T7 B3 Robinson- Michael Fdr- 2 MFR (4!27!06 Has More Info) and 2 Withdrawal Notices 303

8/14/2019 T7 B3 Robinson- Michael Fdr- 2 MFR (4!27!06 Has More Info) and 2 Withdrawal Notices 303

1/11

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Screened/: David Paynt:.sr

04-27-2006MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Hvent: Assistant Administrator for Avia tion Operations Michael R obinson atthe TransportationSecurity Administration (TSA)Type of event : InterviewDate: A ug us t 13, 2003Special Access Issues: SSIPrepared by: Lisa Sullivan and reviewed by all Commission participantsTeam Number 7Location: TSA Headquarters, Crystal City. VA.Participants - Non-Commission: Assistant Administrator fo r Aviat ion Operations, MichaelRobinson, TSA; Susan Teshira, Staff Member. TSA; an d Brandon Slmus; Counsel , TSAParticipants - Commission: Sam Brinkley, John Raid t, Chris Kojm, and Lisa S ullivanThe intent of team 7's interview of Michael Robinson was to ascertain current threat conditionsin the aviation security system and how TSA is addressing the condit ions, keeping in mindpotential recommendations thai could be formulated fo r th e Comm iss ion ' s upcoming interimreport.Robinson joined TSA in March '02 from a career in the Michigan Department of State Police.Following 9/11, he became the state's "defacto homeland security director" and worked withthen-Governor Torn Ridge in that capacity . In his current posi t ion, Rnbin son is responsible fo ral l inspections at airports, current screening regulations, and th e Federal Air Marshals Program(FAM),To start, John Raidt asked Robinson to comment on three areas of the system: I) threat* (inorder of priority), 2) vulnerabilities, and 3) security procedures.Robinson prefaced his remarks by stating the objective of TSA to prevent explosion, takeover oruse of aircraft as weapons. He added that TSA must do its job so as not to collapse th e industry.He stated "we don't want to do to aviation, what the terrorists are trying to do,"

Date

Robinson said that the threat now is the same as it was before 9/1L|9/11 Closed by Statute

I In dealing with these threats, he said the difficulty lies in the balance betweenservicing th e industry and the customer while protecting the public from a ''catastrophic event"without causing th e entire system to collapse in the process.

C O M M I S S I O N S E N S I T I V E


2/11

COMMIS S ION S ENS ITIVE

Robinson w em on to describe vulnerabili t ies as concentric rings through which each passenger inth e avia t ion system mu st go through when traveling. O ne r ing (o r layer of secur i ty) would m ilcounteract all threats. The system relies on cacli r ing work ing together to achieve th e most secureenvironment fo r the public.CAP PS i s t he first r ing. W hen a person check s in al th e c u r b , th e C A P P S systcbeen e x t e n s i v e l y hn e t e d un L A P P S I a nd C A P P S T I by TSA pr ior to this in te rv iew. Please seccorresponding M F R s for more information),^ ^ ^ ^ ^ *"'" " ^ ^ * ^

When asked by Br ink ley to commen t on how the terrorist watch list is working in tliesystem. Robinson repl ied that Com mission staff w o ul d have to take in te l l igence quest ions upvvhh Ciaudio M a n n o from T S A ' 5 Intel l igence D i v i s i o n . 9/11 C l o s e d b y StatutePart of Ro b i n so n ' s job is to make s ure airlines receive the watch list and upda te their,internalsystems in real l ime. Br inkley a.sked if Rohinson was comfortab le with Q IC qual i ty and amounto f in te l l igence passed (o T S A . Ro b inson was com fo r tab le w i th t he degree to which thatinformation is disseminated to the appropriate recipients in a t imely iasbion . and said that TSApassed all th e intelligence it receives on threats. ', \N SENSITIVE


3/11

9/11 Closed by StatuteC O M M I S S I O N S E N S I T I V E ;{-\,

JNo binder, no matter what length, are allowed on airplanes. \ I \ S A sgmxrcygr50,000 boxcutters over thepast year,f J

Secondary-screening is the third ring.

U s scrccneis by o , U O U by Octobertest" to help pare down the workforce.|

t Kobin so n reported mat L ongress tias manoaieu tnat ' I L > A rcauccfer 1, 2003, Robinson said they will use the results chhe "skills

Robinson noted that budgetary restraints and the constant state of transition gives TSAroom to maneuver. The tension between costutncr service and security is a constant issue thatconcerns the air carriers.Discussion of aviation security at-large touched on the need for a "veil of mystery;" thai sfecuiitymeasures shouldn't be apparent to all; that randomness in selection needs to be built into t f y eSVStemJ

COMMI S S ION SENSITIVE


4/11

9/11 Closed by StatuteC O M M I S S I O N S E N S I T I V E V 'X ^--,

Robinson stressed that T S A is still in a transitional phase. Lo gistical pirob'lems cont inue tohamper it s work. Industry dem ands and C ongressional mandates have continued to p r e v e n t T S Afrom focusing on areas that admittedly need i m p r o v e m e n t , such as research A n d d e v e l o p m e n t ofbelter equipment andbetter u tilization ofk n o w n intelligence. \s between TS A and the a i r carriers are han

ISA. T h e y deal w i t h systemic issues related to the carriers, and also get their fe e d b a c k an dcompliance on such issues through those relations,As airports ar e revamped and new ones ar e built , T S A is working to review ar^ rewrite securityplans to accommodate the needs of individual airports. There i s a movement q v f a y froirj "onevsize -fits- a lP regulations forairporte^SAi^sscssm^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ;T ^ \ ^ l

Robinson indicated t h a t T S A is working tovvard 100% electronic scrutiny of all checked, bugs,an d no relianceon Positive Passenger B a g M a tc h (PPtiM) which is done in-licu of checlied^bagscreening. He said thecurrent policy isthat no"selectee" wil l have a n y t h i n g further t h a f i \c scrutinT he R ed T e a m s assessments are reviewed by T S A and taken in to consideration.

7J Current ly , there is no screening of cargo in th ebelly of passenger aircrafts. A n i n v e s t m e n t in a targeting tool is needed to identify what , type ofcargo should be inspected, and then an assurance m u s t b e me t lhat 100-percent of that type ofcargo is inspected 100-percent of the l i m e, T he other i^sue related to cargo inspection ishazardous materials.

COMMISS ION S E N S I T I V E


5/11

C O M M I S S I O N SENSITIVEPresent ly , TSA is retraining all field inspectors on cargo security. Brinkley asked Robinson onth e status of the proposed hardened-cargo com par tme nt program . Robinson said that theindustry w as opposed to the program because of th e high cost.In conclusion, RjjMlLMiriS l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^Afthc research and deve lopment program needsof the future." Com mission staff ment ioned to Robinson th e ideac'fcheckpoint reconfiguration and design; and ins t i tu t ing an "express lane" fo r passengers withoutcaxry-ons, R obin son indicated they are looking al some of these th in gs However', th eorganization is bogged down by congressional deadl ines and t ransi t ional impe'dimenb.

9/11 Closed by Statute

[Classification]

COMMISS ION SENSITIVE


6/11

C O M M I S S I O N SENSITIVE .. . . n _ _ .. r _!U ! . ?J U UD

| ScreenedBY: Ds.v.1. d Psvt'it: sr Dst;e:

M E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E R E C O R DEvent: Assistant Administrator f o r . Aviation Operations Michael Robinson at th e 'I 'ransponationSecurity Administration (TSA)Type of event: Interv iewDate: August 13 ,2003Special Access Issues: SSIPrepared by: Lisa Sullivan an d reviewed by all Commission participantsTeam Number: 7Locut ion: TSA Headquarters, Crystal City , V A,Participants - Non-Commission: Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations MichaelRobinson, TSA; Susan Tcshira, Staff M e m b e r , TSA; an d Brandon Straus; Counse l , TSAParticipants - Commission: Sam Brinkley. John Raidt, Chris K o j m . and Lisa SullivanThe intent of team 7 ~ s interview of Michael Robinson w as to ascertain current threat conditionsin the aviation security system and how TSA is addressing th e conditions, keeping in mindpotential recommendat ions that could be fo rmula ted for the Commission's upcoming interimreport 9/11 Closed by Statute

.sRobinson joined TSA in March '02 from a career in the M ichiga n De partm ent of State Police.Follow ing 9/11, he became the state 's "defacto hom eland security director!',and worked withthen -Governor Tom Ridge in that capacity. In his current position. RobinsoiLis responsible fo ral l inspections at airports, current screening regulations, and the Federal Air Marshals Program(FAM). ~ \ostart. John Raidt asked Robinorder ofpriority), 2)vulnerabilities, and3)procedures. \ndealing with these threats, h e

betw een servicing Ihe industry an d th e customer w hile protecting the publ ic from a "catastrophicevent" without causing the entire system to collapse in the process.

C O M M I S S I O N SENSITIV l i


7/11

C O M M I S S I O N S K N S l T l V t

Robinson went on to describe vulnerabilit ies as concentric rings through which each passenger inthe aviation system must go through when traveling, O ne ring (or layer of security) would,notcounteract all threats. The system relies on each ring working together to achieve the most secureenvironment for the public.CAPPS is the first ring. When a person checks in aUhecuj heCAPPSsystem^^^^JIuJeam?hasS T T by TSA prior to [his interview. Please secAW hen asked by Brinklcy to comment on how the terrorisl watch l ist is work ing injthc'CAPPSsystem. Robinson replied tha t Commission staff would have to take in teMgentie questions upwith Claudio Mar no from TS A ' s Intelligence Division. 9/11 closed bv StatutePart of Robinson's job is to make sure airlines receive th e watch list and\Jpda.te their internalsystems in real t ime. Brinkley asked if Rob inson was comfortable with fife Duality and amountof intelligence passed to T S A . Robinson was comfortable with the degree, ^9 which thatinformation is disseminated to the appropriate recipients in a timely fashion.v^nd'saidthat T SApassed al l th e intelligence it receives on threats.



8/11

9/11 Closed by StatuteCOMMISS ION SENS I T I VE VV/X .. '' :-- ..._

airplanes. TSA sei?,ed over 50,000 box cutters over the past year.o blades, no matter, v^hat length,vare allowedon"

reported that Congress has mandated that.TSA reduce'.it s screenersby6.

Robinson noted that budgetary restraints an d the constant state of transitiongives TSA tittleroom to maneuver. The tension between eostumer service an d security is a constant issite thatconcerns the air carriers.Discussion of aviation security at-large touched on the need for a "veil of mystery.;" that sepurilymeasures shouldn't be apparentto all ; that randomness in selection needs I H be built into thesy stem.| """"""""" "^^^^^^^^^^^

Robinson stressed thai TSA is still in a transitional phase. Logistical problems continue tohamper its work. Industry demands and Congressional mandates have continued to prevent TSAfrom focus ing on areas that admittedlyneed improvement, such as research an d deve lopment ofbelter equipment and better utilization of known intelligence.Relations between T SA and the air carriers are handledby the corporate responsibility staff atTSA. They deal with systemic issues related to the carriers, an d also get their feedback an dcompliance on such issues through those relations.



9/11

9/11 Closed by StatuteCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

\ \As airports ar e revamped and new ones are built, TSA is working lo review an d rewVhe^securityplans to accommodate th e needs of individual airports. There is a movement away from "bne-si/e-fits-all" regulations fo r airports. TSA isa i r o r t b

The Red Teams assessm ents are reviewed by TSA and taken into consideration.

JCurrently, there is no screening of cargo in thebelly of passenger aircrafts. A n inves tment in a targeting tool id needed to identify what type o fcargo should be inspected, an d then an assurance must be met that 100-percent of that type ol'cargo is inspected 100-percent of the time. The other iss ue related to cargo inspection iiha/ardous materials.Presently, TSA is retraining all f ield inspectors on cargo security. Brinkley asked Robinsqn onth e status of the proposed-hardened cargo compartment program, Robinson said that the\ywas opposed to the

IIn conclusioji,J^t)hins2n_saidf tnc rcscarcn an d development program reeds more toeusToaa arcs s needs or the "airport of the future," TSA is also looking at chec kpoint reco nfigurationan d design may institute an "express lane :> fo r passengers without carry-ons. However, th eorganization is bogged down by congressional deadlines an d transitional impedime nts.



10/11

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C ERG: 148Box: 00001 Folder: 0079 Document: 4Series: 9/11 Commission, Team 7, box 1Copies: 1 Pages: 9

ACCESS RESTRICTED 6\\ ^The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file

Folder Title: Robinson, MichaelDocument Date:Document Type: Printed FormFrom:To:

Subject: Checked Baggage Scenario Threat Variants

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefo r examination.

NND: 40474Withdrawn: 11-23-2005 by:RETRIEVAL #: 40474 00001 0079 4


11/11

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C ERG: 148Box: 00001 Folder: 0079 Document: 3Series: 9/11 Commission, Team 7, box 1Copies: 1 Pages: 1

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file

Folder Title: Robinson, MichaelDocument Date:Document Type: Printed FormFrom:To:

Subject' Total Architecture for Aviation Security Sample Worksheet Sample S heet 3

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefor examination.

NND: 40474Withdrawn: 11-23-2005 by:RETRIEVAL #: 40474 00001 0079 3

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T7 B3 Robinson- Michael Fdr- 2 MFR (4!27!06 Has More Info) and 2 Withdrawal Notices 303