T3 B22 Public Hearing Fdr- Tab 17- Questions for Tenet 098

8/14/2019 T3 B22 Public Hearing Fdr- Tab 17- Questions for Tenet 098

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CLANDESTINE& COVERTACTION

SUGGESTEDQUESTIONSFO RGEORGEJ. TENET

Designated Comm issioners: Fred Fielding& Jamie G orelick

1) A Global S trategy of Renditions and Disruptions. The CIApursued a globalstrategy of renditionsand disruptions for going after al Qaeda in theperiod before 9-11. The DCI ha s testified that thesee f f o r t sprevented a numberof terrorist attacksand saved A merican lives.

a. Howeffectivewere the CIA's globalefforts at disruptingal Q aeda cellsbefore 9/11?

b. G iven thatal Qaedawas turningou t thousands of operativesfrom its trainingcamps,how much impact did a rendition strategy have on staunchingterrorism before9/11?

2) Covert Action Strategy. The CIAneeded a new strategy in terrorist safe-havenssuch as Afghanistan, where the U.S. governmentwas unable to gain the cooperationof the Taliban movementin arresting or extraditingBin Ladin. The CIA wasusingproxy forces in Afghanistan to plan operations againstBin Ladin as early as 1997.Beginningin August 1998,the CIAemployedproxy forces to carry out covert actionsagainst Bin Ladin and hisprincipal lieutenants.This strategy continued until9/11.

a. What was theCIA's covert action strategyfo r attackingBin Ladin and al

Qaedain theAfghanistan terrorist sanctuary after the East AfricaEmbassybombings in August 1998?

b. What were the goals of this strategy, and how effective was it in meetingthesegoals?

c. Would arresting or elim inating Bin Ladin in August 1998 have stopped the9/11 attacks?

In mid-1999,the CIAintroduceda new operational strategy called "The Plan," toexpand proxy optionsfor going after Bin Ladin, and develop more unilateral sources(as opposed to relyingon oreign liaison).

d. How did theCIA's covert action strategyfo r attackingBin Ladin and alQaedain the Afghanistan terrorist sanctuary change w ith the im plementationof "The Plan"?

e. Howeffectivewas "ThePlan" in attacking Bin Ladin and al Q aeda?

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5) Sufficient Covert Action Authority. Some working-levelofficers in the CIA'sCoun terterrorist Center (CTC ) have told us they never had the covert authoritytheywanted to effectively go after Bin Ladin before 9/11. They complained that theirability to go after Bin Ladin was inhibited by the act that they couldonly kill himwithin the contextof a capture operation, and that con sequently their ass ets did notthink the U.S. governmentwas serious about wantingto kill Bin Ladin.

a. In your opinion,did the CIAreceive appropriate and sufficient covertactionauthority to go after Bin Ladin before9/11?

b. Did youever express to the policymakers, at any point before9/11, a concernthat the CIA had insufficient covertaction authority to go after Bin Ladin?

c. Did youever ask forauthorities regarding Bin Ladin before9/11 that you didnot get?

6) CIA Direct Action in Afghanistan. After 9/11, the CIA used its own personnel togreat e f f e c t in Afghanistan againstal Qaeda and Talibanforces, operating in anextremelydangerous environment.

Why did the CIAnever put its ownpersonnel on the ground in Afghanistan before9/11 in order to capture or kill Bin Ladin?

7) Capabilities of the Tribal Assets. DC I Tenet told the Commission thatin spring1998 he "turned off " an operation to capture Bin Ladin usingC IA employed Afghantribal assets . He said this decision was b ased on the recom mendationof his chiefoperational officers. The operation'sprospect of success was described to him at thetime as less than 30%.

a. Where were the weak points of this operation? Did your operational officers

have confidencein the ability of the tribal assets to carry out the operation?b. What was the estimatedlikelihood of the operation being successful, as apercentage? What would havebeen anacceptable percentage, that is, alikelihood o fsuccess that would haveled you toapprove the operation?

For three years, from Augus t 1998 through to9/11, the CIA continued to employtheseAfghan tribal as setsto mount offensive operations againstBin Ladin and alQaeda in Afghanistan. Ab outhalf a dozen times during this period the ass etsreportedly attempted to amb ush Bin Ladin. By fall 1999,briefings by theCoun terterrorist Center (CTC ) stated thetribals ' chancesof success in capturing BinLadin as less than 10%. [Note: theCIA's new operational s trategy for goingafter

Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, "The Plan" introducedin all 1999,was inpart a responseto this understanding thatthe CIAcould no t rely solely on the tribals to capture BinLadin].

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c. What gave you confidence thatCIA's Afghan tribal assetshad any morecapability to moun t attacks on Bin Ladin after August 1998 than in the springof 1998?

d. Did you believe at the time of their reporting thatthe assets did in fact try toambush Bin Ladin?

e. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of the tribal assets carrying

out a successful ambush againstBin Ladin in the period before 9/11, whatwould that number have been?f. Did you ever discuss the capabilities of the tribal assets with policymakers

before 9-11? Please discuss in detail any such conversations.

8) Massoud and the Northern Alliance. In February 1999, the CIA had authority toemploy the Taliban'sstrongest opponent, Northern Alliance com mander Massoudand his forces in covert action against Bin Ladin. Beginning in mid-1999, the CIAbegan to focus more attentionon Massoud, with the recognition that "the enem yofmy enemy is my friend. " CIApersonnel who met upwith Massoud to convey to himthe U.S. governm ent's requirement thathe capture rather than kill Bin Ladin told us

that Massoud laughed at such a request.

a. To wha t extent did Massoud share United States'objectives in Afghan istan?

Byfall 1999, briefings by the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) stated Massoud'schances of success in capturing Bin Ladin as no more than 15%.

b. How confident were you in Massoud and his fighters as a proxy force thatCIA could use against Bin Ladin?

c. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of Massoud carrying out asuccessful attack againstBin Ladin in the period before 9/11, what would that

number have been?From 2000 to 2001, the CIA and policyma kers gave great consideration toapian tous e Massoud's forces to tie down the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, althoughthere was disagreeme nt within the CIA as to howmuch support to give Massoud. Inearly 2001, CIA analysts warned that the Northern Alliance mightbe knockedo ff thebattle-field in spring fighting.

d. From 2000 on, were you confident that Massoud wouldbe able to hold backthe Taliban?

e. How concerned were you that Massoud couldbe defeated in 2001, and withwhat potential consequences?

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9) Using Proxies. Although the CIAactively used localforces as proxies to carry outcovert actions in Afghanistan, these proxies do not appear to have ever ca rriedout asingle assault againstBin Ladin or his principal lieutenantsbefore 9/11.

a. Were you confident at the time that the CIA's various proxy forces wouldcapture or kill Bin Ladin during the period before9/11? Did this confidence

increase or decrease at anypoint?b. Did you inform policymakers of the risks involved in usingproxiesas

opposed to U .S. personnelto carry out covert action against B in Ladin?Please discuss in detail any conversations that you had on this topic withpolicymakers in the period before9/11.

c. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of any of theCIA's proxyforces either capturingor killing Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, whatwould that numberbe?

d. Did you everfrankly advise policymakers of the chances that any of the CIA 'sproxy forces would captureor kill Bin Ladin in the period befo re9/11?

e. In short, if the proxyforce strategy wasn't working, what steps did you take to

pursue alternatives to use of proxy forces?f. What alternativesdid you recommend to policymakers?

10)Actionable Intelligence. Yesterday, we heard how manysenior Departm entofDefense officials continually argued that the CIA's inability toproduce "actionableintelligence" limited theirability to undertakemilitary action in the Afghanistanterrorist sanctuary before 9/11.

a. Why was the CIA unable to produce actionable intelligence sufficient to meetthe military's requirementsfor action in Afghanistan before9/11?

b. How is the CIA working with the military to solve this problem now?

Yesterday, we heard how on three occasions between Decemb er 19 98and May 1999,the CIA's intelligencewas strong enough to set in m otion active preparationstolaunch m ilitary strikesto kill Bin Ladin. NationalSecurityAdviser Berger toldtheCommissionthat on each occasionDCI Tenet advised that the intelligencewas notreliable enough to go ahead w ith the action.

c. Please explain the basis for your advising against m ilitary action on thesethree occasions.

11) Predator. Accordingto severalNSC and CIAofficers, the CIA's senior ma nagement

resisted developmentof the Predator as a reconnaissanceplatform in 2000, and onlyagree d to fly Predator over Afghanistan on an experimentalbasis.

a. Did you originally supportthe development of Predator in 2000 as areconnaissance platformto use over Afghanistan? Why was there resistancefrom some senior CIA officers for this project?

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The Predator's flights in fall 2000 werevery successful: CIA analysts think thatBinLadin was spotted on twooccasions.

b. In your opinion, did Predator spot Bin Ladin in fall 2000?c. How valuable was the intelligence Predator collected from reconnaissance

flights in fall 2000?

Whenwinter weath er preve nted furthe r flights, senior managers at the CIA, includingin the C TC , wanted to bring the Predator b ack to the U.S. and not redeploy th ePredator untilan armed capabilitywas ready. CIA analysts said that, sinceth eTaliban had spotted the Predator in the fall, further reconnaissance flights m ight

jeopardize th e effectiveness offuture armedflights.CIA senior manage rs argued with DO D about funding the Predator project, andabout command-and-controlissues (including whetherthe CIA or themilitary wouldpull th e trigger on the armed Predator) . There were no Predator flights overAfghanistan in2001 untilafter 9/11.

d. What were your reasonsfor opposing flying Predator fo r reconnaissancepurposes in 2001?

e. Why didn't the Predator (reconnaissance or armed) fly in spring/summer2001?

f. Did CIA disputes over fundingor command-and-controlissues have the effectof stalling Predator missions?

g. W hy did youchange yo ur positionafter the September 4, 2001 Principals'Committee meeting,and agree to fly reconnaissance flights in2001?

12) Commission Recommendations. W e are considering a rangeof topics forrecommendations. Currently,th e D CI is both th eprincipal analystof th e terrorist

enem y as we ll as the com mande r for many ope rations in the field in the war onterror.

a. How has therole of the C IA in fightingterrorism changed post-9/11 ?b. How has theleadership roleof theDirector of Central Intelligence changed

post-9/11?c. What do you spend most of your time doing? How much of your time is spent

on full operations against terrorism, and how much is spent on analysis of theterrorism threat or on other activities? Is this the right balanceand use ofyourtime?

In theDCI's recent Worldwide Threatbriefing before th e Senate SelectCom mittee on Intelligence, he stated that the alQaeda leadership structure hasbeen seriously damaged since9/11, butthere is still a significant and ongoingterrorist threat.

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d. Two and a half yearsafter the 9/11 attacks, why has the U.S. Governmentbeen unable to findUsama Bin Ladin, and other terrorist and Taliban leaderssuch as Ayman al-Zawahiri, or M ullah Omar?

e. What kind ofconflict is the United S tates currentlyinand against whatenemy? Is this a war on"terrorism" or a struggle for thefuture of the Mu slimworld?

f. Wh at is the appropriate role of the CIA and the Intelligence C omm unity in thewar, and what role is inappropriate?

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Documents

T3 B22 Public Hearing Fdr- Tab 17- Questions for Tenet 098