T3 B15 Counter Terrorism Policy Fdr- 3 Draft Team 3 Workplans 987

8/14/2019 T3 B15 Counter Terrorism Policy Fdr- 3 Draft Team 3 Workplans 987

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Date: Fri,25 Apr2003 12:47:42 -Q4QO\: D a n i e lByman\ \: p z e l i k o w @ 9 - 1 1 l c o m m i s s i o n . g o v9 , ck.ojm@9-1 Tcommission.gov*C c : team3@ 9-11 commission.gov9, \'Bass. W a r r e n " \. 1 ' onnie _| \>9\5 a l l a n ( g > a - i 1commission.gov*

Subject: W o r k p l a nPhilip and Chris,Attached is the workplan for the policy team (team 3). In meetingsyesterday and this morning, we tried to identify the most importantissues and develop a strategy for tackling them.I ' v e suggested to team members that they initially concentrate on doingbackground reading based on the list we suggest for commissioners. Whent h e i r clearances are active (only mine and Scott's are at this point),I ' v e given suggestions as to which Joint Inquiry documents they shouldlook at. In the meantime, if there are any open source materials thatyou would suggest we familiarize ourselves with, please send me or theteam an e - m a i l .However, after you've had time to look at the work plan, I suggest weall meet to discuss the steps staff members should take during the nextfe w weeks as well as the broader vision for this team.Bes t, _ _ "\ n

***""* "*""! , > \]2

Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy TeamAlexis Albion^Scott Allan

/Warren BassDaniel Byman

Bonnie JenkinsCharles Hill

Draft: April 25, 2003

Contentshttp://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=101&index=52&start=3 04/25/2003


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Projec t Ove r v i ew*v

Key Questions

Proposed Division of Labor

Initial Document Review List

Appendix One: Summary of Joint Inquiry Staff Work on Policy

Appendix Two: Suggested Readings

Appendix Three: Notional Interview List

Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for theCommissioners

Project Overview: Counterterrorism PolicyThe policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy before the September11 attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and the nature of the policy today. These tasks will requirereviewing overall priorities, identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism (prosecutions,military strikes, extraditions/renditions, and so on), and determining how well senior policy makers understood the threatfrom al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S. relationships with key foreign partnersan d adversaries with regard to counterterrorism. When appropriate, the team will distinguish between U.S.counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began to emerge. Theseearlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening andnot a lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terroristsduring this era were those backed by states, not those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this periodwa s viewed as an important but not overriding policy concern.As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1 990s, the focus slowly shifted. The 1 993 attack onthe World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualtieson U.S. soil. Incontrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicalswanted a lot of people watching anda lot of people dead.Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy changed unevenly atbest. The 1 9 9 8 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism ingeneraland al-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks todramatically change U.S. counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policydecisions being made almost daily.

"VThe policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review, briefings by keyindividuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss theformulation and implementation of U.S. government policy in the counterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will drawon the work of the Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate.

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Mail:: INBOX: Workplan Page 3 of 10Key Questions

At the Com mission hearings held on M arch 31 in New Y ork, witnesses described their views of the September 11^attackers, the intelligence capabilities of the government, and the quality of the USG's coun terterrorism policy beforeSeptember 11. They also suggested improvements in these areas in order to p revent a nother traged y. Based upon theirstatements and our research so far, we have compiled a list of key questions and issues that we think need to beaddressed by the Commission.The list is divided into three parts, corresponding to the overall statutory structure of the Commission's inquiry. Most ofthe questions focus on Part I (the pre-September 11 era), as this is essential for understanding Parts II and III, whichcover th e period a fter th e attacks.Part One: Counterterrorism Policy before September 11, 2001Background1. What shaped coun terterrorism policy befo re the 1993 World Trade Center attack?

W h a t was the "old paradigm" regarding the threat posed by terrorist groups? W hat instrumen ts (law enforce me nt, diplomacy , military strikes, financial controls, and so on) were used forfighting terrorism? How mportant was terrorism considered, ingeneral?

Strategy and Priorities^

2. Did the U SG possess a unified counterterrorism policy prior to S eptem ber 11 , or did policy vary betw een agenc ies? Did our strategy employ all instruments of U.S. national power?

\ * ^ j- 1 *\ W hat we Was here leadership and coordination? ~ ffQ S 'f*'^ *m b* f*r

* Did anypolit ical concerns affect coun terterrorism policy? \ * **^counterterrorism factored into the design of key foreign policy measures, including policy toward Saudi Arabia,Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Pakistan, and Egypt?

4. Where was counterterrorism on the overall U SG priority list? W hat were the other priorities? Did money fol low the priority list? Did high-level time and attention follow the list? If not, why not? Was here a system for managing priorities? Was here an integration of domestic policy and foreign policy on counterterrorism?

"" * With the knowledge available at the time, should coun terterrorism have been a higher priority? Was he particular threat of al-Qa'ida recognized?

5 . Were an y "bal ls dropped" du r i ng the transition from th e C linton administration to the Bush administration? Werehttp://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=101&index=52&start=3 04/25/2003


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Mail:: INBOX: Workplan Page 4 of 10transit ion mechanisms effective?Understanding the Threat6. Did policy makers fee l well-informed by the intell ige nce community on the nature of the threat, both a t home andabroad? At what stage was al-Qa'ida considered a threat? At what point was al-Qa'ida considered agrave threat?7. Did the White House and Congress ex ercise effective oversight of the intelligence community and other bureaucraciesf ighting terrorism?

WasU.S. policy re alistic given the limitations of the key agencies? In formulating counterterrorism policy, was sufficient attention given to the organization of the intelligencecommunity and its ability to combat terrorism? In formulating counterterrorism policy, did the USG focus sufficient attention on the FBI's organizat ionalability to counter foreign terrorists in the United States?

Terrorism and Foreign Re lations

_/To what e xtent did the United State s empha size and integrate counterterrorism into its foreign relations? What werethe tradeoffs?\fi. Diid the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan and Afghanistan?

n 0. Did the United States properly addre ss the issue of state sponsors of terrorism? W as too m uch attention given to,_ state-sponsored terrorist groups?\Jrt- How supportive were keycountries in fighting al-Qa'ida? *v t -i

How supportive we re P ak istan, Saudi Arabia , and other countries w here popular support for Islamists was high andwhere the g overnments re portedly had links to al-Qa'ida? How supportive we re key Europea n countries, such as Germany? Whowere our vital friends in the effort aga inst al-Qa'ida?

Counterterrorism Instruments1 2. What were the primary instruments used in fighting terrorism?

What we re their limitations? Were these instruments effective? Were they used well? Were certain options off the table? Should they have been?

Pa rt Two: The Immediate Aftermath of September 11 (through September 20)1A/hat changes were m ade in the af te rmath of September 11 , and why?

4ACould these changes have been made before September 1 1 ? Why or why not?1 5 . What was the doctrine laid out by the President 's Septembe r 20 speech and other ke y pronouncements made duringisJjivotal period? How did these eme rge?'Thttp://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=101&index=52&start=3 04/25/2003


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Mail:: INBOX:Workplan Page 5 of 10Part Three: Counterterrorism Policy Todayfl6.Could the United States be better positioned to fight al-Qa'ida and other terrorists today?

7. Are the problems that hindered effective efforts against al-Qa'ida and terrorism before September 11 f ixed?18. What policy steps should be taken today? What bureaucratic and coordination changesare necessary?"~719/ls counterterrorism properly integrated into U.S. foreign policy today? Does our current handling of such issues as-twinning hearts and minds" abroad, using preemptive or retaliatory force, handling failed states, and formulating MiddleEast policy make sense from the perspective of the war against al-Qa'ida?

Proposed Division of Labor (this will change as our team decides who has the best skills for which issue)

PersonAlexis Albion

Scott Allan

Warren Bass

Daniel Byman

Bonnie JenkinsCharles Hill*Dana Leseman or other person whocould do DOJ issuesKevin Scheid or other person withbudget experience

Agency

CIA, Do D

State, DoJ,CIA

White House/NSC, State

WhiteHouse/NSC

DoD, StateStateDOJOM B

IssuesBackground (lead), oversight,transition, understanding the threat(lead)Post-9/1 1 changes, counterterrorisminstruments (lead), foreigngovernments andsanctuariesStrategies/priorities (lead), foreigngovernments, transitions (lead),understanding the threat, post-9/11changesForeign governments (lead),strategies/prioritiesPost-9/1 1 changes (lead), oversight(lead), counterterrorism instruments(but not law enforcement)Background, foreign governmentsCounterterrorism instruments(particularly law enforcement)Counterterrorism budgets

Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses rather than assign aparticular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner.

All team members will work Part III - or at least we will split it up later.Proposed Briefings for the Commission

We believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy towardal-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today.

Richard Clarke, the former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would be the ideal briefer, given his pivotalrole in counterterrorism in both administrations.v

General John Gordon, who now holds Clarke's old job, should brief on the current counterterrorism policy. Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would also be well-suited for

helping Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11.http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=l 01&index=52&start=3 04/25/2003


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Mail:: INBOX: Workplan Page 6 of 10 Dr. Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, perhaps the leading n on-government authority on terrorism, couldprovide an excellent analysis of how the threat of terrorism ha s changed over the years.

-N. Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the N ational Intelligence Office for the Near East and South Asia, is perhaps thegovernment's leading analyst of terrorism an d could provide an overview of the strengths an d weaknesses ofdifferen t counterterrorism instruments.If necessary, staff member Daniel Byman could brief on the nature of al-Qa'ida and several aspects of the Joint Inquiryinvestigation (e.g. covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military force, and the overall counterterrorism strategy as itrelated to intelligence). Howe ver, in his view, these b riefers would be preferred given their stature and experience.Mr. Clarke, Ambassador Sheehan, D r. Pillar, and Dan Byman would probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least,private venue in order to provide the maximum de tail. D r. Hoffma n could brief in public.

Generalized Document Review List

It will be difficult to accurately predict what documents the team will want to review, although there are some obviousones. Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents,the fo cus will be the Executive/N SC/OM B and probably the D epartmen ts of S tate and Justice as well. This list will growand become more specific as the investigation proceeds.The documents we will be requesting include:

P residential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;~N

NSC M emoranda related to counterterrorism policy;

State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorism policy;

Records of discussion of counterterrorism policy;

D eliberative information and factors considered before issuing policy;

Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism;

Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism; and

Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such documents will provideinsights into which options were chosen, which we re rejected, an d which were off the table. Because of the sensitivity of

-vthese documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may necessitate high-level interventions.Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy A rea

T h e I n q u i r y d id some w o r k on po l i cy issues, b u t mos t of t h a t focused on t he i n te l l igence-po l i c y n e x u s ra the r t han on t hehttp://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=l 01 &index=52&start=3 04/25/2003


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soundness of the overall policy. Th e Inquiry discussed intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and thequality of analysis with policy makers in some depth, but it did not venture far beyond this. The focus of its work was on^the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with the Inquiry having more su ccess learning about the Clinton period.Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. For exam ple, the Inquiry looked at how the policymakers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or onneighboring countries. However, this was only done with a few countries, an d even there i t was not done systematically.Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or lessimportant than counterterrorism.The Inquiry d id more extensive wo rk on the use of military fo rce an d on cove rt a ction. On the forme r, how ever, it washampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documents outside the strict purview ofintelligence.The Inquiry did not try to judg e overall coun terterrorism policy in any comprehens ive way. P arts of the Inquiry's w orklooked at issues such as warning the public, working with state an d local officials, an d emphasizing law enforcement overdisruption of terrorist groups. Many of these is sue s, howe ver, involved the work of no n-Intelligence Commun ity agencies(e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry didnot do basic policy analysis such as trying to evalu ate the ava ilable instruments, the limits on those instruments, a ndpolitical support in Cong ress.

Suggested Readings for the Comm issioners on Terrorism and U.S. PolicyReadings on U.S. Policy

1. Jonathan Fredm an, "Cove rt Action, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on Assassination," Studies in Intelligence(1997) , pp. 15-25. ^

2. Adam Roberts, "Coun ter-terrorism, Arm ed Force, and the Laws of War," Survival, Vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp.7-32.3. Paul Pillar, Terrorism an d U.S. Foreign Po licy (Brookings, 2001), pp . 73-1 29 .

i/4. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 219-39 2.General Readings on Terrorism

1. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L.Sawyer (McGraw Hill, 2002), pp . 55-66.2. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp . 13-44.

Readings on al-Qa'ida and Jihadist Groupst/f. Anonymous, Through Oi/r/7em/es'yes(Brassey's, 2002), entire.jL. Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism an d Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 25

(2002), pp . 303-316 . / 2 > . Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: G lobal Network of Terror (Columbia Un iversity Press, 2002), pp. 101-114. \

4. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka M aleckova, "Does Pove rty Cause Terrorism?" New .I IRepublic, June 24, 2002. l\Ay 5. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 3-37. rA/1-

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Mail:: INBOX : Workplan Page 8 of 10Notional List of People to Interview

~ x A s a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into s everal categories: those with respo ns ibilities for U.S.foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in contex t; those w ith counterterroris m respo ns ibilities ; those withvaluablerelated responsibilities; foreign officials; an d outside experts. Th e first list in particular includes the most prominent namesin U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, bu t priorities and focus do begin at the top and often end there. Onceyou go one or two levels down the food chain, the individuals have "accounts" an d thus do not have a sense of wheretheir responsibilities fit into the overall picture. So if we are to be comprehensive, we need to talk to these people. Inseveral cases (e.g., at O MB), it ma y be more appropriate to talk to a deputy or s omeone who focused more oncounterterrorism.Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favo r interviewing the wo rking-level individuals, particularlythose involved in counterterrorism, and outside e x perts first whenever poss ible. Only when we know as much of the storyas pos s ible will we interview the most senior individuals.

People Responsible for Overall Policy President George W.Bush President William J. Clinton Vice President Richard Cheney Vice President A l Gore Condoleezza Rice, National Security A dvisor

-, Samuel Berger, former N ational Security A dvisor

- VQ0f} I < 2 ^ " A nthony Lake, former National Security A dvisor If* *

Brent Scowcro ft, forme r National Security A dvis or 0")w ?**>""T Colin Powell, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Se cretary of State Attorney General John A sh crof t Former Attorney General Janet Reno Secretary of Defens e Donald Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense William Cohen Former O ff ice of Management andBudget Director Jacob Lew Off ice of Management andBudget Director Mitch Daniels Former FBI Director Louis Freeh Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch

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Mall:: INBOX: Workplan Page 9 of 10 Former U.N. Ambas sador Bill Richardson

^ Anyother participants in the "Small Group" Deputies of various departments asappropriate

Counterterrorism Specialists Richard Clarke Past and present participants in the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) AmbassadorMichael Sheehan (former S/CT at State) Sheehan's predecessors at S/CT General (ret.) Wayne Downing, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism

/v General John Gordon, Coordinator for CounterterrorismA

\

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), for both theBush and Clinton administrations SOLIC and CENTCOM officials with CT responsibilities Other former NSC staff working with Clarke (Roger Cressey, Dan B enjamin, Steve Simon, and soon )

i NSC staff working on intelligence

-v Cofer Black, both in his CTC and in his S/CT respon sibilities Dale W atson, former senior FBI official Am bassador Robert Oak ley, former S/CT

Those with Related Responsibilities Ambassador Karl Inderfurth (former As st. Secreta ry, South Asia) Ambassador Mark Parris (former Asst. Secretary, Near East) Ambassador W illiam Burns (Asst. Secretary, Near East) Ambas sador Martin Indyk (Asst. Secretary, Near East) Bruce Reidel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Germany, B ritain, Israel, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and other-v coun tries before September 11

Foreign Government Officials H R H Prince Bandar b in Su l t a n , S au d i ambassador to the Uni ted States

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Mai l :: INBOX : Workplan Jean-Paul Brugiere, investigating magistrate, France Selected other foreign off icials

Outside Experts Bruce Hoffman, the RAND Corporation

Brian Jenkins, the RAND Corporation Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University Jessica Stern, Harvard University Juliette Kayyem, Harvard University Richard Betts, Columbia University

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Date: Mon, 12 M ay 2003 17:26:03 -0400From: Daniel Byman ^To: pzel ikow@9-11 commission.gov^P

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Key Questions


Initial Document Review List




Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Project Overview: Counter-terrorism PolicyThe policy team seeks to understand and assess the development of U.S. counter-terrorism policy before the September 11attacks, the changes in the immediate aftermath, and the nature of the policy today. These tasks will require reviewingoverall priorities, identifying and evaluating the different instruments used to fight terrorism, and determining ho w well seniorpolicy makers understood the threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S.relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries with regard tocounter-terrorism. When appropriate, the team willdistinguish between U.S. counter-terrorism policy in general and U.S. efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in particular.The nature of terrorism during the Cold War shaped U.S. counter-terrorism policy when al-Qa'ida began to emerge. Theseearlier terrorists, in the words of RAND's Brian Jenkins, wanted "a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and nota lot of people dead." Their goals were usually tied to Marxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. The most lethal terrorists duringthis er a were those backed by states, no t those operating independently. In general, terrorism during this period wa s viewedas an important but not overriding policy concern.As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged an d grew in the 1990s, the focus slowly shifted. The 1993 attack on theWorld Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicals sought mass casualties on U.S. soil. Incontrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balked at destroying entire buildings, the new radicals wanted alot of people watching and a lot of people dead.Several government counter-terrorism officials recognized the danger al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S. policy changed unevenly atbest. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya an d Tanzania elevated the importance of terrorism in general an dal-Qa'ida in particular, but policy still lagged behind the immensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks todramatically change U.S. counter-terrorism policy. Even today, counter-terrorism policy is evolving, with important policydecisions being made almost daily.The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests an d review, briefings by keyindividuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those in a position to discuss the formulationand implementation of U.S. government policy in the counter-terrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the work ofthe Congressional September 11 Joint Inquiry as appropriate.

Key Questions

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Th e policy team will determine why the United States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida before September 11 and assessthe effectiveness of counterterrorism policy today. In the process, the team will tell the story of how counterterrorism policyevolved as the al-Qa'ida threat grew during both the Clinton and Bush administrations, examining such key events as the1993 World Trade C enter attack, the 1998 E mbassy bombings, and the 2000 attack on USS Cole.In particular, the team plans to answer the following questions:

Strategy. What was U.S. counterterrorism policy and how did it evolve, particularly after 1998? We re there gaps inthe strategy and, if so, how did policy m akers address them ? What factors hindered policy makers?

Instruments. What counterterrorism instruments did policy makers consider, use, or neglect an d why? How effectivewere instruments such as diplomacy, criminal prosecutions, renditions, fundraising restraints, disruptions, militaryoperations, covert action, and public diplomacy? What were the limits of various instruments? How supportive werekey countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan?

Safe Havens. Did the United States confront terrorist sanctuaries, such as Sudan and Afghanistan, properly? Were"permissive environments" in Europe and elsewhere addressed? Immediate Aftermath. How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks? Whywere several hard-hitting steps only taken after the attacks occurred? Current an d Future Policy. Does the United States have the right policies to fight al-Qa'ida an d other terrorist

groups today? What additional changes should be made, and who should make them?Note: The policy team will work closely with other teams in its research. For example, it will support the terrorist financingteam whe n assessing efforts to disrupt radicals' fundraising and assist the intelligence team in determining whether policymakers received sufficient information on al-Qa'ida's unusual nature to properly structure U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Proposed Division of LaborPerson ||Agency ||lssue LeadAlexis Albion ||CIA, DoD [[instrumentsScott Allan ||state, DoJ, CIA ||Safe HavensWarren Bass ||White House/NSC, State ||strategyDaniel Byman White House/NSC Acting team leader; will work with allteam members on their specific tasks.Bonnie Jenkins IJDoD, State ||lmmediate aftermathCharles Hill* ||StateKevin Scheid or other person withbudget experience OM B Assist with counterterrorism budgetissues

* Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progresses rather than assign aparticular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner after a new team leader is chosen.All team members will work on assessing current and future policy. All team members will work on at least one issue inaddition to the one for which they are responsible.

Proposed Briefings for the Comm issionersWe believe the Comm issioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy, U.S. policy toward

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al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today. Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Coun terterrorism, would also bewell-suited forhelping Commissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before Septemb er 11. General John Gordon, the National Director for Counterterrorism and the Deputy National Se curity Ad visor should

brief on the current coun terterrorism policy. Dr. Paul Pillar, currently the National Intelligence Office for the Near East andSouth Asia, is perhaps thegovernment's leading analyst of terrorism an d could provide an overview of the strengths an d weaknesses of

different counterterrorism instruments. Dr. Daniel Byman, who headed the "lookback" team on the 9-11 Inquiry, could offer a staff briefing onseveralaspects of the Congressional Joint Inquiry investigation, particularly covert action, foreign liaison, the use of military

force, and the ove rall counterterrorism strategy as it related to intelligence. These briefings w ould follow the JointInquiry's more narrow focus and would not reflect many of the broade r issues the Comm ission w ill examine.All four suggested briefers wo uld probably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least, private venue in order to provide themaximum detail.

Notional Document Review List

Much, if not all, of the material we will be asking for will be classified. Since we will be requesting policy documents, thefocus will be the Executive/NSC/OMB and probably the Departments of State and Justice as well. This list will grow andbecome more specific as the investigation proceeds.The documents we will be requesting include:

Presidential Decision Directives related to counterterrorism policy;

Records of discussions of counterterrorism policy, particularly among "Small Group" and "Counterterrorism SecurityGroup" members; NSC Memoranda related to counterterrorism policy; State Department records, from b oth Foggy Bo ttom and the field, related to counterterrorism policy; Tasking directed to the intelligence community related to counterterrorism, including tasking related to renditionsand

other covert action as well as collection and analysis; Tasking directed to the military related to counterterrorism, both with regard to instructions to prepare military options

and instructions to use military force; Military and intelligence agency briefings and memoranda related to military strikes and covert action against al-Qa'ida; Budget documents reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.

Many of the most interesting documents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Such documents will provideinsights into which options were chosen, w hich we re rejected, an d which we re off the table. Because of the sensitivity ofthese documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, which may in turn necessitate high-level interventions.

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To gain a deeper understanding of counter-terrorism, we also intend to focus on the activities of several U.S. missions, suchas Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany, to determine how they handled counterterrorism in practice. In addition toexamining directives from Washington, we also plan to look at cables an d instructions to and from ke y counterterrorismofficials at these posts. We will also interview key country team members as appropriate.

Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy AreaThe Congressional 9-11 Inquiry's work on policy issues focused on the intelligence-policy nexus rather than on thesoundness of the overall policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligence priorities, the dissemination of information, and the qualityof analysis with policy makers in some depth. The focus of its work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, withthe Inquiry having more success learning about the Clinton period.Policies toward foreign partners received at best incomplete attention. Fo r example, the Inquiry looked at how the policymakers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship with Country X affected intelligence gathering on Country X or onneighboring countries. However, this wa s only done with a few countries, and even there i t was not done systematically.Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did not try to judge whether other equities in a bilateral relationship were more or lessimportant than counterterrorism.The Inquiry did more extensive work on the use of military force and on covert action. On the former, however, it washampered by a lack of interviews an d access to many ke y individuals an d documents outside the strict purview ofintelligence.The Inquiry did not try to judge overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive way. Parts of the Inquiry's work lookedat issues such as warning the public, working with state an d local officials, an d emphasizing law enforcement over disruptionof terrorist groups. Many of these issues, however, involved the work of non-Intelligence Community agencies (e.g. theDepartment of Justice, the INS), which received less attention than they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basicpolicy analysis such as trying to evaluate the available instruments, the limits on those instruments, and political support inCongress.

Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. Policy

1. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings,2001), pp. 73-129. These pages in Dr. Pillar's book providean excellent overview of the instruments used to fight terrorism.2. Michael Elliott, "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" Time, August 4, 2002. This article provides a fairly detailed

history of various efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in the Clinton an d Bush administrations. Many of the quotes suggest thatformer Clinton administration officials were sources for the article.

3. Daniel Byman, "A Scorecard for the War on Terrorism," TheNational Interest, Summer 2003. This piece examineshow well the war on terrorism has gone since September 11.

Note: we also highly recommend as background Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (RandomHouse, 2002), pp. 219-349. These pages review (and defend) the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policy andexamine (and attack) the Bush administration's policy before September 11. This is the most detailed look at U.S.counterterrorism policy to emerge so far, though it remains incomplete.

Notional List of People to InterviewAs a first cut, the team would divide people to be interviewed into several categories: those with responsibilities for U.S.foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in context; those with counterterrorism responsibilities; those with valuablerelated responsibilities; personnel at key posts; an d outside experts. NS C staff will prove particularly important, as they oftendirected and coordinated the overall "war on terrorism" in both the Clinton and Bush administrations.

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The first list in particular includes the most prominent names in U.S. government. That may seem ambitious, but prioritiesand focus dobegin at the top - andoften end there. Inseveral cases (e.g., at OMB), it may be more appropriate to talk to adeputy or someone who focused more on counterterrorism.Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the working-level individuals, particularlythose involved in counterterrorism, and outside experts first whenever possible. Only when we know as much of the story aspossible will we interview the most senior individuals.

People Responsible for Overall Policy

1. President George W. Bush

2. President William J. Clinton

3. Vice President Richard Cheney4. Vice President Al Gore

5. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor

6. Samuel Berger, former National Security Advisor

7. Colin Powell, Secretary of State

8. Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State

9. Attorney General John Ashcroft

10. Former Attorney General Janet Reno

11. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

12. Secretary of Defense William Cohen

13. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh

14. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet

15. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State

16. Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Sectary of State

17. Sean O'Keefe, former Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget18. Josh Gotbaum, former Executive Director, Office of Management and Budget

19. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

20. Douglas Jay Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

21 . Steven Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICERG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Mem orial Com missionsSERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 3

NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008

BOX: 00005 FOLDER: 0008 TAB: 6 DOC ID: 31207086COPIES: 1 PAGES:

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:FOLDER TITLE: Counterterrorism Policy W orking PapersDOCUMENT DATE: DOCU MEN T TYPE: ListFROM:TO :SUBJECT: Counterterroism Specialists and Other Senior Working Level Officials.

Pages 7 and 8 of a nine page documents

This document has been w ithdrawn for the following reason(s):9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE


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16. Gregory Passic, Director17. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director

Outside Experts1. Bruce Hoffman, the RAN D Corporation2. Brian Jenkins, the RAN D Corporation3. Juliette Kayyem, Harvard University4. Richard Betts, Columbia University

9Draft -- UnclassifiedDraft -- Unclassified

Delete I Reply I Reply to All I Forward I Redirect I Blacklist I Message Source I Resume I Save as I Print Back to INBOXMove I Copy [This message to

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Initial Work Plan of the Coun terterrorism Policy Team Page 1 of 9

Proposed Work Plan for the Counterterrorism Policy TeamAlexis Albion

Scott AllanWarren Bass

Daniel Bym anBonnie Jenkins

Charles HillDraft: May 15, 2003

ContentsProject Overview

Key Questions


Initial Document Review L ist




Appendix Four: Proposed Briefings for the Commissioners

Project Over view: Counterterrorism PolicyThe policy team seeks to und erstand and assess the developmen t of U.S. Cou nterterrorism policy beforeSeptember 11, 2001, the policy changes in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and the nature of thepolicy today. These tasks will require reviewing overall policy priorities, identifying and evaluating thedifferent instrum ents used to fight terrorism, and determining how well senior policy m akers understoodthe threat from al-Qa'ida. Another integral part of the policy team's effort is examining U.S.relationships with key foreign partners and adversaries with regard to Counterterrorism. When

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Initial W ork Plan of the Counterterrorism Policy Team Page 2 of 9

appropriate, the team w ill distinguish between U .S. counterterrorism policy in general and U.S. effortsto fight al-Qa'ida in particular.The nature of terrorism d urin g the Cold War shaped U.S. counterterrorism policy when al-Qa'ida beganto emerge. These earlier terrorists, in the words of RAN D's Brian J enkins, w anted "a lot of peoplewatching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead." Their goals w ere usua lly tied toM arxist or ethno-nationalist agendas. T he mo st lethal terrorists durin g this era were those backed bystates, not those operating independen tly. In general, terrorism durin g this earlier period was viewed asan imp ortant but not overriding policy concern.As al-Qa'ida and affiliated Islamist groups emerged and grew in the 1990s, th e focus slowly shifted. The1993 attack on the World Trade Center marked a turning point. For the first time, Islamist radicalssought mass casualties on U .S. soil. In contrast to the terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who had balkedat destroying entire buildings , the new radicals w anted a lot of people w atchin g and a lot of people dead.Several government counterterrorism officials recognized the danger that al-Qa'ida posed, but U.S.policy changed unevenly at best. The 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniaelevated the importance of terrorism in general and al-Qa'ida in particular, bu t policy still lagged behindthe imm ensity of the threat. It took the September 11 attacks to dramatically change U.S.counterterrorism policy. Even today, counterterrorism policy is evolving, with important policydecisions being made almost daily.The policy team expects to follow a normal investigative regimen of document requests and review,briefings by key individuals both inside and outside government, and extensive interviews with those ina position to discuss the formulation and implementation of U.S. governm ent policy in thecounterterrorism arena. In addition, the team will draw on the w ork of the Congressional September 11Joint Inquiry as appropriate.

Key QuestionsThe policy team will seek to determine why the Un ited States did not successfully stop al-Qa'ida beforeSeptember 11 and assess the effectiveness of U.S. coun terterrorism policy today. In the process, theteam will tell the story of how counterterrorism policy evolved as the al-Qa'ida threat grew during boththe Clinton and Bu sh admin istrations, examinin g such key events as the 1993 World Trade Centerattack, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.In particular, the team plans to answ er the following q uestions:

Strategy. What was U.S. counterterrorism policy, and how did it evolve, particularly after 1998?W ere there gaps in the strategy, and if so, how did policy m akers address them ? Wha t factorshindered policy makers? Instruments. What cou nterterrorism instruments did policy makers consider, use, or neglectan d why ? H ow effective were instruments such as diplomacy, criminal prosec utions, renditions,fundraising restraints, disruptions, military operations, covert action, and public diplomacy? Whatwere the limits of various inst ruments? How supportive were ke y countries such as Saudi Arabiaand Pakistan? Safe Havens. Did the U nited States properly confront terrorist sanctuaries, such as Sudan andAfghanistan? Were "permissive environments" in Europe and elsewhere addressed? Immediate Aftermath. How did counterterrorism policy change in the aftermath of theSeptember 11 attacks? Why were several hard-hitting steps only taken after the attacks occurred?

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Initial W ork Plan of the Counterterrorism Policy Team Page 3 of 9

Current an d Future Policy. Does th e United States have th e right policies to fight al-Qa'ida an dother terrorist groups today? What additional changes should be made, and who should makethem?Note: The policy team will work closely with other teams in its research. For example, it will supportthe terrorist-financing team when assessing efforts to disrupt radicals' fun drais ing and assist theintelligence team in determining whether policy makers received sufficient informa tion on al-Qa'ida'sunusual natu re to properly structure U .S. counterterrorism efforts.


Person[Alexis Albion[Scott AllanWarren BassBonnie JenkinsDaniel Byman[Charles Hill*Kevin Scheid or other personwith budget experience

Agency**CIAState, DoJWhite House/NSC, O MBDoD

(^r")+

Issue Lead (all team memberswill play a role in at least twoissues)InstrumentsSafe HavensStrategyInstrumentsActing team leader; will workwith all team members on theirspecific tasks.Assist with counterterrorismbudget issues

*Senior advisor. It may be best to use him to review the research plan and work as it progressesrather than assign a particular task. Byman may be used in a similar manner after a new team leaderis chosen.**The agency designee is largely adm inistrative. H e or she will act as the prima ry interlocutor fordocument and interview requests and liaise with other teams working on that agency. All teammembers may interview at or work with documents from ke y agencies.

A ll team mem bers will work on the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the assessment ofcurrent policy, and the recommen dations for the future.A ll team mem bers will work on at least one issue in addition to the one for wh ich they are responsible.

Proposed Expert Briefings for the CommissionersWe believe the Commissioners would benefit from briefings about general U.S. counterterrorism policy,U.S. policy towa rd al-Qa'ida before September 11, and the status of U.S. policy today.

Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the former Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism, would helpCommissioners understand counterterrorism policy in context before September 11. Dr. Paul Pillar, cu rrently th e Nation al Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, isperhaps the government's leading analyst of terrorism an d could provide an overview of thestrengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism instruments. Dr. Daniel Byman, who headed th e "lookback" team on the 9-11 Inqu iry, could offer a staff

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briefing on several aspects of the Congressional Jo int Inquiry investigation , particularly covertaction, foreign liaison, the use of military force, and overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy as itrelated to intelligence. These briefings would follow the Joint Inquiry's more narrow focus andwould not reflect many of the broader issues the Comm ission will exam ine.All three suggested briefers would prob ably prefer to brief in a classified or, at least, private ven ue inorder to provide the maximum detail.

Notional Document Review ListM uch, if not all, of the material we w ill be asking for w ill be cla ssified. Since we w ill be requestingpolicy docum ents, the focus will be the Executive/NSC/OM B, and probably the Departments of Stateand Justice as well. This list will grow and become more specific as the investigation proceeds. Foralmost all categories of docum ents, we w ill focus our requests on the period after January 1998.The documents we will be requesting include:

Presidential Decision Directives and Nation al Security Presidential Directives related tocounterterrorism policy; Records of discussions of counterterrorism policy, particularly among "Small Group" and"Counterterrorism Security Group" members; NSCtaskings andrequests to agencies related to counterterrorism policy; Records of the Transnational Threats Directorate at the National Security Council. This wouldinclude briefing memos, meeting notes, and perhaps selected e-mails related to key events; State Department records, from both Foggy Bottom and the field, related to counterterrorismpolicy. The initial focus will be on documents from the Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism'sOffice, the deliberations of senior State Department officials, and selected documents related topolicy toward key states in the war on terrorism; Tasking directed to the intelligence com mun ity related to counterterrorism, includ ing taskingrelated to renditions and other covert action, as w ell as intelligence collection and an alysis; The Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key commands' (CENTCOM, SOCOM)documen ts related to counterterrorism, particularly w ith regard to instruction s to prepare militaryoptions and instructions to use force; Military and intelligence agency briefings and memoranda related to military strikes and covertaction against al-Qa'ida; an d Selected bu dget docu men ts reflecting resources applied to counterterrorism.

Many of the most interesting docum ents for the purposes of our effort will be predecisional. Suchdocuments will provide insights into which options were chosen, which were rejected, and which wereoff the table. Because of the sensitivity of these documents, it may prove difficult to acquire them, whichmay in turn necessitate high-level interventions.To gain a deeper und erstan ding of counterterrorism, w e also intend to focus on the activities of severalU.S. missions, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany, to determine how they handledcounterterrorism in practice. In addition to exa min ing directives from Wa shington, we also plan to lookat cables and instructio ns to and from key coun terterrorism officials at these posts. We w ill also

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Initial Wo rk Plan of the Coun terterrorism Policy Team Page 5 of 9

interview key country team members as appropriate.Appendix One: Congressional Joint Inquiry Activity in the Policy Area

The Congressional 9-11 Inquiry's work on policy issues focused on the intelligence-policy nexu s, ratherthan on the soundness of the overall counterterrorism policy. The Inquiry discussed intelligencepriorities, the dissemination of info rma tion, and the quality of analysis w ith policy makers in somedepth. The focus of its work was on the late Clinton-early Bush administrations, with th e Inquiry havingmore success learning about the Clinton period.Policies toward foreign partners received, at best, incomplete attention. For example, the Inquiry lookedat how the policy makers' desire for a strong bilateral relationship w ith Coun try X affected intelligencegathering on Country X or on neighboring countries. However, this w as only done with a few countries,an d even there it was not done systematically. Moreover, the Inquiry deliberately did n ot try to judgewhether other equities in a bilateral relationship were m ore or less important than counterterrorism.The Inquiry did more extensive w ork on the use of military force an d covert action. On the former,however, it was hampered by a lack of interviews and access to many key individuals and documentsoutside the strict purv iew of intelligence.The Inquiry did not try to judg e overall counterterrorism policy in any comprehensive wa y. Parts of theInquiry's wo rk looked at issues such as warnin g the public, wo rking w ith state and local officials, andemphasizing law enforcement over the disruption of terrorist groups. Man y of these issues, how ever,involved the wo rk of non-Intelligence Com mu nity agencies (e.g. the Department of Justice, the INS),which received less attention tha n they deserved. In addition, the Inquiry did not do basic po licy analysissuch as trying to evaluate the available instrum ents, the limits on those instrum ents, and political supportin Congress.

Suggested Readings for the Commissioners on Terrorism and U.S. Policy1. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2001), pp. 73-129. These pagesprovide an excellent overview of the strengths and w eaknesses of the instrumen ts that the Un ited

States has used to fight terrorism.2. M ichael Elliott, "Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?" Time, August 4, 2002. This article providesa fairly detailed history of efforts to fight al-Qa'ida in the Clinton an d Bu sh administrations. Man yof the quotes suggest that former Clinton administration officials were sources for the article.3. Daniel Byman, "Scoring the War on Terrorism," The National Interest, Summer 2003. This pieceexamines how w ell the war on terrorism has gone since September 11.4. Daniel Benjamin an d Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 219-349. These pages review (and defend) the Clinton adm inistration's counterterrorism policy andexamine (and attack) the Bush administration's policy before September 11. This is the mostdetailed look at U.S. counterterrorism policy to emerge so far , though it rema ins incom plete.

Notional List of People to InterviewAs a first cut, the team wo uld divide people to be interviewed into several categories: those w ithresponsibilities for U.S. foreign policy who can place counterterrorism in context; those withcounterterrorism responsibilities; those w ith valuable related responsibilities; personnel at key po sts; andoutside experts. NSC staff will prove particularly important, as they often directed and coordinatedoverall U.S. efforts against terrorism in both the Clinton and Bush administrations.

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The first list, in particular, includes the most prominent names in the U.S. government. That may seemambitious, but priorities an d focus do begin at the topand often en d there. In several cases (e.g., atOMB), it may be m ore approp riate to talk to a deputy or someone who focused more oncounterterrorism.Given the prominence of several of the people on this list, we favor interviewing the working-levelindividuals (particularly those involved in counterterrorism) and outside experts first wheneverpossible. Only when we know as much of the story as possible will we interview the most seniorindividuals.People Responsible for Overall Policy

1. President George W. Bush2. Former President William J. Clinton3. Vice President Richard Cheney4. Former Vice President Al Gore5. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor6. Samu el Berger, former National Security Advisor7. Colin Powell, Secretary of State8. M adeleine Albright, former Secretary of State9. Attorney General John Ashcroft

10. Former Attorney General Janet Reno11 . Secretary of Defense Donald Rum sfeld12. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen13. FBI Director Robert Mu eller III14. Former FB I Director Louis Freeh15. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet16. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State17. Strobe Talbott, form er Deputy Secretary of State18. Sean O'Keefe, forme r Depu ty Director, Office of Mana gement and Budget19. Josh Gotbaum , form er Executive Director, Office of Management an d Budget20. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Initial W ork Plan of the Counter-terrorism Policy Team Page 7 of 9

21. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense fo r Policy22. Steven Ca m bone, Principal Depu ty Un der Secretary of Defense fo r Policy23. Steve Had ley, De puty National Security Advisor24. James Steinberg, former Deputy National Security Advisor25. Lt. General Donald Kerrick, former Deputy National Security Advisor

Counterterrorism Specialists and Other Senior Working Level Officials with Duties Related toCounterterrorism

1. Richard Clarke, former National C oordinator for Counterterrorism2. Ambassador Cofer Black, Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) and former CTCDirector3. Ambassador Francis Taylor, former S/CT4. Am bassador Michael Sheehan, former S/CT5. Evelyn Lieberman, former Under Secretary fo r Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs6. Am bassador Tom Pickering, senior State D epartment official in several administrations7. Ambassador Chris Ross8. General (ret.) W ayne D owning, form er Coordinator fo r Counterterrorism9. General John Gordon, Coordinator fo r Counterterrorism

10. Robert C. Doheny, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict(mission: overall supervision of SOLIC)11. Brian Sheridan, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC (around 1999)12. H. Allen Holmes, form er Assistant Secretary of Defense fo r SOLIC13. General Tom m y Franks, CINCCENT since Jun e 200014. General (ret.) An thony Zinni, form er CINC CEN T15. Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for Southern District of New York16. Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, former Asst. Secretary of State, South Asia17. Ambassador Mark Parris, form er Asst. Secretary of State, Near East18. Am bassador William B urn s, Asst. Secretary of State, Near East19. Ambassador Martin Indyk, Asst. Secretary of State, Near East

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Initial Work Plan of the Counterterrorism Policy Team Page 8 of 9

20. Bruce Riedel, former Senior NSC Director for the Middle East21 . Stephen Jennings, former Asst Section Chief, Intl Terrorism Unit at FBI22. Thomas Knowles, former member of Intl Relations Branch at FBI23. Michael Rolince, former Section Chief at InternationalTerrorism Un i t at FBI24. Barry Savin, Counterterrorism Section Chief in DoJ's Criminal Division25. James Reynolds, former Chief of Terrorism an d Violent Crimes section at DoJ

Key Country Team Members from Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan(1998-2001)

1. Ambassador2. 9/11 Closed by Statute3. Deputy Chief of Mission4. Legal Attache (FBI)5. Other U.S. officials as appropriate6. Foreign Ambassador to the United States

Select Additional NSC Staff1. Susan Rice, former Director2. Randy Beers, former Director3. Lee Wolosky, former Director (CFR international affairs fellow)4. William Wechsler, former Director5. Fred Rosa, former Director (from Coast Guard)6. Mary McCarthy, former Director7. Daniel Benjamin, former Director8. Steven Simon, former Senior Director9. Roger Cressey, former Director

10. Michael Fenzel, former Director11. Gayle Smith, former Senior Director (Africa)

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12. Jeffrey Jone s, Senior Director13 . William McR aven, Director14. Lisa Gordon-H agerty, Director (from DOE)15. Joseph (Jod y) M yers, Director16. Gregory Passic, Director17. Nicholas Rasm ussen, Director8

Draft-UnclassifiedDraft Unclassified

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Documents

T3 B15 Counter Terrorism Policy Fdr- 3 Draft Team 3 Workplans 987