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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350
For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
Tactical Commander’s HandbookInformation Operations
Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF)
MAY 2005
FOREWORD
This handbook provides the tactical operator, commander, and battle staff with information onplanning, executing, assessing, and sustaining information operations (IO). The handbook isbased on observations collected in Iraq during July and August 2004 by an IO collection andanalysis team (CAAT). The application of this tool is both for training and real-world events theSoldier may encounter in the Iraqi area of operations.
Because Soldiers are primarily warfighters, this handbook emphasizes those concepts key tooperational planning for conflict. It provides a basis for Soldiers to understand the relevance ofinformation operations and a planning framework for the implementation of informationoperations.
The language and organization of information operation concepts continue to evolve and thedebate continues at the highest levels. This handbook is a collection of observations, issues,lessons, and best practices from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and provides Soldiers awarfighter’s orientation to information operations. It is for use in training as Soldiers prepare fordeployment and operations in Iraq.
LAWRENCE H. SAULCOL, FADirector, Center for Army Lessons Learned
INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Organizing and Executing for Information Operations (IO) 7
Appendix A: Glossary A-1
Appendix B: Military Decision-Making Process Aid B-1
Appendix C: Information Operations Intelligence Preparation of the BattlefieldCenter of Gravity Aid
C-1
Appendix D: Information Operations Battle Damage Assessment Aid D-1
Appendix E: Information Operations Training Considerations E-1
Appendix F: Information Operations Targeting and Effects Aid F-1
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
Director Colonel Lawrence H. Saul
Managing Editor Lon Seglie
Project Analyst Robert J. Meier
Editors, Layout, and Design Jenny Solon
Valerie Tystad
Cover Design and Graphics Mark Osterholm
Labels and Distribution Carrie Harrod
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has collaboratedwith the Department of the Army (DAMO-ODI), Washington Army National Guard InformationOperations Group (WA ARNG IO GP), U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool (USAJFKSWCS), United States Military Academy (USMA), Command and GeneralStaff College (CGSC), Vermont Army National Guard Information Operations TrainingBattalion (VT ARNG IO TNG BN), U.S. Army Field Artillery School, U.S. Army CombinedArms Doctrine Directorate (CAAD), and Combined Arms Center Information OperationsProponent (CAC G7) to prepare and publish this handbook. The collaboration efforts includedcollection of information operations observations; issues; lessons; and tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP) in the Iraqi area of operations in order to help save U.S. and coalition livesthrough efficient and effective application of information operations across the range of militaryoperations.
This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the GlobalWar on Terrorism and should not be necessarily construed as approved Armypolicy or doctrine.
This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defensepurposes only; that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of securityprotection as such information is afforded by the United States; that it is not to berevealed to another country or international organization without the writtenconsent of the Center for Army Lessons Learned.
If your unit has identified lessons learned or tactics, techniques, and procedures, please sharethem with the rest of the Army by contacting CALL:
Telephone: DSN 552-3035 or 2255; Commercial (913) 684-3035 or 2255Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial (913) 684-4387E-mail Address: [email protected] Site: http://call.army.mil
When contacting us, please include your phone number and complete address.
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We solicit your feedback to make this a more useful tool for Soldiers. Please use our ArmyKnowledge Online (AKO) collaboration Web site:
1. Sign into AKO.
2. Enter this URL into the address line and click "go."https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal.do?$p=515
3. You will be taken to the IO TTP Collaboration site.
4. Click on the "Send Feedback" link, approximately ¼ of the way down the page, slightly leftof center; this will open a separate "Send Feedback" window.
5. You will see a drop down menu that lists "Help Desk." Select "Page Creator." Click"Continue" and follow the directions to submit feedback to the IO proponent.
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
Chapter 1
Introduction
A. Operational Environment (OE)B. What does IO do for me?C. Doctrine and this handbookD. What is Information Operations (IO)?E. What IO is notF. IO in the Iraqi Area of Operations (AO)
“IO, however, provides a company commander an opportunity to take control of his sector,earning the respect of local officials and citizens.”
Infantry Company Commander, Operation Iraqi Freedom
“IO is not everything, but everything we do has an IO effect.”
A. Operational Environment (OE). The Iraqi operational environment (IOE) is characterizedby numerous contradictions in the manner U.S. Army units have been configured, resourced, andtrained. The U.S. Army is without peer in today’s world and is configured, resourced, andtrained to execute combat and related operations in a sequential, fluid environment, as ablydemonstrated by V Corps in the major combat operations (MCO) phase of operation IraqiFreedom OIF. See Figure 1-1 below:
Figure 1-1
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The IOE, however, is quite different from the OE for which Army units were configured,resourced, and trained. While combat operations are a part of everyday life for the Soldier inIraq, the primary mission is to set the conditions, by means of stability and reconstructionoperations (S&RO), for an Iraqi government and a populace that is not hostile to the U.S. Notonly are these operations different, but they are executed in a much different and complexenvironment. Units in the IOE operate from fixed bases and conduct numerous operationssimultaneously. See Figure 1-2 for post-MCO (PMOC) situation:
Figure 1-2
IO is relevant to Soldiers because commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have found theproper synchronization of information to be the main effort in making up the difference betweenhow we are configured (conventional Army) and how we operate (what we’re doing) in thisS&RO environment.
B. What does IO do for me? Everything the U.S. Army plans and executes is for the purposeof achieving an effect or effects. Whether it is closing with and destroying an enemy or relatingto the local populace, Army units operate to achieve effects. IO assists the commander to shapehis environment by achieving effects, both lethal and non-lethal. He achieves effects through thecoordination and synchronization of the use of information among all unit activities. OIF hasdemonstrated that units are more likely to achieve desired effects when information is properlycoordinated and synchronized.
Example: A unit commander approved an operation that included a deception componentto the plan. The deception component required the enemy to have functionalcommunications for three days or for the duration of the deception, so the enemy could
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“intercept” coalition communications that allegedly indicated operational intent. Thecommunications nodes, however, were scheduled for destruction by lethal fires in thenext 24 hours which would render the deception plan ineffective. The IO working group(IOWG) synchronized the need for the use of deceptive information in the deceptionplan, and the destruction of the enemy’s communications was delayed until the deceptionplan no longer had need for them. The deception plan was effective, and Soldiers' liveswere saved as a result.
Example: A unit commander’s intent is to cause the maximum number of enemy tosurrender as possible. The staff coordinates and synchronizes the use of informationusing all available assets and arrives at this objective. See Figure 1-3:
Figure 1-3
C. Doctrine and this handbook. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures, (Nov 2003), defines information operations as “the employmentof the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychologicaloperations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influencedecision-making."
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Because an underlying theme in most observations concerning IO is the lack of published IOtactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the tactical level, this handbook is configured withinformation and TTP that have been found to work, whether or not they are published.
Many officers involved in planning IO are not trained in IO. They typically are civil affairs(CA) psychological operations (PSYOP), field artillery (FA), or assistant S3 (AS3) officers whohave been detailed to the task. While FM 3-13 offers an excellent tutorial on planning IO, it doesnot effectively show TTP for specific IO tasks. This requires IO officers and noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) who may or may not be experts in the disparate elements of IO to somehowglean these TTP from data mining the Internet, discussions with peers, or their imaginations.The purpose of this handbook is to provide TTP-level information for the commander and staff,along with suggested planning and synchronizing products.
The use of “IO speak” in this handbook has been minimized because the focus of the handbookis the brigade and battalion commanders and staffs, not the trained IO officer.
D. What is IO?
For commanders, IO:
• Is a tool to influence the use of information to meet your intent in every operation
• Is a horizontal staff synchronization process through all elements of combat power andconducted within the construct of the military decision-making process (MDMP)
• Aligns the use of information by all the unit’s existent functions and operations andfocuses on the commander’s intent
• Is both lethal and non-lethal, directed under the S3/G3/C3, and vertically integratedwith higher and lower plans and with coalition and host nation (HN) IO efforts
• Synchronizes effects
See Figure 1-4 shows a range of agencies that are normally involved in a successfully integratedIO. At G staff level, these are often assigned special staff officers; at brigade and battalion levels,these are additional duties for designated staff officers.
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Figure 1-4
In other words, IO coordinates and synchronizes the use of information within all elements ofcombat power across the spectrum of command and staff activities to achieve effects. See Figure1-5:
Figure 1-5
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FM 3.0 states that commanders combine the elements of combat power - maneuver, firepower,leadership, protection, and information - to meet constantly changing requirements and defeatan enemy. Commanders do this by synchronizing the elements of friendly force combat power tocreate overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place. Massed effects created bysynchronizing the elements of combat power (all five elements use information) are the surestmeans of limiting friendly casualties and swiftly ending a campaign or operation. IO assists you,as the commander, to mass the effects of actions and messages in the information environmentto accomplish the mission.
E. What IO is not. IO:
• Is not magic, rocket science, or nuclear fusion
• Does not compete with the MDMP and is not an independent planning activity, nor dostaff elements fall under it
• Does not have command and control (C2) of other staff elements (staff elementscontinue to work for their current boss while synchronizing the use of informationthrough IO to support the commander’s intent)
• Is not a separate independent staff element, another C3/G3/S3, or just another staffproduct
• Does not develop separate IO themes and messages; public affairs [PA] and PSYOPare the doctrinal staff elements that transmit themes and messages).
• Is not only non-lethal
• Is not another battlefield operating system (BOS)
F. IO in the Iraqi AO. Brigades and battalions plan and execute information operations (IO)continuously in the Iraqi AO. IO had been considered primarily strategic or operational in natureand was, therefore, planned only at the highest levels, theater, corps, and some divisions. This isno longer the case; brigade and below are on the front lines of IO planning and execution.Tactical commanders realize that success (mission accomplishment) often equates to effectiveemployment of IO within their AO. IO must be tailored to local circumstances, area leaders, andthe local populace. IO is nested with the overall theater-level IO plan.
While there are no easy solutions for complex IO situations, this handbook provides a sample"way ahead" for the commander and staff. It provides a somewhat detailed discussion of IO atthe unit level. It leverages current and emerging doctrine, discusses principles and fundamentalsrelated to IO, and provides a framework for the unit commander and staff to use when planning,executing, evaluating, and sustaining IO.
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Chapter 2
Organizing and Executing for Information Operations (IO)
A: Considerations for Brigade and Battalion Staffs
B. Importance of the Iraqi Culture
C. Brigade IO Staff Tasks
D. Battalion IO Staff Tasks
E. Coordination
F. Integrating and Deconflicting
G. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
“You have to know what is important in the daily life of the average Iraqi - security, services,
and jobs."
A: Considerations for Brigade and Battalion Staffs
1. Command Emphasis. Successful IO relies on command emphasis to achieve itsintegrating and synchronizing effects. Successful brigade and battalion IO includes amember of the command group providing oversight of the IO process. In previousrotations, this oversight has been provided by either the executive officer (XO) oroperations officer (S3). Ultimately a command group link to the commander has resultedin successful IO; units without a command group link or command emphasis have beensignificantly less successful.
2. The critical organic staff positions at the brigade and battalion level are the IOcoordinator (IOCOORD), public affairs officer (PAO), IO plans officer, operationssecurity (OPSEC) officer, electronic warfare officer (EWO), chaplain, and civil militaryoperations officer (S5). Psychological operations (PSYOP) support is provided by thesupporting PSYOP tactical PSYOP detachment (TBD) (brigade) or tactical PSYOP team(TPT) (battalion). Other essential staff participants are reflected in Figure 2-1.
3. There are normally insufficient staff resources at the tactical level to dedicate entirelyto the execution of IO. To address this need, commanders have assigned additionalduties to some staff officers and detailed others to support their IO program. Below is asynthesis of how previous commanders have addressed the staffing requirements. Anoutline of the staff members’ duties is listed below.
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Figure 2-1
B. Importance of the Iraqi Culture
1. The importance of culture in determining the effects of IO cannot beunderestimated. IO effects such as deny, degrade, influence, and disrupt C2 or the flowof information can be difficult to measure; however, the means to achieve the effect ismore apparent. It requires some understanding of basic human behavior and the cultureyou are dealing with, as well as the efforts of an adversary to counter your efforts.Culture is defined as:
• The gate through which all people receive, process, and act on information.
• Learned and shared attitudes, values, and ways of behaving in a society.
• Customs, folkways, manners, mannerisms, etiquette, behaviors, body language,gestures, celebrations, milestones, dress, outlooks, perceptions, and thought patterns.
• History, art, myths, legends, and heroes.
• Language, world view, beliefs, behavior, attitudes and values, religion, technology,law, politics, education, history, social organization.
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VIGNETTE:
During a movement along a main supply route (MSR), a convoy of five U.S. militaryvehicles moved through a sparsely populated area and observed a bus driving in theopposite lane strike a young goat herder. The commander stopped the convoy anddispatched two of his combat medics to render immediate first aid; the commander, localtribal leader, and the boy’s uncle decided to evacuate the boy for required urgent medicalcare.
The young boy was rushed into the emergency room with a broken leg and internaldamage. The two natives asked the commander why such an important man as himselfwould take the time to help a goat herder, a boy with very little value. He answered “Iam a guest in your country and if this had of happened to someone in my family then Iwould have wanted someone to help them.” This concept seemed strange to them, that anAmerican would spend his time on a boy from his tribe, whom he did not know nor towhom he was related. The boy was treated and released to the commander and family,with a follow-on appointment the following Saturday. The commander provided themwith a ride back to their family.
The following Saturday morning the U.S. military completed the follow-up appointmentand delivered some clothes, sporting equipment, and miscellaneous supplies to thefive-family compound. Women and teenage girls greeted the returning child and U.S.Soldiers. This is very unusual and showed that the village leaders had a measure of trustin the Soldiers. This was a direct effect of the incident with the boy.
The command wanted to insure they leveraged (as a non-lethal effect) the goodwilldeveloped as a result of the humanitarian aid. The deputy commander wanted to insurethat a follow-up hasty village assessment was conducted and that subsequent CA/civilmilitary operation (CMO) projects (e.g. water well, school repair, and medical clinic)were planned and conducted. The humanitarian aid incident and the subsequentCA/CMO efforts directly supported several information operations and effects basedtargeting objectives (e.g., facilitate national government).
This incident fully illustrates how integration of a non-lethal effect (CMO) within effectsbased operations (EBO) both supports and enhances the IO campaign plan and assists thecommander to achieve his desired combat objectives. There are second and third ordereffects of the humanitarian aid and subsequent CMO actions. As a non-kinetic effect,some percentage of the commander’s relative combat power was preserved because thesingle event provided a stabilizing catalyst, thus minimizing security requirements alongthe MSR.
2. Comparison of U.S. and Iraqi cultures. The following table is a very generalizedsummary of key differences between U.S. and Iraqi culture.
U.S. Basic Values Iraqi Basic Values
Doing Being
Change and action Stability and harmony with discussion
Individualism/independence/self-reliance Belongingness, interdependence, relianceupon others
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Example: “Mission first, people always” Example: Relationships come first,business is secondary follows
U.S. Interaction Norms Iraqi Interaction Norms
Competition individual Group competition cooperation
Verbal directness Verbal and non-verbal
Impersonal Personal
Example: Winning is everything. Timeis money
Example: Maintaining status The processis as important as the end product. “Let’sdrink tea.”
U.S. Social Structure Iraqi Social Structure
Individualistic Collective
Nuclear family Extended family
Achieved status Ascribed status
Example: “I did it my way.” “Self-mademillionaire.”
Example: An individual’s value isdetermined by their family heritage, tribe,etc.
U.S. Psychological Orientation Iraqi Psychological Orientation
Psychology of abundance Psychology of scarcity
Need for achievement Need for affiliation
Weak uncertainty avoidance Strong uncertainty avoidance social order
Guilt (internal) Shame (external)
Examples: Abundance. “The world is myoyster.”
Guilt. Comes from within; does not relyon external judgments.
Examples: Scarcity. Life is a zero sumgame. Anything my neighbor gets issomething I cannot have.
Shame. Depends on getting caught.Derived from others perceptions of you.
Culture, Communication and Conflict, Dr. Gary Weaver, pp. 75-76
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3. Iraqi cultural environment characteristics.
"History, Geography, and Culture are the surest predictors of the future.
Robert Kaplan
Iraq as a sovereign nation is a 1920s creation of the Western powers. The concept ofIraqi nationality and loyalty to the Iraqi state is not strongly rooted among many of theinhabitants of Iraq. The people of Iraq are made up of a number of different religious andethnic groups. The three main groups in order of size are Arab Sh’ia Muslims, ArabSunni Muslims, and Kurds. Smaller groups include Turkomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans,Yezidis, and Druze. Most Iraqis view their identity as first the family tribe or clan theybelong to and then Shi’a, Arab Sunni, Kurd or whichever of the above groups they wereborn into. Feelings of loyalty to the Iraqi state generally are strongest among ArabSunnis. The generalizations below may be useful, but tactical leaders must understandsuch generalizations are not accurate for all individuals and group. Successful tacticalleaders must understand the cultural operating environment of their particular AO andtailor their IO to suit the people.
• History:
º What is now Iraq was:
� One of the birth places of human civilization.
� Home to the Sumerians, Bablyonians, and Assyrians before the time ofChrist.
� The center of Islamic civilization from 680 AD-1258 AD. During thistime Islamic civilization was the most advanced civilization in theworld, far in advance of the West.
� The birthplace of Shi’a Islam as a separate sect of Islam. Iraqi Shi’asview their history as one of near continuous oppression at the hands ofthe Sunnis.
� Not considered a nation until 1920 and was ruled as three distinctprovinces: Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.
º Between 1921 and 2003, Arab Sunnis held most of the political power in Iraq.
� Many Iraqi Arab Sunnis view their post 1920 history as struggle toassert the Iraqi state’s independence from Western control and regaintheir ancient position as leader of the Arab world.
� Many Iraqis, who are not Arab Sunnis, view their modern history as astory of discrimination and often persecution at the hands of ArabSunnis.
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º Many Sh’ia and some Kurds feel that the U.S. encouraged them to rebel againstSaddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf War and then withheld expected support,which they believe permitted Hussein to slaughter them.
º Saddam Hussein's regime was one of the most brutal dictatorships of the postWorld War II era. Iraqis were frequently executed for statements and actionsviewed as critical of the regime.
• Geography: The varied geography of Iraq contributes to various styles of living andwork activities among the people of the different regions.
º North is mountainous
º West and southwest are largely barren desert
º Southeast is a marshy river delta
º Central corridor is a plain divided by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers andnumerous canals.
º Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world and has more waterresources than most countries in the Middle East.
• Culture: Each sect have separate and distinct cultures with some points ofcommonality:
• Ethnic Groups:
º Arab Sh’ia Muslims
º Arab Sunni Muslims
º Kurds
º Turkomans
º Assyrians
º Chaldeans
º Yezidis
º Druze
• Religion: Plays a preeminent or at least very important role in the identities andbehavior of each of these groups.
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• Characteristics:
Family:
� All the cultures of Iraq place a high emphasis on the importance of thefamily and extended family. Many Iraqis value the reputation andwell-being of their family above personal achievement. Some groupsalso have strong clan and tribal loyalties.
� Within families and extended families, older members exercise strongauthority over younger members and males over females.
• Social:
º Personal relationships are valued over impartial adherence to a set of principlesand are the basis of cooperation. Rarely can effective business take place if apersonal relationship has not been established
º Most groups are very conservative about social interaction between unrelatedmales and females.
º Honor and shame are the strongest factors shaping behavior. Affronts to honormust be avenged.
º Many Muslims reject ideas about rules for society and the structure ofgovernment if these rules originate from non-Muslims.
º Many Iraqis agree with the Arab proverb that “1000 years of tyranny is betterthan one day of anarchy” and are willing to tolerate a repressive governmentthat ensures order.
º Many Iraqis do not consider themselves to have rights or responsibilities to thegovernment or state. If they are well connected (having wasta in Iraqi terms),they will exploit the power, influence, and wealth of the state. If they are weakor not well-connected, they fear government and expect it to exploit or terrorizethem.
º One common expectation among most Iraqis is that government will maintainlaw and order, though most Iraqis expect the state to do this without theirindividual participation
º Many Iraqi groups feel that personal and group possession of weapons is theonly sure guarantee against aggression by rival groups (other tribes, Shia vs.Sunni, Arab vs. Kurd etc.).
º Iraqis tend to follow news of political events very closely. Rumors and“conspiracy theories” often receive much attention and carry great weight inthe minds of many Iraqis.
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Figure 2-1
4. Tactical leaders’ critical cultural knowledge. These are cultural questions everytactical leader should ask themselves. If they do not know the answer, they should seekassistance in getting the answer.
• What is your local area of operations (AO)? What is your area of interest (AI)?
• What is the local peoples’ basic world view? Their world view is shaped by theirlearning and experience in the following areas:
º Religion
º Language
º Beliefs
º Education
º Law
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º Social Organization
º Government
• Answers to the following questions can help create a better understanding of the worldview of the people in your area of responsibility (AOR):
º What things are the people in your local area willing to die for? Being awareof what people are will to die for will give you insight into what there arewilling to fight for. If the mission is to foster positive relations, this insight willallow you to distance your Soldiers from areas sensitive to flare ups, i.e., thelocals are willing to die for family honor, do not do things that will bringdishonor to the family.
º What is the basic social structure of the of your local AO? Is the prime unit thefamily, clan, tribe, neighborhood, village, political party, religiouscongregation, or a combination of these? Understanding the social structurewill allow you to identify the local power brokers.
º Who holds the social, political, economic, and religious leadership in your localarea? Do they have an armed following? If yes, what are the size, training,equipment, and loyalty of this following?
º Who are the “protectors” (armed citizens, clan or religious militia, police, andarmy) for the basic social unit (family, clan, tribe)?
º What is the religious affiliation of the local people in your area? To whatextent are the local people in your area influenced by religion in daily life?What are the dynamics and structure of the local religious leadership?
º Do the people in your local area have loyalties, dependencies, or connections(family, clan, tribe, ethnic group, religious sect) that cross outside theboundaries of your AO?
º Are there cultural, religious, or ethnic fracture lines in your local area? Whatare the points of friction between the groups?
º How do people earn their living in your local area?
º What is the primary legal industry (agriculture, manufacturing, etc.) and what,if any, illegal activities provide significant income (smuggling, drugtrafficking, robbery/banditry, black marketeering, etc.). Which of the illegalactivities are considered socially acceptable, tolerable, or are habituallyoverlooked by law enforcement?
º What percent of the people are unemployed? What percent do not have basicnecessities: drinkable water, food, shelter, clothing, food? Is unemployment asignificant problem? If so, do people have difficulty acquiring basicnecessities: water, food, shelter, clothing?
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º How, when, and where do the people buy and sell or acquire goods andservices, especially essentials such as food, water, fuel, medicines and medicalcare, clothes, seed, livestock, building materials, vehicles, vehicles repairs?
º What are the patterns of influence and corruption? What services requirepayment of bribes, and who receives the payments?
º What are the points of social etiquette, customs, and mores that can eitherenhance or harm your acceptability and effectiveness with the people of yourlocal area?
º How do the people of your local area get their information or news? Whichsources have credibility among the local people? How do rumors andconspiracy theories start and spread among the people? What is your feedbackloop to know what the people are really thinking and saying?
º What is the most credible source of news/information for the people? Do localelites value a different source?
C. Brigade IO Staff Tasks
1. Information operations coordinator (IOCOORD)
• Advises the commander on IO effects in the context of planned lethal, and non-lethalactivities in support of tactical operations. Focuses on the status of friendly, neutral,and adversary IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.
• Ensures IO effects are integrated into operations planning and the resulting operationsorder (OPORD).
• Ensures that IO actions (performed by assigned or augmenting IO assets) arecoordinated, integrated, and synchronized with the brigade plan/order and that divisionreceives IO feedback.
• Obtains and processes relevant information and intelligence to achieve IO situationalawareness (SA). Provides IO SA information input to the common operational picture.
• Ensures the IO element performs required staff coordination for IO support fromhigher headquarters (HQ) and to subordinate units.
• Provides assessments of IO situation and capabilities to support the ongoing militarydecision-making process (MDMP).
2. IO plans officer
• Integrates IO into the MDMP in support of higher command’s IO program.
• Produces OPORD/fragmentary order (FRAGO) and other planning material to supportthe synchronization of IO across the brigade.
• During wargaming, represents the action, counteraction, and reaction of friendly,neutral, and hostile forces
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• Ensures that both offensive and defensive IO tasks are included in planning.
3. PAO
• Conducts media analysis within the brigade AOR.
• Supports media inquiries and visits.
• Adapts higher talking points to the command’s AOR. Plans and integrates PAOactivities with the rest of the IO team.
• Conducts local media engagement.
4. Operations security (OPSEC) officer
• Conducts periodic OPSEC awareness training in units within the command.
• Develops and posts OPSEC awareness products.
• Conducts periodic OPSEC assessments and conducts remedial training to addressdeficiencies.
• Integrates OPSEC posture with IO to protect friendly vulnerabilities.
5. Electronic warfare officer (EWO)
• Plans and supervises execution of electronic operations and equipment.
• Collects, evaluates, and prepares reports on threat capabilities.
• Coordinates activities to ensure EW equipment is updated, maintained, and available.
• Monitors division for updates to countermeasures to protect friendly operations.
• Ensures friendly use of EW does not conflict with friendly operation of theelectro-magnetic spectrum.
6. S5
• Coordinates CMO projects with IOCOORD, PAO, military police (MP), and engineer(ENG).
• Tracks CMO conducted by brigade and battalions.
• Develops and tracks measures of effectiveness (MOE).
• Reports project status and MOE indicators to division.
7. Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) officer. (The S6 is thestaff officer for all C4 matters.) IO-related responsibilities include:
• Provides a representative to the IO cell.
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• Provides IO instructions in the C4 operations annex.
• Directs the actions of subordinate net operations.
8. Net operations (NETOPS) officer. (The NETOPS officer integrates missioninformation applications with information system [INFOSYS] and communications andcomputer operations of the warfighting information network.) The NETOPS componentsare:
• Network management. Provides commanders with the ability to review and managetheir networks to support ongoing IO and to adjust or reallocate network capabilities.
• Information dissemination management. Capability to provide a managed flow ofrelevant information based on the command’s missions.
• Information assurance (IA). Includes issuing plans, orders, and policies thatminimize the vulnerabilities of information, INFOSYS, and networks consistent withthe defense-in-depth concept. Its goal is to protect and defend INFOSYS and networksagainst exploitation, degradation, and denial of services.
9. Chaplain. In the Iraqi operating environment, chaplains are key members of theIOWG. They have education, skills, and experience to improve U.S. effectiveness inoperating in the Iraqi cultural environment and in conducting perception managementoperations. Major subordinate command (MSC) staff officers all stated that the MSCassistant chaplain was their most valuable advisor on issues of how to dealcross-culturally with Iraqis. The chaplain brought much more than simply the culturalperspective to the IOWG; the chaplain brought the interrelated cultural-religiousperspective, which is a broader, more dynamic view of the Iraqi populace than simplyhistorical-cultural information. This perspective speaks to the “who, what, when, where,and why” as it pertains to the ethical framework of the Iraqis and the stark contrasts ofthe Iraqi culture with our Western culture. The effect on the IOWGs was dramatic. TheIOWG members used this perspective-changing information in the development of IOrelated actions (all IOWG members) and themes and messages (PAO and PSYOP).
The world view of many Iraqis is shaped and animated by Islam, and many chaplainshave extensive insight into Islam through training in world religions. Others, as a resultof their biblical studies and, sometimes, travel, have extensive knowledge of MiddleEastern history, geography, and cultural customs.
Chaplains often aid the “atmospherics” in dealing with Iraqis. Some Iraqis oppose U.S.operations because they represent American culture. To these Iraqis, American culture,based on what they have seen in American movies and television, is godless andimmoral. By accompanying leaders on meetings with Iraqis, chaplains help dispel thisview.
• Chaplains are valuable in the planning and implementation of information operationsperception management efforts and should be employed as advisors for cross-culturalcommunication.
• Chaplains can be invaluable members of the IOWG by providing the members with thedrastically different cultural-religious perspective of the populace, among whom ourSoldiers must relate and operate.
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D. Battalion IO Staff Tasks
1. IOCOORD
• Advises the commander on IO effects in the context of planned lethal and non-lethalactivities in support of tactical operations. Focuses on the status of friendly, neutral,and adversary IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.
• Ensures IO effects are integrated into operations planning and the resulting OPORD.
• Ensures IO actions (performed by assigned or augmenting IO assets) are coordinated,integrated, and synchronized with the brigade plan/order and that brigade receives IOfeedback.
• Obtains and processes relevant information and intelligence to produce IO SA.Provides IO SA information input to the common operational picture.
• Ensures the IO element performs required staff coordination for IO support fromhigher HQ.
• Provides assessments of IO situation and capabilities to support the ongoing MDMP.
2. IO plans officer
• Integrates the capabilities and vulnerabilities of IO into the MDMP in support of thedivision IO program.
• Produces OPORD/FRAGO and other planning material to support the synchronizationof IO across the battalion.
• During wargaming, represents the action, counteraction, and reaction of friendly,neutral, and hostile forces.
• Ensures both offensive and defensive IO tasks are included in plans.
3. PAO
• Conducts media analysis within the battalion AOR.
• Supports media inquiries and visits.
• Plans and integrates PAO activities with the rest of the IO team. Adapts division andbrigade talking points to the command’s AOR.
• Conducts local media engagement.
4. OPSEC officer
• Conducts periodic OPSEC awareness training in units within the command.
• Develops and posts OPSEC awareness products.
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• Conducts periodic OPSEC assessments and conducts remedial training to addressdeficiencies.
• Integrates OPSEC posture with IO to protect friendly vulnerabilities.
5. EWO
• Plans and supervises execution of electronic operations and equipment.
• Collects, evaluates, and prepares reports on threat capabilities.
• Coordinates activities to ensure EW equipment is updated, maintained, and available.
• Monitors brigade for updates to countermeasures to protect friendly operations.
• Ensures that friendly use of EW does not conflict with friendly operation of theelectro-magnetic spectrum.
6. S5
• Develops CMO projects in coordination with the IOCOORD.
• Develops MOE for CMO projects.
• Tracks CMO projects and MOE and keeps the brigade S5 informed.
• Plans and executes local contracting and purchasing in accordance with (IAW)battalion needs.
• Provides MOE feedback to the IOCOORD.
• Supports the IO intent in preferential selection of contacts and purchases.
7. Chaplain. In the Iraqi operating environment, chaplains are key members of theIOWG. They have education, skills, and experience to improve U.S. effectiveness inoperating in the Iraqi cultural environment and in conducting perception managementoperations. Major subordinate command (MSC) staff officers all stated that the MSCassistant chaplain was their most valuable advisor on issues of how to dealcross-culturally with Iraqis. The chaplain brought much more than simply the culturalperspective to the IOWG; the chaplain brought the interrelated cultural-religiousperspective, which is a broader, more dynamic view of the Iraqi populace than simplyhistorical-cultural information. This perspective speaks to the “who, what, when, where,and why” as it pertains to the ethical framework of the Iraqis and the stark contrasts ofthe Iraqi culture with our Western culture. The effect on the IOWGs was dramatic. TheIOWG members used this perspective-changing information in the development of IOrelated actions (all IOWG members) and themes and messages (PAO and PSYOP).
The world view of many Iraqis is shaped and animated by Islam, and many chaplainshave extensive insight into Islam through training in world religions. Others, as a resultof their biblical studies and, sometimes, travel, have extensive knowledge of MiddleEastern history, geography, and cultural customs.
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Chaplains often aid the “atmospherics” in dealing with Iraqis. Some Iraqis oppose U.S.operations because they represent American culture. To these Iraqis, American culture,based on what they have seen in American movies and television, is godless andimmoral. By accompanying leaders on meetings with Iraqis, chaplains help dispel thisview.
• Chaplains are valuable in the planning and implementation of information operationsperception management efforts and should be employed as advisors for cross-culturalcommunication.
• Chaplains can be invaluable members of the IOWG by providing the members with thedrastically different cultural-religious perspective of the populace, among whom ourSoldiers must relate and operate.
E. Coordination
1. Strength of IO and the IO Team. When connected and employed effectively, thestrength of the entire IO effort will be strengthened and effective.
• Commander provides direction, emphasis, interest, focus, and his intent.
• XO or S3 functions as the command group link.
• IOCOORD takes the lead for the IO staff.
• IO augmentation supports the IOCOORD and provides the experience and expertise toguide and support IO throughout the process.
• Unit staff sections (EW, S6/CNO, PSYOP, military deception [MILDEC], OPSEC,PA, S5/CA/CMO, physical destruction, information assurance, physical security, S2,counterdeception, counterpropaganda, and others) officers/elements operate withintheir functional lanes to integrate and synchronize IO throughout the operationsprocess.
2. Organizational Staff Relationships with the IO Process
• S1
º Can establish a population count of local villages/towns and identify changes inpopulation numbers and demographics (age, sex, main occupations, number offighting age males) on a monthly basis.
º Can track locals interested in translation support and their availability.
• S2
º Monitors enemy forces communications: ultra high frequency (UHF), veryhigh frequency (VHF), cell phone systems, commercial, couriers, signalingmirrors, etc.
º Looks at the civilian populace communications: cell phone systems, hard linephones, radio, TV (satellite and antennae), and newspapers.
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º Monitors the international media (satellite TV, radio, and print) for pro- oranti-coalition effects.
º Should track and report enemy propaganda events: night-letters, recruitingefforts, posters, and graffiti. Be aware of movement of enemypropaganda/recruiting teams within or through the AOR. What is the EWcapability and availability, and what will be its effect?
º Should look at developing a green/amber/red/white format for reporting locallevels of cooperation (white is unknown at present).
• IOCOORD
º Plans, coordinates, and supervises OPSEC and MILDEC.
º Integrates PSYOP into IO and planning and considers product dissemination.
º Identifies and disseminates subjects for command information to task force(TF) Soldiers.
º Tracks PSYOP/IO product dissemination (who, where, when, how many,which product, local national [LN] reaction).
º Identifies potential messages specific to AOR and coordinates with the tacticalhuman intelligence team (THT).
º Tracks themes, objectives, and messages emphasized by higher headquarters.
º Emplaces and tracks bulletin boards and coordinates with Iraqi security forces(ISF)/Iraqi police (IP) as well as THT for local national (LN) reaction.
º Requests products from higher PSYOP.
º Recommends mission-specific products for higher production.
º Tracks messages being broadcast by friendly Peace radio.
º Identifies and tracks enemy propaganda efforts with the S2.
(Note: Related activity support to the IOCOORD would be combat camera (COMCAM)to identify opportunities, request support, and attach COMCAM Soldiers to subordinateunits based upon mission and COMCAM troops available. PAO would coordinate formedia imbeds (journalists), identify to higher PAO potential success stories, and collectall available print media for analysis. CMO would identify Class X for distributionrequirements and reporting: where, when, who, what, and how much. CMO wouldidentify reactions from the local populace; identify specific requirements by village;provide support to cooperative leaders and withhold support from uncooperative leaders;track CMO projects, dollars spent, location, effect; and build a report for the battalioncommander.)
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• S4
º Resources to support CMO.
º Establishes unit basic load (UBL) of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs); basesactivity upon surge and daily requirements.
º Procures and stores HDRs.
º Requests Class X supplies through higher headquarters.
º Collects and distributes sundry pack excess.
º Maintains humanitarian assistance (HA) kits.
º The medical staff would normally be a part of CMO and should be coordinatedwith the IO plan. The medical staff would:
� Conduct an AOR-wide analysis of endemic illnesses: tuberculosis (TB),hepatitis (HEP), goiter, etc. and develop and track a program to providemedical support to meet the intent of the battalion commander.
� Schedule clinics and inoculations of locals in coordination with thebattalion commander, battalion IOCOORD, and company commanders.
� Request medical supplies to support civil military assistance (CMA).
� Conduct “tailgate CMA” in support of battalion combat operations.
º Develop/track “local needs” matrix for 3/6/9 months out.
º Conduct local medical training (including feasibility of training localmidwives).
• Engineer staff responsibilities, like medical operations, need to follow an IOobjective. These activities might include:
º Conducting and tracking a road repair analysis.
º Determining the feasibility of repairing ground lines of communication(GLOC) to increase task force mobility as well as increase LN mobility.
º Identifying and storing excess construction material for delivery through ISF/IPto local cooperative leaders.
• Company commanders can assist with IO at the local level by:
º Conducting village assessments and reporting initial assessments and changesthrough the IOCOORD to the battalion commander.
º Establishing a presence as the single point of contact (POC) for all activitieswithin their assigned company AOR.
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º Developing rapport with cooperative LN leaders and establish dominance overuncooperative leaders through leveraging CMO/CMA and access to higherresources.
º Identifying the type and requirement for CMO/CMA within villages
º Facilitating, through the IOCOORD, nongovernmental organization (NGO)support within supportive villages
º Tracking and reporting, through the IOCOORD, CMO projects to the battalioncommander.
F. Integrating and Deconflicting
1. Brigade
The brigade commander has the tools and assets available to achieve his desired effectson an enemy or populace. To synchronize these tools and assets, he must organize thebrigade staff for efficiency. If this is not done, the brigade staff will become a network ofstovepiped entities, each moving out on a different azimuth.
Figure 2-1
Training environments have seen brigade tactical operations centers (TOCs) composed ofmultiple, seemingly independent cells. It is not unusual to see a current operations cell, aplans cell, a separate project coordination cell (PCC), and a separate effects coordinationcell (ECC) or fires and effects coordination cell (FECC). Each of these cells are soindependent that orders or instructions sent to subordinate units are not synchronized to
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achieve the commander’s desired effect. All too often they conflict with each other. Tocorrect this, brigade TOCs organize under two overarching cells, plans and currentoperations. As overall managers and staff section supervisors, the duties andresponsibilities of the brigade XO and S3 remain valid. Due to the intensity of operations,it is not uncommon and entirely appropriate for the commander to direct the S3 to focushis efforts on current operations, while the XO focuses on planning future operations.The S3 task organizes within the section with available officers to manage the variousstaff coordinating cells to accomplish the mission.
PSYOP tactical PYSOP detachment (TPD) is task organized to support the BCT. TheTPD commander wears dual hats. As the TPD commander, he provides command andcontrol (C2) for all PSYOP forces attached to or under operational control (OPCON) ofthe brigade and is responsible for the planning, integration, and monitoring of all tacticalpsychological operations (TACPSYOP) within the brigade AOR. As the PSYOP staffofficer, his responsibilities include:
• Advising the brigade commander and staff on the psychological effects of brigadeoperations on the indigenous population.
• Serving as the commander’s resident staff expert on the indigenous culture and psyche.
• Assisting the S-3 and IOCOORD in the planning and coordination of operations aimedat influencing, informing, deceiving, disrupting, delaying, degrading, or destroying theadversary’s means of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence(C4I) and IO
• Developing PSYOP objectives that support brigade information operations and higherheadquarters PSYOP objectives.
• Writing the PSYOP appendix to the brigade OPORD.
• Recommending brigade-specific PSYOP plans and programs to higher headquarters.
• Coordinating with higher headquarters for print, audio, audiovisual, and aviationsupport for brigade PSYOP operations.
• Monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of PSYOP.
• Monitoring and assessing indigenous demographic, cultural, and political trends withinthe population.
• Identifying and monitoring enemy propaganda and its sources and recommendingactions to mitigate the effects of misinformation.
• Planning and synchronizing aerial loudspeaker and leaflet drop operations in supportof brigade operations.
• Identifying and leveraging indigenous media sources, including print, radio, andtelevision, to support division and brigade PSYOP/IO/public affairs (PA) operations.
The staff judge advocate (SJA), a special staff officer, is responsible for providing situationalunderstanding of the legal environment in which the brigade operates. The SJA anticipates thelegal implications of expected actions under international law and U.S. law, and the potential
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perception of those actions based upon the HN legal system. Understanding local legal systemswill allow the SJA to forecast the likely actions of enemy forces and potentially availableavenues of influencing others to either support the U.S. mission or not resist friendly activities.The SJA works in conjunction with CA to restore or support judicial functions in a localgovernment.
The PCC is responsible for resourcing, prioritizing, and executing CMO to achieve thecommander’s desired effects.
Level 1 (sewage, water, energy, academics, trash, medical , security [SWEAT-MS]) isthe basic life support requirements of the population. Level 2 (communications, religion,economy, governance [CREG]) is secondary to Level 1 and is focused on as time andresources become available. As with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, until the Level 1requirements are adequately established, SWEAT-MS elements are the BCT’s priority.
LEVEL 1 (SWEAT-MS) Sewage, Water, Energy, Academics, Trash, Medical ,Security
LEVEL 2 (CREG) Communications, Religion, Economy, Governance
The CA officer (S5), a permanent staff member, establishes and supervises the PCC. TheS5 and the CA Team Bravo (CATB) team leader are the principal advisors to thecommander on CMO. The S5 ensures each COA effectively integrates civilconsiderations (the “C” of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). The CA officer considersnot only tactical issues, but also combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)issues. HN support and care of displaced civilians are of particular concern. The CAofficer’s analysis considers the impact of operations on public order and safety andprotection of culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned CA officer,the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member.
CATB is task organized to support a BCT in current operations. As with the PSYOPteam, these teams have proven to be an invaluable combat multiplier. The CATBoperational focus is on the civil center of gravity (COG) and on establishing,maintaining, influencing, and supporting the commander’s interaction with governmentorganizations, NGOs, and international organizations.
The engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the commander of the engineer unit supportingthe BCT. The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) is a permanent staff member who, in theabsence of the ENCOORD, acts as an liaison officer (LNO) to the brigade commanderand staff. In an environment where units are conducting combat operations and stabilityoperations and support operations simultaneously, the ABE’s role in the PCC is tocontract or coordinate/task out military troop projects within approved CMO initiativesand track the progress of ongoing projects. The ABE’s other vital role is to assess supplyroutes and nominate targets based on enemy activity on supply routes. Additionally, theABE provides terrain data and geospatial information to aid in the analysis of enemyoperations. The ABE utilizes reach-back capability to the National Mapping Agency andthe Corps of Engineers to coordinate for products and professional expertise.
The provost marshal officer’s (PMO) role in the PCC is to provide, in coordination withthe CATB, assessments to the command on civil defense and local police. Based on
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assessments and the ground tactical plan, the PMO develops recommendations toimprove civil defense and local police. The PMO advises the command on the properhandling of both combatant and noncombatant detainees. In conjunction with CA, thePMO establishes liaison with the local police to assess the local law enforcementsystem’s ability to deal with the types and categories of noncombatant detainees foreventual prosecution. Additionally, the PMO provides route assessment to the ABE.
The medical support officer provides the PCC with an assessment and projectrecommendations on civilian medical facilities and general populace health within thebrigade AOR.
The comptroller or resource manager (RM) is a position that must be filled to accuratelyaccount for funds used for CMO. The RM tracks the amount and sources of fundingavailable to the brigade. The RM briefs available funding amounts and limitations as wellas amounts already obligated to specific projects or operations.
2. Battalion
Given the vast amount of terrain and populace a battalion commander must manage, IObecomes critical to accomplishing their complex missions. First, it provides commandersthe ability to focus actions and messages to achieve battlefield effects - the end state onan adversary or populace. Second, it provides a method to plan future operations focusingon achieving an objective that are proactive and holistic in countering the enemy.Developing holistic plans designed to achieve a desired effect allows the TF commanderto organize all assets in time and space, massing lethal and nonlethal elements of combatpower, and forcing the enemy to become reactive. Current TF structure requires amodification in the way the commander and staff think. Commanders and staffs plan,execute, and assess fully integrated operations, using all elements of combat power toachieve overwhelming effects.
Understanding the dynamics associated with continuous combat and stability operationsand support operations; realizing the information from every element executing anoperation; and shifting focus from the enemy to effects on threats, populace, andcivil/tribal leaders are fundamental to achieving success on today’s battlefield. They arethe paths to accomplishing the theater commander’s campaign plan.
In the current environment, IO is central to the concept that every action taken or nottaken sends a message to the population, insurgents, and external actors. Whether activeor passive, such messages generate behavioral responses. Knowing this, unitscontinuously evaluate and shape their words and actions to ensure they supportoperations designed to achieve the desired effect. Popular support and proper militaryaction are complementary and feed off each other. Good operations, including nestedCMO, IO, and military operations, generate popular support and accomplish the missionset forth in the campaign plan.
At the battalion level, bringing together the efforts of the battalion fire support element(FSE), civil affairs team alpha (CATA), S5, TPT, PAO, and SJA will provide criticalresources for the commander to focus CMO, fires, and IO to support maneuveroperations.
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Figure 2-2
Patrol debriefs are an invaluable source of information that provide enormous feedbackon daily activities throughout the entire battalion’s AOR and its interaction among thepopulace or with the enemy. Debriefs should be formulated to answer commander’spriority intelligence requirements (PIR), specific information requirement (SIR), andspecific operational requirement (SOR). At the battalion level, debriefs are so importantthat the battalion TOC should track them carefully, making sure every patrol is debriefed,and the debrief is analyzed and passed to higher headquarters. This is not a small task andit cannot be ignored. Within the common operating environment (COE), every elementleaving a forward operating base (FOB) should be considered a combat or reconnaissancemission. During the processing and analysis of patrol debriefs, both the S2 and the ECCprovide a separate but equal analysis of data. The S2 examines debriefs from an enemyand populace perspective, and the ECC examines the data to assist in gauging theprogress the TF is having in regards to the campaign plan.
3. Company
Execution begins and planning ends at the company level. Company commanders focuson issuing orders, verifying pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections are performedto standard, controlling operations, and ensuring debriefs are conducted after everymission. When the battalion issues orders, the company commander receives the task,purpose, and SIR/SOR for each mission. The company commander’s role is to ensureeach mission is executed, the purpose achieved, and SIR/SOR are answered to focusfuture battalion and brigade operations. Given the fact that a company has no staff, thecompany commander should turn to his traditional effects coordinator, the fire supportofficer (FSO), to help manage these new IO tasks.
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The traditional role of the company fires support team (FIST) to coordinate lethal fires insupport of a maneuver company has evolved to include coordination of both lethal andnonlethal effects. The company FIST coordinates nonlethal effects by developing SOI,tracking Level 1 (SWEAT-MS) and Level 2 (CREG) CMO projects, implementingspecific information operation themes and messages and tracking their effectiveness, andacting as company PAO. In addition, FISTs integrate nonlethal combat multipliers suchas CATA, TPTs, and human intelligence (HUMINT) teams. Company FISTs areorganized to execute lethal effects.
Current trends show company headquarters FSEs are not manned adequately to conduct24-hour operations. The FSE also lacks the tools and systems to effectively conduct thefull range of military operations (ROMO). They must brief and debrief patrols, track SOI,and maintain their capability to deliver lethal effects on a 24-hour basis.
Experience has shown all convoys are combat operations and must be briefed anddebriefed along with all other maneuver-centric patrols or operations. A company willhave multiple SOIs to track and communicate within its AOR. The traditional method ofoperations used by company FISTs in a non-stability operations and support operationsenvironment is overwhelmed. Company FSEs must operate like a battalion FSE or effectscell.
The company FSO works with the company commander during operations tosuccessfully accomplish all company essential effects tasks. While the maneuvercommander is responsible for integrating lethal, nonlethal, and maneuver, the FSO mustunderstand the scheme of maneuver as well as the company commander understands it.On the basis of the commander’s guidance, the FSO develops his effects plan andpresents it to the commander for approval.
Company operations need to mirror battalion operations. Standing operating procedures(SOPs), tools, and systems to gather and manage information need to be in place to meetrequirements from battalion. There is a need to have a dedicated lethal and nonlethal cellat the company command post (CP). Without this element, critical information is nottracked, gathered, or managed in the detail required to be successful in combat operationsand the stability operations and support operations environment.
The company must analyze the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planand determine the company’s collection requirements, and then brief those requirements(along with the talking points and MOE) during the mission brief to focus patrols ongathering specific information critical to the planning and refinement at battalion andbrigade. FSE themes, messages, and MOE need to be posted in the company for everyleader and Soldier to view along with PIR and SIR/SOR.
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In today’s environment, there are several different missions a company is expected toconduct simultaneously. See Figure 2-3:
Figure 2-3
A matrix tool is needed to assist the company in tracking patrol operations as well astracking maneuver and the different missions they are currently executing. An example ofa tracking matrix tool is shown below.
COMPANY TRACKING MATRIX
Element Mission DTG
start
DTG
end
Objectives SOR/SIR Brief Debrief
Figure 2-4
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It is imperative that the company conducts patrol briefs with all elements executingmissions. Patrol briefs provide focus to the patrol on gathering specific information thatmay answer PIR or IO indicators. Patrol briefs should follow a prescribed format. Anexample of a patrol brief format is shown below.
PATROL BRIEFS
• PIR, SIR/SOR
• Copy of MOE (indicators)
• Pertinent info from previous patrol
• Any specialty teams attached and mission
• Specific indicators to observe and report (propaganda, negative hand gestures,throwing objects)
• Non-lethal target status
• Current CMO project status
• Previous patrols' activities (promises)
• Target folder review
• Themes and messages
• Talking points
Figure 2-5
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Patrol debriefs are the preferred method for seizing “ground truth.” Debriefs should beconducted upon completion of the patrols and involve all Soldiers in the patrol. Thedebrief should focus on answering SIR/SOR. MOE extracted from the patrol debriefshould be forwarded daily to the battalion for review and utilized during the combatsynchronization meeting. The current status of CMO projects should be debriefed andupdated as well. An example of a CMO Project Tracking Matrix is shown below.
TOWN: UNIT: POC: DTG:
SYSTEM ISSUE ACTIONS STATUS CONTACT PROMISED
DUE DATE
SEWAGE
WATER
ELECTRICITY
ACADEMICS
TRASH
EMPLOYMENT
MEDICAL
SECURITY
Figure 2-6
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It is imperative that CMO projects are tracked in detail at company level. TheSWEAT-MS (including employment) tracking matrix is a valuable tool in tracking vitalinfrastructure and systems and providing the company commander and battalion staffwith an accurate picture of the status, contacts, actions taken at company level, andpromised date for completion. It assists the battalion staff with established priorities and afocus within the AOR.
G. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
1. Information flow
To gain information superiority, commanders rely on ISR, information management(IM), and IO. The synchronization of these activities allows commanders the ability tosee first, understand first, and finish decisively. Bottom-fed information comes in manyforms. CA assessments, PSYOP assessments, battalion task force commanderassessments, bilateral negotiation records, and patrol debriefs are a few. Taken togetherand analyzed by the staff, they paint a picture for the commander. Staffs must havesystems in place to collect this information, update staff estimates, and present thisinformation to the commander in the form of a mission analysis brief. Once staffs andSoldiers understand the paradigm shift of becoming a bottom-fed organization andemplace functional systems to collect such information, they will recognize theimportance of IO. These systems enable information superiority. They are critical inallowing the commander to visualize, describe, and direct actions within the brigade orbattalion AOR.
2. Planning
Include the higher HQ goals and/or objectives within the unit’s mission statement as wellas in the key tasks and end state of the commander’s intent. By doing this, leadersprovide subordinates the use of these effects as the basis for initiative.
A key to effective planning is a clear understanding of the decisive operation. Definingthe decisive operation in today’s complex environment requires commanders to describethe effect desired against an actor (enemy, local leader, or civil population). To define thedecisive operation, commanders must:
• Determine the actor (or group of actors) representing the greatest threat to fulfilling thecampaign plan.
• Describe the decisive operation as a “what” (desired effect), not a “who” (identifyingthe unit to accomplish the decisive operation). For example, a commander could say,“The decisive operation is the identification and neutralization of insurgent C2 cells.”
3. Information Operations Working Group (IOWG). The following are attributes andcharacteristics of functional IOWGs. IOWGs can be informal at brigade and battalionlevel.
• Command emphasis. The commander must support and direct the efforts of theIOWG.
• Meeting purpose and tone. The purpose of the IOWG is to coordinate andsynchronize specific actions with specific IOWG members. It is not a tasking meeting.IO officers who use the IOWG to task IO elements without input from those elements
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risk misusing IOWG members. Coordination and synchronization will not occur in anenvironment where IOWG members feel alienated.
• Due outs. The meeting should identify “due outs,” proposed supporting actions,members take back to their sections for discussion and/or planning and execution, witha defined date and time when the staff section must report feasibility or progress.
• Sample meeting flow:
º Status of ongoing projects (review of MOE and status report on due outs).
º Statement of new problem, commander’s guidance/estimate, or next phase ofthe IO plan.
º How can IO support?
º How might each activity support?
� What is currently being done by each member’s section?
� What new/different/modified actions might be taken?
º Consensus on possible courses of action (COAs).
º Approximate time lines necessary for each activity to complete its part of theCOA.
º Request that members: 1) Staff proposals in their sections; 2) Secure theirprincipal’s approval/disapproval; and 3) Report back on Section ability to takethe considered action (time: to be announced (TBA) based on time line).
º Recap of new due outs.
• Agenda. An agenda must be used, it must be published in a read-ahead packet, and theagenda’s topics should remain relatively constant.
• Read-ahead packet. The purpose of the read-ahead packet is to recommend an agendafor the next IOWG meeting and to recommend those IOWG members whoseattendance is necessary. All IOWG members are welcome to attend every meeting. Itis more efficient to let the meeting agenda dictate who should attend each meeting.One of the most important effects this technique creates is that IOWG members aremore likely to attend meetings on a regular basis since they know their time will not bewasted when they do attend. At battalion level, the read-ahead packet may not benecessary due to the small size of the IOWG.
• Moderator/Noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). The moderator must besomeone with excellent time management skills who can keep the group on task andon schedule. He must be polite, yet firm. The moderator performs the function of timekeeper and note taker. He also assembles and disseminates the read ahead packet. Thisallows the IOCOORD/officer to run the IOWG without being the drill sergeant.Several units have found that NCOs make the best moderators.
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• Time limit. IOWG meetings should only long enough to accomplish goals listed inthe agenda. Issues that require additional time should be handled in break-out sessions.Once the moderator identifies an issue that requires more time than the agenda callsfor, he schedules a break out session with specific IOWG members. This ensures thatonly those members involved are required to invest their time on any given topic.Meetings lasting longer than 60 minutes create challenges to team building and focus.
• Due Outs. Attendees must leave the meeting knowing what their due outs are. Followup IOWG meetings with a memo to the XO and S-3 if IO team members were notpresent.
4. MOE
• MOE are a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. (JP 1-02).Subjective indicators that the outcomes of tactical actions have achieved or contributedto achieving the desired effect. MOE articulate where to look and what to measure inorder to determine if the desired effect has been achieved.
• Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of forceemployment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of threemajor components:
º Battle damage assessment
º Munitions effectiveness assessment
º Re-attack recommendation
• MOE characteristics:
º Focused on assessing the achievement of the objective.
º Measurable and observable: quantitative values or qualitative descriptions.
º Timely/responsive: Collection and analysis is rapid enough to support timelydecision-making.
º Cost effective
• How to develop IO MOE
º Step 1: Develop the MOE statement. Use the objective’s target, effect, andpurpose as a guide to determine what must be observed, reported, and assessed.
º Step 2: Develop the leading indicators that support the MOE statement.Leading indicators are quantifiable signs that measure trends or progresstowards attaining the objective. The IO planner should wargame potentialleading indicators that will assist in measuring achievement of the IO objective.This is normally done in conjunction with the intelligence representative to theIO cell and other members of the IOWG. The purpose of developing indicatorsis to:
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
� Establish a baseline of activity from which success or lack of progresscan be measured. All indicators should have a baseline of activity fromwhich to measure progress.
� Assist the intelligence representative in determining intelligencecollection requirements.
� Focus the other members of the staff and the components to potentialcollection requirements.
º Step 3: The IO cell’s job is to make known the intelligence requirementsand establish a mechanism for tracking progress on accomplishing theobjectives.
Example:
Statement: Leadership is influenced to not attack relief operationspersonnel.
Indicators:
� Decrease in the number of kidnapings or attempted kidnapings ofdisaster relief personnel.
� Decrease in the number of attacks on U.S. military personnel.
� Leadership changes rhetoric in open press.
� Leadership increases contact with third party envoy.
� Intercepts of leadership communications directing no aggression
º Step 4: Coordinate with the intelligence representative on collectionrequirements related to MOE and indicators.
º Step 5: Examine the adversary and friendly force structures anddetermine where to focus IO efforts to achieve the IO objectives. Thisanalysis should lead to developing critical capabilities and critical requirementsthat are most vulnerable to IO capabilities.
º Step 6: Determine what effect you want to have on the most critical andvulnerable functions and select the IO capability or capabilities that canbest achieve that effect.
� Analyze the initial force structure to determine if the apportioned forcesroughly possess adequate IO capabilities.
� Identify any shortfalls and request additional resources from higher.
• Potential MOE. MOE in CMO could include the following:
º Drops in mortality rates in the population below a specified level per day.
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º Increase in water available per day to various levels established for humanconsumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption.
º Increase of available electricity.
º Increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and internationalorganizations.
º Increase in oil /gas refinery capacity.
• The last prerequisite for success entails establishing and monitoring MOE for CMOthat are useful at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. When looking at MOE forCMO, determine what the standard was before arrival and consider this the baselinethat must be improved upon.
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Appendix A
Glossary
Part I: Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABE assistant brigade engineer
AOR area of responsibility
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
BDE brigade
C2 command and control
C2W command and control warfare
C4command, control, communications, and
computers
C4Icommand, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence
C4ISRcommand, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, and reconnaissance
CA civil affairs
CATA civil affairs team alpha
CATB civil affairs team bravo
CENTCOM Central Command
CI counterintelligence
CMA civil military assistance
CMO civil military operations
CNA computer network attack
COA course of action
COE common operating environment
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
COG center of gravity
COMCAM combat camera
COMPUSEC computer security
CP command post
CREGcommunications, religion, economy
governance
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
DOD Department of Defense
DTG date/time group
ECC effects coordination cell
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
ENCOORD engineer coordinator
ENG engineer
EP electronic protection
ETO effects tasking order
EW electronic warfare
FECC fires and effects coordination cell
FIST fires support team
FSE fire support element
FSO fire support officer
GLOC ground lines of communication
HA humanitarian assistance
HDR humanitarian daily ration
HEP hepatitis
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
HN host nation
HUMINT human intelligence
IM information management
INFOSEC information security
IO information operations
IOWG information operations working group
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IP Iraqi police
ISF Iraqi security forces
ISO in support of
ISRintelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance
IW information warfare
JTF joint task force
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
LN local nation/nationals
LNO liaison officer
MCO major combat operations
MDMP military decision-making process
MEDCAP medical civil action/affairs program
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
METL mission essential task list
METT-TCmission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and support available, timeavailable, and civil considerations
MOE measures of effectiveness
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
MRE mission readiness/rehearsal exercises
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NETOPS net operations
NGO nongovernmental organization
Obj objective
O© observer controller
OPFOR opposing force
OPLAN operations plan
OPORD operations order
OPSEC operations security
PAO public affairs officer
PCC project coordination cell
PIR priority intelligence requirements
PA public affairs
PMCO post major combat operations
PMO provost marshal officer
POC point of contact
PSYOP psychological operations
RCP radar communication processor
RISTAreconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition
RM resource manager
ROMO range of military operations
SA situational awareness
SIO special information operations
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SIR specific information requirement
SITEMP situation template
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces
SOPs standing operating procedures
SOR specific operational requirement
SWEAT-MSsewage, water, energy, academics, trash
medical, security
TB tuberculosis
TBA to be announced
TCP traffic control points
TF task force
TOC tactical operations center
TPD tactical PSYOP detachment
TPT tactical PSYOP team
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UBL unit basic load
XO executive officer
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
Part II: Terms and Definitions
A. Terms
Civil Affairs. The activities of a commander that establishes, maintains, influences, or exploitsrelations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental,and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitatemilitary operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performanceby military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government.These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They mayalso occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Joint Pub 1-02
Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designatedcommander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Commandand control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. JointPub 1-02
Communications Security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to denyunauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from possession and study oftelecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results ofsuch possession and study. Communications security includes a. Crypto security and physicalsecurity - The component of communications security that results from the provision oftechnically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. b. Transmission security - The componentof communications security that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions frominterception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. c. Emission security - Thecomponent of communications that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized personsinformation f value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromisingemanations from crypto-equipment and telecommunications systems. d. Physical security - Thecomponent of communications security that results from all physical measures necessary tosafeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observationsthereof by unauthorized persons. Joint Pub 1-02
Computer Network Attack. Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy informationresident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. JointPub 1-02
Computer Security. The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized accessand exploitation of friendly computer systems; also called COMPUSEC. Joint Pub 1-02
Counterdeception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage froma foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function ofidentifying foreign deception operations. Joint Pub 1-02
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Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assignations conducted by or on behalf offoreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, orinternational terrorist activities. Also called CI. Joint Pub 1-02
Deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, orfalsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interested. JointPub 1-02
Defense Information Infrastructure. The shared or interconnected system of computers,communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other support structuresserving DoD local, national, and worldwide information needs. The Defense InformationInfrastructure connects DoD mission support, command and control, and intelligence computersthrough voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services. It providesinformation processing and services to subscribers over the Defense Information SystemsNetwork and includes command and control, tactical, intelligence and commercialcommunications systems used to transmit DoD information. Also called DII. Joint Pub 1-02
Defense Information Operations. Integration and coordination of policies and procedures,operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and informationsystems. Defensive information operations are conducted though information assurance, physicalsecurity, operations security, counterdeception, counterpsychological operations,counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations. Defensiveinformation operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denyingadversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their ownpurposes. Joint Pub 1-02
Incident. In information operations, an assessed event of attempted entry, unauthorized entry,or an information attack on an automated information system. It includes unauthorized probingand browsing, disruption, or denial of service; altered or destroyed input, processing, storage, oroutput of information; or changes to information system hardware, firmware, or softwarecharacteristics with or without the users’ knowledge, instruction, or intent. Joint Pub 1-02
Indications and Warning. Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report timesensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to theUnited States or allied/coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizensabroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities;insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the U.S., its overseas forces, or allied/coalitionnations; hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities, terrorists’ attacks; and other similarevents. Also called I&W. Joint Pub 1-02
Information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that ahuman assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. Joint Pub1-02
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
Information Assurance. Information operations that protect and defend information andinformation systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, andnonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporationprotection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also call IA. Joint Pub 1-02
Information-Based Process. Processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information usingany medium or form. These processes may be stand-alone processes or sub-processes which,taken together, comprise a larger system or system of systems or processes. Joint Pub 1-02
Information Environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect,process, or disseminate information; also included is the information itself. Joint Pub 1-02
Information Operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and informationsystems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. JointPub 1-02
Information Security. Information security is the protection and defense of information andinformation systems against unauthorized access or modification of information, whether instorage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Informationsecurity includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats.Information security is composed of computer security and communications security. Also calledINFOSEC. Joint Pub 1-02
Information Superiority. The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Joint Pub1-02
Information System. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components thatcollect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Joint Pub 1-02
Information Warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict toachieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW.Joint Pub 1-02
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. An analytical methodology employed to reduceuncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations.Intelligence preparation of the battle space builds an extensive database for each potential area inwhich a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine theimpact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form.Intelligence preparation for the battle space is a continuous process. Also called IPB. Joint Pub1-02
Leveraging. In information operations, the effective use of information, information systems,and technology to increase the means and synergy in accomplishing information operationsstrategy. Joint Pub 1-02
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Military Deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing theadversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of thefriendly mission. The five categories of military deception: 1. Strategic military deception -military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders toresult in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator strategic militaryobjectives, policies, and operations. 2. Operations military deception - military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support of operations-level commanders to result in adversaryactions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational militarydeception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and majoroperations. 3. Tactical military deception - military deception planned and executed by and insupport of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted tosupport battles and engagements. 4. Service military deception - military deception planned andexecuted by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service militarydeception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces andsystems. 5. Military deception in support of operations security OPSEC - military deceptionplanned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of theinadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. DeceptiveOPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for,military operations and activities. Joint Pub 1-02
Offensive Information Operations. The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilitiesand activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decisions makers toachieve or promote soporific objectives. These capabilities and activities include, but are notlimited to, operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare,physical attack and/or destruction, and special information operations, and could includecomputer network attack. Joint Pub 1-02
Operations Security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: 1. Identify those actionsthat can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. 2. Determine indicators hostileintelligence systems might obtain that could be interoperated or pieced together to derive criticalinformation in time to be useful to adversaries. 3. Select and execute measures that eliminate orreduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.Also called OPSEC. Joint Pub 1-02
Perception Management. Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning, and tointelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resultingfrom foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In variousways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover anddeception, and psychological operations. Joint Pub 1-02
Physical Security. The part of security concerned with physical measures, designed tosafeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Joint Pub1-02
Probe. In information operations, any attempt to gather information about an automatedinformation system or its on-line users. Joint Pub 1-02
Physical Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately thebehavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations s to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to theoriginator’s objective. Also called PSYOP. Joint pub 1-02
Public Affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relationsactivities directed toward both the external and internal public with interest in the Department ofDefense. Also called PA. Joint Pub 1-02
Special Information Operations. Information operations that by their sensitive nature, due totheir potential effect or impact, security requirement, or risk to the national security of the UnitedStates, require a special review and approval process. Also called SIO. Joint Pub 1-02
Vulnerability. 1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any meansthrough which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fightdiminished. 2. The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a definite degradationincapability to perform the designated mission as a result of having been subjected to a certainlevel of effects in an unnatural manmade hostile environment. 3. In information operations, aweakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controlsthat could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system.Joint Pub 1-02
Vulnerability Analysis. In information operations, a systematic examination of an informationsystem or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies,provide data from which to predict the effectiveness or proposed security measures, and confirmthe adequacy of such measures after implementation. Joint Pub 1-02
B. Definitions
Defensive IO - integrates and coordinates policies, procedures, operations, personnel, andtechnology to protect and defend information and information systems. Defensive IO isconducted through information assurance, OPSEC, physical security, counterdeception,counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, EW, and SIO. Defensive IO ensures timely, accurate,and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendlyinformation and information systems for their own purposes. Defensive IO ensures the necessaryprotection and defense of information and information systems upon which forces depend toconduct operations and achieve mission objectives. Four interrelated process support defensiveIO -- information environment protection, attack detection, capability restoration, and attack
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response. Because they are interrelated, full integration of offensive and defensive IO isessential.
Information - Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. It is the meaning that a humanassigns to do by means of the known conventions used in their representations. The sameinformation may convey different messages to different receipts and thereby provide mixedsignals to information gathers and users to include the intelligence community.
Information Assurance - IO that protects and defends information systems by ensuring theiravailability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiations. This includesproviding for restoration for information systems by incorporating protection, detection, andreaction capabilities.
Information-Based Process - processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information usingany medium or form. These processes may be stand alone processes or sub-processes which,taken together, comprise a larger system or systems or processes. At the tactical level,information- based processes include reconnaissance plans, decision making, and local trafficcontrol points in austere areas.
Information Environment - the aggregate of individuals, organizations, or systems that collect,process, or disseminate information, including the information itself.
Information Operations - actions taken to affect adversary information and informationsystems while defending one’s own information and information systems. IO requires close,continuous integration of offensive and defensive capabilities and activities, as well as theeffective design, integration, and interaction of C2 with intelligence support. Major capabilitiesto conduct IO include, but are not limited to, OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW, andphysical attack/destruction, and could include CNA. IO-related activities include, but are notlimited to, PA and CA.
Information Superiority - the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.Information superiority may be all pervasive in the AOR or it may be function-aspect-specific,localized, and temporal.
Information System - the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components thatcollect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. The informationsystem also includes the information- based processes.
Information Warfare - information operations conducted during a time of crisis or conflict toachieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.
Offensive IO - OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, physical attack,destruction, and computer attack. Offensive IO can be conducted in a variety of situations andcircumstances across the range of military operations. Offensive IO may have the greatest impactprior to open hostilities, but applies to all levels of war.
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
IO Organization
Unit commanders should establish a fully functioning IO cell to develop and promulgateguidance/plans for IO that are passed to subordinate units for decentralized planning andexecution. The IO cell integrates a broad range of potential actions and activities that helpcontribute to the commander’s desired end state in the area of responsibility. The commander’scell must be structured to plan and coordinate IO and sufficiently flexible to accommodate avariety of planning and tactical circumstances. All principal staff must be an active part of IOplanning.
IO Planning
IO planning is accomplished in MDMP. IO planning must be broad based and encompassemployment of all available capabilities. IO planning must analyze the risk of compromise,reprisal, escalation of hostilities, and insubordination or inadvertent counteraction of IO.
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Appendix BAppendix B
IO a
nd M
DM
PIO
Inte
grat
ion
with
IPB
•C
ondu
ct in
itial
ass
essm
ent o
f inf
o op
•D
eter
min
e IO
pla
nnin
g re
quire
men
ts
•U
nder
stan
d IO
situ
atio
n•
Ana
lyze
HH
Q in
form
atio
n op
erat
ion
•D
efin
e &
ana
lyze
the
info
env
ironm
ent a
ndth
reat
•D
evel
op IO
mis
sion
sta
tem
ent &
obj
ectiv
es•
See
k co
mm
ande
r’s IO
gui
danc
e
•ID
frie
ndly
IO c
apab
ilitie
s &
vul
nera
bilit
ies
•D
evel
op IO
con
cept
of s
uppo
rt
•V
isua
lize
oper
atio
ns in
the
info
env
ironm
ent
•W
arga
me
IO c
once
pt o
f sup
port
agai
nst
how
the
enem
y w
ill e
mpl
oy it
s in
form
atio
nsy
stem
s an
d as
sets
•A
naly
ze &
eva
luat
e IO
sup
port
to e
ach
CO
A
•Fi
naliz
e de
tails
of t
he in
form
atio
n op
erat
ion
•P
repa
re IO
ann
ex &
inpu
t to
base
or
der/p
lan
MD
MP
Ste
pIO
Foc
us
Def
ine
the
Bat
tlefie
ld
Des
crib
e th
eB
attle
field
’s
Effe
cts
Eva
luat
e th
e Th
reat
Det
erm
ine
Thre
at C
OA
s
IPB
Ste
pIO
Foc
usA
naly
sis
Pro
duct
Def
ine
the
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent
Des
crib
e th
eIn
form
atio
n E
nviro
nmen
t’sE
ffect
s
Eva
luat
e th
e Th
reat
s’ In
foS
yste
m
Det
erm
ine
Thre
at A
ctio
nsin
the
Info
Env
ironm
ent
Com
bine
d In
form
atio
nO
verla
y-S
igni
fican
t ch
arac
teris
tics
of th
ein
fo e
nviro
nmen
t &ef
fect
s on
ope
ratio
ns
Thre
at C
OG
Ana
lysi
s-
Crit
ical
vul
nera
bilit
ies
Thre
at T
empl
ates
-Who
m
akes
dec
isio
ns; w
hat
node
s, li
nks,
& s
yste
ms
the
thre
at u
ses;
how
in
fo a
sset
s ar
e em
ploy
ed
Info
rmat
ion
SIT
EM
P-
Whe
n, w
here
, & w
hy
the
thre
at w
ill s
eek
toga
in in
fo s
uper
iorit
y
Key
Def
initi
ons
Info
rmat
ion
Ope
ratio
ns:
The
empl
oym
ent o
f the
cor
e ca
pabi
litie
s of
EW
, CN
O, P
SYO
P, m
ilita
ry d
ecep
tion,
an
d O
PS
EC
, in
conc
ert w
ith s
peci
fied
supp
ortin
g an
d re
late
d ca
pabi
litie
s, to
affe
ct o
r def
end
info
rmat
ion
and
info
rmat
ion
syst
ems,
and
to in
fluen
ce d
ecsi
onm
akin
g.
(FM
3-1
3)
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent :
The
aggr
egat
e of
indi
vidu
als,
or
gani
zatio
ns, o
r sys
tem
s th
at c
olle
ct, p
roce
ss, o
r di
ssem
inat
e in
form
atio
n; a
lso
incl
uded
is th
e in
form
atio
n its
elf.
(FM
3-0
)
Info
rmat
ion
Sup
erio
rity :
The
ope
ratio
nal a
dvan
tage
de
rived
from
the
abili
ty to
col
lect
, pro
cess
, and
di
ssem
inat
e an
uni
nter
rupt
ed fl
ow o
f inf
orm
atio
n w
hile
ex
ploi
ting
or d
enyi
ng a
n ad
vers
ary'
s ab
ility
to d
o th
e sa
me.
(FM
3-0
)Fi
eld
Sup
port
Div
isio
n
M
ay 2
004
Rec
eipt
of
Mis
sion
CO
A
App
rova
lO
rder
s P
rodu
ctio
n
Mis
sion
A
naly
sis
CO
A
Dev
elop
men
t
CO
A
Ana
lysi
s
CO
A
Com
paris
on
IO P
lann
er’s
Aid
Exam
ple
Com
bine
d In
form
atio
n O
verla
y
Com
bine
d In
form
atio
n O
verla
y
Civ
ilian
info
infr
astr
uctu
re m
ust b
e in
terd
icte
d to
redu
ce th
reat
ad
vant
age
Info
Sub
-Env
ironm
ent C
: Sou
ther
n Pl
ains
•P
opul
ace:
Den
sely
pop
ulat
ed b
y G
roup
Y (9
5%)
•In
fo fl
ow: F
ollo
ws
grou
nd L
OC
s•
Info
Infra
stru
ctur
e: W
ell d
evel
oped
info
infra
stru
ctur
e; s
uppo
rts
milit
ary
C2;
key
nod
es in
citi
es•
Sup
port:
Stro
ng s
uppo
rt fo
r cur
rent
gov
ernm
ent r
egim
e•
Favo
rs e
nem
y op
erat
ions
Info
Sub
-Env
ironm
ent A
: Nor
ther
n Pl
ains
•P
opul
ace:
Gro
up X
Maj
ority
(80%
)•
Info
flow
: Prim
ary
info
sou
rce
is o
utsi
de c
ount
ry•
Info
infra
stru
ctur
e: U
nder
deve
lope
d &
dila
pida
ted
•S
uppo
rt: L
arge
ly a
nti-g
over
nmen
t reg
ime
•Fa
vors
frie
ndly
forc
e op
erat
ions
Info
Sub
-Env
ironm
ent B
: Cen
tral
Mou
ntai
ns•
Pop
ulac
e: S
pars
ely
popu
late
d by
Gro
up Y
•In
fo fl
ow: I
nfor
mat
ion
vacu
um•
Info
infra
stru
ctur
e: C
anal
ized
alo
ng g
roun
d LO
Cs
•S
uppo
rt: A
mbi
vale
nt to
war
d go
vern
men
t-reg
ime
•N
o si
gnifi
cant
impa
ct o
n fr
iend
ly fo
rce
oper
atio
ns
Gra
phic
por
traya
l of i
nfor
mat
ion
envi
ronm
ent
Coa
x
Roa
ds
Key
Nod
es
Inf
o Fl
ow
Sig
nific
ant c
hara
cter
istic
s of
eac
h in
form
atio
n su
b-en
viro
nmen
t
Exte
rnal
info
flow
& in
fluen
ce fr
om
neig
hbor
ing
coun
try
IO M
issi
on S
tate
men
t
IO O
bjec
tives
Task
s to
IO E
lem
ents
How
IO w
ill s
uppo
rt th
eco
mm
and’
s m
issi
on(W
ho, W
hat,
Whe
re,
Whe
n, W
hy)
Wha
t IO
will
do
to a
ffect
the
info
env
ironm
ent
(Effe
ct, O
bjec
t of E
ffect
[Tar
get],
Pur
pose
of
the
Effe
ct)
3-5
Obj
ectiv
es p
er P
hase
Wha
t act
ions
the
elem
ents
will
per
form
toex
ecut
e th
e in
fo o
p (T
ask,
Pur
pose
)
Task
, Pur
pose
IO C
once
pt o
f Sup
port
How
the
info
ope
ratio
nw
ill b
e co
nduc
ted
(Cdr
’s In
tent
for I
O,
Info
Sup
erio
rity
for t
he
Ope
ratio
n, G
ener
al P
lan
for I
O, P
riorit
y of
Sup
port,
Res
trict
ions
on
the
Em
ploy
men
t of I
O)
Task
s to
Uni
ts
Mis
sion
to T
ask
Prod
ucts
Ex
ampl
e IO
Mis
sion
and
Obj
ectiv
es(T
actic
al C
orps
mis
sion
)
IO O
bjec
tives
:
•D
isru
pt 1
st O
SC
AD
C2
in o
rder
to p
reve
nt c
oord
inat
ed
enga
gem
ent o
f XX
Cor
ps’d
eep
atta
cks.
•D
estro
y 1s
t OS
C h
eadq
uarte
rs in
ord
er to
neu
traliz
e co
mm
and
and
cont
rol b
etw
een
battl
ezon
ean
d re
serv
e fo
rces
.
•D
isru
pt o
pera
tiona
l res
erve
CP
san
d co
mm
unic
atio
n ne
ts
in o
rder
to d
elay
em
ploy
men
t of r
einf
orci
ng o
r co
unte
ratta
ck fo
rces
.
•In
fluen
ce c
ivilia
n po
pula
ce in
occ
upie
d ar
eas
in o
rder
to
min
imiz
e in
terfe
renc
e w
ith X
X C
orps
’ope
ratio
ns.
•D
eny
SP
F de
tect
ion
and
iden
tific
atio
n of
XX
Cor
ps’m
ain
and
tact
ical
CP
sin
ord
er to
pre
vent
targ
etin
g by
1st
OS
C
artil
lery
fire
s.
IO M
issi
on:
On
orde
r, X
X C
orps
IO d
isru
pts
1st O
pera
tiona
l S
trate
gic
Com
man
d (O
SC
) gro
und
and
air d
efen
se fo
rces
’ co
mm
and
and
cont
rol,
influ
ence
s ci
vilia
n po
pula
ce p
erce
ptio
ns,
and
prot
ects
Cor
ps’ c
ritic
al in
form
atio
n in
the
AO
R in
ord
er to
fa
cilit
ate
dest
ruct
ion
of 1
st O
SC
forc
es.
PD EW PSYO
PC
APATi
me
Line
Phas
e I
Phas
e II
Phas
e III
IO A
sses
smen
t
1
3
7
64
5
2
Info
rmat
ion
Supe
riorit
y:1s
t OSC
una
ble
to c
ondu
ctsy
nchr
oniz
ed re
actio
n to
the
Coa
litio
n m
ain
atta
ck.
IO O
bjec
tives
:•
Des
troy
1st O
SC
C2
IOT
neut
raliz
e C
2 be
twee
nba
ttlez
one
and
rese
rve
forc
es.
•In
fluen
ce p
opul
ace
IOT
min
imiz
e in
terfe
renc
e w
ithC
oalit
ion
oper
atio
ns.
IO E
lem
ent T
asks
:P
D:
1. D
estro
y C
orps
and
Div
isio
n C
Ps.
2. D
estro
y fo
rwar
ds o
bser
vers
and
reco
n in
zon
e.EW
:3.
Jam
Cor
ps-D
ivis
ion
C2
nets
.PS
YOP
: 4.
Inf
orm
pop
ulac
e of
coa
litio
n in
tent
ions
, loc
atio
nof
HA,
and
DC
rout
es a
nd c
amps
.5.
Em
ploy
TP
T in
dire
ct s
uppo
rt of
man
euve
r uni
ts.
Civ
il Af
fairs
:6.
Dis
tribu
te H
A to
DC
cam
ps.
Pub
lic A
ffairs
:7.
Pub
liciz
e C
oalit
ion
role
in H
A s
uppo
rt.
SPF
I
E W
XX
XXX
TAC
XXX
Mai
n
XX
I
E W
46
5
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
3
44
4
4
4
51 6
6
7
77Main
Attack
Exam
ple
Cou
rse
of A
ctio
n Sk
etch
(Del
iber
ate
Atta
ck M
issi
on)
Ass
essm
ent
Map
of A
O w
ith
loca
tions
of I
O ta
sks
IO c
once
pt o
f sup
port:
ob
ject
ives
and
task
s (fo
r thi
s m
issi
on)
Tim
elin
e (b
y ph
ase)
of I
O ta
sk e
xecu
tion
This
pro
duct
pro
duce
d by
U.S
. Arm
y, 1
stIn
form
atio
n O
pera
tions
Com
man
d (L
and)
Doc
trin
al E
ffect
s Fo
r IO
(FM
3-1
3)
Des
troy
–D
amag
e a
com
bat s
yste
m s
o ba
dly
that
it c
anno
t pe
rform
any
func
tion
or b
e re
stor
ed to
a u
sabl
e co
nditi
on
with
out b
eing
ent
irely
rebu
ilt.
Dis
rupt
–In
info
rmat
ion
oper
atio
ns, m
eans
bre
akin
g or
in
terru
ptin
g th
e flo
w o
f inf
orm
atio
n be
twee
n se
lect
ed C
2 no
des.
Deg
rade
–In
info
rmat
ion
oper
atio
ns, i
s us
ing
non-
leth
al o
r te
mpo
rary
mea
ns to
redu
ce th
e ef
fect
iven
ess
or e
ffici
ency
of
adve
rsar
y co
mm
and
and
cont
rol s
yste
ms,
and
info
rmat
ion
colle
ctio
n ef
forts
or m
eans
.
Den
y –
In in
form
atio
n op
erat
ions
, ent
ails
with
hold
ing
info
rmat
ion
abou
t Arm
y fo
rce
capa
bilit
ies
and
inte
ntio
ns th
at
adve
rsar
ies
need
for e
ffect
ive
and
tim
ely
deci
sion
mak
ing.
Dec
eive
–C
ause
a p
erso
n to
bel
ieve
wha
t is
not t
rue.
Expl
oit –
In in
form
atio
n op
erat
ions
, is
to g
ain
acce
ss to
ad
vers
ary
com
man
d an
d co
ntro
l sys
tem
s to
col
lect
in
form
atio
n or
to p
lant
fals
e or
mis
lead
ing
info
rmat
ion.
Influ
ence
–C
ause
adv
ersa
ries
or o
ther
s to
beh
ave
in a
m
anne
r fav
orab
le to
Arm
y fo
rces
.
Gen
erat
ing
Effe
cts Ph
ysic
al(M
aneu
ver &
Cbt
Ops
)•I
nfo
syst
ems
& a
sset
s•N
etw
ork
Infra
stru
ctur
e
Info
rmat
ion
(C2
& IM
)•I
nfor
mat
ion
–qu
ality
, flo
w &
con
tent
•Inf
o sy
stem
func
tions
-co
llect
ion,
pro
cess
ing,
&
dis
sem
inat
ion)
Cog
nitiv
e(D
ecis
ion-
mak
ing)
•Per
cept
ions
•Atti
tude
s•U
nder
stan
ding
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent
Dom
ains
Effe
cts
1st O
rder
Effe
cts
Exe
cute
task
s to
cau
se
effe
cts
in th
e ph
ysic
al
dom
ain
2nd
Ord
er E
ffect
sS
um o
f 1st
ord
er
effe
cts
crea
te 2
ndor
der e
ffect
s
3rd
Ord
er E
ffect
sS
um o
f 2nd
ord
er e
ffect
s ge
nera
te a
3rd
ord
eref
fect
Focu
s IO
Obj
ectiv
esH
ere
Focu
s IO
Task
sH
ere
Mod
ified
IO A
nnex
For
mat
1. S
ITU
ATI
ON
.a.
Are
a of
Ope
ratio
ns.
Des
crib
e th
e in
fo e
nviro
nmen
t. b.
Ene
my
Ope
ratio
ns in
the
Info
Env
ironm
ent.
Des
crib
een
emy’
s de
cisi
on-m
akin
g st
ruct
ure;
C4I
SR
ass
ets,
sys
tem
s,
and
func
tions
, ass
ets
and
orga
niza
tions
ava
ilabl
e to
affe
ct th
e in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
t and
frie
ndly
C4I
SR
; and
crit
ical
ca
pabi
litie
s &
vul
nera
bilit
ies.
c. F
riend
ly C
ap. &
Vul
nera
bilit
ies
in th
e In
fo E
nviro
nmen
t. d.
Civ
il C
onsi
dera
tions
. e.
Atta
chm
ents
and
Det
achm
ents
. Li
st o
rgan
ic a
nd
supp
ortin
g as
sets
ava
ilabl
e to
exe
cute
the
info
ope
ratio
n.2.
MIS
SIO
N.
Sta
te th
e IO
mis
sion
.3.
EX
EC
UTI
ON
.a.
Con
cept
of S
uppo
rt. D
efin
e in
fo s
uper
iorit
y an
d ex
plai
n ho
w IO
will
hel
p ac
hiev
e it.
Des
crib
e th
e in
fo o
pera
tion
(i.e.
,ho
w IO
will
be
cond
ucte
d an
d w
ho w
ill p
erfo
rm it
) fro
m
begi
nnin
g to
end
; to
incl
ude
enem
y ca
pabi
litie
s &
vu
lner
abili
ties
to b
e at
tack
ed a
nd fr
iend
ly c
ritic
al
vuln
erab
ilitie
s to
be
prot
ecte
d.b.
Ass
essm
ent.
b. T
asks
to S
ubor
dina
te U
nits
. c.
IO C
ell.
Lis
t ins
truct
ions
not
list
ed in
the
SO
P.
d. C
oord
inat
ing
Inst
ruct
ions
. 4.
SE
RV
ICE
SU
PP
OR
T.
5. C
OM
MA
ND
AN
D S
IGN
AL.
Plan
ning
Fire
s an
d Ef
fect
s fo
r IO
•Cro
ss-w
alk
IO &
fir
e sp
tann
exes
•Writ
e fir
es p
arag
raph
of
& fi
re s
uppo
rt an
nex
Ord
ers
Pro
d.
•Non
e•B
rief f
ire s
uppo
rt pl
an
as p
art o
f eac
h C
OA
CO
A
App
rova
l
•Inp
ut to
TS
M•F
inal
ize
Con
cept
of
Fire
s•F
inal
ize
HP
TL•D
evel
op T
SM
•Dev
elop
fire
sup
port
cont
rol m
easu
res
CO
A
Ana
lysi
s &
C
omp.
•Inp
ut to
Con
cept
of
Fire
s (o
r E
ffect
s)•N
omin
ate
targ
ets
to H
PTL
•Dev
elop
Con
cept
of
Fire
s (o
r Effe
cts)
•Dev
elop
initi
al H
PTL
•Qua
ntify
effe
cts
for
EFS
Ts
CO
A D
ev.
•Nom
inat
e ta
rget
s to
HV
TL•D
eter
min
e su
ppor
ting
IO
capa
bilit
ies
•Dev
elop
IO
obje
ctiv
es o
r E
IOTs
•Det
erm
ine
spec
ified
, im
plie
d, &
ess
entia
l fire
su
ppor
t tas
ks•D
eter
min
e H
VTL
•Tra
nsla
te fi
re s
uppo
rt as
sets
into
cap
abili
ties
•Dev
elop
dra
ft ta
rget
ing
obje
ctiv
es o
r EFS
Ts
Mis
sion
A
naly
sis
IO A
ctio
nTa
rget
ing
Act
ion
MD
MP
Appendix CAppendix C
Med
iaPo
pula
ceIn
form
atio
n In
fras
truc
ture
Com
bine
d In
form
atio
n O
verla
y
Exa
min
e th
e A
O to
iden
tify
sign
ifica
nt c
hara
cter
istic
s of
eac
h in
fo e
nviro
nmen
t dom
ain.
Ana
lyze
:•T
erra
in –
cana
lizat
ion
and
com
partm
enta
lizat
ion
•Pop
ulat
ion
dem
ogra
phic
s –
dist
ribut
ion,
lang
uage
, rel
igio
n, e
thni
city
, ed
ucat
ion
•Soc
ieta
l stru
ctur
es a
nd o
rgan
izat
ions
–po
litic
al, g
over
nmen
t, re
ligio
us, p
aram
ilitar
y, c
rimin
al•C
ivilia
n in
form
atio
n in
frast
ruct
ure
–ke
y lin
ks a
nd n
odes
•Med
ia –
radi
o, T
V, p
rint,
inte
rnet
, inc
ludi
ng a
udie
nce
& u
sers
•Thi
rd p
arty
org
aniz
atio
ns –
non-
gove
rnm
ent a
nd p
rivat
e•I
nfor
mat
ion
–ke
y id
eolo
gies
, per
cept
ions
and
bel
iefs
that
may
ca
use
spec
ific
frien
dly,
thre
at o
r thi
rd p
arty
beh
avio
r
Det
erm
ine:
•Phy
sica
l Dom
ain
–W
hat a
spec
ts o
f the
terr
ain,
wea
ther
, in
frast
ruct
ure,
and
pop
ulac
e w
ill im
pact
the
empl
oym
ent o
f in
form
atio
n sy
stem
ass
ets
and
the
linki
ng o
f inf
orm
atio
n sy
stem
sin
to n
etw
orks
?•I
nfor
mat
ion
Dom
ain
–W
hat i
nfor
mat
ion
and
its q
ualit
y, fl
ow, a
nd
dist
ribut
ion
will
impa
ct in
form
atio
n sy
stem
s’ fu
nctio
ns (i
.e.,
the
colle
ctio
n, p
roce
ssin
g, a
nd d
isse
min
atio
n of
info
rmat
ion)
?•C
ogni
tive
Dom
ain
–W
hat p
opul
ace
perc
eptio
ns, a
ttitu
de,
awar
enes
s, u
nder
stan
ding
, and
kno
wle
dge
will
influ
ence
dec
isio
n-m
akin
g?
C2
& IM
IO In
tegr
atio
n w
ith IP
B
Def
ine
the
Bat
tlefie
ld
Des
crib
e th
eB
attle
field
’s
Effe
cts
Eva
luat
e th
e Th
reat
Det
erm
ine
Thre
at C
OA
s
IPB
Ste
pIO
Foc
usA
naly
sis
Pro
duct
Def
ine
the
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent
Des
crib
e th
eIn
form
atio
n E
nviro
nmen
t’sE
ffect
s
Eva
luat
e th
e Th
reat
s’ In
foS
yste
m
Det
erm
ine
Thre
at A
ctio
nsin
the
Info
Env
ironm
ent
Com
bine
d In
form
atio
nO
verla
y-S
igni
fican
t ch
arac
teris
tics
of th
ein
fo e
nviro
nmen
t &ef
fect
s on
ope
ratio
ns
Thre
at C
OG
Ana
lysi
s-
Crit
ical
vul
nera
bilit
ies
Thre
at T
empl
ates
-Who
m
akes
dec
isio
ns; w
hat
node
s, li
nks,
& s
yste
ms
the
thre
at u
ses;
how
in
fo a
sset
s ar
e em
ploy
ed
Info
rmat
ion
SIT
EM
P-
Whe
n, w
here
, & w
hy
the
thre
at w
ill s
eek
toga
in in
fo s
uper
iorit
y Fi
eld
Sup
port
Div
isio
n
O
ctob
er 2
002
Exam
ple
CIO
CIO
–Th
e “M
CO
O o
f the
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent”
Des
crib
e th
e In
form
atio
n En
viro
nmen
t’s E
ffect
s
Info
rmat
ion
Envi
ronm
ent C
onst
ruct
Def
ine
the
Info
rmat
ion
Envi
ronm
ent
Key
Ref
eren
ces
JP 2
-01.
3, J
oint
TTP
for I
ntel
ligen
ce P
repa
ratio
n of
the
Bat
tlesp
ace
(MA
Y 00
)FM
34-
130,
Inte
llige
nce
Pre
para
tion
of th
e B
attle
field
(JU
L 94
)1s
tIO
CM
D (L
and)
Info
rmat
ion
IPB
TTB
(Dra
ft)
Phys
ical
•Th
e ta
ngib
le, r
eal w
orld
•W
here
info
sys
tem
s an
d ne
twor
ks
resi
deInfo
rmat
ion
•A
bstra
ct c
onst
ruct
bas
ed o
n in
fo
theo
ry•
Whe
re in
form
atio
n ex
ists
, as
wel
l as
the
med
ium
by
whi
ch in
fo is
co
llect
ed, p
roce
ssed
, and
di
ssem
inat
ed
Cog
nitiv
e•
Indi
vidu
al a
nd c
olle
ctiv
e co
nsci
ousn
ess
•W
here
dec
isio
ns a
re m
ade
•Per
cept
ions
•Aw
aren
ess
•Und
erst
andi
ng
Civ
ilian
info
infr
astr
uctu
re m
ust b
e in
terd
icte
d to
redu
ce th
reat
ad
vant
age
Key
Cha
ract
eris
tics
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent
Dom
ains
IPB
Ste
ps
1.D
efin
e th
e B
attle
field
Env
ironm
ent
2.D
escr
ibe
the
Bat
tlefie
ld’s
Effe
cts
3.E
valu
ate
the
Thre
at4.
Det
erm
ine
Thre
at C
ours
es o
f Act
ion
(CO
As)
1.A
naly
ze e
ach
dom
ain’
s si
gnifi
cant
cha
ract
eris
tics
in d
etai
l an
d te
mpl
ate:
2.C
ombi
ne th
e si
gnifi
cant
cha
ract
eris
tics
of th
e do
mai
ns to
de
velo
p ag
greg
ate
effe
cts
for t
he e
ntire
info
env
ironm
ent.
3.P
lot a
naly
sis
to c
reat
e a
Com
bine
d In
form
atio
n O
verla
y (C
IO).
Th
e C
IO d
epic
ts w
here
and
how
the
info
rmat
ion
envi
ronm
ent’s
po
tent
ial e
ffect
s w
ill im
pact
mili
tary
ope
ratio
ns.
Con
side
ratio
ns:
Info
Sub
-Env
ironm
ent C
: Sou
ther
n Pl
ains
•P
opul
ace:
Den
sely
pop
ulat
ed b
y G
roup
Y (9
5%)
•In
fo fl
ow: F
ollo
ws
grou
nd L
OC
s•
Info
Infra
stru
ctur
e: W
ell d
evel
oped
info
infra
stru
ctur
e; s
uppo
rts
milit
ary
C2;
key
nod
es in
citi
es•
Sup
port:
Stro
ng s
uppo
rt fo
r cur
rent
gov
ernm
ent r
egim
e•
Favo
rs e
nem
y op
erat
ions
Info
Sub
-Env
ironm
ent A
: Nor
ther
n Pl
ains
•P
opul
ace:
Gro
up X
Maj
ority
(80%
)•
Info
flow
: Prim
ary
info
sou
rce
is o
utsi
de c
ount
ry•
Info
infra
stru
ctur
e: U
nder
deve
lope
d &
dila
pida
ted
•S
uppo
rt: L
arge
ly a
nti-g
over
nmen
t reg
ime
•Fa
vors
frie
ndly
forc
e op
erat
ions
Info
Sub
-Env
ironm
ent B
: Cen
tral
Mou
ntai
ns•
Pop
ulac
e: S
pars
ely
popu
late
d by
Gro
up Y
•In
fo fl
ow: I
nfor
mat
ion
vacu
um•
Info
infra
stru
ctur
e: C
anal
ized
alo
ng g
roun
d LO
Cs
•S
uppo
rt: A
mbi
vale
nt to
war
d go
vern
men
t-reg
ime
•N
o si
gnifi
cant
impa
ct o
n fr
iend
ly fo
rce
oper
atio
ns
Gra
phic
por
traya
l of i
nfor
mat
ion
envi
ronm
ent
IO In
tegr
atio
n w
ith IP
B
•C
an th
e A
O b
e di
vide
d in
to d
istin
ct s
ub-in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
ts?
•H
ow d
oes
info
rmat
ion
flow
in th
e A
O?
•Is
ther
e ke
y te
rrai
n in
the
info
rmat
ion
envi
ronm
ent?
Dec
isio
n-M
akin
g
MN
VR &
C
BT
Ops
Coa
x
Roa
ds
Key
Nod
es
Inf
o Fl
ow
1 2 3
124
Sig
nific
ant c
hara
cter
istic
s of
eac
h in
form
atio
n su
b-en
viro
nmen
t
•Inf
orm
atio
n qu
ality
•Inf
orm
atio
n flo
w•I
nfor
mat
ion
dist
ribut
ion
•Ter
rain
(geo
grap
hy)
•Wea
ther
•Inf
rast
ruct
ure
•Pop
ulac
e
Coa
x–
Secu
re c
omm
unic
atio
ns, b
ut n
etw
ork
cove
rage
is
limite
d; u
sed
by m
ilita
ry fo
r C2
Roa
ds–
Use
d fo
r cou
riers
; rel
ativ
ely
wel
l dev
elop
ed b
ut n
ot
easi
ly tr
affic
able
dur
ing
incl
emen
t wea
ther
Cel
lula
r–O
nly
relia
ble
tele
phon
e sy
stem
; com
plet
e co
vera
ge in
nor
ther
n an
d so
uthe
rn p
ortio
ns o
f the
AO
Sate
llite
–Ex
clus
ive
use
by g
over
nmen
t offi
cial
s, o
nly
avai
labl
e in
maj
or c
ities
Infr
astr
uctu
re p
aral
lels
ro
ads
betw
een
maj
or c
ities
. R
ural
are
as la
ck
conn
ectiv
ityC
oax
R
oads
C
ellu
lar
Sa
telli
te
Exte
rnal
info
flow
& in
fluen
ce fr
om
neig
hbor
ing
coun
try
Info
SIT
EMP
–Ph
ase
IIIIn
fo S
ITEM
P –
Phas
e II
Info
SIT
EMP
–Ph
ase
IIn
form
atio
n In
fras
truc
ture
Tem
plat
e
Info
rmat
ion
Tact
ics
Tem
plat
e
Dec
isio
n M
akin
g Te
mpl
ate
This
pro
duct
pro
duce
d by
U.S
. Arm
y, 1
stIn
form
atio
n O
pera
tions
Com
man
d (L
and)
Valid
ity T
estin
g fo
r CO
Gs
Will
dest
ruct
ion,
neu
traliz
atio
n, o
r sub
stan
tial w
eake
ning
of t
he C
OG
re
sult
in c
hang
ing
the
thre
at’s
CO
A o
r den
ying
its
obje
ctiv
e?
Doe
s th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce
have
the
reso
urce
s an
d ca
pabi
lity
to
acco
mpl
ish
dest
ruct
ion
or n
eutra
lizat
ion
of th
e th
reat
CO
G?
If th
e an
swer
is “n
o”, t
hen
the
thre
at’s
iden
tifie
d cr
itica
l fac
tors
mus
t be
revi
ewed
for o
ther
crit
ical
vul
nera
bilit
ies,
or p
lann
ers
mus
t rea
sses
s ho
w to
atta
ck th
e pr
evio
usly
iden
tifie
d cr
itica
l vul
nera
bilit
ies
with
ad
ditio
nal r
esou
rces
.
Crit
eria
for C
V A
naly
sis
(CA
RV
ER
)•C
ritic
ality
. An
estim
ate
of th
e C
Vs
impo
rtanc
e to
the
enem
y. A
vu
lner
abilit
y w
ill si
gnifi
cant
ly in
fluen
ce th
e en
emy’
s ab
ility
to c
ondu
ct
or s
uppo
rt op
erat
ions
.•A
cces
sibi
lity.
A d
eter
min
atio
n of
whe
ther
the
CV
is a
cces
sibl
e to
the
frien
dly
forc
e in
tim
e an
d pl
ace.
•Rec
uper
abilit
y. A
n ev
alua
tion
of h
ow m
uch
effo
rt, ti
me,
& r
esou
rces
th
e en
emy
mus
t exp
end
if th
e C
V is
suc
cess
fully
affe
cted
.•V
ulne
rabi
lity.
A d
eter
min
atio
n of
whe
ther
the
frien
dly
forc
e ha
s th
e m
eans
or c
apab
ility
to a
ffect
the
CV
.•E
ffect
. A d
eter
min
atio
n of
the
exte
nt o
f the
effe
ct a
chie
ved
if th
e C
V
is s
ucce
ssfu
lly e
xplo
ited.
•R
ecog
niza
bilit
y. A
det
erm
inat
ion
if th
e C
V, o
nce
sele
cted
for
expl
oita
tion,
can
be
iden
tifie
d du
ring
the
oper
atio
n by
the
frien
dly
forc
e, a
nd c
an b
e as
sess
ed fo
r the
impa
ct o
f the
exp
loita
tion.
Eval
uate
the
Thre
at -
Cen
ters
of G
ravi
ty
Def
initi
ons
Cen
ter o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G):
Prim
ary
sour
ce o
f mor
al o
r ph
ysic
al s
treng
th, p
ower
, and
resi
stan
ce.
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C) :
Prim
ary
abili
ties
whi
ch m
erit
a C
OG
to b
e id
entif
ied
as s
uch
in th
e co
ntex
t of a
giv
en
scen
ario
, situ
atio
n, o
r mis
sion
.
Crit
ical
Req
uire
men
t (C
R) :
Ess
entia
l con
ditio
ns,
reso
urce
s, a
nd m
eans
for a
crit
ical
cap
abili
ty to
be
fully
op
erat
ive.
Crit
ical
Vul
nera
bilit
y (C
V) :
Crit
ical
requ
irem
ents
(or
com
pone
nts
ther
eof)
whi
ch a
re d
efic
ient
or v
ulne
rabl
e to
at
tack
or i
nflu
ence
in a
man
ner a
chie
ving
dec
isiv
e re
sults
.
1.Id
entif
y po
tent
ial t
hrea
t CO
Gs.
Vis
ualiz
e th
e th
reat
as
a sy
stem
of
func
tiona
l com
pone
nts.
Bas
ed u
pon
how
the
thre
at o
rgan
izes
, fig
hts,
m
akes
dec
isio
ns, a
nd it
s ph
ysic
al a
nd p
sych
olog
ical
stre
ngth
s an
d w
eakn
esse
s, s
elec
t the
thre
at’s
prim
ary
sour
ce o
f mor
al o
r phy
sica
l st
reng
th, p
ower
, and
resi
stan
ce.
2.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al C
apab
ilitie
s (C
C).
Eac
h C
OG
is a
naly
zed
to d
eter
min
e w
hat p
rimar
y ab
ilitie
s (fu
nctio
ns) t
he th
reat
pos
sess
es in
the
cont
ext
of th
e ba
ttlef
ield
and
frie
ndly
mis
sion
that
can
pre
vent
frie
ndly
forc
es
from
acc
ompl
ishi
ng th
e m
issi
on. E
ach
iden
tifie
d C
C m
ust r
elat
e to
the
CO
G, o
ther
wis
e it
is n
ot c
ritic
al in
the
cont
ext o
f the
ana
lysi
s.
3. Id
entif
y C
ritic
al R
equi
rem
ents
(CR
s) fo
r eac
h C
C. A
CR
is a
con
ditio
n,
reso
urce
, or m
eans
that
ena
bles
thre
at fu
nctio
ns o
r mis
sion
. CR
sar
e us
ually
tang
ible
ele
men
ts s
uch
as c
omm
unic
atio
ns m
eans
, wea
pons
sy
stem
s, o
r eve
n ge
ogra
phic
al a
reas
or f
eatu
res.
The
re m
ay b
e m
ore
than
one
CR
per
CC
.
4. Id
entif
y C
ritic
al V
ulne
rabi
litie
s (C
Vs) f
or e
ach
CR
. A C
V is
a C
R, o
r co
mpo
nent
of a
CR
, whi
ch is
vul
nera
ble
to a
ttack
or i
nflu
ence
. As
the
hier
arch
y of
CR
s, a
nd C
Vs a
re d
evel
oped
, int
er-r
elat
ions
hips
and
ov
erla
ppin
g be
twee
n th
e fa
ctor
s ar
e so
ught
in o
rder
to id
entif
y C
Rs
and
CVs
that
sup
port
mor
e th
an o
ne C
C. W
hen
sele
ctin
g C
Vs,
CV
an
alys
is is
con
duct
ed to
pai
r CV
s ag
ains
t frie
ndly
cap
abilit
ies.
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s
CO
G
CC
CC
CC
CV
CV
CV
CV
CR
CR
CR
CR
CV
CV
CO
G A
naly
sis
Hie
rarc
hy
Det
erm
ine
Thre
at A
ctiv
ities
in th
e In
form
atio
n En
viro
nmen
tTe
mpl
atin
g (c
ontin
ued)
Eval
uate
the
Thre
at -
Tem
plat
ing
Info
rmat
ion
SIT
EM
P–
Whe
re, W
hen,
& W
hyth
e th
reat
will
empl
oy it
s in
form
atio
n sy
stem
s. R
esul
t is
an o
vera
ll co
ncep
t and
sup
porti
ng
obje
ctiv
es th
at d
escr
ibes
how
the
adve
rsar
y w
ill op
erat
e in
the
info
rmat
ion
envi
ronm
ent.
•W
hy –
Like
ly in
form
atio
n co
ncep
t & o
bjec
tives
and
task
&
purp
ose
of p
rimar
y in
form
atio
n as
sets
•Whe
re –
Loca
tion
of p
rimar
y in
form
atio
n as
sets
•Whe
n –
Pre
dict
ion
of w
hen
in th
e op
erat
ion
info
ass
ets
will
be
empl
oyed
Form
al L
ink
Info
rmal
Lin
kM
ilita
ryPo
litic
alR
elig
ious
Num
erou
s in
form
al li
nks
allo
w
deci
sion
-mak
ers
to s
eek
guid
ance
ou
tsid
e fo
rmal
dec
isio
n ch
ains
XXXX
XXXX
Dec
isio
n-M
akin
g Te
mpl
ate
–W
hoin
an
orga
niza
tion
mak
es
deci
sion
s. P
urpo
se is
to d
eter
min
e ho
w a
n ad
vers
ary
orga
niza
tion
oper
ates
to a
chie
ve it
s m
issi
on o
r go
als.
Con
side
r:•S
truct
ure
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n•C
ritic
al li
nkag
es &
inte
r-re
latio
nshi
ps•K
ey d
ecis
ion
mak
ers
•Dec
isio
n-m
akin
g ch
arac
teris
tics
(i.e.
cen
traliz
ed, d
ecen
traliz
ed,
othe
r)
Info
rmat
ion
Infra
stru
ctur
e Te
mpl
ate
Wha
tnod
es, l
inks
, ass
ets,
and
m
eans
an
orga
niza
tion
uses
to
colle
ct, p
roce
ss, &
dis
sem
inat
e in
form
atio
n. P
urpo
se is
to id
entif
y cr
itica
l adv
ersa
ry in
form
atio
n sy
stem
no
des,
link
s, &
sys
tem
s (to
incl
ude
thos
e as
sets
cap
able
of i
mpa
ctin
g th
e in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
t).
Con
side
r:•I
nfor
mat
ion
node
s an
d lin
ks•C
omm
unic
atio
ns m
eans
•Sup
port
syst
ems
XXX
Coax
Mili
tary
C
ounc
il
XX X
Satellite
Tactic
alCellu
larCourie
r
Mos
tLe
ast
Pref
eren
ce
Dis
tanc
e (K
M)
8
-12
7-10
5
-6
1
1
10-2
5
Info
rmat
ion
Tact
ics
Tem
plat
eH
owth
e ad
vers
ary
will
empl
oy
avai
labl
e in
form
atio
n as
sets
. P
urpo
se is
to id
entif
y ad
vers
ary
info
rmat
ion
and
info
rmat
ion
syst
em
capa
bilit
ies,
vul
nera
bilit
ies,
and
su
scep
tibilit
ies.
Con
side
r:•D
octri
ne•I
nfor
mat
ion-
capa
ble
asse
ts•E
mpl
oym
ent o
f inf
orm
atio
n as
sets
SPF
Mili
tary
C
ounc
il
I I
I MI I MI
I I E W
XXX
TAC
Com
s In
to:
Mil
Cou
ncil
DIV
Mai
nD
IV T
AC
XXX
Mai
n
FEBA
XX XX
34
3
Mod
el th
e th
reat
by
prod
ucin
g te
mpl
ates
that
por
tray
the
norm
al o
r doc
trina
l (hi
stor
ical
) com
posi
tion
and
orga
niza
tion
ofth
e ad
vers
ary’
s in
form
atio
n sy
stem
and
its
asse
ts.
The
resu
lt sh
ould
iden
tify
adve
rsar
y ca
pabi
litie
s an
d vu
lner
abili
ties
unde
r ide
al c
ondi
tions
in th
e in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
t.
NO
TE:
Tem
plat
es w
ill v
ary
wid
ely
by o
pera
tion.
The
ex
ampl
es p
rese
nted
in th
is g
uide
are
illu
stra
tive
only
.
Thre
at In
fo O
bjec
tives
:1.
Prev
ent c
oalit
ion
inte
l col
lect
ion
2.D
egra
de c
oalit
ion
C2
3.Fo
rman
t civ
ilian
dis
cont
ent
Publ
ic In
form
atio
n:T:
Hig
hlig
ht c
olla
tera
l dam
age
P: D
iscr
edit
coal
ition
mis
sion
M: I
nt’l
med
ia, l
ocal
TV
& ra
dio
Prop
agan
da:
T: In
fluen
ce p
opul
ace
(DC
s)P:
Cau
se in
terf
eren
ce w
ith c
oalit
ion
ops
M: P
rint
pro
duct
s, A
M ra
dio,
HU
MIN
T ag
ents
EW:
T: J
am ta
ctic
al S
IGIN
TP:
Pre
vent
col
lect
ion
agai
nst f
orw
ard
elem
ents
M: C
orps
EW
bat
talio
n
SOF:
T: A
ttack
Cor
ps a
nd D
ivis
ion
CPs
P: S
low
offe
nsiv
e co
mba
t ops
M: D
irect
act
ion,
art
iller
y fir
es
1 3
SPF
I
E W
XX
1
1
1 1
XXX
TAC
1
13 XXX
Mai
n
XX
Cor
ps ta
ctic
al
and
cellu
lar
com
ms
are
the
vita
l lin
k in
the
C2
arch
itect
ure
2 4
4
4
2
2
Sate
llite
XXX
XXX
I
E W
13
FSD
FSD
The
purp
ose
of p
erfo
rmin
g a
thre
at C
OG
ana
lysi
s is
to
dete
rmin
e an
d ev
alua
te th
e en
emy’
s (a
nd o
ther
s’) c
ritic
al
vuln
erab
ilitie
s fo
r exp
loita
tion.
Sin
ce th
is to
ol is
use
d to
eva
luat
e th
e th
reat
, the
app
ropr
iate
tim
e to
per
form
this
ana
lysi
s is
dur
ing
Ste
p 3
(Eva
luat
e th
e Th
reat
) of I
PB
. Th
e re
sults
of C
OG
ana
lysi
s ar
e la
ter u
sed
durin
g C
OA
Dev
elop
men
t to
expl
oit i
dent
ified
vul
nera
bilit
ies.
CO
G a
naly
sis
of th
e th
reat
sho
uld
be c
ondu
cted
by
the
G2.
Th
e IO
sta
ff w
ill p
rovi
de in
put t
o, a
nd u
se, C
OG
ana
lysi
s to
de
term
ine
wha
t asp
ects
of t
he th
reat
IO s
houl
d en
gage
.
Thre
at C
OG
Ana
lysi
s an
d th
e M
DM
P
Fiel
d S
uppo
rt D
ivis
ion
Dec
embe
r 200
2
Key
Def
initi
ons
Cen
ter o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G):
Cha
ract
eris
tics,
cap
abili
ties,
or s
ourc
es o
f pow
er fr
om
whi
ch a
milit
ary
forc
e de
rives
its
freed
om o
f act
ion,
phy
sica
l stre
ngth
, or w
ill to
fig
ht. (
JP 5
-00.
1)
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C):
Cap
abili
ties
that
are
con
side
red
cruc
ial e
nabl
ers
for
the
adve
rsar
y’s
CO
G to
func
tion
as s
uch,
and
are
ess
entia
l to
the
acco
mpl
ishm
ent o
f the
adv
ersa
ry’s
ass
umed
obj
ectiv
e(s)
. (JP
5-0
0.1)
C
ritic
al R
equi
rem
ent (
CR
): E
ssen
tial c
ondi
tions
, res
ourc
es, a
nd m
eans
for a
cr
itica
l cap
abili
ty to
be
fully
ope
ratio
nal.
(JP
5-0
0.1)
C
ritic
al V
ulne
rabi
lity
(CV
): A
spec
ts o
r com
pone
nts
of th
e ad
vers
ary’
scr
itica
l ca
pabi
litie
s (o
r com
pone
nts
ther
eof),
whi
ch a
re d
efic
ient
or v
ulne
rabl
e to
ne
utra
lizat
ion,
inte
rdic
tion,
or a
ttack
in a
man
ner a
chie
ving
dec
isiv
e or
si
gnifi
cant
resu
lts. (
JP 5
-00.
1) Threat
CO
G A
naly
sis
Aid
5.Pr
iorit
ize
CVs
. C
AR
VE
R is
a S
OF
met
hodo
logy
use
d to
pr
iorit
ize
targ
ets.
The
met
hodo
logy
can
be
used
to ra
nk-
orde
r crit
ical
vul
nera
bilit
ies,
ther
eby
prio
ritiz
ing
the
targ
etin
g pr
oces
s. A
pply
the
six
crite
ria a
gain
st e
ach
CV
to
det
erm
ine
impa
ct o
n th
e th
reat
org
aniz
atio
n. S
ee
App
endi
x D
, FM
34-
36 fo
r mor
e in
form
atio
n on
CA
RV
ER
.
1.Id
entif
y Th
reat
Cen
ter(
s) o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G).
Vis
ualiz
e th
e th
reat
as
a sy
stem
of f
unct
iona
l com
pone
nts.
Bas
ed
upon
how
the
thre
at o
rgan
izes
, fig
hts,
mak
es d
ecis
ions
, an
d its
phy
sica
l & p
sych
olog
ical
stre
ngth
s an
d w
eakn
esse
s, s
elec
t the
thre
at’s
prim
ary
sour
ce o
f mor
al
or p
hysi
cal s
treng
th, p
ower
, & re
sist
ance
. N
ote:
D
epen
ding
on
the
leve
l (i.e
. stra
tegi
c, o
pera
tiona
l, ta
ctic
al),
CO
Gs
may
be
tang
ible
ent
ities
or i
ntan
gibl
e co
ncep
ts.
Valid
ity T
estin
g fo
r CO
Gs:
2.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al C
apab
ilitie
s (C
C).
Eac
h C
OG
is
anal
yzed
to d
eter
min
e w
hat p
rimar
y ab
ilitie
s (fu
nctio
ns)
the
thre
at p
osse
sses
in th
e co
ntex
t of t
he b
attle
field
and
fri
endl
y m
issi
on th
at c
an p
reve
nt fr
iend
ly fo
rces
from
ac
com
plis
hing
the
mis
sion
. N
ote:
CC
s ar
e no
t tan
gibl
e ob
ject
s bu
t rat
her a
re th
reat
func
tions
.
Valid
ity T
estin
g fo
r CC
s:
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s
Key
Ref
eren
ces
JP 5
-00.
1, J
oint
Doc
trine
for C
ampa
ign
Plan
ning
(Jan
200
2)FM
3-0
, Ope
ratio
ns (J
un 2
001)
FM 3
4-36
, SO
F In
tellig
ence
and
EW
Ope
ratio
ns (S
ep 1
991)
1s
t IO
CM
D In
form
atio
n IP
B T
TP (D
raft)
CO
G A
naly
sis
Hie
rarc
hyC
OG
CC
CR
CR
CR
CC
CC
CR
CV
CV
CV
CV
CV
Cen
ter o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G).
At t
he s
trate
gic
leve
l the
re is
us
ually
onl
y on
e C
OG
. A
t ope
ratio
nal a
nd ta
ctic
al le
vels
th
ere
may
be
mor
e th
an o
ne C
OG
. A
CO
G m
ay s
hift
as a
n op
erat
ion
chan
ges
phas
es.
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C).
Eac
h C
OG
can
hav
e m
ultip
le
criti
cal c
apab
ilitie
s in
the
cont
ext o
f the
bat
tlefie
ld a
nd
frien
dly
mis
sion
.
Crit
ical
Req
uire
men
t (C
R).
Eac
h C
C c
an h
ave
seve
ral
criti
cal r
equi
rem
ents
. C
ritic
al re
quire
men
ts m
ay b
e sh
ared
by
mul
tiple
CC
s.
Crit
ical
Vul
nera
bilit
y (C
V).
Eac
h C
R c
an h
ave
seve
ral
criti
cal v
ulne
rabi
litie
s. C
ritic
al v
ulne
rabi
litie
s m
ay b
e sh
ared
by
mul
tiple
CR
s.
3.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al R
equi
rem
ents
(CR
s).
Eac
h C
C is
an
alyz
ed to
det
erm
ine
wha
t con
ditio
ns, r
esou
rces
, or
mea
ns th
at e
nabl
es th
reat
func
tions
or m
issi
on. N
ote:
C
Rs
are
usua
lly ta
ngib
le e
lem
ents
suc
h as
co
mm
unic
atio
ns m
eans
, wea
pons
sys
tem
s, o
r eve
n ge
ogra
phic
al a
reas
or t
erra
in e
atur
es.
Valid
ity T
estin
g fo
r CR
s:
4.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al V
ulne
rabi
litie
s (C
Vs).
Eac
h C
C is
an
alyz
ed to
det
erm
ine
whi
ch C
Rs,
or c
ompo
nent
s th
ereo
f, ar
e vu
lner
able
to n
eutra
lizat
ion,
inte
rdic
tion,
or
atta
ck.
Not
e: C
Vs
may
be
tang
ible
stru
ctur
es o
r eq
uipm
ent,
or it
may
be
an in
tang
ible
per
cept
ion,
po
pula
ce b
elie
f or s
usce
ptib
ility
.
Valid
ity T
estin
g fo
r CVs
:
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s (c
ontin
ued)
Cen
ter o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G)
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C)
Crit
ical
Req
uire
men
t (C
R)
Crit
ical
Vul
nera
bilit
y (C
V)
Rec
eipt
of M
issi
on
Mis
sion
Ana
lysi
s
CO
A D
evel
opm
ent
CO
A A
naly
sis
MD
MP
Step
CO
A C
ompa
rison
CO
A A
ppro
val
Ord
ers
Pro
duct
ion
Step
3, I
PB: C
OG
Ana
lysi
s:•
Iden
tify
thre
at C
OG
(s),
CC
s, &
CR
s•
Iden
tify
CVs
Step
1, A
naly
ze R
elat
ive
Com
bat
Pow
er:
•Pr
iorit
ize
CVs
(CAR
VE
R A
naly
sis)
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s (c
ontin
ued)
Will
the
dest
ruct
ion,
neu
traliz
atio
n, o
r sub
stan
tial w
eake
ning
of
the
CO
G re
sult
in c
hang
ing
the
thre
at’s
CO
A o
r den
ying
its
obje
ctiv
e(s)
?
Is th
e id
entif
ied
criti
cal c
apab
ility
a pr
imar
y ab
ility
in c
onte
xt
with
the
give
n m
issi
ons
of b
oth
thre
at a
nd fr
iend
ly fo
rces
? Is
the
iden
tifie
d C
C d
irect
ly re
late
d to
the
CO
G?
Will
expl
oita
tion
of th
e C
V d
isab
le th
e as
soci
ated
CR
? D
oes
the
frien
dly
forc
e ha
ve th
e re
sour
ces
to e
ffect
the
iden
tifie
d C
V?
Will
the
abse
nce
or lo
ss o
f the
iden
tifie
d C
R d
isab
le th
e th
reat
’s
CC
?D
oes
the
thre
at c
onsi
der t
he id
entif
ied
CR
to b
e cr
itica
l (do
not
m
irror
imag
e)?
••C
ritic
ality
. A
n es
timat
e of
the
CV’
s im
porta
nce
to th
e en
emy.
To
wha
t ext
ent w
ill th
e vu
lner
abilit
y in
fluen
ce th
e en
emy’
s ab
ility
to c
ondu
ct o
r sup
port
oper
atio
ns.
•A
cces
sibi
lity.
A d
eter
min
atio
n of
whe
ther
the
CV
is a
cces
sibl
e to
th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce
in ti
me
and
plac
e. I
n ot
her w
ords
, doe
s th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce
have
the
reso
urce
s an
d ca
pabi
lity
to a
ccom
plis
h de
stru
ctio
n or
neu
traliz
atio
n of
the
CV?
•
Rec
uper
abilit
y. A
n ev
alua
tion
of h
ow m
uch
effo
rt, ti
me,
&
reso
urce
s th
e en
emy
mus
t exp
end
if th
e C
V is
suc
cess
fully
af
fect
ed.
•Vu
lner
abilit
y. A
det
erm
inat
ion
of w
heth
er th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce
has
the
mea
ns o
r cap
abilit
y to
affe
ct th
e C
V.
•Ef
fect
. A d
eter
min
atio
n of
the
exte
nt o
f the
effe
ct a
chie
ved
if th
e C
V is
suc
cess
fully
exp
loite
d.
•R
ecog
niza
bilit
y. A
det
erm
inat
ion
if th
e C
V, o
nce
sele
cted
for
expl
oita
tion,
can
be
iden
tifie
d du
ring
the
oper
atio
n by
the
frien
dly
forc
e, a
nd c
an b
e as
sess
ed fo
r the
impa
ct o
f the
ex
ploi
tatio
n.
Fitti
ng F
riend
ly C
OG
Ana
lysi
s in
to th
e M
DM
P
Fiel
d S
uppo
rt D
ivis
ion
Dec
embe
r 200
2
Key
Def
initi
ons
Cen
ter o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G):
Cha
ract
eris
tics,
cap
abili
ties,
or s
ourc
es o
f pow
er fr
om
whi
ch a
milit
ary
forc
e de
rives
its
freed
om o
f act
ion,
phy
sica
l stre
ngth
, or w
ill to
fig
ht. (
JP 5
-00.
1)
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C):
Cap
abili
ties
that
are
con
side
red
cruc
ial e
nabl
ers
for
the
frie
ndly
CO
G to
func
tion
as s
uch,
and
are
ess
entia
l to
the
acco
mpl
ishm
ent
of th
e ad
vers
ary’
s as
sum
ed o
bjec
tive(
s). (
mod
JP
5-00
.1)
Crit
ical
Req
uire
men
t (C
R):
Ess
entia
l con
ditio
ns, r
esou
rces
, and
mea
ns fo
r a
criti
cal c
apab
ility
to b
e fu
lly o
pera
tiona
l. (J
P 5
-00.
1)
Crit
ical
Vul
nera
bilit
y (C
V):
Asp
ects
or c
ompo
nent
s of
the
frie
ndly
criti
cal
capa
bilit
ies
(or c
ompo
nent
s th
ereo
f), w
hich
are
def
icie
nt o
r vul
nera
ble
to
neut
raliz
atio
n, in
terd
ictio
n, o
r atta
ck in
a m
anne
r ach
ievi
ng d
ecis
ive
or
sign
ifica
nt re
sults
. (m
odifi
ed J
P 5
-00.
1)
Friendly
CO
G A
naly
sis
Aid
1.Id
entif
y Fr
iend
ly C
ente
r(s)
of G
ravi
ty (C
OG
). S
elec
t the
fri
endl
y fo
rce
desi
gnat
ed to
exe
cute
the
oper
atio
n’s
mai
n ef
fort
as th
e C
OG
. If
the
mai
n ef
fort
chan
ges
durin
g th
e op
erat
ion
(i.e.
by
phas
e), t
hen
so w
ill th
e C
OG
.Va
lidity
Tes
ting
for C
OG
s:
2.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al C
apab
ilitie
s (C
C).
Sel
ect t
he m
ain
effo
rt’s
key
task
s id
entif
ied
by th
e G
3 pl
anne
r. T
hese
ta
sks
beco
me
the
criti
cal c
apab
ilitie
s fo
r tha
t pha
se o
f the
op
erat
ion.
Va
lidity
Tes
ting
for C
Cs:
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s
Key
Ref
eren
ces
JP 5
-00.
1, J
oint
Doc
trine
for C
ampa
ign
Plan
ning
(Jan
200
2)FM
3-0
, Ope
ratio
ns (J
un 2
001)
FM 3
4-36
, SO
F In
tellig
ence
and
EW
Ope
ratio
ns (S
ep 1
991)
1s
t IO
CM
D C
OA
Dev
elop
men
t TTP
(Dra
ft)
CO
G A
naly
sis
Hie
rarc
hyC
OG
CC
CR
CR
CR
CC
CC
CR
CV
CV
CV
CV
CV
3.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al R
equi
rem
ents
(CR
s).
Eac
h C
C (t
ask)
ne
eds
criti
cal a
sset
s in
ord
er to
exe
cute
the
task
. Th
ese
criti
cal a
sset
s be
com
e th
e cr
itica
l req
uire
men
ts fo
r tha
t C
C.
Valid
ity T
estin
g fo
r CR
s:
4.Id
entif
y C
ritic
al V
ulne
rabi
litie
s (C
Vs).
The
CR
sid
entif
ied
have
inhe
rent
vul
nera
bilit
ies
as w
ell a
s vu
lner
abili
ties
base
d up
on th
reat
cap
abili
ties.
The
se
iden
tifie
d C
Vs
mus
t be
acco
unte
d fo
r whe
n de
velo
ping
C
OA
sso
redu
ce th
e op
erat
iona
l ris
k as
soci
ated
with
the
mis
sion
.Va
lidity
Tes
ting
for C
Vs:
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s (c
ontin
ued)
Cen
ter o
f Gra
vity
(CO
G)
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C)
Crit
ical
Req
uire
men
t (C
R)
Crit
ical
Vul
nera
bilit
y (C
V)
Rec
eipt
of M
issi
on
Mis
sion
Ana
lysi
s
CO
A D
evel
opm
ent
CO
A A
naly
sis
MD
MP
Step
CO
A C
ompa
rison
CO
A A
ppro
val
Ord
ers
Pro
duct
ion
Step
1, A
naly
ze R
elat
ive
Com
bat
Pow
er:
•Id
entif
y fri
endl
y C
OG
(s),
CC
s, &
CR
s•
Iden
tify
CVs
Step
4, D
evel
op S
chem
e of
M
aneu
ver:
•Pa
ir th
reat
cap
abilit
ies
agai
nst f
riend
ly C
Vs
to d
eter
min
e de
gree
of v
ulne
rabi
lity.
CO
G A
naly
sis
Step
s (c
ontin
ued)
The
purp
ose
of p
erfo
rmin
g a
frien
dly
CO
G a
naly
sis
is to
de
term
ine
and
eval
uate
the
frien
dly
forc
e’s
criti
cal
vuln
erab
ilitie
s. O
nce
iden
tifie
d, th
ese
vuln
erab
ilitie
s ar
e ad
dres
sed
as a
def
ensi
ve p
lan
with
in th
e ov
eral
l con
cept
of t
he
oper
atio
n.
Sin
ce th
is to
ol is
use
d to
iden
tify
frien
dly
forc
e vu
lner
abili
ties
rela
tive
to th
e pl
anne
d sc
hem
e of
man
euve
r, th
e be
st ti
me
to
perfo
rm th
is a
naly
sis
is d
urin
g C
OA
Dev
elop
men
t:C
ente
r of G
ravi
ty (C
OG
). T
he fr
iend
ly ta
ctic
al /
oper
atio
nal
CO
G is
the
forc
e de
sign
ated
to e
xecu
te th
e m
ain
effo
rt.
Sin
ce th
e m
ain
effo
rt sh
ifts
as a
n op
erat
ion
chan
ges
phas
es, s
o w
ill th
e C
OG
.
Crit
ical
Cap
abili
ty (C
C).
Crit
ical
cap
abili
ties
of th
e fri
endl
y C
OG
are
thos
e ke
y ta
sk(s
) tha
t the
mai
n ef
fort
mus
t ac
com
plis
h.
Crit
ical
Req
uire
men
t (C
R).
Eac
h C
C c
an h
ave
seve
ral
criti
cal r
equi
rem
ents
. C
ritic
al re
quire
men
ts m
ay b
e sh
ared
by
mul
tiple
CC
s.
Crit
ical
Vul
nera
bilit
y (C
V).
Eac
h C
R c
an h
ave
seve
ral
criti
cal v
ulne
rabi
litie
s. C
ritic
al v
ulne
rabi
litie
s m
ay b
e sh
ared
by
mul
tiple
CR
s.
This
pro
duct
pro
duce
d by
U.S
. Arm
y, 1
stIn
form
atio
n O
pera
tions
Com
man
d (L
and)
(Mai
n E
ffort)
(Key
Tas
ks)
(Crit
ical
Ass
ets)
5.Pr
iorit
ize
CVs
. Th
e C
AR
VE
R m
etho
dolo
gy c
an b
e us
ed
to ra
nk-o
rder
crit
ical
vul
nera
bilit
ies,
ther
eby
prio
ritiz
ing
the
oper
atio
ns to
miti
gate
thes
e vu
lner
abili
ties.
See
App
endi
x D
, FM
34-
36 fo
r mor
e in
form
atio
n on
CA
RV
ER
.
•C
ritic
ality
. A
n es
timat
e of
the
CV’
s im
porta
nce
to th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce.
To
wha
t ext
ent w
ill th
e vu
lner
abilit
y in
fluen
ce th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce’
s ab
ility
to c
ondu
ct o
r sup
port
oper
atio
ns.
•A
cces
sibi
lity.
A d
eter
min
atio
n of
whe
ther
the
CV
is a
cces
sibl
e to
th
e th
reat
in ti
me
and
plac
e. I
n ot
her w
ords
, doe
s th
e th
reat
ha
ve th
e re
sour
ces
and
capa
bilit
y to
acc
ompl
ish
dest
ruct
ion
or
neut
raliz
atio
n of
the
CV?
•
Rec
uper
abilit
y. A
n ev
alua
tion
of h
ow m
uch
effo
rt, ti
me,
&
reso
urce
s th
e fri
endl
y fo
rce
mus
t exp
end
if th
e C
V is
su
cces
sful
ly a
ffect
ed.
•Vu
lner
abilit
y. A
det
erm
inat
ion
of w
heth
er th
e th
reat
has
the
mea
ns o
r cap
abilit
y to
affe
ct th
e C
V.
•Ef
fect
. A d
eter
min
atio
n of
the
exte
nt o
f the
effe
ct a
chie
ved
if th
e C
V is
suc
cess
fully
exp
loite
d.
•R
ecog
niza
bilit
y. A
det
erm
inat
ion
if th
e C
V, o
nce
sele
cted
for
expl
oita
tion,
can
be
iden
tifie
d du
ring
the
oper
atio
n by
the
thre
at,
and
can
be a
sses
sed
for t
he im
pact
of t
he e
xplo
itatio
n.
Not
e: T
his
met
hodo
logy
for a
naly
zing
the
frie
ndly
forc
e is
bas
ed
on th
e as
sum
ptio
n th
at th
e fr
iend
ly fo
rce
CO
G is
the
mai
n ef
fort
for t
he o
pera
tion.
Thi
s co
ncep
t is
mos
t val
id a
t the
ope
ratio
nal
and
tact
ical
leve
ls.
Will
the
dest
ruct
ion,
neu
traliz
atio
n, o
r sub
stan
tial w
eake
ning
of
the
CO
G re
sult
in c
hang
ing
the
frien
dly
CO
A o
r den
ying
its
obje
ctiv
e(s)
?
Is th
is ta
sk c
ritic
al to
the
succ
ess
of th
e m
ain
effo
rt in
the
cont
ext o
f the
giv
en m
issi
on (t
ask)
? If
the
CO
G d
oes
not s
ucce
ssfu
lly e
xecu
te th
e C
C, w
ill th
e C
OA
ch
ange
?
Will
expl
oita
tion
of th
e C
V d
isab
le th
e as
soci
ated
CR
? D
oes
the
thre
at h
ave
the
reso
urce
s to
effe
ct th
e id
entif
ied
CV
?C
an th
e C
V b
e ef
fect
ed b
y an
y ot
her e
ntity
oth
er th
an th
e th
reat
?
Can
the
CO
G c
ondu
ct th
e C
C w
ith th
e lo
ss o
f the
iden
tifie
d C
R?
Appendix DAppendix D
33%
Inc
reas
e in
Neg
ativ
e In
cide
nts
2 N
eg1
Pos
0 N
eg3
Pos
5 N
eg
2 N
eg
1 N
eg0
Neg
2 Po
s
3 N
egW
eekl
y A
vera
ge:
•N
egat
ive
-12
•P
osit
ive
-6
Neg
ativ
e In
cide
nts
•V
iole
nce
agai
nst
Frie
ndly
For
ce2
•In
terf
eren
ce w
/ Fri
endl
y Fo
rce
5
•E
thni
c V
iole
nce
2
•P
olit
ical
Vio
lenc
e
2
•C
ivil
Dis
obed
ienc
e0
•H
osti
le P
ropa
gand
a1
•O
ther
Inc
iden
ts
1
Tot
al 1
6
Pos
itiv
e In
cide
nts
•P
eace
ful D
emon
stra
tion
s 1
•R
efug
ees
& I
DP
s0
•O
ther
Pos
itiv
e In
cide
nts
2•
Pop
ulac
e C
oope
rati
on
3T
otal
6
Exam
ple
Tren
d A
naly
sis
Four
Wee
k A
sses
smen
t Per
iod
(Jan
uary
)
Tren
d A
naly
sis
Ass
essm
ent t
ools
sup
port
BD
A, M
OE
, and
CA
by
help
ing
corre
late
eve
nts
(i.e.
, est
ablis
h ca
use
and
effe
ct) i
n th
e ph
ysic
al, i
nfor
mat
ion,
& c
ogni
tive
dom
ains
to IO
task
s,
obje
ctiv
es, a
nd m
issi
on.
Two
com
mon
ly u
sed
asse
ssm
ent t
ools
are
:Tr
end
Ana
lysi
s–
Mea
sure
s ch
ange
s in
the
oper
atin
g en
viro
nmen
t. C
an b
e us
ed to
:•
Org
aniz
e ob
serv
ed a
ctiv
ities
in th
e in
form
atio
nen
viro
nmen
t in
a w
ay th
at a
ssis
ts th
e dr
awin
g of
co
nclu
sion
s.•
Pro
vide
indi
rect
indi
cato
rs (e
.g.,
even
ts /
actio
nsno
t con
clus
ivel
y co
rrela
ted
to th
e in
form
atio
nop
erat
ion,
but
may
be
the
resu
lt of
IO) t
o su
ppor
tes
timat
ion
of a
ggre
gate
IO e
ffect
s.Im
pact
Ass
essm
ent –
A P
SY
OP
tool
use
d to
det
erm
ine
the
effe
ctiv
enes
s of
an
oper
atio
n by
pro
vidi
ng in
dica
tors
of
beh
avio
rs o
r atti
tude
s re
lativ
e to
the
oper
atio
n’s
obje
ctiv
es.
Can
be
used
to:
•P
rovi
de in
dica
tors
that
obj
ectiv
es a
re re
sulti
ng in
the
desi
red
2nd
and
3rd
orde
r effe
cts.
•D
eter
min
e ef
fect
iven
ess
of th
e in
form
atio
n op
erat
ion.
This
pro
duct
pro
duce
d by
U.S
. Arm
y, 1
stIn
form
atio
n O
pera
tions
Com
man
d (L
and)
Dev
elop
ing
an A
sses
smen
t Pla
n1.
Dev
elop
BD
A fo
r key
IO ta
sks.
•BD
A s
houl
d de
term
ine
wha
t frie
ndly
and
adv
ersa
ryac
tions
occ
urre
d in
the
phys
ical
and
info
dom
ains
(1st
& 2
nd o
rder
effe
cts)
.2.
Dev
elop
MO
E to
det
erm
ine
effe
cts
in th
e in
form
atio
nan
d co
gniti
ve d
omai
ns (2
nd &
3rd
ord
er e
ffect
s).
•Writ
e on
e or
mor
e M
OE
to a
sses
s ea
ch IO
obje
ctiv
e.3.
Dev
elop
CA
to d
eter
min
e re
sults
in th
e co
gniti
vedo
mai
n (3
rd o
rder
effe
cts)
. •C
A s
houl
d as
sess
if d
ecis
ion-
mak
ers
are
resp
ondi
ng a
s pr
edic
ted.
4. W
rite
the
asse
ssm
ent p
lan;
incl
ude
in IO
ann
ex.
5. D
evel
op a
mec
hani
sm to
obt
ain
info
rmat
ion
need
edto
det
erm
ine
1st,
2nd,
& 3
rd o
rder
effe
cts:
•Sub
mit
RFI
s ba
sed
upon
the
asse
ssm
ent p
lan.
•Dev
elop
IO in
put t
o C
CIR
.•C
oord
inat
e w
ith B
DA
repo
rting
with
DO
CC
and
targ
etin
g bo
ard.
•Rev
iew
ass
essm
ents
at I
OW
Gs.
•Mon
itor i
ntel
ligen
ce &
ope
ratio
ns in
cide
nt re
porti
ng.
Ass
essm
ent T
ools
Exam
ple
Ass
essm
ent f
or a
n O
bjec
tive
IO O
bjec
tive:
Dis
rupt
gro
und
forc
e co
mm
ande
r’s C
2 in
or
der t
o pr
even
t syn
chro
niza
tion
of c
orps
and
div
isio
n op
erat
ions
. 1s
t Ord
er E
ffect
(BD
A) f
or
Phy
sica
l Dom
ain
•D
estro
yed
corp
s &
div
isio
n H
Qs.
•D
estro
yed
or
capt
ured
reco
n,
inte
llige
nce,
su
rvei
llanc
e, &
ta
rget
acq
(RIS
TA) a
sset
s.
•D
estro
yed
or
jam
med
com
mo
node
s.
•N
o at
tack
s ag
ains
t frie
ndly
fo
rce
criti
cal
asse
ts.
2nd
Ord
er E
ffect
(B
DA
/MO
E) f
or
Info
Dom
ain
•D
ecre
ased
co
rps
&
divi
sion
-leve
l co
mm
o tra
ffic.
•1s
t & 2
nd
oper
atio
nal
grou
ps u
nabl
e to
syn
chro
nize
fir
es a
nd
man
euve
r ab
ove
divi
sion
le
vel.
3rd
Ord
er E
ffect
(M
OE
/CA
) for
C
ogni
tive
Dom
ain
Ene
my
Cdr
co
mm
its re
serv
efo
rce
to th
e ea
staw
ay fr
om fr
iend
ly
forc
es’m
ain
atta
ck.
1. D
eter
min
e fre
quen
cy o
f ana
lysi
s.2.
Det
erm
ine
wha
t act
ivity
/ ev
ents
mus
t be
reco
rded
. 3.
Est
ablis
h ba
selin
e ac
tivity
.4.
Mea
sure
and
ana
lyze
mag
nitu
de a
nd ra
tes
of c
hang
e to
the
base
line
in te
rms
of ti
me,
pla
ce, a
nd ty
pe o
f act
ivity
.
Tim
e–
Perio
d of
ass
essm
ent
durin
g w
hich
the
inci
dent
s oc
curr
ed
Activ
ity–
Type
of a
ctiv
ity a
nd
num
ber o
f inc
iden
ts d
urin
g th
e as
sess
men
t per
iod Plac
e–
Loca
tion
in A
O w
here
re
cord
ed in
cide
nts
occu
rred
•Im
pact
indi
cato
rs a
re o
bser
vabl
e be
havi
or th
at
indi
cate
suc
cess
or f
ailu
re to
ach
ieve
the
IO
obje
ctiv
es.
•Tw
o ty
pes
of in
dica
tors
: P
ositi
ve –
Act
ivity
that
co
rrela
tes
with
the
obje
ctiv
es’ e
ffect
s. N
egat
ive
–A
ctiv
ity th
at is
opp
osite
of t
he th
e ob
ject
ives
’ des
ired
effe
cts.
Impa
ct A
sses
smen
t
Exam
ple
Impa
ct In
dica
tor A
naly
sis
IO O
bjec
tives
Influ
ence
po
pula
ce to
su
ppor
t US
oper
atio
ns
Den
y in
surg
ent
supp
ort f
rom
loca
l po
pula
ce
Dis
rupt
ext
rem
ist
influ
ence
Indi
cato
rs
3 Vi
olen
t dem
onst
ratio
nsdi
rect
ed a
gain
st U
S Fo
rces
Tens
ions
eas
ing
betw
een
Gov
erno
r A a
nd U
S Fo
rces
Polit
ical
lead
ers
publ
icly
pra
ise
US
pres
ence
and
ope
ratio
ns
Insu
rgen
ts p
aid
rew
ards
to k
illpr
o-U
S go
vern
men
t offi
cial
s3
Inci
dent
s of
insu
rgen
t rec
ruiti
ng
Incr
ease
d po
pula
ce re
port
ing
on in
surg
ent a
ctiv
ity
Har
dlin
er ra
lly p
oorly
atte
nded
Loca
l new
spap
er d
enou
nces
extr
emis
t lea
der
Ass
essm
ent
AN
o C
hang
e
RN
o C
hang
e
GIm
prov
emen
t
Ass
essm
ent T
ips
1.Ke
ep th
e in
form
atio
n op
erat
ion
sim
ple,
or
asse
ssm
ent o
f 2nd
and
3rd
ord
er e
ffect
s m
ay
be im
poss
ible
.
2.Be
as
obje
ctiv
e as
pos
sibl
e w
hen
asse
ssin
g B
DA
. A
sses
smen
t of t
he in
form
atio
n an
d co
gniti
ve d
omai
ns w
ill b
e pa
rtial
ly, i
f not
en
tirel
y, s
ubje
ctiv
e.
3.U
se a
naly
sis
tool
s to
sup
port
conc
lusi
ons.
•D
o no
t fix
ate
the
asse
ssm
ent e
ffort
on th
e ph
ysic
al d
omai
n.
•S
eek
to e
stab
lish
caus
e an
d ef
fect
in e
ach
info
rmat
ion
envi
ronm
ent d
omai
n.
•It
is n
eces
sary
to u
nder
stan
d IO
’sag
greg
ate
effe
cts
in th
e ph
ysic
al d
omai
n in
ord
er to
dra
w a
va
lid c
oncl
usio
n ab
out e
ffect
s in
the
info
rmat
ion
and
cogn
itive
dom
ains
.
MO
E
Fiel
d S
uppo
rt D
ivis
ion
D
ecem
ber 2
002
Mea
sure
s of
Effe
ctiv
enes
s (M
OE)
Key
Def
initi
ons
Bat
tle D
amag
e A
sses
smen
t (B
DA
): T
he ti
mel
y an
d ac
cura
te e
stim
ate
of d
amag
e re
sulti
ng fr
om th
e ap
plic
atio
n of
mili
tary
forc
e, e
ither
leth
al o
r non
leth
al,
agai
nst a
pre
dete
rmin
ed o
bjec
tive.
(JP
1-2
0)
Mea
sure
s of
Effe
ctiv
enes
s (M
OE
): T
ools
use
d to
m
easu
re re
sults
ach
ieve
d in
the
over
all m
issi
on a
nd
exec
utio
n of
ass
igne
d ta
sks.
MO
E a
re a
pre
requ
isite
to
the
perfo
rman
ce o
f com
bat a
sses
smen
t. (J
P 3
-60)
Com
bat A
sses
smen
t (C
A) :
The
det
erm
inat
ion
of th
e ov
eral
l effe
ctiv
enes
s of
forc
e em
ploy
men
t dur
ing
milit
ary
oper
atio
ns.
(JP
3-6
0)
IO A
sses
smen
t Aid
Bat
tle D
amag
e A
sses
smen
t (B
DA
)
Hie
rarc
hy o
f Effe
cts
BD
A m
easu
res
the
effe
cts
of fr
iend
ly a
ctio
ns a
gain
stad
vers
ary
info
sys
tem
s an
d as
sets
in th
e ph
ysic
al d
omai
nin
ord
er to
det
erm
ine
whe
ther
IO ta
sks
or s
ets
of ta
sks
have
acc
ompl
ishe
d th
e in
tend
ed p
urpo
se.
As
a m
inim
um,
key
IO ta
sks
shou
ld h
ave
BD
A.
Not
e: B
DA
mus
t be
obje
ctiv
e.
Phys
ical
(Man
euve
r & C
btO
ps)
•Inf
o sy
stem
s &
ass
ets
•Net
wor
ks
Info
rmat
ion
(C2
& IM
)•I
nfor
mat
ion
–qu
ality
& c
onte
nt•I
nfo
syst
em fu
nctio
ns -
colle
ctio
n, p
roce
ssin
g,
& d
isse
min
atio
n)
Cog
nitiv
e(D
ecis
ion-
mak
ing)
•Per
cept
ions
•Atti
tude
s•U
nder
stan
ding
Info
rmat
ion
Env
ironm
ent
Dom
ains
MO
E e
stim
ate
the
aggr
egat
e ef
fect
s of
IO ta
sks
to d
eter
min
e if
the
IO o
bjec
tives
are
cre
atin
g th
e de
sire
d ef
fect
s in
the
info
and
co
gniti
ve d
omai
ns.
2nd
Ord
er M
OE
–E
stim
ate
effe
cts
in th
e in
fo d
omai
n (in
fo
qual
ity, c
onte
nt, &
flow
).
3rd
Ord
er M
OE
–E
stim
ate
effe
cts
in th
e co
gniti
ve d
omai
n(e
nem
y &
oth
er ld
rs’p
erce
ptio
ns, a
ttitu
des,
& u
nder
stan
ding
).
Writ
ing
MO
E:
•E
ach
IO o
bjec
tive
shou
ld h
ave
one
or m
ore
MO
E.
•If
poss
ible
, MO
E s
houl
d be
obs
erva
ble,
qua
ntifi
able
,pr
ecis
e, a
nd c
orre
late
d to
the
effe
ct o
f the
obj
ectiv
e.•
Use
the
obje
ctiv
e’s
purp
ose
as a
gui
de to
wha
t mus
t be
obse
rved
, rep
orte
d, a
nd a
sses
sed.
•If
an M
OE
is d
iffic
ult t
o w
rite
for a
par
ticul
ar o
bjec
tive,
then
re-v
isit
the
obje
ctiv
e to
ens
ure
it ha
s a
clea
rly d
efin
ed,
atta
inab
le e
ffect
. If
nece
ssar
y, re
-writ
e th
e ob
ject
ive.
Form
at–
MO
E s
tate
men
ts in
clud
e:•
A m
etric
-a s
tand
ard
of m
easu
rem
ent s
uch
as a
cha
nge
in
the
info
env
ironm
ent o
r adv
ersa
ry e
ffort
/ tec
hniq
ue,
resp
onse
or n
on-r
espo
nse.
•W
hatd
ata
is to
be
obse
rved
, col
lect
ed, &
mea
sure
d (in
term
sof
num
ber,
time,
etc
).•
Exa
mpl
e: I
ncre
ase
(the
met
ric) o
f loc
al p
opul
ace
supp
ort f
or
frien
dly
forc
es (w
hat i
s to
be
mea
sure
d).
Ass
essm
ent M
etho
dolo
gyIn
form
atio
n O
pera
tion
IO
Mis
sion
IO T
asks
to
Ele
men
ts&
Uni
ts
IO
Obj
ectiv
es
MO
Efo
r eac
hIO
Obj
ectiv
e
BD
A fo
r Key
IO T
asks
Ass
essm
ent
Tool
Ass
essm
ent
Focu
s
Pro
ceed
with
, or c
hang
e, p
lan
Effe
cts C
omba
t Ass
essm
ent (
CA
)C
A a
sses
ses
the
over
all e
ffect
of t
he in
form
atio
n op
erat
ion
(par
ticul
arly
in th
e co
gniti
ve d
omai
n) in
ord
er to
det
erm
ine
whe
ther
IO is
ach
ievi
ng it
s m
issi
on.
Res
ults
are
use
d to
de
cide
if th
e IO
pla
n (c
once
pt o
f sup
port)
sho
uld
proc
eed
or c
hang
e.
•C
A is
an
aggr
egat
e of
MO
E a
sses
smen
ts.
•C
A a
nsw
ers
the
ques
tions
-W
hat d
id IO
do?
Did
IOac
hiev
e th
e de
sire
d ef
fect
in th
e co
gniti
ve d
omai
n?S
houl
d th
e in
form
atio
n op
erat
ion
be m
odifi
ed?
1st O
rder
Effe
cts
Effe
cts
resu
lting
from
ac
tions
aga
inst
info
sy
stem
s &
ass
ets
2nd
Ord
er E
ffect
sE
ffect
s on
info
rmat
ion
& in
form
atio
n flo
w
3rd
Ord
er E
ffect
sE
ffect
s on
adv
ersa
ry &
othe
rs’ d
ecis
ion-
mak
ing
Ass
essm
ent
of
IO O
bjec
tives
(Effe
cts)
Com
bat
Asse
ssm
ent
of In
fo O
p(R
esul
ts)
1. P
hysi
cal A
sses
smen
tQ
uant
itativ
e es
timat
e of
the
exte
nt
of p
hysi
cal i
mpa
ct o
n sp
ecifi
c in
fo
syst
ems
and
asse
ts.
Mea
sure
s th
e ou
tcom
e of
a s
ingl
e ta
sk.
2. F
unct
iona
l Ass
essm
ent
Estim
ate
of th
e fu
nctio
nal
cons
eque
nces
to a
dver
sary
info
sy
stem
s an
d as
sets
. In
ferr
ed fr
om
the
phys
ical
ass
essm
ent o
f an
IO
task
. 3. T
arge
t Sys
tem
Ass
essm
ent
Asse
ssm
ent o
f the
ove
rall
impa
ct
and
effe
ctiv
enes
s of
IO ta
sks
agai
nst a
n en
tire
info
sys
tem
ca
pabi
lity.
Est
imat
es th
e ou
tcom
e of
mul
tiple
IO ta
sks.
IO T
asks
BD
A
BDA
con
sist
s of
thre
e di
ffere
nt
asse
ssm
ents
Ove
rall
asse
ssm
ent b
y on
as
sess
men
t of o
bjec
tives
Ass
essm
ent f
or
each
Obj
ectiv
e
Ass
essm
ent
of K
ey IO
Task
s(A
ctio
ns)
Exam
ple
Obj
ectiv
e A
sses
smen
tIO
Obj
ectiv
e #2
:i.e
.: “D
isru
pt
grou
nd fo
rce
Cdr
’s C
2 IO
T….”
Out
com
e of
Tas
ks
Uni
t des
igna
tion,
geo
grap
hica
l re
gion
, or o
ther
met
hod
of
quan
tifyi
ng ta
sk a
ctio
ns
Effe
cts
of IO
task
s –
Res
ults
of
phys
ical
, fun
ctio
nal,
or ta
rget
sy
stem
ass
essm
ent
Dis
rupt
Cor
ps &
D
ivis
ion
C2
Des
troy
1st
Ech
elon
Rec
on T
eam
s
Key
Tas
k #3
Tim
e Pe
riod
PredictiveAssessment
A Key
Tas
k #4
Key
Tas
k #5
Start
IIaIIb
III
RR
AA
A
GG
AA
R1s
t C
orps
HQ
Des
troy
ed
2nd
Cor
ps H
QD
estr
oyed
1st O
p G
rp
Div
HQ
sD
isru
pted
Res
erve
Div
HQ
sD
egra
ded
2nd
Op
Grp
D
iv H
Qs
Dis
rupt
ed
Exam
ple
Com
bat A
sses
smen
t
IO M
issi
on:
Dis
rupt
Cor
ps &
D
iv C
2
Res
ults
of I
O O
bjec
tives
Tim
e Pe
riod
Start
IIa
PredictiveAssessment
Uni
t des
igna
tion,
geo
grap
hica
l re
gion
, or o
ther
met
hod
of
quan
tifyi
ng th
e ob
ject
ives
’ effe
cts
Des
troy
1st
Ech
lnR
econ
Tea
ms
IO O
bjec
tive
#3:
IO O
bjec
tive
#4:
IIbIII
A
Effe
cts
of IO
obj
ectiv
es –
Estim
ate
of 2
nd a
nd 3
rd o
rder
ef
fect
s
RR
RA
A
AA
GR
G
1st E
chln
C2
Des
troy
ed
2nd
Echl
nC
2D
isru
pted
Res
erve
C2
Deg
rade
dG
GA
AR R
RA
AA
Arm
y C
drun
able
tosy
ncfo
rces
Appendix E
Training Considerations for Information Operations (IO)
General
Prior to establishing an IO training program, unit personnel should consult FM 7-0, Training the
Force; FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training; FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-13, Information
Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; and Joint Pub 3-13, Joint
Doctrine for Information Operations for tips on effective IO training.
Effective employment of IO depends on the ability to organize and train in the manner we willfight. What this means at the tactical level is that we train personnel directly responsible forexecuting the IO mission by integrating unit training throughout the live, virtual, andconstructive environments; focusing on the area of operations (AO); and using a crawl-walk-runmethodology culminating in a collective event stressing the IO team. While IO education can betaught separately, collective unit training should build on ongoing IO activities within the AOand transition to possible courses of action (COAs) responding to real-world contingencies, e.g.,crisis deterrence, conflict resolution, etc. The intent of this appendix is to provide ideas andinformation for IO training. In the end, training IO is no different than training for othercollective events, in that the basic tenants of Army training must be applied, which includesconducting an after-action review (AAR) after all training.
Unit training focusing on either offensive or defensive IO must consider all available andpotential available capabilities, which include multinational, Department of Defense (DOD), andjoint assets.
Normally, offensive and defensive IO training are integrated, emphasizing protection anddefense of information and information systems. Therefore, when planning IO training, considerthe appropriate scope and duration of the exercise. Remember, some IO capabilities fall outsidethe normal Army chain, and scripting of multinational, DOD, and joint capabilities needconsideration. Thus, in order to obtain the true complexity of IO, you must incorporate thosechallenges of coordinating IO activities with other agencies, including nongovernmental.
Whenever possible, the commander accomplishes IO training through combined-armsoperations. Even at the tactical level, the commander uses IO to disrupt or destroy enemyinformation systems through electronic warfare (EW) and physical destruction, which is mostcommon at the brigade and battalion level. IO, applied correctly, is a combat multiplier thatenhances the potential for friendly forces to defeat enemy forces in detail. The commandermaintains access to his information system through operations security (OPSEC)/informationsecurity (INFOSEC) and electronic protection (EP). He seeks access to the adversary’s systemthrough counter-command and control (C2) and manipulates both systems to create aknowledge-based battlefield advantage that can be exploited by military forces to achieve themission objective. Commanders who successfully plan and conduct IO significantly increase thepotential of their force’s combat power and control the tempo of the battle. IO is the means bywhich Army forces will fight and win the information war.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-1
INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
As you build your IO plan, consider the three methods for executing IO training: stand alonetraining, supported training, and supporting training. In stand alone training, your focus is on theadversary and your desire to affect the way he operates; that is, mitigating and interdicting hismethod of operating. You can use supported training when the focus is on IO in the main effort.There will be time when this is the case, so you ought to plan for this occasionally. Lastly, youcan use supporting IO training when IO is applied as a force multiplier coupled with aconventional tactical operation, which is most of the time.
Essentials for Planning IO Training
The following considerations are fundamental for planning IO exercises. While this list is not allinclusive, it provides a basic road map for planning, conducting, and evaluating a unit exercise.
For additional information on Army training, see FM 7-0, Training the Force, and FM 7-1,
Battle Focused Training.
• Determine the environment in which the training will take place: live, constructive, orvirtual (see Chapter 4 of FM 7-1).
• Will the training leverage on-going unit training, and, if so, how will trainingintegration take place?
• Develop concrete attainable IO objectives (see Chapter 3 of FM 7-1).
• Create a realistic IO environment attempting to emulate the unit’s operatingenvironment.
• Exercise all six IO activities in the context of the exercise.
• Provide for sufficient IO actions to support exercise objectives.
• Assess and evaluate IO employment.
• Exercise both offensive and defensive IO using all the capabilities available to the unitwhere it will operate.
• Exercise intelligence support to IO.
• Plan for and use appropriate security measures to protect IO tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP).
Organization for Training
Whenever possible, the IO cell should have representatives from the targeting cell, targetingboard, joint operations and targeting coordination board, or whatever integrating process thecommander uses to integrate and synchronize his resources. If these assets are not available,scripting should be considered. Additionally, each element of command and control warfare(C2W), along with the civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA), should be represented as well.Replicating tactical combat operations, the targeting representative may become the focus ofactivity. When training, consider the functions of the IO, which are:
E-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
• Planning the overall IO effort for the commander.
• Developing IO concepts to support the scheme of maneuver.
• Establishing IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives.
• Determining the availability of IO resources to carry out plans.
Consolidated tasking will assist in the integration and synchronization required for effective IO.As the spectrum of engagement moves between peace to war and back again, it is appropriate tostand up an IO cell and exercise it. Listed below is a graphically diagramed notional IO cell foryour consideration. The actual configuration depends on your situation and operationalenvironment.
Figure E-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-3
INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
IO WorkingGroup
(IOWG)*S3
S6/SignalOfficer
S2
OPSEC
MilitaryDeception
PSYOP
EWOfficer
Targeting/Fire Spt
Chaplain
IO Augmentation Rep
PAO
CivilAffairs
S3 Plans/Mil Deception
Chairperson
IOO
SJA
MP Rep POLAD
* May include others, i.e., ADA, AVN, ENG, NBC, SOF, LNOs, S4
Considerations for Training
Effective IO first requires specific information products on the adversary’s military (C2,intelligence, and capabilities), social, religious, and economic background that may have to beprovided by exercise planners. The data needed to create, update, and use these products needs tobe built into the exercise scenario and master scenario events list.
Secondly, the opposition force should have an IO capability consistent with the exercisescenario. Realistic IO are essential to evaluating friendly IO.
Finally, consistent with the tenets of the exercise, free play of IO must take place by both Blueand Red forces. Pre-structured, mechanical IO will degrade the participant’s ability to gainvaluable experience from the demands of mental agility and creativity that unstructured IO canprovide. Senior exercise participants should allow, even welcome, the C2 chaos that effectiveIO can cause to the exercise participants, and work through such problems.
Well before the exercise, you must develop a basic IO mission essential task list (METL) thatincludes tasks and subtasks. If it is possible, obtain the IO METL from the unit you may backfillin theater and compare the lists. Nevertheless, whatever list you develop, there must be tasks foreach IO capability available to your unit. The IO METL enhances the objective of achievinginformation dominance at selected places and times during an operation. Consider the followingtasks for inclusion:
• Determining required IO information and how to get answers.
º Identify the commander’s IO critical information requirements, priorityintelligence requirements (PIR), and high-priority targets and synchronizeintelligence and information plans and military plans on a near-real-time basis.
º Establish information-linked strategic, operational, and tactical collection,fusion, and report processes (incorporating reconnaissance, surveillance, andtarget acquisition [RISTA]/sensor and counterintelligence [CI]/humanintelligence [HUMINT] data) to develop continuous, timely IO intelligencepreparation on the battlefield (IPB).
• Knowing your IO capabilities and vulnerabilities in relation to the enemy, thenatural environment, the political setting, international law, and so forth.
º Identify and prioritize IO essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
• Knowing enemy IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.
º Maintain a continuous IO estimate of potential adversaries and/or otheroperational situations in support of IO situational awareness and battlefieldvisualization.
º Assess adversary command, control, communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I)/C2W operations, strengths, and vulnerabilities continuously.
E-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
• Knowing how the enemy sees your capabilities and vulnerabilities in terms of IO,the battlefield, and PIR.
º Understand the enemy’s decision-making process.
º Identify the enemy’s critical IO nodes.
º Develop enemy leader personality profiles.
º Understand the enemy’s decision-making doctrine, tactics, and standingoperating procedures (SOPs).
• Protecting critical and vulnerable friendly IO.
º Establish open-source processes to obtain, process, provide, secure, and releasecritical IO information, including PA, CA, governmental, and nongovernmentalinformation, within legal and policy constraints.
º Establish and maintain critical, secure, intertheater/intratheater militarycommunications and computer networks that support IO: for example,digitization, radar communication processor (RCP), situational awareness,battlefield visualization, distribution, and C2 across the battlespace.
º Assess friendly C2 vulnerabilities and C2; protect operations continuously andadjust to maintain C2 effectiveness.
º Achieve C2 protection in support of data integrity and infrastructure protection,IO/C2 node protection, spectrum superiority/control, and graceful degradation.
º Establish procedures to regain information dominance when it is discoveredthat the enemy has achieved information dominance.
• Attacking critical enemy IO vulnerabilities.
º Establish C2-attack targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA) andestablish links to expedite dissemination of adversary information, to includetimely sensor-to-shooter links.
º Attack, deny, degrade, exploit, and/or influence adversary C4I/C2Wcapabilities or other operations using lethal and nonlethal means.
(Note: Portions of the above information were extracted from Appendix D of FM 3-13,
Information Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; and Chapter VI of JP
3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E-5
INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
Appendix FAppendix F
Key
Def
initi
ons
Targ
etin
g: T
he p
roce
ss o
f sel
ectin
g ta
rget
s an
d m
atch
ing
the
appr
opria
te re
spon
se to
them
, tak
ing
acco
unt o
f op
erat
iona
l req
uire
men
ts a
nd c
apab
ilitie
s. (
JP 1
-02/
FM
101-
5-1
)Ta
rget
: A
n ar
ea, c
ompl
ex, i
nsta
llatio
n, fo
rce,
equ
ipm
ent,
capa
bilit
y, fu
nctio
n, o
r beh
avio
r ide
ntifi
ed fo
r pos
sibl
e ac
tion
to s
uppo
rt th
e co
mm
ande
r’s o
bjec
tives
, gui
danc
e an
d in
tent
. (J
P 3
-60/
FM 1
01-5
-1)
Fire
s: T
he e
ffect
s of
leth
al o
r non
-leth
al w
eapo
ns.
(J
P
1-02
)Ta
rget
ing
Effe
cts:
The
exp
ecte
d re
sults
of w
eapo
ns
agai
nst s
peci
fic ta
rget
s.
Fiel
d S
uppo
rt D
ivis
ion
May
200
4
Key
Ref
eren
ces
FM 6
-20-
10, T
TP fo
r The
Tar
getin
g P
roce
ss (M
AY
96)
FM 3
-13,
Info
rmat
ion
Ope
ratio
ns:
Doc
trine
, Tac
tics,
Te
chni
ques
, and
Pro
cedu
res
(NO
V 0
3)
IO T
arge
ting
&
Effe
cts
Aid
Term
s
Hig
h V
alue
Tar
get (
HV
T):
A ta
rget
the
enem
y co
mm
ande
r re
quire
s fo
r the
suc
cess
ful c
ompl
etio
n of
the
mis
sion
. Th
e lo
ss o
f hig
h-va
lue
targ
ets
wou
ld b
e ex
pect
ed to
ser
ious
ly
degr
ade
impo
rtant
ene
my
func
tions
thro
ugho
ut th
e fri
endl
y co
mm
ande
r’s a
rea
of in
tere
st.
(JP
1-0
2)
Hig
h P
ayof
f Tar
get (
HP
T): A
targ
et w
hose
loss
will
si
gnifi
cant
ly c
ontri
bute
to th
e su
cces
s of
frie
ndly
cou
rses
of
actio
n. H
igh-
payo
ff ta
rget
s ar
e th
ose
high
-val
ue ta
rget
s id
entif
ied
thro
ugh
war
-gam
ing,
whi
ch m
ust b
e ac
quire
d an
d su
cces
sful
ly a
ttack
ed fo
r the
suc
cess
of t
he c
omm
ande
r’s
mis
sion
. (J
P 1
-02)
Ess
entia
l Fire
Sup
port
Task
(EFS
T):
A ta
sk fo
r fire
sup
port
to a
ccom
plis
h th
at is
requ
ired
to s
uppo
rt a
com
bine
d ar
ms
oper
atio
n.
Ess
entia
l Fie
ld A
rtille
ry T
ask
(EFA
T):
A ta
sk fo
r Fie
ld
Arti
llery
that
mus
t be
acco
mpl
ishe
d to
ach
ieve
an
EFS
T.
Ess
entia
l Inf
orm
atio
n O
pera
tions
Tas
k (E
IOT)
: A
task
for
IO th
at m
ust b
e ac
com
plis
hed
to a
chie
ve a
n E
FST.
Doc
trin
al E
ffect
s Fo
r IO
(FM
3-1
3)
Des
troy
–D
amag
e a
com
bat s
yste
m s
o ba
dly
that
it
cann
ot p
erfo
rm a
ny fu
nctio
n or
be
rest
ored
to a
usa
ble
cond
ition
with
out b
eing
ent
irely
rebu
ilt.
Dis
rupt
–In
info
rmat
ion
oper
atio
ns, m
eans
bre
akin
g or
in
terru
ptin
g th
e flo
w o
f inf
orm
atio
n be
twee
n se
lect
ed
C2
node
s.
Deg
rade
–In
info
rmat
ion
oper
atio
ns, i
s us
ing
non-
leth
al o
r tem
pora
ry m
eans
to re
duce
the
effe
ctiv
enes
s or
effi
cien
cy o
f adv
ersa
ry c
omm
and
and
cont
rol
syst
ems,
and
info
rmat
ion
colle
ctio
n ef
forts
or m
eans
.
Den
y –
In in
form
atio
n op
erat
ions
, ent
ails
with
hold
ing
info
rmat
ion
abou
t Arm
y fo
rce
capa
bilit
ies
and
inte
ntio
ns
that
adv
ersa
ries
need
for e
ffect
ive
and
tim
ely
deci
sion
mak
ing.
Dec
eive
–C
ause
a p
erso
n to
bel
ieve
wha
t is
not t
rue.
Expl
oit –
In in
form
atio
n op
erat
ions
, is
to g
ain
acce
ss to
ad
vers
ary
com
man
d an
d co
ntro
l sys
tem
s to
col
lect
in
form
atio
n or
to p
lant
fals
e or
mis
lead
ing
info
rmat
ion.
Influ
ence
–C
ause
adv
ersa
ries
or o
ther
s to
beh
ave
in
a m
anne
r fav
orab
le to
Arm
y fo
rces
.
Doc
trin
al T
arge
ting
Effe
cts
(FM
6-2
0-10
)
The
follo
win
g ar
e th
e st
anda
rd “l
etha
l”ta
rget
ing
effe
cts
used
by
the
fire
supp
ort e
lem
ent:
Lim
it –
Red
ucin
g th
e op
tions
or c
ours
es o
f act
ion
avai
labl
e to
the
enem
y co
mm
ande
r.
Dis
rupt
–P
recl
ude
effe
ctiv
e in
tera
ctio
n or
the
cohe
sion
of
ene
my
com
bat a
nd c
omba
t sup
port
syst
ems.
Del
ay –
Alte
r the
tim
e of
arri
val o
f for
ces
at a
poi
nt o
n th
e ba
ttlef
ield
or t
he a
bilit
y of
the
enem
y to
pro
ject
co
mba
t pow
er fr
om a
poi
nt o
n th
e ba
ttlef
ield
.
Div
ert –
Tie
up c
ritic
al e
nem
y re
sour
ces.
Des
troy
–To
rend
er ta
rget
a ta
rget
so
dam
aged
that
it
cann
ot fu
nctio
n as
inte
nded
nor
be
rest
ored
to a
use
able
co
nditi
on w
ithou
t bei
ng e
ntire
ly re
built
.
Plan
ning
Fire
s an
d Ef
fect
s fo
r IO
•Cro
ss-w
alk
IO &
fir
e sp
tann
exes
•Writ
e fir
es p
arag
raph
of
& fi
re s
ptan
nex
Ord
ers
Pro
d.
•Non
e•B
rief f
ire s
uppo
rt pl
an
as p
art o
f eac
h C
OA
CO
A
App
rova
l
•Inp
ut to
TS
M•F
inal
ize
Con
cept
of
Fire
s•F
inal
ize
HP
TL•D
evel
op T
SM
•Dev
elop
fire
sup
port
cont
rol m
easu
res
CO
A
Ana
lysi
s &
C
omp.
•Inp
ut to
Con
cept
of
Fire
s (o
r E
ffect
s)•N
omin
ate
targ
ets
to H
PTL
•Dev
elop
Con
cept
of
Fire
s (o
r Effe
cts)
•Dev
elop
initi
al H
PTL
•Qua
ntify
effe
cts
for
EFS
Ts
CO
A D
ev.
•Nom
inat
e ta
rget
s to
HV
TL•D
eter
min
e su
ppor
ting
IO
capa
bilit
ies
•Dev
elop
IO
obje
ctiv
es o
r E
IOTs
•Det
erm
ine
spec
ified
, im
plie
d, &
ess
entia
l fire
su
ppor
t tas
ks•D
eter
min
e H
VTL
•Tra
nsla
te fi
re s
uppo
rt as
sets
into
cap
abili
ties
•Dev
elop
dra
ft ta
rget
ing
obje
ctiv
es o
r EFS
Ts
Mis
sion
A
naly
sis
IO A
ctio
nTa
rget
ing
Act
ion
MD
MP
IO In
put t
o th
e Ta
rget
ing
Cyc
le
•A
naly
ze th
e C
DR
’sm
issi
on, i
nten
t, co
ncep
t and
initi
al p
lann
ing
guid
ance
.•
Dev
elop
inpu
t to
targ
etin
g ob
ject
ives
.•
Dev
elop
IO e
ssen
tial e
ffect
s ta
sks
whi
ch s
uppo
rt th
e ta
rget
ing
obje
ctiv
es.
•D
eter
min
e w
hich
targ
ets
to e
ngag
e (le
thal
and
non
-leth
al) –
how
, whe
n, &
de
sire
d ef
fect
.•
Pro
vide
inpu
t to
Atta
ck G
uida
nce
Mat
rix (A
GM
) or T
arge
ting
Syn
chro
niza
tion
Mat
rix (T
SM
).•
Pro
vide
inpu
t to
asse
ssm
ent p
lan.
•U
pdat
e th
e H
PTL
& A
GM
/TS
M.
•E
xecu
te th
e en
gage
men
t IA
W th
e A
GM
/TS
M.
•E
valu
ate
if th
e de
sire
d ef
fect
s w
ere
achi
eved
.•
Bas
ed o
n as
sess
men
t, pr
opos
e ta
rget
re
-eng
agem
ent /
cha
nges
to
enga
gem
ent s
chem
e.
Targ
etin
g St
ep
AS
SE
SS
DE
LIV
ER
Act
ions
DE
CID
E1
DE
TEC
T2 3 4
DEL
IVER
ASS
ESS
3
4
PU
RP
OS
E:
Exe
cutio
n of
the
targ
etin
g pl
an in
acco
rdan
ce w
ith th
e TS
M /
ES
M.
IO T
AS
KS
:•
In c
onju
nctio
n w
ith th
e FE
CC
/DO
CC
:-
Ens
ure
ratio
nale
for e
ngag
emen
ts is
stil
l val
id.
-C
oord
inat
e en
gage
men
ts a
s re
quire
d.•
Col
lect
BD
A fr
om e
xecu
ted
enga
gem
ents
to fe
ed in
to
asse
ssm
ent e
fforts
.•
Beg
in c
olle
ctio
n of
MO
P a
nd M
OE
to fe
ed in
to
asse
ssm
ent e
fforts
.
PU
RP
OS
E:
Det
erm
ine
the
over
all e
ffect
iven
ess
of th
eIO
por
tion
of th
e ta
rget
ing
plan
. Th
is e
ffort
shou
ldfo
cus
on o
bjec
tives
to d
eter
min
e if
the
desi
red
effe
cts
are
bein
g ac
hiev
ed.
IO T
AS
KS
:•
Exe
cute
ass
essm
ent p
lan:
−
Mon
itor t
he in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
t in
orde
r to
iden
tify
and
asse
ss in
dica
tors
of c
hang
e.−
Mon
itor a
dver
sary
act
ions
and
sta
tus
for a
ny
indi
catio
ns th
at IO
eng
agem
ents
are
hav
ing
an
impa
ct.
−M
onito
r frie
ndly
forc
es’ s
tatu
s fo
r ind
icat
ions
that
ad
vers
ary
oper
atio
ns in
the
info
rmat
ion
envi
ronm
ent a
re h
avin
g su
cces
s.−
Det
erm
ine
the
effe
ctiv
enes
s of
mes
sage
s an
d ho
w
they
sho
uld
be re
fined
for g
reat
er e
ffect
.•
Re-
enga
gem
ent R
ecom
men
datio
n: B
ased
on
the
asse
ssm
ent,
dete
rmin
e if
the
targ
et re
quire
s re
-en
gage
men
t and
/or i
f the
met
hod
of d
eliv
ery,
del
iver
y as
set o
r mes
sage
requ
ires
mod
ifica
tion.
•A
djus
tmen
ts to
the
enga
gem
ent p
lan
(TS
M /
ES
M) a
s ap
prop
riate
to a
ccom
plis
h th
e de
sire
d ef
fect
s.
NO
TE:
Rep
rese
ntat
ive
exam
ple;
form
ats
vary
by
com
man
d, b
ut th
e sa
me
type
info
rmat
ion
will
be p
rese
nted
. IO
targ
ets
and
enga
gem
ents
sho
uld
be e
mbe
dded
in th
e pl
anni
ng p
rodu
cts
to
impr
ove
sync
hron
izat
ion.
DET
ECT
2P
UR
PO
SE
: V
alid
ate
targ
ets
sele
cted
for e
ngag
emen
t and
id
entif
y ot
her t
arge
ts fr
om in
form
atio
n ga
ined
thro
ugh
the
colle
ctio
n pl
an.
IO T
AS
KS
: •
Mon
itor e
xecu
tion
of IO
-rel
ated
task
s in
the
ISR
sy
nchr
oniz
atio
n m
atrix
/ co
llect
ion
plan
.•
Ens
ure
targ
ets
of in
tere
st to
IO a
re tr
acke
d.•
Mod
ify th
e tim
ing
and
prio
rity
of e
ngag
emen
ts a
nd d
esire
d ef
fect
s ba
sed
on e
volv
ing
situ
atio
n.
Targ
et /
Effe
cts
Sync
hron
izat
ion
Mat
rix
(TSM
/ ES
M)
•To
ol fo
r pla
nnin
g an
d sy
nchr
oniz
ing
leth
al a
nd n
on-
leth
al e
ngag
emen
ts.
•Th
e TS
M /
ES
M is
pro
duce
d by
FE
CC
/DO
CC
, with
inpu
t fro
m th
e IO
sec
tion
and
the
battl
e st
aff.
This
pro
duct
pro
duce
d by
U.S
. Arm
y, 1
stIn
form
atio
n O
pera
tions
Com
man
d (L
and)
, Fie
ld S
uppo
rt D
ivis
ion
DEC
IDE
PU
RP
OS
E:
Pro
vide
an
over
all f
ocus
for t
arge
ting
effe
cts
and
set p
riorit
ies
for i
ntel
ligen
ce c
olle
ctio
n an
den
gage
men
t pla
nnin
g.
IO T
AS
KS
:•
In c
onju
nctio
n w
ith th
e in
telli
genc
e ce
lls b
oth
insi
de
targ
etin
g ce
ll an
d th
e IO
sec
tion
(if a
vaila
ble)
, ide
ntify
kn
own
/ em
ergi
ng fr
iend
ly a
nd th
reat
cap
abili
ties
and
vuln
erab
ilitie
s.•
Iden
tify
inte
llige
nce
gaps
in in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
t an
alys
is a
nd re
fine
IRs
for i
nclu
sion
in th
e co
llect
ion
man
ager
’s c
olle
ctio
n pl
an.
•D
eter
min
e w
hich
thre
at v
ulne
rabi
litie
s th
at m
ust b
e at
tack
ed a
nd fr
iend
ly c
apab
ilitie
s th
at m
ust b
e pr
otec
ted
in th
e in
form
atio
n en
viro
nmen
t in
orde
r to
achi
eve
the
desi
red
effe
cts.
•Id
entif
y an
d pr
iorit
ize
targ
ets
& ta
rget
set
s fo
r IO
. Th
ese
targ
ets
are
HV
Ts(i.
e., k
ey le
ader
s, C
2, c
ivilia
n po
pula
ce, t
hrea
t gro
ups,
etc
.).•
Det
erm
ine
the
time
(incl
udin
g du
ratio
n) a
nd p
lace
in
the
battl
espa
cew
hen
the
effe
ct m
ust b
e ac
hiev
ed to
su
ppor
t the
com
man
der’s
sch
eme
of m
aneu
ver.
•P
rovi
de th
is in
put t
o ta
rget
ing
obje
ctiv
es.
1
Writ
ing
MO
E•
Eac
h IO
ET
shou
ld h
ave
one
or m
ore
MO
E.
•U
se th
e ta
sk’s
pur
pose
as
a gu
ide
to w
hat m
ust b
e ob
serv
ed, r
epor
ted,
and
ass
esse
d.•
MO
E s
houl
d in
clud
e bo
th o
bjec
tive
and
subj
ectiv
e m
etric
s to
mak
e a
mor
e ho
listic
eva
luat
ion
of s
ucce
ss.
•S
ubje
ctiv
e M
OE
sho
uld
be o
bser
vabl
e, q
uant
ifiab
le,
prec
ise,
and
cor
rela
ted
to th
e ef
fect
of t
he IO
ET.
•O
bjec
tive
MO
E s
houl
d be
dire
ctly
tied
to th
e IO
ET,
and
gi
ves
the
com
man
der a
dire
ct in
put i
nto
asse
ssm
ent.
•If
an M
OE
is d
iffic
ult t
o w
rite
for a
par
ticul
ar IO
ET,
then
re-
visi
t the
IOE
T to
ens
ure
it ha
s a
clea
rly d
efin
ed, a
ttain
able
ef
fect
. R
e-w
rite
if ne
cess
ary.
Form
at–
MO
E s
tate
men
ts in
clud
e:•
A m
etric
-a s
tand
ard
of m
easu
rem
ent s
uch
as a
cha
nge
in
the
info
env
ironm
ent o
r adv
ersa
ry e
ffort
/ tec
hniq
ue,
resp
onse
or n
on-r
espo
nse.
•W
hatd
ata
is to
be
obse
rved
, col
lect
ed, &
mea
sure
d (in
te
rms
of n
umbe
r, tim
e, e
tc).
•E
xam
ple:
Inc
reas
e (th
e m
etric
) of l
ocal
pop
ulac
e su
ppor
t fo
r frie
ndly
forc
es (w
hat i
s to
be
mea
sure
d).
Exa
mpl
e M
OE
: •
(Sub
j) Le
vel o
f par
amili
tary
influ
ence
on
the
popu
lace
.•
Per
cent
age
of p
ositi
ve /
neut
ral /
nega
tive
artic
les
publ
ishe
d in
loca
l new
spap
ers.
DEC
IDE
(con
tinue
d)•
Dev
elop
dis
cret
e E
ssen
tial I
O T
asks
(EIO
Ts).
EIO
Tsar
e ke
y ta
sks
that
mus
t be
exec
uted
to a
chie
ve th
e co
mm
ande
r’s ta
rget
ing
obje
ctiv
es a
t the
iden
tifie
d tim
e an
d pl
ace.
Ava
ilabl
e as
sets
sho
uld
be p
riorit
ized
to e
xecu
te
thes
e E
IOTs
abov
e al
l oth
er ta
sks.
•Id
entif
y ta
rget
(s) w
hich
sho
uld
be e
ngag
ed to
sup
port
iden
tifie
d E
IOTs
. Th
ese
are
HP
Ts
•D
eter
min
e th
e de
sire
d ef
fect
for t
he E
IOT.
Thi
s sh
ould
cl
early
iden
tify
wha
t is
to b
e ac
com
plis
hed
by e
ngag
ing
the
targ
et.
•E
IOTs
shou
ld b
e w
ritte
n:E
ffect
: D
estro
y, D
egra
de, D
isru
pt, D
ecei
ve, D
eny,
In
fluen
ce, e
tc.
Targ
et /
Targ
et S
et:
The
obje
ct o
f the
inte
nded
effe
ct.
P
urpo
se:
The
expl
anat
ion
of w
hyth
e ta
rget
set
or t
arge
t m
ust b
e en
gage
d.
•D
evel
op a
pla
n to
ass
ess
IO e
ffect
s an
d ta
sks.
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information in the CALL Archives is password-protected. You may obtain your own password by
accessing our Web site and visiting the CALL Archives page. Click on "Restricted Access" and "CALL
Archives Access Request." After you have filled in the information and submitted the request form, we
will mail you a password. You may also request a password via STU III telephone or a SIPRNET e-mail
account.
CALL's products are produced at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and are not distributed through publication
channels. Due to limited resources, CALL selectively provides its products for distribution to units,
organizations, agencies, and individuals and relies on them to disseminate initial distribution of each
publication to their subordinates. Contact your appropriate higher element if your unit or office is not
receiving initial distribution of CALL publications.
Installation distribution centers TRADOC schools
Corps, divisions, and brigades ROTC headquarters
Special Forces groups and battalions Combat training centers
Ranger battalions Regional support commands
Staff adjutant generals
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INFORMATION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
CALL PRODUCTS "ON-LINE"
Access information from CALL via the World Wide Web (www). CALL also offers Web-based access to
the CALL Archives. The CALL Home Page address is
http://call.army.mil
CALL produces the following publications:
BCTP Bulletins, CTC Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends Products: These products are periodic
publications that provide current lessons learned/TTP and information from the training centers.
Special Editions: Special Editions are newsletters related to a specific operation or exercise. Special
Editions are normally available prior to a deployment and targeted for only those units deploying to a
particular theater or preparing to deploy to the theater.
News From the Front: This product contains information and lessons on exercises, real-world events,
and subjects that inform and educate Soldiers and leaders. It provides an opportunity for units and
Soldiers to learn from each other by sharing information and lessons. News From the Front can be
accessed from the CALL Web site.
Training Techniques: Accessed from the CALL products page, this on-line publication focuses on
articles that primarily provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the brigade and below level of
warfare.
Handbooks: Handbooks are "how to" manuals on specific subjects such as rehearsals, inactivation, and
convoy operations.
Initial Impressions Reports: Initial impression reports are developed during and immediately after a
real-world operation and disseminated in the shortest time possible for the follow-on units to use in
educating personnel and supporting training prior to deployment to a theater. Products that focus on
training activities may also be provided to support the follow-on unit.
To make requests for information or publications or to send in your own observations, TTP, and articles,
please use the CALL Request For Information (RFI) system at http://call-rfi.leavenworth.army.mil/.There is also a link to the CALL RFI on each of our major Web pages, or you may send email directly to:
Support CALL in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be
shared and become Army successes.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED