TableofContentsTitlePageCopyrightPageDedicationIntroduction

CHAPTERONE-TheDayBeforeCHAPTERTWO-DutyCHAPTERTHREE-Cambodia

CHAPTERFOUR-ValleyForgeCHAPTERFIVE-TheRebirthoftheArmyCHAPTERSIX-ManeuverWarfareCHAPTERSEVEN-MarchtotheSoundoftheGunsCHAPTEREIGHT-PreparingforWarCHAPTERNINE-CoiledSpringCHAPTERTEN-TurnEastCHAPTERELEVEN-

AttackEastCHAPTERTWELVE-NightCombatCHAPTERTHIRTEEN-KnockoutCHAPTERFOURTEEN-Cease-FireCHAPTERFIFTEEN-DutyinIraqCHAPTERSIXTEEN-TRADOCandtheFutureofLandWarfareCHAPTERSEVENTEEN-"OnceMore..."

CHAPTEREIGHTEEN-Reflections

AcknowledgementsBibliographyandReferencesIndex

PRAISEFOR

IntotheStorm

"Therewillbesome--inthefuturewhenourarmyagaingoestowar--whowilltakethisworktothebattlefieldasareminderofhowgreatcommandersaccomplishedthemission."--Armor

"Twoareasofthisbookmeritspecialattentionandshouldbemandatoryreadingforallmilitaryofficers.Clancy'snarrativeofthearmyintransitionandhischapteronmaneuverwarfarearesuperb....Whatthereadergainsfrom[Franks's]candidadmissionsisadeepappreciationofthemindofacommanderchargedwithemploying146,000soldiersand50,000vehiclesacross

120milesofenemyterritoryinthefaceofdeterminedresistance."--ArmyMagazine

"Franksmanagestotellagoodstory,offerinsightsintoleadershipandsettherecordstraight."--ScrippsHowardNewsServices

NOVELSBYTOMCLANCY

TheHuntforRedOctoberRedStormRisingPatriotGames

TheCardinaloftheKremlinClearandPresentDangerTheSumofAllFearsWithoutRemorseDebtofHonorExecutiveOrders

RainbowSixTheBearandtheDragon

RedRabbitTheTeethoftheTiger

SSN:StrategiesofSubmarineWarfare

NONFICTION

Submarine:AGuidedTourInsideaNuclearWarship

ArmoredCav:AGuidedTourofanArmoredCavalry

RegimentFighterWing:AGuidedTourofanAirForceCombatWingMarine:AGuidedTourofaMarineExpeditionaryUnitAirborne:AGuidedTourofanAirborneTaskForce

Carrier:AGuidedTourofanAircraftCarrier

SpecialForces:AGuided

TourofU.S.ArmySpecialForces

IntotheStorm:AStudyinCommand

(writtenwithGeneralFredFranks,Jr.,Ret.,andTony

Koltz)EveryManaTiger

(writtenwithGeneralCharlesHorner,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)ShadowWarriors:Insidethe

SpecialForces

(writtenwithGeneralCarlStiner,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)

BattleReady(writtenwithGeneralTonyZinni,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)

CREATEDBYTOMCLANCY

TomClancy'sSplinterCellTomClancy'sSplinterCell:

OperationBarracudaTomClancy'sSplinterCell:

Checkmate

CREATEDBYTOMCLANCYANDSTEVE

PIECZENIK

TomClancy'sOp-CenterTomClancy'sOp-Center:

MirrorImage

TomClancy'sOp-Center:GamesofState

TomClancy'sOp-Center:ActsofWar

TomClancy'sOp-Center:BalanceofPower

TomClancy'sOp-Center:StateofSiege

TomClancy'sOp-Center:DivideandConquer

TomClancy'sOp-Center:LineofControl

TomClancy'sOp-Center:MissionofHonor

TomClancy'sOp-Center:SeaofFire

TomClancy'sOp-Center:CalltoTreason

TomClancy'sOp-Center:WarofEagles

TomClancy'sNetForceTomClancy'sNetForce:

HiddenAgendasTomClancy'sNetForce:

NightMovesTomClancy'sNetForce:

BreakingPointTomClancy'sNetForce:

PointofImpactTomClancy'sNetForce:

CyberNationTomClancy'sNetForce:

StateofWarTomClancy'sNetForce:ChangingoftheGuardTomClancy'sNetForce:

SpringboardTomClancy'sNetForce:The

ArchimedesEffect

CREATEDBYTOMCLANCYANDMARTIN

GREENBERG

TomClancy'sPowerPlays:Politika

TomClancy'sPowerPlays:ruthless.com

TomClancy'sPowerPlays:ShadowWatch

TomClancy'sPowerPlays:

http://ruthless.com

Bio-StrikeTomClancy'sPowerPlays:

ColdWarTomClancy'sPowerPlays:

CuttingEdgeTomClancy'sPowerPlays:

ZeroHourTomClancy'sPowerPlays:

WildCard

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eISBN:978-1-429-58336-7

Clancy,Tom,date.Intothestorm:astudyincommand/TomClancy,withFredFranks,Jr.

p.cm.eISBN:978-1-429-58336-7

1.Franks,Fred.2.PersianGulfWar,1991--UnitedStates.3.PersianGulf

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Thisbookisdedicatedto:

THEVETERANSOFTHEDESERTSTORMVIICORPSJAYHAWKS

ANDTHEIRFAMILIES.

THEBLACKHORSETROOPERS

OFTHEIITHACR.

THEMENANDWOMENOFAMERICA'SARMY,WHODOTHEIRDUTY

EVERYDAY,WHOBEARTHE

WOUNDSOFWARSPAST,ANDWHODIEDINSERVICETOOUR

COUNTRY.

INTRODUCTIONTheQuietLion

HEROESrarelylookthepart.ThefirstholderoftheMedalofHonorImetlookedmorelikearetiredaccountantthanJohnWayne,andwhenIintroducedGeneralFredFrankstoaphysicianfriend,thelatterremarkedthathewasadeadringerforthe

professorofpediatricsatCornellUniversityMedicalSchool.Andthat'sreallythebasisonwhichwefirstmet.In1991,IknewayoungladnamedKylewhowasafflictedwitharareanddeadlyformofcancer.Afriendofmine,MajorGeneralBillStofft,washeadingovertothePersianGulfaftertheconclusionofhostilities.Therewasaseniorofficeroverthere,I'dheard,who'd

lostaleginVietnam.Mylittlebuddyhadjustenduredthesurgicalremovalofhisleg,andIaskedBillifhemightapproachthisofficerandaskhimtowriteabriefletterofencouragementtoKyle,thenatMemorialSloan-KetteringCancerCenterinNewYork.Theofficer,IlearnedfromGeneralStofft,wasFredFranks,thenalieutenantgeneral,andcommanderof

VIICorps.Billdeliveredtherequest,andLieutenantGeneralFranksrespondedatonce,callingitaprivilege.Hewroteawarmlettertomyfriend,andcopiedittomewithacovernotethankingmeformakinghimawareofmyfriendandhisaffliction.That,really,isthebondbetweenus.

Soonthereafter,Fredreceivedanotherstaranda

newpostascommandinggeneraloftheU.S.Army'sTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)atFortMonroeintheVirginiaTidewater,aplumjobwhosemissionitistolookintothefutureandprepareforit,anditwastherethatwemetforthefirsttime.Thefirstorderofbusinesswastothankhimforhisgracioussolicitudetomylittlefriend.Hewaveditoff,thankingmeagainforthe

opportunitytolookafterachild,andreallythat'smostofwhatIneededtolearnaboutthisgentleman.

Fredisamanofmodestsizeandwords--ontherareoccasionswhenheswears,eventhatisquiet.There'sanengagingshynesstothisgeneralofficer.Don'tbefooled.He'soneoftheundramaticpeoplewhogetsthejobdoneandmoveson

withoutfanfaretothenextmission,leavingaccomplishmentinhiswake.

Soldiersarenotwhatwemostoftenseeportrayedonthescreen.Thebestofthem,theoneswhoascendtogenerals'stars,arethoughtfulstudentsoftheirprofession,scholarlycommentatorsonhistory,andgiftedobserversofhumanpsychology.Theprofessionofarmsisevery

bitasbroadanddeepasmedicineorlaw.Likephysicians,officersmustknowtheirsubjectineverydetail,fortheydealinthecurrencyoflifeanddeath,andsomemistakescanneverbecorrected.Likeattorneys,theymustplaneverythinginexquisitedetail,becauseinsomearenasyouhavebutonechancetogetitright.

Thesheerintellectual

complexityofcommandissomethingfewhavediscussedwithanythingapproachingaccuracy.InpreparingtomovehisVIICorpsacrossthedesert,Fredfirstofallhadtoconsiderthemajorpieces:U.S.1stand3rdArmoredDivisions,therenowned1stInfantryDivision(Mechanized),the1stCavalryDivision,U.K.1stArmoredDivision,U.S.2ndArmoredCavalry

Regiment,andthreeseparateartillerybrigades.Thoseunitsaloneaccountfornearly100,000soldiers,eachofwhomwasassignedtoavehicle.Tossinthe"loggies,"thelogisticaltroopswhoseunsungbutvitaljobwastokeepthe"shooters"equippedwitheverythingfromdieselfueltocomputerchips.

Okay,nowimaginethatyouhavetoplantherush

hourforacityof,oh,say,1million,decidinghoweachworkergetshome;thatyouhavetoaccountforeverysingleoneofthem,frompointoforigintodestination,andthateveryonehastoarrivehomeatexactlytherighttime.

Oh,that'snotall:Fredhadtoplansevendifferentoptionsforhismove.Soyoualsomustallowforseven

differentcombinationsofclosedstreets,roadwork,andbrokenbridges,whilestillallowingeverycommutertomakeithomeatthepropertime.

Bytheway,ifyoumessthislittlejobup,humanliveswillbelost.

Soundseasy?Wehaven'tevengottentothereallyhardpartyet.Peoplewillbetrying

tokillthecommuters--organized,trainedpeople,withweapons--andyoualsomustminimizethatlittlehazard.

Andyet,inaway,thiswastheeasypart.JusttogettothatpointFredFranksandhiscolleagues--menlikeCreightonAbrams,EdBurba,BillDePuy,ColinPowell,ButchSaint,NormSchwarzkopf,PeteTaylor,

CarlVuono,andsomanyothers--hadtofixanArmythatintheiryoungerdaysaslieutenantsandcaptainshadbeenbrokenbypoorpoliticalleadershipandpublicantipathy.FredlostpartofaleginVietnam.Hiscolleagueswereallhurtinonewayoranother,andtheArmynearlylostitssoul,whileAmericalostherconfidenceasanation.Asamajorwith1.5legs,lyingina

bedinValleyForge,hehadtoconquerpainandheartache,towonderifhehadacareerbeforehimatall,andtowonderalsoifhiscountrygaveadamnabouthimandhisfellowamputees.

Rememberjusthowdarkthosedayswere?TheArmywasonitsback,itsNCOcorpsblednearlytodeathinVietnam,drugswererampantthroughouttheinstitution,

andmoralewassolowthatonmorethanonepost,officersenteredbarracksonlywithanarmedescort.

Fredwasoneofthemenwhohadtomakegoodallthatothershadconspiredtodestroy.LiketheArmyofthe1970s,hehadtolearntowalkalloveragain.Ashehadtorepairthewoundsinhisheart,sotheArmyhadtorestoreitsconfidence.All

thesethingsdidhappen,however,becauseFredandmenlikehimneverlostfaithintheircountryortheirownideals.

Howgreatwastheirtask?Lookingbackfromtoday'sperspective,itismorefrightening,perhaps,thanitwasatthetime,butthemagnitudeoftheaccomplishmentcanbemeasuredsimply:America

wontheColdWarbecausesheandheralliesweretoostrongtolose.ThathappenedonlybecauseFredFranksandhiswoundedbutproudbandofbrothersmadeherso,andthatonlyafterhealingthemselves.Istartedmeetingthesemenin1988,andthat'swhentheideaforthisbookreallybegan.ThepublicimageoftheArmyismostoftenthatofthecinema,andthatisgenerallyaninfantry

squad,becauseamoviecanshowonlysomuch.Bythesametoken,theheaviestfirepowertheArmyhas--tanksandartillery,whichdomostofthekillingonthemodernbattlefield--hasbeenlargelyignored.Andsotheimagewehaveofthemilitaryisnotsomuchfalseaslimited.That'salessonIlearnedatFortIrwin,California,onacoldJanuarymorning.Havinghadthe

taste,Ihadtolearnmore,andIwasfortunateinfindingasuperbcollectionofteachers.

Anyarmyisavastcommunityofpeoplemorethanacollectionoftheirawesometools.Itmayseemgrotesquetocallwar-fightinganart,butwarfightingismorethananythingelsetheleadershipofpeople,andhandlingpeopleisthemostdemandingofhumanarts,all

themoresowhenthecurrencyislifeanddeath.Morethanthat,inanation'smilitary,youfindthenationitself,allofitsqualities,whethergoodorbad,distilledtoanoddsortofpurity.OurArmyhastraveledinasinglelifetimedownastrangeandcrookedroad,fromthetriumphofWorldWarIIthroughtheembarrassmentofKorea,throughpeacekeepingandholdingthelinein

Europe,throughtragedyandwasteinVietnam,throughneartotalcollapsethereafter,throughalongandwrenchingprocessofreconstitution,thenagaintodominanceonthesandsofIraqandKuwait.

It'sastoryIcouldhardlytellbymyself,andit'sastoryformorethanonebook.FromFredFranksIlearnedthestoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,sogrievously

woundedinVietnam.Thoughtheviewpointsandperspectivesaremine,muchofthestoryishis,andincertainchaptersIhavefeltitonlyfittingthathetellitinhisownwords.OtheraspectsofAmerica'srecoveryanddominancewillcomefromothersinfuturebooks,andIhopethereaderwillcometograspjusthowmuchwasdone,andhowmuchisowed.Therewereplentyofinfantry

squads,andtankcrews,andcannoneers,andloggies,allwearingtheirnation'scolors.Allofthemweretrained,supported,andledbytheprofessionalswhokeptthefaith.

Andsothemanandthearmythatadvancedacrosssandandrockwerereadyfortheirtask,theirmemoriesofVietnamneverfarfromtheirminds,andthelessonsofthat

experienceintheirhands.ThearmyAmericadeployedtothePersianGulfmightwellhavebeenthefinestinallofhistory,equippedwiththebestweapons,trainedinthemostrealisticfashion,andledbymenwho'dlearnedthehardwaywhyyouhavetogetitdonerightthefirsttime.WeallsawtheresultsonTV.

It'sbeenmyhonortogettoknowthisman.Amanofiron

andletters--he'staughtpoetryattheuniversitylevel--FredFrankssymbolizesourarmyaswellasanymancould.

--TOMCLANCY

CHAPTERONE

TheDayBefore

23FEBRUARY19912100

VIICORPSMAINCOMMANDPOST

AFTERtheeveningbriefingandabrieftalktohisstaffandtheliaisonofficersfromsubordinateunits,Fred

Frankswentbacktohissleepingshelter.

Inhistalk,Frankswasemotionalaboutthesoldiersandhard-nosedaboutthetaskahead.Thestaffwasquietandserious.Mostlistenedquietly,andtherewasalotofeyecontact.Whenhefinished,theyallholleredabig"JAYHAWK"--VIICorps'snickname--andthatwasit.Heleftthetent.

Thenhewasalonewithhisthoughts.Beforehegotsomeresthewantedtogooversomethingsabouttheoperationaheadandreflectontheeventsofthisday.

Therewasonethoughtthatwouldnotleavehim."Don'tworry,General,wetrustyou."Asoldierin3rdArmoredDivisionhadsaidthattohimon15Februaryduringoneofhismanyvisits

toVIICorpsunits.Now,howamIgoingtofulfillthattrust?heaskedhimself.Itwaswhatthesoldierswerethinking--heknewthat--andhewantedtobeworthy.

DuringVietnam,thatbondbetweenthesoldiersandthecountry'sleadersinWashingtonhadbeenshattered.Itwasanopenwound.FredFrankswantedtobeoneofthecommanders

whocouldhealthatwound,whocouldrebuildthattrust.Itwasapowerful,consumingthoughtonthiseveofbattle,onethatneverlefthim,ever.

THEnextdaywasG-Day,thebeginningofthegroundattacktoliberateKuwaitofIraqiforces.TheCoalitionplanwasfortheU.S.MarinesandtheSaudistoattackat

0400,200kilometerstotheeastofVIICorps,whilethelightforcesofU.S.XVIIICorps--the82ndAirborneDivisionandthe101stAirborne(AirAssault)Division--andtheFrenchwouldattack100kilometerstothewest.Andthentheheavyforces--VIICorps,thearmoredunitsofXVIIICorps,andtheJFCN(theArabJointForcesCommandNorth,anEgyptianCorpsand

aSyriandivision)--wouldattackonG+1,thedayafterthenext,atBMNT(thebeginningofmorningnauticaltwilight,orfirstlight),or0538GPSlocaltime(theyusedglobalpositioningsystemstogiveexacttime).

WhatFranksdidn'tknowthenwasthatthisnightwasgoingtoturnouttobetheeveofhisownVIICorpsattack.Whenhelearnedofthis

changeofplansthenextday,itwastobeforhimoneofthetwogreatestsurprisesofthewar.

Asfarasheknew,theplanandtheattacktimeswereset,andhewasconsideringnothingdifferent.Nobodyhadmentionedthepossibilityofgoingearly,notThirdArmy,CENTCOM,1JohnYeosock(theThirdArmycommander,andFranks's

immediatesuperior),orNormSchwarzkopf.Theyhadhashedoutthetimingtimeandagain.Asfarasheknew,theyhadsettledit.TheMarinesandtheSaudiswouldgointoKuwaitandfixIraqiforcesthere,andthentheheavyforceswouldgoaftertheRGFC--theRepublicanGuardsForcesCommand.VIICorps,theEgyptianCorps,andtheheavypartofXVIIICorps

werescheduledtoattackonG+1atBMNT.

Ashesatthereinthesilenceofhissleepingshelter--anexpandovanonthebackofafive-tontruck--hecheckedhiscigarsupply.Itwasstillholdingup.Thenhelitoneashebegantogooverinhismindtheposturefortheattackthedayaftertomorrow.Hehadnomap,butbynowtheyhadbeen

overtheplansomanytimeshehaditalmostcommittedtomemory.Aswashispractice,heusedtheArmy'sbasicproblem-solvingmethodandonehehimselfhadtaughtmanytimes,whichwentbytheacronymMETT-T(Mission,Enemy,Terrain,Troopsavailabletoyou,andTime).

MISSION

Themissionwassimple:todestroytheRGFCintheVIICorpszone(thecorpsareaofoperations)andbepreparedtodefendnorthernKuwait.

ENEMY

Thesituationwasthesameasithadbeenforthepastseveralweeks.TheIraqishadessentiallystayedinplace,whichwasnotsurprising,consideringthepunishmenttheywouldtakefromtheairiftheytriedanymajorforce

repositioning.AsfarasFredFrankswasconcerned,thatwasjustfine.Thecoalitionhadthemwheretheywantedthem.

DirectlyinfrontofVIICorpsacrosstheborderwastheIraqiVIICorps.Theirdefenseconsistedoffiveinfantrydivisions,sidebyside,easttowest,andonemechanizeddivisionbehindthemindepth.Thatdefensive

linestartedabouttwentykilometersnorthoftheborder,withacomplexobstaclesystemofmines,trenches,anddefensivebunkers,thickerintheeastandlesssointhewest.Inthewest,theyhadleftanopeningofaboutfortykilometers,wheretheirdefenselinecurvedtothenorthandwest,inordertopreventanenvelopment.Inmilitaryterms,thisiscalled"refusing

theflank."Thewidthoftheirdefendinginfantrydivisionswasabouttwenty-fivekilometerseach,withatotaldepthoftwentytothirtykilometers.

TheVIICorpsplanwasforthe1stInfantryDivisiontopenetrateoneofthesedivisionsinabreachmission,whileanenvelopingforce,consistingofthe2ndArmoredCavalryRegiment,

the1stArmoredDivision,andthe3rdArmoredDivision,wouldsimultaneouslysweeparoundtheIraqiflankandattacktowardtheRGFC.TheBritish1stArmoredDivisionwouldmeanwhilepassthroughthe1stINF(infantry)breach,oncethatwassecured,andattacktowardtheeasttopreventIraqiforcesfromthreateningtheVIICorpsflank.

AbigdisagreementaheadoftimehadconcernedtheestimatedwidthanddepthofIraqifrontlinedivisionsectors.U.S.intelligencethoughtthesectorsweretwenty-fivekilometerswideandnotsodeep;theBritishthoughttheIraqidivisionsectorswereamorenarrowfifteenkilometersanddeeper.TheBritishwerecorrect,asitturnedout,exceptthatthedivisionsectorsgotwiderthe

fartherwestyouwent.Thatwasofsignificantconsequencelater,astheBritishattackhitthecommandpostsoftheIraqifrontlinedivisionsratherthanpassingtotheirrear.

BehindtheIraqiVIICorps,theRepublicanGuards,Iraq'sbest,hadnotmoved,either.ThereweresixRGFCdivisions,threearmored/mechanizedand

threeinfantry(eachGuardsdivisionhadthreebrigades),withtheclosestoftheseabout150kilometersfromtheVIICorps'slineofdeparture.Thoughatthispoint,allsixwereintheVIICorpszoneofattack,fromthestartFranks'sintentwastoaimVIICorpsatthethreeGuardsarmored/mechanizeddivisions(Tawalkana,Medina,andHammurabi).Theyknewaboutwherethese

heavydivisionswere,aswellasthelocationsofthethreeRGFCinfantrydivisions.

BecauseairhadbeenabletofixtheRGFCstrategically(theIraqisknewthatiftheytriedanymajormoves,they'dgethithard),therehadnotbeenanyapparentmajorforcerepositioningsincetheaircampaignhadstartedon17January.Butairhadnotcompletelyimmobilizedthe

RGFC.TheGuardswereabletomoveuptobrigade-sizedunitslocallyintacticalrepositioning,andtheyhaddonesofrequently.SinceimmediateintelligenceaboutthesechangesinpositionwasnotavailabletoVIICorps,theywouldknowonlyapproximatelywheretheRGFCbrigadeswerelocatedatanygiventime.

Inotherwords,thatmeant

thattheIraqiarmoredforcesretainedtacticalfreedomofmovementandcouldmovefromtwenty-fivetofiftykilometerstoadjusttheirpositions.Thus,attackingunitswouldnotknowforsurewhatwasjustbeyondvisualrange.Itwouldthereforebeuptoattackingtroopstofixtheenemytactically,andthentodestroythem.ThatdistinctionwoulddictateFranks'stacticsandthoseof

hissubordinateunitcommandersastheyapproachedRGFClocations.Itwaslikelythatattackingunitswouldbeinvolvedinagreatmany"meetingengagements."2

AshepicturedinhismindthelayoutofIraqiforces,FranksturnedhisattentiontosomeofthenumberdesignationsofIraqibrigadesanddivisions.Theyhadbeen

thesubjectofmanydiscussionsamongintelligencestaffs--wasitthe12thDivisionoverhere,andthe52ndDivisionoverthere,ortheotherwayaround?Thesewereinterestingdiscussions,andimportanthistoricallytogettherecordstraight,yetforthepurposesoftheupcomingattack,hedidnotthinksuchmattershadanypracticalconsequence.Gettingunitdesignations

rightisvaluableforhistorybooks,butwhathereallyneededtoknowwashowmanydivisionsandbrigadestherewere,andwheretheywerelocated.Andhehadaverygoodideaofthat.

TurninghisthoughtsbacktotheIraqiVIICorps,Frankspicturedtheirfiveinfantrydivisionsforwardonline,behindabarriersystemthatwaslesscomplexmoving

westfromtheWadialBatin.(TheWadiisanancient,dryrivervalley,anglingsouthandwestoutofIraqintoSaudiArabia.Alongtheway,theWadidefinesthewesternboundarybetweenKuwaitandIraq.)Thedivisionnumbersfromeasttowestwerethe27th;25th;31st;48th;and26th.Thetacticalreserve,locatedbehindthe25thand31stdivisionsatadepthoffiftytoseventy-five

kilometers,wasthe12thArmored--actuallythe52nd(itwasoneoftheunitdesignationsthey'dgottenwrong).Again,itdidn'treallymattertoFrankswhetheritwasnumberedthe52ndorthe152nd.ItdidmatterthattherewasanIraqimechanizeddivisionthatcouldmove;ifitcouldmove,itcouldinterdicthislogisticsorotherwisegetinthewayofhisattackingforce.Inordertomakesure

thatdidn'thappen,hehadassignedtotheBritishthemissionofdefeatingthatdivision.

TheIraqiVIICorps'swesternmostdivision,the26th,hadtwobrigadesforwardinthedefensiveline.Inordertorefusethatwesternflank,theyhadaninfantrybrigadeindepth,stretchingperhapsfiftykilometerstotherearofthedefensiveline.It

wasthis26thDivisionthatthe1stInfantryDivision,theBigRedOne,wouldpenetrateintheirbreachmissionandthattheenvelopingforcewouldoverrun.

TheIraqiVIICorpshadassignedtheirartillerytofrontlinedivisionsandtotheirsubordinatebrigadeslocatedwiththoseunits.Otherartilleryretainedunder

theircorpscontrolwaspositionedtosupportthefrontlinedivisions.TotalguncountalongthatinitialIraqiVIICorpsdefensebeforetheairattacksbeganwasapproximately400to500,withoverhalfthatinrangeofthe1stINFbreach.

ThoughFrankswasrelativelysureaboutwhattheywerefacinginIraqiVIICorps,hewaslesssureofthe

organizationoftheirdeepforcesandhowtheywouldfight.HeknewtheGuardsweretheirbestandmostloyalforces.Theyalsowerethebestequipped,mostlywithRussian-madeT-72s,BMPs,andself-propelledartillery.IntheIran-IraqWar,theyhaddonewell.IntheinvasionofKuwait,theyhadmovedandfoughtefficiently.Eventhoughairhadhitthemhard,therewasn'tmuchdoubtthat

theRGFCwouldfight.

Franks'skeyquestion,then,waswhattheRepublicanGuardswouldattempttodowhenoriftheydiscoveredtheattack.Defend?ManeuvertowardVIICorpsunitstomeettheirattack?AttempttoescapeupHighway8toBaghdad?(Highway8wasthemainrouteonthesouthsideoftheEuphratesbetweenBasraandBaghdad.)Retreat

towardBasra?Franks'saimwastofixthemwheretheywere,ortosurprisethembeforetheycouldmove.

TherewereotherIraqiheavydivisionsinthecorps'szoneaswell,the10thand12thArmoreddivisions,formedintowhathediscoveredlaterwasthe"JihadCorps."Whatwouldtheseintermediateforcesdo?Inaddition,anotherheavy

division,the17th,waslocatedneartheRGFC,butwasnotintheVIICorpszone.ThepresenceoftheseformationsandtheirsubordinationtotheGuardswouldmakeadifferenceinhowtheIraqihighcommandchosetofightVIICorps.NotcountingthethreeRGFCinfantrydivisions,thatgavetheIraqisasix-divisiontheaterreserve,threeRGFCheavydivisionsandthree

otherarmoreddivisions.

TheforcesarrayedbytheCoalitionspreadfromthePersianGulftoapproximately600kilometersinland.VIICorps'smissionwastodestroytheRepublicanGuardintheirsectorofattack.

TheIraqidefenseswerearrayedinthreebelts.Thefrontlineconsistedprimarilyofinfantryunitsdefendingbehindamassiveobstaclebeltofminefields,trenches,andwire.Thetacticalreservewaspoisedtoreinforcewhereverthefrontlineswerebreached.Theoperationalreserve--theRepublicanGuardsandotherunits--defendedthesouthernapproachesinto

IraqandwerecapableofcounterattackingtheCoalitionforce.

Asheplayedallthisinhismind'seye,healsoconsideredsomethingelse:thelocationoftheIraqiarmywasonlyonepieceoftheintelligencepicture.Theotherpiecewashowstrongwerethey?Whatwastheirabilitytofight?Evenatthispoint,hewasnotveryconfidentthatheknewtheanswerstothat.

Inhiszoneofattackweretwoverydifferent-type

forces.Exceptfortheirmechanizedinfantryreserve,theIraqiVIICorpsconsistedoffivefrontlineconscriptinfantrydivisions,fixedinaWorldWarI-typedefensivearrangement.VIICorpshadhadsomecombatagainsttheseunitsovertheprevioustwoweeks,andprisonersanddesertershadbeentaken.AftertheseIraqisoldiershadbeenquestionedabouttheirdispositions,strength,unit

identification,andmorale,FranksandhiscommandershadgottenaprettyclearpictureoftheIraqiVIICorps.Theinfantrydivisionswerebrittleandwouldeasilycrackatthefirsthard,sustainedgroundattack.They'dbeenhurtbadlybyU.S.air,Apache,andartilleryattacks,andbythedesertionofsomeoftheirownleadership.Theconclusionwasthattheywerebetween50and75percent

strength.Theydidnothavemuchfightleftinthem.

ButFrankshadnosuchclearpictureoftheRGFC,oroftheotherIraqiarmored/mechanizedformations.PrewaraircampaignobjectiveshadcalledforthereductionofRGFCstrengthby50percentbythetimethegroundwarstarted.Theaterhadselectedthatnumberbasedonan

analysisoffriendlyandenemyforceratios.Ifthatfigurewasachieved,they'dthought,VIICorpswouldhaveenoughcombatpoweravailabletofinishthedestructionindirectgroundcombat.

Asithappened,noneofthegroundcommandershadparticipatedinsettingthisobjective.Andwhentheyhadlearnedofit,mosthad

thoughtitwouldnotbeachievableunlesstheattackswentonalongtime.

Therealproblemwasnotthespecificobjective(whether50percentorwhatever).Theproblemwasthattherewasnoreliablemethodfordeterminingiftheobjectivehadactuallybeenachieved.Therewasnowayofknowing,infact,iftheywereevenclose.Precise

bomb-damageassessment(BDA)wasdifficult.Itwasrelativelyeasytofiguredamagedonetoafixedtargetsuchasabridgeoranaircraftshelterbyaprecision-guidedweapon,butdamageagainstmobilearmoredunitsbydumbbombsor30-mmcannonsfrom10,000feetandhigher--now,thatwasharder.

SoVIICorpsestimatesofIraqiRGFCstrength

remainedquiteconservative.Thoughintheplanstheyhadbriefedtheyhadassumedthestatedobjectiveof50percent,theyalwayshedgedtheirbets.TheirownestimatewasthatGuardsandotherIraqiarmored/mechanizedunitswouldbecloserto75percentwhenVIICorpshitthem.Corpsalsothoughtthat,unlikethefrontlineinfantrydivisions,theGuardswouldfight,andnotrunawayor

desert.

AsFranksweighedthesenumbers,hebecameawarethattherealartwastoassessenemyfightingcapabilities,competence,andwillingnesstofight.Locatingthemanddeterminingnumberswastheeasypart.Itwasalmostscientific.Itwasthisotherpartthatwastheart.Youwantedneithertooverestimatenor

underestimatetheenemy.

FredFranks'sexperienceinVietnamhadinfluencedhimonthismatter.Ifheerred,hewantedtoerronthesideofoverestimatingtheenemy.Hewantedtobesurethat,thistime,theresultswouldbedifferent.

INthefinalanalysis,Franks

knewthathehadadecentintelligencepictureforIraqiunitlocationsbutapoorpictureofRGFCstrength,fightingcapability,andcompetence.

Hewasawareagainthathehadtocometoaconclusion.Hewouldalsoneedtopredictandinfluencetheirtacticalmaneuver.WouldVIICorpsbeabletokeepthemfixedwheretheywereandsurprise

theminthesizeanddirectionoftheattack?Wouldtheycometowardhisadvancingunits?WouldtheyattempttogoupHighway8?Wouldtheyattempttoescapeoutofthetheater?Andhealsoknewhewouldhavetodecideallthatabouttwenty-fourhoursaftertheVIICorpsattackatfirstlighton25February.

TERRAIN

Fromhisperspectiveascorpscommander,Frankshadnotspentalotoftimeexaminingterrain.InEuropeithadbeenvitaltodeterminekeyterrain--thepiecesofgroundthatdominateanarea--andtolookverycloselyat

avenuesofapproach--theareasthatallowedrapidmovementbylargeformationsinthedirectioninwhichyouortheenemywantedtogo.Theyhadexaminedthecross-countrytrafficability--thecapabilityoftheterraintoallowheavyarmoredmovement--andlookedatroads,bridges,airfields,towns,andcities,andathowtheymightinfluenceoperationsand

logistics.

Notmuchofthatmatteredhere.Thiswasdesert.Fightingherewaslikenavalsurfacewarfareontheopenocean.Heretheycouldessentiallytaketheirfleetanywhere,andinalmostanyformationtheywanted.Nowsmallerunitsinthecorpshadtobeconcernedwiththenormalrisesanddropsinthedesertastheyattacked.They

alsohadtobeawarethatinsomeplaces--especiallyin1stADsector--thesandwassofterthaninothers(andthuslesstrafficableforheavyarmor),andthatinsomeplacestherewerenarrowdefiles.

Sothattheycouldhavethebestavailableintelaboutsuchareas,aSpecialForcesnightflighthadbeensentforwardintotheVIICorpszoneto

lookovertheterrain.WhentheflighthaddeterminedthattheterrainwouldholdanythingFrankswanteditto,he'dfiguredhecouldmaneuverhisfleetanywhere.SocouldtheIraqis,herealized.Butasitturnedout,theyanchoredtheirfleetwithshortchains.Sincetheyhadnoconfidenceincross-desertmaneuver(andtheydidnothaveaccesstoGPSreceivers),theIraqismainly

stucktotheirroads.

Infact,weatherturnedouttobeabiggerfactor.Severelocalsandstorms,calledshamals,hidVIICorpsattacksfromIraqis,butalsolimitedsomeuseofApaches,andtroopshadtofightthroughcoldnighttemperaturesandtorrentialrains.

TROOPS

TheVIICorpssituationwasexcellent.Theplanwassoundandwellunderstoodbyallunits;theyhadrehearsedandwar-gamedit.TheCorpswasatfullstrength,andtheequipmentavailabilityofmajorcombatassetssuchas

tanksandBradleyswasat97percent.ThatwasbetterthanintheCorps'sbestColdWardaysinGermanyaspartofNATO.

Thecommanderswereready,andtheteamworkamongthemwastight.Itwasatalentedteam.Franks'smajormaneuvercommanderswereMajorGeneralTomRhame,1stInfantryDivision;MajorGeneralRonGriffith,

1stArmoredDivision;MajorGeneralPaul"Butch"Funk,3rdArmoredDivision;MajorGeneralRupertSmith,1st(U.K.)ArmoredDivision;ColonelDonHolder,2ndArmoredCavalryRegiment;andColonelJohnnieHitt,11thAviationBrigade.BrigadierGeneralJohnTilellicommandedthe1stCavalryDivision,whichwastobereleasedtoCENTCOMastheaterreservethenextday.

ThecorpsartillerycommanderwasBrigadierGeneralCreightonAbrams;andBrigadierGeneralBobMcFarlinwasthecommanderoftheCorps'salmost27,000-soldierSupportCommand.

Thetroopswerementallyready,andtheyweretrainedtoarazor'sedge.Duringtheweeksbeforecombat,theyhadtrainedhardtoadapttheirtacticstothedesertandto

practicetheirtasks.TheyalsohadbeenincombatagainstIraqis.Duringthetwoweekspriortotheattack,Frankshadwantedsomeactualfightinginordertogethisforcesmentallyreadytofight,aswellastoconductfeintstodeceivetheIraqisastotheactualpointofattack,andtodestroyartilleryinrangeofthebreachsite.Asaresult,theartilleryandaviationofeverymajormaneuverunitin

VIICorpshadbynowparticipatedinacombatactionagainstIraqifrontlineunits.

TIME

Thetimingoftheattackwasclear.TheywouldattackthedayaftertomorrowatG+1atBMNT.

Franks'sbestcommander'sestimatewasthatthewholeoperationwouldtakeabout

eightdays:twodaystogetthroughnon-GuardsIraqiforcesandthe150to200kilometerstotheGuardsthemselves,fourdaystodestroytheGuards,andtwodaysforconsolidation.TheThirdArmyestimatehadbeentwoweeksforthegroundoffensiveandanotherfourforconsolidation.

THATwastheMETT-TsituationfacingFredFranksashesatinhissleepingshelter,gazingouttheopeningtothenow-quietlifeofthemaincommandpost.

Itwasaveryfamiliarscene.ItwastheArmy'spracticetousethreecommandposts,calledthe"tactical,""main,"and"rear"posts,dependingontheirclosenesstotheenemy.The

close--orimmediate--battlewasledusingthetacticalcommandpostasabaseofoperations;therearpostdirectedallthelogisticsorcombatservicesupportoftheunit;andthemaincommandpostkepttrackoftheimmediatefightandthedeeperfightbeyondthatone,andplannedthebattlestobefoughtinthefuture.Atthemaincommandpost,allthreecommandactivitieswere

normallyfullycoordinated,aswasairsupport.Themaincommandpostwasalsothelinktohigherheadquarters,bothforoperationalmattersaswellasforintelligence--alldownlinkterminalswerelocatedthere,whichbroughtdirecttheaterornationalintelligencesystem"feed"totheunit.

FrankspicturedthemainCPinfrontofhim--

essentially,alargecamp-sitewithtentsandtruckvans.TheareaoftheCPcoveredabout500metersindiameterandperhapsakilometerincircumference.Theentireareawasbehindacircular,ten-foot-highbermofsandshovedupbyCorpsengineers.Abouttenfeetoutsidethebermwastriple-strandconcertinabarbedwirearrangedtriple-thickandpiledintightlytangledcoils.

Atregularintervalsaroundthisbermweresix-by-six-footbunkers,withuptotwofeetofoverheadcover.TheseweremannedbyarmedsoldierswithcommunicationtoacentralpostcommandedbytheHQbattalioncommander.

Therewasonlyoneentrancetothecommandpostarea.Togetin,youhadtoidentifyyourselftomilitary

police,whowouldpullthetemporaryslidingwirebarrieroutoftheway,andthenyouhadtodrivedownaserpentinecoursepasthighmoundsofsand.Onlyafewvehicleswerepermittedinside,andtheseweredirectedtoaparkingareajustinsidetheentrance.Thereallpersonnelwoulddismountandwalktowherevertheyneededtogo.ToallowmuchvehicletrafficinsidetheCP

wastostirupsomuchsandthatitwasharmfultotheequipment,plusitwasn'tsafeatnightwithnolights,anditmadelifeunbearableforthetroops.Mostvehiclesparkedoutside,andtheiroccupantswalkedtotheirdestination.Troopsmanningtheentrancecouldspotvehiclesapproachingfromalongdistance.

Insidetheperimeter,the

truckvanswerearrangedaccordingtotheirindividualfunction:Staffelementswerelocatedclosetootherstaffelementswithwhomtheyneededtocoordinate.Forexample,intelligenceandoperationswerealwaysnexttoeachother,andAirForceair,corpsartillery,andArmyaviationstayedclosetogether.

Thesetruckvanswere

whattheU.S.Armycalled"expandovans,"likeFranks'sownsleepingshelter.Theywerefive-tontruckswithasteelenclosureontheback.Whenthevehiclewasstationary,thiscouldbe"expanded"byabouttwofeetoneachside,thusincreasingtheworkarea.Theinsideofthesevanstookonvariousphysicalconfigurationsdependingontheirfunction.Insidedimensionswereabout

twentybyfifteenfeet,andtheywereprewired,sothatwhenyoustoppedyoucouldplugincablesandhavelights.Inotherwords,theywereessentiallyportableoffices.

AtthemainCPwereaboutathousandsoldiersandperhapstwohundredvehicles.Becauseofthetimeneededtoinstalllong-haulcommunicationsforboth

intelligenceandcommand,andbecauseofthenetworkofcablesandwiresthathadtobehookeduptoprovideelectronicnetworkingcapabilitybetweenthesevans,itwasnotveryphysicallyagile.

Thepictureofahigh-techCPFranks'sunitwasnot.PattonorBradleywouldhavebeenrightathomehere.Theyusedpapermapswithhand-

drawnsymbolsonacetatecoveringstodepictboundaries,phaselines,andobjectives,theusualcontrolmeasuresforacorps.Theyusedline-of-sightradiosandlonger-haulcommsthatweretheequivalentofradiotelephonestoreachRiyadhortheUnitedStates.Theyusedcommercialfaxmachinestotransmithardcopiesofsmallpapers.Forlargeracetateoverlays,theydrewthemone

atatimeandsentthemvialandoraircouriertosubordinateunits.Theyhadcomputersforanalysis,wordprocessing,andespeciallyintelligence.Butintheend,thecentralfocusofallthefriendlyandenemyinformationwasapapermappostedbyhand,notalarge-screencomputermonitor.Itwasaroundthatmapthattheyheldtheirdiscussions,andwhereFranksmadewhatever

decisionshemadeintheCPandwherehegaveguidance.

Duringthewar,FrankswouldnotstayinthemainCP,butinthesmaller,moremobileTACCPclosertothefight.Hewantedtobeupfront,wherehe'dhaveamoreprecisefeelforthebattle.

InRiyadhaswell,thebattlewastrackedonpapermaps.Inorderfor

informationaboutfriendlyandenemyunitstobeaccuratelyandtimelypostedonthosemaps,thestaffhadtorelyonvoicephonecallsandwrittensituationreportsthatwerehoursold.Insuchasetup,wheretherewasnoautomaticandsimultaneouselectronicupdatingofthesecommonsituationaldisplays,youhadabuilt-inprescriptionformisunderstanding.

EARLIERTHATDAY

Frankslethisattentionstraybackovertheeventsoftheday,andespeciallyhisvisitstotheunits.

Hehadgoneallaroundthecorpstalkingtocommanders,

lookingsoldiersintheeye,shakingtheirhands,bangingthemontheback,handingoutVIICorpscoins,sayingafewwords,suchas"goodtogo,""goodluck,""trustyourleaders,we'vegotagreatschemeofmaneuverhere,""theIraqiswillneverknowwhathitthem."Andhehadcalledouta"JAYHAWK"ortwo.

Hewantedtoshow

confidenceandtogetasenseoftheelectricitygoingthroughtheunits.AndhefoundtobetruewhathehadreportedtoSecretaryCheneyandGeneralPowellon9FebruaryinthefinalbriefinginRiyadh:"VIICorpsisreadytofight."Soldierswereallpumpedup.Therewassomeoftheusual"kicktheirass"typeofthing,"theIraqisaremessingwiththewrongguys."Soldier-to-soldier

chatter.

Forthemostpart,thetroopsandleadersweregoingabouttheirworkwithanairofquietprofessionalism.Theyweredoingsmallthingsthatcount,suchascleaningweapons,checkingfuel,checkingoilintheirvehicles,anddoingalittlemaintenanceontheirvehicles.

Duringhisvisitswith

commandersthatday,Frankshadtalkedaboutsomeofthepiecesoftheattackmaneuver.Thoughbythistimetheyhadbeenoverthebasicmaneuvermanytimes,hewantedtoreviewsomeofthedetailsagain.Forexample,hewantedtolookoverthecoordinationbetweenthe1stArmoredDivisioncomingupontheleftofthe2ndCavalry.Thatis,hewantedtoreviewhow

the2ndCavalry,whichwasinitiallycovering--infrontof--boththe1stADand3rdAD,woulduncoverthe1stAD--getoutfrominfrontofthem--sothat1stADcoulddashforwardtoal-Busayyah,whichwastheirinitialobjective(calledObjectivePurple),about140kilometersfromtheattackstartpoint.

HehadalsotalkedtoMajorGeneralGeneDaniel,

hisdeputy,aboutthetaskforceheadquartersthatDanielwouldheadupatthebreach.Sincethe1stInfantryDivision,theBritish,theCorpslogisticselements,twoCorpsartillerybrigades,andperhapsthe1stCavalryDivisionhadtopassthroughthebreach,heneededacommandertherewhocouldmakesurethatprocesswentwithoutletup,andwhocouldmakethenecessary

adjustmentsonthespot.(The1stCavalryDivisionwasthetheaterreserve;itwasexpected--butnotcertain--thatthisdivisionwouldbeaddedtotheVIICorpsattack.)

Andhewenttovisitthe1stCAVagain.Hisintentionhadbeentoattendthememorialservicefortwosoldierskilledon20FebruaryduringdivisionactionsintheRuqi

Pocket,3butbecauseofGPSnavigationproblems(notthatunusualinahelicopter),hehadn'tarrivedatthedivisionuntiltheservicewasover.However,hewasstillabletostayaroundandtalktothetroopsandcommanders.Ithadbeenanemotionalmoment,visitingsoldierswhohadjustlostfriendsincombat.Heknewwellthatdeathincombatissuddenand

usuallyunexpected,eventhoughyouknowitwillhappen.Andhewasremindedagainoftheinnersteelrequiredofsoldiersandleaders.Soldierswerespeakinginsofttonesabouttheaction.Whiletheywereclearlytouchedbythelossoftheirbuddies,theywerenotabouttobackoff.Theywerereadytogoagain.

Hedrewtwolessonsfrom

thefirsthandaccountsheheardoftheactionthatmorning:First,the1stCAVwasabletostrikebackhardwithacombinationofgroundmaneuver,artillery,andairandseverelypunishtheIraqis.Second,theIraqiscoulddeliverheavyandaccuratefiresifyouhappenedtodriveintotheirpredetermineddefensivearea.

Atthe1stInfantry

Division,hevisitedColonelBertMaggart'sfirstbrigade.Maggart,hiscommanders,andhisbrigadestaffgavehimathoroughbriefingontheirattackplansintheirTACcommandpost(threeM577sparkedsidebysidewithcanvasextensionsoffthebacktoformasmalltwenty-five-by-thirty-footworkarea).Theyneedednonotesorreferences.Theyhadbeenoveritmanytimesbefore.

Theirsoldierswerekeyedup,readytogo;plansfortheattackweresetandrehearsed;soldiershadconfidenceintheirleadersandtheirabilitytoaccomplishthemission.Youcouldseeitintheireyes.Youcouldhearitintheirvoices.Becausetherehadbeenlotsofpredictionsaboutthetimingoftheattack,thetroopsweregettingalittleimpatientwithallthefitsandstarts.Bynowtheywantedto

getintoitandfinishitandgohome.

Hefoundthesameattitudeinboththe3rdandthe1stArmoredDivisions."We'retrained,weknowwhattodo,"trooperstoldhimagainandagain.Andhe,too,wassayingthesamethingagainandagain:"We'reready,we'retough,we'retrained.Justlookoutforeachother,followyourleaders,and

knowwhatthehellyou'redoing."Hegotquickstatusreportsfrombothdivisioncommanders.

Atthe1stArmoredDivision,thespiritofoneunitespeciallytouchedhim,andhespentthebetterpartofanhourwiththem.TheywereaBradleyplatoon,the1stPlatoon,CompanyC,1stBattalion,7thInfantry,3rdBrigade,3rdInfantry

Division.Theycalledthemselves"Raiders"andtheirmottowas"Getsome."TheplatoonleaderwasFirstLieutenantDougMorse,andtheplatoonsergeantwasStaffSergeantJamieNarramore.Theywerereadyandtoughandnotwithoutasenseofhumor.Theyhadcomposedasongandsangitforhim,aprofanedescriptionofhowtoughtheywereandwhattheywereabouttodotothe

Iraqis.Hewasn'tsurehowtheyhaddoneit,buttheyhadputeverycusswordheknewinthere."Thanksfornotcourt-martialingus,"SergeantNarramoretoldhimafterward.TheyhadevengottenhimtosignhisnameonaBradleyforgoodluck,andFranksandthetwenty-eightplatoonmembershadposedforateampicture.Afterthewar,justbeforetheygotontheplanetogohome,

FranksandtheRaidershadamini-reunion;theytoldhimsomewarstories.Theyhadnothadanyonewoundedorkilledintheaction.HestillhastheRaiderspictureonhiswallathome.

Someoftheleadersweregoingthroughlast-minuterockdrillswhenhevisited.Ina"rockdrill,"leadersgooutinthesandandmarkoutapieceofgroundwithwhite

engineertapetomakeascaledreplicaoftheiractualanticipatedbattlearea.Then,usingrocksasuniticons,theymovetherockstoshowhowtheyplantomovetheirunitsinrelationshiptooneanother,theterrain,andtheenemy.

Basedonwhathe'dseeninVietnam,thetroopswereinabouttherightframeofmindandkeyedupproperly.InVietnam,anothergeneration

ofAmericansoldiershadgoneacrosshalftheworldtodowhattheircountryhadasked;andtacticallythey'ddoneitaswellasanyothergenerationofAmericancombatsoldierscould.Butthistimeitwasgoingtoenddifferently.Theyallwouldseetothat.

REFLECTIONS

FrankswasproudofhisVIICorpsteam.Afterlookingbackovertheday'svisits,hethoughtagainabouttrust--andmadeaquickinventoryofwhatheneededtodotofulfillthattrust.

Hehadgoneoverhis"commander'sintent"withhiscommandersanumberoftimes.Thisistheconciseexpressionofhowyouvisualizetheoperation,anditisalwayswrittenbythecommanderpersonally.Intheabsenceofspecificorders,itcouldbeusedasoperatingguidelines.Bynowhethoughtitwasclearandwellunderstood.Itread,

IintendtoconductaswiftseriesofattackstodestroyRGFCandminimizeourowncasualties.Speed,tempo,andacoordinatedair/landcampaignarekey.IwantIraqiforcestomovesothatwecanattackthemthroughoutthe

depthoftheirformationsbyfire,maneuver,andair.Thefirstphasesofouroperationwillbedeliberateandrehearsed,thelatterwillbemoreMETT-Tdependent.Wewillconductadeliberatebreachwithprecisionandsynchronization,resultingfrom

precisetargetingandcontinuousrehearsals.Oncethroughthebreach,Iintendtodefeatforcestotheeastrapidly,withonedivisionaseconomyofforce,andtopassthreedivisionsandACRaspointofmainefforttothewestofthataction,to

destroyRGFCinafast-movingbattlewithzonesofactionandagileforcesattackingbyfire,maneuver,andair.CSSmustkeepup,becauseIintendnopauses.Wemuststrikehardandcontinuallyandfinishrapidly.

Franksthenturnedhisattentiontoaspecificskill:theabilitytopictureoperationsinhishead,andtojudgetime/distancefactorstogettherightunitsintherightcombinationattherightplaceattherighttime.Frankscalledthis"orchestrating"thebattle.Howwouldwedo?Howwouldhiscommanders?

TheArmyhadgivenFrankslotsofopportunitiesto

practiceanddevelopthisskill,fromplatoonleadertocorpscommander.Thattrainingandsomeexcellentmentorshadalottodowiththehoningofhisability,ashadthecrucibleofVietnam.Butitwasnotonlyamatterofpracticeandexperience;italsohadtodowiththewaythebrainworked--withimagination.

Allheknewwasthat

somehowhecouldseeabattleclearlyinhishead,relatethephysicalandsoldierpiecestogether,andfigurehowlongitwouldtakeadivision,forexample,toturnthreebrigadesninetydegrees,ortomarktwenty-fourlanesofaminefieldbreach,ortocloseanartillerybrigadeonamovingdivision,ortoclosethreedivisionsonacommonobjective.

Somecommanderswerebetterthanothersatorchestratingabattle.Forsomeitwasalearnedskill;forothersitcamemoreeasily.Fortheconductofbattletheywereabouttowage,itwasindispensable.ButFranksfeltallhiscommandershadit.Hehadhadtheopportunitytomakehisownjudgmentsaboutallofthemduringtheirtimetogetherthesepastfew

months.

AtThirdArmyhetrustedJohnYeosock.Eventhoughhehadnotcommandedacorps,Yeosockunderstoodallthis,asdidhisG-3,BrigadierGeneralSteveArnold.Seniortothem,Frankswasnotquitesure.Hewasneversure,especiallyatCENTCOMinthebasementoftheMODbuildinginRiyadh,howVIICorps

maneuverswouldbeinterpreted.Asithappened,theperceptionthereofwhatitwouldtaketomaneuverthislarge,multidivision,146,000-soldierarmoredcorpsinacoordinatedattackofover200kilometerswasverydifferentfromhowitwasonthesceneinIraqandKuwait.Thisdifferenceinperceptionwouldleadtocontroversieslater.

Alliedtothislastissuewasacommunicationsmatterthatdidnotconcernhimthen--CENTCOMHQ'spictureofboththeenemyandfriendlysituation.Inlightoflaterevents,herealizeditshouldhave.

Wouldtheirpicturebethesameashisown?Wouldhismaincommandpost(itselfmanykilometersfromhislocationandthebattle)be

abletotrackthebattlecloseenoughtokeepThirdArmyinformedandtoaccuratelywritetherequireddailycommander'ssituationreports?AndthenwouldthisinformationgetpassedaccuratelytoCENTCOM?WouldJ-3(CENTCOMoperations)evenpayattentiontowhatasinglecorpswasdoing?Orwouldthatgetrolledupinabigpicture?WouldCENTCOMbeaware

ofthenormaltime-infolagofgroundoperationsreportsandsituationaldisplays?Andthenwouldtheyaskforanupdatebeforemakingdecisionscriticaltogroundops?WherewouldFranks'shighercommanderschoosetolocatethemselvesduringtheconductofthegroundwar?WouldtheycomeforwardintoIraq,wherehewouldbeinordertogetafirsthandfeelforthefight?And,finally,

shouldhetalktoSchwarzkopfduringthewar?Orshouldhecommunicateprimarilywithhisimmediatecommander,JohnYeosock?

HewasconfidentthathissubordinatesatVIICorps'smaincommandpostwouldgetthecommunicationjobdone.Theywereasmart,talented,skilledgroup.TheywouldcertainlyreportthecorrectpictureofVIICorps's

actionstoThirdArmy.

POSSIBLEuseofchemicalandbiologicalweaponswasabigconcern,however.HadtheygottentoalltheIraqiartillerycapableofreachingthe1stInfantryDivisioninthebreachorthefollow-onunitspassingthroughthebreach?Theyhadnowayofcompletelyknowing.No

otherissuemadeFranksfeelsomuchangerattheIraqileadershipastheirpossibleuseofchemicalorbiologicalwarfare.

VIICorpswasface-to-facewiththepossibilitythattheIraqiswoulduseoneorboth.Theyhadthem.TheyhadusedthemontheirownpeopleandagainstIran.Therewasnothingintheirbehaviororbattletendencies

thatindicatedtheywoulddoanythingdifferentthistime.Frankstrulyexpectedit.

TheVIICorpscommandersandsoldierswerenotintimidatedbyanyofthis,however.Foralongtime,theyhadtrainedinchemicalprotectivegearinNATOandU.S.trainingexercises,fullyexpectingtheWarsawPacttousechemicals.Ithadallseemed

soabstractthen,though.Theywouldenduretheseperiodsoftimeinmasksandchemicalsuits,shoutinginsqueakyvoicesthroughtheirmaskstobeheardontheradio,sweatingeveninthewinterinsidethecharcoalsuits,fumblingastheytriedtolaceupthedamnedrubberbootiessomeonehaddesignedtogoovertheirregularboots,wearingthemonsterrubbergloves,andlaboringtolook

throughgunsightswithaprotectivemaskon.Theyhadmadeitworkthroughdisciplinedtraining.Theyhaddoneitsomuchithadbecomeroutineandasourceofconfidence,aslongastheyhadtherightgear.Theyhadgottenthattakencareofafewdaysbefore.Theyhadprotectivemeasures.Theyalsohadantidotes.Theywereready.

Biologicalwarfarewasadifferentmatter.Frankswasnotsosureaboutthis.TheyhadhadverylittletrainingagainstbiologicalagentsinGermanyandweremostlyunfamiliarwiththeagents,eventhoughsomeofthem,suchasanthrax,botulism,andsalmonella,werecommonlyknownsicknesses.Theproblemwithbiologicalwarfareisthatthebiologicalagentshaveadelayedeffect,

whichmakesdetectionofthesourcedifficult.It'shardtofindevidenceofwhodidit--andthusretaliationisdifficult.TheyhadalltakenacrashcourseonIraqideliverymeans,though.TheVIICorpsNBCofficer,ColonelBobThornton,andG-2(Intelligence)ColonelJohnDavidsonwerehelpfulingettingwhateverinformationwasavailable.Frankswantedtostopalotofrumorsand

badinformationgoingaround.HedidnotwantthetroopsintimidatedbyIraqibiologicalwarfarecapability.OfallthecapabilitiespossessedbytheIraqis,itwastheonethatconcernedhimthemost,rightuptotheendofthewar.

HEalsowasawareofsomeotherthingsthatnight--larger

issuesbeyondtheactualconductoftheirmission.

ToFredFranks,andtomostofhissoldiersandleaders,whattheywereabouttodowastheirduty,pureandsimple.Theywereprofessionalssenttoskillfullyuseforceasaninstrumentoftheirgovernment(andoftheUN),tocompelaforeignbelligerenttodowhataUNresolutionhadorderedthem

todo.Theyknewhowtodothat.Butthiswasnotajihadforthem.Thiswasneithertotalwar,norawartosavecivilization,norawartostopmadmenfromtryingtoenslavethegreaterpartoftheworld.Themissionwasclear:toliberateanationanddriveaninvaderoutinanareaofvitalinterests.Itwasuseofforcetogainspecificstrategicobjectivesattheleastcosttotheirownside--thengohome.

ThiswouldaffectFranks'sselectionoftactics;hethoughtitwouldbeirresponsibleofhimandofVIICorpstopayanunlimitedpriceinthelivesoftheirsoldiersforalimitedobjective.Vietnamhadtaughtthemallthat.

PerhapsSFCEdFelderofCompanyD,1stBattalion,37thArmor,1stArmoredDivisionhadsaiditbest:

"Nobodywantstogotowar,butwetrainforiteveryday.That'swhatwegetpaidtodo.We'reprofessionals."AndPFCBruceHuggins,atankmechanicofthatbattalion'sheadquarterscompany,said,"Theyaskedforourhelpandwe'regoingtogivethemthathelpandwe'llfreethatcountry.We'lldoourjob,gohome,andcarryonwithlife."

Theendresultwasneverin

doubt.Theywouldwin.Forhimasamajorcommanderitwasamatterofselectionofmethodandonethatwouldcomeatleastcosttosoldiersforthemissionassigned.Therewouldbeindividualactsofheroism,astherealwayswere.Butforseniorcommanders,Frankssawnothingparticularlyheroicinwhattheywereabouttodo.Hehadsaidrightfromthestart,"We'llgodowhatwe

havetodoandtalkaboutitlater."ThiswasinthemodeofKorea,Vietnam,andPanama.Itwasnotacrusade.

ThatdistinctioncomeshardforAmericans.Inourownhistory,moreoftenthannot,wehavefought"crusades"orusedforcefornationalsurvival:theRevolution,theWarof1812,theCivilWar,WorldWarsIandII.Notonlydo

Americanshavelessexperiencewiththeotherkindofwar,buttheytendasamatterofnationalcharacternottobewarlike--eventhoughAmerica'ssonsanddaughtersmakethebestwarriorswhencalledupon.

TheotherfactorthatstayedwithFrankswasVietnam.InthehospitalatValleyForge,wherehehadhadhislegamputated,hehadmadea

pledgetohisfellowamputeesandtohisfellowVietnamveterans:"Neveragain."Neveragainwouldyoungmenandwomencomeawayfromabattlefieldonwhichtheywereaskedtorisktheirliveswithoutgainingtheirobjectives,withouthavingthoseobjectivesthoughttobeworththeeffort,withoutanagreementaheadoftimethatthetacticalmethodsneededtoachievestrategicobjectives

wereacceptableforthemilitarytouse,andwithoutawordofthankstothosewhowentwhenitwasallover.

FredFrankswasnotinchargeofallthat;buthewasinapositiontosatisfyhimselfasacommanderthatallthesemistakeswouldnotberepeated.Thatconvictionburnedhotinhim,likeablueflame.VietnamwasneverfarfromhimthroughoutDesert

ShieldandDesertStorm.Now,thatwasacrusade,atleastforFredFranks.

AnotherfactorhegotoutofVietnamwasarespectforwaranditscosts,andforwhatittakestowin.Whenyou'reonthebattlefield,yougetintofights,eitherdeliberatelyorinsurprisemeetingengagementswiththeenemy,andtheygotintoalotofthoseinVietnam.

Franksbelievedthatyouhadtomakeitanunfairfightasrapidlyasyoucould.Youwantedtogetalltheadvantagesonyourside,andtowinthetacticalengagementasrapidlyaspossibleandatleastcosttoyoursoldiers.Thatmeantalotoffirepower.Italsousuallymeantmovingintoapositionaladvantageandbringingbrutalamountsoffiretobearontheenemy,

untiltheycalleditquitsandranaway,oryoudestroyedtheircapabilitytocontinue,andcontrolledthearea.Andthatwastheendofit.

InVietnam,"IftheenemyfiredatuswithasingleAK-47round,wepoundedthemwithallwehad.Weputasmuchfirepowerbackonthemaswehad,somuchfirepowerthattheywishedtheyhadn'tstartedsomething."

ThatinfluencedhisthoughtsonIraq.Differentcommandersmightdothingsindifferentways,butFranks'swaywas,"Whenwecameintocontactintheareaofmainattack,thenitwasgoingtobewithabigfist.WeweregoingtohammertheIraqisrelentlesslywiththatfistuntilwefinishedthem.Weweregoingtosustainthemomentumofthatattackuntilwewerethroughwith

whatwecametheretodo."

Sotheideaof"fairfight"hadnomeaningforFranksinthiscontext.Itseemedtotallyinsanetogivetheenemysomesportingchancetowin.

"Ifyouhavetofight,"Frankslikedtosay,"then100tonothingisabouttherightscoreforthebattlefield.Twenty-fourtotwenty-onemaybeokayintheNFLon

Sundayafternoon,butnotonthebattlefield.

"Myinclinationintacticsistomaneuverourforcetobringsomuchcombatpowertobearontheotherforcethatwewillgetthembackpedaling.Iwanttogetthemontheropesandkeepthemthere.Then,whenwe'vegotthemdown,we'llfinishthem.We'regoingtofinishthem.

"Ifwehavetofight,thenweweregoingtogoforthejugular,notthecapillaries.

"Butoncewearewinningourbattles,we'vegottolinkthosesuccessfulbattlesinsomepatternordirection,sotheyadduptomeansomethingbigger.Theyhavetoendupaccomplishingyourstrategicaims.Thatiswhyyouarefightingthosebattles.Andthatiswhythetroops

whoareriskingitalltowinthosebattlestrustthatthegeneralsandSecretariesofDefenseandPresidentsknowwhattheyaredoing,andwillmakeallthatsweatandbloodcountforsomething."

FromwhatFranksandhiscommandershadseensofar,thecommandclimatewasfardifferentfromtheoneinVietnam.Theycouldfeelthesteelinthewill,fromthe

PresidentandtheSecretaryofDefensethroughGeneralPowell,tothetheater.Itwassolid.

FINALLYhewasatpeacewithhimself,asmuchasanycommandercouldbeontheeveofbattle.Histroopsandleaderswereready.Theyhadworkedlikehelltogettowheretheywere,andmost

unitshadhadtheminimumtwoweeks'traininghethoughtnecessary.Soldierswereconfidentinthemselves,theirequipment,oneanother,andtheirleaders.FrankshadknownthatwouldcomebecauseofthetraininginSaudiArabiaandtheteam-buildingtheyhadworkedonsincethestartofthemissiontodeployon8November.TheyhadbecometheVIICorpsteamsonecessaryfor

successincombat.

On21February,SamDonaldsonofABCNewscametovisitVIICorps.Franksescortedhimtothe2ndACRand1stAD.Whileat1stAD,DonaldsontalkedtomembersofanM1A1tankcompanycommandedbyCaptainDanaPittard.Frankswasnevermoreproudofhissoldiersthanhewaswhenheheardthemtalkofthe

missionandofoneanother.SpecialistShawnFreeney,amechanicinHeadquartersCompany,1stBattalion,37thArmor,said,"Itletsyouknowthat,whenitcomesdowntoit,you'rearoundfamily.Allofusherearefamily--righthereismyfamily."

Theyhadpreparedthewayyouwouldforabiggame.Theyhademphasizedskills

infundamentalsandteamwork.Theyhadgonethroughsituationdrillsagainstpossiblegamesituations.Theyhadgottentheir"battingpractice"underclose-to-gameconditionsandtheyhadhadsomescrimmages.

ButwhereFranksknewthesportsanalogystoppedwasgametime.Warisdifferent.Groundcombatisphysically

tough,uncompromising,andfinal.Theenemycanbeascloseasafewmetersorthousandsofmeters.Thereyoudealintheultimatereality--lifeanddeath.Thereisnohome-and-homescheduling.Thereisnonextyear.Whenit'sover,it'sover;thememoriesandresultsarefrozenintimeforalifetime.Forsomesoldiers,therewouldbenomorelifetimeafterthis.FredFranksknew

that,andsodidthey.

Franksthoughtagainofhissoldiersandleaders."HaveIpreparedthemwellenoughforthismission?Ithinkso.Didwehaveaworkableplan?Yes.Havewethoughtofeverything?Probablynot.Haveweignoredanythingmajor?Idon'tthinkso.Arethetroopsready?Yes.Theyknowwhattodo,they'remotivatedbytherightthings,

andtheywanttogetthisgoingandgetitfinishedsotheycangohome.Notacomplicatedsetofemotions.Soldiersandunitsgoattwospeeds,all-aheadfullorstop.Therecanbenohalf-stepping,especiallyforamountedattack.We'reready."

HerecalledthensomethingCaptainDanaPittardhadsaidtoSamDonaldson:"My

biggestfear,ofcourse,ismakingsureIdon'tdosomethingwrongthatwouldcostsomebody'slifeorsomethingelse.There'snofearonthepersonalside."Healsorecalledtheoldsayingthatgeneralscanlosebattlesandcampaigns,butonlythesoldierscanwin.Hebelievedthat.Healsobelievedthatifhegotthemandtheircommanderstotherightplaceattherighttimeinthe

rightcombination,inbattleafterbattle,theywouldtakeitfromthereandwin.

HISthoughtsturnedtoDenise,hiswifeofthirty-oneyears,andtotheirdaughter,Margie,andherfamily.Theywereallaclosefamily;they'dbeenthroughalottogether.DenisewasnowbusyathomeinGermanywith

familysupportwork.ForthefirsttimeinthehistoryoftheU.S.Army,theyhadtakenunitsalreadydeployedinonetheater(withfamilies),deployedtoanother,andlefttheirfamiliesoverseas.

SomeonehadaskedDeniseifshewas"goinghome"--thatis,leavingStuttgartandreturningtotheUnitedStates."Iamhome,"shereplied.Thoughtheycouldhave

returnedtotheStates,mostfamiliesstayedrightthere.Indoingthat,theywerebreakingnewground,adaptingtonewrealities.AndDenisewasprovidingleadershipandmoralstrengthinherownquietandforcefulway.Shewasshowingherownformofcourage...justaswerealltheotherfamilymembersinGermany.Theywereansweringthecall.Theirfavoritesongwas

"FromaDistance."

Franksrememberedallthathe,Denise,andMargiehadbeenthroughduringandafterVietnam.Andherememberedthehospitalrecoveryofalmosttwenty-onemonths.

Beforehe'dleftfortheGulf,hehadpromisedDenisehe'dcomeback"whole"fromthisoperation,butwitha

smile,she'dremindedhimthatthatwasnolongerpossible.Theyhadn'tbeenabletophoneeachotheroftenwhilehewasondutyintheGulf.Theonephonecallthey'dhadtothispointinJanuarywastenseandfulloffeeling.

InBadKissingen,Germany,Margie,alsonowanArmyspouse,hadherownfamilyoftwoboysandher

husband,Greg.GregwasacaptainintheBlackhorse.Atthatmoment,hewasS-3ofthe2ndSquadron,11thACR,or"Battle3,"thesamejobFrankshadhadinVietnam.NowMargie'sdadwasatwaragain.Denisehadsenthimataperecordingofthefamily,andhewouldlistentoittohearthesoundsoftheirvoices.Familywasrealclose,justlikehisVIICorpsfamily.Theybothinspiredhim.

Afterpullinghistankersuitpantlegoverthetopsohedidnothavetoremovetheboot,Franksunstrappedhisprostheticleg.Hesetitwherehecouldreachitinthedark,thenpulledthesleepingbagoverhim,saidaprayerforhistroopsandthathewouldhavethewisdomtodowhatwasright,andsleptsoundly.

CHAPTERTWO

Duty

MAJORFredFranksfoughtinVietnamwiththe11thArmoredCavalryRegiment,the"Blackhorse,"fromAugust1969,whenhearrived,toMay1970,whenhewasseverelywoundedduringtheCambodian

invasion.HehadpreviouslyservedwiththeBlackhorseinGermanyforalmostthreeandahalfyears,fromMarch1960toJuly1963,andhewasgladtobebackinhisoldoutfit.Hewasacavalryofficer;heknewcavalry;cavalrywashishome.AndtheBlackhorsewashisregiment.

LikesomanyAmericansbeforehim,Franksgotoffthe

planewithhisfellowsoldiersatLongBinh,Vietnam,readytodohisduty.HehadflownoverinastretchDC-8outofTravisAirForceBase,justnorthofSanFrancisco.Justthedaybefore,hehadsaidgood-byetoDeniseandMargieatthePhiladelphiaInternationalAirportandflowntoSanFrancisco.Hiskidbrother,Farrell,haddriventhemtotheairport,andhismotheranddadmet

themtheretosaygood-bye.Itwasaquickforty-eight-hourtransitionfromwhatsoldierscalled"theworld"toacombatzone.

Thefirstthingthathithimgettingofftheplanewastheunmistakablesmell.Itwasacombinationoftheheat,thesmokeintheairfromburningwood,andwhoknewwhatelse.Buthewouldneverforgetit.

Fighteraircraftwereparkedcloseby.Heheardsoundsofjetfighterstakingoffandflyingoverhead,aswellastheunmistakableVietnamsoundofUH-1"Huey"helicopterrotorbladesslappingintheair.Hewasintentontakinginasmuchashecould,rightaway,ashethoughtbackonhowhe'dgottenthere.

Aftergraduatingfrom

WestPointin1959,Frankshadaskedforandwascommissionedintoarmor.Hewasa"tanker,"andyethesawhimselfasmorethanthat.Thoughtanksarethecenterpieceofcavalry--theygiveititspunch--cavalrygoesbeyondtanks.Armoredcavalryisthefirstteam;ithasacommandfreedom,anesprit,anethos.Inthecavalry,smallunitsoperateacombinationofpotent

weaponssystems(intheArmy,thisiscalled"combinedarms")thatgivethemthecapabilitytomovefastandhithard.Onthebattlefield,theseunitsoperateunderdecentralizedleadershipinmissionsthatareoutinfrontofeveryoneelse.

First,though,Frankshadtogothroughsomefundamentals:abasicarmor

courseatFortKnox,thenRangerandairborneschoolsatFortBenning.ChestdeeponpatrolinthedarkwatersoftheFloridaswampsandtheninthenumbingcoldoftheDahlonega,intheGeorgiahills,Frankslearnedalotabouthimselfandcombat.ItwasthebestindividualpeacetimetrainingheevergotintheArmy.

Franksdidhisapprentice

workinarmoredcavalryalongtheIronCurtainbetweenCzechoslovakiaandWestGermanyduringatimethatincludedthe1961Berlincrisisandthe1962Cubanmissilecrisis.InthecrucibleofdailylifeasayoungtroopleaderintheBlackhorse,helearnedfromtheofficersandnoncommissionedofficersthetough,hardskillsofsmall-unittacticalleadership.CombatveteransofWorld

WarIIandKoreadrilledthemoncombatcavalryfundamentalsandtaughtthemtribalwisdomthroughwarstoriesduringthelongnightsatthebordercampsalongtheCzechborder.Likesomanyothers,hedevelopedhistacticalskillsbydoinghisjobdaytodayinthefield,bylistening,workinghard,andbymakingdamn-foolmistakes,andbeingallowedtogetbackupandlearnfrom

them.

ForhisfirstfifteenmonthsintheBlackhorse,Frankswasalieutenantleaderofthesmallestcombined-armsunitintheU.S.Army,anarmoredcavalryplatoonofscouts,tanks,mechanizedinfantry,andaself-propelledmortar.Fromtherehewasthesquadron'ssupportplatoonleader,responsibleforleadingtruckresupplyofthe

squadron.Forthenexteightmonths,hewasexecutiveofficer(secondincommand)ofacavalrytroop.ThenhecommandedTroopI.

WhenheheadedtoVietnam,itwastheBlackhorseheintendedtobelongto--buthealmostdidn'tmakeit.BythetimeFranksgottoVietnam,thebeginningsoftheU.S.drawdownhadscrewedup

theindividualreplacementsystemsobadlythatallorderswerecanceled,andnewreplacementsweresequestereduponarrivaltoawaitneworders.Hewasinstructednottocallanyone.Noway,Franksthought,I'vegottogettoaphone.HegotthroughtoasergeantattheBlackhorseunitatLongBinh."Waitrightthere,don'tgoanywhereelse,we'llbeovertogetyou.Weknewyou

werecoming."

Thenextmorning,truetothesergeant'sword,theBlackhorsesentavehicleoverandpickedhimup."MajorFranks?Comewithme,sir.Yourordersareallcutandwe'rereadytogo."WhenFrankssawthatrearingblackhorsepatchonthesoldier'sshoulder,hefeltasthoughhehadseenafamilymember.Actually,hehad.

In1969,theBlackhorsewasoneoffourcavalryregimentsonactivedutyintheArmy.Theothers,2nd,3rd,and14th,wereinGermany.TheBlackhorsehadbeenwithdrawnfromGermanyinthesummerof1964andstationedatFortMeade,Maryland.WhenthebigU.S.buildupinVietnambeganin1965,itsoonbecameapparentthatanarmoredcavalryregiment

wouldbeavaluableassetinthewar,andthe11thACRwasdeployedtoVietnam,arrivingin1966.Itimmediatelyestablisheditselfasatoughcombatregiment,successfullycompletingawidevarietyofmissionsonmanydifferentterrains.SoonithadinflictedheavypunishmentontheVietCongandtheNVA,theNorthVietnameseArmy.

TheArmyisacompetitiveorganization,butFrankswasacompetitiveman.Whenhejoinedthe11thACRinVietnam,hehadnotyetmetawallthatcouldstophim.Iftherewasahurdletoleap--physical,psychological,orintellectual--heleaptit.Ifhefailedthefirsttime,heworkedandtraineduntilhemadeitover.Hewasanathlete;hewasusedtointensetrainingandtohard

drills.Andhewasusedtothepayoffthathardtraininggavehim.Thoughatfive-eight,hecouldn'tbecalledphysicallyimpressive,hewasatalentedbaseballplayerwho'dreachedacareerbattingaverageofbetterthan.300ontheWestPointbaseballteam,andbeenteamcaptain.There'sagoodchancehewouldhavesucceededasaprofessionalballplayer.Hewastempted.In1961,thechoice

confrontedhim:tobeasoldierorabaseballplayer.Frankschosesoldier.

Therewasalsoinhimafinelytuned,well-developedmind,andin1964,theArmysenthimtoColumbiaUniversitytostudyforanM.A.inEnglish.Afterward,hewasscheduledtoteachatWestPoint.Itwasatwo-yearcourseatahigh-rankingschool,butcharacteristically,

hepushedit.Hefinishedthedegreeinayear,inthebeliefthathewouldbesenttoVietnamforthesecondyear,andthentoWestPointfollowingthat.Somehowabureaucraticfoul-upputastoptothat:"Ifwe'vesetyouupfortwoyearsofstudy,"hewastold,"youhavetoputyourselfthroughtwoyearsofstudy."Anditturnedouthecouldn'tgotoVietnamin1965afterall.Daunted,yet

stillpushinghard,hecontinuedatColumbiaandcompletedmostofthecourseworkforaPh.D.Thenhewenton,asplanned,toWestPoint,where,onateacher'sschedule,hehadtheopportunitytofinishuphisdaysatareasonablehourandperhapsspendrealtimewithDeniseandMargie(likemostyoungArmyofficers,he'dbeenawaymoreoftenthanhewashome).

Don'tcountonit.Hedidgettospendmoretimewiththem,buthealsohitthebooksandcompletedhisPh.D.orals,whilecarryingafullteachingloadandtakingonthejobofassistantvarsitybaseballcoachforthefallandspring.Ontopofthat,hetookacorrespondencecoursefromFortSilltokeephisnuclearweaponsproficiencycurrent,anecessaryskillforofficersinthe1960s.

SERIOUSAmericaninvolvementintheVietnamWarbeganin1962.Bythelate1960s,U.S.forceshadgrowntooverhalfamillion,andwiththatincreasecameanumberofplansandprogramsforvictory.Thoughnotallofthemwereillconceived,eventhebestneededtimeforsuccessful

completion,andsomecametoolate.TheUnitedStateswasoutoftime.Bythelatesummerof1969,strongantiwarfeelingsintheStates,broughtaboutprimarilybytheever-increasingAmericancasualties,hadcausedPresidentNixontobeginageneralwithdrawal.Atthesametime,hehopedtogivetheSouthVietnamesegovernmentsomechanceatsurvival.Theprogramwas

calledVietnamization.ItsaimwastoturnmoreandmoreofthegroundwarovertotheSouthVietnamese,whiletheUnitedStatessimultaneouslyprovidedairandlogisticsassistanceandbegantowithdrawitsowncombattroops.OperationswerelaunchedtoattempttobuytimefortheSouthVietnamese,suchasthecontinuationofthe"secret"bombingsofCambodia,then

theinvasionofCambodiainMay1970.Otherswouldfollow.

InAugust1969,theregimentalcommandpostoftheBlackhorsewasatthevillageofQuanLoi.QuanLoiwasjusteastofthemarkettownofAnLoc,fortykilometersfromtheCambodianborderandaboutaforty-five-minutehelicopterrideorafour-hourarmed

convoytripfromLongBinh.AC-130-capableairstripwasalsoatQuanLoi,andtheregiment'saircavalrytroopoperatedoutofthere.The11thCavalryrearbasewasatLongBinh,nearSaigon,thelargestU.S.ArmylogisticsfacilityinVietnam.

TheregimentwascommandedatthetimebyColonelJimmieLeach,anexperiencedandaggressive

cavalrycommander.AWorldWarIItanker,LeachhadcommandedatankcompanyinGeneralCreightonAbrams's37thTankBattalioninthe4thArmoredDivision.

Oneoftheregiment'smissionswastokeepopenthemajorroadfromLaiKhe,inthesouth,throughAnLoc,toLocNinhtothenorth.Todothisrequiredadailyminesweepoftheroad,plusactive

reconnaissanceoftheareatoeithersideofit.Allthreeoftheregiment'ssquadronsandtheaircavalrytroopwereengagedinthisoperation.TheBlackhorseatthetimewasundertheoperationalcontroloftheBigRedOne,the1stInfantryDivision,whoseheadquarterswereatLaiKhe.OthermissionsinvolveddirectattackonNVAunitswhentheywerefoundandfixed,andarea

reconnaissanceoftheentireareatokeeptheNVAout.Meanwhile,aspartoftheconsolidationthatwasoneofthefirstconsequencesofVietnamization,the1stInfantryhadbeengivenorderstobegintoredeploybacktotheUnitedStates.Aspartofthatredeployment,theywouldgiveupsomeoftheirrearbasecampsaroundLongBinhandDiAn,andtheBlackhorserearbasewas

movedfromXuanLoc,theirhomefromthetimetheycametoVietnam,toLongBinh.Someresidual2ndSquadronelementsweretomovetoDiAn.

WhenFranksreportedforduty,Leachassignedhimto2ndSquadron,butorderedhimbacksouthtoXuanLoctohelpclearupsomeproblemsandtoplantherearbasemovetoDiAn.Franks

knewhehadalottolearninashortperiodoftime.

Frankswaswhatthetroopscalleda"fanoogie,"abbreviatedasFNGandstandingfor"f'ingnewguy."Itwasawayforveteranstosetthemselvesapartfromthenewcomersandtotellthenewguysthattheyhadlotstolearnandsomeritesofpassagetogothrough.Therewasanofficialwaytodoit,

too--theArmysentallnewcomersthroughafive-daycoursein-countrytoindoctrinatetheminthewaysoftheunitandcombattechniquesandtheenemy.Unfortunately,thosecourseswereatLongBinhandFrankswasatXuanLoc,somedistanceaway.Heneededasubstitutecrashcoursefast.

Thecourseheneededwas

rightunderhisnoseatXuanLoc.Frankshadalwaysfeltnewleadersandcommandersshouldspendalotoftimelistening,andnotalotoftimesoundingoff:Whenyoujoinanewunit,youfindmostlysoldiersandleaderswhowanttobelongtoagreatoutfit.Theywantyoutosucceed.Theywantyoutobeabletoleadandcommandthemwell.Givethemachancetotellyouearlyonhowtheythink

theycanhelpyoudothat.IthadworkedforhimintheBlackhorsebefore.Gainthesoldiers'confidenceandrespectbytreatingthemthesamewayyouwanttobetreated.Earnyourwayontheteaminahurryandlearnwhileyouaredoingit.Thefirstfewweeksarewhenyoulearntheropesandyoualsomakeafirstimpression,and,likeitornot,assoonasyougetthere,youarebeingsized

upbythesoldiers,yourpeers,andyoursuperiors.Theywillputyouthroughbothformalandinformalritesofpassagetoseewhatyouaremadeof.Youjusthavetobereadytorisetothechallenge.

SoFrankswantedtospendasmuchtimeaspossiblewiththesoldiers,becauseitwasthebestwaytoreadhimselfintothisnewsituation.ManyoftheNCOstherein2nd

Squadronhadseenconsiderableactioninthepastmonths.Allhehadtodowasask.Frankswasabletodrawoutoftheminformationaboutthecountryandterrain,theenemy,andaboutsmall-unitfightingtechniquesandtactics.HealsohadtheopportunitytospendtimewithCaptainClaude"Keyes"Hudson,whohadbeencommandingthe2ndSquadronrearbase,had

recentlybeenacavalrytroopcommander,andwassoontogohome.Hudsonturnedouttobeawalkingrepositoryoflessonslearned,andFrankspumpedhimformoreinformation.Franksknewhowtofighttroopsandthesquadron.Whathedidnotknowweretheactualtacticalmethodsthatworkedhere,inthisterrain,againstthisenemy.KeyesandtheNCOsgavehimanintroductionto

VietnamandtotheBlackhorsehecouldnothavegottenanywhereelse.

Thatwaslucky,becausewhatFrankshadgottenbackintheStateshadn'tbeenanyhelp.Beforeheleft,hehadbeensenttoFortKnoxforastandard"refreshercourse,"whoseaimwastobringofficersuptospeedforserviceinVietnam.Frankscouldn'tbelievewhathe

found.TheywereteachingWorldWarIIinCentralEurope,andusinganoldseriesofradiosnolongerinserviceinVietnam.Afterafewdays,he'dstoppedgoingtoclassandsoughtoutVietnamveterans,especiallyBlackhorseveterans,forinformation.Itwasinvaluable,andafarsightbetter.

Thenhegotabreak.

LieutenantColonelJimAarstaatwantedhimtocomeforwardtoQuanLoitobecomethe2ndSquadronS-3(inchargeofplansandoperations)whenthecurrentsquadronS-3,MajorJohnGilbreath,wentonRandR.Thoughthejobwasofficiallytemporary,itlookedlikelytobecomepermanent.WhenGilbreathreturned,hewouldprobablybecomethesquadronXO(secondin

command)andFrankswouldremainS-3.

ToFranks,thiswasthebestjobyoucouldhaveasamajorintheBlackhorse.IntheU.S.Army,majorsdonotcommand;theclosesttheycouldgettotheactionwasasabattalionorsquadronS-3.Itwasthefirstteam.TobeamajorS-3inaneliteoutfitliketheBlackhorsewasarealhonor,andthetoughest,most

challengingcombatjobanarmymajorcouldfind.

Butitsurehappenedfast.JohnGilbreathwasabouttwentykilometerswestofQuanLoioperatingoutofasmallfirebase.FranksaskedGilbreathwhenhewasgoingonRandR.Hesaidtomorrow.Theyhadashorttransitionmeetingaboutthesquadronmissionandhowitwasconductingoperations,

thenGilbreathtookhimuponareconnaissanceflightoverthearea.Itwasfastandlow,andtheonlyplaceforhimtoridewasonthefloorinthebackoftheOH-6helicopterasGilbreathpointedouttheterrain,theenemyroutes,andrecentbattlesites.Andthatwasit.HewastheS-3ofthesquadron.He'dbeeninVietnamforalloftwoweeks.Yearslater,Frankswouldrememberthosetwoweeksas

hethoughtabouthowmuchtimeVIICorpsneededtoprepareforcombatinSaudiArabia.

Meanwhile,allthiswasnotunfamiliar.TheorganizationwasbasicallythesameasinGermany.Theenemywasdifferent,butitwasapparentthatthesquadronoperatedjustashewouldexpectitto.Thecavalrytroops,includingtheaircavalrytroop,would

findandfixtheenemy.Then,whileairandartilleryisolatedthemonthebattlefield,sealedofftheenemyretreat,andsimultaneouslypoundedtheenemywithfires,thebigfistofthetankcompanywouldmaneuveragainstthem,alongwiththecavalrytroops.ThejoboftheS-3--underthecommander--wastoorchestrateitallandbringalltheweaponsintothefightsimultaneously.

Asayoungofficerinacavalrytroop,youpickupanenormousamountofexperiencedoingthesethings.You'reinvolvedinoperationswherealargenumberofactionsaregoingonsimultaneously,almostallofthemoutofyoursight.Youneedacreativeimagination.Youhavetoknowwhat'sgoingonbylisteningtoreportsontheradio.Youseesomeofit.

Youhearmostofit.Youpictureitinyourmind.Oneactioninthewoods.Anotheroverbytheriver.Anothernearthetown.Maybesomeindirectfirebehindthewoods.Maybesomeattackhelicoptersbetweenthewoodsandthetown.Andmaybesomecloseairsupportcominginalongtheriver.Quickdecisionsarerequired,oftenwithoutseeingitallexceptinyourhead.You

havetofiguretime/distancefactors.Canaunitreinforceintime?Cantheybeattheenemytothepunch?Alloftheseactionsarehappeningsimultaneously,andallofthemhappening,muchofthetime,underconditionsofstressandfatigue,inallkindsofweather,andwithcasualties.Andsoasacavalryofficer,yougrowtobeproficientatjugglinghalfadozenorsothoughts

simultaneouslyinyourhead,picturingactionsinyourmind'seye,andconstantlymakingjudgmentsaboutwhentoactandwhentoremainsilentandletthingsgoon.

Becausehehadhadsomuchpracticeatthiskindof"battleorchestration"duringhistimeinGermanywiththeBlackhorse,Frankshadnodoubtthathecoulddowhat

hehadtoasS-3inVietnam.Itwasamatterofadaptingquicklytothetechniquestobeusedinthisterrainagainstthisenemy,andatthesquadronlevel,insteadofthesmallercavalrytroop.

Andheknewhebettergetitrightfromthestart,becausetherewerealotofsoldiersdependingonit.Theyhadeveryrighttoexpecthimtoknowwhathewasdoing,and

ifhedidnotmeasureup,theyhadeveryrighttogetsomeoneelse.

Whenhetookoveras2ndSquadronS-3,thisiswhatFredFrankshadtodealwith:

AnarmoredcavalrysquadroninVietnamnormallyconsistedofaheadquarters,withabout200troops;threeletteredcavalrytroops(2ndSquadrontroops

wereE,F,andG),eachwithbetterthan130men;atankcompanyofseventeenM48A3tanksandabout85troops;andahowitzerbatteryofsix155-mmartillerypieces,withabout125troops.Later,the2ndSquadronwouldgettwoeight-inchhowitzers,withaboutfortytroops,andaplatoonof40-mmantiaircraftpieces,whichwasanattachedunitthatwentwiththesquadron.Acombat

engineerplatoonfromtheregiment's919thEngineerCompanyalsowentwiththem.Atthattime,thecavalrytroopsdidnothavetanks,butinsteadvehiclesknownasACAVs,ArmoredCavalryAssaultVehicles(M113s),whichwerelightlyarmoredtrackedvehiclesarmedwithmachineguns.Thesquadronalsohadasectionoffourhelicopterstobeusedforcommandand

controlofsquadronoperations.ThereweretwoUH-1"Hueys"andtwoOH-6"Loaches."Normally,thesquadroncommanderusedtheUH-1s,andtheS-3usedtheOH-6s.Therewerecrewsforeachaircraftandtheyflewalternatedays,whilethecommanderandS-3fleweveryday.TheregimentalsohadanaviationtroopwithCobraattackhelicoptersandOH-6scouthelicopters.

Thesenormallyflewinsupportofdailysquadronoperationsorworkedindependentlyattheregimentalcommander'sdirections.TheCobraswerecalled"red"teams,andthescoutswere"white"teams(cavalrycolorsareredandwhite).Whentheyworkedinpairs(oneCobraandoneLoach),theywerecalled"pink"teams.

ThejoboftheS-3wastoplantheoperationsandrunthenervecenterofthesquadron.Underthecommander'sguidance,theS-3woulddeviseaplanthatwouldensurethattheelementsofthesquadroncombatpower--artillery,engineers,tanks,scouts,cavalrytroops,andair--werealltiedtogetherinsomecoherentwaytodowhatthecommanderwanteddoneto

defeattheenemyatleastcosttothesquadron.Attheforwardcommandpost,thecommanderandS-3wouldworkoutofthreeM577commandposttrackedvehicles.Theyeachalsohadtheirowncommandtrackedvehicle,M113ACAVs.

Thecommandpostofacavalrysquadronissmallandinformal.Itwas--andis--organizedlikethis:belowthe

executiveofficerwasastaff--S-1,S-2,S-3,andS-4(Sisfor"staff").The-1handledpersonnel;the-2handledintelligence;the-3handledplansandoperations;andthe-4handledlogistics.Normally,theS-3wastheseniorofthesefourandcoordinatedwiththem.The2ndSquadronofthe11thACRinVietnamwassetupsothatthepersonnelandlogisticselements,andthe

XO,normallystayedatthebasecamp(atQuanLoiatthattime),whiletheoperationalelement(S-2andS-3)wasoutrangingasfarasfiftykilometersfromthere.LieutenantColonelAarstaatwouldchoosewheretobetocommandifafightbrokeout.Therewasafightnearlyeveryday.

ByAugust1969,theenemywasnownolongerthe

VietCong,butNorthVietnameseregulars.TheTetOffensiveof1968,whichhasusuallybeenperceivedasadisasterforU.S.forces,wasactuallyacatastrophefortheVietCong.TetvirtuallydestroyedtheVietCongasanoperationalforce.Afterward,theNorthVietnameseArmytookovermilitaryoperationsinthesouth.ThefewVietCongthatwereleftmighthavelaidminesorinvolved

themselveswithotherminoractions,butanyseriousengagementsinvolving2ndSquadronwerealwayswiththeNorthVietnamese.Thiswasarmyinthefieldagainstarmyinthefield,atleastfortheBlackhorse.TheNVAwereexcellentlightinfantryandtheywerehardtofindandfix,buttheywerenotguerrillas.

WhenFredFrankstook

overasS-3,the2ndSquadronpartoftheregimentalmissionwastokeepopenthehighway--actually,atwo-lanedirtroad--fromAnLoctoLaiKhe,adistanceofaboutthirtykilometers.TheregimentusedtheroadforitsownsupplytoAnLocfromLongBinh,butciviliantrafficalsoneededit.ToestablishthattheSouthVietnamesegovernmentwasincontrolofthearea,thefreeflowof

normalciviliantraffichadtoberestored.Bythistime,theBlackhorseandthe1stInfantryDivision,alongwithsomeARVNunits,hadestablishedgoodcontroloverthearea.Thethreatofminesremained,buttheprobabilityofambushesbyNVAunitswaslow.SecondSquadron'smissionwastokeepitthatwaybyaggressivereconnaissancetothewestoftheroadouttodistancesof

twentytothirtykilometers.TheretheywouldinterceptanyNVAunitsmovinginthedirectionoftheroad.

InlateAugust,2ndSquadronoperatedoutofafirebaseapproximatelytwentykilometersfromAnLocandtenkilometerswestofthehighway.Theoperationalelementofthemaincommandpost(theS-2andS-3)wasthere,along

withthetankcompanyandartillerybattery.Atnight,andinthelocationwheretheyhadbeenoperating,thecavalrytroopssetupatightlaagerforself-protection.

Duringtheday,thesquadronaviationcouldflyovertheconvoysandbeavailableifafightbrokeout.Whenconvoyswerenotoperating(therewasnormallyoneperday),thesquadron

wasengagedinaggressivereconnaissanceintroop-sizedoperationalareastothewestoftheroad,wheretheylookedfortheenemyandfrequentlyfoundhim.Thethreatfromgroundattackatthetimewassolowthatthecavalrytroopswerenotinvolvedinprotectingtheconvoys.Butartillerylocationswerespacedinmutuallysupportingpositionsalongtheroad.Thesquadron

commanderorS-3wouldflyovertheconvoy,andcoulddealwiththeenemywithfiresavailablefromtheartilleryalongtheroute,orfromcloseairsupportorhelicopterattackaviation.

ItwasduringthistimethatFranksreceivedhisbaptismbyfire.Thisishowheremembersit:

"What'sthat?"I

askedmypilot,astherewasapop-popsoundandgreentracerszingedpasttheOH-6helicopter.

"We'retakingfire,"hesaid,turningtheLoachquicklyoutofthearea.

Isuspectedas

much.

Thatwasmyfirstexperienceofbeingdirectlyshotatincombat.Itwouldnotbethelast.Youalwayswonderhowyouwillreact.Itgotmyattention.Ifeltthenormalfearrisingtotakecontrol,andIwasinstantlymore

aware.Mysenseswereonsuper-alert.Inaninstant,though,yougetontopofthefear,putitaside,andtrytofocusonwhatyouknowyoumustdo.IfoundIcoulddothat.Thatdidnotmakemeunique,butitwasreassuringtopassthatfirsttest.Ialso

didnotfeelasthoughthefirewouldhitus.Somehow,asortofcalmcameoverme,andIfoundIwasabletothink,andotherwisedomydutyandhanginthere.Therewouldbemanymoreoftheseonthegroundandintheair.Myreactionwas

alwaysthesame,rightupuntilIwaswoundedthesecondtime.OnenightinGermany,IhadaskedCaptainHermWinans,oursquadronS-2andadecoratedKoreanWarveteran,"What'sitliketobeshotat?"Hetoldme,"Thefirsttimeistheworst,and

afterfivesecondsyouareallveterans.Don'tworryaboutit.Yourtrainingwillkickin."Abitofold-soldierwisdominanightlychatatourbordercampalongtheCzech-WestGermanborder.Hewasright.

Afewdayslater,anARVNinfantryunitwalkedbymistakeintoanareanearourfirebasewhereourengineershadputoutafieldofminesandboobytraps.Theywentoff.Wegotthemontheradioandhadthemfreezeinplace,thenwenttogetthem

outviathesafelanes.Isawmyfirstbattlecasualtyasalegwiththebootstillonit,separatedfromtheARVNsoldierwhohadbeenkilled.Younevergetusedtoseeingcasualties,eventhoughyouknowtheyarepartofcombat.Therewouldbemore.You

feeleveryone.

Duringthisperiodofalmostthreeweeks,the2ndSquadronhadanumberofengagementswiththeNVA,rangingfromasingleenemyrocketfiredintotheirfirebasetoanNVAcompany-sizeattackagainstoneofthecavalrytroops.Inthecourseoftheseoperations,FrankswoulddoallthethingsanS-3

ofacavalrysquadronwoulddoincombat:callinandadjustartilleryfire,callinairstrikes,maneuverforcesontheground,andinabattle,orchestrateallthefireandmovementsimultaneouslyoverasingleandtightlydisciplinedradiofrequency.NoU.S.soldierswerelosttoenemyaction.Althoughhewasnotyetaseasonedcombatveteran,hewasachangedsoldierfromtheone

ofthreeweeksbefore.

InearlySeptember,LieutenantColonelGrailBrookshirereplacedAarstaatassquadroncommander,andofficiallymadeFredFranksthe2ndSquadronS-3(andGilbreaththeXO).Forallhehadlearned,however,Franksknewhehadalongwaytogo.Healsowasawarethathehadtoexecutewhilehegrewincombatexperience.Hedid

notwanthisgrowthtobeattheexpenseofthesoldiers.Overthenextninemonthsofcombat,hewouldformsomeverydefinitivethoughtsabouthowtowinatleastcosttohissoldiers.Somewereconfirmationsofthingshe'ddevelopedfrompreviousexperienceintraining,education,andcommand.Somewereadirectresultofseeingwhatworkedincombat.Theywerebothparts

ofbeingasoldier--mattersofthemindandmattersoftheheart.Forsoldieringinvolvesmuchthinkingandintenseproblemsolving,butitisalsoanintenselypassionateprofession,becauseincommand,inordertodoyourduty,youputinharm'swaythatwhichyouhavecometolovesomuch--yoursoldiers(asMichaelShaarasaidsowellinhisCivilWarnovel,TheKillerAngels).

FredFranksknewwhatmadeunitsgreatinpeacetimetraining.Hewasnowtoseewhatmadeaunitgreatincombat.Andhewastolearnthattheywerethesame.

THEMINDOFA

COMMANDER4Manypartsmakeupa

commander--manyattitudes,skills,experiences,andconvictions.Someofthesearefundamentalandeternal--duty,honor,country,courage,

integrity,loyalty,patriotism.Othersaremoreparticularandpersonal;theygrowanddevelopovertime.Theparticularconstellationofattitudes,skills,experiences,andconvictionsthatFredFranksbroughtto2ndSquadron,andwhichgrewanddevelopedduringhismonthsinVietnam,latercharacterizedhisperformanceasacommander,uptoandincludinghiscommandof

VIICorpsinDesertStorm.Youdon'tunderstandFredFranksunlessyouunderstandthese.

Let'sstartwiththeblindinglyobvious.Whenyoufightincombat,youdon'tfighthalfway.Fightingisforkeeps.Whenyouplayball,youwalkawayfromthegame.Youlosetoday,youplayagaintomorrow.Butincombatthestakesarefinal.It

canbringaboutthedeathsofpeopleyou'veworkedwith,areresponsiblefor,andcareabout,oryourowndeath.Youdon'tgetsecondchances.Thismeans,asI'vealreadyindicatedFredFranksisfondofsaying,whenyouwin,youdon'twanttowinclose.Youdon'twantdrama.Youwanttowin100-0,not24-23.Inotherwords,there'snoroomforsloppiness.Andthere'snoroomforlapsesinalertness.

Itmeansthatwhenyou'reasoldier,youwantnotjustasmalledgeoveryourenemy,butaslargeanedgeasyoucanget.Thus,whereyoucan,youwanttoworkyourunitsintosituationswherethedifferencebetweenwinningandlosing,orbetweenlifeanddeath,doesnothangonactsofextremecourage--oronMedalofHonor-winningbravery.Itmaycometothatandthemissionmight

demandit,butyoutrytoworkitsothoseactionsaddtotheedge.Forasoldier,ordinarycourageshouldbemorethanenough(andordinarycourageisnotatalleasy!).Ordinarycouragemeansdoingwhatyou'resupposedtobedoingaswellasyoucan;anditmeansnotlettingdownthosewhodependonyou.Actsofordinarycouragesometimesrequireextraordinary

measures...butthat'sanotherstory.

Whatgivesthemtheedgetheyneed?Herearetheways,asFrankscametoknowthem:

Soldiers

Frankswastoconfirmwhathealreadyknew:Itallstartswiththesoldiersthemselves.Itistheirtrainingandcourage,andthequalityoftheirnoncommissionedofficerandofficersmall-unitleadership,thatwin.

Inthoseearlydaysofcombat,FranksquicklysawthattherealheroesofVietnamwerethesoldierswhobyandlargehadbeendraftedandwhohadcometoVietnamtodowhatourcountryhadaskedthemtodo.Inthe2ndSquadronFranksfoundatight-knitteamwhowerefiercelyproudoftheunitandwholookedoutforoneanother.Theylivedoutoftheirvehiclesformonths

onend,fightingfromthem,livinginthem.Dayafterdaytheywouldgoontheirmissions,lookingfortheenemyandonmostdaysfindinghim.BylateAugust1969,theyhadbeenatitconstantlyforalmostsixmonths.Frankswantedto