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-.R^ ^ INAL
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
STATE OF OHIO : Appeal from the Allen CountyCourt of Appeals, Third Appellate District
Plaintiff-Appellee,Court of Appeals
V. : Case No. 1-11-18
^ -0 8 11 3 uMARK A. WANGLER
Defendant-Appellant.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF APPELLANT, MARK A. WANGLER
Christopher R. McDowell (Counsel of Record)Dinsmore & Shohl LLP255 East 5th Steet, Suite 1900Cincinnati, Ohio 45202513.977-8588513.977-8566 (fax)[email protected]
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, MARK A. WANGLER
Jana E. EmerickAssistant Prosecuting AttorneyA11Pn C:nnntv_ Ohio- ------ _ -- -----., - --- -Court of Appeals Bldg., Suite 302204 North Main StreetLima, Ohio 45801
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STATE OF OHIO
JAN 15 ?013
CLERK OF COURTSUPREME COURT OF 0H10
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................i
EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS FELONY CASE IS ONE OF PUBLIC ORGREAT GENERAL INTEREST INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALCONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ... ............................................................................................1
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS .......................................................................2
II. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW ..............................................4
Proposition of Law No. I: Where evidence has been improperlyadmitted, a court may determine that it is harmless because it iscumulative of other property introduced evidence only if there is adetermination that the guilty verdict act-ually rendered in the case wasunattributable to the error. The mere fact that there is other evidencethat covers the same subject matter is not, in and of itself, sufficient todetermine that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ...................................4
A. The Journals Are Not Cumulative Of Other Evidence .........................................4
B. The Journals Compared To The Witness Testimony ...........................................6
Proposition of Law No. II: A trial court fails in its Daubertgatekeeper role when it admits scientific testimony that is notgenerally accepted or where there is an analytical gap betweenthe accepted scientific premise and the conclusions of the ..................................9
- -- III:of Law No. 11I: A trial court abuses its discretion when itimproperly limits qualified expert testimony .......................:......................................13
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................15
PROOF OF SERV ICE ...................................................................................................................16
APPENDIX:
State v. Wangler, 3d Dist. No. 1-11-18, 2012-Ohio-4878 (October22, 2012 Judgment Entry and Opinion) .............................................................. A-1
State v. Wangler, 3d Dist. No. 1-11-18, 2012-Ohio-4878(December 5, 2012 Judgment Entry Denying 26(A) Motion) ........................... A-2
i
EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS FELONY CASE IS ONE OF PUBLIC OR GREATGENERAL INTEREST INVOLVING SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
This case presents critical issues of public importance and substantial questions of
constitutional law. Left uncorrected, the appellate court's decision countenances convictions
secured upon unlawfully seized evidence and establishes dangerous precedent nullifying the trial
court's federal and state constitutional gate keeping responsibilities under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 46 (1993).
Dr. Mark Wangler was wrongfully convicted of murdering his wife, Kathy, years after
she died from carbon monoxide poisoning. The appellate court determined that Dr. Wangler's
Journals were unconstitutionally seized from his home and improperly admitted. Nevertheless,
the court found the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The harmless
error finding was not based on overwhelming evidence of guilt, but only on a determination that
the information contained in the Journals was: (1) "cumulative in nature," and (2) "contained
many entries that were favorable to [Dr. Wangler]." State v. Wangler, 3d Dist. No. 1-11-18,
2012-Ohio-4878, ¶ 51-52. The court conducted no further analysis of the Journals' impact on
the jury's verdict. The court's holding is in conflict with accepted constitutional case law.
In reality, the court did not conduct a harmless error analysis at all. Once it determined
that the tainted evidence was duplicative in some way of properly admitted or arguably helpful
evidence, the court held that the constitutional error was ipso facto harmless. The court's
holding ignores the overall object of harmless error analysis - to determine if there is a
reasonable possibility that the tainted evidence may have contributed to the conviction. See State
v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035 (1976), paragraph seven of the syllabus.
In addition to the above dangerous precedent, the court disregarded proper Daubert
analysis. The court's opinion permits litigants to submit "scientific" evidence that unjustifiably
1
extrapolates from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. As it stands, the court's
holding has negative implications for the fairness of civil and criminal cases throughout Ohio.
Here, the State was permitted to introduce expert testimony based on samples taken from the
home years after Mrs. Wangler's death and assert that they showed that vehicle exhaust was
introduced into the home at the time of her death. The "science" upon which this testimony was
based has never been introduced in any court of law before or since. This federal and state
constitutional error was compounded when the trial court excluded Dr. Wangler's expert's
testimony that would have contradicted the State's expert's findings.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Mrs. Wangler died in her home on September 4, 2006 as a result of CO poisoning. Dr.
Wangler was sleeping when he was awakened by the sound of a CO detector. He searched the
home for the source of the alarm and found his wife on the floor having a seizure. He quickly
called 911 and performed CPR until help arrived. None of the first responders smelled vehicle
exhaust in the house or garage. Immediately after the Wanglers were taken to the hospital, the
gas company inspected the home and "red tagged" the water heater. In the gas company's
opinion, the water heater presented a dangerous CO hazard because it was improperly ventilated.
Seven months later, police searched the home and exceeded the scope of the search
warrant when they seized Dr. Wangler's private Journals and other evidence not outlined in the
warrant. Over a year after Mrs. Wangler's death, the police conducted a second search in which
they seized ducts from the residence. The ducts were later submitted for testing in the hope that
they would show the presence of "biomarkers" allegedly relating to vehicle exhaust.
Dr. Wangler was indicted three years after his wife's death on one charge of aggravated
murder. A jury trial was held between February 28 and March 16, 2011. Prior to trial, Dr.
2
Wangler filed motions to suppress evidence seized from the searches of his home. The trial
court denied the motions and permitted the State to introduce the Journals seized from the home.
The State's purported expert, Dr. Schauer, opined that the ducts from the home had
biomarkers that allegedly showed that vehicle exhaust traveled through them at the time of Mrs.
Wangler's death. Dr. Wangler moved to exclude this testimony, but the motion was denied.
At the Daubert hearing, Schauer testified concerning the tests performed on the ducts.
He testified that: (1) he knew of no case, "anywhere, anytime in which the techniques and
methods" used in this case were admitted; (2) he knew of no peer-reviewed article that used the
presence of these biomarkers to show the presence of CO; (3) he never personally inspected the
home and did not know the date when Mrs. Wangler died or the date when the samples were
collected; (4) prior to examining the ducts, he had never before performed any analysis on duct
work and had no experience testing such samples; (5) he had not published any articles on soot
deposits inside homes; (6) he had never conducted any peer-reviewed experiments working with
wipe samples; and (7) his overall estimated error rate was 10 to 20%.
Schauer further testified that: (8) he conducted no tests of other homes in the area to
compare to his data and such a comparison would have been useful in validating his opinions; (9)
a vent cover was purchased from a hardware store in Lima and used as a control; however, it
tested positive for the same "trace amount(s) of the mobile source fingerprint" found in the
Wangler home; (10) he used no controls for some of the samples he took; (11) the only control
he used for the ductwork was the outside of the same piece of ductwork but he knew of no peer-
reviewed literature that states this is a valid control; (12) he was not aware of any peer-reviewed
literature where someone had taken wipe samples and then attempted to go back in time and
show what an event looked like years before; (13) the chemical compounds that, in his opinion,
3
- ^
evidence vehicle exhaust are in the air everywhere and can be found "in most places on the face
of the earth," including inside homes; he was not aware of the concentration of these compounds
in the air in Lima; (14) no EPA or federal standards govern the methodology used by the Lab in
this case; (15) he created the methodology used to conduct the testing himself; and (16) he
considered data below the report limit set by the Lab in reaching his conclusions.
While the trial court permitted Schauer to testify, it excluded defense expert, Fred
Teeters, on Daubert grounds. Teeters would have testified that candles, not vehicle exhaust,
were the source of the alleged biomarkers and soot inside the home.
On March 16, 2011, the jury found Dr. Wangler guilty of aggravated murder, and
sentenced him to life with parole eligibility after 25 years. Dr. Wangler moved for Judgment of
Acquittal on March 29, 2011. On April 8, 2011, the trial court denied that motion. (Doc. 443)
A notice of appeal was filed on April 12, 2011. The court issued its opinion on October 22,
2012. Dr. Wangler filed a timely request for reconsideration pursuant to App.R. 26(a), which
was denied on December 5, 2012.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
Proposition of Law No. I: Where evidence has been improperly admitted, a court maydetermine that it is harmless because it is cumulative of other properly introduced evidence onlyif there is a determination that the guilty verdict actually rendered in the case was unattributableto the error. The mere fact that there is other evidence that covers the same subject matter is not,in and of itself, sufficient to determine that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. The Journals Are Not Cumulative Of Other Evidence.
Contrary to the finding of the court, the Journals are not cumulative of other evidence.
The court found that the Journals were cumulative of other evidence concerning the "ruinous
state of Mark and Kathy's marriage." Wangler at ¶ 51. However, the State's use of the Journals
went well beyond an account of the "ruinous" state of the marriage. The State used the Journals
4
to show Dr. Wangler's state of mind both before and after his wife's death. Dr. Wangler did not
testify at trial and the Journals were the only evidence that showed his state of mind.
Exhibit 46(a) is one of the unlawfully seized Journals that were introduced at trial. The
State was permitted to highlight in yellow certain parts of this journal for the jury to read. The
State highlighted information in the journal concerning (1) Dr. Wangler's suicidal thoughts and
actions - "I thought about suicide;" "It would be best if I would just die;" "I went to my bed
room, took my shotgun and attempted suicide;" (2) Dr. Wangler's extra-marital affair - "I did
have an affair with her for about two months;" (3) Dr. Wangler's wife's previous affair - "I
found Kathy and Brian with their arms around each other in a passionate kiss;" (4) Dr. Wangler's
belief that his wife was having a new affair shortly before her death - "Two lady's came up to
me... and asked if I thought Kathy was having an affair.... each of these ladies pointed out
several things that made me suspicious;" (5) information concerning Dr. Wangler's feelings of
anger: "I am sometimes like a Doberman. A Doberman is really a sensitive dog but it is easy to
make them mean by mistreating them.... I see that I am sensitive and that I tend to keep anger
inside until I explode;" (6) detailed information on Dr. Wangler's innermost thoughts - "I am not
satisfied with my sex life," "Sometimes I feel rage," "Our marriage is not what 1 dreamed it
would be," "I do not feel loved." "I feel trapped with no escape," "I do not feel assured that
Kathy will never leave me," "People have no idea what our relationship is really like," "I am
suspicious of Kathy," "Kathy has only had sex with me one time in the past year."
The State argued in closing argument that:
those journals . . . depict a man who was depressed beyond belief, who wasincreasingly angry and obsessed about his wife and his wife's whereabouts andwhat was going on with her. And a man who had suffered repeated humiliationsthrough the years and more specifically at that time by the constant and completerejection of him by his wife. Those words that you heard in those journals...they describe a man who is so depressed and so miserable and so trapped that by
5
July of 2006, just weeks before his wife has died, he's thinking about killinghimself and he writes that he's thinking about using carbon monoxide....
(Tr. Vol. 12, p. 2743-44)(emphasis added). The last quote comes from an entry that has nothing
to: do with the Wanglers' alleged "ruinous" marriage, but rather a quote from one of the Journals
wherein Dr. Wangler writes, "thoughts of suicide are a little strong again. Satan is attacking in
new way this time, using car exhaust. This time I have been tempted through the internet. Please
Lord, block these thoughts from me." (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 2056) The fact that Dr. Wangler was
considering suicide by carbon monoxide just weeks before he allegedly murdered his wife with
carbon monoxide is neither cumulative of other evidence, nor is it favorable to the defense.
The primary use to which the State put the Journals was not, as the court found, to show
the "ruinous" state of the Wangler marriage. Instead, they were used to depict Dr. Wangler's
state of mind. The Journals were used to characterize Dr. Wangler as a "trapped," suicidal, and
"desperate" man who saw no alternative out of his situation but to murder his wife. The State
argued that the Journals, not witness testimony, contradicted the defense theory that Dr. Wangler
was a kind and compassionate person. The State asserted that the Journals presented evidence of
Dr. Wangler's true thoughts and motive, and that the Journals contained evidence that Dr.
Wangler planned to kill his wife using carbon monoxide. As such, the Journals are not
cumulative of any other testimony or evidence, nor were they helpful to the defense.
B. The Journals Compared To The Witness Testimony
The court asserts that the State called "several witnesses who testified in some degree
about the difficulties Mark and Kathy were experiencing in their marriage***." Wangler at ¶ 51.
Five witnesses testified concerning the relationship. The first, Joanne Zacharias, asserted that the
Wanglers did not go places together, that the marriage was "strained," and that Dr. Wangler
criticized his wife and did not want to be buried near her. The second witness, Brenda Keller,
6
4 ^
testified that Dr. Wangler asked her to pray for the marriage because they were having problems.
Next, Sherri Miller testified that Dr. Wangler was critical of his wife's appearance. The fourth
witness, Diana Boedicker, stated that Mrs. Wangler was considering divorce, purchased
expensive jewelry, and that Dr. Wangler expressed no sadness at his wife's funeral. Finally,
Joseph Schlarman testified that the Wanglers did not act like a couple, Mrs. Wangler wanted out
of the marriage, and Dr. Wangler was faking sorrow after his wife's death.
The testimony of these witnesses was contradicted by several defense witnesses. Aaron
Wangler, Dr. and Mrs. Wangler's son, testified that Dr. Wangler was "very, very upset. Very
upset. Very sad," and that he was at his father's side throughout the funeral and graveside
service and that Dr. Wangler appeared "devastated" and was "crying." He testified that Dr.
Wangler was not faking sorrow. He further testified that Dr. Wangler expressed a desire to be
buried next to Mrs. Wangler, but that those plans changed because other family members wanted
her buried in a different city. The Wanglers' other son, Nathan, echoed his brother's testimony
concerning his father's grief. Nathan also testified that his parents loved one another. P.J.
Minor; who was at the hospital with Dr. Wangler after Mrs. Wangler passed, testified that he was
crying and upset and was not faking sorrow. Diane Stuber testified that she was Mrs. Wangler's
best friend, and that, although the Wanglers "struggled like anybody else through their
marriage," they loved each other. She also testified that she was with Dr. Wangler when he was
told his wife died and that he was "bawling like a baby."
Based on the witnesses' testimony, the state of the Wanglers' marriage was, at best, an
open question. Although some witnesses testified Dr. Wangler was not sad after his wife's
death, others testified that he was genuinely sorrowful. While there were clearly issues in the
marriage, the problems, based on the witness testimony, could not be characterized as out of the
7
^. ^
ordinary, much less "ruinous." The Journals, however, are a different form of evidence. They
are a direct firsthand account of the marriage and provide undispiu.table detail of an awful marital
situation. The Journals go beyond any witness testimony and do describe a "ruinous" marriage.
The fact that the Journals contain information that is, in part, duplicative of some witness
testimony does not automatically render them "cumulative" of other evidence as that term is used
for harmless error analysis. The cumulative evidence rule is based on the premise that reversal is
not required where there is evidence in the record that "neutralizes" the prejudice resulting from
the improper admission of evidence on the same subject. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions
and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 Vil.L.Rev. 48, 55 (1957). However, the
error is not harmless in a cumulative sense unless the neutralizing evidence has the same
probative effect as the evidence improperly admitted and is of the same degree of persuasiveness
as the evidence in the record. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 291 (Mo. 1967).
"To be truly cumulative, the evidence must be of the same kind tending to prove the same point."
Dudley, The Cumulative Evidence Rule and Harmless Error, 40 Mo.L.Rev. 79, 82 (1975).
The contested testimony of witnesses is not the same kind of evidence as journals kept by
an accused, nor, in this case, was the witness testimony as persuasive as the words written in Dr.
Wangler's own hand. Therefore, the Journals are not "cumulative" of the witnesses' testimony.
Even if the Journals were cumulative of other evidence, this would not be the end of the
harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court has stated that: "[w]e do not suggest that, if
evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is tendered, the use of cumulative evidence,
though tainted, is harmless error." Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). For a
court to conclude that tainted evidence is cumulative of other evidence and, thereafter, end its
analysis creates a substantial likelihood of injustice. In fact, it ignores the overall object of the
8
5
analysis, which is to determine if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence may have
contributed to the conviction. See Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d at paragraph seven of the syllabus.
Instead of merely determining that unconstitutionally seized evidence is cumulative of
other evidence and ending the analysis, the United States and Ohio Constitutions require that an
appellate court analyze the character and quality of the illegally obtained evidence bearing on the
same issue and appraise the possible impact upon the jury of the wrongfully obtained evidence.
See State v. Brown, 65 Ohio St.3d 483,491, 605 N.E.2d 46 (1992) (Wright, J., dissenting). That
was not done here. Had the court performed the required analysis, it would have determined that
it is impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the Journals did not contribute to the
conviction. Thus Dr. Wangler's state and federal due process rights were violated when the
Journals were published to the jury. The Court should hear this case to clarify that a finding that
evidence is cumulative does not automatically result in a finding that the error is harmless.
Proposition of Law No. II: A trial court fails in its Daubert gatekeeper role when itadmits scientific testimony that is not generally accepted or where there is an analytical gapbetween the accepted scientific premise and the conclusions of the expert.
Pursuant to well-established Daubert analysis, the testimony of Schauer should have been
excluded as unreliable. Dr. Wangler's federal and state constitutional rights were violated when
untested scientific evidence was introduced. In addition to failing to meet the four-prong test set
by this Court in State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (1998), the testimony
included conclusions that were unsupported by the underlying data. Expert conclusions must be
supported by the underlying data and unwarranted extrapolations must be excluded. See
Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio-3561, 850 N.E.2d 683, at ¶18.
In Valentine, this Court considered whether "Evid.R. 702(C) requires a scientifically
valid connection between the opinion of an expert witness and the resources relied upon by the
9
expert." Id. at ¶1. To be "scientifically or technically reliable, expert testimony *** must `fit'
the case at hand." Id. at ¶30. "[A]n expert's opinion would not fit if sources relied upon by the
expert did not actually support the expert's opinion." Id. at ¶32; see also In re: Welding Fume
Prod. Liab. Litigation (N.D.Ohio 2005), No. 1:03-CV-17000, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46164, at
*29 (a court "must not admit expert testimony if the expert `has unjustifiably extrapolated from
an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. "').
Schauer proffered two primary opinions. First, Schauer testified that wipe samples taken
from the duct work seized from the Wangler home over a year after Mrs. Wangler's death
showed the presence of certain chemicals that, based upon his research, are derived only from
exposure to an internal combustion engine. Second, Schauer opined that the chemicals in
question were quickly introduced into the duct work at the time of Mrs. Wangler's death and that
there was an unnaturally high concentration of the chemicals deposited at that time.
Both the trial and appellate court focused their Daubert analysis on the first part of
Schauer's opinion. The court found that "Schauer testified that the chemical fingerprint was
similar to the known chemical fingerprint associated with soot found in exhaust emitted from an
engine***" and that the "opinion as to the origin of the soot is reasonably drawn from the
underlying data." Wangler at ¶ 78. While Dr. Wangler takes issue with this conclusion, and
argues that Schauer failed to account for a potential false positive from candle soot and that the
presence of the biomarkers, even if they are from vehicle exhaust, is meaningless because the
biomarkers can be found everywhere on Earth, the real Daubert issue in this case is with the
second portion of Schauer's opinion.
As to the second part of Schauer's opinion, the appellate court concluded that Schauer's
opinion that the soot sampl_es were deposited over a short period of time was permissible based
10
on deposition velocity data (the rate at which particles deposit on a surface), as well as the
photographs depicting a V-shaped soot mark in the bedroom where Mrs. Wangler died. Id. at ¶
79. Thus, the court found that Schauer was able to determine "that a high concentration of soot
traveled through the ventilation system." Id.
Schauer's opinions, however, went further than the court recognized. Schauer opined not
only that there was a high concentration of soot in the home, but also that vehicle exhaust was
introduced directly into the ducts at the time of Mrs. Wangler's death. This opinion constitutes
an unjustifiable extrapolation from an accepted premise (the testing of air samples to determine
pollutants) to an unfounded conclusion (the testing showed in this case that the Wangler home
was previously subjected to an unnatural and sudden accumulation of vehicle exhaust at the time
of Mrs. Wangler's death). In other words, Schauer's data did not "fit" his conclusions, and his
conclusions presented "too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."
See Valentine at ¶18. As such, the trial court incorrectly admitted the testimony.
The deposition velocity numbers mentioned in the court's opinion and upon which
Schauer relied to reach his conclusions were not disclosed to the defense because the trial court
ruled that Schauer's mathematical formulas were privileged "work product." (Doc. 267). As a
result, neither the trial court nor the defense was able to fully explore the methodology used by
Schauer to arrive at his conclusions. Schauer admitted that he did not use standard deposition
velocity equations, but instead compiled his deposition velocity numbers from "different
sources" and "estimated" what the concentration would be for different periods of time. Schauer
further admitted that there was disagreement between the various sources used to create his data,
and that he was uncertain what the actual error rate of his deposition velocity analysis was.
Because Schauer would not disclose how he arrived at his deposition velocity numbers or even
11
what the numbers were, Schauer's work could not be replicated, confirmed, or rebutted by Dr.
Wangler's expert. Pursuant to Daubert, courts should not admit scientific conclusions that are
based on secret novel methodology or that represent an unsupported leap from accepted science.
The methodology used by Schauer to reach his conclusions is different from anything he
or anyone else has used before. The methodology used in this case is not used or accepted by
other well respected labs in America. Indeed, prior to paying Schauer to perform this work, the
police contacted the Ohio State Crime Lab, the Ohio State Arson Lab, the FBI crime lab in
Washington D.C., the EPA lab in Washington D.C. and the EPA laboratory in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, all of which stated that they could not perform the tests. (Tr. Vol. 7, p. 1620-23)
The determination by the court that Schauer's opinion is bolstered by the photographic
evidence of the V-shaped soot stain on the bedroom wall where Mrs. Wangler died is not well
founded. The court's opinion ignores Aaron and Nathan Wangler's testimony, and the fact that
Schauer is not an expert in forensic photographic analysis and has not published any peer-
reviewed articles relating to his special ability to look at photographs of soot stains and divine
from such photographs the source and age of a stain. The room in question was previously
Aaron's bedroom. Aaron testified that the stain was there four to five years before his mother's
death and that when he moved to go to college that he "absolutely" recalls seeing the V-shaped
soot stain on the wall. Aaron further testified that his mother burned candles "all the time."
Nathan Wangler also testified that the V-shaped stain was not new and that the mark was on the
wall when he left for college in 2001. Nathan could not say for sure what made the soot stain on
the wall, but he did note that his mother burned "lots of candles in the home."
Finally, Dr. Schauer's opinions are not on an area in which he is an expert. The State
obfuscated Schauer's area of expertise throughout this case. Schauer was qualified as an expert
12
in "environmental chemistry and aerosol science." (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1862). Aerosol science
investigates the physical and chemical properties of airborne particles. While Schauer may be an
expert in that area, this case does not deal with an analysis of airborne particles. Instead, in this
case, Schauer tested wipe samples from a home to show that someone was murdered there years
before the samples were ever taken. Schauer is not an expert in this area - no one is.
The problem in this case is not so much the testing of the wipe samples - although there
are many issues with those tests. The major Daubert issue in this case is the application of the
testing to a new area of "science." Because no one has previously looked at wipe samples from
homes in an effort to go back in time and determine what happened in the residence years before
the samples were taken, there is insufficient data from which to draw accurate conclusions.
There is no baseline for what wipe samples from a home should look like. No one has
established how much of the biomarkers could be expected to be found in an average 5, 10, or 15
year-old home. There are no established controls or recognized averages. There are no peer
reviewed articles on the subject. Schauer's only effort to establish an accurate comparison to the
Wangler home failed. That is, when data was collected from a home in the same subdivision as
the Wanglers' home, the tests actually showed more of the alleged biomarkers for vehicle
exhaust than were found in the Wangler home.
In sum, Schauer essentially took the known science of testing air samples to determine
pollutants and extrapolated from that accepted premise that Mrs. Wangler was murdered in her
home by vehicle exhaust based upon his analysis of wipe samples taken years after her death and
his observation of a photo of a stain on a wall. There was no "fit" between the technically
reliable science and Schauer's conclusions. If left uncorrected, the court's published opinion
establishes damaging precedent that will cause mischief for years to come.
13
Proposition of Law No. III: A trial court abuses its discretion when it improperly limits
qualified expert testimony.
The appellate court erroneously concluded that, although it may have come to a different
conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Teeters's testimony. Wangler
at ¶ 91. The court also erred in finding that, even if the limitation of Teeters's testimony was
improper, the error was harmless because another defense expert testified to the fact that burning
candles can produce soot that would contain hopanes, steranes, and PAH's.l Wangler at ¶ 92.
The trial court abused its discretion and violated Dr. Wangler's federal and state
constitutional rights when it permitted the State to object to Teeters minutes before he was to
testify, compounding the error by only allowing Dr. Wangler ten minutes to overcome the
challenge, and ultimately in severely limiting Teeters' testimony to the jury. The trial court ruled
that Teeters had "no qualifications to be an expert relative to candle soot in the house." (Tr. Vol
11, p. 2636) However, the court found that Teeters had "sufficient background in tracing of
biomarkers and emissions such to at least, at this point, present evidence* * * relative thereto."
(Id.) The court's ruling is not logical and demonstrates the trial and appellate courts'
misunderstanding of the science in this case.
The trial court's ruling precluded Teeters, who was qualified in the area of "forensic
chemical analysis" and has over 30 years' experience in determining the source, cause, and
origin of chemical contaminants, from testifying as to candle soot in the Wangler home, but
permitted him to testify concerning tracing of biomarkers and emissions. As a result, Teeters
testified that the chemical compounds in the ducts were not from vehicle exhaust, but he was
prohibited from testifying that the same chemicals in the ducts and from the stain on the bedroom
' These are the chemicals that make up the alleged biomarkers for vehicle exhaust. The court'sopinion also erroneously states that the defense did not proffer Teeter's testimony. Wangler at
¶ 91. However, the defense did proffer Teeters's testimony. (Tr. Vol 11, p. 2659-60).
14
wall where Mrs. Wangler died were from candles, or that candles, in this case, created a false
positive for vehicle exhaust in Schauer's tests.
Teeters, pursuant to the Daubert standard discussed in the previous section, was
eminently more qualified than Schauer to testify on these subjects. Yet, the trial court permitted
Schauer, who had not previously performed studies on candles or published articles on soot
stains inside homes (Daubert Tr. p. 235), to testify that the soot in the home was not from
candles. Schauer even admitted on cross-examination that candles are a potential source of soot
and PAHs in homes.
Had Teeters been permitted to fully testify, he would have opined that the compounds
emitted from burning candles created a false positive for the alleged vehicle exhaust biomarkers
inside the Wangler home and that the soot stain on the wall of the bedroom originated from
candle soot and not vehicle exhaust. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 2659-60). Even the court recognized that
Wangler's other expert "did not go so far as to conclude that [these chemicals] may result in a
false-positive for [vehicle exhaust]," Wangler at ¶ 92, which demonstrates the harm. He further
would have tied all the other testimony together with the ultimate conclusion that candle soot
created a false-positive in the home for vehicle exhaust. Because this ultimate conclusion was
what all the other testimony was leading up to and the jury was not permitted to hear the opinion
from the expert, Dr. Wangler was harmed by the exclusion of the testimony.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this felony case involves matters of public and great
general interest and substantial constitutional questions. Dr. Wangler respectfully requests that
the Honorable Court accept jurisdiction in this case so that the important issues presented will be
reviewed on the merits.
15
Respectfully submitted,
Christop er R. McDowell (0072218)DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900Cincinnati, Ohio 45202Phone: 513.977-8588Fax: 513.977-8566Christopher.mcdowell (,dinslaw. com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant,Dr. Mark A. Wangler
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief was sent via U.S. mail, postageprepaid, on this 15th day of January, 2013 to Juergen A. Waldick, counsel for the State of Ohio,Allen Cty. Prosecutor, Court of Appeals Building, Suite 302, 204 N. Main St., Lima, Ohio
45801.
Christopher R. McDowell
16
APPENDIX 1
It
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOTHIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO9
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
MARK A. WANGLER,
CASE NO. 1-11-18
JUDGMENTENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is
hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of
the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this
Court's judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by
App.R. 27; and serve a copy of this Court's judgment entry and opinion on each
party to the proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
DATED: October 22 ® 2012
,^ 1.
f ^JUDGES
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIOTHIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT r -
ALLEN COUNTY ' 4
^=-r
STATE OF OHIO, CD^`^ y £^
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
MARK A. WANGLER,
CASE NO. 1-11-18
OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas CourtTrial Court No. CR2009 0298
v uQa..^"n^°::t A ffir mn rl
Date of Decision: October 22, 2012
APPEARANCES:
Christopher R. McDowell, Sarah Sparks Herron and
Roxanne L. Ingles for Appellant
^-.._..^^.
Juergen A. Waldick and Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
Case No. 1-11-18
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Mark Wangler ("Mark"), appeals from the
judgment of the Court of. Common Pleas of Allen County convicting him of one
count of aggravated murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after twenty-five years. On appeal, Mark contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motions to suppress; that the trial court erred in refusing to
exclude the testing performed by the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene ("the
Lab") and the testimony of the Lab's employees; that the trial court erred in
excluding testimony of his expert witness, Frederick Teeters; and, that he was
denied a fair trial as a result of discovery violations that denied him access to
material evidence. Given the alleged errors, Mark contends that his conviction
should be vacated and that he be granted a new trial. Based on the following, we
affinn the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On the night of September 4, 2006, Mark and his wife, Kathy Wangler
("Kathy"), were asleep in their residence. That night, Kathy slept in a bedroom
located on the second floor, while Mark slept in the master bedroom located on the
first floor. At 5:18 a.m., the Allen County Sheriffs Office ("the Sheriffs Office")
received a 911 call from Mark exclaiming that the carbon monoxide ("CO") alarm
in his residence was sounding and that Kathy, a diagnosed epileptic, was having a
seizure. During the 911 call, but prior to the arrival of emergency services, Mark
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Case No. 1-11-18
informed the dispatcher that he had opened the windows in Kathy's bedroom and
began performing CPR on Kathy.
{¶31 At approximately 5:22 a.m., Chief Joseph Kitchen ("Chief Kitchen"),
Bath Township's Fire Chief, was the first of the emergency services personnel to
arrive at the residence. Upon entering the residence, Chief Kitchen heard the CO
alarm sounding. Mark escorted Chief Kitchen to Kathy's bedroom where he
found Kathy lying with her torso on an air mattress and her legs on -the floor.
Upon checking Kathy's vital signs Chief Kitchen discovered that Kathy was not
breathing and had no pulse. As a result, Chief Kitchen proceeded to slide Kathy
off the air mattress and began CPR.' At approximately 5:23 a.m., the Bath
Township EMS arrived on scene and began advanced life support procedures.
During this time, Kathy was placed on a cardiac monitor, which revealed that
Kathy was in asystole, which is colloquially -known as flatline, i.e., there was no
electrical activity in her heart. Because of her condition and failure to respond to
advanced life support procedures, Kathy was transported to Lima Memorial
Hospital ("the hospital"), where she arrived at 5:45 a.m. Shortly after Kathy was
transported to the hospital, a sheriffs deputy transported Mark to the hospital for
treatment.
1 At trial, Kitchen, as well as other medical professionals, testified that in order to properly administer CPRthe victim must be lying on a solid surface.
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Case No. 1-11-18
{¶4} Upon arrival at the hospital, Dr. Rina Stein, the attending emergency
physician, examined Kathy noting that her jaw was stiff and difficult to open, her
neck was stiff, her skin was pale and cool to the touch, her internal body
temperature was 95.5 degrees Fahrenheit, and her body was exhibiting signs of
posterior lividity. Despite continued efforts to resuscitate Kathy, she was
officially declared dead at 5:54 a.m. Based on the condition of Kathy's body, it
was Dr. Stein's opinion that Kathy had died before she arrived at the hospital.
{¶5} Mark arrived at the hospital shortly after Kathy, and was treated for
CO poisoning. At the hospital, Mark was found to have a carboxyhemoglobin
level of 13%.2 Mark was released from the hospital at 10:54 a.m.
{¶6} After Kathy was transported to the hospital, at approximately 5:40
a.m., Cledus Hawk II ("Hawk"), a firefighter with the Bath Township Fire
Department, entered the residence to measure CO levels. Initially, Hawk
proceeded to the basement where his measuring instrument, a four gas analyzer
("analyzer"), measured a CO level of 50 parts per million ("ppm"). As a result of
the reading, Hawk exited the residence and equipped himself with a self-contained
breathing apparatus ("SCBA"). Several minutes after Hawk exited the residence,
he reentered the residence and again proceeded to the basement. This time the
2 Carboxyhemoglobin is defined as "a very stable combination of hemoglobin and carbon monoxideformed in the blood when carbon monoxide is inhaled with resulting loss of ability of the blood to combinewith oxygen." Merriam-Webster (2012), http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/carboxyhemoglobin
(accessed October 15, 2012).
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Case No. 1-11-18
analyzer measured a CO level of 35-30 ppm. At 6:00 a.m., Hawk closed all of the
windows in the residence and waited approximately an hour before he reentered
the residence. At 7:10 a.m., Hawk reentered the residence and proceeded to the
basement where the analyzer measured a CO level of 20-15 ppm. After taking a
reading in the basement, Hawk proceeded to Kathy's bedroom. There, the
analyzer measured a CO level of 25-20 ppm. Shortly thereafter, Hawk returned to
the basement and held the analyzer near the natural. gas-fired water heater and
furnace for several minutes and found that the CO levels near those appliances
were the same as those measured throughout the basement.
{¶7} After the residence was deemed safe for entry without a SCBA,
Sergeant Philip Sherrick ("Sergeant Sherrick"), a deputy with the Sheriff's Office,
conducted a walkthrough of the residence. Upon inspecting Kathy's bedroom,
Sergeant Sherrick observed soot-like markings on the wall directly above a
register located in the floor. Sergeant Sherrick then continued to the master
bedroom. Upon entering the master bedroom, Sergeant Sherrick noticed a
pungent sulfur-like order emanating from the en-suite master bathroom. Upon
entering the master bathroom, Sergeant Sherrick observed that the carpet around
the toilet was wet, a floor fan was running, and the bathroom window was open.
Thereafter, Sergeant Sherrick continued to the basement. The basement had two
staircases, one leading into the residence and one leading into the garage. After
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Case No. 1-11-18
examining the basement, Sergeant Sherrick continued to the garage where he
observed two vehicles parked inside the garage, as well as a lawn mower, snow
blower, and gas powered generator. Outside the garage, Sergeant Sherrick
observed an RV and another vehicle parked in the driveway.
{¶8} After conducting a walkthrough of the residence, Sergeant Sherrick
drove to the hospital. Sergeant Sherrick arrived at the hospital at approximately
8:15 a.m. and spoke with Mark. During their conversation, Mark explained that
he awoke to the CO alarm sounding, that he went upstairs to check on Kathy and
found her having what he perceived to be a seizure, that he went back downstairs
to call 911, and that he conducted CPR until emergency services personnel
arrived. Mark also explained that the furnace and water heater had been replaced
two years prior, and that the wind would periodically blowout the water heater's
pilot light.
{¶9} On the morning of Kathy's death, Jan Zuber ("Zuber"), a customer
service representative for Old Dominion Gas Company, arrived at the residence to
determine the source of the CO. Zuber sealed the residence (i.e., closed the
windows and doors) and ran the furnace and water heater one at a time. As each
appliance was running, Zuber walked throughout the residence measuring the CO
levels. During the testing, the highest measurement of CO detected in the
residence was 3 ppm. Zuber also inspected the furnace and water heater and
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Case No. 1-11-18
determined that each appliance was properly operating. Despite this
determination, Zuber placed a red tag on the water heater because of a code
violation concerning the height of the water heater's flue outside the residence.
{¶10} On September 5, 2006, Dr. Diana Barnett ("Dr. Barnett"), a forensic
pathologist and deputy coroner with the Lucas County Coroner's Office,
performed Kathy's autopsy. As part of the autopsy, Dr. Bamett sent samples of
Kathy's blood to Dr. Robert Fomey, chief toxicologist with the Lucas County
Coroner's Office. Kathy's blood had a carboxyhemoglobin level of 69.6%. Based
on Kathy's carboxyhemoglobin level, Dr. Barnett concluded that Kathy died of
acute CO poisoning: Upon review of Kathy's emergency room records, it was Dr.
Barnett's opinion that Kathy died one to two hours before arriving at the hospital.
{¶11} On the morning of September 6, 2006, Steve Erlenbach
(66Erlenbach"). an enizineer with SEA Limited, a forensic investigation firm, was
contacted by the Sheriff's Office and asked to investigate Mark and Kathy's CO
poisoning. Erlenbach arrived at the residence at approximately noon the same day
and began his investigation. First, Erlenbach conducted a walkthrough of the
residence. During his walkthrough, Erlenbach observed and photographed soot
stains on the wall above the register in Kathy's bedroom, as well as soot-stained
carpet underneath the same register. Erlenbach noted that the residence contained
three natural gas-fired appliances, to wit: a furnace; a water heater; and gas
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Case No. 1-11-18
fireplace. All three natural gas-fired appliances were located in the basement.
During his investigation, Erlenbach operated the furnace, water heater, and gas
fireplace one at a time under different conditions (i.e., basement door open and
closed, bathroom exhaust fans on and off, windows open and closed). After
testing each appliance, Erlenbach determined that each appliance was properly
operating and detected no abnormal or unsafe levels of CO emanating from the
appliances. Though Erlenbach determined that the water heater was properly
operating, he did find that the flue from the water heater extending outside the
residence was in violation of the National Fuel Gas Code, because it did not
extend high enough in the air.
{¶12} Following his investigation, in October 2006, Erlenbach sent the
Sheriff's Office a report detailing his investigation, analysis, and conclusions.
Erlenbach's report contained the following conclusions:
SEA testing of the gas appliances within the Wangler home showedno source of fugitive carbon monoxide (outside of a small amount ofcarbon monoxide emitted from a vent-free fireplace).
The levels of carbon monoxide emitted from the vent-free fireplacefall well within acceptable exposure limits set by OSHA andASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers) and were not causal to the incident.
The vent for the water heater was not of sufficient height accordingto the National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA 54).
If Mr. Wangler's story about the water heater pilot light is true, thenthe water heater has a venting problem that occurs under certain
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Case No. 1-11-18
conditions. This problem could be allowing products of combustion(including CO) to backdraft through the water-heater vent and intothe home. According to Mr. Wangler, there was hot water use thenight preceding the incident.
Additional testing would be required to test venting performanceunder different outdoor conditions.
If it is true that Mrs. Wangler had a carboxyheinoglobin (COHb)level of 69%, she would had to have been exposed to CO levels inexcess of 1200 ppm. The fact that Mr. Wangler was in a room withthe windows open and a fan running could explain why his COHblevels were so much lower than his wife's.
Additional testing would be required to determine the cause of thestaining near the supply-air registers.
SEA cannot eliminate the possibility of a car running in the attachedgarage as a potential source of carbon monoxide in the home.October 2, 2006 SEA Report, p. 2.
{¶13} In April 2007, then Sergeant Clyde Breitigan ("Sergeant Breitigan"),
a deputy with the Sheriffs Office, filed an affidavit ("April affidavit") in support
of a warrant to search the Wangler residence. In the April affidavit, Sergeant
Breitigan made clear that the Sheriff's Office sought the requested items in
relation to the offense of aggravated murder.3 The warrant ("April search
warrant") was granted and executed on April 24, 2007. During the execution of
the April search warrant, law enforcement, including Sergeant Breitigan, seized
various items, including but not limited to, a personal computer, a laptop, various
computer accessories, various data storage devices, a portable GPS unit,
3 The requested items will be discussed in further detail below.
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Case No. 1-11-18
iniscellaneous papers, three handwritten journals, cash, credit cards, jewelry, and
books.
{¶14} In October 2007, Sergeant Fred Depalma ("Sergeant Depalma"), a
deputy with the Sheriff's Office, contacted the Lab and spoke with the Lab's
program director, Dr. Jamie Schauer ("Dr. Sehauer"). Sergeant Depalma asked
Dr. Schauer whether the Lab was capable of testing for and detecting particles
emitted from an internal combustion engine ("engine"), to which Dr. Schauer
responded in the affirmative:
{¶15} In November 2007, Sergeant Breitigan, based on the items seized
under the April search warrant and the testing capabilities of the Lab, filed an
affidavit ("November affidavit") in support of a second warrant to search the
Wangler residence. The warrant ("November search warrant") was granted and
executed on November 15, 2007. During the execution of the November search
warrant, law enforcement, including Sergeant Breitigan, seized various items,
including but not limited to, ductwork, the register from Kathy's bedroom, and a
swatch of carpet surrounding the same register. These items were sealed and
stored in the Sheriff's Office's evidence room, where they remained until they
were transported to the Lab.
{¶16} On January 29, 2008, Sergeant Depalma transported the items seized
under the November search warrant, as well as several control samples, to the Lab.
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Case No. 1-11-18
On September 11, 2009, the Lab sent the Sheriff's Office a report ("the Report")
authored by Dr. Schauer detailing the Lab's analysis and his conclusions. In the
Report, Dr. Schauer concluded that molecular tracers found in the soot collected
from the duct work were commonly found in soot emitted from an engine.4
{¶17} On September 17, 2009, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Mark
on one count of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), an
unclassified felony. In response, Mark entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶18} In November 2009, Mark filed motions to suppress property seized
under the April and Noveinber search warrants. In December 2009, the matter
proceeded to a suppression hearing. During the hearing, the trial court requested
that the parties file supplemental briefs in support of their respective positions,
and, based on the parties agreement, that the briefs be filed on the same day. On
January 12, 2010, the Darties filed their supDlemental briefs. Later that same
month, the trial court filed its order overruling Mark's motions to suppress.
{1119} In August 2010, Mark filed a motion in limine requesting the trial
court to exclude the testing performed by the Lab and the testimony of the Lab's
employees. Mark argued, in relevant part, that the testing performed by the Lab,
as well as expert testimony concerning the same, was not admissible because the
methodology employed by the Lab was neither scientifically reliable nor relevant
4 We note that in addition to the Report issued by the Lab in September 2009, Dr. Schauer authored arevised version of the Report in February 2011, in which he explained the Lab's analysis and hisconclusions in further detail. The State admitted the revised Report at trial.
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Case No. 1-11-18
to the facts at issue in the case. In September 2010, the matter proceeded to a
Daubert hearing. Later that month, the trial court filed its order overruling Mark's
motion in limine.
}¶20} On February 28, 2011, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. On
March 16, 2011, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the sole count of aggravated
murder. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Mark to life imprisonment with
parole eligibility after twenty-five years.
{¶21} It is from this judgment Mark appeals, presenting the following
assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of ENroN No. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESSTHE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TOUNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH WARRANTS.
Assignment ofError No. II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO EXCLUDETHE STATE'S EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Assignment of ErroN No. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING THETESTIMONY OF DR. WANGLER'S EXPERT WITNESS,FREDERICK A. TEETERS.
Assignment of Error No. IV
DR. WANGLER WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS ARESULT OF NUMEROUS DISCOVERY VIOLATIONSTHAT DENIED HIM MATERIAL EVIDENCE.
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Case No. 1-11-18
Assignment of Error No. I
{¶22} In his first assignment of error, Mark contends that the trial court
erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained under the April and November
search warrants. Specifically, Mark contends that the April affidavit lacked
probable cause to seize handwritten materials from his residence; that the April
and November affidavits contained stale information; -that the April search warrant
did not describe with particularity the items to be seized; that law enforcement
exceeded the scope of the April and November search warrants; that the trial court
erred in applying the good.faith exception to the items seized urider the April and
November search warrants; and, that the November affidavit contained knowingly
false information.
{1123} Before we address the merits of the foregoing contentions, we must
first address the issue of waiver as raised by the State.
1. Waiver
{1[24} In its response to Mark's first assignment of error, the State argues
that three of Mark's foregoing contentions were not raised below, to wit: the April
and November affidavits contained stale information; the April search warrant did
not describe with particularity the items to be seized; and, law enforcement
exceeded the scope of the November search warrant. As a result, the State argues
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Case No. 1-11-18
that Mark has waived appellate review of these contentions. Based on the
following, we agree.
}¶25} Crim.R. 47, which governs motions in criminal proceedings,
provides, in relevant part:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. Amotion, other than one made during trial or hearing, shall be inwriting unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state
with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall setforth the relief or order sought. It shall be supported by amemorandum containing citations of authority, and may also besupported by an affidavit. (Emphasis added.).
In City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), the court explained that
"[Crim.R. 47], *** when applied to a motion to suppress evidence obtained by
search and seizure, requires that the prosecution be given notice of the specific
legal and factual grounds upon which the validity of the search and seizure is
challenged." Id. at 219. "The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge
in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge
in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the
merits." Id. at 218. "Failure on the part of the defendant to adequately raise the
basis of his challenge constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal:" Id.; see also
State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58 (1994) ("[b]y requiring the defendant to
state with particularity the legal and factual issues to be resolved, the prosecutor
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Case No. 1-11-18
and court are placed on notice of those issues to be heard and decided by the court
and, by omission, those issues which are otherwise being waived").
{¶26} Review of the record, specifically Mark's motions to suppress,
suppression hearing transcript, and Mark's supplemental brief in support of his
motions to suppress, reveal that Mark never argued before the trial court that the
April and November affidavits contained stale information or that the April search
warrant did not describe with particularity the items to be seized.5 Accordingly,
Mark's contentions concerning staleness and particularity are waived on appeal.
{¶27} In addition, review of the record reveals that Mark has waived his
contention that the November affidavit contained knowingly false information.
While Mark did argue below that the November affidavit contained knowingly
false information, the basis of that contention was materially different from the
basis of his assertion on anpeal. Below, Mark argued that Sergeant Breitigan's
discussion of Kathy's condition upon her arrival at the hospital (i.e. Kathy's core
temperature, stiffness of her jaw) and conclusion that her condition indicated she
died sometime before Mark called 911 was false and made in reckless disregard
for the truth. (Docket No. 28, p. 3-5; Docket No. 43, p. 16-22). On appeal,
however, Mark contends that Sergeant Breitigan's statements that Mark tracked
Kathy's movements via GPS and conducted internet searches relating to CO were
5 Notably, Mark, in his reply brief, does not deny that he failed to raise these contentions before the trial
court.
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Case No. 1-11-18
false and made in reckless disregard for the truth. Clearly, the argument raised
below concerning the inclusion of knowingly false information in the November
affidavit was materially different from Mark's contention on appeal. Accordingly,
Mark's newly raised contention' concerning the inclusion of knowingly false
information in the November affidavit is waived on appeal.
{¶28} Unlike Mark's contentions concerning staleness, particularity, and
the inclusion of knowingly false information, Mark did argue before the trial court
that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the November search warrant.
(Docket No. 43, p. 10-11). In fact, the trial court considered and overruled that
argument in its decision on Mark's motions to suppress. (Docket No. 45, p. 6).
Despite having raised that argument below and the trial court's ruling thereon, we
find that Mark has waived the issue on appeal. Review of the record reveals that
Mark first raised the contention in a supplemental brief filed after the suppression
hearing. (Docket No. 43, p. 10-11). We find the timing of Mark's contention runs
afoul of Crim.R. 47.
{¶29} As previously mentioned, Crim.R. 47, as it pertains to motions to
suppress, is designed to place the state on notice of the specific legal and factual
grounds upon which the validity Qf the search and seizure is challenged. Xenia at
219. This notice affords the state an opportunity to rebut the grounds upon which
the defendant is challenging the search and seizure. Here, due to the timing of
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Case No. 1-11-18
Mark's contention and the fact that the supplemental briefs were filed on the same
day, the State was not given an opportunity to present arguments and evidence to
rebut the same: Indeed, an officer's testimony concerning the seizure of an item
allegedly not covered under the search warrant would be relevant in determining
whether the item at issue was covered under the search warrant or was otherwise
properly seized pursuant to a warrant exception, such as the plain view doctrine.
Furthermore, the fact that the trial court ruled on Mark's contention, albeit in the
State's favor, does not preclude the application of the waiver doctrine. The State
did not have the opportunity to present rebuttal arguments or evidence, which
consequently places the State at a severe disadvantage if this court were to
consider the merits of Mark's contention. Accordingly, Mark's contention that
law enforcement exceeded the scope of the November search warrant is waived on
aalrtPa 1r.$, _.._.
}¶30} Having determined that Mark has waived his contentions concerning
staleness, particularity, inclusion of knowingly false information, and the scope of
the search under the November search warrant, we turn our attention to Mark's
remaining contentions, to wit: the April affidavit lacked probable cause to seize
handwritten materials; law enforcement exceeded the scope of the April search
warrant; and, the trial court erred in applying the good faith exception.
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Case No. 1-11-18
Considering the nature of Mark's remaining contentions, we will first address his
contention that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the April search warrant.
II. Scope of the April Search Warrant
{¶31} Mark contends that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the April
search warrant when it seized iniscellaneous papers, handwritten journals, cash,
jewelry, credit cards, a briefcase, a safe, a disposable camera, and headphones.
Based on the following, we agree.
{¶32} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. State v.
Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850 (12th Dist. 2000). Therefore, when an
annPllate court reviews a trial court's ruliniz on a motion to suppress, it must,^r.r..__.-_- ------ -- -- - -- ---- - " _ _
accept the trial court's findings of fact when supported by competent, credible
evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ^ 100, citing
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). The appellate court must then
review the application of the law to the facts de novo. Roberts, citing Burnside at
T 8.
{¶33} The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, commands in relevant part, that
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Case No. 1-11-18
no warrants shall issue. except those particularly describing the things to be
seized.6 Consequently, the permissible scope of a search is governed by the terms
set forth in the search warrant. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656,
100 S.Ct. 2395 (1980). "If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the
terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from
the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more."
Horton v. Califonnia, 496 U.S. 128, 140, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990). "While this does
not mean that every police action while inside a home must be explicitly
authorized by the text of the warrant, the Fourth Amendment does require that
police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion." (Citation omitted.) Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611,
119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999).
F^i^dl C;ncP thP nerm;csihle scnne of a sea.rch is governed bv the terms set
forth in the search warrant, we begin with the terms of the April search warrant.
Affidavit having been made before me by Sergeant C.W. Breitiganthat he has reason to believe that on the premises located at 860Yorkshire Drive Lima, Allen County, Ohio * * *
***
[T]here is now being concealed certain property, namely
(1) Computers, computer components, computer peripherals, wordprocessing equipment, modems, monitors, printers, keyboards,
6 Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains a nearly identical provision. State v. Jones, 124
Ohio St.3d 1203, 2009-Ohio-6188, ¶ 29.
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Case No. 1-11-18
cables, scanning equipment, information storage devices, includingbut not limited to hard disc drives, remote disc drives, computercompact disks, 3'/2 inch computer discs, zip disks, removable diskcartridges, smart cards, computer tapes; (2) Any and all electronicaccounting records, in the form of computer generated logs ofcriminal activity, including but not limited to diaries, journals,calendars or computer system audit records; electronic mailmessages, opened and unopened, to or from co-conspirators,associates or victims; computer account information, including butnot limited to computer host names and internet addresses, accountnames, passwords, access telephone numbers, password files andother information about computer systems, users, accounts andrelated topics and documents that show ownership and control; (3)any and all electronic communications including but not limited toopened and unopened e-mail messages, instant messages (IM),letters and other electronic records, documents, correspondence,notes, memoranda, address lists, telephone directories, screen namelists, buddy lists, advertisemeints, calendars, diaries, journals, telexes,faxes, audio and visual tape recordings, any global positioningsystems, any computer(s), hardware, software and items used todownload information off a GPS tracking device(s)
[W]hich are ***[E]vidence of the crime of Aggravated Murder,O.R.C. 2903.01(A)
{¶35} A plain reading of the April search warrant's terms reveals that law
enforcement could search and seize three different categories of items. The
parties' do not dispute that the first category authorized the search and seizure of
computers and devices associated with the operation of computers (i.e., printers,
keyboards, information storage devices, etc.).7 The parties, however, disagree as
to the scope of items that could be searched for and seized pursuant to the second
7 The first category is delineated in the April search warrant by the number one in parentheses.
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Case No. 1-11-18
and third categories.8 Accordingly, we will consider the second and third
categories.
{¶36} A plain reading of the second and third categories in the April search
warrant authorizes the search and seizure of electronic records, communications,
and documents. The second category reads, in relevant part, "[a]ny and all
electronic accounting records, in the form of computer generated logs of criminal
activity, including but not limited to diaries, journals, calendars or computer
system audit records." (Emphasis added.). The third category reads, "any and all
electronic communications including but not limited to opened and unopened e-
mail messages, instant messages (IM), letters and other electronic records,
documents, correspondence, notes, memoranda, address lists, telephone
directories, screen name lists, buddy lists, advertisements, calendars, diaries,
inr,rnnlc tPlexec faxec *f l" (F.m-nhacic nclded_1_ An ohiectivelv reasonable^..,...___w_^, °___-__.,, _...__^ ^•^ ^-----r--^___ ^^^_^.i- ---- --^---- --^
reading of these categories requires each category to be read in its entirety. See
United States v. Young, 263 Fed.Appx. 710, 714 (10th Cir.2008) (reading warrant
in its entirety to determine scope of the warrant). When the second and third
categories are read in their entirety, it is apparent that the terms "electronic" and
"computer generated" modify the terms that follow, which happen to include
"records," "documents," "diaries," and "journals." Accordingly, the second and
8 The second and third categories are delineated in the April search warrant by the numbers two and threein parentheses, respectively.
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Case No. 1-11-18
third categories authorized the search and seizure of electronic records,
communications, and documents.
{¶37} Our reading of the second and third categories is strengthened by
reference to the April affidavit prepared by Sergeant Breitigan. In particular, the
following language from the April affidavit supports the fact that law enforcement
primarily sought computer(s), computer related devices, and information stored in
computers and computer related devices (e.g., electronic records, communications,
and documents).
Based on the evidence summarized earlier in this affidavit, there isreason to. believe that Dr. Mark Wangler used coinputer(s) andcomputer diskettes to store, maintain, retrieve and use electronic datain the form of electronic records, documents and materials and thathe used the following data types
A. computer software used for criminal purposes;
B. account information (site names, internet addresses, accountnames, screen names, passwords, telephone numbers and similaritems) of entities who were contacted by individual(s) at 860Yorkshire Rd., Bath Township, Allen County, Ohio on the intern.etfor the purpose of furthering criminal activity; and
C. system accounting and audit logs which record the operationsoccurring on that computer (including criminal activities)
D. GPS tracking systems[.] April Affidavit, p. 12.
Notwithstanding the foregoing language, the State maintains that the April
affidavit did not limit the form of the information being sought to electronic
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Case No. 1-11-18
records, communications, and documents, citing the following language, which
appears in the April affidavit.
These tenns records, documents and materials as used above includeall of the foregoing items of evidence in whatever form and bywhatever means such records, documents or materials, their drafts,or their modifications may have been created or stored[.] AprilAffidavit, p. 12.
While it is arguable that law enforcement sought information in electronic and
non-electronic forms, we note that this language was not included in the April
search warrant. We believe that the absence of this language in the April search
warrant reveals that the issuing magistrate intentionally limited the form of
information to be searched for and seized to electronic information.
{¶38} Accordingly, we find that the April search warrant was limited to
searching and seizing computers, computer related devices, and information stored
in cmmnuterc and cemnuter related devices (e.^"., electronic records,___ _^---r------- --- ---r- ---
communications, and documents). Bearing this in mind, we turn our attention to
those items which Mark contends were seized outside the scope of the April
search warrant.
{¶39} Upon executing the April search warrant law enforcement seized
numerous computer related items, as well as miscellaneous papers, j ournals, cash,
jewelry, credit cards, a briefcase, a safe, a disposable camera, and headphones. At
trial, the State offered several of the miscellaneous papers and journals seized
-23-
Case No. 1-11-18
during the April search warrant, which were ultimately adinitted into evidence.
Those miscellaneous papers and journals consisted of the following: a,single piece
of paper, purportedly created by Mark, which contains a crude computer-generated
diagram of the death scene and typewritten notes concerning the possibility that
Kathy was trying to murder Mark (State's Exhibit 43); a printed email dated April
19, 2005 from Dave Warren to Mark regarding the effect of divorce for someone
who is or wants to become a deacon in the church, and several printed resources
concerning same issue (State's Exhibit 44); a bound journal book entitled "It's Not
About Me Journal" which contains Mark's handwritten responses to prompts
throughout the journal (State's Exhibit 45); a large blue binder with the phrase
"Cosmetic Training Kit" on the outside and numerous pages of Mark's
handwritten autobiographical notes and impressions of his relationship with Kathy
^r,eirlP (State's F,xhibit 461: and. a bound iournal book entitled "Revolve My___..___
Journal On Life, Faith & Other Stuff' which contains approximately two hundred
pages filled with Mark's handwritten journal entries dated between December 31,
2005 and December 31, 2006 (State's Exhibit 47).9 Because the aforementioned
items were offered by the State at trial, and subsequently admitted into evidence,
9 For ease of discussion, we will refer to the paper with a diagram of the death scene and the email betweenMark and Dave Warren by the exhibit numbers assigned to each at trial (i.e., State's Exhibit 43 and 44,respectively). As for the remaining items, we will refer to those items as "the Journals."
-24-
Case No. 1-11-18
we will consider whether these items were seized outside the scope of the April
search warrant.' o
{^40} We find that the seizure of State's Exhibit 43 and 44 was within the
scope of the April search warrant. While the scope of the warrant is limited to
electronic records, communications, and documents, we find that an objective
reading of these categories also encompasses papers and documents that were
created on and printed from a computer; as such 'items are simply hardcopy forms
of an electronic record, communication, or document. Based on our prior
descriptions of State's Exhibits 43 and 44, it is clear that each was created on and
printed from a computer. Consequently, each of these items, though in a hardcopy
form, is derived from an electronic document and electronic communication,
respectively, and therefore falls within the scope of the April search warrant.
f41d11 A.-, for the _Tnurna.ls_ we find that thev do not fall within the scope of^ ^^ . _, _ _-- ---- ---- - - -------- ^ ^ -
the April search warrant. As previously mentioned, the Journals are handwritten
and contain nothing that would lead law enforcement to believe that they were
created on and printed from a computer like State's Exhibits 43 and 44.
Consequently, the Journals do not constitute electronic records, communications,
10 Mark also contends that law enforcement exceeded the scope of the April search warrant when theyseized cash, jewelry, credit cards, a briefcase, a safe, a disposable camera, and headphones. While seizureof the aforementioned items undoubtedly exceeded the scope of the April search warrant, these items wereneither offered by the State in order to prove Mark's guilt, nor is there evidence that the items resulted inthe discovery of evidence offered by the State to prove Mark's guilt. Consequently, Mark was notprejudiced by the improper seizure of the aforementioned items.
-25-
Case No. 1-11-18
or documents, and therefore were seized outside the scope of the April search
warrant.
{¶42} Given the foregoing, we find that the search and seizure of the
Journals was outside the scope of the April search warrant.
{¶43} The State argues that even if the Journals were outside the scope of
the April search warrant, law enforcement properly seized the Journals because
they were closely related to the crime being investigated. In support, the State
relies on a prior decision of this court, State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154 (3d
Dist. 1971).
{¶44} In Fields, defendant and an accomplice snatched a woman's purse
from her person. A passerby witnessed the robbery and attempted to apprehend
defendant and his accomplice. In doing so, the defendant shot and killed the
passerby with a .38 caliber revolver. A search warrant was later issued for the
seizure of a .38 caliber revolver and a purse. Law enforcement . executed the
warrant on the accomplice's residence, but was unable to locate a .38 caliber
revolver or a purse. Law enforcement did, however, locate and seize a spent .38
caliber shell. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the shell arguing that it
was not specifically described in the warrant, but the trial court overruled
defendant's motion and the defendant was later convicted of the passerby's
murder. Defendant appealed the trial court's decision denying his motion to
-26-
Case No. 1-11-18
suppress. On appeal, this court affirmed, finding that items not explicitly listed in
a search warrant, like the shell, may be lawfully seized during the execution of a
search warrant if: (1) based upon evidence known to law enforcement the articles
seized were closely related to the crime being investigated; or, (2) law
enforcement had reasonable cause to believe the items seized were
instrumentalities of the crime. Fields at 160-61.
{¶45} Having considered Fields, we note that this court's holding in Fields
as it pertains to the seizure of items outside the scope of the search warrant is
merely an early variation of the plain view doctrine. Several years after this
court's opinion in Fields, this court implicitly recognized that its holding in Fields
had been superseded by the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Williams,
55 Ohio St.2d 82 (1978). State v. Bika, 3d Dist. No. 9-78-06 (Oct. 19, 1978).
Arrnrrlinalv izTa uAll a-n-nlv thP nlain view rlnctrine aq cet forth in Williams.
{¶46} In order for evidence to be seized under the plain view doctrine the
prosecution must demonstrate that ( 1) the initial intrusion which afforded the
authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was
inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately
apparent to the seizing authorities. Williams at paragraph one of the syllabus. In
State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301 (1986), a divided court modified the
second and third elements of the plain view doctrine set forth in Williams. The
-27-
Case No. 1-11-18
"inadvertent discovery" requirement can be satisfied when law enforcement "lack
antecedent probable cause, i.e., an advance particularized knowledge of, or intent
to seize, those objects ultimately seized." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
The "immediately apparent" requirement can be satisfied when law enforcement
has "probable cause to associate an object with criminal activity." Id. at paragraph
three of the syllabus. Additionally, law enforcement may rely on their specialized
knowledge, training and experience when determining whether an object is
associated with criminal activity. Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus.
{¶47} The State contends that the Journals were properly seized under the
plain view doctrine because the Journals contained infonnation establishing
motive, i.e., the state of Mark and Kathy's marriage. While the Journals may have
been relevant in establishing motive, the allegedly incriminating nature of the
Journals, wa:c not immediatelv annarent to law enforcement cluring the execution of- - -------- ^ --- --- - ------- °------^ --rr --- ---- -- -^ .. ------ - -------- -------o ---- ---- - ------- - -
the April search warrant, as evidenced by the following colloquy during the
suppression hearing:
[Defense Counsel:] So, you're saying that you knowingly tookfinancial paperwork from the house knowing that it wasn't relevant?
[Sergeant Breitigan:] I took everything together as one as they weretogether so that they could be reviewed, sorted, separated.
[Defense Counsel:] So, you just grabbed every piece of paper, tookit back to your office so you could look at it later, is that correct?
[Sergeant Breitigan:] Not every piece of paper, no.
-28-
Case No. 1-11-18
[Defense Counsel:] All right. But you took all the pieces of paperthat were set forth in items 31, 32, 33, 34, 25 [of the inventorysheet], corre.ct?11
[Sergeant Breitigan:] Did take those, yes.
[Defense Counsel:] All right. But you didn't look through them todetermine whether they were within the scope of the search warrantat the time you took them, did you?
[Sergeant Breitigan:] No, they're included with other paperworkthat was included in the scope of this warrant. Suppression HearingTr., p. 53-54.
Clearly, law enforcement was unaware of the content at the time the Journals were
seized. The allegedly incriminating nature of the Journals only became apparent
sometime after the search had been completed, and consequently was not
immediately apparent to law enforcement at the time they discovered the Journals.
Therefore, the Journals were not properly seized under the plain view doctrine.
{¶48} Given the foregoing, we find that the Journals were improperly
seized under the April search warrant, and therefore erroneously admitted during
trial. In so finding, Mark's remaining contentions concerning a lack of probable
cause to seize handwritten materials (i.e., the Journals) and the application of the
good faith exception are moot and we decline to address them. See App.R.
12(A)(1)(c).
11 Items 31, 32, and 33 in the inventory sheet correspond to the Journals.
-29-
Case No. 1-11-18
{¶49} Though we have deterlnined that the Journals should have been
suppressed, Mark contends that all of the items seized under the April search
warrant should have been suppressed because law enforcement flagrantly
disregarded its terms. In support, Mark relies on a case from the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir.1988),
wherein the court held that blanket suppression was warranted where law
enforcement flagrantly disregarded the terms of the search warrant by seizing 667
items which were not identified in the warrant. The holding in Medlin, however,
is not binding upon this court, and even if it were, we do not find law enforcement
actions in this instance to be so flagrant as to warrant blanket suppression.
{¶50} Finally, having determined that the Journals were improperly seized,
and consequently erroneously admitted at trial, we must determine whether the
error was harmless or nreiudicia1.12 "Error in the admission of evidence is---__
harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence may have
contributed to the accused's conviction. In order to hold the error harmless, the
court must be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73 (1978), paragraph seven of
the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3135
(1978). "[C]ases where imposition of harmless error is appropriate must involve
12 Notably, Mark advances no arguments that admission of the Journals was prejudicial. Despite theabsence of such arguments, we are nevertheless compelled to determine whether admission of the Journals
at trial resulted in harmless or prejudicial error.
-30-
Case No. 1-11-18.
either overwhelming evidence of guilt or some other indicia that the error did not
contribute to the conviction." State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio St.3d 146, 151 (1986),
quoting State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St.3d 160, 166 (1983), fn. 5. When considering
whether error is harmless, the reviewing court's judgment should be based on its
own reading of the record and on what it determines is the probable impact the
evidence had on an average jury. State v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 284 (1987),
citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969). For the
following reasons, we conclude that the admission of the Journals was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
}¶51} Throughout its case-in-chief the State drew the jury's attention to the
ruinous state of Mark and Kathy's marriage, arguing that it was a motivating
factor for Kathy's murder. At the beginning of its case-in-chief, the State called
0^1 Aro1 wit1naoc+ae Xx iln ^PQf1T7P^ tn cnme (i?tail ahnnt the diffic»ltiec Mark and0WVlIlU.l VV11.11V00V0 VY11v
Kathy were experiencing in their marriage prior to Kathy's death. At the end of
the State's case-in-chief, the State revisited Mark and Kathy's marital difficulties.
This time, however, the State had Sergeant Breitigan read aloud select entries from
the Journals. Though the entries read aloud provided a more detailed insight into
Mark and Kathy's marital difficulties, we find that those entries and the Journals
as a whole were cumulative in nature, and therefore harmless, since the jury had
-31-
Case No. 1-11-18
already heard testimony from several witnesses concerning the ruinous state of the
marriage.
{¶52} In addition to the Journals being cumulative, the Journals contained
many entries that were favorable to Mark. While the State selected entries that
captured the ruinous state of Mark and Kathy's marriage, many other entries
revealed that Mark remained hopeful about his marriage and made great efforts to
improve his marriage. The existence of these favorable entries was brought to
light during Sergeant Breitigan's cross-examination.
[Defense Counsel:] And throughout [the Journals] Mark prays for agood relationship with his wife, correct?
[Sergeant Breitigan:] Yes, he does.
[Defense Counsel:] And he prays for strength from the Lord to helphim work on the relationship?
fCaraaant Rreitivan•^ YeC_^^,...fj.JU.^... Y^..^ _b...._ .J - -"-
[Defense Counsel:] And he prays that his wife will also sort of seethe way and work on the relationship too, doesn't he?
[Sergeant Breitigan:] Yes. Trial Tr., 2064.
In addition to the entries alluded to in the foregoing colloquy, there were
numerous entries from the days, weeks, and months following Kathy's death in
which Mark repeatedly discusses his grief and how much he misses Kathy.
Because the Journals contained many entries favorable to Mark and the jury was
made aware of such entries during Sergeant Breitigan's cross-examination, we do
-32-
Case No. 1-1.1-18
not believe that there was a reasonable possibility that the Joumals contributed to
Mark's conviction.
{^53} Given the foregoing, we conclude that the admission of the Journals
was harrnless beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶54} Accordingly, we overrule Mark's first assignment of error.
Assignment of ErroN No. II
{¶55} In his second assignment of error, Mark contends that the trial court
erred when it determined that the tests performed by the Lab and the testimony of
its employees were admissible. Specifically, Mark contends that the tests
performed by the Lab were unreliable, and therefore inadmissible under Evid.R.
702(C). In the alternative, Mark contends that even if the tests performed by the
Lab and the testimony of its employees are admissible, such evidence should have
1;een : xctuded p,rsmant tn E«ird,R, 40^(A)'c halaneing test,
following, we disagree.
Rased on the
A. Admissibility of the Lab's Testing and Expert Testimony
{¶56} The admissibility of expert testimony is a matter cominitted to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be
overtumed absent an abuse of that discretion. Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio
St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio-3561, ¶ 9. A trial courtwill be found to have abused its
discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the
-33-
Case No. 1-11-18
evidence, or grossly unsound. See State v. Boles, 2d Dist. No. 23037, 2010-Ohio-
278, ¶ 16-18, citing Black's Law Dictionary 11 (8 Ed.Rev.2004). When applying
the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Nagle, 1 lth Dist. No. 99-L-089, (June
16, 2000), citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶57} Generally, "courts should favor the admissibility of expert testimony
whenever it is relevant and the criteria of Evid.R. 702 are met." State v. Nemeth,
82 Ohio St.3d 202, 207 (1998). Evid.R. 702, which governs the admissibility of
expert testimony, provides:
A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:
(A) The witness' testimony either relates to matters beyond theknowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels amisconception common among lay persons;
lRl ThP witnPCC i.c nnalifierl ac an exnert bv snecialized knowledae.
skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matterof the testimony;
(C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical,or other specialized information. To the extent that the testimonyreports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony isreliable only if all of the following apply:
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment isbased is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widelyaccepted knowledge, facts, or principles;
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliablyimplements the theory;
-34-
Case No. 1-11-18
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted ina way that will yield an accurate result.
{¶58} Here, there is no question or dispute that the subject about which Dr.
Schauer testified is beyond the knowledge or experience of lay persons and that
Dr. Schauer's credentials and experience qualify him to testify as an expert:
Evid.R. 702(A), (B). Accordingly, the sole issue is whether the testing performed
by the Lab is reliable under Evid.R. 702(C).
{¶59} In determining whether the opinion of an expert is reliable under
Evid.R. 702(C), a trial court, acting as a gatekeeper, examines whether the
expert's conclusion is based on scientifically valid principles and methods.
Valentine at ¶ 16, citing Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607 (1998).
"In evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence, several factors are to be
considered: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has
been subjected to peer review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of
error, and (4) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance." Miller at
611, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94,
113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993). Although these factors may aid in determining reliability,
none of the factors are dispositive as the inquiry is flexible. Id., citing Daubert at
594. Ultimately, the focus is "solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate." Id., quoting Daubert at 595.
-35-
Case No. 1-11-18
{¶60} In the case sub judice, the trial court held a Daubert hearing to
determine whether the testing performed by the Lab and Dr. Schauer's testimony
concerning the same was reliable. In determining the reliability of the testing
performed by the Lab, the trial court considered the factors set forth in Daubert.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999)
("[W]hether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of
reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad
latitude to determine."). As to the first factor, whether the theory or technique had
been tested, the trial court found that "the testing was done subject to standard
protocol and has been objectively tested[,]" and that "[t]he type of testing has been
done all over the world and accepted." (Docket No. 204, p. 3). As to the second
factor, whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review, the trial
cnnrt fnnncl that "nther research g rouns have used the same and similar testing ando --. -
the same has been subject to much peer review." (Id.). As to the third factor,
whether there is a known or potential rate of error, the trial court found that the
error rate did "not affect the reliability of the testing and the conclusions." (Id.).
As to the fourth factor, whether the methodology has gained general acceptance,
the trial court found that "[t]he methodology has been generally accepted in the
scientific community, as well as the [United States] E.P.A.[,] National
-36-
Case No. 1-11-18
Organizations[,] and world wide (sic) organizations."13 (Id. at p. 4). Based on its
consideration of the factors set forth in Daubert, the trial court concluded that
"[t]he State * * * presented sufficient evidence to support the reliability of its
expert's theory/testing under Evid.R. 702." (Id.).
{1161} Despite the trial court's determination concerning the reliability of
the testing performed by the Lab, Mark contends that the testing and testimony of
the Lab's employees do not meet any of the factors set forth in Daubert.
{¶62} First, Mark contends that the methodology underlying the testing
performed by the Lab ("the methodology") has never been tested. Contrary to
Mark's contention, Dr. Schauer's testimony establishes that the methodology has
been tested. Generally, the methodology involves chemical analysis of a soot
sample to determine the soot's origin, i.e., whether the soot originated from things
^anL^ ^c^ e^n^J r^nnlrinrr fnnr (`1(TAt'P'f'^'P CTYIll1IP hY anPn41nP Ar.rnrrlinu tn11 R^7 vU.111111s vvvvu, vvviuii^ ivvu, vaswava.a.v .^aiivv, v^ w^^ ..^^b^s^... ^^.......-'"`---a •.•-3u
Dr. Schauer, when an item or substance is burned the resulting soot contains
specific chemical compounds known as molecular tracers, which, when viewed
together, form a chemical fingerprint that is used to trace the soot to its origin. On
direct examination, Dr. Schauer testified that the methodology is born from
decades of research performed by him and other scientists throughout the world.
Dr. Schauer testified that the methodology has been tested and replicated by other
13 "EPA" as used throughout this opinion refers to the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
-37-
Case No. 1-11-18
laboratories around the world. Later, during cross-examination, Dr. Schauer was
asked whether he created the methodology used in this case. In response, Dr.
Schauer denied that he created the methodology explaining that it "is built upon
knowledge that exists in the community" and that it "[has] been approved by a
quality assurance officer at the U.S. EPA." Daubert Tr., p. 79-80. Given the
foregoing, we find that ' the trial court did not err when it found that the
methodology was tested.
{1[63} Although the record contains ample evidence that the methodology
has been tested, Mark, nevertheless, maintains that Dr. Schauer's lack of
experience in using wipe samples and testing samples taken from duct work is
evidence that the methodology has never been tested. While Dr. Schauer testified
that he had never tested wipe samples taken from duct work, we are not persuaded
+1nn+ 1nia lonv ^f PvV14]ri4]ll^P 1»a anxr haarinrr nn rlatarininincr [xrI1PtI'1?r tf1PL11SA.L 1110 1G.V11 Vl l`t/Vl"VV 1140 C411,' VV(.Lllll5 Vll uvl,vlllalaalals ♦111v411vi 1aav
methodology has been tested. First, Mark does not explain how Dr. Schauer's
experience (or lack thereof) relates to determining whether the methodology has
been tested. Second, Mark cites no authority in support of his position. Simply
because Dr. Schauer had not personally analyzed soot collected from duct work
using a wipe sample does not mean the methodology employed by the Lab in the
case sub judice has not been tested.
-38-
Case No. 1-11-18
{¶64} Moreover, while Mark contends that use of wipe samples has not
been tested, review of the record reveals otherwise. A chemist employed with the
Lab, Mark Mieritz ("Mieritz"), collected all of the wipe samples.14 When
questioned whether he developed the wipe method Mieritz responded "I applied it.
I didn't really develop it. It's used all the time in PCB analysis under EPA
protocol. That uses a gauze and measures a specific area."15 Trial Tr., p. 1841.
While the Lab used quartz fiber wipes as opposed to gauze, there is no evidence
that this seemingly minor difference materially altered the methodology's
reliability. In addition to the EPA's use of wipe samples, one of the Mark's
experts, Frederick Teeters, testified that he had used wipe samples to determine
the origin of chemical compounds found in pollutants. Trial Tr., p. 2640.
{¶65} Next, Mark contends that the testing performed by the Lab has not
^..is^^v. ^.^^^o^^- ^^ v^o01' YLIx)iPAiT Tn cilY^Ylllr^' Marlr Yl[1tP.C t^lat nt CeveralnointsUGGll JLLL/JGI^L LV t1vC1 1vvl%, vv. r-
throughout the course of the Daubert hearing Dr. Schauer testified that he was not
aware of publications concerning the following: whether molecular tracers can be
used to establish the presence of CO; whether testing the outside of the duct work
was a valid control to compare against the presence of molecular tracers inside of
14 There is no evidence that Dr. Schauer collected any of the wipe samples.ts Polychlorinated Biphenyl, which is colloquially known as PCB, is defmed as "any of several compoundsthat are produced by replacing hydrogen atoms in biphenyl with chlorine, have various industrialapplications, and are toxic environmental pollutants which tend to accumulate in animal tissues." Merriam-Webster (2012), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/polychlorinated+biphenyl?show=0&t=13463
37023 (accessed October 15, 2012).
-39-
Case No. 1-11-18
the duct work; and, whether a wipe could be used to determine the presence of
molecular tracers a year or more before the wipe was taken. Though Dr. Schauer
was unable to cite any publications concerning the foregoing, we are not
persuaded that Dr. Schauer's inability to cite to such publications establishes that
the methodology has not been subject to peer review.
{¶66} First, the existence of publications concerning whether molecular
tracers can show the presence of CO is immaterial in determining the reliability of
the methodology. Dr. Schauer never testified that the testing was capable of
showing the presence of CO. Instead, the presence of CO was established though
the Lab's determination that the soot found throughout the duct work originated
from an engine, the exhaust of which contains CO.
{¶67} Similarly, the existence of publications concerning whether a wipe
nnv,lrl ha ,oarl +n rlalarr,,;na tba -nracanrP nf mnlarn,lar trarPrc a vear nr mnre before0./OIUl\A V</ 1.LJV^.L LV ^.LVLV1111111V Lllv t/1vvv11vv va aa.avivv...+w+ u+wvv+.+ .... J...+- ^.- ------- -------
the wipe was taken is immaterial in determining the reliability of the methodology.
Although Dr. Schauer testified that he was 'aware of individuals who had used
wipe samples to determine the presence of molecular tracers a year or more before
the samples were taken, he never testified that the methodology employed by the
Lab could determine such information. In fact, Dr. Schauer testified to the
contrary. See Daubert Tr., p. 42. Given Dr. Schauer's testimony, we fail to see
the significance in Dr. Schauer's inability to cite publications establishing that
-40-
Case No. 1-11-18
wipe samples could be used to detennine the presence of molecular tracers a year
or more before the sample was taken.
{¶68} As for publications concerning the use of the outside of the duct
work as a control to compare against the presence of molecular tracers inside of
the duct work, Mark contends that Dr. Schauer knew of no such publications.
Mark's contention misconstrues Dr. Schauer's testimony. When questioned about
publications concerning the use of the outside of the duct work as a control to
compare against the presence of molecular tracers inside of the duct work Dr.
Schauer responded, "I'm sure I could find one for you, but I can't recall one off
the top of my head right now." Daubert Tr., p. 92. Considering Dr. Schauer's
response, it appears that he was aware of publications covering the requested
subject matter, but merely could not remember the title or author(s) of those
i_1.__^'CIl.._ tzn.:i- r ^,^f r„^1^ r.,,l-,lijatinne mav h^.av
^9 a.^ ......bPPn^uviivc^iviiv .--UU11C%1Vlls. VV1111G 1JrVUUlJL1V11 0l UG7%.11^1^1VU Vl ouvii i.i..^)
beneficial to determining the reliability of the methodology, we do not believe that
Dr. Schauer's inability to specifically recall the publications rendered the
methodology unreliable. Furthermore, even if Dr. Schauer testified that he was
not aware of any publications concerning the requested subject matter, the
existence of publications (or lack thereof) is not dispositive when assessing the
reliability of a scientific method. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
-41-
11
Case No. 1-11-18
{¶69} Notwithstanding Dr. Schauer's inability to present peer-reviewed
literature on every detail of the methodology, the record contains ample evidence
that the testing conducted by the Lab has been subject to peer review. While
Mark's contention focuses on Dr. Schauer's inability to cite publications
supporting the methodology, we note that publication is not a sine qua non of
admissibility, but one element of peer review. Daubert at 593. During the
D,aubert hearing, Dr. Schauer testified that he has authored and coauthored
numerous publications concerning the use of molecular tracers to trace soot to its
origin. Indeed, review of Dr. Schauer's curriculum vitae, which was admitted
during the Daubert hearing, corroborates Dr. Schauer's testimony. In addition,
Dr. Schauer testified that the methodology has been adopted by other laboratories,
as well as being used to verify other methods designed to detect and use molecular
trararc tn traoa cnnt anrl n1'hPr 71Ar1'1[`.il1a1'P. tYlAttP.t' t(1 1tC nt'lgln_ Tiven the foreaoina.
we find that the trial court did not err when it found that the methodology has been
subject to peer review.
{¶70} Next, Mark contends that Dr. Schauer could not identify a known
error rate. Indeed, review of the record reveals that Dr. Schauer was unable to
testify to a known error rate. However, the lack of a known error rate is not fatal
to the methodology's reliability. Daubert instructs that the court may also
consider the potential rate of error. Daubert at 594. During the Daubert hearing,
-42-
Case No. 1-11-18
Dr. Schauer testified that when testing for the existence of molecular tracers there
is an uncertainty (which appears to be a synonym for error rate) associated with
accurately identifying each individual molecular tracer. Although Dr. Schauer
was unable to recall the exact uncertainty for each molecular marker he did testify
that the uncertainties for the molecular tracers detected in the soot analyzed by the
Lab were in the range of 10 to 20 percent. Given this testimony, we cannot
conclude that the uncertainties testified to by Dr. Schauer render the methodology
unreliable. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not err when it found that
the uncertainties did "not affect the reliability of the testing and the conclusions."
(Docket No. 204, p. 3).
{¶71} Last, Mark contends that the methodology has not gained general
acceptance. Contrary to Mark's contention, the record reveals that the
^.1,.^a^,^ i.,,, o,a o,^0,-^ 1 onnar^tanrP Prinr tn onntactinu the T,ah_ law11G611VUV1V8y 110.^ gaiil%.u 6V11V1G1 aa ^ ^Y^cuavv. i .- - -s .- ---p -___ --_7 __. ..
enforcement contacted several laboratories inquiring about their ability to test for
and detect particles emitted from an engine. Mark argues that the difficulty in
finding a laboratory to perfonn the desired testing indicates that the testing, and
consequently the methodology, has not gained general acceptance. We disagree.
{¶72} First, difficulty experienced by law enforcement in locating a
laboratory capable of performing the requested testing is not indicative of whether
a particular methodology is generally accepted. There are other more reasonable
-43-
Case No. 1-11-18
explanations as to why law enforcement had difficulty locating a laboratory
capable of performing the requested testing, reasons which have no bearing on
whether the methodology is generally accepted. For instance, law enforcement
was unaware whether the testing they requested could be done, let alone whether a
particular laboratory could perform the requested testing. Consequently, it is not
at all surprising that law enforcement experienced difficulty in finding a laboratory
that could perform the requested testing.
{¶73} Notwithstanding the difficulty of finding a laboratory capable of
performing the requested testing, the record reveals that the methodology has been
generally accepted. Dr. Schauer testified that many research groups use the
methodology, as well as government agencies such as the United States EPA.
Given the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err when it found that the
methodology haC been aPnerallv neented_bJ b"` ^ ^ ^ r -- ---
{¶74} Having found no error with regard to the trial court's findings under
the Daubert factors, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
concluded that the methodology was reliable.
{¶75} Though we have found no error with regard to the trial court's
determination that the methodology is reliable, Mark contends the analytical gap
between the data derived from the testing and Dr. Schauer's conclusions is too
great, and therefore should have been excluded.
-44-
Case No. 1-11-18
{¶76} In addition to being reliable, Evid.R. 702(C) requires that the data
generated by the methodology at issue support the expert's opinion. Valentine,
110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-Ohio-3561, at ¶ 18. "A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."
Id., quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512 (1997).
While scientists may certainly draw inferences from a body of work, a trial court
must ensure that any extrapolation accords with scientific principles and methods.
Valentine at ¶ 18.
{1177} Based on the testing performed by the Lab, it was Dr. Schauer's
opinion that exhaust from an engine had been directly introduced into the duct
work. The trial court concluded that Dr. Schauer's "opinions are not speculative
and his opinions are based upon sufficient facts and data and the product of
_YPliahle nrincinles and methods." (Docket No. 204, p. 4). We agree..-__.,.^-- r------r--- ----- -- . - -
{¶78} Dr. Schauer's opinion concerning the origin of the soot does not
present too great an analytical leap from the underlying data. Dr. Schauer testified
that analysis of the wipe samples taken from the items submitted for analysis,
particularly the duct work, revealed the existence of hopanes, steranes, and
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons ("PAHs"). Dr. Schauer testified that alone
these molecular tracers provide little or no guidance concerni.ng the origin of the
soot in which they were found. Rather, Dr. Schauer testified that the molecular
-45-
Case No. 1-11-18
tracers detected in a soot sample must be viewed together to determine the
chemical fingerprint. Once the chemical fingerprint has been identified it can be
matched to known chemical fingerprints which have been discovered through
decades of research. Here, the Lab was able to identify the chemical fingerprint of
the soot found in the duct work from the combination of molecular tracers. Dr.
Schauer testified that the chemical fingerprint was similar to the known chemical
fingerprint associated with soot found in exhaust emitted from an engine. Given
the foregoing, we find that the Dr. Schauer's opinion as to the origin of the soot is
reasonably drawn from the underlying data.
{¶79} Additionally, Dr. Schauer's opinion concerning the exhaust having
been directly introduced into the duct work does not present too great an analytical
leap from the underlying data. 'In reaching this opinion, Dr. Schauer appears to
have relied on several nieces of data. First, Dr. Schauer, having measured the---- - - --- - -- - -- -
concentration of soot found on the inside surface the duct work, considered how
long it would have taken that soot to accumulate using depositional velocities.
Based on the testimony adduced during the Daubert hearing and trial, it appears
that depositional velocities, which vary depending on the environment and
location, are the rate at which particles suspended in the air deposit on a surface.
Upon consideration of the appropriate depositional velocities, Dr. Schauer
determined that the soot samples collected from the inside surface were deposited
-46-
Case No. 1-11-18
over a short period of time. In addition to this data, Dr. Schauer also considered
photographs depicting a V-shaped soot mark above the register in Kathy's
bedroom, soot stained carpet which surrounded the vent in Kathy's bedroom, and
soot marks around openings where two sections of duct work were joined.
Although Mark challenges Dr. Schauer's ability to view photographs. and
determine whether something was directly introduced into the duct work, the
record reveals that Dr.. Schauer's experience qualifies him to reach such a
conclusion. In particular, Dr. Schauer testified that he has conducted several field
studies wherein he has become familiar with soot deposition within a building, as
well as the means by which soot enters and circulates throughout a building (i.e.,
via the ventilation system or via the intrusion of ambient air from outside a
building). Based on the soot patterns depicted in the photographs, Dr. Schauer
3 e«.:. . 7 41. .4 l.: rl^v^nor^tro4i^n ^f cnnt travPlPr, tl'1rn71ah tllP ventilationUGLG1111111GU 1.11Q.L a luEll cV11V1^11L1CA.L1V11 vi ^vv^ ^=wvv=.^.+ ^_.=^.-.b== ^__-^ •^--_^----•--_^__
system. Given the foregoing, we find that Dr. Schauer's opinion as to the how the
soot was introduced into the duct work is reasonably drawn from the underlying
data.
{¶80} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err when it found
that Dr. Schauer's opinions were reasonably drawn from the underlying data.
-47-
Case No. 1-11-18
}¶81} In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing the jury to consider the testing performed by the Lab and
the testimony of the Lab's employees.
B. Evid.R. 403(A)
{¶82} Mark contends that even if the Lab's testing and the testimony of the
Lab's employees is relevant and reliable, the evidence should have been excluded
pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A). Based on the following, we disagree.
{¶83} An appellate court reviews the trial court's decision on the admission
of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Heft, 3d Dist. No. 8-09-08, 2009-
Ohio-5908, ¶ 62, citing State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 (2001). As previously
mentioned, a trial court will be found to have abused its discretion when its
decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the evidence, or
grosslv unsound. See Boles. 2d Dist. No. 23037, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 16-18, citing
Black's at 11. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court
may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Nagle, 1 lth Dist.
No. 99-L-089, (June 16, 2000), citing Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219 (1983).
{¶84} Evid.R. 402 provides that relevant evidence is generally admissible
except as otherwise provided by the rules of evidence and other laws or statutes.
Evid.R. 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
-48-
Case No. 1-11-18
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Evid.R.
403(A) provides that relevant evidence is not admissible "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the
issues, or of misleading the jury."
{1185} Mark contends that the unfair prejudice resulting from the admission
of the Lab's testing and testimony of the Lab's employees stems from the strong
risk that the jury considered the Lab's results as conclusive evidence that exhaust
from an engine was introduced into the duct work. In particular, Mark contends
that finding hopanes, steranes, and PAHs in the duct work is irrelevant and
unreliable in proving causation because those molecular tracers are found
everywhere in the environment and therefore their existence in the duct work in no
way establishes that a crime was committed. As previously discussed, the Lab's
A .. : 1; ., .4 +l,o ^ -4^n ^ri^rin .^ oe nnt v^rar^iratPl^ nn AQ1Y1S7lP. 111[IlP,C11lA1 tldCEr_l&G6G11111112LL1V11 Vl 611G 3vvb a viiEiu vvuo uv.. N..J - » ^---p=- __ ,
but a collection of specific molecular tracers which form a chemical fingerprint,
which, in turn, is used to determine the soot's origin. Accordingly, while it may
be common to find individual hopanes, steranes, and PAHs throughout the
environment, it is less common to find them together in the same soot sample
forming a chemical fingerprint which research has shown to be associated with
exhaust from an engine. Furthermore, the Lab's results revealed that there was an
abnormally high amount of hopanes, steranes, and PAHs found in the soot samples
-49-
Case No. 1-11-18
taken from the duct work, as well as visual evidence that a high concentration of
soot traveled through the duct work. This evidence tends to support the
conclusion that the exhaust was directly introduced into the duct work. Given the
foregoing, we do not find that the probative value of the Lab's testing and the
testimony of the Lab's employees is outweighed by the "danger of unfair
prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." Evid.R. 403(A).
{T86{ Accordingly, we overrule Mark's second assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. III
{¶87} In his third assignment of error, Mark contends that the trial court
erred when it prohibited his expert, Frederick Teeters ("Teeters"), from testifying
about candle soot in the Wangler residence. Mark contends that Teeters was
qualified to testify about whether the soot found in the Wangler residence
.,4 o.4 f,-.,,^, ronlllae Qrrnrrlina tn Mark Teeters wnuld have testifiedVll6 111QLL+U 11V111 Vl•Fillllls VU.+1^.L1VV. t ivvv+K+++t, uv +.+w^^^, +.^^.•^-^ •• ----_^ ____. _ ___ -. .
that the chemical fingerprint associated with soot emitted from burning candles is
similar to the chemical fingerprint associated with soot emitted from an engine,
and that the soot found in the Wangler residence, while seemingly from an engine,
was, in fact, from burning candles. Based on the following, we disagree.
{¶88} Under Evid.R. 702(B), a witness may qualify as an expert by reason
of his or her knowledge, experience, skill, training, or education. "Neither special
education nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness. The
-50-
Case No. 1-11-18
individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in
question, as long as the knowledge she possesses will aid the trier-of-fact in
performing its fact-finding function. Pursuant to Evid.R. 104(A), the trial court
determines whether an individual qualifies as an expert, and that determination
will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion." (Citations omitted.) State v.
Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423 (1999)
{¶89} At trial, prior to Teeters' testimony, the State moved the trial court to
exclude his testimony arguing that he did not qualify as an expert in the subject
matter at issue. In response to the State's motion, the trial court held a Daubert
hearing outside the presence of the jury.
{¶90} During the Daubert hearing, Teeters testified that he has over forty
years of experience in solving fluid flow problems and porous media. Teeters
4mc.t;fiAA +1,a4 m„rl't nf his AxYIAriAnne involved analvzinLy chemicals in fluids and1.6+a1.ilil^u l.llu.l. llluvia vi iiiv -r...i--.... --- • " - . - -- --- ---J V
using molecular tracers, which included hopanes and steranes, to determine the
chemicals' origin. Prior to trial, Teeters apparently analyzed the data generated
from the testing performed by the Lab in an effort to independently determine the
origin of the soot tested by the Lab.'6 Teeters testified that the analysis he
16 Upon review of the record, it appears that Teeters authored two reports. See Trial Tr., p. 2617, 2625.One report apparently dealt with candle soot in residential buildings and whether the soot found in the
Wangler residence originated from burning candles. Id. at p. 2617. The other report apparently dealt with
a comparison of soot found in the exhaust emitted from a RV parked in the Wangler driveway on the night
of Kathy's death with soot found in a blue flex hose. Id. The reports, however, were neither admitted into
evidence nor proffered by Mark. Consequently, our knowledge of the reports' content is limited to the
testimony adduced during the Daubert hearing.
-51-
Case No. 1-11-18
conducted in the case sub judice did not significantly differ from work he has done
in the past. According to the testimony, it appears that Teeters devoted a sizeable
portion of one of his reports to discussing candle soot in residential buildings and
whether the soot found in the Wangler residence originated from burning candles.
Teeters, however, testified that he does not consider himself to be an expert in
candle soot. Teeters also testified that he has never conducted experiments or
worked with candle soot. Rather, Teeters testified that his knowledge about
candle soot was derived from articles he found on the internet and at libraries.
Based on the foregoing testimony, the trial court found that Teeters "has no
qualifications to be *** an expert relative to candle soot in the house[,]" but
found that Teeters was qualified to testify about "tracing biomarkers and
emissions." Trial Tr., p. 2636.
rQn, l Tho„rs1, ,:ra mav have come to a clifferent conclusion, we find that the11I71 J 1 11V l.l6ll Vv v
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded Teeters from testifying
about candle soot. Indeed, Teeters' testimony established that he had extensive
experience in tracing chemicals, particularly those found in fluids, to their origin.
However, Teeters lacked experience working with candle soot, a fact he conceded
during the Daubert hearing. Lack of personal knowledge concerning candle soot,
while seemingly insignificant considering Teeters' experience with tracing
chemicals to their origin, is nevertheless a reasonable ground to exclude testimony
-52-
Case No. 1-11-18
concerning candle soot. As previously discussed, soot contains a chemical
fingerprint (i.e., a collection of specific molecular tracers) which is used to
determine the soot's origin. Since Teeters had no experience working with candle
soot it is reasonable for the trial court to infer that Teeters would not be aware of
the chemical fingerprint or fingerprints associated with candle soot. Moreover,
there is no indication that the internet and library resources that Teeters relied on
contained information concerning the chemical fingerprint or fingerprints
associated with candle soot, as such information was not adduced during the
Daubert hearing nor did Mark proffer the same.l7 Given the foregoing, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
{¶92} Moreover, in light of other testimony presented during the defense's
case-in-chief, we find that the trial court's ruling concerning the scope of Teeters'
4PCt;mnnv rl;rl nnt rirP;,,[iir.e Mark_ Prior to Teeters' testimonv, the defense called
Robert Wabeke ("Wabeke"). Wabeke testified that most candles are made of
paraffin wax, which is a derivative of crude oil. As a result, Wabeke explained
that one would expect to find similar molecular tracers in soot from a burning
candle and soot from an engine. To demonstrate the similarity, Wabeke
performed a test to determine the chemical composition of eight different types of
17 In his reply brief, Mark states that Teeters compared the chemical signature from candles removed fromthe Wangler residence to the chemical fingerprint which Dr. Schauer interpreted as being associated withsoot found in exhaust emitted from an engine. Mark, however, fails to support this statement with a
citation to the record. App.R. 16(A)(7).
-53-
Case No. 1-11-18
candles.18 Focusing on hopanes, steranes, and PAHs, Wabeke testified that the
chemical fingerprints from soot samples collected from each candle were not
homogeneous. For example, the soot from one candle contained hopanes and
steranes but no PAHs, while the soot from another candle contained PAHs but no
hopanes or steranes. Wabeke testified that if the aforementioned candles were
burned together the analysis of the resulting soot may reveal the presence of
hopanes, steranes, and PAHs. Though Wabeke did not go so far as to conclude
that the foregoing scenario may result in a false-positive for exhaust from an
engine, the jury, via Dr. Schauer's testimony, was already aware that those same
molecular tracers make up the chemical fingerprint associated with soot from an
engine, and therefore could have concluded, without further testimony, that the
soot analyzed by the Lab could have originated from burning candles instead of an
^: . 41..,. f-,Y,.;,-..r o f;,,rl tl,ot A/Tartr ^xTac nnt YIrF?711(J1(:p.(J hv tlleeligllie. 111vG11 l.i1G 1V1G6V1116, wV 1111u LuuL .r- ----
exclusion of Teeters' testimony concerning candle soot.
{¶93} Accordingly, we overrule Mark's third assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. IV
{¶94} In his fourth assignment of error, Mark contends that the trial court
erred when it refused to order the State to provide all information from Elemental
Carbon - Organic Carbon analysis ("ECOC, analysis") conducted by the Lab and
18 Upon review of the record, the origin of the candles Wabeke tested is not clear. See Trial Tr., p. 2248-
2252, 2324-2326.
-54-
Case No. 1-11-18
data considered by Dr. Schauer to calculate depositional velocity ("depositional
velocity data" or "data"), thus denying him a fair trial. Specifically, Mark
contends that the State was required to provide all infonnation associated with the
ECOC analysis and depositional velocity data pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963) and Crim.R. 16. Based on the following, we
disagree.
1. ECOC Results
}¶95} During the Daubert hearing, it was discovered that the Lab
conducted ECOC analysis on dry wipe samples taken from items submitted to it
for testing. Mark, having not been aware of the ECOC analysis performed by the
Lab, moved the trial court to order the State to provide all information associated
with the ECOC analysis arguing that the information may be exculpatory. The
i ., a ^a Ar,,,.v1 n9.1AC1.t colAll uGiliGu lvta111 J tivt
ivia.
{¶96} On appeal, Mark contends that the trial court erred when it refused to
order the State to provide all information associated with the ECOC analysis.
First, Mark contends that the information associated with the ECOC analysis is
material to his guilt, and should have been provided pursuant Brady v. Maryland.
Alternatively, Mark contends that the State was required to provide the
information associated with the ECOC analysis pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B)(3), (4).
We will address each contention in turn.
-55-
Case No. 1-11-18
A. Brady Issue
{¶97} It is well settled that the prosecution's suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the prosecution's good or bad faith. Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). Similarly, Crim.R. 16(B)(5)
requires the prosecution to disclose "any evidence favorable to the defendant and
material to guilt or punishment." See State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 650
(1998) (the terms "favorable" and "material" in Crim.R. 16 have the same
meaning as they do in Brady). Brady's holding, as well as Crim.R. 16(B)(5),
places upon the prosecution a duty to disclose evidence "that is both favorable to
the accused and `material either to guilt or to punishment."' United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985), quoting Brady at 87. The
rarr^aPn»finn^c^ AlI'fcl n-F laicf^^nc77NP 77Y1l^PN KN/1/117 PY'fPY1tiQ t!1 T`.1x7nrqhlP '.lYlil matPrial^J1VJ\+\+LAL1V11 J lLl.lL.Y Vl ll1JV1VJl.ilv uliuvi a.+r wwy v^>a.vuu.U 1- au.. vawviv -i-
evidence that is known to the prosecution and to others acting on the prosecution's
behalf in the case. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995).
{¶98} The key issue in a case where favorable evidence is alleged to have
been withheld by the prosecution is whether the evidence is material. State v.
Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60 (1988). "The mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the
outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense."
-56-
7 ^
Case No. 1-11-18
State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 33 ( 1991), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976). Rather, "[e]vidence is considered material
`if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "' State v.
Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 23, quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. The touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability"
of a different result. Kyles at 434. "The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but
whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence." Id. Accordingly, the rule in Brady is violated
when the favorable evidence that was not disclosed by the prosecution "could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
r• , ., ,• , ee I I e!ll_.- C7^ 7a ee 'lnn^7 l11..;.. nQ2^l (iconllUellce in tne verQlcL. JLate v. 13Y'own, 11J V1110 3I.JU JJ, L.VV /-v111v-°ro 7 /, H
40, quoting Kyles at 43 5.
{¶99} The defense bears the burden of proving a Brady violation rising to
the level of denial of due process. State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 92 (2001),
citing Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 33.
{¶100} Mark contends that the ECOC analysis is material to his guilt
because the testing performed by the Lab was central to the State's case. Though
the testing performed by the Lab was central to the State's case, review of the
-57-
Case No. 1-11-18
record reveals that had the results of the ECOC analysis been disclosed the results
could not reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undennine confidence in the verdict.
{¶101} First, the results of the ECOC analysis were invalid. During the
Daubert hearing and again at trial, Dr. Schauer testified that the ECOC analysis
performed on dry wipe samples collected from items submitted to it for testing
yielded invalid results. While Mark contends that the veracity of Dr. Schauer's
foregoing testimony is questionable, we find that none of the testimony or
evidence Mark cites to in support of his contention contradicts Dr. Schauer's
testimony. As such, we must conclude, as did the trial court, that the results of the
ECOC analysis were invalid. Since invalid results are inherently unreliable, we
cannot conclude that the results of the ECOC analysis were material to Mark's
-,;i,- r-^ dlw^inJn ,, Rnnlr 'l77 F C„nn 2rl 743 755-757 (E.D.Mich.2004).^¢.luc. AJC.c. llcwi oaao v. av...o, ........ , ...^»r,S,.^» . .-, • _ _ . _ _ ^_-__ _ ^
Furthermore, Mark has cited no authority wherein invalid results, which were not
provided to the defendant, were found to be material to the defendant's guilt.
{¶102} Second, the results of the ECOC analysis would have provided little
to no assistance in rebutting Dr. Schauer's conclusion concerning the origin of the
soot found in the duct work. First, the record reveals that ECOC analysis is "being
used as a marker for Diesel exhaust." (Docket No. 256, p. 1). Here, there is no
evidence that any of the engines located in the Wangler garage or driveway on the
-58-
Case No. 1-11-18
day of Kathy's death operated on diesel fuel. Second, and more importantly, Dr.
Schauer explained that ECOC analysis is not used to identify molecular tracers in
soot, which, as previously explained, is the means by which the origin of the soot
is identified. Rather, Dr. Schauer explained that ECOC analysis simply measures
the amount of elemental carbon and organic carbon contained in soot, which is
then used to "quantify the blackness of the [soot] deposits" as opposed to the
origin of the soot. Daubert Tr., p. 249.
{¶103} Given the foregoing, we find that the information associated with
the ECOC analysis was not material to Mark's guilt, and therefore find no Brady
violation.
B. Crim.R. 16
{¶104} Alternatively, Mark contends that he was entitled to the infonnation
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{¶105} Crim.R. 16(B)(3), (4) provides as follows:
(B) Discovery: Right to Copy or Photograph. Upon receipt of awritten demand for discovery by the defendant, * * * the prosecutingattorney shall provide copies or photographs, or permit counsel forthe defendant to copy or photograph, the following items related tothe particular case indictment, information, or complaint, and whichare material to the preparation of a defense, or are intended for useby the prosecuting attorney as evidence at the trial, or were obtainedfrom or belong to the defendant, within the possession of, orreasonably available to the state, subject to the provisions of thisrule:
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Case No. 1-11-18
(3) Subject to divisions (D)(4) and (E) of this rule, all laboratory orhospital reports, books, papers, documents, photographs, tangibleobjects, buildings, or places;
(4) Subject to division (D)(4) and (E) of this rule, results ofphysical or mental exaininations, experiments or scientific tests;
{¶106} The State contends that the neither Crim.R. 16(B)(3) or (4) applies
in the case sub judice, since there were no results or reports generated from the
ECOC analysis. Though Dr. Schauer testified that he did "not consider the ECOC
analysis in authoring the Report, consequently rendering (B)(3) inapplicable, he
did testify that the ECOC analysis produced results, albeit invalid results. See
Daubert Tr., p. 248. Mark argues that given the language of (B)(4), the results of
the ECOC analysis, though invalid, were discoverable. Indeed, (B)(4) does not
distinguish between valid and invalid results. Instead, it merely states that the
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language of (B)(4), we agree that invalid results are discoverable, but are not
persuaded that the State was required to produce the results of the ECOC analysis.
{¶107} Pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B), "the prosecuting attorney shall provide
copies or photographs, or permit counsel for the defendant to copy or photograph"
those items which are (1) detailed in (B)(1-7) and (2) "which are material to the
preparation of a defense, or are intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as
evidence at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant, within the
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Case No. 1-11-18
possession of, or reasonably available to the state." (Emphasis added.) Crim.R.
16(B). Here, we have determined that the results of the ECOC analysis are
discoverable under (B)(4), thus satisfying the first requirement. Mark, however,
has advanced no argument as to the second requirement, i.e., whether the results
were material to the preparation of his defense, intended for use at trial by the
prosecuting attorney, or were obtained from Mark and available to or within the
State's possession. Given the lack of argument, we find that Mark has not
satisfied the second requirement. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, we find that
the State did not violate Crim.R. 16.
{¶108} Even if the State violated Crim.R. 16, the violation would not be
grounds for reversal. "Violations of Crim.R. 16 by the prosecution may result in
reversible error only upon a showing that (1) the prosecution's failure to disclose
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have benefited the accused in preparing a defense, and (3) the accused has suffered
prejudice." State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, T 38, citing State
v. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458 (1995). Without deciding either the first or
second requirements, we find, for the reasons stated in overruling Mark's Brady
argument, that Mark cannot establish prejudice because there was no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the State
disclosed the information related to the ECOC analysis.
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Case No. 1-11-18
{¶109} Given the foregoing, we find that the State's violation of Crim.R.
16 does not constitute reversible error.
II. Depositional Velocity Data
{¶110} During the Daubert hearing it was discovered that Dr. Schauer
considered depositional velocity data in determining how quickly the soot found in
the duct work would have accumulated. Mark, having not been aware of Dr.
Schauer's consideration of the depositional velocity data, moved the trial court to
order the State to provide the data arguing that access to such data is necessary to
challenge Dr. Schauer's conclusions or subject them to replication. The trial court
denied Mark's motion, finding that the data was work product.
{¶111} On appeal, Mark contends that the trial court erred when it refused
to order the State to provide the depositional velocity data. First, Mark contends
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Mark contends the data is material to his guilt, and should have been provided
pursuant Brady v. Maryland. We will address each contention in turn.
A. Crim.R. 16
{1[112} Mark contends that the depositional velocity data should have been
provided pursuant to Crim.R. 16. Mark, however, does not cite which provision of
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Case No. 1-11-18
Crim.R. 16 applies.19 "It is not appropriate for an appellate court to construct the
legal arguments in support of an appellant's appeal." Beckett v. Wisniewski, 3d
Dist. No. 5-09-17, 2009-Ohio-6158, ¶ 16, citing Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App.3d
371, 2006-Ohio-943, ¶ 94 (10th Dist.). "If an argument exists that can support
[an] assignment of error, it is not [an appellate] court's duty to root it out." Id.
Accordingly, since Mark does not cite (and consequently does not argue) which
provision of Crim.R. 16 requires production of the data, we decline to address
Mark's contention.
B. Brady Issue
{¶113} Alternatively, Mark contends that the depositional velocity data is
material to his guilt. Specifically, Mark contends that without the data "there
[was] no way to adequately challenge Schuaer's conclusions or subject them to
,• ^,__ scientific +^ ^a » n,..,.oit^^+^^ R, „ 2S ^AThiIP ^a^P rln notrepllcaLioT1 using llic Ji:iell^lliV llic^llvu. r^-P1,..iiuiit, a L1., F. - .. ^^.^. ,. ^. ^-
doubt that having the data would have allowed Mark to more thoroughly vet Dr.
Schauer's conclusions, review of the record reveals that had the data been
disclosed it could not reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
{¶114} Viewing the record as a whole, we fail to see how access to the
depositional velocity data would undermine confidence in the verdict. Dr.
'9 We further note that review of the record, particularly the Daubert hearing and Mark's motion requesting
the trial court's reconsideration of its ruling concerning the data, reveals that Mark did not cite which
provision of Crim.R. 16 requires production of the data.
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Case No. 1-11-18
Schauer's conclusion that exhaust was directly introduced into the duct work was
based on the data as well as photographs of soot stains on the exterior of the duct
work and the wall above the register in Kathy's bedroom. Considering Dr.
Schauer's testimony, it appears that the data and photographs each provided an
individual basis for Dr. Schauer's conclusion that exhaust was directly introduced
into the duct work. Consequently, even if we were to assume that the data was
somehow erroneous, the photographs still provide a basis for Dr. Schauer's
conclusion. In addition, Dr. Schauer testified at trial that he had never before
considered depositional velocity data as it pertains to soot found in duct work.
Clearly, this testimony calls into question Dr. Schauer's ability to accurately
determine how long it would have taken for the soot found in the duct work to
accumulate. Accordingly, we fail to see how more evidence concerning the data
and Dr. Schauer 's consia, _erat
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{¶115} Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the idea
that the materiality standard should go to the defendant's ability to prepare for
trial. The court explained:
It has been argued that the standard should focus on the impact ofthe undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare fortrial, rather than the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guiltor innocence. Such a standard would be unacceptable fordetermining the materiality of what has been generally recognized as"Brady material" for two reasons. First, that standard wouldnecessarily encompass incriminating evidence as well as exculpatoryevidence, since knowledge of the prosecutor's entire case would
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Case No. 1-11-18
always be useful in planning the defense. Second, such an approachwould primarily involve an analysis of the adequacy of the noticegiven to the defendant by the State, and it has always been theCourt's view that the notice component of due process refers to thecharge rather than the evidentiary support for the charge. (Citation
omitted.) Agus, 427 U.S. 97, fn. 20, 96 S.Ct. 2392.
{¶116} We interpret Mark's contention, quoted above, as arguing that
access to the data was necessary to prepare for trial. Given Mark's contention and
the precedent set forth in Agurs, we find that Mark has failed to establish the
materiality of the data.
{¶117} Given the foregoing, we find that the depositional velocity data was
not material to Mark's guilt, and therefore find no Brady violation.
{¶118} Apart from our determination that no Brady violation occurred,
Mark contends that without the data the trial court was incapable of preforining a
complete Daubert analysis of the methodology. While the trial court did not
review the data firsthand, the testimony during the Daubert hearing was sufficient
to determine the reliability of the data, and consequently the methodology.
Moreover, given the nature of the data at issue, which apparently is comprised of
complex mathematical formulas, we are not convinced that the trial court's
reliability determination would have been any different had it considered the data.
{¶119} Accordingly, we overrule Mark's fourth assignment of error.
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CaseNoo 1-11-18
{¶120} Having found no error prejudicial to Mark herein, in the particulars
assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
P ST®N and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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APPENDIX 2
^-^I L ^*^;x^^^^
} 3 P ;,.. _.l ^] 1
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF tO OHIOTHIRD APPELLATE DISTRWIDIEC' -5 NMI 12
ALLEN COUNTY
«^_ i.,i ^f ^ F f
^`"'S"^.«!....E4 Srl^ I ^ Y. tJ^:^k•^ ...
STATE OF OHIO9
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
MARK A. WANGLER,
CASE NO. 1-11-18
JUDGMENTENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
This matter comes on for determination of Appellant's application for
reconsideration pursuant to App.R. 26(A), and Appellee's response in opposition
to the application.
Upon consideration the Court finds that the application fails to raise any
error in the decision or any issue not properly considered in the first instance. See
Garfield Hts. City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1992), 85 Ohio App.3d 117;
Columbus v. Hodge (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 68. Appellant's application raises the
same arguments that were fully and correctly addressed by the Court.
Accordingly, the application is not well taken.
^ ^^^^^ - C4a
Case No. 1-11-18
It is therefore ORDERED that Appellant's application for reconsideration
be, and the same hereby is, denied. ryL.
JUDGES
DATED: December 5, 2012/hlo
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