1973, PDPA government in 1978, and the Soviets after 1979, are unambiguous examples. The only possible way to detach the Afghan masses from these traditional traits is to first introduce widespread economic and educational activities, and then gradually make them see the light of reason in their conduct. This latter objective (after the initiation of economic and educational activities) can be achieved by gradually preparing the Afghan masses to completely prefer the Islamic Sharia over Pushtunwali. To highlight the difference between these two codes of conduct, three example would suffice. Under Pushtunwali it is mandatory to kill the killer, but Islamic Sharia also provides for a way of even pardoning a killer if the aggrieved party so agrees, with or without a compensation. Islamic Sharia not only emphasises the education of women but also encourages their full participation in the social fields suitable to them. And, Islamic Sharia completely bans production and use of all sorts of narcotics.

Effects of UN Sanctions

The explicit key American objective in the UN sanctions it engineered against Taliban government is extradition of Osama bin Laden to US, because Washington claims that he is the mastermind of a vast international terrorist network active against US interests, although it

has so far failed to produce any evidence to make this point even somewhat convincing to the world at large.

The US hesitation in not going all out against Taliban government has an overriding reason. It is obvious that with the background of its support and involvement in the emergence and strengthening of Taliban, the US government can hardly afford to lose this countrywide potential governance mechanism which has already proven that it is capable of bringing peace and stability to the country. The key importance of Taliban for the US is also because of the reality that at present there are only three major players in Afghanistan, i.e. the Taliban, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Abdur Rashid Dostum; the so-called modernised Afghan elite had already lost whatever minimal role it had till the early 1970s in the Afghan body-politic ---- though this faction, now mostly scattered in the West, has better access to the Western media for projecting its own version contrary to the ground realities in Afghanistan. It is obvious due to the reasons mentioned earlier in this study that the Taliban remain the only choice for the US as the bargaining party in Afghanistan.

This US design has a basic flaw, i.e. of dangerously fiddling with one of the strongest aspects of the Afghan psyche. The US policymakers who have chosen to put the Afghans ‘in a corner’ by bombarding their country and by getting the UN sanctions clamped on their government, have missed the well-known fact that the will of an Afghan can neither be destroyed nor be subjugated even under the greatest of pressures including widespread destruction and massacres. This lesson was learnt by as great kings and powers as Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, the British colonial empire, and the Soviet super-power.

Another point to note in this context is that the UN sanctions against Taliban government basically include freezing of the overseas accounts of Afghan regime and blocking Ariana international flights. As for freezing the bank accounts, it is worth noting that for the past over two decades at least, none of the so-called governments in Afghanistan was ever in a position to operate its internal and external economy in an organised manner; hence the question of any substantial overseas accounts of Afghan governments (whose freezing could have any meaningful effect) does not factually arise.

And, as far as Ariana flights are concerned, these were not a major source of Afghan economy in any case. The perception that the Afghan drug smugglers were using Ariana flights is also completely at variance with the ground realities. So, stopping of Ariana flights will have no effect either on drug trafficking or on the smuggling of goods through Afghanistan. Smuggling of Russian-made and other goods is still likely to continue along so many of the routes through the porous borders.

It is for these reasons that UN sanctions can hardly be expected to serve either the aforementioned explicit or implicit US objectives.

Misperceptions in Media

This study has already highlighted most of the misperceptions against the Taliban projected by the Western and other media. However, for the purpose of clarity, an enumeration of the general media misperceptions ---- given in italics, followed by brief commentary ---- is presented in the succeeding paragraphs.

Afghan women face a horrifying array of restrictions, among the most repressive in the world. These restrictions factually refer to the use of burqa or chadari by Afghan women and their segregation from men in education and other fields of social life. As already mentioned in this

study, use of burqa or chadari is a mark of honour, rather than any restriction for over 90 per cent of Afghan women. This fact is fully known to those who know Afghan society; and that is why Suzanne Goldenberg has also highlighted that Taliban’s instructions to use chadari or burqa will cause no problem to 95 per cent of the Afghan women because it is already their own way of life.(41) Besides, use of chadari or burqa is certainly not an alien custom to even the remaining 5 per cent of Afghan women. The principle of segregation of sexes in educational institutions is also the part of the centuries old culture of Afghan society. And, in any case within the bonds of this norm even the rural Afghan woman have also been and are still fully participating in the social fields which are more suitable for women.

Afghanistan is the world’s leading producer of opium. Money from the drug trade finances the Taliban, helping to ensure their control over the country. Drug money has also enabled the Taliban to gain influence in Pakistan and other neighbouring countries, buying off local officials who might otherwise police the border. The best answer to this misperception and allegation has been provided by Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil himself. He said: "The larger issue is lack of industry, and a devastated infrastructure as well as a depleted irrigation system. There is no real economy except for agriculture and related sectors. How can we abruptly ask the people to stop cultivating poppy without offering them any alternatives? The UN does not want to help us in offering alternatives in a country badly affected by 20 years of civil war. And, most importantly, it is not the Taliban who have introduced poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Farmers here have been growing poppy for centuries. How can we root out centuries old practice overnight? Let me make it clear: this problem cannot be resolved through allegations. Neither can it be resolved in isolation. Those who want to help us eradicate poppy cultivation are welcome to extend financial support but the strategy should not be complicated and it must have the right incentives. Simply asking farmers to stop cultivating poppy is neither possible nor feasible from a humanitarian point of view. Gradually, however, we can tackle the problem. We have already announced a cut in the area under poppy cultivation by one-third as a first step".(42)

Afghanistan has become a major centre for smuggling, particularly of arms. It is a known fact that one of the important sources of Afghan economy has always been their earning of tariff on the transit trade (legal or illegal) conducted by the neighbouring countries through Afghanistan. This centuries old practice dates back to the operative days of the Silk Route during the medieval times. It is obvious that a war-ravaged Afghanistan can hardly afford to change this practice outrightly. It can only be done if the developed and rich countries come forward to introduce micro- and macro-economic activities in Afghanistan to help the Afghans in generating healthy economic pursuits rather than smuggling.

The Evaluation

The foregoing presentation of the facts related to the Taliban phenomenon, its realities, potential and possibilities answers all the questions raised by William Maley in the first chapter of his book Fundamentalism Reborn? In that, these facts bring to fore that the Taliban are neither a transient phenomenon, nor they reflect intransigent fundamentalism, recrudescence of tradition, any manifestation of totalitarian drive to subordinate the whole of private life to public control, or the rebirth of fundamentalism; and that, the Taliban are amenable to reform through gradual synthesis in an environment of economic development, rather than through sudden changes attempted under force or pressure, as well as they have the potential of reconstructing Afghanistan.

The basic factor which initiated the emergence of a small group of taliban under Mullah Omar was secular (using the words of the Israeli researchers), which aimed at ridding their country

of the widespread lawlessness and banditry in the name of Islam or in the name of governance, and at bringing peace and development to the Afghans. This factor still remains the basic agenda of Taliban.

The pattern of sudden strengthening, organisation and arming of the Taliban’s ranks was remarkably the same as that of the mujahideen who initially took up arms against the widespread repression by the then Daud government, but were picked up, organised and strengthened by the US for evicting the Soviet forces and influences from Afghanistan. However, there is one point of major subsequent difference. As per the captured US classified documents published in Tehran in 1979, it was an integral part of the US design that the mujahideen could not form their own government after the eviction of the Soviets. In contrast, the Taliban not only succeeded in attaining their aforementioned objective by evicting different factions that were busy terrorising the people, and, in the process, also serving the (actual) major US interest ---- eviction of the Moscow-Kabul-Tehran nexus under the Rabbani/Massoud government in Kabul, and eviction of the pro-Iranian warlord controlling western Afghanistan ---- but unlike the mujahideen, even after the capture of Kabul (September 1996) the Taliban showed no signs at all of any internal disunity or disarray. In fact, unity of their political and military command kept getting stronger day by day. Besides, their success in bringing peace and order to the territory under their control attracted volunteers from other factions including even the former communists. All these factors clearly showed the grass-roots support and organisational competence of Taliban that enabled them to establish a durable government in the country.

It was at this juncture that the US Taliban policy underwent a visible change in 1997, applying various modes of coercion including bombardment and sanctions to pressurise Taliban into political subordination, if not subjugation; albeit, also ensuring at the same time not to completely lose them. And now there is a lobby especially comprising the Afghans settled in the West which is presenting serious misperceptions about the Taliban, persuading the US policymakers to adopt a completely anti-Taliban policy and even going to the extent of suggesting that the US support the Massoud/Dostum factions. However, the US policymakers are likely to realise sooner or later that any attempt to destabilise, weaken, or destroy the Taliban will only result in bringing back the anarchy and the same foreign influences which have been evicted by Taliban; and, why should the US lose an already established government in control of about 90 per cent of the country which is clearly ready to work with Americans for mutual economic and strategic interests?

Having come thus far in attaining the control of, and establishing the writ of order in, about 90 per cent of the country as the first essential for laying the foundation of a durable government, the Taliban certainly reflect strong potential for playing a positive geo-political role for securing their mutual benefits with the regional countries and world powers. Factually, the core interest of all these countries is the establishment of peace and stability in Afghanistan under a durable government, so that the Afghan territory may be used for trade routes and economic investment; as also, that Afghan territory may not be used for spread of influences detrimental to the interests of other countries. To that effect, the conduct of the Taliban government during the last over half a decade has clearly shown a number of positive signs.

First, it is for the first time after the reign of Ahmed Shah Abdali in the 18th century that the Taliban government has succeeded in establishing the ‘participatory political unity’ in Afghanistan, rather than the spells of coercive consolidation which always had the fires of rebellion against the central authority kindling in different parts of the country.

Second, under the present circumstances, Taliban are the only entity in Afghanistan who are rather keen not to be partisan but to work for mutual economic and other benefits with any regional or extraregional country.

Third, during the current period and at least in the foreseeable future, Taliban are the only entity which is acceptable for governance to the majority of Afghans, not only due to the traditional Pushtun predominance but also because of their proven deed of bringing peace which the Afghan masses were so desperately yearning for.

Fourth, Taliban have been consistently showing their amenability to moderation in internal policies relating to handling of public and private life. Their promises and efforts to accept the Western and UN demands regarding poppy cultivation and women’s education are examples to that effect ---- though, obviously they have to go slow in these directions because these are in contravention to the deeply entrenched Afghan traditions.

Fifth, in external relations too, Taliban have shown balanced and mature vision and behaviour. Their unexpected cool when, in September 1998, Iran reacting to the killing of nine of its diplomats made large-scale military deployments along the border, their subsequent deal with Iran for mutual trade, their tactful handling of the Indian airliner hijacking case, their ongoing talks with Iran and certain European countries for developing better relations, and their recent success in obtaining financial assistance from Japan for construction and logistics in Afghanistan, etc, are unmistakable pointers to that effect.

In the ultimate analysis, therefore, it becomes evident that during the current and projected time frame, the Taliban government is the only entity which holds the promise of bringing stability to Afghanistan and commencing its reconstruction, and in the process also serving many of the economic and other interests of regional and extraregional countries. So far Taliban appear to be fairly set on the course of actualising that promise. The speed of that development will, however, depend largely upon the readiness of the regional countries and world powers in participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, conducting their trade through Afghan routes and initiating other micro- and macro-economic activities in that country.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

William Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1998, (Hereinafter cited as Fundamentalism Reborn?).

Ibid., p.3.

Suzanne Goldenberg, "Anti-US Sentiments Sustaining Taliban Despite Global Isolation", Khaleej Times, Dubai, 5 December 1999, reprinted in monthly Press Review Panorama, January 2000, ISPR, Rawalpindi, pp.11-14 (Hereinafter cited as Goldenberg, "Anti-US Sentiments").

Ralph H Magnus, and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, Mujahid, Harper Collins Publishers, India, 1998, p.181 (Hereinafter cited as Magnus, Mullah, Marx, Mujahid).

Richard Mackenzie, "The United States and The Taliban", in Fundamentalism Reborn? op.cit., p.95.

Ibid., p.96.

Ibid., pp.100-101.

Ibid., p.102.

Barnett R Rubin, The Search For Peace in Afghanistan, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, pp.22, 29, 30, 63 and 100.

H. W. Bellew, Surgeon-General, Bengal Army (Retd), An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan, 1891, reprinted by Indus Publications, Karachi, 1977.

H. W Bellew, Afghanistan: The Country and People, Sh. Mubarak Ali, Lohari Gate, Lahore, 1978, pp.27-28, 44-45.

Lawrence Lifschultz, ‘The CIA-ISI Connection’, Newsline, Karachi, November 1989, p.51.

Interview of Lt Col (Retd) Abdul Hafeez in July 1994.

Leon B Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1929, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1973, pp.15-18.

Grant M Farr, & John G Merriam, (eds.) Afghan Resistance: the Politics of Survival, Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, 1988, p.52.

Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan, Allied Publishers (Pvt) Ltd., New Delhi, 1981, pp.19-22.

Rossanne Klass, (ed.), Afghanistan: the Great Game Revisited, Freedom House, New York 1987, p.387,, (Hereinafter cited as Klass, Great Game).

Marek Sliwinski, "Afghanistan the Decimation of A People", Orbis, Winter 1989, p.463 (Hereinafter cited as Sliwinski Decimation of A People).

Ibid., pp.464, 467.

Goldenberg, Anti-US Sentiments, op.cit, p.13.

Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn? op.cit, p.15.

‘The Taliban’s Strategy for Recognition’, The Economist, 6 February 1999. (Hereinafter cited as Taliban’s Strategy, The Economist, 6 February 1999).

Ibid.

Magnus, Mullah, Marx, Mujahid, op.cit, p.78.

N. H. Dupree, "Afghan Women Under the Taliban", in Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn? op.cit. pp.152, 160 and 163.

H. Johnston, and Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives on Mobilization Against Authoritarian Regimes’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 27(1), 1988, pp.32-47.

E. Sahliyeh, (ed.), Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990, pp.11-14.

P. Berrymen, Liberation Theology, Philadelphia: Temple University, 1987.

E. Sprinzak, "Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel", in Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics and Militance, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1991, pp.462-490.

Jonathan Fox, "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence or the Status Quo?", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 2, April-June 1999, pp.119-139.

Ibid., pp.133-134.

Goldenberg, "Anti-US Sentiments …", op.cit., p.14.

Magnus, Mullah, Marx, Mujahid, op.cit., p.182.

N. H. Dupree, "Afghan Women Under the Taliban", in Fundamentalism Reborn? op.cit., pp.157-158.

George Mac Munn, Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah, Nisa Traders, Quetta, 1978, pp.304-306.

Klass, Great Game, op.cit. pp.40-43.

Richard Nixon, In The Arena, Services Book Club, 1992, p.383.

USA’s Classified Documents, Isnadlanah Jasoosi, Tehran, Vol. 30, n.d. pp.24-25, 40.

Goldenberg, "Anti-US Sentiments …", op.cit., p.13.

Ibid., p.14.

Ibid., p.12. Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, "Western allegations against US are politically motivated’, Friday Times, Lahore, January 7-13, 2000, p.3.