T7 B19 FBI Knife Evidence Fdr- 1-27-04 Statement of Cathal L Flynn (w Notes) 583

8/14/2019 T7 B19 FBI Knife Evidence Fdr- 1-27-04 Statement of Cathal L Flynn (w Notes) 583

1/7

( | I S


2/7

Statement of Cathal L. Flynn

Hearing on Borders, T ransportation, and Managing Risk of the National Com mission onTerrorist Attacks U pon th e United States. Fifth Panel, Aviation Secu rity on 9/11: TheRegulators.January 27 , 2004

(Submitted January 16, 2004)

The panel is asked to focus on two topics: The development of the civil aviation system that existed onSeptember 11,2001. Assessment of the performance of the civil aviation security systemon September 11, 2001, and in the im mediate aftermath.

Having been the Associate Adm inistrator for Civil Aviation Security, Federal Av iationAdministration, from 1993 to 2000,1 ca n write knowledgeably about th e first topic. M ythoughts on the second topic, based on news coverage of the events an d publishedcomm entary, are necessarily speculative.Last September 9,1 had a long interview with Commission staff members, in which wediscussed these topics in detail. The Com mission having a record of that interview, thisstatement can be briefer than it otherwise m ight need to be.The Statement of Ms. Jane Garvey, former Administrator of the FAA, to the Commissionon May 22, 2003, summarized the development of the national aviation security programfrom i ts beginning. In his statement to the Com mission on M ay 23, 2003, Major GeneralO . K. S teele, my imm ediate predecessor as Assistant Adm inistrator for Civil AviationSecurity, described the events an d accomplishments of his t ime in the job, 1990 to 1993,particularly the FAA's implementation of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of1990 and the recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security andTerrorism (the Pan Am 103 Commission) of that year. I will try to avoid repeating theseexcellent summaries. I will instead emphasize developments in the period from 1993 to2000, an d then give my assessment of the security system's performance on andimmediately following September 11, 2001 .To begin , I wish to say that I had the steady and effective support of the FAAAdministrators, the Secretaries of Transportation, and the Directors of TransportationIntelligence and Security who held office during my time at the FAA . Also during thattime, I was privileged to work with the m emb ers of the FA A security service,professionals who daily exhibited a high order of comp etence, dedication, an ddetermination to do right.


3/7

United States aviation security was implemented in a regulatory framework. FederalAviation Regulations (FAR) Parts 107,108,109, and 129, which are public documents,respectively applied to airports, air carriers, indirect air carriers (freight forwarders), andforeign air carriers. Detailed implementing requirements were imposed on the regulatedentities by restricted program documents: Airport Security Programs, Air CarrierStandard Security Program, Indirect A ir Carrier Standard Security Program, and ModelSecurity Program (for foreign air carriers flying to the United States).Any substantial permanent addition to the regulations had to be brought about by acumbersome and time-consuming process of public rule making. Consequently, m uchreliance was placed on the Administrator's emergency authority, which permitted theimposition of additional or more stringent measures by m eans of security directives a ndemergency program amendment documents, often effective immediately on receipt bythe regulated e ntities.From 1993 to 2000, aviation se curity was imp leme nted in an environm ent shaped byseveral developments an d events: memory of the Pan Am 103 catastrophe an d nationaldetermination that nothing like it should happen again; the World Trade Center bombingof February 1993 and the discovery, in the post-bombing investigations, of previously un-noticed groups w ithin the United States that at least seemed to be connected with MiddleEastern terrorist organizations; th e "Manila Conspiracy", also called the "Bojinka Plot",that aimed in early 1995 to destroy as ma ny as twelve U .S. airliners nearlysimultaneously as they flew from airports in East Asia; growing awareness of the alQaeda terrorist organization; and the crash of TW A flight 800 on July 17, 1996, whichinitially appeared to have been caused by an on-board bomb and thus raised nationalawareness of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States.The investigations stemming from the World Trade Center attack did not reveal terroristplans or intentions to attack civil aviation in the United States. Nev ertheless, because itwas believed that Middle East-connected terrorists might well have a propensity to attackaviation, additional security measures were imposed by security directives and programamendments, at first only for a time around salient events such as the sentencing ofWorld Trade Center terrorists. Later in 1995, the measures were re-implemented withsome changes, an d kept in effect.

_ The Manila C onspiracy drama tically demonstrated that th e terrorist organization that laterfj fc came to be known as al Qaeda had global reach, determination to comm it mass murder

* * and inflict enormous economic damage, willingness to plan an d rehearse attacks patientlyj V , L overaperiod ofmon ths, technical ingenu ity inbomb making, and adequate financial' backing. It s defeat also showed that U.S. government agencies directed by the National

Security C ouncil staff, agencies of ma ny other governments, airport authorities, air' carriers and indirect air carriers had learned how to cooperate effectively incircumstances of high threat and tension. The F A A ' s role began by investigating th ebombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434 on Decem ber 11, 1994, which was R amz iYousef s dress rehearsal for his intended bombing of U.S. airliners. That investigation


4/7

revealed inform ation vital to connecting the conspiracy's dots and to devising measuresto protect flights. In the critical period, from January to April, intelligence and lawenforcement information w as effectively passed to the FAA, thus enabling efficientman agemen t of focused emergency measures on an unprecedented, nearly global scale.Other events of note in 1995 included the brief implementation of Contingency Planmeasures to cou nter a threat from the Unabomber to flights from Californian airports, anda serious shooting incident at Minneapolis-St. Paul International, which was effectivelyresolved by airport police.By 1995, the FAA had becom e con vinced that the baseline of aviation security, theaggregate of the p erma nent carrier and airport program s, had to be raised. Adequa tesecurity could not be effectively maintained by m eans of temporary security directivesand program am endm ents depending on the Adm inistrator 's e me rgency powers. We alsobelieved that a more effective national intelligence program, aimed at identifying andneutralizing terrorists before they attacked, w as essential. And we believed that a broadnational consensus was needed to bring about permanent improvements, many of whichwould be expensive an d burdensome to implement . W ith the support of the Secretary ofTransportation and the National Security Council staff, the FAA determined that itsAviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was the forum in which to achieve theconsensus for a new baseline. The A S A C met and formed th e Basel ine Working Groupon July 17, 1996. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Mortimer Downey an dCongressman Jam es Oberstar addressed th e A S A C and strongly endorsed raising aviationsecurity in this m anner. The d estruction o f TW A flight 800, which follow ed the B aselineWorking Group's creation by only a few hours, accelerated a process already underway.President Clinton formed the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Securityon July 25. Its mem bers included the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI.Working long and hard, th e ASAC Baseline Working Group provided th e Commissionwith a preliminary report on August 30 and a final report on December 12. The WhiteHouse Com mission published an initial report on September 9 and a final report onFebruary 12, 1997.The White House Commission's final report was disappointing in some respects. It didnot stress the central importance of intelligence and law enforcement in detecting andcountering terrorist activities aimed at aviation. It gave equal emphasis to the OklahomaCity and World Trade Center bombings as indicators of the terrorist threat to civilaviation, thereby obscuring the very different motivations, objectives, capabilities, andattributes of the two attacks' perpetrators. By recommending a budget of only $100million annually for capital expenditures to imp rove aviation security, the C om missionimplied that the threat within the United States was not imminent . It was known that wellover 1000 explosives detection systems (EDS) were needed to screen al l checkedbaggage at our airports. Given the need to buy other equipm ent, a $100 million capitalbudget would perm it purchase an d installation of about 50 EDS per year, and it thus


5/7

would take twenty years at best to achieve a complete checked baggage screeningprogram. That did not indicate urgency.On the other hand, the Commission did achieve consensus that protecting civil aviationwas an essential part of national security, an d that the security baseline would be raised.It s recommendations gave important direction, authority, and resources for FAA's workin the subsequent years.By 2000, the FAA , other federal agencies, and the regulated entities had made substantialprogress in implementing the C omm ission's recomm endations and raising the securitybaseline.The airlines had implem ented Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening (CAPPS ) asthe basis for the c hecked baggage security program . The checked bags of passengers /Vvo4'selected by CAPPS were either bag-matched (not carried unless the passenger was on , ~/ \ ) orbags, because o nly 101 EDS w ere in use, at 37 airports, by mid-2000 ). W e had highconfidence in CA PPS , and it is still in use in today's security programs, but our eventualgoal was to achieve screening of all bags and then stop using it. In 2000, CAPPS wasused only in the checked ba ggage prog ram , where selection of a fraction of passengerswas needed. It was not used at the checkpoints, where passengers and personsaccompanying them to and from the gates, workers at concessions within the sterileareas, aircrew and other airline and airport employees, and their belongings, were al lscreened.To improve the checkpoints' detection of weapons and ~ particularly, because they wereseen as the principal dang er ~ improvised explosive devices (lED's, bombs), 420 new X-ray units, equipped with Threat Image Projection (TIP) were installed. Over 450explosives trace de tection units were also in use at checkpoints. T o improv e theproficiency of screeners, Computer-Based T raining (CB T) systems were installed intraining rooms at major airports. At the same time , FAA recognized that screenerperformance could not be improved me rely by deploying better equipm ent, and thatdirect, performance-based regulation of screening companies was needed. FAA expectedto publish the final screening c omp any c ertification rule in 2001 .FAA also conducted anintensive program of inspections and tests to maintain performance.

screening i w f f t i the primary measure to prevent hijackings of air&raft. Thesliflip-ogrltti wa$1fs\ip l( vhijackings was greater there, ^nearly all F A T V I missions were otffhternational routes.The FAM program became controversial within the US government in late 1 993 an dearly 1994. The Dep artment of Defense and the FBI sought to have it terminated becausein their view there was una cceptab le risk, in the even t of a hijacking, of their hostagerescue efforts being dangerously com plicated by the presence of armed FAM's in theaircraft. "Blue-on-Blue" friendly fire incidents were central to their concerns. The FAAdid not agree that there w as an appreciable risk, and insisted on continuing the program


6/7

fo r deterrence. The National Security Council staff resolved th e matter in the FAA'sfavor. Thereafter, the FA A's efforts to m aintain a small, high-quality FAM corpscontinued, no tably by relo cating its base to the Technical Center at Atlantic City, where ithad ready access to greatly impro ved training facilities.The pro gram 's ob jective was deterrence. The F A M ' s were highly trained and disciplined,an d well prepared to use lethal force, but the probability of a team being in po sition todefeat a hijacking was very low. It was unlikely even that any of the scores o f armedfederal, state, and local law enfo rcement officers that flew on airliners within the UnitedStates o n any day, and were authorized to use their firearm s to prevent in-flight crime,would be aboard a targeted flight.I have gone into detail about CA PPS, pre-board screening, and the FAM pro gram,because they seem of particular interest in the context of the September 11 attacks.Considerable attention and effort were also given to the s ecurity of air cargo , to co ntrol ofaccess to airpor t ram ps, to implementing fingerprint-based criminal history checks fo rscreeners and all who had unescorted access to the secure areas o f airports. The F AA 'sSecurity R&D Service had notable success in the areas o f detection equipm entdevelopment, human factors , and system testing; it also collaborated pro ductively withother U.S. and foreign R&D p ro gram s. The FAA explosives detection canine progr amdoubled, f rom 87 to 174, the number of effective airport canine teams.Starting well before 1996, but reinfo rced and accelerated with the additional reso urcesrecomm ended by the White Ho use Co mm ission, the FAA conducted an increasinglywell-focused and intensive program of tests, assessments, and audits to m easure theperformance of all elements of the security pro gram , to ensure co mpliance, and supportenforcement actions. The results were consolidated, analyzed, and presented to regulatedentities. They were also presented, in closed sessions, to the oversight an d appropriationscommittees of the House and Senate.The FAA security service had a heavy wo rkload. In fiscal year 2000, for exam ple, itincluded 12,382 inspections of U.S. and foreign air carrier stations, airports, andcheckpoints in the United States, 14,000 compliance tests, 516 inspections of U.S.carriers ' foreign stations, 178 inspections of foreign air carriers at their last po ints ofdeparture to the United States, and assessm ents of 122 for eign airports. In addition itaccomplished evaluations of canine teams, vulnerability assessments, 6,583 dangerou sgoods and cargo security assessments, and assessments o f the operation o f EDS and ETDequipment.

\ \ i C\ 2000, the national security baseline had been r aised as intended. Its baseline\ effectiveness wasadequate for the conditions of lowthreat that prevailed. It could be

\ \J&& - ' made mo re stringent when heightened threats required it. There was an active, co ntinuingprogram to identify specific weaknesses and fix them, and to impr ove the entire programover t ime. It was adequate to fill its role in national anti-terrorism strategy. In order to_ ^ P < o defeat the defenses at airports and around airliners, terrorists wo uld need to organize,


7/7

plan, prepare, and rehearse their attacks in ways that would come to the attention of thenational intelligence comm unity.The failure of aviation security on September 11 was due to failures of imagination:failure to imagine what th e terrorists apparen tly knew , that an air l iner 's imp act an densuing fires wou ld cause a great buildin g to collapse; failure to imag ine suicidal terroristpilots com ma ndeering airliners in flight over the United States and then flying them ashuge missiles into their targ ets. A nd that was despite know ing that some terrorists - andsome pilots - have been suicidal. And also knowing that one of the M anila terrorists m ayhave spoken of using an aircraft to attack the Central Intelligence Ag ency 's headquarters.If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligenceagencies kne w them , the attacks could have been blunted, perhaps com pletely defeated,simply by requ iring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to lawenforcement agencies.The terrorists, by most accounts, did not have firearms on the aircraft. If that is so, it is areasonable surmise that they thought there was excessive risk of firearms being detectedat checkpoints. They m ight have preferred to have firearms on the aircraft, but insteadthey used items that were not prohibited as their weapons. O n S eptemb er 11, and fordecades before, some knives and blade s were not prohibited because innocent reasons forcarrying them fa r exceeded an y menace they seemed to convey.Judging on the basis of published accounts of what happened, neither the airports nor theair carriers were at fault in their execution of their security duties.The FAA acted speedily and effectively on September 11, grounding all aircraft toprevent additional attacks. Then the FA A devised, and the regulated entitiesimplemented, modificat ions to the security program s to cope with the new form of threatand to perm it resumption of flights. The changes included perm itting only ticketedpassengers, and not escorts, to enter the sterile areas, with benefits that included givingadditional time per passenger for the m uch m ore intensive screening then needed, andusing CAPPS to select passengers for secondary screening at the boarding gates. Other,less visible changes were implemented, such as for air cargo security. General aviationbecame subject to unprecedented restrictions. Overall, the FAA and the regulated entitiesresponded well an d comprehensively, serving to restore public co nfidence in safety offlight.

Documents

T7 B19 FBI Knife Evidence Fdr- 1-27-04 Statement of Cathal L Flynn (w Notes) 583