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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1986cflFRICfl<REPORT

AMERICA'SLEADING MAGAZINEON AFRICA

VOLUME 31, NUMBER 6

A Publication of theAfrican-American Institute

TheAfrican-American Institute

ChairmanRandolph Nugent

PresidentDonald B. Easum

PublisherFrank E. Ferrari

EditorMargaret A. Novicki

Assistant EditorPaula Hirschoff

Editorial AssistantAndre Astrow

Production EditorAlana Lee

Art DirectorJoe Pomar

Advertising ManagerTerry Rosen

InternDemetrios Mihailidis

Africa Report (ISSN 0001-9836). a non-partisan magazine of African affairs, ispublished bimonthly and is scheduledto appear at the beginning of each daleperiod a! 833 United Nations Plaza,New York, NY. 10017. Editorial corre-spondence and advertising inquiriesshould be addressed to Africa Report.al the above address. Correspon-dence regarding subscriptions, distri-bution, and other business mattersshould be sent to Transaction Periodi-cals Consortium, Dept. 8010, RutgersUniversity, New Brunswick, New Jer-sey 03903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: Individuals:U.S.A. $21. Canada $27, air rate over-seas $45. Institutions. U.S.A. $28.Canada $34, air rate overseas $52Second-class postage paid at NewYork, NY. and at additional mailing of-fices. POSTMASTER: If this magazineis undeliverable, please send notice toAfrica Report, Transaction PeriodicalsConsortium (address above). Tele-phones: Publisher (212) 949-5719; Ed-itor (212) 949-5731. Copyright <c 1986by the African-American Institute. Inc.

European Distribution by CLIO Oistn-bution Service, 55 St. Thomas' Street.Oxford OX1UG, England.U.S.A. Newsstand Distribution byFOUR STAR News Distributors, Inc..33-30 57th Street, Woodside, NewYork 11377.

lvorian Preeminence?Page 9

Women in BurkinaPage 26

In MemoriamPage 34

The New OAUPage 55

Interview

Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings, Chairman,

Provisional National Defence Council, Ghana 4Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki

West AfricaHouphouet's Region 9

By Howard French

Togo

Eyadema's Nightmare 14

By Richard Everett

Nigeria

The Year of the IMF? 18By Peter Blackburn

Guinea

Conte in Control 21

By Howard Schissel

Women

Josephine Ouedraogo, Minister of Family Affairs

and National Solidarity, Burkina Faso 26Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki

Liberia

A Seven-Cornered Solution? 31

By Larry James

A Tribute to Samora Moises Machel 34

Update

Editor: I'aula Hirschoff

Assistant Editor; Andre Astrow 35

MozambiqueThe Malawi Connection 51

By Allen Isaacman

Interview

Uenis Sassou-Nguesso, President, the People's Republic of the Congo;Chairman, Organization of African Unity 55

Interviewed by Andre Astrow

Non-AlignedHigh Hopes in Harare 59

By Andrew Meldrum

Press

Joe Thloloe, Features Editor, the Sowetan 63Interviewed by Margaret A. Novicki

Kenya"Hear No Evil" 67

By Michael Maren

North Africa

Oujda on the Rocks 72By George Henderson

SudanSadiq and the South 77

By Carol Berger

Photo Credits:The cover photo of Fit -LI. Jerry Rawlings and Capt. Thomas Sankara was taken by PennyDarko/Ghana Information Services. The photographs of Presidenls Felix Houphouet-Boignyand Gnassingbe Eyadema were taken by Camerapix. Special thanks lo Michael Lardner forproviding typesetting advice on this issue

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega with Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings; "We identify with the struggle of the Nicaraguan people to be a free andsovereign nation even if they are in the backyard of a superpower"

Flt.-Lt. Jerry RawlingsChairman, Provisional National

Defence Council, GhanaINTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: It has been nearly five years since you calledfor "nothing less than a revolution" to transform Ghana's soci-ety and economy. Have you achieved the transformation inGhanaians' attitudes that you sought, and if not, who is toblame—you and your government or the Ghanaian people?Rawlings: That call for "nothing less than a revolution" re-mains valid. It is a challenge to the Ghanaian people as well asthe government. A total transformation of Ghana's societyand economy was needed to reverse the dramatic decline. Itwas not to be a coup—the replacement of one set of peopleholding political office with another lot, and then "business as

usual." No! The period since December 31, 1981, has cer-tainly not been a "business as usual" period. Many changesare taking place in the attitudes of people. There is a growingrecognition that our economic reality is what we make it, howmuch productivity we generate, how the rewards we expectare related to what we have produced, etc. But of course, oldattitudes remain and what is worse, influential groups in oursociety are sometimes manipulated against their own interestand into opposing necessary progress. We could have movedfurther ahead within this period—sometimes we take a coupleof steps forward and then we are pulled back a step.

But you must not forget that there have been powerfulforces against us from the beginning, determined that we do

Shortly after the coup attempt in Lome, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings answered theTogolese government's charges in an exclusive interview with AfricaReport. The Ghanaian leader also comments on his country's troubledrelationship with the United States and outlines new initiatives in the politicaland economic spheres.

AFRICA REPORT • November-December 1986

not survive, and they have not stopped. A personal disap-pointment I have is about how much time I have had to devoteto the issues of our nation's security instead of being out therewith the people, securing the future of our children through amassive effort of mobilization for productivity. Significantlythough, our people themselves have made security their re-sponsibility. Our security is not from any elaborate apparatuswe have created—it is from the confidence that we havegained in ourselves as a people, in our ability to create the newGhana, from our determination to be satisfied with nothingless than a revolution!Africa Report: Your efforts have come under a lot of scru-tiny—and criticism—from Western observers of varying po-litical persuasions. Some analysts have called Ghana a "splitpersonality nation," citing what they perceive as a contradic-tion between your government's capitalist economic policiesand your staunchly anti-imperialist foreign policy. Leftist ana-lysts have said that you have been won over by the right inwhat they have termed as an internal struggle between social-ist/Marxist thinkers and "economic pragmatists." Is there anytruth in either of these analyses?Rawlings: Shouldn't the analysts and observers be askingthemselves whether their categories for analyzing us are notdefective? For instance, we identify with the struggle of theNicaraguan people to be a free and sovereign nation even ifthey are in the "backyard" of a superpower; we make nocompromises with apartheid in South Africa; we remain trueto our foundation membership in the Non-Aligned Movement,and some observers see this as being anti-West and hence donot understand that we can have economic relations withinstitutions like the World Bank or the IMF. But this isstrange. Many people in the United States support the strug-gles of the Nicaraguans and of black South Africans. TheHouse of Representatives and the Senate have overturnedPresident Reagan's veto on the sanctions legislation. Many ofthe congressmen and senators are even Republicans, mem-bers of the President's party who even admire their presi-dent. Are they schizophrenic to part company with him whenprinciple demands it?

The causes that we defend in our foreign policy and oureconomic policy are wholly consistent. We aspire to establishan economic system that caters for the needs of our popula-tion. But our economy is part of the world economy, and weare hit by external constraints, such as the prices of cocoa andgold. We have also been hit by natural disasters such as bushfires and drought. And we have said: Here's what we aredoing, any help from outside, from countries that we have hadcenturies of economic interaction with, is most welcome aslong as it is consistent with our objectives. When any countryhas said, "Go down on your knees before we help you withmorsels of food," we have said, "No way!"

You know, many of these critics do not really understandthe psychology of the downtrodden—we demand our free-dom to be, to create, and to trade the products of our creativ-ity with even the most powerful. We will not be cowed by theirsheer power because we believe that however powerless weare, we share a common humanity, a desire for dignity, and ameasure of independence. This is what makes for individuality

even at the level of nations and cultures, and those who onlysearch the world for masters and their slaves will not find us!Africa Report: Your economic recovery program continuesto win you praise from Western donors and creditors, yetcriticism from certain sectors of Ghanaian society, i.e. theunions, which have suggested that you have sacrificed theirinterests to the IMF. Has your economic program given youmore headaches than concrete achievements? What advicewould you give other African governments contemplating anequally rigorous IMF-supported economic reform effort?Rawlings: It is not advice that we would give to other Africangovernments—they have their own reality and can negotiatethat with as much conscientiousness as we are trying to do.But it is clear to me how important it is for us to exchangeideas, to compare notes on our experiences and not make thesame mistakes, whether these are mistakes of technical ap-preciation or of negotiating strategy, or even of a more politi-cal kind. In dealing with donors, the IMF or what have you, wemust remember that they have interests which will need to bemolded to our particular situation. There may even be dogmasthat our practical situation refutes and we need to make for-eign agencies sensitive to what our reality is. This requires aconstant vigilance as well as close attention to technical detail.Loan institutions should not set our priorities, but that isalways the danger, and we must admit in all honesty that whenour preparatory work has not been as thorough as it shouldhave been, we have sometimes given in to conditionalities thatwe should have thought through more fully.

"The effort of economic recovery canbe painful given the background oflaxity, but these headaches will beovercome by the lasting pain-killer ofsuccess in building a strong,efficient, more self-reliant economyin which the freest possible rein willbe given to the creativity andinitiative of the working people."

But the criticisms that you refer to from some sectors ofGhanaian society must be carefully assessed. Let me point outthat some so-called spokesmen of the unions should not beequated with the unions. You see, the trade union movement,like other institutions—the military, political parties, etc.—has had it own history of power being exercised by a few whodo not always express the real interests of that constituency.Some of these spokesmen do not see beyond the short-term;they will not analyze the implications of purely wage claimswithin an economy in which production is declining. We havenot sacrificed the interests of working people to the IMF. Wehave certainly asked for restraint as far as immediate andoften unreasonable demands are concerned, so that we canhave a sustainable economic recovery in which workers willbenefit the most. We must not forget that by restraining infla-


tion alone, this government has protected that worker'swage. And for the overwhelming majority of working peo-ple—the peasants—we have ensured from the very begin-ning a fairer price for their produce. The producer price ofcocoa has increased about four times since December 31,1981. These are reaJ gains even in the short-term. The effortof economic recovery can be painful given the background oflaxity, but these headaches will be overcome by the lastingpain-killer of success in building a strong, efficient, more self-reliant economy in which the freest possible rein will be givento the creativity and initiative of the working people.Africa Report: Nevertheless, some critics maintain that as aconsequence of your tough economic policies, your credibilitywith the nation's working classes—once the bedrock of yoursupport—has eroded considerably, citing as evidence yourdifficulties with the Trades Union Congress. How would yourespond? Do you think the Ghanaian people at large supportthe economic recovery program?

Rawlings: I think so, but I would also be the first to admitthat people are entitled to expect more by way of improve-ment in their conditions of life. But the Ghanaian people un-derstand that it is only out of their own sustained efforts—notfrom government handouts—that further improvements cancome. The resources at government's disposal are what thenation produces. The difficulties with the Trades Union Con-gress have often come from a communication gap. For in-stance, when we tried recently to begin a process of stream-lining allowances that are paid in the public as well as privatesector by abolishing the leave allowance, we should haveprovided the explanations very fully before the event. As itturned out, when the Secretary for Labor eventually went onthe air about this issue, many workers wished they had knownearlier. In fact, there have been some extremely frank discus-sions between members of government and the Trades UnionCongress in recent months on the economic recovery pro-gram and there is growing understanding of what we aretrying to do. I like to think that there is no longer an attitude ofconfrontation which some elements tried hard to instigate fortheir own purposes.

Africa Report: What is the economic rationale behind theweekly foreign exchange auction you have just introduced andhow will it further the goals of your recovery program?Rawlings: Foreign exchange is a scarce resource in Ghanaand if the official banking system fails to recognize its scarcitypremium, an avenue is provided for racketeers to exact rents.Providing foreign exchange at rates well below the actualtransaction prices really means that the government is subsi-dizing such racketeering instead of appreciating the need togenerate more foreign exchange for national needs. We haveinstituted the "second window" as a way of letting the value ofofficial foreign exchange also be determined by first, those inthe economy who need the foreign exchange to sustain theirproductivity, and second, those who generate the foreignexchange through their export activities. If the rate at thesecond window can provide us with additional resources tocompensate better those who produce non-traditional exportslike copra, that way we will ensure more foreign exchange andremove the premium that is obtained on the parallel market.

personal disappointment, about how much

have had to devote to the issuesnation's security instead

out there with tr

Demonstration in Accra after U.S. attack on Tripoli: "I have oftenasked myself why Ghana should be of such interest to the CIA"

We are determined to make the official banking system theonly foreign exchange market and not give easy money tothose who engage in parallel market activity, who are onlyconcerned for their private profit. The second window makesthe determination of foreign exchange not just a subjectivematter decided from time to time by the government. Thereare aspects of the functioning of the economy over whichgovernment really has little control.Africa Report: On the political front, your government iscriticized for having failed to achieve its goal of "participatorydemocracy," that there are no avenues for the expression ofpolitical views. Some see the National Commission for De-mocracy as bereft of any new political initiatives. What is yourresponse?Rawlings: It is true that we have not quite institutionalizedthe new forms of participatory democracy that we are com-mitted to developing, but the building blocks are being put biplace, and in many ways, there is real participation in theaffairs of government, particularly by sections of the commu-nity who previously would not have been allowed a voice. Iwish you had been here a few months back when the regionalconferences of the Committees for the Defense of the Revo-lution [CDRs] were held. Representatives from all walks oflife and all corners of the regions came together with theirPNDC regional and district secretaries, regional heads of gov-ernment departments, as well as some participants from cen-tral government, to thrash out problems and work out policies

6 AFRICA REPORT • November-December 1986

and plans that would respond to their situation. And at thenational level, these regional representatives of the CDRs andregional and national officials attended an expanded meeting ofthe PNDC which discussed only a few weeks ago major issuesof national economic policy.

Of course, for those who are looking for participation in theform of a Westminster-style parliament where politicians vieagainst each other for the limelight, there is no participation.The starting point is the grassroots where the people are. Ourdecentralization policy will soon receive a new momentumwith an effort to link up the important initiatives that are takingplace at the grassroots into a national planning system. Thebasic element of participation that is often overlooked is theparticipation of the people in wealth generation. To have had,in spite of that, political institutions which did not respect thatparticipation, but which ensured that the wealth created bythe people was skimmed off by an urban, educated elite, hasbeen the model of colonial domination. This structure of rela-tions lias continued in various forms after independence. Wedo not see how real democracy can emerge from that struc-ture—for real democracy, there must be accountability to theproducers of the wealth. Our objective has been to strengthenthe capacity of those producers to have a say and to makenational leadership participate with the people in the task ofnation-building. Throughout the country, I have seen definitesigns of undertaking shared objectives. The political initiativesare emerging from the grassroots, from the rural majority thatis outside Accra.

Of course, the work of the National Commission for De-mocracy is not an easy one; we do not expect them to impose

some foreign model or an abstraction on our situation. I knowthe commission has been interacting with people throughoutthe country so that they can express the deepest aspirations,values, and traditions of the nation. But I am also the first tourge the commission to speed up its work and enable us tomove further to a clearer articulation and institutionalization ofan authentic national democratic experience. I will have lesswork to do then!Africa Report: Judging by the number of plots against yourgovernment which have been based in neighboring countries,it does not appear that your neighbors have become any morevigilant in controlling these elements. On the other hand, yourgovernment has been highly effective in aborting these at-tempts and in some cases apprehending the culprits, yet ef-forts to destabilize you continue unabated. Why, consideringthat you have signed security agreements with your neigh-bors with respect to these attempts?Rawlings: We know who have been involved in these plotsand we have often notified our neighbors to the west and east,Ivory Coast and Togo, about the activities of some of thesepeople. It is clear that substantial funds are being invested inthe activities of these people, in purchasing tons of arms andammunition for them, in facilitating their movement in and outof various capitals trying to coordinate their subversive acts.Our own security agencies have been vigilant enough to keepus ahead of them, but we have certainly expected cooperationfrom our neighbors, particularly when we provide detailedfacts and figures of what is going on from their territory.

When we signed the quadripartite agreement betweenGhana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria in Lagos in December 1984,I made some observations I would like to recall: AH too oftencriminality is defined in terms of the small fry after whom lawenforcement agencies go with great enthusiasm. When itcomes to the big fish who have connections and are regardedas respectable even though their activities do more seriousharm to our countries, there is a lot of hesitation and evencovering up—this is true of cooperative efforts in trackingdown crime, as well as local law enforcement.

As to why destabilization attempts continue against us, onebasic factor is simply desperation. Those involved have al-ready compromised themselves and have to go on as a way oflife—a rather comfortable way of life, I might add, especiallyfor the leading elements. With the financing they obtain fromcertain quarters, they cannot be idle—they must have some-thing to show!Africa Report: How do you react to the accusations by theTogolese government about Gliana's alleged involvement inthe recent attempted uprising in Lome?Rawlings: A host of contradictory and wild allegations havebeen made by the Togolese authorities, insinuating possibleinvolvement of Ghana in the recent incident. We have beenrestrained in our reaction to these ridiculous and insultingaccusations because we knew they were a pretext for intro-ducing into this sub-region the armed presence of a big power.In fact, the whole story as it has been presented by theTogolese government is not really convincing. How can youbelieve that a group of "well-trained and well-equipped profes-sional fighters," as they presented them, could be responsible


for such a muddled fiasco? It is even harder to believe that anyserious country could have backed them! I am sure you knowthe standards of professionalism and expertise that Ghana'ssecurity forces have developed. Even France, which overre-acted to Eyadema's SOS call, has been extremely cautiousabout mentioning any external implication. It is anyway a wor-rying fact for all the region that a country can so easily andwithout any proof of external threat bring in extra-Africantroops and means. The whole affair was strangely enough nota surprise for the Togolese authorities since a senior Frenchofficer close to Eyadema said to the public that they "werewaiting for them."

In fact, Togo's attitude seems to be aimed at provoking astronger reaction from our side. How else to understand that16 days after the coup attempt, four Togolese jets flew overour Volta Region, many kilometers within our borders? Wewarned the Togolese authorities to put an end to their "showof strength" and rather to ensure our citizens' security. Presi-dent Eyadema personally gave our diplomatic mission in Togoassurances which we expect to be made real. Our compatriotsare still victims of unjustified harassment.

We have requested the Togolese government to provideinformation to assist investigations that we ourselves initiatedto ascertain the possible involvement of, for instance, Togo-lese exiles who may have passed through Ghana. Unfortu-nately, we have not received a response from the Togolese.We absolutely do not believe in stirring up any problems forother countries and we will not be an alibi for any country'sinternal worries. Our adherence to the principles of the OAUand the UN is clear in the record of our political practice.Africa Report: American policy toward Ghana appearssomewhat schizophrenic—on the one hand, the U. S. praisesyour economic policies and on the other, you uncovered theexistence of a substantial CIA network in Ghana, and Ameri-can involvement in a mercenary attempt to overthrow you hasbeen documented. How do you explain this? Do you believethe U. S. government is bent on overthrowing you, and if so,why?

Rawlings: Could it be that when you imagine somebody tohave a "split personality" as you mentioned some observersbelieve about Ghana, you may also react in a split way to thedifferent perceived sides of the personality! I don't know theanswers to your questions. I have often asked myself whyGhana should be of such interest to the CIA and I have won-dered to what extent the other organs of American foreignpolicy—the ambassadors and aid agencies for instance—knew of the CIA network that was admitted to exist by theU.S. itself some months back.

I recently read an account of American foreign policy inAfrica during the Kennedy era by an old school mate of mine,William Mahoney, in which he reveals the ignorance of hisfather, who was then the U. S. ambassador to Ghana, aboutcertain activities of the CIA in Ghana against Nkrumah. Ap-parently, when Ambassador Mahoney got to know, he took aplane to Washington and complained to President Kennedywho gave new foreign policy instructions that brought theactivities of the CIA under the control of the ambassador. Thebook does not go on to say whether the CIA's activities

against Nkrumah stopped after Mahoney's visit to Washing-ton. But you know that after Nkrumah's overthrow, therehave been detailed revelations by American journalists aboutthe complicity of the CIA in the plot that led to his overthrow.Recently, a group of American mercenaries arrested in Brazilon a ship carrying tons of arms destined for a destabilizationattempt here had been told that they had the backing of theU.S. government.

On our side, we are a small country trying to achieve a lifeof dignity for our people in a rather hostile international envi-ronment. We have a great deal of respect for the Americanpeople and for their rich traditions of revolutionary indepen-dence, creativity, and democracy. Our people, as I'm sureyou've noticed, are very warm to Americans, particularly ourblack American cousins. We represent no threat whatsoeverto the U.S. and we remain vigorously non-aligned. Whyshould the U.S. government or its agencies want to over-throw us? If any agency of the U. S. government is indeed benton supporting destabilization moves against us, I can do nobetter than echo the words of a former U.S. assistant secre-tary of state: "It'sthe wrong game foragreat country, and theplayers you have chosen are the wrong players!"Africa Report: Are there any particular misconceptions youfeel the American public has about your government and isthere any message you would like to get across to them?Rawlings: Well, I hear a judge who tried a number of Ghana-ians including a former finance minister involved in arms traf-ficking with a view to overthrowing the government of Ghanamade some strange remarks about us and applauded our op-ponents as "freedom fighters!" I don't really know what heknows about Ghana except perhaps what the good connec-tions of the accused may have told him. Incidentally, doesn'tthe result of that trial illustrate my earlier point about the bigfish generally having ways of slipping out!

You see, I think Americans should learn more about othercountries and not interpret the world too simply in terms ofsuperpower rivalries. Perhaps the media in the U. S. can helpby being more informative about our countries instead of im-posing superficial interpretations on events they report. Wehave a visit from President Ortega, or President Nujoma ofNamibia, or Colonel Qaddafy and all they see is red! At thesame time, they hear that we have agreements with the IMFand the World Bank to support our economic recovery pro-gram and they can't reconcile this to their earlier prejudices.But the problem must be their oversimplified world view, notus! I believe that the public in countries like the U.S. andindeed the Soviet Union must really try to understand thereality of small countries like ours—our history, our prob-lems, and our objectives. I have been impressed by the tre-mendous sympathy expressed in the U.S. for the famine inAfrica and the support for the struggle of black people in SouthAfrica against the apartheid regime. This shows how commit-ted the American people continue to be to the ideals of theAmerican revolution. We share those ideals and hope that ourcontinent will find Americans continuing to live up to theseideals, defending the cause of the oppressed and supportingour struggles for liberation as Abraham Lincoln would havewished to see. •


West African politics have long been dominated by the towering presenceand influence of the Ivorian leader. In the autumn of his career, however,Felix Houphouet-Boigny confronts an evolving regional political context inwhich Cote d'lvoire's preeminence is no longer assured.

Houphouet'sRegion West Africa

BY HOWARD FRENCH

Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny has always been a man of

grand visions and grand ambitions.Since his emergence as leader of hiscountry's nascent political scene in the1930s and 1940s, Houphouet has be-come accustomed to—some would sayobsessed with—-being seen as the re-gion's preeminent leader.

By the mid-1950s, Houphouet had al-ready succeeded in virtually quelling anyserious political challenge to his leader-ship of Cote d'lvoire. Since that time, hehas energetically prevented the emer-gence of potential rivals, neutralizing oreliminating from the political scene, asthe case may be, all those who riskedbecoming threats to his power.

Having succeeded in mastering thedomestic political milieu, the Ivorianleader set his sights around him to theWest African region, where he wouldlikewise employ almost any means toachieve and consolidate his preemi-nence.

On the eve of the West African inde-pendence era, the Ivorian leaderfounded the Rassemblement Demo-cratique Africain (RDA), an alliance ofnewly formed political movements fromseveral of the region's former Frenchcolonies. With Ghana's attainment of in-dependence in 1957 and France's diffi-culties with its North African and Indo-chinese colonies, President Charles deGaulle began to see the handwriting onthe wall and contemplated formulas for

Howard French reported for stx years from Coted'lvoire as a freelance journalist. He now wntesin New York.

according independence to France'ssub-Saharan empire. Houphouet-Boigny intended that the RDA wouldserve as the platform from which hewould influence the modalities of thatindependence.

The post-World War Ii decade provedto be a prosperous time for Cote d'l-voire. By the mid-1950s, the colony hadbecome more well-off than its FrenchWest African rivals, including Senegal,France's administrative base for the re-gion. With the Ivorian economy boom-ing, Houphouet became obsessed withthe idea of preventing his country's re-sources from being redistributed byFrance for the benefit of the rest of theregion. His particular wariness of Sene-gal, where the elites of all of fran-cophone West Africa received their edu-cation, made him determined to freeCote d'lvoire from Dakar's fiscal and ad-ministrative control.

Ghana's independence and KwameNkrumah's role as the self-appointed ad-vocate of universal independence fromcolonial rule set three francophone lead-ers down different paths toward inde-pendence. France had proposed that itscolonies opt for independence within aFrench-sponsored "Community." In-spired by the example of independentGhana, Guinea's leader, Ahmed SekouToure, rejected the French proposal.Guinea was granted independence in1958 with no assurances of French sup-port.

Senegal's Leopold Senghor acceptedthe idea of a "Community" with France,but sought to prevent the balkanizationof French West Africa by urging that theregion be consolidated into one entity,

President Felix Houphouet-Boigny "sethis sights around him to the West Africanregion where he would employ almost anymeans to achieve and consolidate his pre-eminence"


with Dakar as its political capital, as ithad been the administrative capital un-der colonialism.

Houphouet, on the other hand, moti-vated by the desire to be independentfrom Senegal (more than from France),argued for a Franco-African Federationinspired by the British Commonwealth,in which each former African colonywould retain its own government, shar-ing some degree of sovereignty withFrance.

In the ensuing melee of rival inter-ests, none of the African leaders clearlyprevailed. Houphouet never forgaveSekou Toure his defiance, not onlyagainst de Gaulle, but against himself.Toure's Parti Democratique Guineen(PDG) was a member of the RDA, andto Houphouet's line of reasoning,Toure, the younger of the two men,should have bowed to his leadership.

Houphouet resented Toure's new-found stature, and most of all his bud-ding alliance with Nkrumah, whoseprestige had already made him the Ivor-ian leader's major rival. He would cometo fight every attempt by Nkrumah andToure to bring about political unificationin Africa, fearful as he was of relinquish-

ing any political resources to less well-endowed states.

Houphouet-Boigny failed to convincethe French of the need to create a com-munity based on the Commonwealthmodel. Bitter from this defeat, herefused to join the Community as pro-posed by France. Senegal, which hadaccepted the Community, was busilybuilding toward its goal of a unifiedFrench West Africa. In 1959 and I960,Senghor convinced Mali and Dahomeyto join the "Mali Federation," whosegoal was to be the building block for aregional unitary state. Guinea, thoughnot a member, looked favorably on theMali Federation.

The Ivorian leader felt it was crucialto block the consolidation of the MaliFederation, whose success he fearedwould consolidate Senegal's grip on theregion and possibly engulf his country.At the same time, anxious to protecthimself from accusations that he was abalkanizer, he sought to link himself tosome of the weaker states in the region.For this purpose he created the EntenteCouncil, enlisting as members UpperVolta, Niger, and Dahomey, the latter ofwhich he persuaded to break away from

the Mali Federation (some claim hepromised jobs for Dahomean teachersand civil servants who had recently beenexpelled en masse from Cote d'lvoire).

Houphouet's refusal to acquiesce wasa key element in the demise of both theFrench "Community" scheme andSenghor's Mali Federation, neither ofwhich could sustain momentum withoutthe Ivorian leader's cooperation. Al-ready in 1960, Houphouet had provenhimself to be the force to be reckonedwith in regional politics, and the Frenchpresident's adviser on African affairs,Jacques Foccart, began to study ways ofemploying the stubbornness and vanityof the Ivorian leader to French advan-tage. At the creation of the EntenteCouncil, Malian President Modibo Keitacharacterized Houphouet as "anti-Afri-can," saying that the Ivorian had "al-ways been for the division of Africa."

The Entente Council would prove tobe the only long-lived instrument of in-fluence built by Houphouet until 1973,although not for lack of trying. In theearly 1960s, he championed the found-

"Kwame Nkrumah's prestige made himthe Ivorian leader's major rival"


ing of the Union Africaine et Malgache(UAM), which attempted to align sup-port for the French position on interna-tional issues among former colonies, i. e.adoption of soft language encouragingAlgerian independence, as opposed tostrong condemnations of French coloni-alism in the UN or Organization of Afri-can Unity (OAU).

The UAM died due to dissensionover political positions and because anumber of its members thought that itwas inappropriately usurping the role ofthe newly formed OAU. Then in 1964,Houphouet torpedoed Mauritania's cre-ation of the Union Africaine et Malgachede Cooperation Economique (UAM-CE), whose vocation, againstHouphouet's liking, was purely eco-nomic.

The Ivorian leader badly wanted tocreate and maintain a political organiza-tion of former French colonies that hecould use to force his views on the OAU.Failing that, he had no use for the conti-nental organization and in fact has at-tended only three OAU summits sincethe body was founded in 1963, even or-ganizing a boycott of the 1965 Accrasummit to prevent Nkrumah from en-joying the prestige that its hosting wouldhave conferred upon him.

With the creation of the OAU in1963—and partial credit for its creationis due to Houphouet—the Ivorian presi-dent devoted his energies to counteringthe goals of some of its more forcefulmembers—bringing about meaningfulpolitical unity. The principal means heemployed toward this obstructionist aimwas not by attending OAU summits andpetitioning his counterparts, but ratherby systematically opposing those twoleaders who most incarnated the idea ofpolitical unity—Nkrumah and Toure.

The leaders of Ghana and Guinea rep-resented double threats to the Ivorianpresident. First, he saw any increase intheir prestige as directly affecting hisown, and could not tolerate being out-done by them. Secondly, these neigh-boring countries were similarly en-dowed with rich agricultural lands andwere immeasurably richer in terms ofknown mineral reserves. Should eitheror both achieve political stability,Houphouet feared they would attract in-vestors away from Cote d'lvoire.

Houphouet used isolation to cripplethese two rivals, encouraging mistrustof them by the Entente countries, and inthe case of Guinea, by using his consid-erable influence in France to prevent ahealing of the rift between Conakry andParis. The Ivorian supported exiled rev-olutionary movements, obliged Mali tokeep its distance from Se kou Toure, andused lobbying to persuade the U.S. notto replace France as a major donor.

Sekou Toure's isolation was an unat-tended success, and with Nkrumahoverthrown in 1966, Houphouet turnedhis attention to Nigeria, the region's de-mographic and geographic giant, whichhe was determined to prevent from be-coming an economic or political giant.With the outbreak of the civil war in1966, the occasion presented itself toencourage the disintegration of Nigeria,and hence the elimination of the mostredoubtable challenge to his preemi-nence.

Considerable evidence exists to showthat Houphouet was instrumental inconvincing France to back the Biafranrebellion by supplying arms, merce-naries, money, sympathy, and propa-ganda. Houphouet and his long-timeally, President Omar Bongo of Gabon,eventually recognized Biafra and al-lowed their countries to serve as thestaging grounds from which vital supplyoperations into Iboland were organized.In this conflict, they found themselvesallied with the likes of fascist Portugal,Rhodesia, and South Africa, all of whichwanted to see a diminished Nigeriaemerge from the civil war.

"The Ivorian leaderbadly wanted to createand maintain a politicalorganization of formerFrench colonies that hecould use to force hisviews on the OAU."

To Houphouet's dismay, Nigeria em-erged united and ultimately strongerfrom the Biafran war, and eventually be-gan to assume the mantle of regionalleadership that he had always fearedwith the creation of the Economic Com-

munity of West African States (ECO-WAS) in 1975 and the adoption of anincreasingly vocal and Africanist foreignpolicy during the same decade. Nigeria'soil boom further haunted Houphouetwith fears that Lagos would become theregion's pole of attraction and economicpowerhouse.

In anticipation of Nigeria's creation ofECOWAS, Houphouet engineered theestablishment of a rival community, theCommunaute Economique de l'Afriquede 1'Ouest (CEAOj, in 1973. The ideafor an economic community, in fairnessto the Ivorians, was not new, nor was itstolen from the Nigerians. Houphouet-Boigny had long cherished the notion oflinking the other CFA franc countries ofthe region into a common market whichwould provide most favored nation trad-ing status among member-states, thusgiving Cote d'lvoire—with its relativelydeveloped industry—a captive marketbase on which its economic growthcould depend.

Already in late 1965, Houphouet pro-posed according dual nationality to resi-dent nationals from [then] Upper Volta,and was quickly petitioned by the headsof state of the other Entente Councilcountries for the same status for theircountrymen. To the dismay of the Ivor-ian president and the Franco-Ivorian in-dustrialist class, the Ivorian people in-stantly manifested their discontent overthe proposed dual nationality plan andforced the idea to be dropped. Dual na-tionality was, in effect, the politicalsweetener offered to his Entente Coun-cil counterparts to get them to acceptCote d'lvoire's economic dominanceand Houphouet-Boigny's political pre-eminence in the region.

The backfiring of the scheme spelledthe instant retirement of the EntenteCouncil from the region's list of impor-tant active political organizations. It hasnever been officially disbanded, how-ever. Meanwhile, the CEAO, shortlyafter its inception, seemed to be a re-markable success, in the words of WestAfrica magazine, "linking Ivory Coast,Benin, Togo, Mali, Niger, Mauritania,Guinea, Senegal, and Burkina to Francein a linguistic, monetary, economic (andfor many political) unit." Such a linkageof sovereign states with France was af-ter all what Houphouet had craved since

AFRICA REPORT • November-December 1986 11

Francophone leaders at 1983 summit: "In 1957, PresidentCharles de Gaulle began to see the handwriting on the wall andcontemplated formulas for according independence to France'ssub-Saharan empire"

independence, and now he had achievedit with its clear economic and politicalleadership emanating from his country.

The CEAO worked by exempting theindustrial exports of member countriesfrom most of the taxation to which ex-tra-regional industrial products are sub-ject. Here again, a "sweetener" was re-quired to get the non-industrial mem-bers to swallow the CEAO package.Since Cote d'lvoire, and to a muchlesser extent, Senegal, are the only in-dustrial members of the community,they agreed to pay the bulk of the capitalto the various CEAO regional develop-ment funds.

As long as these two economic mo-tors were able to keep the organiza-tion's machinery oiled by constantly in-creasing contributions to the solidarityfunds, the CEAO functioned smoothly,and the Nigerian "ogre" with its sup-posed designs of economic dominance(and "its" organization, ECOWAS) waskept at bay.

Unfortunately, the CEAO, like theEntente and the UAM before it, beganto fall apart and lose momentum. Eco-nomic crises in the early 1980s left Coted'lvoire unable to sustain the level ofcontributions to which the other mem-

ber-states had become accustomed.Corruption and patronage hiring be-came rampant within the CEAO and fi-nally, Houphouet began to distort its ec-onomic function.

In 1984, Houphouet-Boigny soughtto employ the CEAO as a political in-strument, leading it away from its in-tended economic vocation and eventu-ally precipitating a crisis which would callinto question the future of the organiza-tion. By attempting to isolate BurkinaFaso's President Thomas Sankara byarranging for his country's turn as headof the organization to be skipped in favorof Malian President Moussa Traore,Houphouet fueled the antipathy be-tween the two men and set off a cycle ofmutual recriminations that would endtwo years later in war between theneighboring states.

When Sankara finally assumed thepresidency of the CEAO in 1985, helaunched an investigation into corrup-tion which uncovered evidence prejudi-cial to both Mali and Cote d'lvoire. Fol-lowing the Burkina-Mali war of Decem-ber 1985, a trial of those implicated inthe CEAO's corruption scandal was heldin Ouagadougou, and a commission pre-sented recommendations for the reor-

ganization of that body to the summit ofCEAO heads of state. Since that time,the CEAO reform plan has gathereddust as Houphouet, Traore, and per-haps other heads of state as well, anx-ious to avoid crediting Sankara with sav-ing the organization, have preferred tolet it once again lie dormant.

In the autumn of his long political ca-reer, Houphouet-Boigny finds his once-legendary influence in the region vasdydiminished. His most recent coup waspulled off when his foreign minister, Si-meon Ake, rushed into shuttle diplo-macy to bring about a cease-fire be-tween Mali and Burkina Faso last Janu-ary. Nigeria and Libya had alreadyprepared terms agreed upon by bothsides for a truce, but when the Ivorianleader persuaded Mali of the peril of al-lowing a Libyan role in the peace pro-cess, the Libyan-Nigerian talks mysteri-ously fell through.

Just as relations between Hou-phouet's Cote d'lvoire and thosecountries where Ivorian influence hastraditionally been great has changed, sohave relations with those countries thathave been traditional "rivals" to that in-fluence.

While relations with Ghana warmed


Houphouet-Boigny and Ahmed Sekou Toure at the first OAU summit: "With the creation of the OAU in 1963, the Ivorian president devotedhis energies to countering the goals of some of its more forceful members"

somewhat in the post-Nkruniah era,Ivorian-Ghanaian ties have remainedrocky. A seemingly permanent obstacleto better ties is the clandestine cocoatraffic from Ghana to Cote d'lvoirewhich Ivorian authorities have done lit-tle to arrest.

Houphouet has also repeatedly har-bored opponents to whoever has beenin power over the years in Accra—per-haps in order to hold in reserve a meansof applying pressure on Ghanaian gov-ernments. Another form of pressurethe Ivorians have used to punish orsway Accra has been the periodic clo-sure, or tlireat thereof, of the long bor-der shared by the two countries. In1982, this was done in conjunction withTogo, thus cementing a warm relation-ship between Ghana and its only otherneighbor—Burkina Faso.

Since Senghor's retirement from thepolitical scene in Senegal, relations be-tween Dakar and Abidjan have im-proved. Abdou Diouf enjoys Hou-phouet's respect, perhaps in partbecause of his formal adherence to thevaunted African respect for elders. Thisrespect takes the form of extensive con-

tacts between the two governmentsand periodic visits by Diouf to Yamous-soukro, where, in the obligatory airportpress conference, he unfailingly praisesthe Ivorian president's wisdom.

"Motivated by thedesire to beindependent fromSenegal—morethan fromFrance—Houphouetargued for aFranco-AfricanFederation."

The two leaders differ starkly,though, in several areas, including "dia-logue" with South Africa, the use andmeaning of democracy, and their stylesof rule. Diouf has also turned a deaf earto the Ivorian leader's lobbying for rees-tablishment of relations with Israel.

In the two years before Sekou

Toure's death, Houphouet felt that hehad finally forced the Guinean leader toaccept his view of the world, and isquoted as having said that Sekou Tourewas now in the camp of Africa's "moder-ate" leaders. After an initial bid to ex-tend Ivorian influence over Toure's in-experienced successor, Conakry hasshown itself to be uncontrollable—atleast from Abidjan or Yamoussoukro. Asense of drifting entropy, more than anyideological divergence, has ledHouphouet to realize that Guinea is notlikely to soon fall into his orbit.

The region now looks very differentto Houphouet from the time when theleaders of Upper Volta, Togo, and Nigerwere steady allies, and the regimes ofMali, Benin, and even post-NknunahGhana were usually sympathetic to hispositions. At present, an independentand leftist Sankara government prevailsto the north; Togo's government—re-cently his closest ally—rocks insecure;and with the possible exception of Mali,no other government in the region goesfurther than performing an occasionalbow in deference to Le Vkux for his en-durance. •


The 1987 anniversary celebrations of President Eyadema's 20 years inpower will be overshadowed by September's coup attempt. Togoleseallegations of the involvement of its neighbors and its reliance on Frenchmilitary support highlight the political insecurity that has long plaguedEyadema's rule.

Eyadema'sNightmare

Togo

BY RICHARD EVERETT

The recent quashing of yet anothercoup bid in Togo will only add to

the popular Togolese myth, encouragedby President Gnassingbe Eyadema him-self, that the military leader is fated tosurvive any attempts to assassinate himor otherwise topple him from power.

Like his survival of a mysteriousplane crash in 1973, Eyadema haswalked away unscathed from what hehas called an attempt by "armed terror-ist commandos" to assassinate him andoverthrow his government. Less thanone week after the attack, foreign jour-nalists were shown seized weapons,cowering captured "terrorists," and ajubilant president, who said the plottershad "not a single accomplice among themilitary and civilian population."

According to Togolese Interior Min-ister Kpotivi Tevi-Djidjogbe Lacle, onthe night of Tuesday, September 23, agroup of 60 heavily armed men at-tempted to kill Eyadema and overthrowthe government by seizing a militarybarracks, the ruling Togolese People'sRally headquarters, and the country'stelevision and radio stations.

Togolese security forces, tipped off inadvance to the attack, ambushed aLome villa, capturing a number of menand large quantities of arms and neutral-

Richard Everett, an Abidjan-based freelancejournalist, contributes to the Associated Press,The Times of London, and the Voice of America.

"Just one week after the attempt,Eyadema led his ministers on an im-promptu walk through the streets of Lometo demonstrate his popularity and self-confidence in public"

izing what Togolese officials said was amain assembly point for the assailants.Scattered gun battles continuedthroughout the night as the military en-countered other groups of attackersmoving about the city.

The situation appeared normal byWednesday, however surprise out-breaks of gunfire Thursday morning ter-rified Lome residents and sent the armyout again to mop up an apparent last-

ditch attempt by the assailants. Onehundred fifty French paratroopers andfour French air force Jaguar jets arrivedThursday night from Bangui and Li-breville to help restore order, althoughby the time they had landed, Togolesesecurity forces had regained control ofthe seaside capital.

Togo's director of national security,Seye Memene, told Africa Report that27 people had initially been taken intocustody. He said that 19 were capturedin the villa, while another 10 were ar-rested between Tuesday and Thursday.Two of those arrested in the villa later


died in the hospital, reportedly fromwounds suffered when security forcesrushed the house.

Another six, all said to be Ghanaians,including two with Ghanaian militaryIDs, died in the initial attack when theirlandrover was hit by army gunfire. Atleast eight civilians, including a French-man and a German businessman, alsodied in the fighting. No mention wasmade of army casualties.

Togolese authorities immediatelyclosed the border with neighboringGhana, saying the attackers had infil-trated from the Ghanaian town of Aflaowhich lies 50 meters across the borderon the outskirts of Lome. Ghana hassince responded by closing its side of theborder.

At a news conference on Monday,September 29, Lade said the attackersclaimed they were trained and armed byGhanaian and Burkinabe military offi-cers in those two countries. Ladeavoided directly accusing the two gov-

"Following the attack,Eyadema presentedhimself to journalists asa self-assured leaderwho never doubted hehad the upper hand inthe affair."

ernments of involvement in the plot,maintaining under repeated questioningfrom journalists that all his informationcame from the captured assailants, andthat the investigative authorities had notreached their final conclusions.

Eyadema also declined to directly ac-cuse the governments of Ghana's Fit.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings and Burkina's Capt.Thomas Sankara, saying he wished tofirst present them with Ms findings tosee "what they know and what theythink."

Togo's two neighbors respondedswiftly to the allegations, denying theimplied complicity. A Ghanaian news re-lease vociferously criticized the allega-tions, suggesting that the captured as-sailants may have been tortured intomaking their confessions. The Ghanaianmedia also criticized what it said was

harassment of Ghanaians in Togo fol-lowing the attack. However, reportsthat hundreds of Ghanaians were seek-ing refuge at the Ghana embassy inLome proved false, and Ghana's charged'affaires in Togo, Victor Djisan, saidonly eight Ghanaians had sought refugefollowing the attack and border closure.

The Burkinabe government also de-nied any involvement. Number-twoman Capt. Blaise Compaore said, "Onlythe shock and psychological effect ofwhat [Togo] has just experienced canexplain the cascade of incoherent accu-sations from the Togolese authorities."Burkina leader Sankara responded tocharges that 200 Burkinabe supporttroops had been mobilized in the villageof Dialo by inviting the Togolese tobomb the village if they could find it, asSankara said no such village exists in hiscountry.

Through it all, the three govern-ments have expressed the desire to re-main good neighbors, and despite themaintenance of tr<x>p alerts, there havebeen no clashes between their forces,aside from a few scattered shots alongthe Ghana-Togo border shortly after theattempt failed.

In addition to implicating Togo'sneighbors, the captured attackers alsoaccused two of Eyadema's sworn ene-mies—Gilchrist Olympio and FranciscoLawson. Olympio, the son of SylvanusOlympio, former Togolese presidentmurdered in a 1963 coup led by then-

Sgt. Eyadema, and Lawson, a formerarmy captain, have been implicated inprevious coup plots, most notably theso-called mercenary plot of 1977.

The two men have never concealedtheir dislike of Eyadema, and many To-golese interviewed in Lome said theywould not be surprised to find themsomehow involved. However, it is onlythe declarations of some of the capturedassailants that point to them as possibleaccomplices. The two have yet to pub-licly comment on the accusations, al-though the Movement for Togolese De-mocracy, a Paris-based oppositiongroup which Olympio has ties to, de-nounced Togo's claims as a fabrication.

Lade said the attackers had identifiedOlympio as the ringleader and financierof the plot. He purportedly paid forAmah Ayayi, a Togolese resident inGhana, to recruit and train Togolese andother West Africans for a commandoraid. Ayayi, allegedly working in collu-sion with Ghanaian army officers atGondar barracks in Accra and a certainCapt. Tchindjere in Burkina, spent sev-eral months arming and training themen. According to the captured assail-ants, the group was to kill Eyadema andestablish a provisional renewal councilwhich would rule until Olympio arrivedto form a government after about aweek.

After successfully crushing the at-tempt, Eyadema's position could hardlybe stronger. His advance knowledge of

"Eyadema declined to directly accuse the governments of Ghana's Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawl-ings [right] and Burkina's Capt. Thomas Sankara, saying he wished to first present themwith his findings"


the coup plot, aided by French intelli-gence and paid informers, showed thatTogolese security can adequately keeptabs on dissidents, inside or outside thecountry. A French military officer saidthere was no doubt that Togo knewabout the attack at least a week in ad-vance, although not all the details abouttiming and logistics were known.

In addition, the attack brought an out-pouring of support from Eyadema's al-lies. France, the former colonial power,showed its support with its rapid de-ployment force which Lacle pointedlynoted was there more for "psychologicaland diplomatic than tactical" reasons.Togo is to host the Franco-African sum-mit of France and its former African col-onies later this fall, and the two coun-tries have a strong interest in ensuringthat any security problems are ironedout well in advance.

Eyadema's "grand freres" and coun-sellors in the region, Cote d'lvoire's Fe-lix Houphouet-Boigny and Zaire's Mo-butu Sese Seko, immediately sent dele-gations expressing their support.Mobutu himself arrived for a two-dayvisit less than a week after the attempt,bringing 50 Zairois paratroopers in asymbolic gesture recalling Eyadema'sdispatch of Togolese troops to help Mo-butu during the Shaba disturbances.

Eyadema also received gestures ofsupport from other neighboring coun-tries, including a message from Nigerian

"Most of the details of the plot and all ofthe accusations come from the mouths ofthe captured attackers"

President Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangidaand a visit from Liberian President Sa-muel Doe, another West African leaderprone to security problems. Finally, hereceived overwhelming support fromEurope and North America, with U.S.President Ronald Reagan sending ateam of "experts" to help the Togolesewith their security operations.

Following the attack, Eyadema pre-sented himself to journalists as a self-assured leader who never doubted hehad the upper hand in the affair. Just oneweek after the attempt, he led his minis-ters on an impromptu five-kilometerwalk through the streets of Lome todemonstrate his popularity and self-con-fidence in public. Meanwhile, the Wash-ington-based public relations firm ofDavid Apter and Associates, chargedwith showing visiting journalists aroundLome, did its best to sell the idea thatprivatization and tourism were more in-teresting stories than a successfullyhandled security problem.

However, a number of aspects aboutthe affair leave room for questions,most notably the fact that most of thedetails of the plot and all of the accusa-tions come from the mouths of the cap-tured attackers. A small number of pris-oners were exhibited to the press at the

news conference, but were led away asjournalists pressed forward to ask ques-tions.

As a result, it is difficult to judge theveracity of their statements, especiallythose about the training, and how theywere elicited from the men. The sevenshowed no signs of having been beaten,but it is nol; known if they were coercedinto making their accusations.

In addition, there are some doubts asto the "professionalism" of the so-calledcommandos. Despite an impressive ar-ray of Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers,grenades, ammunition, and walkie-talk-ies, the small number of men used toseize a number of major well-guardedtargets like the barracks and the radiostation seems poorly planned. In addi-tion, the different groups, although hav-ing an elaborate system of code namesand key commands, appeared to bewandering around the city out of contactwith each other once the attack began.

However, the fact that most of theirarms and the main command post, aswell as one-third of the force, wereseized two hours before the attack be-gan may have been the cause of the con-fusion. Journalists present at the pressconference agreed however that thesorry bunch of prisoners hardly lookedlike a band of professional terrorist com-mandos.

Lacle and Eyadema have carefullyavoided directly accusing their neigh-


bors, while presenting an apparently de-tailed case against members of theirarmed forces. In naming Gondar bar-racks, Accra's central military installa-tion, as the training center for the at-tackers, the Togolese are suggestingthat if the allegations prove true, seniorGhanaian military officials knew of theplot.

Some captured assailants said theywere trained by a Ghanaian army cap-tain and Michael Soussoudis, a cousin ofFit.-Lt. Kawlings who was arrested lastyear in the U.S. on espionage chargesand later released in trade for Ghanaiansdetained in Accra for alleged CIA con-nections. By naming Soussoudis, theimplicit suggestion is that Rawlings wasaware of the plot.

Relations between Rawlings andEyadema have always been tense, witheach one claiming the other is harboringpolitical dissidents. Between his twotenures as head of state, Rawlings wasonce briefly detained by Togolese au-thorities while returning overland from avisit to Benin. However, diplomats inthe region express skepticism that thetwo young radicals—Sankara and Rawl-ings—would actively pursue the over-throw of their older, more conservativeneighbor. But they say it is clear thatthis latest incident will poison relationsfor some time to come.

"Journalists present atthe press conferenceagreed that the sorrybunch of prisonershardly looked like aband of professionalterrorist commandos."

The aborted attack also raises ques-tions for the Togolese themselves, in-cluding the sticky issue of how to reactto what has become a regional incident.At least officially, Eyadema has shown astrong inclination to avoid direct conflictand to instead seek satisfaction throughvarious regional bodies, including theANAD defense and non-aggression pactand the Entente Council, both of whichfall under the watchful eye of fran-cophone doyen, Houphouet-Boigny, an

advocate of dialogue.Interestingly however, on August 11,

the same day that the Togolese authori-ties convened international journalists inLome to reveal an alleged plot by Lib-yan-backed "terrorists" to bomb theAmerican embassy and Lome's centralmarket, Eyadema and Houphouet—along with Mobutu and Gabonese Presi-dent Omar Bongo—met in Yamoussou-kro to discuss "security issues"—agathering distinctly outside the frame-work of any of the regional organiza-tions.

Following the September attempt,Nigeria's dispatch of a senior militarydelegation and an ensuing exchange ofmessages with Eyadema about regionalsecurity suggest that President Ba-bangida Ux) would like to use his influ-ence to resolve the dispute in his capac-ity as head of the 16-member EconomicCommunity of West African States, theonly regional organization which in-cludes Ghana as well as Burkina andTogo.

Finally, the Togolese people are ask-ing themselves if their country will eversolve its ongoing security problems,which have plagued Eyadema through-

out his near 20 years in power. The cap-tured attackers have said that they wereresponsible for last year's bomb explo-sions in Lome, thus apparently linkingthe attack and those events as the workof one group. However, the authoritieshave made no connection between thisincident and the bomb plot revealed inAugust.

More importantly, although Eya-dema has at least the passive sup-port of his countrymen, his regime willcontinue to be menaced by potentialthreats as long as there is a well-fi-nanced opposition to his rule. For anumber of years, Eyadema has askedthe French to deport Olympio and otherParis-based opposition figures. It re-mains to be seen if the heightenedFrench support will include this furtherstep, something the French have untilnow been reluctant to do.

Moreover, it seems clear that despitea lack of popular support for their activi-ties—which perhaps stems from fearsof further internal repression—therewill always be a group of dissidents whowill continue to hatch new plots againstEyadema, leaving the prospect of manymore sleepless nights. Q

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Despite the Nigerian people's overwhelming opposition to an IMFagreement, the Babangida government has gambled that its recenteconomic reforms, including a de facto devaluation of the naira, will besufficient to attract new revenues and open credit lines. Is a deal with theIMF around the corner?

Year of

IMF?Nigeria

BY PETER BLACKBURN

Nigeria's President, Maj. -Gen.Ibrahim Babangida, has taken a

courageous political gamble in carryingout a major devaluation of the local cur-rency, the naira. His move toward amore realistic exchange rate, by intro-duction of the Second Tier Foreign Ex-change Market (SFEM), has broken thelong deadlock with the country's exter-nal creditors and offers prospects for ec-onomic recovery.

The gamble is remarkable as it comesless than one year after the Nigerianpeople categorically rejected the idea ofan International Monetary Fund agree-ment—the crucial prerequisite forwhich was a major devaluation of thenaira—after an emotional and one-sideddebate. The debate was characteristicof Babangida's more open style of gov-ernment and contrasted with the re-pression and rigidity of his predecessor,Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari.

Babangida said that a major reason forhis bloodless coup in August 1985 wasBuhari's failure to halt the economic de-

Peter Blackburn is a freelance journalist based inAbidjan covering West Africa. He contributes reg-ularly to the Financial Times, African EconomicDigest, Christian Science Monitor, and Mc-Graw Hill publications.

President Ibrahim Babangida "beat atactical retreat in mid-December lastyear, announcing that negotiations withthe IMF had been suspended"

cline during his 20 months in office."Austerity without structural adjust-ment is no solution to our economic pre-dicament, " Babangida declared. Hespoke of the need to break the deadlockin negotiations with the IMF over termsfor a $2.5 billion loan—a stalematewhich had dragged on since April 1983.

Babangida argued that an IMF agree-ment would lead to not only a majorWorld Bank structural adjustment loan,but also a rescheduling of the country'sexternal debt and possible fresh com-mercial credit.

But the national debate, intended asan exercise in public education, back-fired badly. Conducted mainly in thecountry's outspoken press and on radioand television, the discussion wasmostly irrational and irate, with the out-come never in doubt.

Opponents of an IMF agreement,ranging from academics to marketwomen, argued that it would surrender"national sovereignty" to the facelessgnomes from Washington. Some aca-demics contended that Nigeria would

lose more than it gained from devalua-tion, given that over 95 percent of itsexports are oil and denominated in dol-lars. At the same time, the cost of im-ports of food, raw materials, capitalgoods, and consumer items would risesharply, they predicted.

The more cynical Nigerians arguedthat the inflow cf new IMF/World Bankand other international aid would largelybe wasted due to the lack of an honestand efficient civil service. There wasalso widespread skepticism as towhether IMF medicine could indeedcure the Nigerian economy given itsmixed record elsewhere in Africa. "Is itworth the pain?" many Nigerians asked.

Babangida—described by observersas an astute politician beneath a rotundand jovial exterior—beat a tactical re-treat in mid-December last year, an-nouncing that negotiations with the IMFhad been suspended. This helped to un-dermine popular support for an at-tempted military coup which was in-tended to exploit the government's"softness" with the IMF.

Shortly afterwards, undaunted by thenegative outcome of the IMF debateand convinced that a "realistic" ex-change rate was essential for economic

"Opponents of an IMFagreement, rangingfrom academics tomarket women, arguedthat it would surrender'national sovereignty'to the faceless gnomesfrom Washington."

adjustment and eventual recovery, Ba-bangida introduced a budget incorporat-ing many of the conditions posed by theIMF.

One of its main features was a sub-stantial cut in the domestic petroleum


subsidy which resulted in a doubling ofgasoline and tripling of diesel prices.Other IMF reforms, such as greater fis-cal and monetary discipline, reducedsubsidies for parastatals, revision oftrade tariffs, and introduction of exportincentives, were also announced.

However, two major conditions re-mained unfulfilled. The first, trade liber-alization, is considered more a matter oftiming than a question of principle. Thesecond, devaluation of the naira, was amore complex and politically sensitivedecision.

"Import licenses wereoften considered to bepieces of politicalpatronage to be resoldto desperateindustrialists for hugeprofits."

The budget was preceded by a 15-month "economic emergency" programwhich has so far been peacefully ac-cepted by the volatile Nigerian people,and lias demonstrated their capacity forNigerian if not IMF-imposed austerity,observers pointed out. The measuresincluded cuts in civil service and militarysalaries, a one-third reduction in foreigndiplomatic staff, and the banning of riceand maize imports.

Although the SFFM was first an-nounced in the 198(i budget, its imple-mentation was delayed many monthsdue to difficulties in working out modali-ties and pressure from various interestgroups which stood to lose by the newarrangement. When finally introducingthe measure in September, FinanceMinister Dr. Chu Okongwu said thatlaunching the SFEM was like a "militaryoperation," requiring complex planningand tight security.

One of the most serious risks is thatthe devaluation brought about by theSFEM will trigger a steep rise in theprice of imported food and essential con-sumer items. However, analysts pointout that most consumers in Lagos andother large Nigerian cities are alreadyaccustomed to paying inflated black

market prices, so in fact their purchas-ing power may be little affected.

Secondly, prices may even drop aftera few months as unscrupulous traderseventually release hoarded goods ontothe market. For its part, the govern-ment may be holding stocks of certainstrategic items, such as sugar, to offloadonto the market when prices start tospiral. The rise in imported food priceswill also strengthen the government'scampaign to encourage Nigerians to eatmore locally grown staples such as cas-sava and yams.

Opposition to the SFEM has comefrom many quarters. Manufacturerscomplain that the cost of imported rawmaterials and spare parts will risesteeply, making local production uneco-nomical and forcing many bankruptciesunless the government relaxes its pricecontrols.

Nigerian industry is about 70 percentdependent on imported raw materials,which have been increasingly difficult toobtain because of the shortage of for-eign exchange. In addition, profit mar-gins have been squeezed during the pastyear by the increase in fuel prices. Thegovernment is urging industry to relymore on local resources, although busi-nessmen point out that this goal will takeseveral years to achieve.

According to observers, the govern-ment's long delay in introducing the sec-

"The rise m imported food prices willstrengthen the government's campaignto encourage Nigerians to eat more lo-cally grown staples"

ond tier market reflected the lack ofpopular enthusiasm for the new system.The former system of import licensesand foreign exchange controls gave con-siderable power and wealth to certainmembers of the government bureau-cracy and the military establishment. Itwas regarded, especially by southern-ers, as benefiting the northern Muslimtraders and reflecting the balance ofpower in previous civilian and militarygovernments. Import licenses were of-ten considered to be pieces of politicalpatronage to be resold to desperate in-dustrialists for huge profits.

Finance Minister Okongwu pointsout that one of the advantages of a "real-istic" exchange rate policy is that "it willeliminate bureaucratic controls on for-eign exchange and trade." In this way, itwill reduce the possibility for corruption.However, bureaucrats are already mak-ing some moves to introduce "pre-im-port registration" in order to discouragethe wastage of foreign exchange on friv-olous consumer imports. Controls arealso likely to prevent a flight of capitalout of the country.

According to Okongwu. the govern-ment aims to merge the first and secondtier foreign exchange markets withinone year. The latter covers all transac-tions except government debt serviceand payments to international organiza-tions. Importers who have depositednaira with the banks to cover their for-eign exchange applications are also con-cerned that they will now have to makeextra payments under the new and


higher exchange rate to get their goodsinto the country.

Despite the World Bank's recent ap-proval of a $450 million loan to help fi-nance the second tier market, there arefears of a shortage of foreign exchangeto meet the demand at the weekly auc-tions. This could mean that the devalua-tion could spiral out of control as moreand more naira bid for ever scarceramounts of hard currency. With the Ni-gerian economy flush with unwantednaira, this could indeed happen.

One group that has been consistentlyhostile to the IMF and any move towarddevaluation is the Nigerian Labour Con-gress (NLC). Labor leaders argue thatdevaluation and the consequent rise infood prices always hit the workers hard-est. They regard the second tier marketas a "disguised devaluation" and a secretsell-out to the IMF. Indeed, the firstforeign exchange auction on September26, which resulted in a 67 percent deval-uation of the naira reducing it to close tothe black market rate, seems to haveborne out their worst fears.

The NLC, representing some 3 mil-lion workers from 70 trade unions, hasbeen severely weakened by the eco-nomic recession that has gripped Nige-ria since the early 1980s. There havebeen massive layoffs, especially in theprivate sector, and an estimated 5 mil-lion people are now unemployed, about80 percent of them under age 25.

For the past two years, abundantfood harvests have helped allay socialunrest. The rural population has hadplentiful food supplies, some of whichhelp to feed the cities, while the govern-ment has so far been able to finance es-sential food imports to make up the bal-ance.

However, the collapse in oil revenuesthis year has helped to hasten thecrunch for the Nigerian economy. Abunching of medium and long-term debtmaturities combined with the build-up intrade arrears has brought the countryclose to financial collapse.

Nigeria has already been forced tounilaterally impose three three-monthdebt repayment moratoria, the latestone extending until the end of the year.Ironically, Nigeria's external debt ofsome $14 billion, combined with tradearrears of about $6 billion, is modest by

Lagos harbor: One of the mam featuresof the new budget was a substantial cutin the domestic petroleum subsidy, re-sulting in a doubling of gasoline and tri-pling of diesel prices

Latin American standards. "Nigeria hasplentiful mineral, agricultural, and hu-man resources. Its present crisis islargely due to mismanagement and poorpublic relations," one banker com-mented.

In the debt-rescheduling talks, com-mercial bankers have refused to treatNigeria as a "special case," as this wouldset a dangerous precedent for dealingswith the much larger Latin Americandebtor nations.

The 90-day debt moratoria are only astop-gap solution and have done nothingto meet Nigeria's desperate need fornew financial resources to pay for foodand raw material imports or for longer-term productive investment withoutwhich economic recovery is impossible.

As President Babangida has appar-ently rejected the "default" solution toNigeria's financial crisis, he has soughtto "adjust" the exchange rate in a bid toreach an understanding with the IMF, inthe absence of which a rescheduling ofofficial debt owed to the Paris Club andcommercial debt to the London Clubcannot be achieved, nor new credit linesextended.

The coming weeks and months couldbe extremely tense as Nigerians adjustto the new second tier market, whosemechanisms neither officials, bankers,nor businessmen fully understand. Thegovernment will be watchful of specula-tors trying to unduly depress the valueof the naira, inflate food prices, or orga-nize a flight of capital.

The biggest threat may still comefrom traditional supporters within thearmy and in the Muslim north who haveseen one of their main sources of enrich-ment evaporate. Babangida is unlikelyto take time off to celebrate the comingnew year, as it is a favorite time forlaunching coup attempts.

Will the "disguised devaluation"brought about by the second tier marketbe enough to secure the IMF's approvalfor Nigeria's own economic reform pro-gram, enable a rescheduling of the ex-ternal debt, and bring in fresh money?The signs certainly point in that direc-tion.

In early October, a joint note by theIMF and World Bank characterized thepolicy reforms, particularly the naira de-valuation, as a "major turning point inNigeria's economic policy," and statedthat "support from the international fi-nancial community will be essential in-gredients in the success of the pro-gram. " To assist in the reform efforts,the World Bank has agreed to a three-year $4.3 billion project loan for nextyear, and an economic policy memoran-dum has been signed with the IMF,clearing the way for a possible debt re-scheduling.

While skeptical bankers are likely toinsist on strict IMF monitoring of theadjustment program, Nigerians' pride intheir national sovereignty could makethis too bitter a pill to swallow. As oneWestern banker said, "The governmenthas introduced some impressive budg-ets in recent years, but they have neverbeen properly implemented. We want toavoid the same fate for the adjustmentprogram, especially if our money is tiedto it." •


Guinea

Conte in ControlPresident Lansana Conte has not found it easy overcoming the legacies ofSekou Toure's corrupt and authoritarian rule. Emerging strengthened fromlast year's failed coup attempt, the President is attempting to restore bothdomestic and international confidence in his ability to rebuild the country.

BY HOWARD SCHISSEL

Two and a half years after the deathof Ahmed Sekou Toure and the

subsequent military coup that sweptaway the debris of his autocratic sys-tem, Guinea is still in a state of flux. Thewave of enthusiasm that captured thepopulation, particularly the youth, dur-ing the first days of the new governmentproved to be ephemeral. It scx>n becamestrikingly evident that many long and dif-ficult years would be required to over-come the handicap represented by theheritage of 26 years of economic misma-nagement and often brutal dictatorship.

Guineans wanted not only the guar-antee of respect for human rights, butalso improved living standards. Guinea'seconomy, potentially one of the richestin West Africa thanks to substantial min-eral resources and immense agro-indus-trial possibilities, was largely shackledunder the anckn regime by a plethoricbureaucracy and institutionalized cor-ruption.

Under the banner of "African social-ism," Sekou Toure fostered a systemwhich benefited a small group of seniorbureaucrats and allied traders almostexclusively. The result was that almost2 million Guineans were forced to seektheir livelih(x>ds abroad and the under-ground economy flourished.

The reform of the stagnant economywas at the top of the agenda for the newmilitary government. But the applica-tion of a reform program needed strong

Howard Schisse! is a Paris-based freelance jour-nalist specializing in French-speaking Africa aswell as questions relating to African natural re-sources.

and credible leadership. The MilitaryCommittee of National Recovery(CMRN), the ruling body created by thearmed forces, turned out to be a hetero-geneous organ lacking a clear politicaldirection.

In the first heady days of the post-Toure era, almost all the senior brass,many of whom played a role in the peri-odic purges organized by the late dicta-tor, were automatically given a seat onthe CMRN. The aim was to project theimage of a united army and a consensusamong the country's diverse ethnicgroups. Rapidly, however, the CMRN

proved to be unwieldy. Personal ambi-tions and ethnic rivalry paralyzed its de-liberations. Top officers and their cro-nies quickly enriched themselves. Thepopulation became skeptical about theprospects for positive change.

The most serious problem, however,was the sharpening divisions betweenPresident Lansana Conte, a Soussoufrom a village about 50 miles north of thedilapidated capital, Conakry, and then-Prime Minister Diara Traore, a Malinkelike the late head of state. The latter,impetuous and self-serving, sought torally support both in the country and

President Lansana Conte: "Without any military or civilian rival, he has become thecountry's uncontested chief"


abroad to fulfill his ambitions.It did not take long before it became

clear that Guinea's two top officerswere on a collision course. PresidentConte took the initiative of eliminatingthe prime minister's office during a cabi-net reshuffle at the end of 19H4. At thattime. Col. Traore was demoted to oneof the four newly-created state ministerposts. This situation was short-lived,however. Early in the summer of 1985,Traore spearheaded a failed coup at-tempt. The French played a major rolein enabling the president to reestablishhis authority.

Many officers close to Traore, as wellas civilian supporters of the ex-primeminister, were arrested in the wake ofthe foiled putsch. Most of those ar-rested were of Malinke origin, althoughthe government tried to downplay theethnic nexus behind the coup. The

Fishing boats, Conakry: "The populationhas experienced a deterioration in its al-ready low standard of living"

blame was placed on Traore's ruthlessquest for power. In Conakry and othertowns, the population often blamed theMalinke for seeking to reestablish theirdominance lost with the passing of Se-kou Toure.

The attempted coup is still shroudedin mystery. Hie government initiallypromised that the plotters would bebrought to public trial. This has neveroccurred. Traore's fate remains un-known. In Conakry, most sourcesreckon that he was executed, along withall the male members of the Toure fam-ily. Other members of the former firstfamily, including Madame AndreeToure, are either in prison or underhouse arrest. It is believed that theyknow the whereabouts of the large

sums of money which Guinea's firstleader reputedly stashed away abroad.

Instead of precipitously reshufflinghis cabinet after the failed putsch. Presi-dent Conte took his time. Indeed, herequired almost six months to decide ona new government and initiate the firsteconomic reform measures. This ex-tended delay gave the impression of in-decision and weak leadership. Conte,who prides himself on his peasant ori-gins, tends to deliberate carefully beforecoming to an important decision. But re-maining firmly in control, he has beenable to form a new government de-signed to give the country the measureof confidence it lacked.

One of the main hallmarks of the gov-ernment that emerged last December

UN-sponsored fish-smoking project: "In-ternational organizations have been as-sisting Guinea on the difficult road to eco-nomic recovery"


was the decline in the role of the mili-tary—an increase from nine to 19 in thenumber of civilian ministers. It alsomarked the entry onto the politicalscene of a bevy of young teclmocrats,most of whom owe their promotion tothe president's good will. Also worthnoting was the enhanced role grantedexpatriate Guineans—a number ofwhom returned after a long exile to ac-cept cabinet portfolios—meant to reas-sure wealthy Guinean traders in neigh-boring states and tempt them to investback home.

Conte also used the cabinet reshuffleas a means of diminishing the influenceof potential rivals in the armed forces:Many were sent to the hinterland asresident ministers. Former ForeignMinister Facinet Toure, a Soussou witha reputation as forceful and somewhatruthless, was appointed minister for theForest province near the frontier withCote d'lvoire and Liberia.

"Remaining firmly incontrol, Conte has beenable to form a newgovernment designed togive the country themeasure of confidenceit lacked."

Col. Mamadou Balde, the highestranking Feu! officer, was sent to admin-ister Upper Guinea, the fief of the Ma-linke. The Peul community was theprincipal target for persecution underSekou Toure, and many leaders of thisgroup feel that they have not yet re-ceived restitution. Finally, CommanderMankan Camara, a Malinke, was givenauthority in Middle Guinea.

The president strongly reinforced hisown hand, appointing a key supporter,Commander Kerfalla Camara, as per-manent secretary of the CMKN. Sensi-tive ministries were placed under thepresident's wing with minister-dele-gates named for the portfolios of plan-ning and international cooperation, inte-rior and centralization, defense, and in-formation. The armed forces commandwas also reorganized, with < jfficers closeto the Guinean leader given key posts.

However, it took only a few monthsbefore the first crisis developed. Minis-ter of Information Jean-Claude Diallo,the top expatriate Guinean in the gov-ernment, devised a plan to liberalize theimport of basic foodstuffs. Known as theProgramme Libre de Commerce(PLC), it was criticized as designed tofavor the Peul community and openingthe door for all sorts of sundry commer-cial practices. An influential French ad-viser, Bernard Vatrican, who was giventhe sobriquet the "white marabout,"also backed the PLC.

A coalition of French and indigenouseconomic forces convinced PresidentConte to abolish the PLC and maintainstate control over vital imports. Diallo,who obviously felt targeted by thisaction, t<x>k advantage of a trip abroadearlier this spring to resign and de-nounce the venal practices of the gov-ernment.

His action, contrary to expectations,did not have much impact in Guinea.The other ministers representing theGuinean expatriate community kepttheir posts. Vatrican, whose role be-came controversial, used the opportu-nity of the PLC affair to resign and leavethe country.

Without any military or civilian rival,Conte has become the country's uncon-tested chief. Although he resides amidintense military security at Camp Sa-mory in a Conakry suburb, the presi-dent has assumed the trappings ofpower. Within his crack presidentialguard unit, certainly the best armed andtrained in the Guinean armed forces, hehas set up a special mounted guard usedfor honorary parades and receptions.Both the French and the Moroccansprovide training for the presidentialguard, composed principally of soldiersfrom the Soussou ethnic group.

The Guinean leader makes few publicappearances and rarely travels abroad.He is not accustomed to the media andtherefore gives few interviews. His fu-ture plans are an open question. Likeother African military leaders, such asPresident Moussa Traore of Mali, hecould attempt to institutionalize his re-gime by organizing presidential elec-tions.

Such an option, however, is undoubt-edly years away, for the president

would have to create a new politicalparty and a parliament. For the mo-ment, however, the main preoccupationappears to be putting into motion wide-ranging economic reform measures andmaking sure that the transition perioddoes not engender excessive discontentin the urban areas and possible distur-bances which could be used to destabi-lize the government.

Guinea's economy was in shambles atthe fall of Sekou Toure's regime. West-ern economists estimate that up to athird of the country's gross domesticproduct passed through parallel blackmarket networks. Due to low domesticproducer prices, farmers often soldtheir cash crops in the neighboringstates of Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Sene-gal. In these countries, they were paidin a convertible currency which couldthen be exchanged at favorable blackmarket rates for the Guinean syli orused to buy food or consumer productsabroad.

Guinea was also flooded by smuggledmanufactured goods and foodstuffs thatmade fortunes for well-connected trad-ers, politicians, and customs officials.Much of Guinea's diamond and gold out-put found its way to markets outside thecountry. The outrageously overvaluedcurrency rendered any economic re-form efforts worthless.

Sekou Toure used the bloated stateadministration and parastatal sector tocreate a political base through the grant-ing of employment opportunities. Statecompanies were notoriously inefficient.Moreover, they required constant sub-sidies to be kept afloat.

This system also corresponded to theneeds of a group of bureaucrats whoheld the reins of power under the ancienregime. By controlling official monetarytransactions, for example, they wereable to amass considerable fortunes. At

"Growing socialinequities could poseserious problems forthe government anddiscredit free marketeconomics as a panaceafor the country's ills."


the same time, the bauxite mining sec-tor, representing 97 percent of exportearnings, operated as a prosperous en-clave in a drained economy. The mines,operated by foreign partners, had littleimpact on the overall economy.

Once President Conte gave thegreen light to start cleaning up Guinea'seconomic morass, foreign experts firsthad to solve the currency problem. TheGuinean syli was massively devalued inOctober last year, bringing its valuebroadly in line with the CFA franc. Earlythis year, the syli was replaced by thenew Guinean franc and a dual exchangerate was established for public and pri-vate sector transactions.

In June, this system was abolishedbecause of the Guinean franc's remark-able stability, as it maintained its nearparity to the CFA franc. This monetaryreform went through smoothly and it islikely that Guinea will soon join the CFAfranc zone, thereby guaranteeing it aconvertible and transferable currency.This would certainly bolster confidencein Guinea among potential foreign inves-tors as well as the affluent expatriatecommunity.

The banking sector was also over-hauled. Three new banks were created,each under the auspices of a largeFrench financial institution. Frenchtrading houses established a joint ven-ture with the government for the importof vital foodstuffs. Guinea's parastatalsare being reorganized by the French In-stitute of Industrial Development.Other French firms have taken over re-sponsibility for strategic economic sec-tors.

A Frenchman, Leon Chaize, was ap-pointed vice-governor of the BanqueNationale de Guinee, although he is offi-cially a World Bank functionary. Thissudden thrust of French interests hascreated friction: It is common, for in-stance, to find Guineans bitterly com-plaining that France is seeking to makeup for lost time by "neo-colonizing" thecountry.

International organizations also havebeen assisting Guinea on the difficultroad to economic recovery. Since thebeginning of 1986, the InternationalMonetary Fund has granted a $33.6 mil-lion 13-month s tandby loan to help im-plement reforms. The World Bank, for

its part, agreed to a $42.6 million struc-tural adjustment loan to support thegovernment program. The Paris Clubreached an agreement during the springon the rescheduling of $200 million ofGuinea's foreign debt.

Guinea owes the Soviet Union around$400 million from past purchases ofarms and industrial equipment; this isbeing repaid by bauxite exports fromthe Kindia mine operated by Soviettechnicians. Compared to other WestAfrican states, Guinea's overseas debtis quite manageable.

Foreign donors have proven to begenerous with Guinea. With the coun-try's overture to the West and its at-tempt to implement free market eco-nomic guidelines, Guinea has become afavorite in the Western donor commu-nity. France, naturally, has played aleading role: In 1985, for example,Guinea was the second largest recipientof soft loans from France's Fonds d'Aideet de Cooperation (FAC) with $88.6 mil-lion. The United States, West Ger-many, Belgium, Italy, and Arab sourceshave also kicked in considerable sumsfor infrastructure and developmentschemes.

Outside the mining sector, there hasbeen little fresh private investment.Australia's Bridge Oil has set up a jointventure, Aredor, to mine Guinea's richdiamond reserves. A Canadian-Swissconsortium, Chevanning Mining, hasbegun prospecting a highly promisingconcession in the Siguiri region. Ameri-can concerns are involved in oil prospec-tion off the Boe region after a continen-tal plateau dispute with Guinea-Bissauwas settled in a judgment rendered bythe International Court of Justice.

Despite immense agro-industrial pos-sibilities, few foreign investors havebeen tempted. The country's lack of in-frastructure and trained cadres repre-sents a bottleneck. Some firms haveadopted a wait-and-see approach in or-der to judge if political and financial sta-bility can be assured.

Guinea's other large mining projectsare finding it difficult to get off the draw-ing boards. A scheme to open a fourthbauxite mine at Ayekoye has met withlittle success. This $2.2 billion projectinvolves the construction of an alumi-num smelter and a large hydroelectric

"Thirty months is a relatively short periodto transform an economy and society stillunder the influence of a quarter-centuryof misgovernment"

dam on the Konkoure river. The weakprice of aluminum on world markets andsoft demand does not bode well for theAyekoye project.

In addition, a $1.5 billion iron oremine at Mount Nimba, close to the fron-tier with Liberia, is in suspended anima-tion. Guinea envisages setting up a jointcompany with Liberia and associatingAfrican and Western interests in the de-velopment of this high grade ore lode.However, as with the proposed bauxitemine, iron ore is suffering from weakinternational demand. Guinea also facescompetition from other West and Cen-tral African states—notably Senegaland Gabon—who have rival iron oreprojects in the pipeline.

Bringing order to the state adminis-tration and parastatals is liable to posesome delicate problems. A study of theadministration revealed thousands offictitious posts, and those with genuine


jobs, some 84,000, were under-em-ployed or had few real qualifications.Most of these civil servants live in Cona-kry and have only passing awareness ofthe country's realities. This inefficientorganization costs the Guinean exche-quer dearly. After payment was endedto fictitious civil servants, a plan to paredown the administration was enacted.The government announced that it ex-pects to reduce the state sector to some50,000 by the end of 1987.

It is hoped that the private sector willbe able to absorb the laid-off civil ser-vants, many of whom were given cashbonuses to encourage them to openbusinesses. In particular, it is fearedthat disgruntled civil servants could cre-ate a political backlash which could beexploited by anti-Conte forces. This isall the more the case as Conakry is sub-merged by unemployed youth, many ofthem sch(x)l graduates who are dissatis-fied with their lot and face a grim future.

The reform of the monetary systemand other IMF-sponsored measureshave resulted in a sharp increase in the

cost of living in Conakry and other urbancenters. The population has thereforeexperienced a deterioration in its al-ready low standard of living. To alleviatesome of the hardship, the governmentgranted the remaining civil servants ahefty wage increase.

As the majority of the populationstruggles to eke out a livelihood, a classofnouveanx riches has flourished in Con-akry. Never before have there been somany luxury cars and such outwardflaunting of wealth in the capital. Thishas given rise to bitterness among aver-age Guineans who claim that the wealthis largely misbegotten. This is oftenconfirmed by official statements pledg-ing to punish corrupt functionaries andtraders, but these declarations arerarely followed by concrete action.Growing social inequities could pose se-rious problems for the government anddiscredit free market economics as a"panacea" for the country's ills.

In the industrial sector, the parastatalreform program has led to the closure ofseven companies, the reorganization of

four, and the offering to the private sec-tor of another 13. Manufacturing units,usually working at a quarter of capacity,are over-staffed money-losers. Thenon-industrial sector, encompassingsome 130 state-owned concerns in theimport-export, wholesale, and distribu-tion business, is also being rationalized.

As Guinean economist Diallo Mama-dou Lamarana suggests, "There is arisk of seeing the development of aspeculative market in real estate and im-port-export, two sectors reputed to behighly profitable. Investment in indus-try, profitable in the long term, will bethe practical monopoly of foreign inter-ests. And a situation could developwhere a compradore bourgeoisie wouldbenefit from its position in the state bu-reaucracy to engage in affairism. . .

At present, there are few forces ca-pable of resisting such a drift in the econ-omy. Another potential problem is thedevelopment of a new system of ethnicnepotism and sinecures modeled on Se-kou Toure's government—but benefit-ing ethnic groups other than the Ma-linke.

Yet another question mark concernsthe rural economy. Under the first re-public, the peasants were punished bylow producer prices and inefficient gov-ernment services. The result was a vir-tual stagnation of subsistence agricul-ture and a regression in the export-ori-ented sectors. The new governmenthas declared that the development ofagriculture and livestock is one of its toppriorities. Implementing these good in-tentions may be more difficult thanimagined: The peasantry is extremelyweary of the central government's ver-bal commitments. Furthermore, theGuinean community could play an im-portant role in investing in agriculturalschemes, but until now they have madeonly timid moves.

Of course, 30 months is a relativelyshort period to transform an economyand a society still under the influence of aquarter-century of misgovemment andvaried abuses. Bad habits are hard tochange. While progress has been made,the task that lies ahead is immense. Thepopulation cautiously supports Presi-dent Conte, but the institutions remainfragile and the shock of change couldproduce unexpected developments. •


Women

In the first of a series of articles to explore the contributions of Africanwomen to national economic and political development, Africa Report talkswith Josephine Ouedraogo about the Burkina government's innovativeapproach to women's issues and the role of donor organizations insupporting these efforts.

Josephine OuedraogoMinister of Family Affairs and

National Solidarity, Burkina Faso

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Your government is perhaps the most pro-gressive on the African continent in its commitment to wom-en's advancement, evidenced by the fact that there are cur-rently five women ministers. Could you explain the philosophyof your government insofar as the role of women in nationaldevelopment is concerned?Ouedraogo: I think what is important in the Burkinabe gov-ernment's conception of theliberation of women is thatwomen must be accepted aspartners at all levels. The factthat at the moment there arefive women ministers in ournew cabinet shows that at thehighest levels, women are ac-cepted as partners in makingimportant political decisionsand in the conception of the na-tion's development program.This is a really extraordinarymark of the confidence thegovernment has invested inwe women in Burkina. Notonly are there women minis-ters, but also many womenwho occupy other posts of po-litical, administrative, andtechnical responsibility, suchas high commissioners and di-rectors of companies and de-partments. If women are not

participating in decision-making in any given country, it's be-cause they are not regarded as having the necessary compe-tence and analytical abilities. Therefore, for us, it is a mark ofthe National Council of the Revolution's [CNR] confidence inour women that we have been asked to participate at thehighest levels.

One might think—well, it's only the elite of our women whoare so privileged. But in reality, women are involved at everylevel in the country, equally down to the very basic

grassroots. From the very be-ginning of its existence, theCNR decided to organize ourwomen so that they would berepresented at all levels andwould be able to provide theirviews and participate in politi-cal activities. This is very im-portant. Even at the villagelevel, women have their repre-sentatives. An office of the Un-ion of Burkinabe Women[UFB] has recently been cre-ated in each village. But evenbefore that, there was at leastone woman member of the vil-lage bureaus of the Commit-

^ tees for the Defense of the§ Revolution [CDRs]. This< translates concretely into the% fact that in all village activities,I women have the opportunity

"Women are accepted as partners in making important political to be present and to partici-decisionsandin the conception of the nation's development" pate—even in collective ef-


Operation Literacy Commando: "At the operations closing cere-monies, a woman delegate stood up and said she wanted toopenly register her dissatisfaction that so few women were cho-sen to benefit from the literacy campaign!"

forts, such as the construction of a reservoir, a school, or awell.

If they are not doing so, it can only be because perhaps theyhaven't understood the opportunity which is being offeredthem to participate, because there are too many other con-straints on their time, or because there hasn't been sufficientpolitical education. Nevertheless, the door is open to them,and to illustrate this point, I want to tell you a story aboutsomething that occurred during our "Operation LiteracyCommando," a program we carried out in February andMarch to introduce literacy to 36,000 peasants under theaegis of the Ministry of Agriculture. At the operation's closingceremonies, in front of all the members of government, awoman delegate stood up and said she wanted to openly regis-ter her dissatisfaction that so few women were chosen tobenefit from this literacy campaign! She had a good point! Shefelt the program was an important one, she was invited toexpress her views, and she did so! And although some wereembarrassed that she spoke out like that, she proved that thedoor is really open for women to participate and to expressthemselves.

I think it is this change in perceptions that is essential,because all those "women's projects" sponsored by non-gov-ernmental organizations [NG()s| and governments—we havehad so many of them here over the last 20 years—are all verynice, but as long as women are not brought into the decision-making process, are not involved in the modern sector, arenot educated, and don't make the decisions, these small pro-jects will never be able to change the status of women! Youcan launch an income generation or educational project forwomen, but it will only marginalize them and will never lead totheir involvement in the political, economic, or cultural sceneas equal partners with men. I think it is this dimension that hasbeen lacking and what the CNR has been able to providethrough the revolution. It wouldn't surprise anybody hereeven if 10 women are named as ministers!Africa Report: As you pointed out, "women's projects" of-ten tend to marginalize women. Therefore, have you changedthe policy guidelines you utilize in dealing with NGOs who areinterested in financing women's projects?

Ouedraogo: Yes, we are, but this is a change that will comeabout progressively. The NGOs have already been madeaware of ourpoint of view. However, we do not yet control allthe aspects of project design insofar as women's projects areconcerned. Many of these projects are still designed by theNGOs and are already being implemented We hope ulti-mately to arrive at a situation where, if donors want to under-take a project for women in Burkina, they will find an interloc-utor at our national level who will be able to say, "No, we thinkthat this project, given our realities, will contribute tomarginalizing our women, and it would be better to change it insuch or such a way." Ultimately, we hope to arrive at a situa-tion where even at the level of agricultural projects, theirimpact upon women will automatically be taken into account,because very often agricultural development projects havemarginalized women, with the end result that they lose theirsole source of income.

Ultimately we need to design the projects ourselves, be-cause we have learned that many NGOs really don't believe inequality for women, even those which are busy extolling thevirtues of "women's projects!" In reality, they fund theseprojects only to assuage their consciences and to prove toeveryone that they are interested in women's issues. Thereare NGOs which are funding very interesting programs on theeconomic front, for example, but which admit, "The socialimplications are not our problem. We are here to build a road,a school, a dam—its social or political implications don't con-cern us." They forget that the dam they build or the agricul-tural project they undertake will bring about transformationsin the society-—whether by marginalizing women, by givingmore authority to men, or whatever. There is not a singleaction that one can undertake that will not have an impact uponthe population and therefore upon the women.Africa Report: It seems that NGOs often put the cart beforethe horse, in their view that it is the proliferation of these smallprojects that will bring about women's advancement, ratherthan understanding that a certain level of development andclearly defined development objectives are necessary beforethese small projects can have an impact.

Itfl"You can launch dit inhume generation or educational project forwomen, but it will only marginalize them and will never lead totheir involvement in the political, economic, or cultural scene asequals with men"


Ouedraogo: Or even before knowing what small projects areneeded! These small projects do not bring about develop-ment. I think what you said is especially true for Burkina—acountry which has received perhaps the most assistance inthe form of these small NGO projects. We have received anenormous amount of assistance at this level. But why hasn't itchanged anything? It's because the big picture—developmentin all its aspects—hasn't been taken into account. Further-more, in the past, there was no precise definition of the formof the population's participation in the development processwhich clearly spelled out the priorities, and then within thesepriorities, which small projects were needed. Without suchclarity, each NGO comes with its own view of things andchooses its own preferred area, but that doesn't contribute toanything but a dispersal of funds and often a considerablewaste of money. Maybe the lot of one group of villagers isimproved, but that isn't enough. In the end, however, theeffort has to come from us, and as long as a governmentdoesn't have the political will to clearly define its conception ofdevelopment, then you can't blame the NGOs for taking ad-vantage of the situation.

Africa Report: Could you outline the priorities of your minis-try insofar as women are concerned, and how these prioritiesare addressed by the recently launched five-year develop-ment plan?Ouedraogo: My ministry is not solely involved in women'sissues. In tackling specific priority issues, we are involvedwith a variety of social groups, for example, marginalizedpersons such as juvenile delinquents. We believe that throughvarious activities we undertake, we can indirectly contributeto raising the status of women. For example, we are tacklingthe issues of family planning and increasing women's incomes.Concerning family planning, the objective is not specifically toreduce the birth rate, but rather to educate the family tounderstand that limiting the number of children or spacingbirths will contribute to their well-being. They must under-stand that failure to do so can harm the health of the motherand the child and limit the family's access to social benefits.Therefore, by educating the family, we will be contributing toraising the status of women. We have decided, for example,that our strategy of consciousness-raising on this issue will bedirected at both the men and the women. We will attempt tocreate a dialogue between men and women on this issue. Inthe context of our society, this is something very new, givenour traditional sexual division of responsibilities. The world ofmen is often far apart from the world of women. When societywas purely traditional, there was a certain equilibrium in thisarrangement. Today, however, it is only the world of menwhich is open to societal changes, while the world of womenhas remained somewhat forgotten.

There has also been a rupture in relations between men andwomen in the household. They don't talk to each other andrarely discuss the issues which affect the family, such as, forexample, the education of their children. Each concentrateson his or her own problems and the children are socially andmorally abandoned. The extended family system is eroding.Hence, we want to contribute to creating a dialogue betweenmen and women, thereby forcing the men to accept that

women also have a point of view concerning their health, theirpregnancies, etc. When women have an opportunity to speakout, they tell us: "Men regard us solely as baby machines. Assoon as you are pregnant, the men are satisfied and they asknothing more of you. If you give birth to a son, they are evenhappier. But if you don't get pregnant or if you bear onlydaughters, your status is very low."

When the women are able to express these feelings, theyfeel liberated, and the men see that in fact their women are notmachines, that their wives think and speak their minds. Thisbecomes uncomfortable for the men! We think this is veryimportant because by enabling women to express themselvesabout problems on which they have been obliged to keepsilent, that contributes to an evolution in thinking. Similarly inour project to launch day nurseries for children between theages of three and six, we are involving both parents—fathersand mothers—trying to get them to see the welfare of theirchildren as a family problem, not just a problem for thewomen.

Hence, all these activities contribute to having women ac-cepted as equal partners in the family. We are talking aboutthe qualitative element here—our priority in this ministry is tohave the woman accepted as an interlocutor, as a person withopinions about her life, her relationship with her husband, andthe education of her children. On the economic front, one ofour priorities, for example, is to raise the personal economicstatus of women. Here, we are in the midst of defining pro-jects which will enable women to earn an income, because it isa sign of independence for women to earn their own moneyand therefore have their own resources. Traditionally,women had this option, but with all the transformations whichhave occurred for example in the agricultural sector, as I saidearlier, the women have lost a great deal of their economicautonomy.

Therefore, one of the slogans of our five-year developmentplan is "For each woman, an income." We will be looking atwhat types of activities we can undertake that will enablewomen to earn an income. But first, we are organizing aseminar to be held next year which will bring together womenwho are involved in all types of economic activities to provide


Women lead President Sankara's official motorcade: "The CNRdecided to organize our women so that they would be repre-sented at all levels"

their views on this project. We are aware, for example, that ifwe create additional activities for women without having re-solved their domestic problems, such as the education andcare of their children, in fact we will be creating monstrousproblems. If women don't have access to an income today, it isprobably because they have to spend too much time on theirdomestic responsibilities, and these burdens must be eased.If women aren't trained or educated, it's not because theydon't want it, but rather because they are already too preoccu-pied. We can't solve this problem for them—the women par-ticipating in this seminar must do so. We will discuss all thesequestions. Those women who are already involved in artisanalactivities, for example, will explain how they manage, giventheir domestic responsibilities. Is it that they dump their do-mestic responsibilities onto another woman? In that case, thisis a justification for polygamy! Is it that they rely on a type offamily slavery by exploiting their daughters or young girls inorder to have the necessary free time? We can't close oureyes to these questions. Therefore, what must come out ofthis debate is a determination whether the projects that weare going to undertake to increase women's incomes arereally going to improve their lives.

Africa Report: Could you provide some examples of thetypes of income generation projects you envision for womenin the rural areas?Ouedraogo: For example, market gardening is an activitythat can increase women's incomes. It can also augment theincome of the family when men are involved. In regions withfood deficits, like our northern provinces where we are en-couraging market gardening in order to achieve food self-sufficiency—in these regions where survival itself is a prior-ity—we're not going to tell women, "You must abandon yourfamily plots so that you can earn an income." That would bevery foolish.

Therefore, even if we design ways that various activitiescan earn an income for women, such as artisanry, cattle-raising, or food processing, we must first do preliminary stud-

ies to know whether this is feasible for the family. While we'retrying to help women earn incomes, we shouldn't put in jeop-ardy the survival of the family. In our cities, many women areinvolved in commercial activities. I'm talking about the womenthat you see in the markets—women who are involved inpetty commerce and weaving. But when you look at howthey're able to do so. . . is it a good thing to ultimatelystrengthen polygamy because it's necessary for women toearn incomes? There are all these problems to resolve. Wecan't solve women's economic problems without affectingother cultural and social aspects. Therefore, when I'm askedto outline the concrete actions that we've undertaken, I mustadmit that they have been few, but this is because there are somany of these basic issues to resolve, among which the qualityof women's daily lives is very important.Africa Report: The Union of Burkinabe Women just cele-brated its first anniversary. Can you explain the objectives ofthis organization?

Ouedraogo: The UFB was created to respond to the need toorganize our women, so that no matter where you go inBurkina, when you want to involve the women, you can utilizethis structure. The UFB is a structure for the mobilization andorganization of our women. Thanks to the UFB, if any minis-try wants to ascertain women's views or if women's involve-ment is needed in any particular operation, the women willalready be organized and prepared to express their views.Thus, the UFB isn't solely connected with my ministry. Allthe government departments are required to interact with it.For example, there is now a national commission on the re-cently elaborated Family Code in which the UFB, my minis-try, and the Ministry of National Education are participating,under the leadership of the Ministry of Justice. The UFB wasasked to play a very important role in providing women'sviews on certain elements of the code. Thanks to the UFB,we're able to organize our women at any given moment. Wehave gotten, for example, women's views on polygamy, abor-tion, and female circumcision. If the UFB didn't exist, it wouldhave been extremely difficult to gather this information in solittle time. The UFB is even able to represent the views ofrural women because it is involved all the way down to thevillages.

Africa Report: So the UFB doesn't suffer from the sameproblems of many of the continent's women's organizations,i.e. being run by the educated city women who can't relate atall to the problems of their rural counterparts.Ouedraogo: Yes, you're absolutely right, especially giventhat the organization started by electing village delegates,then departmental, and then provincial delegates. The na-tional bureau hasn't even been elected yet. Certainly at thenational level, there will be women of a certain calibre, butthey will be required to be answerable to all women. Lastyear, when we celebrated National Women's Week, the UFBwas able to bring together delegates from all the provinces. Ithad to translate everything into four languages so that womenfrom Don, Banfora, Fada, would be able to understand whatwas said and express their views. If we didn't have this organi-zation, we wouldn't have been able to do that, likewise if wehad many different women's organizations. In the past, there


were many women's organizations, but none which repre-sented the masses of our women. Organizations of profes-sional women are still in existence, which in itself isn't a badthing; however, they do defend their own secular interests.

Africa Report: What are the aims of the Family Code?Ouedraogo: The Family Code is not yet finalized, becausewe plan on submitting it for the views of many women and acertain number of men—for the moment, it is the work of acommission. Hut in the end, the Family Code will be the firsttime that we will have one single law which regulates the life ofthe family in Burkina. Presently, there are many differentlaws—the Napoleonic Code and various customary laws re-lated to religious traditions, for example—which regulate so-cial and family life in Burkina. For example, whether or not aman is Muslim, he may abide by Muslim laws in running hisfamily and in regulating his relations with his wife—her rights,duties, etc. If it's in a man's interest to use this or that law, hewill do so. If the woman doesn't know any better, it's she wholoses in the end. There are cases of marriages that have beenconsecrated under customary law without the woman'sknowledge! A man marries a woman and he is a polygamist.When the woman complains about it, he says that Muslim lawallows him to be polygamous.

Therefore, we will have one Family Code which will applyto everyone and which we hope will provide equal justice formen, women, and children. The Family Code says that mo-nogamy will be the rule, although we will accept polygamyhere because we can't just dissolve it like that. In the past, allpolygamous marriages were recognized. But henceforth, al-though you can be polygamous if you choose, in the eyes ofthe law, polygamy will not be recognized. While not doingaway with polygamy, this will allow us to diminish somewhatits negative aspects. Many women have warned that if polyg-amy is banned, they will be penalized. They say that it's notpolygamy itself, but rather the entire economic system thatmakes them have too much work, it's the social system whichmakes them have too many children. We accept polygamy asinsidious, but we can only abolish it progressively.

The Family Code will also give women a say in makingcertain household decisions such as management of thehousehold income and in the case of divorce, the disposition ofthe children. In the past, if a couple divorced, children wereautomatically given to their fathers from the age of seven. Acustomary law concerning widowhood will also be done awaywith. This law says that when a woman is widowed, she mustchoose between staying in her husband's family or leaving it. Ifshe chooses to stay in the family, she is required to marry oneof her husband's relatives. She is not allowed to stay in thefamily as a single woman. Often a woman had to accept this inorder to stay with her children, because if she refused tomarry a member of the family, she would be required to leavethe family, including her children. This law was very painful forwomen. Through the Family Code, women will be given morerights than they previously enjoyed.Africa Report: What advice would you give to an AmericanNGO, for example, which is interested in supporting women'sefforts in Burkina?

Ouedraogo: I would first of all tell an NGO that it should havea clearly defined sector when it says it wants to do somethingfor women. Then, depending on the area, it can address itselfto my ministry or to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministryof Health, or one of the other ministries. It depends on itsfocus. Hit doesn't have a specific focus, then it should come tomy ministry because my ministry touches on many differentaspects. We will see from there because we already have ourown projects. If an NGO has its own program, we will deter-mine whether this is something we want. We're in the midst ofsetting up a national structure which will define our prioritiesas far as women are concerned, and which at any given mo-ment can provide the picture of women in Burkina as well asthe impact of all that has already been done. Any NGO that isinterested in being involved in women's issues will automati-cally address itself to this structure, at which level we will be ina position to say: "This is what we want to do, and this is howyou can become involved." And the UFB will be involved as asupport structure because it is already undertaking work tomobilize and conscientize our women. The fight against fe-male circumcision, for example, cannot be carried out by any-one but the UFB because that is a cultural battle, a battle forwomen by women. The UFB is useful for virtually any techni-cal activity that one wants to undertake for women. If youwant to reach women in a certain village, it's possible nowbecause the women are already organized by the UFB.Africa Report: Is there anything else you would like to addabout women in Burkina?

Ouedraogo: At this point, the impact of what we are trying todo, as I said earlier, is above all at the qualitative level. Webelieve that at this stage, the qualitative aspect is much moreimportant than any concrete actions we might undertake,because it will lead us to a better understanding of our womenand what their real preoccupations are. But it must be thewomen themselves who articulate their priorities. Even ifwomen aren't at a certain level, they are capable of conceptu-alizing and expressing their views on their own situation.

My ministry's predecessor, the Ministry of Women's Sta-tus, had so conditioned our women to think that sewing andknitting were the priority that today when we go to a villageand ask women what they want, they reply, 'Teach us how tocrochet!" Thus, because they have been so brainwashed, ourwomen end up by ignoring what their real priorities are! Butwhat we're trying to do today is to get our women interestedin all issues and to ask themselves to define their own priori-ties. Thus, we're in the phase where internal work is the mostimportant. Even if we don't receive much in the way of exter-nal assistance, I say to myself, "Fine, this isn't a problem."And if some people don't understand what we're trying to dohere, I say: "Too bad!" Later on, the concrete activities thatwe'll undertake will be much clearer, they will be well thoughtout, and therefore the impact will be much more significant.As long as they are well-intentioned, anyone who wants tocome and support us today is welcome. We will work togetherto outline precise areas in which to cooperate, because everyday we are learning more and more about what is necessaryand in which areas we need to act, and well understand thiseven better in the future. D


A 'Seven-CorneredSolution?

Liberia

Political repression and a bankrupt economy have left Liberia with adivided opposition that has failed to provide a credible alternative toPresident Samuel Doe's government. Critics contend that the short-termefforts to resolve the economic crisis are only leading the country towardfurther chaos.

BY LARRY JAMES

The chain of events in Liberia, be-ginning with the October 1985

elections followed soon after by Novem-ber's abortive coup and the subsequentimprisonment of opposition leaders, hasled to a deepening political crisis pittingthe government of President Samuel K.Doe against his political rivals.

The recent flight from the country offormer Finance Minister Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf—one of the Doe government'sstrongest critics—underscores the ex-tent of the problem. She was jailed in thewake of last year's coup attempt andstood trial on treason charges until sheand a number of others were releasedunder an amnesty announced by Doe.

The government claimed the pardonwas a humanitarian gesture aimed at na-tional reconciliation. Johnson-Sirieafcontended that the government had notproven its charges in court and releasedher in order to avoid further embarrass-ment. After her release, she resumedan active role in the opposition move-

Larry James is a freelance journalist living inWest Africa- He reports fur the Associated Press,National Public Radio, and publications special-izing in African a/fairs.

ment, which called for new elections toreplace last year's vote which theyclaimed was rigged to favor a Doe vic-tory. Johnson-Sirleafs repeated re-quests for an exit visa were denied. Thedeteriorating security situation finallyimpelled her to flee without a visa.

hi a late August interview in Monro-via, she described the situation as tenseand admitted she feared for her life. "Itisn't Doe I fear," she said. "Strangelyenough, after all that has happened, Ican still talk to him. In fact, he called meinto the Executive Mansion since I'vebeen out of jail. It's the thugs in theNDPL INational Democratic Party ofLiberia] who scare me. I believe thev

would stop at nothing to keep holding onto the power they have."

On October 1st, the Elections Com-mission issued a statement calling onDoe's NDPL to disband its "task force,"set up prior to last year's general elec-tions ostensibly to insure a peacefulcampaign. The opposition charged thatin fact it was the task force which wasresponsible for creating violence and in-timidating anyone who opposed thehead of state. Commission ChairmanIsaac Randolph said the group should be

"When demonstrators gathered in defi-ance of government warnings, riot po-lice used tear gas and batons to dis-perse the crowd"


banned, as its continued existencewould disturb the public peace "to thedetriment of our political system," hesaid.

Many Liberians remain unconvincedof the sincerity of the Doe government'scommitment to a truly free political sys-tem. In September, a Reuters reportquoted Foreign Minister BernardBlamo as saying that the governmenthad uncovered an invasion plot byrebels, some of whom allegedly tookpart in the abortive coup last Novem-ber. Skeptics say the threat of invasionwas imaginary and reports of it weredeliberately leaked to journalists so thatthe government would appear justifiedin further clampdowns on the opposi-tion.

In August, three opposition politi-cians were jailed for failing to pay a finelevied on them for creating what thecourt called an "illegal political party."This grouping, at one time called the"grand coalition," was made up of theLiberia Action Party (LAP), the LiberiaUnification Party (LUP), the UnityParty (UP), and the United People'sParty (UPP).

The three men, LAP's Jackson Doe,LUP'S William Gabriel Kpolleh, and theUP's Edward Kesselly, were releasedin September after each paid the $1,(KX)penalty, but not before the situation haddeteriorated to the point of violent con-frontation between supporters and riotpolice.

"Gabriel Bacchus Matthews of the UPPsaid his party would form a loyal opposi-tion and try to work with the govern-ment"

The men were confined at the maxi-mum security prison, Bella Yella, in ruralLofa county. The fact that they wereheld in a penal institution with a notori-ous reputation for torture led to opposi-tion charges that the government wasviolating their human rights and civil lib-erties. When demonstrators gatheredin defiance of government warnings,riot police used tear gas and batons todisperse the crowd.

The release of the three politicianshelped defuse the situation somewhat,but tensions remain high. Oppositionleaders charge that the Doe govern-ment has no real commitment to anysort of national reconciliation and thatthe head of state privately taunts themwith his power while in public affecting aconciliatory tone. They have vowed tosuspend the activities of their individualparties until the government yields totheir demands for new elections.

As Kenneth Best, managing editor ofthe independent Daily Observer puts it:"We have a political crisis on our hands,a situation in which the opposition lead-ers have not accepted the results of theelection. It's an explosive situation."

"Sour Grapes"Many officials in the Doe administra-

tion dismiss opposition charges of foulplay in the October 1985 elections as"sour grapes." They claim the opposi-tion is composed of elitists who want toreturn to the good life they enjoyed be-fore Doe's April 1980 military coupended more than 130 years of rule by"Americo-Liberians," the descendants

of freed American slaves who foundedthe country in 1847.

"The indigenous people of Liberiahave had a taste of power and they arenot going to turn the government overto the Americo-Liberians again," saysJustice Minister Jenkins Scott. "Fromnow on they will always be a part of thegovernment of this country."

According to Scott, it is the maneu-vering of the former ruling class which isthe root cause of the country's currentturmoil. "We wouldn't be having thetroubles we have right now except thatAmerico-Liberians are behind it. Theremay be indigenous Liberians frontingthese so-called parties, but theAmerico-Liberians are the ones callingthe shots."

"People try to give you the impres-sion that the opposition representssome sort of popular movement," Scottsays. "Well, it's just the other wayaround. We're the ones the people ofLiberia are behind, and don't think for aminute we don't intend to stay. I'veheard people try to compare what hap-pened in Haiti or the Philippines withwhat might happen here. Well, I'll tellyou this. If some U.S. official came up tome and said, 'We've got a plane waitingfor you, let's go,' I'd say shoot me on thespot and bury me on the spot. I'm notgoing anywhere."

Similiar views are expressedthroughout the government. "We don'tneed these people," says InformationMinisters. MomoluhGetaweh. "I knowthem all and not one of them has a planfor the development of this country. Allthey are interested in is getting backinto power. We need Samuel Doe be-cause he has the power to keep thepeace so this country can develop. Peo-ple have so little here that they thinktheir only chance to get anything will beto take it from those in power. It's a sadfact of life about Liberia and it's not goingto change overnight."

At least one opposition party hasmoved to distance itself from what wasthe "grand coaltion"—LAP, LUP, UP,and UPP. Gabriel Bacchus Matthews ofthe UPP said his party would form a"loyal opposition" and try to work withthe government to solve the country'sproblems.

Some fonner UPP supporters


Riot police in Monrovia: "We have a political crisis on our hands, a situation in which theopposition leaders have not accepted the results of the election"

viewed that action as a self-serving ca-pitulation on Matthews' part Thosecritics were not surprised when on Sep-tember 22, Doe announced the lifting ofa 13-month ban on the UPI\ the coun-try's most popular opposition party.Doe called his action "another manifes-tation of the government's sincere de-sire to bring about unity and true recon-ciliation among Liberians."

Last August, the party had beenbanned from participating in the 1985general elections which returned Libe-ria to civilian rule. Authorities charged itwith having "aims and objectives detri-mental to the peace and stability of thecountry." At the time, political observ-ers said the move was clearly Doe's at-tempt to eliminate his only serious oppo-nent.

Economic UncertaintySince Doe came to power six years

ago, Liberia has struggled with a stead-ily worsening economy. Even his worstcritics will admit that Doe inherited a badsituation, but they are quick to point outthat he has done little to improve it.

"Foreign investors have no confi-dence in Doe and until there is a govern-ment here they can have faith in, thingsare not going to get better," says UnityParty leader Edward Kesselly. "I willadmit he has been given bad advice, butit was his fault that he took it. The veryworst thing he could have done he did,and that was to listen to the people who

suggested he mint his own money. Wemay never get over that blunder."

The seven-cornered dollar coin isgenerally blamed for much of the coun-try's current economic trouble. Thegovernment says there is some $30 mil-lion worth of the coins in circulation.Other estimates put the figure closer to$50 million. Whatever their number,their existence has created a local cur-rency in a country where the U. S. dollarwas once the legal tender. The dollar isstill officially the legal currency, but it isincreasingly hard to come by. In the pastyear, the Liberian dollar has lost 50 per-cent of its value and there is now anactive black market for greenbacks.

In August, the International Mone-tary Fund sent a team of advisers toMonrovia to assess the state of theeconomy and to evaluate the new pro-grams put into effect by Finance Minis-ter Robert Tubinan. It is expected thatthose advisers will recommend a reduc-tion in the coinage in circulation, some-tliing Tubman is not likely to want tohear.

Critics admit that Tubman, a formerfinancial adviser for the Economic Com-munity of West African States, has beenable to meet the current governmentpayroll and has caught up with past pay-roll obligations. Before he took officeearlier this year, many workers had notbeen paid for four or five months. Buthis critics claim he found the money bysimply minting more seven-cornered

coins, wliicli they claim will only worsenthe country's cash crunch later on.

Tubman denies the charge. "Whatwe did was set up a system of prioritiesto make sure the most important debtsgot paid first," Tubman says. "Before It(K)k this position, the policy was to re-spond to foreign creditors first. My be-lief is that you must pay the people whofuel your own economy if you expect toget that economy moving. That is whatwe did."

Tubman remains optimistic. He be-lieves that the World Bank and IMF maybe ready to do business again with Libe-ria now that some of the country's debtshave reportedly been paid. Liberia stillowes $90 million to the IMF and $1.4billion to the World Bank. Interest onthat debt alone exceeds annuaJ govern-ment revenues. At the end of August,the United States granted $28.2 millionto help pay off some of the debt.

Even with that assistance, however,bankers still consider Liberia a basketcase. There has been virtually no re-sponse to Doe's repeated calls for for-eign investment in the country. Con-sumers are now hard hit by severeshortages of consumer goods, such asmilk and sugar, and common drugs,such as chloroquine. Doe put a tempo-rary clamp on opposition activities withthe imprisonment of the opposition lead-ers, but intermittant detentions cannotbe a permanent solution to the country'spolitical problems, any more than theminting of dollar coins can solve the eco-nomic crisis. •


S A M 0 R A M 0 I S E S1 9 3 3 - 1 9 8 6

M A C H E L"Your life continues in those who continue the Revolution."

Samora Moises Machel was born into a peasant family onSeptember 29,1933, in the village of Xilembene, near the fertile Lim-popo Valley in Gaza Province. His forebearers took an active part inthe wars of resistance against colonial conquest. Thus, from an earlyage, he was schooled in the patriotic tradition of his family.

During his youth, Machel experienced life under the system of com-pulsory cotton cultivation, in which the monopolies forced the Africansto grow vast acreages of cotton which were then bought at starvationprices. Many people died of hunger as a result of this brutal exploita-tion. Large numbers of peasants were left with no choice but to aban-don their land and accept being sold to the goldmines on the SouthAfrican Rand. Machete oldest brother and many close relatives diedin the mines, while others came back as permanent invalids.

In the early 1950s, the colonial government expelled the Limpopopeasants from their land to make way for landless Portuguese. Theland cultivated by Machel's family was confiscated by the colonialistsand his family home was demolished.

Through an agreement with the Vatican, the Portuguese colonialistshad put African education totally into the hands of the Catholic mis-sions which required that every student be baptised in the church.

Thus, although Machel came from a Presbyterian family, he wasforced to be baptised as a Catholic in order to study. In addition topaying high fees, the students were forced to cultivate the rich fieldsof the missions. Since the schools were primarily concerned withteaching the catechism, any progress made by students was due en-tirely to their own effort.

Machel completed his primary education, butfor an African to go on to secondary school waspractically impossible. Nonetheless, the mis-sionaries decided that the rebel," as Machel wascalled, should continue his studies at theseminary. Machel refused and decided to go towork. He finished his secondary studies in nurs-ing at night school, paying for his course out ofhis wages.

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw a rapidgrowth of patriotic awareness on the African con-tinent. Ghana's independence in 1957, the con-flict in the Congo, and the beginning of theAngolan liberation struggle in 1961 were power-ful catalysts for the Mozambican patrioticmovement and filled Machel and his colleagues with enthusiasm.

Frelimo was formed on June 25, 1962, under the leadership ofEduardo Mondlane. Machel joined in 1963 and was among the firstgroup to be trained in Algeria. He played an active part in launchingthe armed struggle on September 25, 1964, working out the plans,selecting the fighters, and organizing their infiltration into Mozambique.

Machel was then entrusted with the responsibility of trainingFrelimo's forces. In 1965, he directed the launching of the armed strug-gle in the eastern section of Niassa, and then organized the Centerfor Political and Military Training in Nachingwea, Tanzania, where thecadres of the Mozambican revolution were trained in guerrilla warfare.

Under Machel's leadership, Frelimo began the process of transfor-ming the semi-liberated areas. Through the deployment of trained guer-rillas, Frelimo replaced the feudal power structure with people's com-mittees. The cooperative campaign aimed to establish the basis forcollective production and trade.

Between 1960 and 1970, a power struggle ensued between themoderate and radical forces within Frelimo. When the moderates failedto defeat the most politically conscious and organized elements inFrelimo, they allied themselves with Portuguese colonialism andhelped assassinate eminent leaders such as Mondlane, SansaoMuthemba, and Paulo Kankhomba. Throughout this crisis, Machelsuccessfully isolated the moderates and mobilized the patriotic forcesbehind Frelimo.

It was in this context that the third session of Frelimo's central com-mittee was held in April 1969. To preserve unity, a presidential coun-

cil was created, to which Machel was appointed in May 1970. Thefourth session of the central committee elected Machel presidentof Frelimo.

After the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974,Machel led the Frelimo delegation in negotiations with the newLisbon government. On September 7, 1974, an agreement wasreached that power would be handed over to Frelimo within theyear. On June 25,1975, independence was declared and SamoraMoises Machel became president of the People's Republic ofMozambique, in which capacity he served until his death on Oc-tober 19, 1986.

Allen Isaacman, a leading American authority on Mozambique,knew President Machel for many years. He provides the followingtribute to the late President:

"Samora Machel loved life. Anyone who had the privilege ofmeeting him could not help but recognize how his eyes radiated andhis smile beamed. There was something electric in the way he step-ped to the podium and engaged enthusiastic crowds in song andbanter. And there was something reassuring in the way he graspedyour hand and while acknowledging the many problems his youngcountry faced, reminded you that these difficulties paled by com-parison to the hardships the handful of poorly armed young men andwomen encountered when they began their struggle against Por-tuguese colonialism. Even his harshest critics acknowledged thathe was 'a charismatic leader.'

"But Samora Machel was more than that.His biography encapsulates the struggle of theMozambican people for a more equal andjust society. President Machel often recountedwith pride how his grandfather had played animportant role in the 1895 Maguiguanarebellion —the first of many attempts todislodge the Portuguese. He recalled how hisfather and brother had no alternative but towork for meager wages in the South Africanmines, an ordeal from which the latter neverreturned.

"And he anguished as he described thehated system of chibalo — enforced cottoncultivation —under which his parents andother peasants suffered. In a long interview,

Machel emphasized that his own political education began 'not fromreading Marx or Engels, but from seeing my father and mother forc-ed to grow cotton for the Portuguese and going with themto the market where they received prices which were appreciably lowerthan those paid to the Europeans.'

"Against all odds, he, along with Frelimo's first president, EduardoMondlane, led the Mozambican people against the Portuguese colonialregime. Victory did not come easily. He suffered the loss of Mondlane,his close friend, and saw many other compatriots die in battle. He wat-ched helplessly as his father and brother were arrested, and he wasdevastated by the loss of his young wife, Josina, herself a leading mili-tant in the anti-colonial struggle.

"Independence brought new problems and little relief. Drought,famines, and the flight of virtually the entire skilled labor force left Mozam-bique's underdeveloped economy paralyzed. Machel's commitment toaid the Zimbabwean freedom fighters resulted in massive reprisals atthe hands of the Ian Smith regime and the Mozambican NationalResistance Movement, which the Rhodesian security forces createdand the South African military sustained. His outspoken criticism of theapartheid regime and support for the African National Congress broughtnew attacks from Pretoria and its MNR clients which wreaked furtherhavoc on the economy.

"And yet throughout it all, Samora's commitment to building a socialistsociety, free from the grip of the apartheid regime, never wavered. Theenergy and hope which he radiated inspired millions of Mozambicans.His loss will be felt throughout the continent." •


Black activists launch joint nationwide campaignLeaders of the United Demo-

cratic Front (UDF), the CongressofSouth African Trade Unions, andthe National Education Crisis Com-mittee emerged briefly from hidingin early October to launch a unitedresistance campaign at a clandes-tine press conference in downtownJohannesburg. It marked the firstjoint effort by the three major blackactivist organizations to protestagainst the state of emergency sinceit was imposed in June.

Murphy Morobe, UDF acting na-tional publicity secretary, said theinitiative represented a "reorgani-zation and galvanization of ourforces which have been besieged inthe months of the state of emer-gency," but he was reluctant to pro-vide details of the campaign in orderto avoid eountermeasures from thegovernment. The official campaignstatement simply called on "all pa-triots" to fight for several key de-mands, including lifting the emer-gency, releasing all political pris-oners, establishing "people'seducation," unbanning organiza-tions, and the right to strike.

The three groups—which to-gether claim a following of 3 mil-lion—described the campaign as asignificant step toward uniting ex-tra-parliamentary forces. Morobesaid that "a process is now startingwhereby we can attain the kind ofunity we crave—disparate forces inthe political spectrum can bebrought in. We seek unity not onlyat the leadership level, but alsoamongst the masses."

The black activists told the pressthat the other major goal of the ini-tiative was to get moderates to takea stand. As Morobe put it. "We arealso implementing a 'fence-shakingprocess." People who support thiscampaign must come out publiclyand distinguish themselves fromforces still operating under Presi-dent Botha's scheme of things. It isno longer good enough to pledgesupport in the dark. This campaign

will result in the clearer drawing ofthe battle lines in the country."

Less than a week later. PresidentP.W. Botha's government drew itsown battle lines by declaring theUDF an "affected organization"—a measure that falls short of ban-ning, but effectively severs the mostinfluential multi-racial group in thecountry from foreign funding. Therestriction could deal a devastatingblow to the UDF, whose domesticfundraising has been severely ham-pered by the state of emergency.Over half the organization's reve-nue has been contributed fromabroad, mainly by Scandinaviancountries and anti-apartheid groupsin the West.

Under the Affected Organiza-tions Act—passed in the early 1970sto destroy "un-South African" or-ganizations—the president is em-powered to take action against anygroup if he is "convinced that poli-tics is being conducted by orthrough that organization with thehelp of. . . an organization or per-son overseas." The government hasfrequently accused the UDF of be-

ing a front for the proscribed Afri-can National Congress.

The UDF, a federation of morethan 700 organizations, has bornethe brunt of the state crackdownagainst anli-apartheid activistssince the emergency was declared.AzharCachalia, UDF national trea-surer and one of the few leaders notin hiding or detention, said that be-tween 70-80 percent of the esti-mated 20,000 people detai ned underthe emergency were affiliated withthe UDF "in one way or another."But he promised that the UDF's na-tional and regional leadershipwould meet in secret to discuss fu-ture action against the latest gov-ernment restriction.

Cachalia admitted that "the proc-lamation will certainly hurt theUDF, but not to the extent that itwill cripple us"—even if it is merelya preliminary move to outlawing theorganization entirely. As he said,"It's going to take more than declar-ing us an affected organization; it'sgoing to take much more than ban-ning the organization to stop thetide of resistance in the country." •

Pretoria's expulsion of migrant labordeals blow to Mozambican economy

Pretoria's decision in early Octo-ber to terminate the employment ofMozambicans in the mining and ag-ricultural sectors of South Africadealt a crippling blow to the econ-omy of the frontline state. Remit-tances from workers in South Af-rica comprise Mozambique's larg-est single source of foreignrevenue—approximately one-thirdof its annual earnings from abroad.

The migrant workers must departwhen their current contracts expire,and none will be recruited in the fu-ture, Pretoria said. The announce-ment came just days before Presi-dent Samora Machel was killed in aplane crash in South Africa.

The Mozambican governmentviewed the expulsion of workers asa deliberate effort to further under-mine its economy. South AfricanForeign Minister Pik Botha, how-ever, justified it as a response toMozambique's alleged support ofviolence by the African NationalCongress (ANC).

The decision followed an incidentin which six South African soldierswere wounded when their vehicledetonated a landmine close to thecommon border. Charging that Mo-zambican security forces were re-sponsible, Pretoria reiterated ear-lier threats of military retaliation.

Continued on next page


Mozambique. . . continued

"If President Machel chooses ter-rorism and revolution, he will clashhead-on with South Africa,"warned Defense Minister MagnusMalan.

Officials estimated that up to100,000 Mozambicans were work-ing in South Africa—more than halfin the gold mines of Eastern Trans-vaal. Mozambican workers alleg-edly hold higher-level jobs in themines than other black miners. Inaddition, they have been less likelyto join the National Union of Mine-workers because of fears of repatri-ation. Mozambicans also form asignificant portion of the labor forceon farmlands in the Eastern Trans-vaal.

The number of Mozambicansworking illegally in South Africa is

expected to grow dramatically as aresult of Pretoria's action. Many ofthem come from famine-stricken ar-eas of Mozambique, and theirwages represent the only means ofsurvival for their families backhome. Others are refugees with nohomes to return to.

The economic blow coincidedwith Mozambique's worst militarycrisis since independence, as theSouth African-backed MozambiqueNational Resistance Movement(Renamo) launched an offensive,capturing strategic towns that linknorthern and southern Mozam-bique and that control the Beira cor-ridor. The rebels overran key Mo-zambican bases, built up a largeforce in the town of Zumbo at LakeCabora Bassa, and were said to bein control of the Zambezi River Val-ley by mid-October. •

Pact holds hope for Mano River UnionThe Mano River Union non-ag-

gression and security pact, ap-proved in September by justice min-isters of Guinea, Liberia, and SierraLeone, is expected to help revivethe troubled economic community.

The treaty prohibits the member-states from using each other's terri-tory for subversion or aggression.In addition, they agreed to preventthe official media from "sowingseeds of discord" in their respectivestates and to persuade the privatepress to refrain from such activityas well. The three presidents, whohad called for the September meet-ing at a July summit in Conakry,were scheduled to sign the pact bythe end of the year.

The agreement is considered animportant step toward alleviatingthe long-standing hostility betweenLiberia and Sierra Leone, which es-calated when President Samuel Doerepeatedly accused the Sierra Leo-nean government of complicity inthe Liberian coup attempt that fol-lowed national elections last year.Although President Joseph Momohdenied the charges. Doe closedtheir commbn border, sent troops toreinforce border security, and re-called the Liberian ambassador and

Mano River Union Secretary-Gen-eral Augustine Caine fromFreetown. Twice this year, ManoRiver Union meetings were can-celled when Doe demanded that Si-erra Leone admit its complicity inthe aborted coup.

The animosity between the twogovernments dates back to the Li-berian military coup of 1980 whenDoe seized power and killed formerPresident William Tolbert. Presi-dents Siaka Stevens and Tolberthad been close friends, and Doesubsequently received less thanwhat he felt was his due respectfrom the Sierra Leonean leader.

When Momoh took over fromStevens, however, he pledged toimprove relations with his neigh-bors and made conciliatory over-tures to Liberia. Caine returned tohis post in March, and with urgingfrom the Organization of AfricanUnity, he persuaded Guinean Presi-dent Lansana Conte to mediate thedispute—an effort that culminatedin the July summit.

There are signs that the politicalreconciliation has already begun toinfuse the financially ailing organi-zation with new energy. The threemembers have pledged to pay at

least 25 percent of their arrears tothe union by the end of 1986. In Sep-tember, the union's ministerial com-mittee made a number of major rec-ommendations, including a thor-ough review of personnel employedby the union and an audit of finan-cial records from 1983-84 and 1985-86.

The committee also decided to re-duce expenditures by paring schol-arship programs to a bare minimumand terminating support for the ma-rine training and forestry institutesin Liberia and the telecommunica-tions institute in Sierra Leone, stat-ing that they should be financed bythe individual states. Union priori-ties have been narrowed down toagriculture, communications, en-ergy, industry, and transport.

The union was founded 13 yearsago by Liberia and Sierra Leone,with Guinea joining in 1979. One ofits most important goals—con-struction of a highway from Monro-via to Freetown with support fromthe African Development Bank—has recently stalled due to lack offunds. The other key project—the$2.5 million Mano River Bridge be-tween Liberia and Sierra Leone—was completed in 1976. In addition,a common external tariff on majorimports was established in 1977 be-tween Liberia and Sierra Leone.Plans for a hydroelectric project toserve all three countries and aFreetown-to-Conakry branch of thehighway are pending. •

COTEd'IVOIREHard times brewing for cocoa

Agriculture Minister Denis BraKanon confirmed in early Octoberthat for the first time in four years,Abidjan would not raise cocoa andcoffee producer prices for the com-ing season due to difficult interna-tional markets for the two commod-ities.

According to President FelixHouphouet-Boigny's government,output is likely to drop for both cof-fee and cocoa in the 1986-87 season.As the world's leading cocoa pro-ducer. Cote d'lvoire hit a new rec-ord of 580.000 tons in 1984-85. Butbecause of unusually low rainfallthis year and the cumulative effect


of three successive good crops, out-put is expected to decline hy at least50.000 tons next season.

BraKanon said the Ivorian coffeeand cocoa plantations faced difficultclimatic conditions this year, withthe main growing regions in thesouthwest, west, and center of thecountry receiving only one-third thenormal annual rainfall. As a result,the 1986-87 coffee crop is also ex-pected to fall—by as much as 10percent from last season's output of281.000 tons.

Houphou&t-Boigny; Swallowing a bitter brew

The government made its pessi-mistic forecast only a few monthsafter reluctantly agreeing to partici-pate in the newly-negotiated Inter-national Cocoa Agreement in lateJuly. The five-year deal was con-cluded after the failure of five otherattempts by the world's main con-sumers and producers to reach aconsensus that would stabilize themarket price of cocoa.

Cote d'lvoire—the key producercountry—had walked out of theUnited Nations-sponsored talksearlier in the year when it could notbe guaranteed a minimum price forits cocoa. But when producers andconsumers subsequently agreed toa compromise pact, BraKanon saidthat although the accord was notideal, it was sufficiently flexible for

his country to join.The new pact, however, which

was to take effect in October withthe expiration of the previous agree-ment, has yet to come into forcesince too few importers have com-pleted the necessary legal proce-dures. A four-month transitionalperiod has been proposed to allowcountries more time to give the UNat least provisional assurances thatthey intend to participate. Ivoriancocoa producers contend, how-ever, that the delay will not jeopard-ize implementation of the newpact. •

GHANAWindow shopping in Accra

Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings' govern-ment introduced a weekly foreignexchange auction system in mid-September, aimed at increasing thecountry's foreign exchange re-serves, eliminating the foreign cur-rency black market, and encourag-ing exports of non-traditional prod-ucts.

In establishing what amounts to asecond-tier foreign exchange mar-ket, the ruling Provisional NationalDefence Council (PNDC) specified,however, that certain vital transac-tions, including the purchase ofcrude oil and essential drugs, gov-ernment debt servicing, and cocoarevenue, would continue to be cal-culated at the current rate of 90 ce-dis to the dollar. The Second Win-dow Rate—as the value of the cedifixed by the auction is known—isdetermined by changes in supplyand demand of foreign exchange.

The auction is open to holders ofimport licenses, who submit theirbids to the Bank of Ghana. Accord-ing to a government communique,this is "to ensure that only organiza-tions and individuals requiring for-eign exchange for priority areas ofthe economy can participate in theauction and prevent speculation inforeign exchange."

The Rawlings government saidthat to avoid the problems encoun-tered by other countries with for-eign exchange auctions, adequatesafeguards have been built intoGhana's two-tier system. In partic-ular, a method of strict monitoring

has been initiated to make certainthat winning bidders use the foreignexchange for their stated intentionand to prevent those who havehoarded cedis from using the auc-tion to filter their money out of thecountry.

A spokesman for the PNDC'sStructural Adjustment ProgrammeTeam said the new procedure wouldencourage Ghanaians living abroadto send remittances home throughthe banking system instead ofthrough the black market. The auc-tion system should also remove bot-tlenecks in the long administrativeprocesses through which foreignexchange is allocated.

In pursuing a realistic exchangerate policy through the "secondwindow," the government has in ef-fect continued its policy of progres-sive devaluation, which is expectedto produce a new rate closer to thatobtained on the black market of 180cedis to the dollar. The first weeklyforeign exchange auction in lateSeptember produced an exchangerate of 128 cedis to the dollar, repre-senting a devaluation of about 30percent. By the third week, the ratehad jumped to 145 cedis to the dol-lar, establishing a pattern which thegovernment expects will allow it toeffectively compete with, and even-tually absorb, the black market.

Proponents of the two-tier for-eign exchange market, however,have warned that the auction sys-tem cannot in itself solve all thecountry's economic ills. Accordingto Yaw Manu Sarpong. chairman ofthe Foreign Exchange AuctionCommittee. "The new arrangementcannot provide an adequate solu-tion to our economic problems. Thekey to the success of this arrange-ment will depend on our reactionand response to the new situationslikely to be created."

But the government anticipatesthat the second window will helpexpand the economy's productivecapacity, as it gives a competitiveedge to locally produced goodsagainst imported substitutes. Ulti-mately, the real value of the cedi de-pends upon productivity, and there-fore the exchange rate establishedby the weekly auction will accu-rately reflect Ghanaians' efforts to


boost production in all sectors ofthe economy. As the governmentcommunique concluded, hardwork, efficient mobilization of re-sources, and the elimination ofwaste are the major factors neededto produce a more favorable ex-change rate. •

GUINEA-BISSAUTrading places

Faced with a continuing down-ward slide of the economy and dete-riorating social conditions. Presi-dent Joao Bernardo Vieira's gov-ernment recently announced amajor policy change by deciding toliberalize most of the country's im-port-export sector.

This new trade strategy is seen asa major step toward reaching anagreement with the World Bankover the terms of a comprehensiveadjustment program that will in-volve a loan of up to $20 million. AWorld Bank mission has reviewedthe state-owned sector and the gov-ernment's public investment portfo-lio, while proposals for a medium-term program have already beensubmitted to the Vieira govern-ment.

Since 1974—when the previousgovernment of Luis Cabral optedfor a socialist economic orientationin the post-independence period—all of the country's trade was placedin the hands of two state-owned en-terprises, the People's Stores (Ar-mazens do Povo) and the Importingand Commercial Company (So-comin). Private traders were re-stricted to retail shops which had tocompete with the government'sown stores.

But in light of persisting eco-nomic difficulties, Vieira disclosedin August that both import and ex-port transactions would be handedover to private traders who wouldhave to organize themselves into as-sociations or into a chamber of com-merce and industry. According toobservers, nearly 200 businessesare likely to be affected by this newdenationalization strategy.

Vieira indicated, however, thatthe importation of rice, petroleum,and other essential commoditieswould stay under state control •

Visa policy prompts charges of racismThe British government's recent decision to require visitors from Nigeria,

Ghana, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to obtain entry visas before travel-ing to Britain has sparked heated debate over immigration policy. Common-wealth countries—except for Sri Lanka—had previously been exempt fromsuch controls.

In defense of the policy, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd claimed thatpeoples of the Third World are becoming "increasingly footloose" in theirsearch for better prospects. The change in policy was partly a response tothe Immigration Service Union's call for action to alleviate "intolerable"conditions at Heathrow and Gatwick airports, where growing crowds ofThird World visitors have created long lines and short tempers. Travelersawaiting processing were being put up in nearby hotels or overcrowded,military-like detention centers.

Critics of the Tory government policy argue that employing additionalimmigration officers at the airports might be a more reasonable solution.They charge that the visa policy has racist overtones which will exacerbaterelations with Third World countries and damage the Commonwealth.

Shadow Home Secretary Gerald Kaufman said it was "deplorable" for theHome Secretary to implement the controversial policy before it could bedebated in the House of Commons. Both the opposition Labour Party andthe Liberal/Social Democratic Party Alliance described the new policy as"racialist."

The policy was applied to visitors from the Indian sub-continent on Octo-ber 15. In a rush to beat the deadline, thousands of Asians boarded flights forLondon, creating chaos at British airports and prompting warnings of addi-tional stampedes if procedures are not altered before the restriction is im-posed on Ghanaians and Nigerians.

The debate over immigration from developing countries has also intensi-fied in other European countries. In France, the government expelled 10!illegal immigrants from Mali in October—the first significant application of anew immigration law that gives the administration full power to oust immi-grants who lack proper papers. SOS Racism?, various trade unions, andother French anti-racist organizations attacked the move.

The entry visa requirement imposed on 38 countries after the recent waveof terrorism is part of the French government's tougher stance on immigra-tion and security. However, it has been enforced unevenly as police re-ported that no American had been denied entry into the country since thepolicy was initiated, while up to 30 percent of visitors from North andCentral Africa were prevented from boarding flights for France or enteringat the border.

In mid-October, the Danish Parliament also approved tough new restric-tions on immigration that will cut the stream of refugees by 50-80 percent. Asa result of the government-sponsored legislation, refugees will now be re-quired to show a valid passport or visa at the border before being allowed toapply for asylum from inside the country.

In West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Partyis expected to follow suit, pushing fora constitutional amendment to narrowthe right of political refugees to seek asylum in the country. However, liberalparties have made it clear that they would fight such a change.

NIGERIASeeking political consensus

The political bureau which hascoordinated national debate on apolitical system for the Third Re-public over the past year is nowsummarizing recommendations

with a view to presenting PresidentIbrahim Babangida with a proposalby the end of 1986.

Babangida had charged the com-mittee with assessing the failure ofNigeria's past forms of government.Committee members were to seek anew system—"rooted in a truly Ni-


gerian experience"—to be imple-mented when the present militaryadministration steps down in 1990.

The 17-member team toured thestates to survey local opinion andcollect submissions from individ-uals who had played key roles inpast administrations. However, lo-cal debate was somewhat phleg-matic, due largely to public disillu-sionment with politics and restric-tions Babangida has imposed,including the recent ban on politicalparticipation by officials whoserved in the Shagari administra-tion.

The debate, nonetheless, waskept alive in the press. Academics,journalists, military officers, politi-cians, market women, and othersmade proposals, including a returnto the British parliamentary systemthat was adopted after indepen-dence or to the American presiden-tial system that was used from 1979to 1983. Some Nigerians have urgedthat the military retain a role, whileothers want traditional chiefs toplay a part in the Third Republic.Other issues include the number ofparties which should be allowed andfederation versus a decentralizedconfederation of states.

Retired Gen. Theophilas Dan-juma, whose proposal in the LagosGuardian attracted considerable at-tention, suggested the followingtimetable: elections for governorsand local government councillors inDecember 1987, elections to a Sen-ate and House of Representatives inDecember 1988, and presidentialelections in August 1990, twomonths before the military is due tohand over the reins of power.

Anthony Enahoro, a traditionalchief whose views were solicited,advocated a "hybrid" system thatlinks the unique qualities of Nige-ria's political experience with aknown system of government,probably a multi-party democracy.A plurality of parties could eventu-ally be consolidated into a two-party system, he said, which couldsolve the problem of ethnic bias inparties that plagued the First andSecond Republics. Minority groupscould be ensured government rep-resentation through the constitu-tion.

In one of the last debates—orga-nized by the Punch Group of news-papers, Maj.-Gen. David Ejoor ar-gued against rushing into a new sys-tem, urging that proposals be testedfirst at the local government level.G.L. Adeola, director of researchfor the Punch Group, recommendeda "rootacracy" in which individualswould become eligible for nationaloffice at the community level so asto avoid the divisiveness of nationalparty politics.

But some commentators havecharged that the very nature of thediscussion is misguided. Ratherthan seeking the perfect politicalsystem, Nigerians should besearching within themselves for theanswer to why they could not makepast systems work, they said. •

SIERRA LEONEMomoh struggles with reforms

In the face of growing public pres-sure for improved economic condi-tions. President Joseph Momoh ispleading for patience and remindingSierra Leoneans that he inheritedthe problems of corruption and in-discipline plaguing the country.

Responding to recent chargesthat the nation is '"unhappy andrestless," Momoh publicly ac-knowledged that his popularity hasdiminished considerably in recentmonths. The public turnaround is insharp contrast to the enthusiasmthat greeted his promises of reformwhen he was elected president onlyone year ago.

Enormous price increases trig-gered by the 1986-87 budget reforms

introduced in June have put manygoods and services beyond thereach of the average consumer. Thegovernment abandoned currencycontrols and floated the leone. Ac-cording to Finance Minister ShekuKanu, the government and the In-ternational Monetary Fund agreedon the floatation in order to stimu-late exports and make foreign ex-change more available.

In addition, government controlswere lifted from key domesticprices and a phase-out of subsidieson essential items was initiated—ameasure long advocated by the IMFas a major condition for a newstandby. Heavy export tariffs wereimposed as a revenue-raising de-vice, including a 22 percent duty onscrap metal, 20 percent on fish anddrugs, and 10 percent on semi-fin-ished goods and raw materials.

The effect of these drastic mea-sures has been an economic up-heaval. Traders and shopkeeperscontinued to demonstrate confu-sion about the real value of the cur-rency several months after thefloatation. Moreover, some power-ful businessmen have apparentlydecided to curtail their investmentsin Sierra Leone, while others aremoving in to fill the gap. In particu-lar. Liat, a firm which reportedlyhas close ties to Israel and SouthAfrica, is establishing itself in theagricultural, engineering, mining,and transportation sectors.

While calling on his countrymento remain patient, Momoh awaits anIMF standby and increases in con-cessional aid from donor govern-ments and financial institutions. •

:1 AFRICA

Museveni thwarts coup plotters, rebelsThree cabinet ministers, six offi-

cers from the 35th battalion of theUgandan army, and more than adozen others were charged withtreason in early October for plottingto overthrow the government. Theaccused are suspected of support-ing the rebels who have launchedrepeated attacks on PresidentYoweri Museveni's northern garri-sons in recent months.

The alleged plotters, who had

been under government surveil-lance for more than four months, in-clude leaders of several oppositionparties that were invited to join thegovernment after Museveni came topower last January. Prominentamong them is Paulo Muwanga,leader of the Uganda People's Con-gress (UPC) and former vice-presi-dent, and Anthony Ssekweyama,editor of the Citizen, the Demo-cratic Party (DP) newspaper.


The cabinet ministers—all keymembers of political parties—areCommerce Minister EvaristoMyanzi (DP), Environmental Pro-tection Minister David Lwanga(Fe-demu), and Energy Minister An-drew Kayiira (Uganda FreedomMovement). UFM members com-prise most of the 35th battalion,which had been stationed in thenorth.

Troops also searched the UPCheadquarters and the offices of In-ternal Affairs Minister Paul Ssemo-gerere, DP leader. Museveni hasbanned party activity, but some par-ties have maintained pared-downoffice operations.

The accused had banded togetherto oppose recent governmentactions—such as Col. MuammarQaddafy's visit to Uganda in Sep-tember and the establishment of vil-lage-level committees of resis-tance—which they viewed as a slideto the left, according to New Vision,the government newspaper. Thethree ministers and others amongthose arrested are Baganda—gener-ally considered relatively conserva-tive in their political views.

The conspiracy, rebel attacks,and growing pressure to restore theBaganda monarchy have severelyundermined Museveni's struggle tounify the nation. In the first seriousuprising since Museveni's takeoverof the north five months earlier,rebel troops attacked Gulu,Kitgum, and other northern sites inAugust. Charging that the Sudanesegovernment had armed and sup-plied the rebels, Museveni closedthe border and stationed troopsalong the frontier and routes be-tween the northern towns of Gulu,Kitgum. Moyo, and Arua.

Sudanese government officialsvehemently dented the charges andflew to Entebbe in late Septemberto confer with Museveni. Subse-quently, Uganda reopened the bor-der and in return. Sudan consentedto Kampala's request to pursue therebels across the border into terri-tory where the Sudanese People'sLiberation Army (SPLA) is wagingguerrilla warfare against Prime Min-ister Sadiq al-Mahdi's government.

The SPLA draws the bulk of itsforces from southern peoples who

share a Nilotic heritage with theAcholis and Langis who comprisethe majority of the Ugandan rebels.Thus, it is likely that the rebels havereceived help from Sudanesesources. The problem has beencompounded by the return of hun-dreds of thousands of refugees fromSudan to their Ugandan homelands.

Meanwhile, pressure for restora-tion of the Kabakaship has intensi-fied among the Baganda. In earlySeptember, the government ar-rested 25 plotters for allegedly em-ploying witchcraft in an effort tooverthrow the government and re-introduce the monarchy. New Vi-sion described them as "the lunaticfringe" of the royalist movement.

The plot was detected shortly af-ter Museveni rejected a formal pleato restore the monarchy and justtwo weeks after Prince Ronnie Mu-tebi's return to Kampala following20 years of exile. The prince is heirto the throne of the late Kabaka whodied in exile after abolition of thefederal status of kingships in 1966.Mutebi came home to a hero's wel-come. Ten thousand Baganda gath-ered at a religious service to wel-come him, and elders knelt beforehim as he climbed the steps to thechurch.

Museveni held a series of meet-ings with Baganda elders to discusstheir demands, but maintained thathis interim government lacks theauthority to decide such a complexconstitutional issue. The monarchycould be restored as a cultural entitybut not a political institution, hesaid. The Baganda, however, havesaid they would not accept thiscompromise. •

DJIBOUTIAden Robleh's quick getaway

Former Commerce MinisterAden Robleh Awaleh was sen-tenced to life imprisonment in ab-sentia by a state security court inearly September, after being con-victed of "attempting to destabilizethe regime and murder senior offi-cials." Five alleged co-plotters alsoreceived jail sentences—three ofthem in absentia.

Third vice-president of the rulingPeople's Rally for Progress {RPP)

and a leading candidate to succeedPresident Hassan Gouled Aptidonin next year's presidential elections,Aden Robleh had fled the countryin May after being forced out of thepolitburo and learning that he wasabout to be arrested. He crossed theborder to Ethiopia with anotherparty leader. Deputy Omar ElmiKhaire. before making his way toFrance, where he is reportedlyseeking political asylum.

Hassan Gottted: Confronting his opponents

Aden Robleh claims he was thetarget of a systematic harassmentcampaign, particularly after beingthreatened by Hassan Gouled. Hispassport was withdrawn and one ofhis followers was allegedly torturedto extract evidence against him. Heis reportedly establishing a broad-based political movement in exile,the National Djibouti Movement forDemocracy (MNDID). Based inParis, the front will bring togetherexiled opponents of HassanGouled's RPP.

Aden Robleh, who played aprominent role in the struggle for in-dependence as leader of the Somali-based Liberation Front of Somali-land (FLCS), remained an influen-tial political figure even though hisparty was dissolved when HassanGouled took over. In 1983, he re-signed as minister of commerce ongrounds of ill health, but his real

40 AFRICA RE°ORT • November-December 1986

UJ3ATE

downfall began in January 1986when a bomb exploded al RPPheadquarters, leading to thecharges that he had plotted to over-throw the government. •

KENYABanks go bust

Confidence in indigenous finan-cial institutions has been slow to re-cover following the recent collapseof two banks and several credit in-stitutions.

New managers were appointed atthe troubled institutions, and Fi-nance Minister George Saitoti isheading a Special Investment Com-mittee (SIC) of government andCentral Bank officials to advise theappointees. The committee will tryto recover the funds of thousands ofindependent depositors and to per-suade Kenya's public and privatesectors to refloat the institutions.

Some observers believe that gov-ernment and Central Bank officialsare partly to blame for not actingmore swiftly to head off the crisisand for possibly colluding with theinstitutions' directors in unethicalor illegal practices. Thus, the SIC islikely to find the restoration of pub-lic confidence a difficult task, andthe possibility of another run on thebanks remains a threat in the finan-cial community.

A public stampede in late Augustbrought down the Pioneer BuildingSociety and its affiliate, the CapitalFinance Company. Hundreds of de-positors rushed to make with-drawals at Pioneer's Nairobi head-quarters, forcing the building soci-ety to close its branches in Eldorel,Meru, Mombasa, Nakuru, andThika.

While earlier collapses were trig-gered by similar panics, it was thealleged diversion of funds to indi-viduals and companies linked withthe directors of the institutions thatwas the root cause of the crisis. Forexample, the directors of Continen-tal Bank, which had to close itsdoors in July, are said to have with-drawn large sums in low-interestloans, resulting in a shortage of op-erating funds which triggered panicfirst in the financial community andthen among depositors.

The early August failure of UnionBank of Kenya and its affiliates,Jimba Credit Corporation, Ltd. andKenya Savings and Mortgages, wasprobably due partly to a domino ef-fect set off by public fears.

A year and a half earlier, the Ru-ral-Urban Finance Corporation, abuilding society, had gone into re-ceivership after suffering serioustroubles. The government has notyet worked out a means of reim-bursing the thousands of depositorswho lost their savings at that time.

Rural-Urban, Union, and Conti-nental are among the dozens of in-digenous financial institutions thatmushroomed during the past dec-ade, most of them founded by Ki-kuyu businessmen in an effort to

Saitoti: In search of lost funds

break the long-time monopoly origi-nally held by the British banks, Bar-clays and Standard, and latershared with Kenya CommercialBank and the National Bank ofKenya—both owned by the Ken-yan government.

While these four giants still con-trol the industry, the newcomers en-joyed some success, fueled byheavy investments from govern-ment funds, including the NationalSocial Security Fund and the Na-tional Health Insurance Fund.Workers and retirees have fre-

quently had trouble collecting theirbenefits from these funds, and asthe recent crisis unfolded, the Cen-tral Organization of Trade Unionspublicly called for action to protectworkers' contributions to health,social security, and retirementplans.

President Moi responded to thecrisis by declaring it was a plan tosabotage Kenya's economy, and heordered drastic action against theresponsible parties. The directorsof the financial institutions "shouldnot be allowed to sleep after causingheavy inconvenience and sufferingto Kenyans," he said.

In mid-August, at least seven di-rectors of Rural-Urban and Conti-nental were held for interrogation.Andrew Kimani Ngumba, Rural-Urban president, managed to evadearrest by fleeing to Europe. Only aweek earlier. Ngumba, a member ofParliament, had been removed fromhis post as assistant minister ofplanning and development. It is notclear why certain directors weresingled out for questioning, particu-larly since the problems at Rural-Urban date back to 1984.

Meanwhile, amendments to Ken-ya's Banking Act—including imple-mentation of a system for insuringindividual depositors—are due totake effect soon, just in time to ap-ply to the Thabiti bank which plansto open its doors in 1987—"a boldstep under the circumstances."commented The Weekly Review. •

MADAGASCARDoubts cast on progress

This year's food harvest fallsshort of government goals, despiteproducer price increases imposedas part of the country's structuraladjustment program, according toAfrica Analysis.

Artificial shortages caused byhoarding and speculation have ex-acerbated the problem, leading todoubts about the real benefits of theInternational Monetary Fund'sstructural adjustment program.

The latest IMF standby arrange-ment—one of a series initiated in1980—followed a 20 percent deval-uation of the Malagasy franc in Au-gust. The IMF will provide SDR 30


million over 17 months in support ofthe 1986-87 structural adjustmentprogram.

The IMF points to progress inseveral areas, particularly reduc-tions in the fiscal deficit and the rateof inflation—now 10 to II percentcompared to 30 percent in 1982.However, the balance of paymentssituation "has remained under con-tinuous pressure," the IMF reports,due to poor weather and marketingdifficulties exacerbated by insuffi-cient competitiveness, a rigid ex-change and trade system, and tightcontrols over many areas of eco-nomic activity. •

SEYCHELLESPlotters falter, coup fails

Government officials uncovereda military plot to overthrow Presi-dent Albert Rene while he was at-tending Ihe Non-Aligned Summit inHarare in September.

The coup was planned by armyofficers loyal to Col. Ogilvy Ber-louis, the minister of youth and de-fense, according to Paul Chow, sec-retary-general of the exiled Sey-chellois National Movement.However, the plot failed when theconspirators disagreed overwhether to seize control while Renewas abroad or to bide time until hisreturn in order to attempt an assas-sination. Chow said.

After receiving word of the plot,Rene cancelled his state visit toKenya and flew back to Victoria ina plane supplied by Indian PrimeMinister Rajiv Gandhi. He dis-missed several high-ranking mili-tary officers—Majors RaymondBonte, Phillip Lucas, and RoilyMarie, but did not detain them. Thegovernment subsequently an-nounced that Berlouis had resignedand departed for an unknown desti-nation abroad, while Bonte fled toKenya.

Berlouis figured prominently inthe 1977 coup which removed Presi-dent James Maneham from officeand brought Rene to power.

Following the removal of Ber-louis and the majors, the Presidentannounced high-level personnelchanges in thearmed forces and thefirst government reshuffle since

World Bank targets family planningPopulation growth is thwarting economic and social development in sub-

Saharan Africa to such an extent that the World Bank has put family planningassistance on the continent at the top of its agenda. In a policy study releasedin September, the World Bank says it will increase its assistance as rapidly asprograms can be developed, with a goal of doubling current expendituresover the next three years.

Al the current average growth rate of 3 percent a year, sub-Suharan Afri-ca's population will balloon from 470 million to 700 million by the year 2000and 1.8 billion by 2050, the World Bank says. By contrast, Europe's growthrate during its industrial age seldom exceeded 1 percent, with emigrationabsorbing about 20 percent of the increase. Although Africa has vast areas ofunused land, huge investments would have to be made in roads, irrigation,seeds, and eradication of disease before they could be habitable.

The report, entitled Population Growth and Policies in Sub-Saharan Af-rica, offers "cautious hope" for the future, however, based on recent atti-tude changes regarding fertility. A decade ago only Botswana, Ghana, andKenya were promoting population control, while today a majority of Africangovernments support family planning.

By the time of the Second African Population Conference in Tanzania in1984, the idea of family planning had gained such widespread acceptancethat African governments ratified an action program making populationgrowth and distribution a key component of development plans. So far,however, Zimbabwe is the only country where a decline in national fertilityhas been documented.

The World Bank argues that economic and political changes in the statusof women are of critical importance in population control. Advances inwomen's education, for example, are likely to reduce fertility. In 10 Africancountries where data is available, women averaging seven or more years ofeducation want an average of five children, while those with no educationwant almost eight.

Legislation mandating women's rights can be indirectly helpful, accordingto the report. Laws raising the minimum age of marriage, for example, mayencourage young people to start their families later. Women's organizationscan also contribute to reducing birth rates over the long term. Nearly 22percent of the members of Maendaleo Ya Wanawake, Kenya's nationalwomen's organization, use contraception, compared with only eight percentnationwide.

Concrete action by African governments is the most immediate and vitalneed, however. The World Bank recommends that each nation design popu-lation programs that conform to its own cultural, social, and economic cir-cumstances. Local institutions, including churches, community organiza-tions, and volunteer groups, should be encouraged to help provide familyplanning services.

Currently, only three to four percent of African couples practice birthcontrol, but that rate could rise to 25 percent wi:hin the next decade solelythrough more effective use of existing facilities, the World Bank says.

1982. Rene took over the defenseportfolio and appointed seven newmembers to the cabinet, includingthe country's first female minister,Rita Sinon, to head internal affairs.

The Rene government has beenthe target of several aborted coups,including an attempt to seize powerby a group of South African merce-naries led by "Mad" Mike Hoare inNovember 1981. •

TANZANIAWeak party support for Mwinyi

President Ali Hassan Mwinyi'svigorous anti-corruption campaignin the civil service and parastatalshas been undermined by the ab-sence of support from Chama ChaMapinduzi (CCM). Tanzania's rul-ing party. The general public, how-ever, appears to be strongly behind


the drive, demonstrating supportfor Mwinyi's effort at recent ralliesin Dares Salaam.

In public statements, Mwinyi hasrepeatedly focused on the corrup-tion that riddles Tanzania's public-sector. "I am (old the peasants can-not get any service in rural areas un-til they oil the hands of those con-cerned," he said recently. Tanzani-ans must now even pay to exercisetheir constitutional rights, he told aCoast Province group which hadcome to congratulate him for ananti-corruption speech. He has alsocarried his message to the party,charging that the CCM tends to pro-tect its officials who are known to bedishonest or corrupt.

The president has backed hiswords with action including the sus-pension or firing of public employ-ees and a reshuffle of key parastataldirectors. In addition. Finance Min-ister Cleopa Msuya has imple-mented strict controls, includingquarterly reviews of expenditures,on government spending units.

In a parallel effort. Zanzibar'sChief Minister Seif Sharrif Hamadis crusading against corruption on

the islands, cutting the salaries ofhundreds of senior and mid-level of-ficials and suspending others fromtheirjobs. The drive has earned himthe antipathy of a growing circle ofcritics, many of whom have beentargeted in his campaign.

The CCM leadership has alsofailed to promote the economic re-forms being implemented in con-junction with the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) standby ar-rangement—finally signed in lateAugust. Observers noted that partystalwarts are apparently unwillingto compromise their long-held op-position to IMF-imposed condi-tions. Former President JuliusNyerere, who heads the partythrough the end of the year, resistedthe IMF's harsh prescriptions dur-ing his last years as president.

The standby for SDR 64.2 millionover 18 months will support Tanza-nia's $4.5 billion Economic Recov-ery Program, which focuses on in-creasing agricultural productivityand industrial capacity, revivingtransportation and communicationsinfrastructures, and reforming fiscaland trade policy. •

Israel makes a comeback in YaoundeCameroon has restored full diplo-

matic relations with Israel—a majorboost to Jerusalem in its drive to re-gain official recognition in sub-Sa-haran Africa. The controversial an-nouncement by President PaulBiya's government came at the endof a two-day visit to Yaounde byPrime Minister Shimon Peres in lateAugust, marking the first Israelihead of state visit to black Africa in20 years.

Most African countries severedties with Israel following the 1973Yom Kippur war to protest Israelioccupation of Egyptian territory.Among Organization of AfricanUnity members, only Lesotho, Ma-lawi, and Swaziland failed to jointhe boycott.

Israel began its comeback in sub-Saharan Africa when it officially re-sumed diplomatic links with Zairein May 1982 and Liberia in August1983. Earlier in the year, Abidjan

joined the fold, fueling specu-lation that several more Africancountries would soon follow. In themeantime, Israel established spe-cial interest sections in the embas-sies of eight additional Africanstates, including Gabon, Kenya,and Togo, as a first step toward re-gaining full diplomatic representa-tion.

The latest Israeli foreign relationstriumph follows five years of grow-ing economic and military coopera-tion with the Biya government. Ac-cording to Israeli officials, the twocountries initiated secret trade rela-tions in 1981. Israel was subse-quently allowed to establish an in-terest section in Yaounde whenBiya took power two years later,with a number of Israeli companiesoperating in Cameroon under covernames. Since then, trade betweenthe two countries has flourished,with Israeli exports for the first half

of 1986 unofficially estimated at$984,000—a 300 percent increaseover the same period last year.

Perhaps more importantly, Israelhas significantly increased its mili-tary assistance to Cameroon sinceBiya suppressed a bloody coup at-tempt in April 1984. An Israeli mili-tary mission has been training thecountry's 7.0(H)-strong army inYaounde, while many of Camer-oon's top army brass have been sentto Israel for instruction. Under-scoring the close military coopera-tion between the two countries, theBiya government recently an-nounced that it had agreed to buy 12Kfir fighter bombers and four Aravatransport planes from Israel for anestimated $50 million.

Peres* visit could hardly havebeen better timed to bolster Israel'simage in the country. The primeminister arrived in Yaounde with ateam of doctors and medical spe-cialists just as the Biya governmentwas appealing to the internationalcommunity for relief in the wake ofthe toxic volcanic gas leak thatkilled neatly 2,000 people in north-west Cameroon. The Israeli medi-cal personnel were the first for-eigners to reach Lake Nios. bring-ing with them large quantities ofemergency relief equipment.

Biya, who agreed to visit Israel ata later date, said the resumption ofrelations was dictated by "mutualnational interests." and that theArab states" boycott was "limited intime," since Egypt and Israel hadmade moves toward mendingfences. Cameroon and Israel agreedto set up a joint commission to pro-mote cooperation in agriculture,trade, tourism, communications,and defense. •

CHADShadow boxing with Habre

Goukouni Oueddei's TransitionalGovernment of National Unity(GUNT) suffered yet another blowto its credibility when the ChadianLiberation Front (Original Frolinat)pulled out of the Libyan-backed op-position to President Hissene Ha-bre's government in mid-Septem-ber. Several weeks earlier, AcheikhIbn Omar's much larger Revolution-


ary Democratic Council (CDR) an-nounced that it had decided to leavethe GLINT, preferring to continueits struggle against the Ndjamenagovernment independently.

While Original Frolinat Secre-tary-General Abdelkader Yacinecondemned the "lack o\' a clear-cutposition by the GUNT" and "itscondoning of political stalemate,"the CDR went further. In explainingthe decision to break away, Acheikhaccused Goukouni and his men ofresorting to "torture, arrests, andeven killings" in their attempts toimpose factional unity. Neverthe-less, he said, the CDR would con-tinue to maintain its links with thefighting forces and political trendsassociated with the GUNT.

However, fighting broke out inlate August at the Fada oasis innorthern Chad between CDR andGUNT units supporting Goukouni.leaving 30 dead and 50 wounded.The CDR seized control of Fada—the most important locality in theregion after Faya-Largeau—whileLibyan troops stationed there re-portedly observed a strict neutral-ity. Acheikh and Goukouni subse-quently went to Tripoli as part of aLibyan effort to mediate betweenthe two opposition factions.

Despite the disintegration of theGUNT, Acheikh made clear hewould not return to Ndjamena,claiming the Chadian president hasnot sought real negotiations. More-over, said Acheikh of Habre's na-tional reconciliation policy, "To re-cuperate several personalities doesnot resolve the problem of theChadian masses."

The GUNT, which has suffered amajor leadership crisis sinceGoukouni failed to show up for aMarch 1986 meeting with Habre inBrazzaville, has been plagued byseveral key defections includingthat of its vice-president, Col. Wa-dal Abdelkader Kamougue, in June.But the pull-out by the CDR—thebest armed and most organizedGUNT faction—leaves Goukounimore isolated than ever before.

Acheikh has already indicatedthat preparations are underway fora gathering of anti-Goukouni fac-tions in an effort to establish a "newcommon platform of struggle" dis-

tinct from the GUNT. At least halfof the dozen factions which until re-cently have made up the Libyan-backed opposition are expected totake part, including the PopularArmed Forces (FAP) of MahamatIssa Idriss and the First Army ofMahamat Abba Seid, who also haveleft the GUNT since mid-August. •

EQUATORIAL GUINEAKey coup plotter executed

Eugenio Abeso Mondu, who al-legedly masterminded a plot tooverthrow President TeodoroObiang Nguema, was executed byfiring squad on August 17. Monduwas a deputy in the national assem-bly and had served as a diplomat inHavana, Moscow, and Madrid. Hisbrother, Melchior Ndong Mondu,was sentenced to 20 years in jail.

A military tribunal handed down28-month sentences to other plot-ters, including the president's un-cle. Deputy Prime Minister Fruc-toso Mba Onana; Planning and De-velopment Minister Marcos MbaOndo: Finance Minister GuillermoNguema Elu; and National BankGeneral Director Damian OndoMane.

The relative speed with which thetrial and execution were carried outhas fueled speculation that the dis-covery of the plot was used as a pre-text to neutralize key governmentofficials who posed a threat toObiang Nguema.

The alleged plot was foiled onJuly 17 when forces loyal to thepresident intercepted some 30 civil-ians and military officers as theytried to take over the presidentialpalace in Malabo. •

;i f; =; : AFJMCAMubarak battles fundamentalist fervor

President Hosni Mubarak's gov-ernment has arrested hundreds ofIslamic fundamentalists in recentmonths in a bid to hold back the tideof religious fervor sweeping thecountry. Interior Minister ZakiBadr, who took office with a reputa-tion as a hardliner, has directed theEgyptian government's latest cam-paign to break the stronghold of Is-lamic militants—particularly onuniversity campuses.

In trying to stamp out what theMubarak government considers aserious long-term political threat,Badr has said that his mission is to"detect and prosecute" those usingthe "slogans of Islam to conduct ter-rorist activities and to shake the sta-bility and security of this country."Although it is unclear how many ar-rests have been made—Islamic mil-itants claim the total is at least 900—several major court cases involvingfundamentalists have made head-lines in the local press.

One case involves 75 defendantscharged with setting fire to a num-ber of theaters, video rental clubs,and a grocery store selling alcohol.They were also accused of advocat-ing the overthrow of the regime andof stealing firearms and ammunition

from the armed forces and the po-lice. In another well-publicizedtrial, Mubarak issued a decree man-dating that a military court try 37defendants charged with forming aclandestine organization to over-throw the government.

The growing popularity of Is-lamic fundamentalism is most strik-ing on university campuses wheremilitants have swept virtually allstudent elections despite govern-ment attempts to scratch most ofthem off the ballots. Said one for-eign professor, "The fundamental-ists dominate the university. Theydo what they like in lectures. Theystart the lecture by praising Islam,they interrupt classes. The Chris-tian students live in fear of some-thing happening."

Islamic fundamentalism has alsomade ils mark at the communitylevel. IT Assiout, south of Cairo,several primary schools privatelyrun by Islamic groups represent agrowing challenge to the state-runeducation system. The parallel in-frastructure is making in-roads atthe grassroots level, due largely tothe deteriorating quality of most in-stitutions operated by the govern-ment.


Islamic alternatives have come toappear increasingly attractive tomany Egyptians. Islamic institu-tions, including health clinics andsmall hospitals, banks, insuranceplans, and business services, aregenerally operated more efficientlythan the slate-run counterparts,which are breaking down under theweight of Egypt's population explo-sion and economic difficulties.

Mubarak: Holding back the tide ot Islam

The fundamentalists' ultimategoal of establishing an Islamic statein Egypt, however, is a muchlonger-term project. As one CairoUniversity lecturer put it, "TheseIslamic groups are competing nowfor the loyalty of the average citi-zen, of the layman. They are notnecessarily pushing for a politicalconfrontation, but rather seeking togain the support of the averageEgyptian, one by one, inch byinch. . . What we are seeing is analternative society in formation, analternative society being born grad-ually and incrementally." •

LIBYANo longer in the driver's seat

In late September, Col. Muam-mar Qaddafy's government unex-pectedly agreed to seli its shares inEiat, following several rounds of ne-gotiations with Giovanni Agnelli,

chairman of the Italian motor andindustrial conglomerate. Libya hadearlier rejected all attempts to buyout its 15.9 percent stake in thecompany, but falling oil revenuescombined with the Italian govern-ment's growing pressure to acceptthe $3.15 billion deal apparentlyforced Qaddafy's hand.

The Libyan Arab Foreign Invest-ment Company (Lafico) bought thestake for about $400 million 10 yearsago at a time when the automobilemanufacturer was suffering fromsevere losses and labor problems.In the 1980s, however. Fiat made aspectacular economic recovery,helping transform the Libyan shareinto a secure and lucrative invest-ment.

But the Libyan link—which in-cluded the presence of two Laficomembers in the Fiat boardroom—became a growing source of embar-rassment for the car company, par-ticularly after the Italian govern-ment accused Tripoli of supportingterrorism and expelled several Lib-yan diplomats and businessmenearlier this year. Lafico's Rome of-fice manager was deported, whileanother Lafico employee was ar-rested during an investigation intoterrorist activities.

The sale of the Libyan stake re-moved a possible barrier to Fiat'seffort to gain Pentagon contracts inconnection with the U.S. StrategicDefense Initiative. In May, DefenseSecretary Caspar Weinbergerblocked a $7.9 million contract witha Fiat subsidiary to supply bull-dozers to the Marine Corps, on thegrounds that part of the profit fromthe deal could wind up in Libya'shands. Three months later, the Pen-tagon lifted the ban on contractswhen Fiat formed a trading com-pany in the U.S. to isolate Libyafrom any profits derived from theItalian firm's participation in StarWars projects.

After the Libyan government re-vealed in June that it had no inten-tion of selling its Fiat stake, Italystepped up its economic pressureon Tripoli. In August, a court in Mi-lan froze $5 million of Libyan assetsin a case brought by an Italian civilengineering contractor. Althoughthe amount was relatively small, it

set an ominous precedent for Libya.Faced with growing Italian hostility,the Qaddafy government acqui-esced to Fiat's demands, evidentlypreferring to stay in the good gracesof its number-one trading partner.

Just as importantly, the deal gaveLibya a large sum of much-neededcash to compensate for declining oilrevenue. American and Europeancutbacks on imports of Libyancrude oil, together with plummetingprices, have seriously squeezed theQaddafy government as its oil earn-ings have shrunk from a peak of $22billion in 1980 to $5 billion this year.Said one financial analyst in ex-plaining the deal, "The combinationof a huge profit and the absoluteneed for cash is a pretty powerfulargument." •

MAURITANIASecond-class citizens on trial

The government of PresidentMaaouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya ar-rested more than three dozen peo-ple in early September-—includingseveral leading public figures—forallegedly taking part in an "unau-thorized public gathering and dis-tributing leaflets aiming to under-mine national unity." Within twoweeks, 20 detainees were tried andconvicted in Nouakchott, with sen-tences ranging from six months tofive years. Their names were not re-leased, however.

In confirming the arrests. InteriorMinister Djibril Ould Abdallah saida group of "misled persons" hadbeen "intoxicating the people withhate and confusion," and "makingcontacts outside Mauritania with aview to sowing seeds of discord."He claimed that working fromabroad, the group had produced anddistributed a document aimed at"dividing our people."

Relatives of the detainees sug-gested that the government'sclampdown was part of "punitivemeasures against black Africanswho no longer want to be consid-ered as second-class citizens inMauritania." The document—de-scribed as a "manifesto of op-pressed black Africans"—report-edly denounced the ascendancy ofthe Moors over black Mauritanians


UP'Jiii

and criticized the government's pol-icy of arabization—especially in thesouth where black ethnic groupspredominate.

The majority of those arrestedwere black Africans, including Taf-sirou Djigo and Mamadou Ly, bothbusiness executives and formergovernment ministers. Others de-tained were Abdoul Aziz Ba, aformer member of the national as-sembly, and Oumar Ba, a prominenthistorian and linguist. SeveralArab-Berbers were also said tohave been arrested, but relatives ofthe accused have claimed they were"only scapegoats," held in an at-tempt to camouflage an anti-blackcampaign by the government. •

SUDANFood for thought in the south

"Operation Rainbow," the $1million relief airlift, finally got un-derway in mid-October when twochartered aircraft carrying emer-gency food supplies landed safely inSudan's war-torn south despitethreats by the Sudanese People'sLiberation Army (SPLA) to shootthem down.

The relief operation, sponsoredby the U.S., Canada, the Nether-lands, and several private and inter-national agencies, had been sched-uled to begin nearly two weeks ear-lier, but was delayed for "technicalreasons." Organizers estimate thatup to 2 million people face starva-tion in southern Sudan, which hasbeen ravaged by drought and a con-tinuing civil war between Col. JohnGarang's estimated 12,000 soldiersand Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mah-di's government troops.

Sponsors of the airlift had earliernegotiated an agreement with theSPLA so that food could be flown tothe government-controlled town ofWau and the rebel-held area ofYirol. But Sudanese authorities re-jected the plan and demanded thatinitial flights go exclusively to gov-ernment-controlled areas.

The SPLA promptly condemnedthe relief sponsors for "capitulatingto the Khartoum government" andwarned that they would be flying attheir own risk. In mid-August, theSPLA shot down a Sudan Airways

African leaders at United Nations:The debt burden of developing nations and the anti-apartheid struggle

were the main focus of African leaders who addressed the 41st session of theUN General Assembly in September and October. Several African repre-sentatives also discussed problems facing their individual countries.Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe: "African governments and peo-ples are becoming increasingly aware that they, more than anybody else,must play a major role in their continent's economic regeneration. They areaware of their responsibility to effect and ensure the success of painfulstructural adjustment measures, which may not be without serious politicaland social consequences. However, there can be no denying that unless ourefforts are generously supported and complemented by the internationalcommunity, and especially by the industrialized countries, Africa's eco-nomic recovery, growth, and development prospects will continue to beremote."External Relations Minister Leandre Bassole, Burkina Faso: "The fact is thatAfrica has rarely been the master of its own development: Africa's develop-ment has almost always been the brainchild of persons who have had and stillhave a very questionable understanding of our profound being. So far, Af-rica has been content with being a passive consumer of products and ideascoming from outside the continent. Therefore, another strategy is required,which means breaking with the practices of the past."External Affairs Minister Afonso Van Dunem, Angola: "The People's Repub-lic of Angola continues to be faced with an undeclared war situation createdby the South African racist regime, which has forced the Angolan people toendure enormous sacrifices. . . Defenseless children, women, and elderlypeople are one of South Africa's favorite targets and the racist forces con-stantly blow up our bridges, railways, and roads, and destroy our hospitalsand schools, not sparing our industrial installations. Material damage causedto our country has been estimated at $12 billion."Foreign Minister Maj. Jean Traore, Guinea: "The north-south dialogue hasbecome bogged down and has reached a dead end in all fora of the UNsystem. Some countries have even pitted some organs of the system againstothers, as though deliberations on international trade, industrialization, fi-nances—for example, in the UN Conference on Trade and Development andthe UN Industrial Development Organization—were encroaching on the

flight as it left the city of Malakal,killing all 60 passengers. As a resultof the accident, an earlier airlift wascancelled.

While the Mahdi government hasargued that relief supplies should beflown to the main towns, the SPLAhas said that starvation is muchworse in the countryside. Garanghas pointed out that if internationalaid agencies want to help the great-est number of people, 'There mustbe a basic agreement on propor-tions. , . When they talk about re-lief they talk about relief to thetowns, not to the countryside. Wedid not cut off relief supplies. It isthe relief supplies that have nevercome."

Because Garang's forces controlas much as 95 percent of the mainlyChristian or animist south—except

for a few government-held townsthat are under siege—the only wayto reach people in the rural areas isthrough the SPLA's relief wing, theSudan Relief and Rehabilitation As-sociation.

Although each side has used foodas a weapon of war that has servedto polarize the conflict, Garang saysthe SPLA does not want to split thecountry along Muslim-Christianlines. Rather, the SPLA seeks toconvince leaders in Khartoum thatSudan can no longer afford to bedominated by the north. As Garangput it, "We are not fighting to be in-vited to dinner. We are fighting toeffectively participate in the deci-sion-making of our country, in therestructuring of political power inKhartoum. Our aims are to create anew Sudan." •


Speaking out on debt, apartheidcompetence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the IMF,while in fact the activities of all these organizations are complementary andclosely interrelated."Ambassador to the UN Wilbert Chagula, Tanzania: There have been ques-tions about whether the special session of the General Assembly on Africawas a success or a failure. The adoption of a consensus resolution on thecritical economic situation in Africa was, in itself, a positive and significantoutcome of (he special session. However, the realization of the success ofthe special session is yet to be seen, since it all depends upon how theinternational community as a whole will implement the UN Programme ofAction for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990."Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, Sudan: We intend to make "an overall revi-sion of the volume and sources of external debt. However, we will not be in aposition to deal with all our external debts according to the customary com-mercial basis. We will pay what we can in a manner that does not disturb thenorms of life of our people while bearing in mind the need to provide themwith ihe requested level of development. . . We shall also continue to ad-dress the rich debtor countries, hoping that they will understand the stillprevailing past circumstances which necessitated the accumulation of thesedebts, especially with regard to Sudan which actually lost much of its mate-rial and human resources during 16 years of disarray and suppression. Tothis end. we shall continue to address the rich countries to follow the exam-ple of Canada and Italy, which took commendable decisions leading to thealleviation of these debts or freezing them or cancelling them altogether."Ambassador to (he UN Farah Dirir, Djibouti: "The Republic of Djibouti issituated in one of the most arid regions in the world, and the scarcity andirregularity of rainfall are impediments to undertaking any meaningful agri-cultural development. . . Livestock has been the principal livelihood of thepopulation before the development of urban centers. However, the over-grazing of pastoral land and the recurrent drought have brought about anenvironmental change which means that livestock rearing is no longer aviable means of subsistence. Consequently the rural population has becomemore and more dependent on urban centers for their sustenance. As aresult. . . Djibouti is a nel importer of almost all the food needed for localconsumption."

TUNISIAMzali blamed for national ills

Ex-Prime Minister MohamedMzali was sentenced in absentia to ayear in jail for illegally fleeing thecountry in early September. Thesentence came after President Ha-bib Bourguiba decided to expel himfrom the Socialist Destour Party(PSD), cancel his parliamentary im-munity, and pursue charges againsthim. A judicial enquiry into his sixyears in office is foreseen.

The government was expected toannounce additional chargesagainst Mzali, who was unceremo-niously dumped from power in July,only days after the aging Bourguibahad called him, "my son. . . myright-hand man in the party and thestate."

Disguised in sunglasses, falsemoustache, and a fez, Mzali slippedacross the border September 3,spending several days in Algeria be-fore flying to Europe. He wasgranted a provisional right to re-main in Switzerland. He told thepress he had not planned to flee un-til his trip to Switzerland as vice-president of the International Olym-pic Committee was cut short at Tu-nis Airport in mid-August, despitehis having received invitations fromthe committee president andFrench Prime Minister JacquesChirac.

He also reportedly suspected thathe was about to be arrested after thegovernment stepped up harassmentof his relatives with investigationsinto their financial affairs. Threesons, a son-in-law, and other rela-

tives were detained and interro-gated. The residence of his wife,Fathia Mzali, former head of theMinistry for the Family and Wom-en's Affairs, was under surveil-lance. Two sons, Rafik and Hadem,subsequently received two-monthsuspended sentences for helpingtheir father escape. From exile,Mzali denounced the persecution ofhis family, describing it as an un-precedented development in Tuni-sian history.

Government officials haveblamed Mzali and his associates formisdeeds ranging from neglect andmismanagement of the country'seconomic affairs to siphoning offpublic funds over a period of years.They have also claimed that heaided radical elements in Tunisia'sgrowing Islamic fundamentalistmovement. His program of arabiza-tion of public education has comeunder heavy criticism and is alreadybeing reversed by a new emphasison French instruction at the pri-mary school level.

Evidence has surfaced that Mzaliand Minister of Culture Bechir BenSlama used public funds to publishfundamentalist propaganda as wellas their own biographies and an Ital-ian translation of the former primeminister's works.

Meanwhile, investigations werealso underway into the past activi-ties of Bourguiba's ex-wife, WassiiaBen Ammar, who now resides inParis. After 25 years of marriage,their divorce was official on August11, although she had been expelledfrom the presidential palace lastJanuary. According to Jeune Afri-que. the government has evidenceto convict her of amassing a per-sonal fortune for herself and herfamily, appropriating expensivegifts presented to the head of state,and various charges of corruption,nepotism, and influence trafficking.

It was her personal forays into in-ternational diplomacy, however,that were said to have disturbedBourguiba the most—particularlyher contacts with Algerian officials,including an alleged request thatthey assume a direct role in solvingTunisia's "crisis of authority," andher friendship with Libyan leaderCol. Muammar Qaddafy.


In addition, a power struggle be-tween Wassila and Mzali was re-portedly a key factor in their down-fall. Mzali was allegedly preparing adetailed file of charges against her,while Wassila was said to be at-

tempting to undermine the primeminister's credibility with the presi-dent by emphasizing his obsessionwith the succession issue to the ex-clusion of other important mat-ters. •

Black workers form rival labor giantAnother chapter in the history of

South Africa's black labor move-ment was written in early Octoberwhen the Council of Unions ofSouth Africa {Cusa) and the Aza-nian Confederation of Trade Unions(Azactu) finally merged to launch a"super-federation." With the amal-gamation of the black conscious-ness labor groups, the Cusa/Azactufederation is expected to become amajor rival to the Congress of SouthAfrican Trade Unions (Cosatu), themulti-racial super-union body bornin December 1985.

According to its president, JamesMndaweni, the new federation has248,000 paid-up and 420,000 signed-up members, linking 23 unions—12from Cusa and 11 from Azactu. Theblack consciousness-inspired unionis thus somewhat smaller than Cos-atu, which represents 450,000 paid-up industrial and commercial work-ers in 34 multi-racial but black-dom-inated trade unions, including thepowerful National Union of Mine-workers (NUM).

Azactu spokesman PandelaniNefolovhodwe said the new laborgiant would operate on four funda-mental principles: one union foreach industry, worker democracy,financial accountability, and blackworking class leadership. Emphasison black leadership, however, is thekey provision which distinguishesthe new federation from Cosatu,whose commitment to non-racial-ism became a major stumblingblock to uniting the labor movementlate last year. Cusa and Azactuwithdrew or were excluded—theversion of each side differs—fromthe negotiations leading to the for-mation of Cosatu following differ-ences over this issue.

Despite the political divisionsthat have plagued the blackworkforce, the labor movement

flexed its growing muscle in earlyOctober when about 325,000 minersstaged the biggest-ever stayaway inany one industry to mourn the 177killed in the Kinross gold mine dis-aster.

According to Cyril Ramaphosa,general secretary of the NUM,which called the successful day ofaction, "Management should takeheed that the NUM is prepared totake up any issue, be it wages, poli-tics, safety—it can mobilize work-ers around virtually any issue." An-other 275,000 members affiliatedwith Cosatu engaged in unprece-dented solidarity action, organizingwork stoppages, memorial meet-ings, and demonstrations, accord-ing to federation spokesman JayNaidoo.

The miners—all but five of themblack—were asphyxiated by toxicfumes from a fire in a mile-deepshaft. Said one survivor, "The min-ers didn't stand a chance. They raninto a wall of smoke and must havedropped like flies."

The Chamber of Mines proposeda token five-minute silence to com-memorate the dead, but the NUMdismissed the employers' sugges-tion and called for a one-day workstoppage. A memorial service orga-nized by the mine owners, the Gen-eral Mining Union Corporation,was similarly condemned.

Explained one angry worker,"We don't respect management andwe don't respect their memorial."Hundreds of militant mine workerswaving sticks and chanting slogansdisrupted the ceremony and calledon the crowd of 2,000 to walk out."We are not going to pray withwhites today. We've never been al-lowed to pray with whites. We'llhave our own rites," they shouted.

The NUM blamed the disaster onslack safety measures which have

led to more than 46,000 deaths in thegold mines since the turn of the cen-tury and some 9,000 in the last dec-ade. As the statement by the UnitedDemocratic Front, the country'smajor legal anti-apartheid organiza-tion, put it, "Despite all the profitsaccrued from mining proceeds.South Africa still has the worst rec-ord for mine disasters anddeaths." •

ANGOLAStamp of approval on rebel aid

In the final weeks before adjourn-ment in mid-October, Congressgave President Reagan a vote ofconfidence for covert aid to Unitaand endorsed legislation sending amessage of disapproval to Ameri-can oil companies operating in An-gola.

By a 229-186 vote, the House ofRepresentatives deleted an amend-ment to the intelligence authoriza-tion bill that would have requiredCongress to openly acknowledgeand approve assistance to Unita,the South African-backed rebelgroup which is waging a war againstthe Angolan government.

The White House has admittedthat it has supplied the rebels with$ 15 million in covert military assist-ance, which is said to includeStinger missiles and light anti-tankweapons, as well as training byAmerican advisers.

Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chair-man of the Intelligence Committeeand sponsor of the amendment, andother opponents of aid to Unita em-phasized that the aid would escalatethe war in Angola and put Washing-ton in league with South Africa."Aid to Unita is aid to apartheid.Make no mistake about it," saidRep. David Bonior (D-MI). Hamil-ton blamed the defeat of the amend-ment to election year pressures andthreats of being "soft on commu-nism."

In addition, Congress passed twoamendments on U.S. oil companiesdoing business in Angola in an effortto resolve the contradiction be-tween military backing for therebels and U.S. corporate supportof the Angolan government throughtaxes and royalties.


The first was a "sense of the Con-gress" resolution—which does nothave the force of law—requestingthat the President consider using hisauthority under the Export Admin-istration Act to restrict U.S. busi-ness transactions that conflict withU.S. security interests in Angola.The original version of the legisla-tion would have banned Export-Im-port Bank credit to U.S. oil firms inAngola.

The weakened version, nonethe-less, sets a bad precedent, accord-ing to Steve North, a spokesman forChevron, who said that existingloans would not be affected. Insteadof seeking new loans from the Ex-port-Import Bank, companies plan-ning to initiate operations in Angolamight approach European financialinstitutions, "sothe impact could bedamaging to American commercialinterests in Angola," he said.

Congress also approved anamendment to the Department ofDefense (DOD) authorization bill,prohibiting DOD from purchasingAngolan petroleum products fromU.S. oil companies in Angola in aneffort to "reduce to an absoluteminimum DOD procurement of An-golan oil products." Originally, themeasure was worded in muchtougher language, but it was wa-tered down after administrationrepresentatives told members ofCongress that it would endanger na-tional security.

Meanwhile, the government ofPresident Jose" Eduardo dos Santoscontinued efforts to establish diplo-matic relations with the U.S. gov-ernment. Foreign Minister Afonsovan Dunem called for a meeting be-tween top Angolan and Americanofficials, and the Luanda govern-ment retained former U.S. DefenseSecretary Elliot Richardson, whoheld several cabinet positions in theNixon and Ford administrations, toinvestigate how best to succeed inthis endeavor. •

BOTSWANATwo decades of progress marked

Pride in the country's social andeconomic progress merged withtrepidation about the future inspeeches commemorating Botswa-

ANC school trains student refugeesDozens of high schools in Soweto and other townships stood empty in

early October, testimony to the power of a student boycott demanding therelease of student and teacher detainees.

The educational process has practically ground to a halt in the townships,even when schools manage to stay open. The current political crisis, setagainst decades of government neglect of black education, has created anatmosphere in which teaching and learning are virtually impossible.

But thousands of miles to the north in Mazimbu, Tanzania, some SouthAfrican students are receiving an uninterrupted education at SolomonMahlangu Freedom College (Somafco), a school run by the exiled AfricanNational Congress (ANC). Located on a former sisal estate donated by theTanzanian government, Somafco enrolls more than 1.000 students at pri-mary and secondary levels.

Some were illiterate when they reached the school, Tim Maseko, Somaf-co's chief administrator, told Africa Report. Many are orphans or separatedfrom their parents. Large numbers of the older students have been victims ofharassment, detention, and torture in South Africa. The staff—ANC mem-bers as well as expatriate volunteers sent by European and African govern-ments—often have to serve as counselors and parents as well as teachers.

Somafco provides a sharp contrast to the stifling system of "Bantu educa-tion," which trains black students to think of themselves as suitable only forsubservient roles, according to Don Ngakana, a Somafco teacher who taughtin Soweto until 1976. At that time, a student protest against the imposition ofAfrikaans as the language of instruction prompted a savage governmentcrackdown, forcing thousands to flee.

Conceived shortly after the Soweto uprising and opened in 1979, Somafcowas named for a student protester who was later executed by the SouthAfrican government. The school adopted the British education system withinstruction in English, preparing students for university studies abroad. The75-year history and ideology of the ANC are included in a curriculum whichfocuses on academic subjects.

The Mazimbu campus is more like a self-contained community than aschool compound. The ANC runs a large farm (which sells its surplus toTanzanian buyers), a hospital (where Tanzanians can receive free healthcare), carpentry and clothing factories, various shops, and a nursery, as wellas a center for agricultural training and other vocational studies at nearbyDakawa. Tanzanian troops protect the school.

Maseko and Ngakana, who toured the U.S. in October to raise support forSomafco, said the American public as well as the government need to bebetter informed about the ANC. The ANC has a two-fold purpose, theyexplained—not only to destroy the apartheid system, but also to become acreative force in building an alternative for the future. It is this second goalthat Somafco seeks to fulfill by preparing students to play important roles ina future non-racial, democratic South Africa, Maseko said.

na's 20th anniversary of indepen-dence in late September.

Primary education is now nearlyuniversal, and almost every villagehas clean drinking water, PresidentQuett Masire said in a celebrationspeech. When Botswana becameindependent in 1966, the countryhad only three kilometers of tarredroads, and life expectancy was 35years. Today there are nearly 2,000kilometers of tarred roads connect-ing every major village in the coun-

try, and average Batswana can ex-pect to live to age 58, according toMasire.

In addition, the economy is doingwell, largely because of the rich re-serves of high-quality diamonds dis-covered shortly after indepen-dence. Botswana is one of the fewAfrican countries with a trade sur-plus, and the local currency—thepula—is stronger than the South Af-rican rand. According to the WorldBank's 1986 world development re-


port, Botswana has one of the fast-est growing economies in the world.It also boasts a multi-party electoralsystem with a healthy and growingopposition.

Yet officials in the Masire govern-ment speak cautiously about theircountry's future. Much of Masire'sindependence day speech focusedon the threat of South African retali-ation for alleged African NationalCongress (ANC) activity in Bot-swana. In July, Foreign MinisterGaositwe Chiepe warned Parlia-ment thai Pretoria was probablypreparing to launch another attacklike the one on a Gaborone suburbin May.

Government officials also antici-pate economic reprisals, such as thepossible expulsion of Batswanaworking in South Africa, followingthe precedent set with the ousting ofMozambicans in early October.Foreign investors—the best pros-pect for diminishing Botswana's ec-onomic dependence on South Af-rica—shy away from major com-mitments, due to fears of anupheaval in South Africa.

Chiepe: Forecasting another raid

Most observers say that the eco-nomic progress of the first two dec-ades has probably reached a pla-teau. "To plan on the assumptionthat these favorable conditions willcontinue would be very unwise,"warned Vice-President Peter

Mmusi in his 1986-87 budget pre-sentation earlier this year. He saidthat although diamond reserves areexpected to last for 40 years, thewindfall profits of recent years arecoming to an end.

Government efforts to revive thelagging agricultural sector havefailed, due largely to the severe five-year drought, which is expected tolast at least two more years and isnow exacerbated by crop destruc-tion from flocks of quelea birds andbrown locusts. •

ZIMBABWEUnity on the horizon

Prospects for a successful mergerbetween the ruling Zimbabwe Afri-can National Union (ZANU-PF)and Joshua Nkomo's oppositionZimbabwe African People's Union(ZAPU) improved dramatically inlate September when Prime Minis-ter Robert Mugabe gained the back-ing of his central committee for pro-posals to integrate the two partystructures.

Mugabe, who said the unity talkshad reached an "advanced stage,"is understood to be planning a mer-ger whereby Nkomo would be ap-pointed to a newly-created post ofsecond deputy prime minister. Aspart of the package deal, ZAPU islikely to obtain a small minority rep-resentation in the merged party'stwo main executive organs—thepolitburo and the central commit-tee—as well as in the cabinet. Suchan arrangement would go far towardcreating the one-party state long ad-vocated by Mugabe.

As the junior partner in the pro-posed merger, ZAPU has report-edly agreed that the new party becalled ZANU. This marks a retreatfrom Nkomo's earlier insistencethat the name pay some tribute toZAPU's role in the liberation strug-gle.

The latest breakthrough in thelong-stalled unity talks followed thegovernment's August release of 10prominent ZAPU officials andformer guerrilla commanders ac-cused of plotting to overthrow thegovernment. Among those freedwere ZAPU National ChairmanWilliam Kona and Chief Whip Sid-

ney Malunga. In July, about 50lesser-known ZAPU members werealso released.

Mugabe skid that the governmenthad decided to release the politicaldetainees in the interests of nationalunity, because the alternativewould have been a treason trial thatmight have implicated Nkomo andterminated the merger talks. Thedelicate and protracted negotia-tions, added Mugabe, have reacheda "critical stage" and "the atmos-phere for success must be created."

The ZANU government also re-vealed that Zimbabwe's AttorneyGeneral Godfrey Chidyausikuwould begin a complete and imme-diate review of all pending cases ofZAPU political detainees—esti-mated at under 200—to determinewhether pardons should be granted.This could open the door for the re-lease of Dumiso Dabengwa, ZA-PU's former military leader, whoremains the key to the success ofthe unity talks.

Arrested in 1982 following thediscovery of arms caches on ZAPU-owned farms and charged with plot-ting a coup, Dabengwa was subse-quently acquitted by the High Courtbefore being re-detained under theemergency powers regulations. Heis widely perceived as the oneZAPU leader with the authority toend the former guerrillas' dissidentcampaign that has plagued the Mu-gabe government in Matabeleland.

Authorities in Harare recognizethat an inter-party consensus is es-sential if Zimbabwe is to success-fully defend itself in any showdownwith Pretoria. The Mugabe govern-ment has alleged for some time thatdissidents in Matabeleland receivefunds and weapons from South Af-rica and is concerned that the desta-bilization campaign could eventu-ally turn into a massive operationalong the lines of the Renamo rebelsin Mozambique.

In this context, the Zimbabweangovernment has pushed peace andreconciliation in Matabeleland tothe top of its agenda. Explained Mu-gabe, "With a neighbor like the rac-ist South African regime, division inour nation can only operate to ourdetriment by playing into [Preto-ria's) hands." •


Recent revelations of the role of President Kamuzu Banda's government insupporting the Mozambican National Resistance's destabilizationcampaign, as well as continued South African backing of the rebels, pointto increasing security threats for the Maputo government.

The MalawiConnection

Mozambique

BY ALLEN ISAACMAN

South Africa's continued violation ofthe Nkomati Accord has taken a

new twist which could spark a regionalconflict. In the face of mounting evi-dence of collusion between Pretoria andBlantyre, President Samora Machel isreported to have warned that his coun-try "will close its border with Malawiand station missiles on the frontier" un-less Life President Hastings KamuzuBanda's government ceases its supportfor the South African-backed Mozambi-can National Resistance Movement(known alternately as the MNR or Re-namo). The ultimatum came at a closedmeeting this fall between Banda andMachel, who was accompanied by Zim-babwean Prime Minister Robert Mu-gabe and Zambian President KennethKaunda.

The participation of the latter twoleaders suggests how seriously thefrontline nations view Malawi's defec-tion. Their presence also raises theprospect that in an effort to pressurelandlocked Malawi to reverse its policy,Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania mightpursue a joint strategy. At present, Ma-lawi's ambiguous relationship withSouth Africa threatens the very survivalof the regional economic alliance—theSouthern African Development Coordi-nation Conference (SADCC).

In March 1984, Mozambique andSouth Africa signed the Nkomati Ac-Allen haacman is professor of Afro-Americanand African studies in the Department ni Historyat the University of Minnesota. He ts the author ofseveral books and articles on Mozambique.

cord. Each party agreed "not to allow itsterritory to be used for acts of war, ag-gression or violence against the other."From the outset, there has been a glar-ing disparity in the degree to which thetwo countries have implemented theagreement.

Shortly after the accord was signed,Mozambican security forces began todisarm members of the African NationalCongress. Within a few weeks, theANC presence was drastically reduced,and the organization has since been per-mitted to maintain only a limited diplo-matic presence in Mozambique. For theFrelimo government, this strategic, ifpainful, concession was acceptable onlyin the hope of ending the bandit war andreversing the spiral of economic de-struction; The decision initially strainedrelations with the ANC and raiseddoubts among many of Mozambique'slong-time allies.

By contrast, South Africa covertlyviolated both the spirit and the sub-stance of the accord. Documents cap-tured at Renamo headquarters insideMozambique reveal that shortly beforethe Nkomati agreement, Pretoria pro-vided Renamo with sufficient arms topursue military activities for severalmonths. An entry in one of the captureddiaries noted that Renamo leaderAfonso Dlhakama met "on February 23,1984, at 10 a.m. in Pretoria. . . [withjthe general of military intelligence."

The purpose of the meeting was to"plan the war in the face of the situationtaken up by the South African Repub-lic"—a euphemism for the impendingNkomati agreement. General Van derWesthuizen is quoted as reaffirming thecommitment of the South African secu-

rity apparatus to Renamo. "We the mili-tary will continue to give them [Re-namo] the support without the consentof our politicians in a massive way sothat they can win the war."

While it is possible, even likely, thatdifferences existed between the SouthAfrican military and civilian branches ofgovernment, they seem to have cen-tered around the level of support SouthAfrica should continue to provide to Re-namo. At no time after the Nkomati

On October 19, 1986, shortlyafter the author submitted thefollowing article on Mozambique toAfrica Report, President SamoraMachel was killed in a plane crashin South Africa as he returnedhome from a meeting in Lusaka,Zambia. As we go to press, the ex-act cause of the crash remainsunknown. Reports from SouthAfrica claim that the accident wasdue to bad weather, and in point offact, there was substantial airturbulence in the region that night.Mozambican officials are with-holding judgment, but have notruled out the possibility ofsabotage. On October 22, thegovernment appointed a high levelcommission of inquiry headed byArmando Guebeza to investigatethe air crash.

At this point, there are severaltroubling questions. What was theplane doing so far off course? Whydid Pretoria, which monitored theflight path of Samora Machel'splane, fail to inform the Mozam-bican government of the crash fornine hours? And finally, there wereSamora Machel's own disturbingcomments just two weeks beforehis death. According to journalistswho were present at a meeting ofnews editors called to discuss theSouth African military buildup,Machel revealed that there hadbeen a recent attempt on his life.In fact, it was the South Africanbuildup and Mozambique's fear ofan impending invasion which inpart had prompted the trip toLusaka from which Machel wouldnever return.


agreement did the civilian leadershipmove to disarm Renamo, dismantle itsSouth African bases, or close down itscommunication centers. To the con-trary, senior civilian officials, includingthen-Deputy Foreign Minister LouisNel, as well as a high-ranking militaryofficer, clandestinely visited Renamobases in Mozambique in direct contra-vention of the accord.

Simultaneously, South African planesand ships violated Mozambique's airspace and territorial waters to resupplyRenamo. An entry from one of the cap-tured diaries dated October 19, 1984—approximately six months after theNkomati agreement—suggests the ex-tent to which Pretoria was committed torearming Renamo. The document notesthat during the week ending September28, South African Dakota and DC-3s air-dropped supplies to Renamo forces op-erating in the provinces of Sofala, Ma-puto, Inhambane, and Zambesia. Whenconfronted with this evidence, South Af-rican Foreign Minister Pik Botha con-ceded that there had been some techni-

"Malawi's life presidentmay simply be closinghis eyes and givingPretoria a free hand."

cal violations of the accord, but claimedthat the supplies were only for humani-tarian purposes.

South Africa's repeated denial of anycomplicity and its refusal to rein in Re-namo effectively undercut the Joint Se-curity Commission set up to implementthe terms of the Nkomati Accord. InOctober 1985, Machel suspended hisgovernment's participation in the com-mission and announced that Mozam-bique would intensify military effortsagainst Renamo.

This decision, coupled with Machel'shighly visible Western diplomatic offen-sive in the fall of 1985, posed a seriousproblem for the Botha regime. On theone hand, Western governments, espe-cially the Reagan administration whichhad brokered the Nkomati Accord, ex-erted pressure on Pretoria not to violatethe agreement. On the other hand,powerful domestic forces, including key

President Hastings Kamuzu Banda: "Onthe face of it, Malawian support for theSouth African-backed Renamo wouldseem inexplicable"

sectors of the military and security ap-paratus, the right-wing of the NationalParty, and the increasingly powerfulPortuguese community representing 15percent of the electorate, all demandedthat Botha escalate support for Re-namo.

One way to accommodate these po-tentially contradictory pressures wasfor South Africa to curtail some of themore visible aspects of its destabiliza-tion campaign. Although Pretoria con-tinued to resupply Renamo by subma-rine and night flights, senior Mozambi-can officials acknowledged that thenumber of airdrops from planes based inSouth Africa has declined over the pastyear.

At the same time, however, thereare indications that South African mili-tary intelligence has helped to forgeclandestine supply networks stretchingfrom the Middle East to Somalia, the

Comoros, and Malawi. Indeed, Preto-ria's shift in strategy rests on the ex-panded involvement of the Malawiangovernment which, since 1981, had pe-riodically allowed Renamo to launch at-tacks across its frontier.

Military bases in Malawi, adjacent tothe vast border with Mozambique, pro-vided an ideal way to surreptitiously re-supply Renamo. They also offered easyaccess to strategic economic targets incentral and northern Mozambique. Theexistence of a South African embassy inMalawi also facilitated the collection ofintelligence information, allowing SouthAfrican security to coordinate strategicmilitary planning for Renamo.

In a rare interview, Mozambique'schief of staff, Sebastiao Mabote,claimed: "Malawi is helping South Afri-can-backed guerrillas materially, logisti-cally, and is also providing them withtravel documents and airport access sothat they can move around the world."When pressed for specifics, he cited"the presence of Renamo training basesin southern Malawi" and the fact that"South African helicopters and DC-3swere using airstrips in Malawi to re-sup-ply Renamo forces in Niassa, Zambesia,and Tete provinces."

At a news conference in Maputo im-mediately after his meeting with Bandathis fall, Machel was blunter. Hecharged that "the Malawian police, se-curity, and military are controlled bySouth Africa and are being used to de-stabilize Mozambique."

There is mounting evidence to sup-port these claims. Zimbabwean intelli-gence officers who recently returnedfrom Mozambique confirm the exist-ence of Renamo bases run by South Af-ricans in Malawi. They also report thatPretoria is using airstrips in southernMalawi for covert night flights into Mo-zambique. In private, some Westerndiplomats agree that Malawi is harbor-ing Renamo forces, and Britain has re-portedly put pressure on Malawi to cur-tail Renamo activity.

Recently, a journalist for The Ob-server of London witnessed Malawiantroops fraternizing with Renamo forcesat the frontier post of Muloza. The Ma-lawian commander was quite candid:"We are with them all the time and wehelp them against Frelimo" (The Ob-

52 AFRICA REPOF1T • November-December 1986

server, August 24, 1986). And whenMachel confronted Banda with this doc-umentation at their recent meeting, theMal;iwian president conceded that therecould be clandestine bases in the southoperating without his authorization.

On the face of it, Malawian supportfor the South African-backed Renamowould seem inexplicable. Not only doessuch a policy further isolate the Bandagovernment from its African neighbors,but Renamo attacks have disrupted Ma-lawian commerce which relies heavilyon Mozambican ports. As a result, Ma-lawian businessmen have had to usemore costly transport routes via SouthAfrica and Tanzania.

Despite his government's repeatedpublic denials, there are several possi-ble explanations for Banda's policies.Some observers suggest that becauseof close economic and security ties to

Pretoria, Malawi's life president maysimply be closing his eyes and givingPretoria a free hand. Others point toBanda's longstanding claim to much ofnorthern Mozambique which he main-tains had historically been part of agreater Malawian empire. Control overtliis territory would give landlocked Ma-lawi direct access to the Indian Ocean.In the early 1960s, he proposed to then-Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere thatthe two countries divide northern Mo-zambique. Banda subsequently aided atiny separatist movement (Uniao Na-cional Africana de Rombezia) as part of aplan to integrate northern Mozambiqueinto a greater Malawi.

In explaining Banda's position, it mayalso help to note his well-documentedties with Portuguese investors who fledMozambique after independence andwho are now bankrolling Renamo and

President Samora Machel inspecting cap-tured Renamo equipment: "At no time af-ter the Nkomati agreement did the SouthAfricans move to disarm Renamo, dis-mantle its South African bases, or closedown its communication centers"

playing important roles within the rebelmovement. Consider the background ofEvo Fernandes, currently the leadingRenamo spokesman in Europe. Duringthe colonial period, he worked for thePortuguese industrial and newspapermagnate Jorge Jardim, whom Banda hadappointed Malawi's consul-general inBeira. Orlando Christina, another Por-tuguese who held a leadership positionin Renamo, also worked for Jardim andhad close connections to the Malawiangovernment.

Whatever Banda's motives, escalat-ing Renamo attacks from Malawi in thefirst half of 1985 led to a deterioration ofthe security situation in central andnorthern Mozambique. At an urgent


meeting in June 1985, the leaders ofTanzania and Zimbabwe promised to in-crease their military support for Ma-chel's government. Tanzania, whoseown resources are limited, agreed totrain Mozambican recruits fighting in thethree northern provinces. For theirpart, Zimbabwean officials, who nowprivately acknowledge "that they hadnot taken the Rename threat seriouslyenough," have moved to rectify this sit-uation.

Since 1984, Zimbabwe has dramati-cally increased its military support forMozambique. The numbers of its sol-diers deployed in that war-torn countryand providing logistical back-up fromZimbabwe tripled to more than 12,(XX).Most of these forces are used to protectthe corridor connecting Harare to theIndian Ocean port of Beira and strategicareas in the Zambesi Valley.

Senior Zimbabwean military officialsemphatically deny reports that slowprogress in the war has caused them toreconsider their commitment. To thecontrary, they stress the fact that over-all military assistance will increase sub-stantially in the near future. "If we loseMozambique to .South Africa, we arelandlocked and ultimately will be stran-gled."

To avoid this eventuality, Zimbabwehas offered to train several thousandMozambican troops and officers and toprovide greater logistical support andadditional supplies. Hans are also un-derway for increased Zimbabwean eco-nomic and agricultural assistance in theadjacent Mozambican provinces ofTete, Manica, and Sofala.

With the help of Zimbabwe, Mozam-bican forces have reversed the deterio-rating military situation in several partsof the country. A sustained Mozambicanoffensive in the southern provinces ofInhambane and Gaza has effectivelyeliminated the Renamo threat in thoseareas. Security is also considerably bet-ter in the central provinces of Manicaand Sofala, leading American Ambassa-dor Peter de Vos to conclude that "sinceJanuary 1985, the military situation hasgenerally improved." He emphasizedthat "the Mozambican government is along way from collapsing."

Diplomats in Maputo also note thatRenamo's terror tactics, problematic

political agenda, and total dependenceon South Africa call into question itscredibility as a legitimate oppositionforce. One Western ambassador put itrather bluntly: "My impression is thatRenamo is composed of desperategroups of gunslingers, thugs, white Por-tuguese opportunists, and other as-sorted anti-Frelimo types in the serviceof Pretoria."

Splits within the Renamo leadershiphave compounded its political problemsand frustrated its quest for political legit-imacy. Renamo dissidents organized ameeting in Cologne this spring at whichthey tried unsuccessfully to purge EvoKernandes and his coterie of Portu-guese followers, whom they claimedwere dominating the movement.

This summer, the WashingtonTimes, which has enthusiasticallybacked Renamo, expressed concernthat "political in-fighting among exiles

"There are indicationsthat the Botha regime iswilling to take a highermilitary profile as theconflict in Mozambiqueescalates."

from the southeastern African countryhas thrown confusion into conservativegroups trying to get Reagan administra-tion support for the resistance" (August20, 1986). The article went on to notethat Free the Eagle and the Conserva-tive Action Foundation are touting dif-ferent Renamo representatives. Theformer has endorsed Luis Serapiao, aprofessor at Howard University, whilethe latter has embraced Arturo Vi-lankulu. The Washington Times re-ported that "each accuses the other ofbeing a fraud and lining his pockets withfunds raised in the name of resistance."

This in-fighting, however, has notprevented Pretoria from pursuing itsrather successful policy of destabiliza-tion. Indeed, the situation in Mozam-bique remains very serious. Despitesome recent gains on the battlefield,there is little evidence that government

forces, even ;iided by Zimbabwe, havethe military capacity to blunt Renamo aslong as it remains an arm of the SouthAfrican military. Moreover, there areindications that the Botha regime is will-ing to take a higher military profile as theconflict escalates. In May and again inAugust this year, South African trans-ports landed men and war materiel inthe central Mozambican province ofManica.

The cumulative effects of this cycle ofdestruction and terrorism have beendevastating. Between 1983 and 1985,Renamo attacks were responsible forthe closing of more than 1,800 schoolsand the displacement of 313,000 stu-dents, thereby crippling the govern-ment's rural education and literacy pro-grams. In 1985, Renamo activity wasresponsible for the destruction of morethan 900 stores in the countryside.

A July 1986 report of the Ministry ofAgriculture revealed that productionplummeted over the past three years insharp contrast to the period from 1977to 1982. And in late September, the Mo-zambican government issued an urgentappeal for food aid for nearly 4 millionpeople who are facing famine. While anumber of poorly conceived and badlyimplemented state policies have con-tributed to this agricultural crisis, esca-lating violence in the countryside re-mains at the core of the problem.

The decision in July to name a primeminister to oversee daily governmentaloperations suggests how seriously Fre-limo views the security problem. Re-cent efforts to upgrade the poorlytrained and beleaguered army and amore aggressive policy toward Malawiboth point to a new military offensive.

But as long as the South African re-gime stays in power and continues tosupport Renamo, and as long as theUnited States ;ind other Western na-tions are not prepared to take effectivemeasures against the apartheid regime,peace in Mozambique and indeedthroughout the region, remains illusory.

Daily accounts of repression in SouthAfrica, the continued illegal occupationof Namibia, attacks against Angola, aswell as recent reports that a large Re-namo force based in Malawi has invadedMozambique, highlight the volatile con-ditions in this strategic region. D


DenisSassou-Nguesso

President, People's Republic of the CongoChairman, Organization of African Unity

As newly elected chairman of the OAU, the Congolese President outlinesthe organization's economic and political priorities for the coming year. Healso puts Congo's recent agreement with the IMF in perspective andcandidly discusses his country's efforts to meet the challenges of thepost-oil era.

INTERVIEWED BY ANDRE ASTROW

Africa Report: You have come to the U.S. as the newlyelected chairman of the Organization of African Unity. What isyour agenda for the coming year? Will it be significantly differ-ent from that of your predecessor, Senegalese President Ab-dou Diouf?Sassou-Nguesso: I think you may have followed the decla-ration I made at the 41st session of the General Assembly. Inthat declaration, after having touched on general internationalissues—the crisis in multilateralism, problems of disarma-ment and others—I also dealt with two essential questionsspecifically concerning Africa, the continent's critical eco-nomic situation and the dramatic situation in southern Africa. Ithink these are the two key issues.

Today, in the aftermath of the United Nations Special Ses-sion on Africa's economic crisis, the point is to put into effectAfrica's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery and theaction plan of the United Nations. Therefore, after the conclu-sion of this special session under my predecessor's mandate,

we must now go into action. Having mobilized internationalpublic opinion through this special session, we must nowpress for specific commitments and obtain announcements ofcontributions. This is the path that I am pursuing with respectto Africa's economic crisis.

Concerning the issue of southern Africa, we are doing simi-lar work to mobilize international public opinion by establishingcontacts in the U.S. and other countries. Earlier, I met withSecretary of State George Shultz and discussed the veryissue of southern Africa, to push for the adoption of interna-tional and mandatory sanctions against South Africa. When wetalk of economic sanctions, we mean that countries such asthe U.S. should oppose the importation of strategic raw mate-rials like uranium, gold, steel, iron, and coal, as well as agricul-tural products. They should take concrete measures in thisdirection. The U. S. should ban investments by companies andbanks in South Africa, oppose air and sea traffic destined forthe apartheid regime, sever all sports links, and put an end totechnical and cultural cooperation with that country.

These are the kind of comprehensive and concrete mea-


sures that we expect from the U. S. and other countries. Wehave seen the tentative decisions taken by the European Pxo-nomic Community and we tliink that they will be strength-ened. Thus, we are acting on two fronts: the economic situa-tion in Africa, as well as the eradication of apartheid in SouthAfrica and the independence of Namibia.

There are naturally other questions facing the continent. InJune of next year, we hope to convene the Congress of Afri-can Scientists. In so far as we are able, we would also like towork toward bolstering pan-African sentiment. Moreover,there are of course specific issues like Chad and the WesternSahara that we must address. Concerning the Western Sa-hara, for example, I had lengthy discussions with the secre-tary-general of the United Nations to continue the work thathad been initiated by my predecessor—that of encouragingnegotiations between Morocco and Polisario.Africa Report: But some critics of the OAU claim it is adivided and ineffective body which has little power to imple-ment its resolutions. Do you think the OAU is a viable organi-zation capable of tackling the major tasks it faces?Sassou-Nguesso: Yes. To critics we can begin by pointingout that African leaders and the African people can be proud tohave established the only viable continent-wide political or-ganization that exists in the world. Other continents have yetto successfully create such an organization, so this is in itself aconsiderable achievement and an important element to con-sider. Every organization has its weaknesses and its strongpoints. Since its creation 23 years ago, the OAU has neverthe-less led numerous countries under colonial rule to indepen-dence, and the OAU Liberation Committee in these cases hasplayed a very important role.

With respect to the economic crisis, the OAU formulatedthe Lagos Plan of Action, outlining a development strategy forAfrica during an OAU economic summit in 1980. And morerecently, we drew up Africa's Priority Programme for Eco-nomic Recovery. I think these are encouraging signs. Eventhe United Nations has its problems. It has not resolved allproblems in the world, for otherwise Namibia would alreadybe independent. Therefore, I do not think that one shouldcriticize the OAU without examining it in greater detail. It hasits weaknesses, but it also has many strengths.Africa Report: Earlier you talked about South Africa. At the22nd OAU summit in Addis Ababa, a resolution was passedcalling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Preto-ria. How do you answer those who claim sanctions would bemore harmful to black South Africans and to the frontlinestates than to the Botha regime?Sassou-Nguesso: We say that it is pretentious to claim toknow better than those who are directly affected, since it isthe African people themselves who are asking for the imple-mentation of these sanctions. They are the ones who say thatthey will not experience greater suffering than that alreadycaused by apartheid. So to claim to know better than they isabsurd. In addition, I don't think it is possible to evaluate theeffectiveness of sanctions before having implemented them.That is our opinion, which is why we continue to demandcomprehensive and mandatory sanctions.Africa Report: Can the OAU have a meaningful impact on

Witwatersrand, South Africa: "It is pretentious to claim to knowbetter than those who are directly affected, since it is the Africanpeople themselves who are asking for the implementation ofsanctions"U.S. policy in southern Africa? Do you think the U.S. can playa positive role in the region?Sassou-Nguesso: All the discussions that I am having atpresent with U. S. authorities are working toward this goal: toensure that the U.S. has a real influence over the SouthAfrican regime to help Africa eradicate apartheid. We thinkthat the U.S. can effectively help Africa to achieve this goal.Africa Report: Ycu have touched on the formidable eco-nomic tasks confronting the African continent. Perhaps wecould discuss more specifically some of the recent economicdifficulties facing your country. Eor many years your govern-ment was one of the few in Africa that had steadfastly opposedan agreement with t le International Monetary Fund. How doyou explain therefore the recent accord with the IMF? Is itdeteriorating economic conditions that forced this turnaboutor does it signal a change in your political approach to theWest?Sassou-Nguesso: No, we have never categorically opposedan IMF agreement. You may recall that in 1978 we came toterms with the IM?. What we said in 1985 was that ouranalysis of the econcmic situation revealed that by implement-ing our own internal measures, we could successfully lead thecountry to economic recovery. This was in June 1985. A fewmonths later, as you know, came this oil crisis: The price of oilnose-dived, and the value of the doJar dropped. These twofactors together produced an entirely new situation, leadingus to sign an agreenent with the IMF. But it is not the firstone. It is the second one. It is therefore not a change inapproach, but rather changing conditions that have justifiedthe signing of such a pact. We have acted today as we did in1978.Africa Report: Gilfen the drastic fall in the price of oil, what


measures have you taken to diversify the economy to preparethe country for the "post-oil" era? How has this affected theprojects initiated in the 1982-8(5 development plan?Sassou-Nguesso: This is the question. We believe that pre-cisely because of the unpredictable nature of oil revenues, wemust envisage a post-oil economy. We do not lack the meansto achieve such an objective. That is why during the course ofthe 19H2-198H development plan ending this year, we concen-trated our energies on developing basic infrastructure in therural areas. We have built many roads, bridges, and airports,extended the electricity network, and improved the country'stelecommunications. We have thus quietly begun to develop abasic infrastructure. Today, we believe that we can movetoward developing various productive sectors, particularly inagriculture, if certain preconditions are met.

We have good land, a lot of water, sunshine, and theworkforce required to relaunch our agricultural sector. Wehave vast woodland reserves with, for example, 20 millionhectares of forests. We have an ambitious reforestation pro-gram, as today we have produced nearly 25, (XX) hectares ofeucalyptus trees, which will allow us to manufacture paper.Thus the conditions exist in the country to prepare the econ-omy for the post-oil era.Africa Report: Your government has continued to espouseMarxism-Leninism as a guiding economic and political philoso-phy. Would it not be more accurate to say that on most eco-nomic issues, pragmatism has come to override the Congo-lese Labor Party's [FCT] ideological principles as evidencedby the austerity measures along capitalist lines adopted in thewell-publicized Structural Adjustment Program?Sassou-Nguesso: We do not intend to operate beyond thebounds of reality. You seem to be presenting Marxism a littlebit like a fetish, like a dogma. It is a science which is based onthe analysis of the realities of life. We analyze them contin-ually, and each time a situation presents itself, we analyze it

scientifically and make our decisions based on tliis situationwithout changing our primary orientation for the developmentof our society. Marxism is not a fetish, it is a social sciencewhich develops and which has a living existence.Africa Report: In this respect, you have accounted for thePCTs pragmatic approach in the past by arguing that Congo ispresently in the national democratic stage of its revolution,thereby laying the basis for socialism. In what way is Congoconcretely pursuing the strategy of scientific socialism? Andhow do you reply to skeptics who say that developing coun-tries are inevitably forced back along the capitalist paththrough the pressures of the world economy?Sassou-Nguesso: We say that we are presently in the na-tional democratic and popular stage of the revolution and con-sider this a period through which countries like ours that havesuffered from colonial domination and exploitation must nec-essarily pass. We have seen the creation of structures thatwere never meant for development but rather for exploitingthe riches of our countries. To attain socialism, it is necessaryto pass through this very delicate and difficult stage, but passthrough it we must, by adapting the structures to the realitiesof what actually exists.

When we say that in the course of this stage we will acceptthe coexistence of various sectors—a state sector, a mixedsector, a private sector, a cooperative sector—it reflects afull set of measures that we are taking that are connected tothe current stage of the national democratic and popular revo-lution—the stage which prepares the conditions necessaryfor socialism. But on this question one must not take a short-sighted approach, seeking blueprints, or drawing hasty con-clusions—that because we are doing this or that it means thatwe are already in the clutches of capitalism.

In any case, in Third World countries the capitalist optionhas not exactly been a resounding success. We can see hereand there horrible cases of misery in those countries that haveopted for capitalism. There is no model that has been a totalsuccess. I speak here of the Third World. Maybe one shouldnot draw immediate conclusions. Let's first allow peoples'lives to develop. History will be the judge.Africa Report: Have you got anything to add for our Ameri-can audience?Sassou-Nguesso: I would simply like to say that we ask theAmerican people to remember their own history. To recallthat their history is one of a people fighting for independence.They fought an intense struggle to create a multi-racial societywhich has given rights to all social and racial groups, andprovided them with civil and political freedoms.

The American people must remember that when theycame to Europe's rescue against Nazism and helped Europeto rebuild after World War II, the African continent made itsshare of sacrifices. Although monuments may not have beenerected in their memory, thousands of Africans died in thestruggle against Nazism. But today, Africa is confronted bythe problem of apartheid, and the economic situation is cata-strophic. So we hope that the American people will side withthe African people. I think the historical facts are there toshow that the American people do not lack the capacity to actin this way. That is my message. D


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High Hopes in HarareZimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe is widely credited with havinginjected a new dynamism into the Non-Aligned Movement following theeighth heads of state summit. During his tenure as chairman, southernAfrican issues are expected to take precedence in the organization'sagenda.

BY ANDREW MELDRUM

The unfolding South African revoltagainst apartheid was the central

focus for the Non-Aligned Movement's(NAM) eighth heads of state summit,dramatically held in Harare just a fewhundred miles from Pretoria.

A sensational appearance by LibyanCol. Muammar Qaddafy, the continuingconflict between Iran and Iraq, and the

Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist whohas been based in Zimbabwe for six years, reportson southern Africa forThe Guardian of London,Agence F ranee-Presse, and Voice of America.

storming of a hijacked airliner in Karacliiwhile Pakistani President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq was attending the summit all madeheadlines and temporarily took centerstage in Harare, but those events failedto divert the conference from its pri-mary task of considering the South Afri-can crisis.

There was some disappointment thatthe Harare summit did not commit the101 non-aligned countries to imposingsanctions against South Africa, but thenew Non-Aligned chairman, Zimbab-wean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe,

declared his satisfaction at the more lim-ited measures taken by the Harare sum-mit to support the anti-apartheid strug-gle. He said the summit increased theinternational momentum for sanctions.

"The focus really was on southern Af-rica," said Mugabe at the predawnpress conference to mark the end of theSeptember 1-7 summit. "There was noone who did not make reference toSouth Africa and the region. And we arevery pleased with the declarations andresolutions approved. We are delightedthat for the first time in the organization,

AFRICA REPORT* November-December 1986 59

we have emerged with a real, viableprogram of action."

Mugabe was referring to the creationof the Africa Fund to channel non-aligned donations of financial and mate-rial aid to southern Africa's majority-ruled frontline states to help themweather the spill-over effects of im-pending sanctions.

He cited the creation of the fund as"the most important achievement" ofthe Harare summit because it repre-sents "a bid now by the Non-AlignedMovement to work vigorously and pur-posefully in this region, to aid the front-line states and other countries thatmight need assistance in fighting apart-heid. . . Almost every area of concernhas been covered: roads, railways,transport, communications, and severalother areas including trade will all besupported by the Africa Fund to protectus from the adverse effects of sanctionsor of retaliation from South Africa."

Mugabe's high hopes for the fund aresomewhat qualified by the fact that nospecific pledges of money or materialgoods were announced during the sum-mit. Outgoing Non-Aligned chairman,Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, andZambian President Kenneth Kaunda willhead the fund, which is to work closelywith the Southern African DevelopmentCoordination Conference (SADCC), theorganization striving to make the ninemajority-ruled countries of southern Af-rica more economically independentfrom South Africa.

But practical steps to launch the fundhave begun as Indian Minister of Statefor Foreign Affairs Edward Faleirotoured the frontline states to study whatspecific assistance the non-alignedgroup could give to best help thosecountries.

The Harare Non-Aligned summit alsourged the United Nations to imposecomprehensive mandatory sanctionsagainst South Africa and criticized theWestern powers that have blocked suchaction by the world body.

Non-aligned members Zambia, Zim-babwe, and India, as well as Australia,the Bahamas, and Canada, dramaticallycommitted themselves to sanctionsweeks before the Non-Aligned meetingat the special Commonwealth mini-sum-mit in London at the beginning of Au-

gust. But the momentum toward sanc-tions faltered at the summit meetings ofthe six frontline states and nine SADCCmembers held in Luanda, Angola, just aweek before the Non-Aligned summit.

Both the frontline states—comprisedof Angola, Botswana, Mozambique,Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—andSADCC—-those six, plus Lesotho, Ma-lawi, and Swaziland—stopped short ofactually committing themselves to im-posing sanctions and instead "com-mended" and "endorsed" sanctions.There was some surprise that the moremilitant frontline states did not join Zim-babwe and Zambia in their sanctionsstand, but the moderated positionreached in Luanda exactly matched theNon-Aligned Movement's sanctions de-cision taken in Harare.

The non-aligned leaders reasonedthat they could not effectively imposesanctions against Pretoria without theparticipation of South Africa's mainWestern trading partners. In October,the United States Congress passed atough sanctions package, but theReagan administration remains opposedto sanctions and would certainly veto anew UN sanctions move. Other West-em governments remaining opposed toeffective sanctions are Britain and WestGermany.

To encourage those countries to altertheir opposition to punitive measures,the non-aligned leaders decided to senda delegation of foreign ministers to meetwith leaders of industrialized countriesin Bonn, London, Tokyo, and Washing-ton.

The Non-Aligned summit alsostrongly urged the two superpowers toagree to nuclear disarmament in the in-terests of world peace and called for theindustrialized countries to help bringabout a new world economic order. TheWorld Bank and the International Mone-tary Fund came under particular criti-cism for their economic dictates to ThirdWorld countries.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro, a previousNon-Aligned chairman, reiterated hiscall for Third World countries to simplycancel their huge debts, but the final ec-onomic document suggested that in-debted countries follow the proposal ofPeru's president, Alan Garcia, to limittheir debt payments to a selected per-

Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe"has let it be known that he intends to bean activist Non-Aligned leader"

centage, ranging from 10 to 30 percentof their annual foreign exchange earn-ings.

Of course, of the 49 heads of statewho attended the Harare summit andaddressed the meeting, virtually all ofthem attacked the apartheid system inneighboring South Africa and praisedthe efforts to topple the Pretoria gov-ernment. But it was two South Africanspeakers who caught everyone's atten-tion and focused the issues at stake inthe current anti-apartheid unrest: Afri-can National Congress (ANC) PresidentObver Tambo and the Rev. AllanBoesak, a patron of the United Demo-cratic Front (UDF), South Africa's larg-est legal anti-apartheid movement.

At a packed press conference at thestart of the summit, Tambo forcefullyurged both the West and specifically the


NAM countries to impose sanctionsagainst South Africa. He argued thatsanctions imposed by African and non-aligned countries could be effective,even if they were not joined by the bigWestern economic powers.

"I earnestly appeal to this historic as-sembly of the leaders of two-thirds ofmankind to join in action," said Tambo."Otherwise, Zambia and Zimbabwe willstand alone and exposed" to possible re-taliation from South Africa.

Although the summit did not meetTambo's call for sanctions and althoughhe never directly addressed the sum-mit, the Harare assembly was seen as asuccess for the ANC. Tambo wassought after for private meetings withthe heads of state, particularly fromLatin America and Asian countries thathad not previously paid much attentionto the ANC.

A carefully worded and articulatespeaker, Tambo made strong impres-

sions upon non-aligned leaders. He gavea characteristically considered responseto a question about the use in South Afri-ca's townships by anti-apartheid youthsof the "necklace" form of killing,whereby a petrol-soaked tire around thevictim's neck is set on fire to burn theperson to death.

"We would rather there is no neck-lace, this is a hint," said Tambo, some-what distancing himself from the grue-some form of execution and apparentlysending a message to those in South Af-rica to discourage its use. But Tamborefused to denounce those using thenecklace. "The necklace is a recent ap-pearance, it coincides with a period ofextreme brutality by the governmentagainst the people. . . its cause is apart-heid. "

He said that the ANC could not con-demn the necklace killings of suspectedgovernment collaborators or other anti-apartheid violence such as landminesand explosions because those in SouthAfrica battling apartheid were operatingagainst tremendous odds. Other ANCofficials pointed out at the summit thatthe number of necklace deaths are un-der 150, while more than 2, (XX) blackshave been killed in the past two years ofunrest, most of them by police.

Tambo also expressed a willingnessto meet with top officials of the Britishand American governments, butwarned them not to try to divide theANC into two camps, those who aremembers of the South African Commu-nist Party and those who are not. "Weare all members of the ANC and wehave one goal, to end apartheid," saidTambo.

Shortly after the summit, Tambo metin London with British Foreign Secre-tary Sir Geoffrey Howe. He was alsoexpected to meet U.S. Secretary ofState George Shultz during his tour ofsouthern Africa, solidifying the wide-spread belief that no serious negotia-tions about a settlement in South Africaare possible without the ANC.

The rival black nationalist movement,the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), wasalso quite visible at the summit, repre-sented by its new chairman, JohnsonMlambo. Zimbabwe newspapersquoted the PAC leader as saying that theorganization would seek full member-

ship status in the Non-Aligned, like thePalestine Liberation Organization andthe South West Africa People's Organi-zation. But the Non-Aligned Movementwould have to grant dual membershipfor South Africa, and was not eager togive such status to both the ANC andPAC. In any case, the ANC announced itwould not seek membership and nomore was heard about the PAC's bid.

"The non-alignedleaders reasoned thatthey could noteffectively imposesanctions againstPretoria without theparticipation of SouthAfrica's main Westerntrading partners."

Robert Mugabe had personally in-vited South African church leaderBoesak to Harare to impress upon theleaders how crucial and strategic a mo-ment it is for the international commu-nity to increase its support for the peo-ple's revolt against apartheid.

Although strict NAM regulations for-bid any non-head of state from address-ing the summit, Mugabe held a specialdinner where Boesak used his well-known oratory skills to describe theSouth African people's battle against op-pression, visibly moving several headsof state, according to those present.

Boesak brought eyewitness descrip-tions from South Africa of violenceagainst blacks at a funeral of 15 peoplekilled by police during rent protests inSoweto. "One does not have to be aprophet to see that violence will esca-late," said Boesak.

"Every single act that the govern-ment does is almost calculated to makethe level of tension rise in the town-ships. The anger of the people will growmore and more, because this funeral hasalready given rise to another and so willthe funeral tomorrow and the funeralnext week."

Boesak told the non-aligned leadersthat the current state of emergency hadattempted to assert the Pretoria gov-


emment's authority over the town-ships, but that was "very shallow andextremely short-term."

"The violence will not end becauseapartheid still exists," said Boesak."The people know the governmentwould rather kill our children than giveup white people's over-privileged posi-tion of economic and political power. He-cause we know that, there will alwaysbe more violence."

Like Oliver Tambo, Allan Boesakurged the Non-Aligned Movement totake concrete steps to help the currentstruggle. Boesak said that the South Af-rican courts had ordered him not tospeak about sanctions, but speaking forthe people of South Africa, the anti-apartheid crusader said, "What we arelooking for is not yet another statement.Whatever the non-aligned leaders comeup with, the most important thing is thatthey make it stick, can they carry itthrough? Will they be determinedenough to understand that the time fortalking tough about South Africa, thetime for making statements full of moralindignation is finally and definitelyover?"

The Non-Aligned Movement, whichcelebrated its 25th anniversary at theHarare summit, has been known mostlyas a forum for its Third World membersto air their views about international af-fairs and their criticisms of the worldeconomic order, but not as a body takingaction on any particular issue. TheHarare summit challenged the Non-Aligned Movement to move beyond itslong-stated opposition to apartheid andgive tangible assistance to the anti-apartheid forces.

The effectiveness of the NAM's re-sponse to that challenge to a large ex-tent depends on new Chairman RobertMugabe, who must turn the declara-tions and funds for southern African intomeaningful action.

Mugabe has already let it be knownthat he intends to be an activist Non-Aligned leader, not only on the questionof South Africa, but in reshaping the or-ganization's operations and decision-making process.

At the close of the summit, Mugabeannounced his intention to put the Non-Aligned Movement on a more formal ba-sis and to drastically change the organi-

Cuban leader Fidel Castro (with AngolanPresident Jose Eduardo dos Santos) "re-iterated his call for Third World countriesto simply cancel their huge debts"

zation's mode of operation by using ma-jority voting and creating a permanentsecretariat.

Mugabe said that because the Non-Aligned has grown so, the tradition ofreaching consensus to make decisionshas become unwieldy. He cited the ex-ample of the disagreement on whatcountry should host the next NAM sum-mit in 1989. Nicaragua had the strong-est bid for the honor, which would in-clude taking over the chairmanship fromMugabe, but total agreement could notbe reached, so the decision was post-poned until the foreign ministers meet in1988. But then, the close of the Hararemeeting was delayed for 10 hours as noconsensus could be reached over whereto hold the foreign ministers' meeting.

North Korea had long been the favor-ite to hold that meeting, but six West-ern-leaning countries blocked that deci-sion at the last moment. Finally, Cyprus

was agreed upon as the site for themeeting.

Mugabe said such long-winded wran-gles among the 101 members could beavoided by using a two-thirds majorityfor important NAM decisions. Such achange in policy would be a dramaticshift for the Non-Aligned which has al-ways prided itself on getting all mem-bers to agree on decisions.

But Mugabe would argue that theconsensus style of decision-making hasmade the NAM less decisive. And hewould also argue that running the NAMwithout a permanent secretariat makesthe body less effective. He has alreadyannounced that Zimbabwe will staff asmall secretariat.

With Robert Mugabe tackling suchstructural problems, it seems clear thathe will also manage the Non-AlignedMovement to make the most of theHarare summit declarations concerningSouth Africa and southern Africa, par-ticularly in the creation of an Africa fundthat will channel meaningful financial andmaterial aid to the frontline states facinga belligerent South Africa. •


Press

Joe ThloloeFeatures Editor,the SowetanA leading South African journalistdescribes the draconian restrictionsimposed upon reporters by the stateof emergency and comments on therole of the press in the struggleagainst apartheid. •ikfe

FRONT PAGE COMMENT

Our lawyerstell us we can

say almostnothing critical

about theEmergency

Butwe'll try:

r\K BOTHA. IM Minister of Furcign AIT«irs.lold US television sudnni.es thii »t tk Hut [heSum! African press remained free.

They considered our pubLicanim subversive.• !f il ii subversive la s p n t oul tgiins!

^ ^ H , we plead Buillj.• I f II ia subversive [o expire, cincffra about

M ^ ^ K , w victO guilty•K it ii subversive 10 bclie-ve ihtt there are

benei ionics 10 puce fton ihe artMMMk wo -ple*d guift*.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Coutd you tell us a bit about what it is like tobe a black journalist in .South Africa today, using your owncareer as an example?Thloloe: I started journalism in 1961 on the Bantu World.From there, I worked for various newspapers inside SouthAfrica—the Rand Daily Mail, Golden City Post, Drum maga-zine. It's been a very long career. At the moment, I amfeatures editor on the Sowetan.

The first time I got into trouble with the South Africanauthorities was in 1960 when the anti-pass campaign wascalled by the Pan Africanist Congress. I participated in thatcampaign and was convicted. I spent nine months in 1960inside jail. When I was released, I matriculated and then joinedthe newspapers. The next time I got into trouble was in 1976.At the time, I was president of the Union of Black Journalists[UBJ]. Following the events of June 16 of that year, we hadpublished a magazine with journalists' first-person accounts ofwhat they had seen on June 16. Although some of the stuff hadbeen published before, it had a lot of impact put together. Ithink that edition of the UBJ bulletin was very frightening tothe government because they banned it and they locked us up.I was put under "preventative detention" from the first ofSeptember until Christmas day in 1976. They were prevent-ing me from doing harm to myself!

Then on the first of March the following year, 1977, I wasback in jail. This time I was held under Section 6 of the Terror-ism Act, for 18 months in solitary confinement. I was interro-gated as they wanted information that they believed I had.Then on my release, I went to work for the Transvaal Post.The UBJ and the World had been banned in October 1977,while I was in jail. But the same staff that had produced the

World was now producing the Post, so it was a change of nameonly—the staff was the same, the contents of the paper weremore or less the same, only a little more restrained because ofwhat had happened to the World. We continued functioning ina new union, the Media Workers Association of South Africa(Mwasa). In 1980, Mwasa held the first newspaper strike inSouth Africa, when we closed down the Post for the durationof the strike, as well as the black editions of major whitepapers. It was mainly a strike over pay and on recognition ofthe union, and management in the end agreed to pay increasesand to recognize Mwasa. Fortunately, we were having verygood relations with management up until this point.

But then the state decided to intervene. First they told theArgus management that its registration had lapsed during theduration of the strike. But even if it had not lapsed, they werein fact going to ban the Post, so the Argus managementshouldn't try to revive it. That was the first action they took.Next, they picked on the leadership of Mwasa and clamped uswith three banning orders. These were people like ZwelakheSisulu, Mathatha Tsedu—all of us were banned, confined toour townships, not allowed to work for our newspapers, notallowed to attend meetings, not allowed to be on newspaperpremises, not allowed to be in factories. We were confined toour houses from 6 pm to 6 am during the week, and thenweekends from Friday night until Monday. It was a bizarreway of living.

While we were banned, Mathatha Tsedu and I were ar-rested again under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, in June1982. After a process of detention and solitary confinement,eventually in November they charged me and a few otherchaps with terrorism. Then in April 1983, we were convictedof furthering the aims of the Pan Africanist Congress [PAC].The actual charge was that I was found in possession of a PAC


pamphlet, and I was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. Istarted serving the sentence in April 1983, but on appeal, itwas discovered that we were convicted under a law thatwasn't in existence at the time our crimes were supposed tohave been committed. So I was released in January 1984. Atthis point, our banning orders had lapsed so I went back towork for the Sowetan, where I'm still working. Hopefully theywon't send me back to prison.Africa Report: How is it working as a black journalist underthe current press restrictions?Thloloe: The first few days of the current state of emer-gency were very frustrating. We'd walk around the office withlong faces not knowing what to do and what not to do. But aswe are getting used to the regulations, it has become a veryexciting game. It's a game of Russian roulette—to see how faryou can go without breaking the law. Most of our staff hasdeveloped a sixth sense—you feel something might be wrongwith a particular story, so you pick up the phone and you readit to the lawyers. They are on tap 24 hours a day since theemergency regulations started. We always try to push to thelimit, and fortunately for us, they are also into this game ofhow far you can push. In a way, it has become fun. But as Isaid, initially it was very depressing.

I remember when it started, we wanted to comment on thestate of emergency—was it necessary, would it achieve whatthey hoped, were they trying to throw a red herring instead oflooking at the actual problems? Because we couldn't commentunfavorably on the emergency regulations, we felt we had toleave a blank space, to signify our protest. We did the samething with pictures. Where we felt we could have used a goodpicture showing what was happening in the townships, we lefta blank space.

But after a week or two, there was a meeting of editors andthe top brass of the police, and our editor was told that theblank spaces that he was leaving in the paper were subver-sive, and would he mind stopping that practice. The wordsubversive is a catchall phrase—anything they don't like in thepaper they say is subversive. So when he came back, he wentto the others and said, "The police are saying these whitespaces are subversive. Do you agree with them?" We said,"Of course the police are talking nonsense." But the problemis that this question will not be tested in a court of law. Theywill merely seize copies of the daily paper or they will suspendpublication of the paper for the duration of the state of emer-gency. So we were advised to stop using these blank spaces,because of the risks involved. So that is the kind of game weare involved in.

Recently, the English-language papers in the country tookthe government to court because they believed that the emer-gency regulations made it almost impossible to publish. Theywon a few concessions, but these are meaningless because inthe end, the government ministers can go back to their desksand write up new regulations, so these victories are merelypyrrhic. One of the victories of this court case was that thecourt said that it was ridiculous that journalists could be keptout of unrest areas. After the initial decision, journalists wentback into unrest areas during the period of grace they hadgotten from the courts. But all the government did was to go

back and rewrite the regulations to keep journalists out.We had a very i iteresting problem when the regulations

were first promulgated. Our sports editor went out to inter-view a football pla> er in Soweto. The editor himself lives inSoweto; he had come into the office to do his normal diary andhe was going back to interview this chap. He came to a policeroadblock and he was turned back because he was a journalist.He was told that journalists were not allowed inside Soweto.He said, "No, I live in Soweto, I woke up in Soweto thismorning." They sad that was for reasons other than report-ing, but now he w< nted to go in as a reporter, therefore hecouldn't. So he came back to the office and we sent off a telexto the Bureau for Information trying to get clarification on whythis man had been turned back, because the impression wehad was that the oily thing we were not allowed to do wasreport on the unre< t. Then shortly after, the women's editorwent into the township and she was also turned back. I per-sonally got very fur ous and picked up the phone and called thebureau. The guy who answered was very cheerful—"Howare you, Mr. Thloloe?" So I explained the problem, and hechanged his tone <nd said: "If you read regulation 7-1C inconjunction with something else, you will understand whythey were turned back. Good day, Mr. Thloloe."

So, I phoned the lawyers and asked what these regulationsmeant and I was toll that Soweto had been declared an unrestarea and as a result no journalist could get into the township,whatever stories tiey were reporting—whether a footballmatch or a funeral It took us aboJt a week to get all thatreversed, because all the things we were publishing at thetime were illegal. Fortunately, they didn't close us down forthat. But in the end, they realized that this was ridiculous andso they said we could go in and do stories other than unreststories, which must come from the Bureau of Information, notfrom any other source.Africa Report: Wiat effects are all these restrictions havingon how people understand what is going on inside South Af-rica? Is the news getting out in any qualitative way, or is it so


"Soweto had been declared an unrest area and as a result nojournalist could get into the township"

filtered that we really don't see the true picture of what ishappening?Thloloe: I think it's controlled both for the foreign media aswell as for us. In fact, the media in South Africa is losingcredibility because of the restrictions. We're now getting tothe point where people rely more on word-of-mouth storiesthan on what is published in the newspapers. And this isfanning rumors, fanning what the government is trying tostop. I suppose a development from this is that people aregoing to resort to pamphlets, to underground newspapers,etc. It hasn't reached that point yet, but it's definitely com-ing—where people would rather inform each other than relyon newspapers. In fact, the circulation of black newspapershas taken quite a knock because of the regulations.Africa Report: How are the restrictions affecting how theworld views what's going on in South Africa?Thloloe: What I have noticed in my short visit to the U.S. isthat people are becoming more sensitive to what is happeningin South Africa. The stories that come out with little logossaying that they have been censored—that's much more ef-fective than if the true story is told. So it's having exactly theopposite effect to what the government intended. Our gov-ernment is always working in this type of circular atmos-phere—what they intend doing does exactly the opposite.Africa Report: Much is made in this country of the principleof the "objectivity" of the press. Can South African journalistsreally be "objective" given what is going on in the country?Thloloe: When journalists get very bored, they talk aboutobjectivity and fairness! Hut any practicing journalist will tellyou it's not possible to be objective—you always write from aperspective, from a particular angle. In South Africa, the linesare very clearly drawn. You either write or broadcast from theoppressor's perspective, or from the perspective of the op-pressed. It's a very simple choice. We are in this very difficultposition that we have very few publications that are actually

controlled by blacks. The paper I work for, for instance, isowned by a white company, the biggest newspaper companyin the country. They allow us to be to the left of most of theirnewspapers because of the audience we're addressing—theblacks in the townships.

But we cannot go to the point where we actually choose oursides. We would prefer to come out much more openly andsay we are on the side of the oppressed. But the people whoown us, the Argus, think of what the advertisers will do. Theyare always saying that the advertisers will pull away if we getmore radical than we are. They are always worried aboutwhat the government will do to the paper and how much theywill lose. They always tell you of what happened to the Worldand the Post, and how much money they lost as a result ofthose closures. We don't have the latitude to say what wewant to say. We try to push ourselves to the limit within thesystem, but we know we can't say what we want to. But onthe other hand, the people who are on the side of the oppres-sor decide what goes into the papers. So we are being bom-barded all the time with what the oppressor wants.Africa Report: A South African observer once commentedthat the white liberal press had lionized Desmond Tutu, AllanBoesak, and Beyers Naude as the leaders of black SouthAfricans by virtue of always giving them the publicity, to theexclusion of other leaders within the black community, andthat in turn affects how the average person views who are theleaders of the community. Do you think it's true that the SouthAfrican press can almost outline political options?Thloloe: In fact, it has done that to a very large extent. Theliberal press has picked on the United Democratic Front[UDF] to back. The choice is between the Afrikaner presswhich will push Buthelezi and homeland leaders—whateverthe government picks—and the English-language paperswhich pick the UDF. And there aren't any other newspapers.There isn't any other media that is controlled by blacks. That'sthe major problem. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy—so-and-so is the leader, this organization is the organization, andthey sing the same tune so often that people then begin sing-ing it—a whole big public relations exercise.Africa Report: In the U.S., we hear very little about theblack consciousness groups, for example. On the other hand,apologists for apartheid say that the black community in SouthAfrica is so divided that there is no way everyone can uniteunder a common cause. Are these alleged divisions in theblack community artificially created or are they a serious mat-ter?

"We're now getting to the pointwhere people rely more onword-of-mouth stories than on whatis published in the newspapers. Andthis is fanning rumors, fanning whatthe government is trying to stop."

Thloloe: I don't think the divisions are as serious as they aremade out to be. The black consciousness organizations and


the UDF have more or less the same objectives—they wantto see the creation of a non-racial society. They are bothvaguely socialist. The major difference comes over tactics.The black consciousness organizations say that all our livesare run by whites—that's the essence of apartheid. You go towork—your supervisor is going to be a white man. You go intoeducation—your inspector will be a white man. So they arealways in a position of control, while blacks are outside thatpower position. Therefore, if we create our own organiza-tions, we should not transfer into them the same structures.This is a chance for people to learn how to run their own lives.If you invite a white man to become secretary of a trade union,you are robbing a black man of the chance to learn how to run atrade union. You will appoint the white man because he ismore efficient, he's better educated, he's got expertise,etc. —obviously good reasons for doing so. But the point isthat the black man in that union is dependent on that whiteman, so you've transferred the power structures from societyinto your own organizations. So, black consciousness says weshould do our own thing without any white participation. Wecan go and ask for assistance from whites where we need it,but let us show some measure of independence.

The UDF position would be that there are some whiteswho are as committed to black liberation as blacks and weshould already anticipate our future—where we will be choos-ing people on merit and not on color. It sounds like a very fairargument, except that the people who come into this non-racial enclave are at different levels and the most powerfulpeople in that group will always be the whites. They come inwith the money and the expertise, not at the ordinary level.Take the trade unions, for example. I don't believe there areany white blue-collar workers who are members of Cosatu,but there are whites who are organizers and secretaries. Soessentially that is the basic argument. One group believes itsmethod will take us to liberation much faster than the other.But both intend getting to the same place. These divisions arebeing magnified by the press to the point where people forgetto look at their similarities and look more and more to theirdifferences. That is why we get these inter-organizationalfights.

Africa Report: Such as in the unions?Thloloe: They are still along the two lines—those that be-lieve in black consciousness and those that believe in the UDFtype of non-racialism. Again, the unions are a very good ba-rometer of people's thinking. Cosatu has the largest numberof members, but these figures are inflated by the NationalUnion of Minewurkers. If you remove the National Union of

Mineworkers, yoi have an even balance between the blackconsciousness uni >ns and the non-racial unions. But if youread the press every day, you will get the impression that it isonly those people who support the UDF or the FreedomCharter who are dominating the country, and that they arebeing projected as the only viable group in the country. It isnot true. Again it s the creation of the press.Africa Report: You have written quite extensively on theunions. Do you thir ik that in the coming year, they will becomemore involved in )ressing the veiy basic political issues inSouth Africa through work stoppages, etc.—or will they fo-cus more on resol/ing shop floor issues?Thloloe: I don't think they will be tied to what is happening onthe shop floor for a simple reason: I might get a two randincrease at work, but that doesn't affect the way my life isbeing run. At the workplace, we find there is more and moretalk of integration. :iut what in fact is happening is that there isa shortage of white skilled labor. Whites are being pushed upmuch faster. As tl ey are being pushed up, blacks are beingput in to replace them. The dividing line is still there, but it'smoving upwards. '1 'his gives the illusion that there is change atthe workplace, but there really isn't. The more you try to fightthat dividing line, the more you realize that it is tied into whatis happening in s<x iety generally. It is very frustrating. As Isaid, you get a tw> > or three rand increase at work. You goback to the township and find you are living under exactly thesame conditions, the people that control your life are still thesame people. So y >u start questioning the whole system.Africa Report: Do you envision more strikes, more of theunions flexing their political muscle in the larger political sceneas the situation becomes more untenable?Thloloe: Yes, I think so. Their advantage is that they havecoherent communication systems so that they are able to takedecisions much more easily than the political organizations. Asit is now, almost all the major political organizations have beenhit very hard by the emergency regulations. But the unionsare still functioning and are still able to take decisions, so thatthey will be used more and more in mass strikes, etc.Africa Report: rbw do average black South Africans viewAmerican policy at i his time? Even though the Reagan admin-istration is claiming it wants to talk 1:0 the black leadership, isthe U. S. so discredi ted at this point that people would just say,"What for? Why should we talk to you?"Thloloe: I think Ar lerican policy is very unpopular as of now.We get Americans visiting and the foreign journalist asks totalk to us. It's a diffii ult decision to agree to talk to that person.But at the governm nt level, lines are clearly drawn—nobodyis going to talk to any member of the American government.America has never been as unpopular as it is now and it'sgrowing. It will cortinue growing as long as Americans sup-port Savimbi and Anericans are seen to be supporting whiteSouth Africa, and as long as they continue to invest in what wesee to be the past of our country and not in the future. If I werean American, I woi Id cut all ties wilJi the South African gov-ernment, even to the point of cutting ties with Savimbi andactively supporting the liberation organizations—because Iwould then be inves ing in the future; of the country. That's theonly thing that coul i restore the credibility of America. •


Kenya

"Hear No Evil"President Daniel arap Moi's efforts to clamp down on internal dissent mayhave backfired, as underground opposition to his rule continues to grow.Increasing social inequities, along with abuses of power, are fueling fearsfor Kenya's political future.

BY MICHAEL MAREN

Last July, Joseph Munyao, an MPfrom Kenya's Maehakos District,

complained in Parliament that thugswere roaming the countryside aroundMaehakos, robbing, beating, and some-times killing people. His constituentswere living in fear, he told his col-leagues, and 20 to 30 victims of theseattacks were arriving at the hospital ev-ery day.

Michael Maren is a freelance journalist andformer assistant editor of Africa Report. He hasrecently returned from a visit to Kenya, where helived from 1977-1981.

Several weeks later, President Dan-iel arap Moi spoke in Maehakos and de-clared that it was not possible that 20 to30 people were dying every day. Stand-ing on the same dais with Munyao, Moireprimanded the MP for "causing unjus-tified alarm" and threatened to have himtossed out of KANU, the country's onlypolitical party.

The next day, a humbled Munyao is-sued a public apology to President Moi:"He is my president and I have a lot ofrespect for him. . . I have never doneanything to annoy him. 1 would like toapologize to him personally and to thenation at large. . . I have no other presi-

dent. My president is Daniel arapMoi. . . I have never dreamt of servingany other person."

Thus another debate on public policywas closed in Kenya.

In similar fashion, the government inrecent years has silenced voices whichcomplained about famine, landlessness,and poverty. It seems to matter little tothe government that the crime spreethat Munyao spoke of continues in Ma-ehakos or that the streets of Nairobi arebecoming crowded with the poor andlandless. Rather it appears that Kenya'srulers are intent on sustaining the illu-sion of peace and prosperity and on deal-ing harshly with anyone who might sug-gest tliat things are otherwise.

Had Munyao not issued his grovelingapology, his political career would havebeen finished—and, as it is, he hasplaced himself in danger of becoming apolitical nonentity in Kenya. But Mu-nyao could have also found himself join-ing the ranks of Kenyan MPs who havehad to flee the country in recent years,fearing for their lives after saying thingsthat the government found unaccepta-ble.

The most recent politician to go intoexile is Koigi Wamwere who fled thecountry in September. Wamwere, aformer MP, charged that his defeat inthe last parliamentary election was aresult of fraud and that he had been har-assed by government officials in hishome Nakuru District ever since. FromNorway he wrote a letter to Kenya'sWeekly Review, claiming that he hadbeen under close police surveillance andfeared that the government planned to"liquidate" him because he used to"speak the truth in Parliament on behalfof the voiceless poor."

AFRICA REPORT* November-December 1986 67

Wannvviv had been declined twicebefore, most recently following the1982 attempted coup, and had been as-sociated with dissident members of Par-liament, all of whom have since lost theirseats, live in exile, or remain in Kenyaon the condition that they keep theiropinions to themselves.

But the country's hear-no-evil ap-proach to dealing with problems has be-gun to backfire. In the past, Kenyanscould count on the occasional dissidentvoice to be raised in Parliament to speakfor the interests of the poor and to chal-lenge the edicts of the president and hisministers. Hut under Moi, the Parlia-ment, always greatly limited in its politi-cal power, is slowly being drained of thelast vestiges of its influence. And now,robbed of any outlets for their manygrievances, Kenyans are beginning tolook to dissidents outside of govern-ment for leadership.

The most recent manifestation of thatdissent has emerged in the Mwakenyamovement. Mwakenya, a Swahili acro-nym for the Patriotic Front for the Lib-eration of Kenya, first came to the pub-lic's attention last March when the gov-ernment announced the arrests ofseveral lecturers and dissidents, charg-ing them with membership in an under-ground organization and of possessingor distributing the organization's publi-cation, Mpatanishi (Swahili for "The Ar-biter").

The government decided to deal withMwakenya openly in an attempt to rallypublic support against the organization.Past experience had taught them thatthe Kenyan people had little sympathyfor the self-labeled intellectuals andwould-be liberators who periodicallyarose to challenge the government.

To (he chagrin of the Mobil Oil Corpora-tion, Moi changed the name of the company toKobil"

Newspapers printed politicians' per-functory denunciations of the move-ment and chronicled the daily arrests ofdissidents linked to the underground orof people who were found in possessionof Mpatanishi.

A railway clerk was arrested andcharged with attempting to sabotage atrain. In another case, a government ag-ricultural officer and two universitygraduates were charged with trying toderail a freight train.

In court, the three were defiant.There was no public admission of guiltor open displays of regret that had beenusually associated with such arrests.The newspapers, which had been cov-ering the detentions and trials all along,printed the dissidents' challenge to thecourt: "We did not commit any criminaloffenses. Those targets were selectedby our guerrilla commanders in our de-clared warfare."

"Under Moi, theParliament, alwaysgreatly limited in itspolitical power, isslowly being drained ofthe last vestiges of itsinfluence."

The list of detainees continued togrow, reflecting the sweeping and in-creasingly arbitrary manner in whichKenya's secret police, known as theSpecial Branch, were doing their jobs.Instead of the usual collection of univer-

sity lecturers and professional dissi-dents, the rolls of the arrested includedGathoga Kihara, a farmer charged withpossession of Mpatanishi; David Muto-nya, a district information officer; DavidMzirai, an engineer; and StanleyMburu, a bank employee. This is Ken-ya's middle class, the people on whomthe government once counted for sup-port.

And there was something else thatmade Mwakenya unique: Thereseemed to be no single ethnic group atits center. "This is the first truly nationalresistance movement I've seen," said aWestern diplomat.

The organization continued printingits seditious literature, once littering thestreets of Nyeri town with pamphletsand another time delivering a copy toeach MP's mailbox in the Parliamentbuilding. The public began to see themas Robin Hoods rather than as traitorsand the publicity given to the arrestsbecame a testimony to the scope of themovement rather than to the strength ofthe government.

In June, the government reversed itsstrategy and declared an end to public-discussion about Mwakenya. Moi can-celled all public meetings that werescheduled on a national holiday on theflimsy pretext that attendance at theseevents would keep farmers away fromtheir fields at a time when they shouldbe planting. Moi also warned foreigndiplomats and journalists about "spread-ing rumors," and hinted that Mwakenyawas under foreign control.

The government's attempt to portrayMwakenya as a small and isolated or-ganization has failed miserably. "Thegovernment gave the dissidents theirbiggest boost by publicizing the move-ment in the first place," a Western diplo-mat in Nairobi said. "I guess that thereare probably a thousand core membersof the organization and hundreds ofthousands of sympathizers."

But despite all the excitement, verylittle is known about Mwakenya. Theorganization is divided into cells alongthe lines of Kenya's anti-colonial MauMau movement. Members take bloodoaths and never meet in large groups.Even if one cadre were to talk to thepolice, he couldn't know the names ofmore than a few others. Although the


government claims to have detainedMwakenya's leaders, there is no way itcan be sure of who they are.

"As there is no conflictof interest law inKenya, it is legal forpoliticians to engage inbusiness if they wantto—and all of them do."

Mwakenya is a descendent of a groupthat was known as the DecemberTwelfth Movement, or DTM after thedate that Kenya was granted indepen-dence from Great Britain. Like Mwake-nya, DTM made its presence felt pri-marily through its publication, Pam-bana, from 1982-84. Its ideas and goalswere identical to those of Mwakenya's,and many of its leaders are now proba-bly behind the Mwakenya movement—but DTM never had any real public sup-port.

But Mwakenya is operating in achanged environment. The ranks ofKenya's poor and landless are swellingwhile the blatant accumulation of vastfortunes by the country's ruling elitemakes a mockery of the government'sunkept promises of assistance.

When Moi became president afterthe death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, helaunched a drive to rid the country ofcorruption. Political prisoners were re-leased and Kenyatta's corrupt cadreswere run out of government. In the nextelections, some unpopular politicianswho were perennial winners were de-feated. It seemed like the dawn of a newera in Kenya. People began to speakopenly about politics; politicians beganexpressing opinions; and newspapersstarted offering some lively commen-tary. At one point, university studentseven staged a pro-Moi march throughthe streets of Nairobi.

But that lasted for less than twoyears. Once Kenyatta's loyalists weresafely out of the way, Moi's populistrhetoric faded. He began building hisown empire, putting his people into keygovernment positions and allowingthem to begin amassing private for-

THE CASE OF SALIM LONE

When I arrived in Nairobi to research this article, I went to visit Salim Lone, aKenyan journalist I'd met in New York. Lone had been living in the U.S. and

working for the UN since 1982 when he left Kenya in the wake of the sweeping ar-rests which preceded the August 1982 attempted coup. Lone returned to Kenya tovisit his family last July after receiving assurances from senior Kenyan officials thatit was safe to do so.

I went to the apartment building where Lone was staying and asked a young womanin the office for the number of his apartment. "He is not here," she said softly, hereyes scanning the open spaces behind me.

"What do you mean? Has he gone out for a short time or left for good?" But itwas already clear from the look on her face that Lone had not just gone out forbreakfast.

They came for him in the morning," she whispered.I went up to Lone's apartment and discovered who " the/ were. The man who

greeted me at the door was tall and well-dressed. Behind him, I could see two othermen rifling through the apartment, searching through books and overturning seatcushions. It was the Special Branch.

"What do you want?" the man demanded, trying to block my view of the rest ofthe apartment with his body.

"Sorry, wrong apartment," I said, and hurried away.Although Kenya's Special Branch had detained over 100 people since the rise of

Mwakenya, they had never gone so far as to grab someone holding a UN passportor with as many friends outside of the country. Through his previous work and cur-rent job as press spokesman for the UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa,Lone had gotten to know many international journalists, and word about his deten-tion quickly reached New York where the story was published in papers across the U.S.

The UN vigorously protested his detention and for the first time, the Kenyan govern-ment was under intense pressure from the international media to release one of itsdetainees.

After two days of relentless interrogation, Lone was freed and advised to leavethe country immediately. Back in New York, he learned while listening to the BBCthat his government had taken one more action against him: In an unprecedentedmove, the Kenyan authorities had revoked his citizenship. Lone found himself a manwithout a country.

Although he cannot exactly be regarded as a friend of the Kenyan government,Lone is not an active opposition spokesman and can hardly be classified a dissi-dent. In Kenya, he was best known for publishing controversial articles in Viva, awomen's magazine he edited. He cut through the thin veneer of official governmentpositions, often giving coverage to "unpopular" politicians such as Koigi Wamwereand reporting the Kenyan army massacre of Somali children in the eastern townof Garrisa.

It was not what Lone said that annoyed Kenyan officials, but what he saw andreported. He never advocated the overthrow of the government nor did he ever directlyattack any of Kenya's leaders. But he had alienated enough of the country's rulingelite to give him good reason to fear for his freedom in 1982.

Lone chooses his words carefully when speaking to the press about Kenya. Hehas been advised to limit his comments to his own case, and says little about theinternal situation that led to his arrest. "I deny that I have ever been disloyal, thoughsome of my political views do not coincide with the government's —and that wasreflected in my journalistic work" he said.

While in detention, Lone was drilled about his political positions and was askedto characterize them. "I told them that I considered my views to be nationalist," he said.

He says that he was fairly well-treated in detention, although never informed ofthe charges against him and refused permission to make a phone call.

Lone has retained a lawyer to contest the withdrawal of his citizenship. "I cannotbelieve that the law allows for the revocation of a Kenyan's citizenship without dueprocess," he protested. The right to citizenship is one of the most deeply cherishedof the basic human rights, and I will struggle to have it restored."

Lone is the first Kenyan to have that right revoked for political reasons. Evendissidents like Ngugi wa Thiongo who openly advocate the overthrow of the govern-ment are still citizens. Perhaps the government was gambling that taking away citizen-ship from Lone, who is of Asian descent, would prove popular at a time when thegovernment is again blaming Asians for many of the country's problems. Alternatively,it may have been a way of saving face after having shown the bad judgment to ar-rest him in the first place.

Whatever the case, the government appears to be shooting in the dark in its at-tempt to smother the growing dissent in the country. Despite the high-level assurancesof safety he received, Lone's arrest is another example of the extraordinary powersthat are being accrued by the Special Branch. In Kenya's current political climate,Lone's appeal for the reinstatement of his citizenship is not likely to succeed. It maybe a long time before Salim Lone goes home again. —MM,


Homeless boys »n Meru burning cardboard to keep warm The ranks of Kenya's poor and landless are swelling

tunes. When voices were raised in pro-test, Moi silenced them.

That process was temporarily slowedby the failed coup attempt of 1982. Theabortive attempt by Air Force NCOscame at a time when corruption and de-tentions of political dissidents wereagain on the rise in Kenya. The coupattempt sent a shock through govern-ment officials who couldn't help but no-tice the enthusiastic support given tothe rebels by Nairobi's urban poor.

But those lessons seem to have beenforgotten in four short years. In the pastyear alone, President Moi and his busi-ness partners have bought up large realestate holdings in Nairobi. "Kenyans nolonger try to figure out which buildingsMoi owns; they try to figure out whichbuildings he doesn't own," a Kenyanfriend told me in Nairobi.

Along with some of Nairobi's majorbuildings, Moi's personal business hold-ings are said to include MarshallPeugeot, Kenya's largest automobiledealership, and Fox Theaters, recentlypurchased from 20th Century Fox,which has a monopoly on the importa-tion of films to Kenya.

Reliable sources have also confirmedthat Moi was behind the purchase ofMobil Oil Kenya by a Delaware-basedholding company. (Much to the chagrinof the Mobil Oil Corporation, Moi haschanged the name of the company toKobil while keeping the familiar Mobillogo.) Moi has also reportedly bought acontrolling interest in Firestone'sKenya subsidiary through another hold-

ing company, and he earlier attempted,without success, to buy out BarclaysBank, Kenya. (Barclays reportedlythreatened to leave the country if an-other buyout was attempted.)

Kenya's elite also began to open theirown banks, undercapitalized and poorlymanaged institutions which were ripefor failure from the start. Several ofthese banks have already gone under,the most recent example being Conti-nental Bank. When the bank folded inJuly, the government revealed that thebank's directors had lent themselvesand their relatives some $23 million inunsecured loans.

But other banks survive while operat-ing in a similar fashion. Many informedsources in Kenya believe that the failureof Continental Bank, and the earlier col-lapse of the Rural-Urban Credit FinanceCompany were helped along by the gov-ernment. Both the bank and the creditcompany were Kikuyu-owned institu-tions (Vice President Mwai Kibaki wasone of the principals in ContinentalBank). Both institutions put consider-able economic weight in the hands of agroup of people who have been deprivedof much of their political and economicpower in the last few years.

As there is no conflict of interest lawin Kenya, it is legal for politicians to en-gage in business if they want to—and allof them do. There is no distinction madebetween the interests of the individualswho comprise the new ruling elite andthe interests of the government and thecountry, and the government can dic-tate which institutions succeed andwhich fail simply by telling government-owned corporations where to keep theirmoney.

Selling influence and tailoring govern-ment policy for personal gain are notconsidered as corruption in Kenya. Butwhere politicks get the money neces-sary to engage in their business transac-tions is another matter. Wherever itcomes from, it represents a vast drain ofpublic funds into private pockets. "Interms of corruption, Moi now ranks aclose second to Mobutu," a Westerndiplomat said- "And he's not done yet."

Kenyans accepted the corruption thatflourished under Kenyatta's vast pa-tronage system. Politicians were ex-pected to take their share, but somefruit always fell from the tree. "UnderKenyatta everybody stole and every-body was encouraged to get big," a Nai-robi shopkeeper said. "Now people areafraid to get big, because if they do, thepresident might notice and take theirbusinesses."

"I can only compare the mood inKenya today to that just before the 1982coup," a veteran Kenyan journalist toldme. "The corruption. . . the fear. . .the mistrust. There is a feeling thatsomething is going to happen."

The amassing of wealth by the elite isclashing with natural limits of the envi-ronment and beginning to be feltthroughout the society. Kenya's popula-tion of 20 million is growing at theworld's highest rate of 4 percent peryear and there is no more land. Onlyone-third of tins country's land is arableto begin with, and all that is taken.Meanwhile government officials and theelite continue to create estates reminis-cent of the banished colonial empire.

But if the present situation is provingdifficult for many Kenyans, the futureseems even more frightening. MostKenyans know that the overthrow orchange of government is not an answerto all of their problems. "The peoplehave seen what has happened in Ugandaand in Ethiopia," I was told in Nairobi.'This government doesn't seem too badin comparison. Most people just hopethat the government doesn't do some-thing stupid and force the army to act.The mechanisms still exist to turnthings around here democratically. . .but those mechanisms are being de-stroyed. "

My friend's fears were prophetic. Aweek later, in mid-August, KANU an-nounced the abolition of the secret bal-


"The amassing ofwealth by the elite isclashing with naturallimits of theenvironment andbeginning to be feltthroughout thesociety."

lot. Voters in the next primary electionswill cast their votes by lining up behindthe candidate of their choice. If a candi-date receives 70 percent of the vote inthe primary, he will stand unopposed inthe general elections. KANU officialsclaim that the procedure is being put inplace to eliminate fraud and vote-buy-ing. In practice, however, the newmethod will assure that no candidate op-posed by KANU will be elected—noKenyan citizen would dare to publiclycontravene the stated will of the party.

The government's attack on freeelections immediately raised protestsfrom churches in Kenya. In an unprece-dented move, the National ChristianCouncil of Kenya firmly denounced thechange, embroiling the church and gov-ernment in a heated war of words. Onecabinet minister challenged the church'sopposition to the new law by question-ing how the church, which considers it-self the light of the world, could approveof doing anything in secret.

Although the party has won the politi-cal battle, the church's challenge hasbeen duly noted by Kenyans and canonly damage party and governmentcredibility in the end.

It would appear that Moi's drive toconsolidate power has gone beyond thepoint of diminishing return. Kenyansarenow wondering why Moi would push forpower after his hold on the governmenthas seemingly been secured.

And eight years into his presidency,people still question whether Moi is run-ning the country or if someone else ispulling the strings. Moi is often per-ceived as craving public approval and asbeing a populist at heart—characteris-tics that are at odds with the harshmethods of his rule. The popular wis-dom contends that the government isactually run by Simon Nyachai, the per-

manent secretary' in the office of thepresident.

On several occasions, Nyachai hashad to step in to "clarify" off-the-cuffstatements that Moi has made. Mostrecently, Moi announced in his May Dayspeech that workers would only have towork five days a week rather than six.The call was greeted with jubilation byworkers, but threw shopkeepers, busi-nesses, and public corporations into apanic. Nyachai had to explain that thedetails of the proposal had yet to beironed out and that it was not intendedfor immediate implementation.

First considered no more than a con-venient ethnic compromise—a Kalenjinin a country dominated by the Luo andthe Kikuyu—Moi shocked friends andenemies alike by adeptly securing hisown power base and ridding the govern-ment of all challengers. The most highlypublicized of these moves was the politi-cal destruction of Charles Njonjo, thefeisty minister of constitutional affairswho at one time was considered the realpower behind Moi, simply biding histime until circumstances were right forhim to take over.

In 1983, Moi dispensed with Njonjo inone bold move and proceeded to re-make the government in his own image.The only remaining government officialwho was not strictly indebted to Moi isthe vice president, Mwai Kibaki, a Ki-kuyu from Nyeri whose presence ingovernment was seen as an insurancepolicy against a Kikuyu uprising.

But earlier this year, Moi movedagainst Kibaki. In March, an MP stoodup in Parliament and attacked Kibaki ona trivial issue. It seems that Moi hadspoken in Kibaki's home district of Nyeriand urged politicians to stop squabblingamong themselves. After commentingthat there wasn't any squabbling goingon, Kibaki was attacked for contradict-ing the president.

While Moi kept his distance from theincident, it is apparent that no one wouldcriticize the vice president without theapproval of a higher authority. Criticismof Kibaki persisted, but the vice presi-dent was able to hang on.

But most observers agree that elimi-nating Kibaki would be a grave error onMoi's part. It would be seen as a blowagainst all Kikuyu, many of whom al-

ready feel that they have been victim-ized economically and politically by theMoi government. At a time when dis-sent is on the rise, Moi can ill afford tomake unnecessary enemies.

The president's popularity is clearlyon the wane. At a recent rally, Moistood in front of a huge crowd chanting,"Nyayo. nyayo" (Swahili for "footsteps")as he has done for years. At Kenyatta'sdeath, Moi proclaimed that he wouldfuata nyao, or follow in Kenyatta's foot-steps. As opposition to Moi's ascen-dency to the top post was beaten back,politicians and leaders joined the nyayocall, indicating that they would follow inMoi's footsteps.

It is Moi's personal rallying cry, andthe crowds that come to greet the presi-dent usually return ''Nyayo' in enthusi-astic reply. But at this political rally, thehuge crowd was noticeably reticent.They silently looked on as if the presi-dent were no more than a curiosity. Allthe same, Moi continued to raise his fly-wisk to his own cries of "Nyayo". It wasas if he couldn't hear that the crowdwasn't with him.

Many observers believe that Kenyais now facing the greatest threat to itsstability since independence. The onlything that is keeping the lid on the politi-cal situation, they argue, is the strengthof the economy due to the combinedeffects of lower oil prices, high prices forKenya's principal exports of coffee andtea, and record levels of tourism. Butthis cushion won't be there forever, oreven for a few more years.

Kenya today is filled with fear—fearof the current government and of theSpecial Branch secret police who haveoverstepped their bounds, and fear ofwhat might happen if the Moi govern-ment's excesses lead to its overthrow.

Not one of the people I talked to inKenya would allow me to use his or hername, and many refused to talk to aWestern journalist at all. My Kenyanfriends were especially reluctant to dis-cuss politics. Foreign journalists basedin Kenya sit on their stories and plan touse them after they leave the countryfor good. They feel that it would be toorisky to publish the truth while they arestill there, for there is nothing the rulersof Kenya seem to fear more than thetruth. D


North Africa

1 A

Oujdaon theRocks

Morocco's King Hassan and Col. Muammar Qaddafy of Libya havedissolved their two-year-old "Arab-African Union." Morocco's closerelationship with the United States and the Libyan leader's support forradical causes rendered this unlikely partnership untenable.

BY GEORGE HENDERSON

On August 2S, King Hassan II ofMorocco unilaterally ended his

country's treaty of unity with Libya,signed two years earlier. The followingday, the King announced his decision onMoroccan television, making it clearthat he had already informed Libyanleader Col. Muammar Qaddafy. Hisaction, he explained, was prompted byan August 25 communique issued inTripoli at the end of Syrian PresidentGen. Hafez al-Assad's two-day visit tothe Libyan capital.

What offended the Moroccan rulerwas the reference in the communique tohis meeting with Israeli Prime MinisterShimon Peres at the end of July, anevent which was greeted with negativecomment throughout the Arab world.At the time, Libya issued no officialstatement. Showing unusual reticence,Qaddafy merely expressed his "amaze-ment" on being told the news butavoided any additional public pronounce-ment. However, on the occasion of As-sad's visit, and no doubt partly throughhis prompting, Libya's August commu-

Ceorge Henderson has specialized in North Af-rica for many years. He is a frequent contributorto the BBC and specialized publications on Mo-rocco and Libya in Britain and Europe.

nique called the Moroccan action "trea-son. "

Soured RelationsAlthough abrupt, the Moroccan deci-

sion was not altogether unexpected.Recent trends in Moroccan policy indi-cate that the move had been coming forseveral months. Many observersthought that the King merely capitalizedon an opportune moment to formalizethe break. Clearly, enthusiasm for theTreaty of Oujda had waned for sometime—at least in official Moroccan cir-cles—and a good excuse was all thatwas needed to cancel it.

Indeed, from the beginning of 1986,Morocco showed increasing embarrass-ment at being associated with a countryvilified as responsible for a series of ap-palling acts of international terrorism.After the mid-April U.S. bombing ofTripoli, for example, Morocco con-tented itself with a purely formal decla-ration of support for the Qaddafy gov-ernment in its hour of need—eventhough the Oujda treaty incorporatedspecial provisions for mutual defense insuch situations.

King Hassan was also irritated by Lib-ya's actions in the wake of the Tripoliraid. After having convened the Arabforeign ministers in Fez to prepare for a

full meeting of Arab heads of state, theKing discovered that Libya, on whosebehalf the meeting was called, wouldagree to the summit only if it were heldin Sebha, in southern Libya. Syriabacked the Libyan demand, and bothcountries insisted that the meeting ad-dress only the attack on Tripoli, al-though other Arab countries wanted todiscuss the Gulf war and the Arab-Is-raeli dispute as well.

However, it was not only Moroccowhich had become increasingly unen-thusiastic over the political implicationsof the treaty. Libya had begun to resentthe limitations the treaty imposed on itsradicalism—-over the Western Sahara,for example. The Qaddafy governmentwas also frustrated at its continued ex-clusion from Algeria's economic and po-litical integration with Tunisia—theresult of the 20-year Treaty of Concordand Fraternity signed by the two coun-tries in March 1983 and to which, inpart, the pact with Morocco had been ariposte.

Libya tried to join the Algerian initia-tive for Maghrebian unity in December1983, but was rebuffed because of itsrefusal to compromise over the twocountries' common border in the Ghatregion. Libya's anxieties over its rela-tions with Algeria deepened after the


August 1985 expulsion of over 30,000Tunisian workers from Libya. Algeriaroundly supported Tunisia, particularlyafter Libya allegedly threatened to in-vade Tunisian territory. As the U.S.grew more hostile toward Libya at theend of 1985, the Qaddafy governmentwas clearly anxious to restore friendlyrelations with Algiers.

The Algerians, however, remainedcautious in their responses to the evermore urgent Libyan signals for rap-prochement, although President Chad-li Benjedid's government was pri-vately delighted at the possibility of in-creasing Rabat's isolation in theMaghreb. Clearly, at least one of Alge-ria's demands for improved relationswould be tied to Libya's support for Poli-sario, the Saharawi liberation move-ment fighting Morocco's occupation ofthe Western Sahara.

Moroccan discomfort with the Libyanconnection was therefore intensified bythese moves. Rabat's anxieties came toa head in January this year, when it wasannounced that Qaddafy and Chadii metat the Algerian desert border town of InAmenas. The Algerian authorities ap-proached this meeting with apprehen-sion, given U.S. claims of Qaddafy's in-volvement with international terrorismfollowing the attacks on the Vienna andRome airports at the end of December1985.

After all, in 1985 Algeria had ex-pended considerable effort to improve

"It was evident thatHassan had decidedthat closer relationswith the U.S. were farmore important toMorocco than acontinued but moribundfederation with Libya."

its relations with Washington, partly inhopes of persuading the Reagan admin-istration to reduce its support for Mo-rocco over the Western Sahara issue—precisely because of the Moroccan-Lib-yan link. Algiers clearly did not want tolose the benefits of its diplomatic shifttoward the West by any precipitateaction in favor of Tripoli.

Col. Muammar Qaddafy: "Libya had begun to resent the limitations the treaty imposed onits radicalism"

On the other hand, the Chadii gov-ernment was increasingly predisposedtoward improving relations with Tripolibecause of its desire to avoid Arab andAfrican accusations of support forAmerican policies on terrorism and theMiddle East. At the same time, the op-portunity to wean Libya away from Mo-rocco was too good to miss. Algeria heldout the bait of economic cooperation toseal the bargain, involving supplying Al-gerian natural gas to northern Libya,linking electricity grids of both coun-tries, cooperation over Algerian auto-mobile production and Libyan aluminumsmelting, and joint oil exploration, min-eral extraction, and industrial enter-prises.

To Moroccan leaders, it seemed as ifLibya was returning to its old habits ofsupport for radicalism in North Africa,particularly over the Western Sahara is-sue. The Algerian media indicated thatLibya would renew its support for Foli-sario—although this proved too san-guine. At least in part, this was due toHassan's offer to both Libya and Wash-ington to act as a mediator after the U.S.attacks on missile sites in the Gulf ofSirte and the bombings of Tripoli andBenghazi in March and April, respec-tively.

The U.S. showed no interest in theoffer, but Libya did. As a result, no evi-dence surfaced in the media or else-

where that Libya had decided to openlysupport Polisario—at least before theend of August. The Algerian presswould certainly have publicized suchnews as part of its campaign against Mo-rocco's obdurate refusal to modify itsstand on Western Sahara.

Observers quickly noted, however,that Mohanied Abdelaziz, president ofthe Saharan Arab Democratic Republic(SAI)R), Western Sahara's govern-ment-in-exile, attended the September1 celebration of the 1969 Libyan revolu-tion which brought Qaddafy to power.Presumably, once Morocco had unilat-erally breached its unity treaty withLibya, Qaddafy no longer saw any pointin concealing his basic sympathies forthe SADR.

The Background to the TreatyIndeed, the SADR president's partic-

ipation in the 17th anniversary celebra-tions of the Great September Revolu-tion provided an appropriate symbol ofthe unrealistic nature of the treaty be-tween Morocco and Libya—the Arab-African Union. The union had after allbeen born out of frustrations over theSaharan conflict and the consequent po-litical divisions in North Africa.

The union had originally been a Mo-roccan proposal, made just a year afterQaddafy's own unexpected appearancein Rabat in June 1983. He had come to


repair relations with Morocco, broken inthe wake of Libya's ill-judged and pre-mature support for the abortive army-backed Skhirat coup plot against theMoroccan ruler in 1971. Aware of Qad-dafy's frustration at Algeria's refusal toconsider Libyan participation in theTreaty of Concord and Fraternity, Has-san exploited the opportunity by makinghis unity proposal in mid-August 1984,thus breaching Morocco's own isolationin North Africa.

Algerian anger over the totally unex-pected Moroccan initiative intensifiedwith the discovery that the proposedunion was identical to one the King hadoffered to Chadli earlier in the year. TheMoroccan treaty also formalized Libya'stermination the previous year of mate-rial aid to Folisario. This persuaded Al-geria that Morocco had no intention ofsatisfying Organization of African Unity(OAU) demands for a negotiated end tothe Western Sahara conflict. After Libyaaccepted the proposal, Algeria beganlarge-scale military support to Polisario.Libya further restricted its contactswith the Western Saharan movementand abstained on the issue in discussionsat the OAU and the UN.

The unity treaty between radicalLibya and the conservative Moroccanmonarchy—strange bedfellows indeed,particularly in view of their mutual an-tagonism during the previous decade—was greeted enthusiastically in Mo-rocco. In a referendum on the issue atthe end of August, 96.7 percent of theelectorate approved the union. Theoverwhelming vote of approval re-flected both genuine enthusiasm for re-gional unity—a major platform for all po-litical parties since independence—andpopular resentment against Algeria foropposing Morocco's claims to the West-ern Sahara. Most Moroccans feel Alger-ian leaders have done their best to frus-trate these claims since the 1960s.

In Libya, there was unanimous sup-port for the unity proposals from the1,347 peoples' congresses. The Libyangovernment is after all founded on thepremise that regional unity in North Af-rica and the Middle East is the ultimategoal of foreign policy. Admittedly, thisunity proposal was unlike Libya's sixprevious attempts, since there could beno easy integration of national political

U.S. AID health care project: "U.S. aid did not fall significantly despite the threats"

structures. Nonetheless, it did seem tooffer the only short-term opportunity torealize Libyan policy objectives in thisdirection.

Complex federal political structureswere created by the treaty which, un-like the Algerian Treaty of Concord andFraternity, was to be open to otherArab and African states without precon-dition. There was to be a two-year ro-tating presidency, advisory committeeson common political, economic, andtechnical matters, a mutual defense obli-gation, and a federal tribunal to pro-nounce on breaches of the treaty.

Although an administrative backupfor the presidency was created, to-gether with a joint parliamentary com-mittee and some technological commit-tees, it was soon evident that the politi-cal will needed to sustain the systemwas not really there. King Hassan nevermade his promised visit to Tripoli, andCol. Qaddafy never returned to Rabat.

There were, however, develop-ments in the economic field. Moroccancompanies were granted special con-tract terms in Libya and Moroccansthemselves began to look toward Libyafor employment opportunities. Eventu-ally, around 20,000 Moroccans foundwork in Libya and, unlike Egyptians andTunisians, were excluded from the ex-pulsions begun in August 1985 whenLibya decided to cut back on its foreignpayments by reducing the migrant laborforce.

During 1985, Morocco also received500,000 tons of crude oil from Libya at

preferential rates. In addition, Tripolipromised a loan of $100 million for cerealpurchases—although, given the col-lapse in oil prices during the latter part of1985 and 1986, it is unlikely that it wasactually made. A joint holding company,Salima, was set up by Libya's foreigninvestment arm, Lafico, and by the Mo-roccan Office de Developpement et In-dustrialisation, with a capital base set at$43 million.

At the end of 1985, both countriessigned an agreement to facilitate remit-tances and commercial payments, andMoroccan companies operating in Libyawere given special status. Negotiationswere also underway for joint projects inoil prospecting, fertilizer production,and iron ore supply from Morocco to thenew Libyan steel complex at Misurata.

Nevertheless, it was apparent thatthe main purpose of the unity treaty wasdiplomatic—at least as far as Moroccowas concerned. Indeed, the primarypurpose was to keep Libya from sup-porting Polisario and to prevent Algeriafrom increasing its hegemony over theNorth African region. In this respect,Hassan can well feel pleased, since forthe past two years, the treaty achievedprecisely these results.

At the same time, Morocco was ableto use the respite to complete its defen-sive system in the Sahara, which nowcontrols over two-thirds of the terri-tory. Furthermore, tacit Libyan sup-port for Morocco's moves in the West-ern Sahara helped deflect internationalcriticism following Morocco's OAU


walkout in November 1984 and its sub-sequent withdrawal from the organiza-tion.

Although Libya did not leave theOAU, it provided no active support tothe Algerian-SADR case, as it wouldhave done in the past. In the UN Gen-eral Assembly debate a few weeks afterthe OAU decision, Libya abstained inthe final vote, thus providing Moroccowith further indirect support. The mostimportant aspect for Morocco, how-ever, must have been the knowledgethat Libya's military aid to Polisario hadceased and that Algeria had to assumethat burden.

In some ways, this decision wasprobably not very difficult for Qaddafy,since he was always ambivalent over theWestern Sahara issue, on the one handsupporting a struggle for national libera-tion against a regime which, until June1983, he had always characterized ascorrupt, but on the other hand, fearingthe consequent "balkanization" of NorthAfrica resulting from an SADR victory.

Further, Moroccan support, how-ever restrained, was a great help to thebeleaguered Qaddafy government,given its intense isolation in the MiddleEast and Africa resulting from its sup-port for Iran, its antagonism to the main-line Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO), its interference in Chad andelsewhere in the Sahel, and problemswith European states such as France.

The U.S. DimensionIndeed, it was precisely this aspect of

the treaty arrangements that soannoyed the U.S. administration. After

all, Morocco was considered a vital U. S.ally in terms of American interests inAfrica. To see such an ally align itselfwith a state that Washington had turnedagainst as early as 1981 and towardwhich American hostility had steadilygrown must have been very irritatingindeed for the Reagan administration.

American anger was aggravated bythe fact that not even the U.S. ambassa-dor in Rabat, Joseph V. Reed, whoclaimed privileged access to official Mo-roccan circles, knew of the decision tosign the treaty. Congress too was en-raged by the Moroccan action andthreats were made to cut future militaryaid.

In fact, U.S. aid did not fall signifi-cantly despite the threats, totalling $150million in fiscal year 1984, $135 million in1985, and $140 million in 1986. Of thistotal, military aid comprised approxi-mately $65 million, $45 million, and $52million, respectively. The Libya treaty,however, helped senators and con-gressmen who wished to see the admin-istration take a more even-handed ap-proach in the Western Sahara conflict—for the U. S. tended to supportMorocco. Now they could argue thecase against Morocco far more easilyand expect to receive a better publichearing.

In any event, the Reagan administra-tion did not significantly reduce its sup-port for Morocco, although the U.S.embassy in Algiers did revive the cau-tious contacts with the Western Sa-harans that existed at the end of the1970s. The White House did, however,make it clear to Moroccan envoys, suchas the King's personal adviser RedaGuedira, that the treaty with Libyawould make it extremely difficult tomaintain close personal contacts be-tween Moroccan and U. S. officials—es-pecially between the president and theKing.

As a result, Hassan was forced toforego his traditional annual visit toWashington until July this year, whenthe trip was once again delayed to makeway for the historic meeting betweenthe King and Peres. Despite this sign ofpresidential displeasure, Morocco nev-ertheless was able to ensure that U.S.food aid continued and that the Algerianpresident's first official visit to the U.S.

in 1985 would not signal any change inpolicy toward Morocco.

In fact, it appears that the King hadcarefully calculated the dangers of hisLibya pact. The U.S. weighed its obvi-ous irritation against the real advantagesof close relations with Morocco—facili-ties for the Rapid Deployment Force atKenitra airbase and at Side Slimane andfor the new Voice of America transmit-ter in Tangier. Furthermore, Moroccocould offer support for U.S. policy in theMiddle East, for the King was the chair-man of the standing committee of theArab league.

During 1986, the significance of thisslowly became apparent, as King Has-san gingerly edged toward a dramaticchange in policy involving open contactswith Israel. This move also coincidedwith Rabat's reckoning that the Oujdatreaty had served its purpose, and thatLibya was now probably severelyenough affected by declining oil reve-nues to be unable to offer significant rnil-

"The Libyan treaty hadoutlived its usefulnessand the King had beenlooking for anappropriate opportunityto break it for severalmonths."

itary aid to Polisario.During Hassan's visit to France in late

November 1985, there were hints that ameeting with Peres was not altogetherout of the question. Tliis came on theheels of Morocco's decision to allow Is-raelis, including Likud Knesset mem-bers, to visit the country for a MoroccanJewish Congress in May 1984 and theKing's decision to jointly sponsor astanding Jewish congress in Quebec in1985 with the Israeli prime minister.

Although Hassan made no secret ofhis belief that negotiations over theArab-Israeli conflict and the Palestiniansituation were essential, it was not anaccident that his initiative coincided withmore direct efforts to improve relationswith the U.S. At the King's 25th anni-versary celebration of his accession tothe throne, American guests were


prominent and included CIA DirectorWilliam Casey and U.S. ambassador tothe UN Gen. Vernon Walters.

It was evident that Hassan had de-cided that closer relations with the U.S.were far more important to Moroccothan a continued but moribund federa-tion with Libya, especially in view of theopen confrontation between the U.S.and Libyan governments. There were,however, other more direct benefits.

Morocco has a massive foreign debt,now totalling close to $14 billion. As oneof the 20 most heavily indebted coun-tries in the world, it is a prime candidatefor aid under the Baker Plan proposals.Over the past three years, however,the Moroccan government, with IMFand World Bank help, has been restruc-turing its economy, enabling it to re-schedule its bilateral, multilateral, andcommercial debt.

Nevertheless, there have been prob-lems with commercial banks—in whichU.S. banks predominate—and with theIMF, which has been worried over theimplications of recent levels of govern-ment expenditure. The result has beenthe withdrawal of IMF standby creditand problems over further reschedulingof commercial debt. Support from theU.S. government could well ease boththese problems at a time when the Mo-roccans believe they are close to resolv-ing their economic difficulties, despitethe costs of the Western Sahara war andthe continued depression in interna-tional phosphate prices. (Morocco is theworld's largest exporter of phosphates,which form the most important compo-nent of its exports.)

There are two other crucial economicconsiderations as well—both of whichwould have pushed Morocco to reevalu-ate and improve its relations with theU.S. at Libya's expense. First, Mo-rocco, in common with all U. S. aid recip-ients except Israel, must fear the dan-gers of the across-the-board aid cutsthreatened by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment. Even though theoriginal amendment has been rejectedby the U.S. Supreme Court, it will reap-pear in another form, threatening allAmerican aid recipients.

By demonstrating its importance forU.S. policy in the Middle East and NorthAfrica, Morocco\ might well improve its

aid position in FY 1987. Furthermore,Morocco is also anxious for U.S. aid inanother direction. During his visit to theWestern Sahara in March 1985, KingHassan announced a five-year $1 billionrearmament program for the Moroccanarmed forces.

A crucial element is the acquisition ofnew aircraft for the Moroccan airforce.The original intention was to acquire Mi-rage 2(XX)s from France, but neitherSaudi Arabia nor France were willing tooffer financial aid for the purchases.Now it appears that Morocco is lookingtoward the U.S. to both supply appro-priate aircraft and help with the financ-ing. Improved relations between theU.S. and Morocco are thus essential.No wonder then that the treaty withLibya was jettisoned.

King Hassan's decision to abandon histwo-year-old treaty with Libya also cor-responds with the monarchy's improvedsense of internal stability now that themilitary problems of the Western Saharaappear to be solved. This has beenmarked by a pronounced foreign policymove toward the West and a readinessto reject the iron certainties that havecharacterized Middle Eastern politicsfor so many decades, particularly overthe Arab-Israeli conflict. The immediatebenefits are considerable—economicassistance, military aid, and future ku-dos over Morocco's new posture in theMiddle East. The loss of Libyan supportmust seem extremely slight by compari-son.

At the same time, Morocco mustnow deal with increased isolation insidethe Middle East and North Africa. Notonly will Hassan's government be re-jected by the radicals—who have in anycase long been suspicious of the Moroc-can ruler's pro-Western tendencies—but moderates will also have to be cir-cumspect in their relations with Mo-rocco in the short-term at least.

Indeed, there are already sugges-tions that Middle Eastern radicals haveturned their unwelcome attentions to-ward the Sharifian monarchy. Moroccansecurity services claim to have uncov-e*" ' two terrorist plots, one involvingtwo Palestinians and two Tunisians ar-rested in Casablanca in possession ofexplosives, and the other involving aplanned attack on a Casablanca syna-

gogue.Moderates like Tunisia, who would

like to strengthen ties with Morocco andsee a degree of regional unity believingthis is the only way to resolve the West-ern Sahara conflict, must now standback and wait for better times.

Hassan, however, clearly feels thatthe U.S. option is best for Morocco.This parallels the Moroccan attempt tofind a basis for entry into the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC), pro-posed in 1985 as a means of resolvingthe economic problems between thesouthern Mediterranean states and theEEC. Quite simply, Hassan believesthat Morocco can and should act as abridge between the West and MiddleEast.

Further, Morocco should be pre-pared to point the way to Middle East-ern states in making unpalatable deci-sions, such as talking to Israel—ensur-ing, at the same time, that Israel isforced to recognize the relevance andimmutability of Palestinian demands andthe role of the PLO.

In the end, the Libyan treaty had out-lived its usefulness and the King hadbeen looking for an appropriate opportu-nity to break it for several months. Yet,Hassan cannot forget his domestic con-stituency. Moroccans have learned toaccept and respect their ruler's subtleand frequent shifts in foreign policy, butthey may also have different impera-tives. Most Moroccans perceive arcaneconsiderations of the importance ofU.S. relations as secondary to the vitalsocial and political imperatives of Araband Maghrebi unity.

They are bound, therefore, to be in-tensely disappointed with the conse-quences of the recent policy changes inRabat. Yet, they will tolerate the King'sdecisions—provided they result in eas-ing the austerity of daily life and not inmore profound regional isolation. How-ever, Moroccan memories are long andit is a tradition that they do not easilyforget their rulers' mistakes. It is there-fore hoped that the Reagan administra-tion will respond appropriately to theKing's moves and not treat them cyni-cally as part of its simplistic strategicview of the Middle East and North Af-rica as surrogates in the greater conflictbetween East and West. Q


The new Sudanese Prime Minister has had little time to address thecountry's economic problems due to the spreading war in the south. Thereluctance of foreign oil companies to continue operations given thesecurity risks will pose further hardships on an already collapsingeconomy.

BY CAROL BERGER

After a three-month delay in releas-ing the budget, preliminary fig-

ures from the Sudanese Ministry of Fi-nance suggest it will closely mirror thedeficit budget of 1985. The budget wasplanned to coincide with the launching ofa long-awaited recovery program, butfinancial authorities abroad are hardlyholding their breath.

After adopting a wait-and-see atti-tude following the April elections, theirmood has turned into impatience anddisenchantment. The World Bank hadurged Khartoum to introduce reformsat the time it announced the budget, andunless it soon does so, say bankers, anylarge multilateral rescue package is con-sidered unlikely.

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, longviewed in the West as a moderate, hasspent his first months in power pursuingArab unity. In trips to the Soviet Union,Kuwait, and Iran, his advisers under-took an international mediating role inconflicts far beyond Sudan's traditionalsphere of influence. Back home, the ec-onomic and political situation worsens.

Political insiders suggested monthsago that Mahdi's political career mayhave peaked with liis election andwarned that Western leaders were na-ive in their assessments of the premier,a member of the Ansar, the largestnorthern religious group. As head of acoalition government representing theKhattmiyya sect's pro-Egyptian Demo-cratic Unionist Party, Mahdi confrontswhat is considered an unworkable divi-sion of party and national interests.

The current mood of Sudan's interna-tional donors varies. The Netherlands,considered a key donor, is understoodto fully support the new government;West Germany is described as hesi-tant; the United Kingdom's Overseas

Carol Berger is a freelance journalist who hasreported from Sudan for The Times of London,the BBC World and Africa Services, The Econo-mist, and other publications and new services.

Sudan

Sadiqand theSouth

Development Agency says its funds areexhausted.

The U. S. is still reassessing its com-mitments. Despite political pronounce-ments to the contrary, Washington isreportedly disillusioned with Mahdi. Su-dan's growing links with Libya have ledto significant cuts in the U.S. aid pro-gram—allegedly for security reasons.

On April 15—only hours after theAmerican bombings of Tripoli andBenghazi—a U.S. embassy employeewas seriously wounded in Khartoum. Inthe days following the attack, the em-bassy evacuated more than 300 Ameri-can citizens. Many of those remainingwere directly involved in the disburse-ment of aid. However, despite acutelystrained relations, Sudan will be thelargest black African recipient of Ameri-can aid in FY 1986-87, receiving $223.5million, an increase over the previousyear, but less than the requested $254million.

The prognosis for economic recoveryis poor, however. Agricultural outputcontinues to fall. The effects of ex-tended drought and seed shortageshave slashed grain yields; at the sametime, white fly infestation of the cottonharvest has dramatically reduced earn-ings.

U.S. AID food drop in Darfur: "Despiteacutely strained relations, Sudan will bethe largest black African recipient ofAmerican aid in FY 1986-87"


Most of the 1984-85 cotton crop wentunsold until August of this year, whenthe Sudan Cotton Company sold some324,(XX) bales of barakat (long-staple)cotton at far below world market prices.In 1985, the World Bank advised thatthe crop could fetch $0.90 per pound.Some reports suggest that the recentsale was for only half that amount.

Total revenue from agriculture fell bya staggering 33 percent between the1984 and 1985 seasons. Cotton earn-ings declined by 25 percent while othercrops saw similar reductions. Gum ara-bic fell by 36 percent, and sesame by 39percent. Revenue targets in recentyears are evidence of the country's nar-row tax base. Targets were hit in partby import restrictions and the ban onalcohol imposed in 1984 by former pres-ident Gaafar al-Nimeiry.

In recent years, the developmentbudget was financed almost entirely byforeign grants and loans and the localproceeds of commodity aid. With nogovernment recovery program in sight,however, the International MonetaryFund declared Sudan ineligible for fur-ther borrowing in February this year.The suspension of Fund lending has hadlittle practical effect, but it is significantin political terms. The decision marked anew low in Sudan's decline in cre-ditworthiness and was a warning to do-nors against further loan commitments.

Budget details for the current yearwere presented by Finance and Eco-nomic Planning Minister Beshir Omeron September 18. The deficit is esti-mated at $1.2 billion in fiscal year 1986-87. The estimated deficit in the previousyear was $1.12 billion. About $795 mil-lion will be financed by foreign loans andgrants. Revenues are projected to total$1.1 billion against only $538.2 millionthe previous year.

Expenditure has been set at $2.2 bil-lion, compared with $2.43 billion in1985-86, including $952 million for de-velopment and $212 million for debtservicing. Arrears to the IMF are esti-mated at $300 million. In the absence ofa decisive economic reform program,the international donor community isunlikely to provide the multilateral res-cue package needed to address thedebt. Total debt is now estimated at astaggering $10 billion.

"If the government shows it is doing areasonable job of putting its house in or-der, then it will be time for talks on aninternational effort to begin," said oneeconomist. "In a situation where no spe-cific policies exist, a rescue plan will notbe launched."

To date, the government has givenlittle indication of its plans for reform. Ina speech to the national assembly onJuly 7, Mahdi did refer to the need toreduce expenditure and review ineffi-cient government corporations. How-ever, economists are discouraged byreferences to continued meat subsidiesand the banning of some livestock ex-ports.

During budget discussions, the WorldBank reportedly emphasized the needto draw up a comprehensive economic"Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, long viewed in the West as a moderate, has spent hisfirst months in power pursuing Arab unity" _ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ — ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ —

program. As a senior Bank official said,"Sudan's economic problems are be-yond the stage where measures such asa moderate budget deficit will give re-lief."

If the government follows IMF direc-tives, the program will include mea-sures on the exchange rate, revenue in-creases, and a deregulation of diesel andwater prices. But financial analysts holdout little hope for dramatic reform in thenear future. "It doesn't look too good,"says one. "It is a tremendous problemto tackle the economy while the war isstill going on."

The three-year war with southernSudanese rebels has accelerated sinceearlier this year. With substantial back-ing from neighboring Ethiopia, the Su-dan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)has effectively halted all aid and develop-ment in the resource-rich south, andtaken control of large areas in the re-mote region.

The August 16 downing of a civilianaircraft killing all 63 aboard further inten-sified calls in northern Sudan for a re-newed offensive in the south. Pressurehas been building in the northern citiesas more and more southern refugeesfrom the war settle in the urban slums.Fears are now growing that violence willsoon spread to the northern centers.

In the weeks leading up to the Aprilhandover of power, the TransitionalMilitary Council (TMC)—led by Maj.-

Gen. Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab—mounted a well-publicized assault on therebel-held town of Rumbek, in Bahr elGhazal region.

Amid the climate of electioneering,the fundamentalist National IslamicFront (formerly known as the MuslimBrotherhood) demanded that volun-teers be allowed to fight in the south andrallied for greater support for the Suda-nese army. Although the TMC rejectedvolunteer enlistment, the army did re-ceive more support—including the useof Libyan bombers and weaponry fromEgypt and other Arab states. However,despite massive troop deployments andthe Libyan aircraft, the town remainsinsecure and liable to SPLA recapture.The assault on Rumbek is reported tohave displaced thousands of civilians,most of whom remain in the inaccessiblebush.

International aid agencies now esti-mate that more than 2 million peopleface starvation, mainly in SPLA-held ar-eas. Those near the Kenyan bordermay receive help from Western aidagencies. The vast majority in the re-mote Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal re-gions can expect no assistance. The Su-danese government has banned all con-tact between aid agencies and theSPLA, and the rebels say they will shootdown any planes flying into govern-ment-controlled towns. As the politicsof food drags on, the situation is consid-


ered critical in large parts of the region.As long as the war continues, the

government will be unable to curb ex-penditure. In 1985, Khartoum officialsestimated that the conflict was costingmore than $400,000 a day. This figurehas since risen: The governmentstepped up military operations early thisyear and dramatically increased field payto the southern-based troops. Com-pounding this are the effects of domesticinflation—now estimated at 45-50 per-cent annually.

Rising security fears and a worseningeconomic picture have dealt a particu-larly severe blow to Western firms op-erating in the oil-rich south. Following aSeptember 4 meeting of the White NilePetroleum Company (WNPC) in Gon-dar, the government announced that allcontracts issued by the company for thenow-defunct oil pipeline project hadbeen cancelled.

The board also agreed to close thecompany's Khartoum offices. WNPCshareholders include the AmericanChevron Corporation, the Royal DutchShell Group, the Al Khobar-based ArabPetroleum Investments Corporation(Apicorp), the International FinanceCorporation, and the Sudanese govern-ment.

The scheme dates from the headypre-civil war days of 1983, when officialsoptimistically forecast tliat oil wouldflow along the 1,424-kilometer pipelineto the Red Sea coast by early 1986. To-tal cost of the pipeline project, including

Chevron's exploration expenses at itssouthern Sudan fields, was put at $2.5billion. The value of the pipeline itselfwas said to approach $1 billion.

While sporadic anti-governmentclashes were well underway in 1983, itwas not until February 1984 that violentand well-planned attacks by the SPLAparalyzed both oil exploration and workon the Jonglei canal water project in theUpper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regionsof southern Sudan. Both the oil and ca-nal work were in the heart of Sudan'sremotest territory. In September, theFrench firm contracted to build theJonglei canal took the Sudanese govern-ment to court for $30 million in dam-ages.

In the same month that the rebel at-tack on Chevron's Rub Kona base campended what had been a $500,000-a-dayproject. Chevron and the Royal DutchShell Group signed an agreement givingShell 25 percent of Chevron's equitystake in WNPC. Shell also took on 25percent of Chevron's production-shar-ing agreement.

After more than two years of sus-pended oil work in the now war-tornsouth, the cancellation of the WNPCcontracts marks a tum for the worse inSudan's hopes of recovering what areconsidered to be important reserves.Some industry estimates put Chevron'sUnity field reserves at 150 million bar-rels. Total reserves are estimated at200 million to 300 million barrels.

According to a senior Chevronspokesman, the company has spent $1billion to date in its Sudan concession.How that investment will be pro-tected—from both a logistical and politi-cal standpoint—is unclear.

Energy and Mining Minister AdamMoussa Madibu said recently that thegovernment told WNPC directors of itsplans to cancel the company's licensesto operate in Sudan. The governmentwants to liquidate the oil company, theminister added, but a decision on such amove will be deferred until the board'snext meeting in Khartoum in Decem-ber.

Senior Western officials at WNPChave sharply contradicted governmentstatements about the liquidation. Theboard is understood to have made nosuch decision, although it has agreed to

close its offices."Even if we elect to liquidate, it must

be done in an orderly fashion. First of all,we must cancel remaining contracts,"says one spokesman. He declined tocomment on what could prove to be pro-tracted talks with company sharehold-ers about WNPC debt. But he noted, "Alot of work was undertaken in the nameof White Nile, a lot of money was spent.The money was provided by somebodyand it wasn't White Nile. Now WhiteNile has an obligation."

That somebody was Chevron andRoyal Dutch Shell. The companies havealready lent White Nile about $132 mil-lion as compensation to contractors dur-ing the extended work shutdown.

Despite these considerable difficul-ties, the government has not given upthe idea of developing its oil reserves inthe near future. Publicly, it says that forthe time being, the low world oil pricehas made the export pipeline unfeasible.However, oil companies consider theprice of oil to be academic next to theoverriding security problems.

France's Total, which has licensingrights in the rebel-controlled Upper Nileregion, has been unable to pursue ex-ploration for almost three years. Com-pany officials say its Khartoum officeswere effectively closed in mid-Septem-ber, when its last remaining "trouble-shooter" left the country. Total, bestknown in Sudan oil circles for attemptingnegotiation with the southern Sudaneseopposition, has apparently abandonedhopes for a peaceful resolution in thenear future.

Chevron now says its comprehensivereview of Sudan prospects will be pre-sented to the government in mid-1987.Meanwhile, expatriate staff have beencut to 12 and work in the relatively se-cure areas of southern Kordofan hasbeen shut down since May.

It is now clear that other oil interestsoperating outside areas of conflict arealso reassessing their investment. SunSudan Oil Company, operator in a175,0<X)-square-kilometer block innorthern Sudan, is not operating atpresent. The U.S. firm's local subsidi-ary has drilled three wells and is nowinterpreting seismic and drilling results.Africa Report understands its expatriatestaff has been reduced. •


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And from St. Martin's for the Fall . . .MULTINATIONALS OF THE SOUTHNew Actors in the International Economyedited by Khushi M KhanThe rapid increase in the number and competitive powerof Third World multinationals is the subject of this book,which analyzes their role as promoters of economic develop-ment in developing countries. Providing a conceptual andtheoretical framework for their effects on the internationaleconomy, an examination is made of their activities in thestrategic sectors of production, trade and finance. A com-parative analysis oi old and new multinationals in the ThirdWorld throws light on the broader context of internationaleconomic relations.November 200 pp. ISBN (Ml2-55246-7 $29.95

JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTSThe Conscience of a South AfricanKenneth InghamThis biography recounts the career of Smuts, the leadingfigure in South African affairs for more than half a cen-tury, in terms of his desire to walk the world stage and hisstruggle to unite South Africa—set against his tragic failureto appreciate the aspirations of his black countrymen.Smuts, who fluctuated between the roles of academic ac-tivist, politically aware cosmopolitan, scientific humanist,and Christian, involved himself in the moves to unite theBoers and British oi South Africa, to strengthen the bondsbetween the member-states of the old British Common-wealth, and to build a worldwide version of that Com-monwealth through the League of Nations. Although hesucceeded in some- of those areas, becoming a consultantto Louis Botha, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill andWoodrow Wilson, Smuts was much less effective on racialproblems This study considers him from all sides, plac-ing Smuts in the context of his own time.July 296 pp. ISBN O-3I2-43997-O $29.95

VICTORIAN SHIPPING, BUSINESS ANDIMPERIAL POLICYDonald Currie, the Castle Line and SouthernAfricaAndrew PorterRoyal Historical Society Studies in History SeriesBetween 1860 and 1900 the Castle Line lay at the heartof an expanding business empire embracing shipping,minerals, and real estate. The financial and geographicalscale of Currie's operations in Southern Africa meant thatunder partition, both (he company and its founder becamedirectly involved with both imperial and colonial govern-ments as well as international capitalists and metropolitaninvestors. Porter analyzes the connections between govern-ments and commercial shipping interests, and themanipulation of each by businessmen and politicians. Us-ing banking and shipping archives, private papers, andgovernment records, he relates the growth of shipping be-tween Britain and South Africa to the broader pattern ofeconomic change, international competition, and imperialexpansion.August 352 pp. ISBN 0-312-84442-5 $35.00

INSIDE THE OAUPan-Africanism in PracticeC 0. C. AviateThis is the first book about the Organization of AfricanUnity offering a comprehensive view from inside the con-ference room of the OAU itself. Amate draws on officialrecords and documents and quotes extensively fromstatements made by African rulers as well as from thereports of OAU Secretaries-General and of the manycommittees and commissions the OAU has set up. Earlyrecords of discussions reproduced verbatim from theAfrican heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs makefascinating reading.December 608 pp. ISBN 0-312-41878-7 $45.00

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICAKurt M. CampbellThe white buffer states that once separated the Republicfrom Black Africa have all collapsed; South Africa standsalone as the last bastion of minority rule on the continent.The USSR, by virtue of its prominent role in the long-standing struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa,has gained considerable influence in the region. Becauseof Soviet aid to insurgent groups and outspoken supportof the anti-apartheid movement in international forums,many in the West fear that the USSR will garner hand-some political dividends in the struggle over the future ofSouth Africa: as they interpret it, a fundamental shift inthe global balance of power is at stake. There is littleunderstanding, however, about the actual nature of Sovietactivities in the region, and Campbell's study fills this gap.Examining the nature of the USSR's current and past in-volvement and its stake in South Africa, Campbell focuseson the state, party and commercial contacts between theUSSR and the Republic.September 272 pp. ISBN 0-312-74853-1 $32.50

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