TEACHER INCENTIVES AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED PROGRAM IN KENYA

Joost de LaatMichael KremerChristel Vermeersch

WHAT KIND OF TEACHER INCENTIVES?

Narrow incentives easy to game Glewwe et al. (2003), Lavy (2004), Jacob and

Levitt (2003)

Broader incentives using community information Local communities may have broader

information on teacher performance Criteria may be harder to game Repeated interactions and commitment

problems.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN KENYAN SCHOOLS: SCHOOL COMMITTEES

Conformation: mandated by law 15 members: 9 elected parent representatives, 2 District

Education Board delegates, 3 sponsors, head teacher. Elected yearly by parent assembly

Roles: oversee disbursement of capitation grants design & implementation of school development plans communicate with local education office about any issues Suggesting promotions and transfer of teachers to MoE

officials, no hiring

PROGRAM GOALS AND CONTENT

Improving accountability: stronger collaboration between school, school committee, and local educational authorities

Incentives for teachers: prizes to be assigned by the school committee, based on broad criteria (50% of a month salary)

Knowledge of financial procedures & oversight: training of school committee

IDENTIFICATION AND DATA

Randomized evaluation: 34 treatment, 34 comparison schools

Data: Voting behavior for prize allocation Composition of school committee School committee activities Teacher and student attendance Classroom activities Student scores on national exam

PRIZE ALLOCATION

Criteria varied over the years Year 2:

Important: male, senior teachers and relatives/neighbors of committee members

Not important: Good attendance SC did not rate males and relatives/neighbors

higher in terms of quality Year 3:

Important: good attendance Not important: male and relative/neighbor of SC

members

RESULTS, OVERALL

Teacher attendance: no effect overall (from 87% level) negative impact on types “wrongfully” favored

Teacher turnover: No overall effect Classroom observations:

Some increase in idle time Increase in homework allocation

Pupil attendance: no effect Test scores: no effect

RESULTS IN FINAL YEAR ONLY

School committees more likely to meet with parents

School committees more likely to discuss teaching matters with teachers

COMPOSITION OF THE SCHOOL COMMITTEE

Baseline: 82% male, Avg. 49 years old Avg <8 years of education 85% peasant farmers

Program impact: No change in turnover Increase in education levels (0.58 years) Increase in average age (1.54 years) No changes in other characteristics

CONCLUSIONS

Community based evaluation is not a panacea

Overall: little to no impact Some perverse incentives, especially at the

beginning Took time for positive changes to happen Related to the yearly SC election cycle? No enough time to evaluate long term effect