T4 B10 Senate Banking Terrorist Financing Fdr- Entire Contents- Transcripts and 10-1-03 Zachary Abuza Article- 1st Pgs Scanned for Reference- Fair Use 841

8/14/2019 T4 B10 Senate Banking Terrorist Financing Fdr- Entire Contents- Transcripts and 10-1-03 Zachary Abuza Article- 1st

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-fg T - Asia Hasn't Stopped Th e Terror Funding Page 1 of 3

TH E W A L L STREET O U R N A L .O N L I N E '

October 1, 2003

COMMENTARY

Asia Hasn't StoppedThe Terror FundingBy ZACHARY ABUZA

I t ' s no w just over a year since 20 al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah operatives in Southeast Asiawere added to the list established under United Nations Resolution 1390, which provides forinternational sanctions against known terrorist financiers. Earlier this month, the U.N. put another19 such terrorists from Southeast Asia on the list. These actions amount to little more than futilegestures that do little to tackle the problem of terrorist funding in Southeast Asia.Many of these men are in jail -- one since 1995 -- and the rest are on the run. None are known tohave significant assets, very few of which have been frozen. Almost the only benefit of placingthese individuals on the U.N. blacklist was to make it easier to target those who do business withthem. That's especially important in countries like Indonesia, where JI has still not been bannedand you can't be arrested for being a member of the group unless police can draw a direct link to acrime or terrorist act.Once an individual is on the Resolution 1390 list, it becomes an offense to have any business orfinancial dealings with them. So even if it is impossible to link a JI member to the Bali bombing,proving he gave money to someone on the list becomes enough to issue an arrest warrant almostanywhere in the world.Necessary as this is, it's a far cry from what's needed to tackle terrorist funding in Southeast Asia.Al Qaeda has been active in the region since the early 1990s, when it first began using SoutheastAsia as a back office for activities such as setting up front companies, fundraising, recruiting,forging documents and purchasing weapons. Only later did the region become a theater ofoperations in its own right as JI, its local affiliate, developed its own terrorist capabilities.According to U.S. law-enforcement officials, Southeast Asia has now become even moreimportant to al Qaeda's money men following the Sept. 11,2001 terrorist attacks. Those prompteda crackdown on funding channels in the Middle East, especially in the financial centers in AbuDhabi and other parts of the United Arab Emirates. Bu t little was done to shut down fundingchannels in Southeast Asia, where money continues to flow to the terror group through hawalanetworks, gold and gem smuggling and cash transfers. That's why the list ofnames added to theU . N . blacklist last year was so disappointing, since it didn't include any of the known frontcompanies an d charities affiliated with terror groups in the region.

DOW JONES REPRINTS

http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB106496110262485500,OO.html 10/30/03


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UNTANGLING THE TERROR W EBT he Need for a Strategic Understanding of th e Crossover BetweenInternational Terrorist Groups to SuccessfullyProsecute the W ar on Terror

Testimony ofMatthew A . LevittSenior Fellow in Terrorism StudiesThe Washington Institute fo r Near East PolicyOctober 22, 2003

Committee on Banking, Housing, an d Urban AffairsUnited States Senate


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Appearance fo r Hearing of U.S. Senate C ommittee on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs on October 22, 2003Oral StatementLouise RichardsonExecutive DeanRadcliffe Institute for Advanced StudyHarvard University

Good morning Chairman Shelby, Senator Sarbanes, and other distinguishedmembers of the committee. I am honored to have this opportunity to speak to you aboutmy understanding of the nature of terrorism and about ho w lessons can be derived fromthat understan ding for the disruption of their operations. A s will soon be ob vious, I amno t an expert on terrorist finances, rather I am someone who has thought about and taughtabout terrorist movements fo r many years.

The first point to be made in any discussion of terrorism is to be clear about whatit is we are discussing. The term terrorism is being used so loosely that it has come tolose muc h mean ing. The only unive rsally accepted attribute of the term is that it ispejorative. I would like simply to posit what I take to be the seven crucial c haracteristicsof the term "terrorism."1. Political. To co nstitute terrorism the act must be politically inspired. If it is not, then itis simp ly criminal activity.2. Violent. If the act does no t involve violence or the threat of violence then it is notterrorism.3. Comm unication. The point of terrorism is to comm unicate a message. It is notviolence for the sake of it or even violence in the expectation of defeating the enemy, butrather violence to convey a political message.4. Symb olic. The act and the victim usually have symbolic significance. The shock valueof the act is enhanced by the power of the symbol of the target. The whole point is for thepsychological impact to be greater than the actual physical act. Terrorist movements aregenerally out-manned and out-gunned by their opponents so they employ these tactics togain more attention than an objective assessment of their capabilities would warrant.5. Non-state actor. Terrorism as we understand it is conducted by clandestine groups,not states. Th is is not to argue that states cannot use terrorism as an instrument of theirforeign and dom estic policy; they can and they do. Nor is it to argue that states cannottake actions which are the moral equivalent of terrorism; they can and they do. It issimply to argue that if we want to have any analytic clarity in understanding the behaviorof these groups we must understand them as clandestine sub-state actors rather than asstates. Moreover, in our dealing with states we have the whole panoply of internationallaw to assist us in interpreting and responding to their actions.6. The victim and the audience are not the same. The point of terrorism is to use thevictim as a m eans of altering the behavior of the larger audience, usually a governm ent.


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WRITTEN TESTIMONYOFJEAN-CHARLES BRISARDINTERNATIONAL EXPERT ON TERRORISM FINANCINGLEAD INVESTIGATOR, 911 LAW SUIT

CEO, JCB CO NSULTING INTERN ATIONALBEFORE

THE COMM ITTEE ON BANKING , HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRSUNITED STATES SENATE

OCTOBER 22,2003

Chairman Shelby, Senator Sarbanes and distinguished members of this Committee,thank you for inviting me to testify today about the global war on terrorism financing.I started investigating terrorism financing networks in 1997 for the Frenchgovernment, since then, I have provided expertise to various governments and to theUnited Nations. Since June 2002, I have been leading an international investigationfor the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism in the course of an actionbrought by 5,600 family members before the US District Court of Washington, D.C.against several entities, banks, companies, charities and individuals that providedfinancial or logistical support to the Al-Qaida network.In that respect, our investigation is today active in various regions of the world andhas been able to recover a considerable amount of information on Al-Qaida supportnetworks through procedures of judicial or political cooperation established withmore than 30 countries.To date, our effort is probably a unique example of non-State cooperation andinvestigation on terrorism.This process, through cooperation and interviews with hundreds of law enforcementofficials, provides us with an independent, although global, perspective on assessinginter-governmental efforts on terrorism financing.Above all, the current process has been able to uncover major documents and itemsrelated to the funding of the Al-Qaida organization, and I would like to share some ofour findings with you today. These findings help understand both the global context ofterrorism funding and the ways and m eans used by Al-Qaida on a regular basis to raiseand move funds for operational purposes.


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7 of 113 DOCUMENTSCopyright 2003 Federal News Service, Inc.

Federal News ServiceOctober 22, 2003 Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARINGLENGTH: 11104 wordsHEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEESUBJECT: THE FINANCING OF TERROR ORGANIZATIONSCHAIRED BY : SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY (R-AL)PANEL II LOCATION: 538 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.WITNESSES: LOUISE RICHARDSON, RADCLIFFE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES; MATTHEWLEVITT, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FO R NEAR EAST POLICY; AND JEAN-CHARLES BRISARD, CEO, JCBCONSULTING

BODY:SEN. SHELBY: We're going to call up our second panel. Dr. Louise Richardson, the executive dean, RadcliffeInstitute for Advanced Studies, Harvard University; Dr. Jean-Charles Brisard, CEO, JCB Consulting; and Mr. Matthew

Levitt, senior fellow, Washington Institute for ear East Policy.I just want to say a few words about Dr. Richardson and others. Dr. Richardson is the executive dean of theRadcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies at Harvard. She has studied and written extensively on the alignment of terrorgroups throughout the world. W e look forward to her views on the shifting alliances among hi some instances thesewhat we call strange bedfellows.Dr. Jean-Charles Brisard is the C EO of JCB Consulting. In that position he is also the lead investigator for the lawfirm of Ronald Motley, representing many of the families that were victims of the attack on September the 11th. He haswritten and studied extensively not only regarding the attacks, bu t also generally concerning the movement of fundsnecessary to support terror organizations.And finally we will hear from Mr. Matthew Levitt. Mr. Levitt is a senior fellow for the Washington Institute forNear East Policy. He has a unique perspective concerning these issues, built in no small part by his work as a specialagent at the FBI for many years. Mr. Levitt was in the International Terrorism Section of the FBI. He has expanded thatwork into his present position. He will assist us today in looking at the transition from the conceptual analysis to the

practical complexity of identifying, tracking and disrupting terror organizations using the trail that money leaves.Dr. Richardson, Mr. Brisard, Mr. Levitt, your written testimony will be made part of the hearing record in theentirety. You can proceed as you wish. Dr. Richardson.MS. RICHARDSON: Good morning, Chairman Shelby, Senator Sarbanes, and other distinguished members of thecommittee. I'm honored to have this opportunity to speak to you about my understanding of the nature of terrorism andho w lessons can be derived from that understanding for the disruption of their operations. As will readily become

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T4 B10 Senate Banking Terrorist Financing Fdr- Entire Contents- Transcripts and 10-1-03 Zachary Abuza Article- 1st Pgs Scanned for Reference- Fair Use 841