System Design Concept for Safe Return to Port (SRtP

Doc. No. Technical Documentation Revision

F-05784-00110-DOC 1.9

System Design Concept for Safe Return to Port (SRtP) regulations

Hoppe Valve Remote Control System (VRCS) with bus-controlled valves type HOBUS-V

Ring Supply Unit RSU

Ring Supply Unit RSU

Electro-Hydraulic VRCS (bus-controlled)

HOMIP – Hoppe embedded iPC for system control

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System Design Concept HOBUS-V (VRCS) according SRtP Issue Date 30.07.2021


F-05784-00110-DOC 1.9

Table of Content

1 General ............................................................................................................................................... 4

1.1 System design philosophy ............................................................................................................ 4

1.2 Cabinet design and location ......................................................................................................... 5

1.3 Control philosophy ........................................................................................................................ 5

1.4 Redundancy of power feeding for VRCS cabinets ........................................................................ 5

1.5 Valve loop architecture ................................................................................................................. 5

1.6 Ring Supply Units (RSU) .............................................................................................................. 6

1.7 Bus-coupler design ....................................................................................................................... 6

1.8 Actuator design ............................................................................................................................ 6

1.9 Feature summary ......................................................................................................................... 7

2 VRCS system layout ........................................................................................................................... 8

2.1 System layout details ................................................................................................................... 9

3 System operating levels (top to down) ............................................................................................... 11

4 Failure routines for various situations ................................................................................................ 12

4.1 Loop failures ............................................................................................................................... 12

4.2 Valve failures .............................................................................................................................. 14

4.3 Loss of compartment .................................................................................................................. 17

4.4 Loss of VRCS AFT cabinet ......................................................................................................... 18

4.5 Loss of VRCS FWD cabinet ....................................................................................................... 19

4.6 IAMCS interface failure routines depending on casualty levels ................................................... 20

4.7 VRCS failure routines for power supply ...................................................................................... 21



F-05784-00110-DOC 4/21 1.9

1 General

Increasing the vessels robustness, fault tolerance and its ability to safely return unsupported back to port –

that are the most important intentions behind the technical concepts for the so called “Safe Return to Port

(SRtP)” regulations.

Generally stated by SOLAS II-1/Reg. 8-1, SOLAS II-2/Reg. 21 and SOLAS II-2/Reg. 22, the primary

objective of the SRtP regulations is to meet the principle that “a ship is its own best lifeboat” and to ensure

that the required systems are designed and arranged under the aspects of adequate redundancy and

segregation. Thus, any fire or flooding casualty will only have very limited effects and the required systems

are capable of being restored and remain operational until a safe port can be reached under the vessels

own power. During the SRtP voyage, all persons onboard shall be accommodated in safe areas where

health and safety services are available.

Therefore, the SRtP regulations defines certain systems as being “essential systems” to be available in

order to ensure propulsion, manoeuvrability and to maintain safety in such areas onboard that are not

affected by a flooding or fire casualty.

The Safe Return to Port (SRtP) regulations require a multi-disciplinary work approach and each

stakeholder shall observe the functional requirements of the various systems which are supposed to remain

operational in a threshold after a casualty.

With the design of our HOPPE bus-controlled valve control system HOBUS-V, we comply with the

requirements of the SRtP regulations under the aspects of system security, system availability and system

recoverability after a casualty.

1.1 System design philosophy

The remotely operated HOPPE bus-controlled valve control system is designed in a ring topology,

exclusively for remote controlled valves. The advantages of a ring topology, where the source signal

circulates in a loop until the intended valve-actuator combination has been detected, are of high reliability

and reduced cabling and installation effort.

This solution is especially useful in the event of a malfunction, due to the fact, that no components from

other systems are integrated in this concept. Hence, a problem with the remote bus-controlled valve control

system does not affect e.g. level monitoring sensors for tanks or draft. In this way, the independence of the

systems is guaranteed in the event of a fault.



F-05784-00110-DOC 5/21 1.9

1.2 Cabinet design and location

The remotely operated HOPPE bus-controlled valve control system consists of a minimum of two valve

control cabinets which are located in safe compartments above the waterline. The design relates to the

SOLAS II-2/Reg. 3 definitions for “Main Vertical Zones (MVZ)”, whereas these are “those sections into

which the hull, superstructure, and deckhouses are divided by “A” class divisions, the mean length and width

of which on any deck does not in general exceed 40m”.

The first valve remote control cabinet is located in the aft main vertical zone of the vessel. The second valve

remote control cabinet is located in the forward main vertical zone of the vessel. If there are more than two

main vertical zones, more valve remote control cabinets are arranged, so that there is a valve remote control

cabinet in each main vertical zone.

1.3 Control philosophy

Each valve remote control cabinet is equipped with a HOMIP (HOPPE embedded iPC for system control).

The HOMIP is a LINUX-based embedded iPC, acting as a controller and interface to the vessels IAMCS. If

the interface to the IAMCS fails, the HOMIP acts as an emergency controller to operate the valves and keep

the remote control valve system operational.

The application software installed on the HOMIP is protected against any manipulation by third parties.

Changes to the software are only possible by qualified personnel. Parameter settings and update routines

are password protected.

Application software as well as system parameter settings are stored in a safe databases. If the system

needs to be restored, the small size of the application software and the parameter files means that they can

also be sent via vessels e-mail.

1.4 Redundancy of power feeding for VRCS cabinets

The HOBUS-V VRCS contains a 3~230Vac power feeding from the Main Switch Board (MSB) and the

Emergency Switch Board (ESB) including switch over from MSB to ESB. The status of which power feeding

is active is shown by LEDs in the front door of each VRCS cabinet.

Note: Two VRCS cabinets via two main vertical zones need synchronous power feeding for both cabinets.

1.5 Valve loop architecture

The HOBUS-V VRCS is designed in a way of a loop architecture. This architecture ensures the system

availability in the event of a fault due to a failure of a bus controller or in the event of a cable damage in the

loop. An interrupted valve loop will be detected by the system and triggers an “open loop” alarm.



F-05784-00110-DOC 6/21 1.9

1.6 Ring Supply Units (RSU)

The HOBUS-V VRCS provides operational safety through optimized power and bus management with so

called Ring Supply Units (RSU). The RSU serves as a supply terminal and bus head for the

intelligent valve control. By means of Ring Supply Units (RSU), the valve bus loop will be initialized with

reduced current until it is completely initialized.

1.7 Bus-coupler design

The HOBUS-V VRCS bus coupler offers a function to enable on-site control of the valve-actuator

combination: Status LEDs provide local indication of the valve’s status, and by holding a magnet in front of

these LEDs, the valve can be controlled manually on-site. This local control function is the last operational

stage before using the portable hand pump for local valve control.

The LEDs indicate the following valve status:

Blue: local control via magnet.

Blue (blinking): valve bus loop initialisation.

Yellow: Valve is closed.

Yellow (blinking): Valve is closing.

Green: Valve is open.

Green (blinking): Valve is opening.

Red (blinking): Valve failure.

1.8 Actuator design

The low-maintenance electrohydraulic actuators are characterized by their robust and compact design.

The actuators are available as 90°-rotating actuators or as linear actuators. All actuators offer a mechanical

position indicator on-site as well as connections for a portable hand pump. The compact design allows the

function to be maintained in an event of temporary flooding. The modular actuator design allows swift

replacement of components, if necessary. Wall mounted remote control stations are optionally available.



F-05784-00110-DOC 7/21 1.9

1.9 Feature summary

To summarize all features of our HOBUS-V Valve remote Control system (VRCS) once again:

VRCS Cabinets located in safe compartments above the water line.

Redundancy of power supply for VRCS cabinets with power supply from Main Switch Board

(MSB) and Emergency Switch Board (ESB), including LED status

Redundancy of VRCS control containing two HOMIP (HOPPE embedded iPC for system control),

with HOMIP controllers and I/O modules supported by an internal UPS

Loop Architecture ensuring system availability in failure events

Operational safety by optimized power and bus management, including open loop detection

BUS Coupler Design providing local operation possibilities

Actuator design of compact electro-hydraulic bus-controlled actuators, designed with connectors

for manual casualty cases, allowing functional integrity during temporary flooding and swift

replacement



F-05784-00110-DOC 8/21 1.9

2 VRCS system layout

E M Station AFT E M Station FWD

VRCS Cabinet VRCS Cabinet

-----------------------Waterline

Modbus RS-485 or Modbus TCP Modbus RS-485 or Modbus TCP

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

Ethernet CAT7 max. 100mtr.

CAN BUS

Loop1 Loop2 Loop3 Loop4 Loop5 Loop6

Ship Automation IAMCS

General system layout



F-05784-00110-DOC 9/21 1.9

2.1 System layout details

IAMCS = Integrated Alarm Monitoring and Control System

3~230VacMSB

3~230VacESB

3~230VacMSB

3~230VacESB

CAT7 max.100mtr.4×2×0,5 orFibre optic >100mtr.Internal communication

10x2x0,75CAN Bus Communication

4x2x0,75Modbus RS-485+Pot.free contactorCAT7 max. 100mtr.4x2x0,5Modbus TCP+1x2x0,75Pot. Free contact

VRCS Cabinet AFT

VRCS Cabinet FWD

4x2x0,75Modbus RS-485+Pot.free contactorCAT7 max. 100mtr.4x2x0,5Modbus TCP+1x2x0,75Pot. Free contact

Cabinet connections



F-05784-00110-DOC 10/21 1.9

RSU 1 A

RSU 2 A

RSU 7 A

RSU 3 A

RSU 4 A

RSU 5 A

RSU 6 A

RSU 7 B

RSU 6 B

RSU 1 B

RSU 5 B

RSU 4 B

RSU 3 B

RSU 2 B

VRCS Cabinet

AFT

VRCS Cabinet

FWD

Loop 6 Qty. of valves max. 30







Valve connections



F-05784-00110-DOC 11/21 1.9

3 System operating levels (top to down)

The HOBUS-V VRCS provides several stages of operating levels in case of casualties.

Level Casualty Description of functionality level

1 IAMCS: Normal operation

Control and monitoring of VRCS via ships Integrated Alarm, Monitoring and Control System (IAMCS).

2 IAMCS: Interface 1 Fail Control and monitoring of VRCS with IAMCS via 2nd HOMIP (Hoppe Monitor Interact Process) still possible.

3 IAMCS: Interface 2 Fail Control and monitoring of VRCS with IAMCS via 1st HOMIP (Hoppe Monitor Interact Process) still possible.

4 IAMCS: Interface 1&2 Fail

Control and monitoring of VRCS via 1st and 2nd HOMIP (Hoppe Monitor Interact Process) still possible.

5 HOMIP 1&2: Fail Local operation of depending actuator via magnet at bus controller possible.

6 Total loss of power or interfaces

Local operation of depending actuator via hand pump (fixed or portable) possible.



F-05784-00110-DOC 12/21 1.9

4 Failure routines for various situations

4.1 Loop failures



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS


Alarm: Modul RSU open loop .

VRCS: Operational.Situation: Defective cable in VRCS loop.

Check loop for defective cable!

VRCS: Transition from ring operation

to line operation.


One defective cable connection in a loop



F-05784-00110-DOC 13/21 1.9



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS 120 Ohm


Alarm: Modul RSU open loop & Valve

xxx.xxx BUS fail.

VRCS: Operational, except the

depending valves in the defective

segment of the loop. These valves

are only operational by portable hand

pump.

Situation: Defective cable segment in

VRCS loop.

Check loop for defective cable /

segment!


to line operation.


Several defective cables/segment in a loop



F-05784-00110-DOC 14/21 1.9

4.2 Valve failures



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

1x Ethernet CAT7 max. 100mtr.

1x CAN BUS 120 Ohm


Alarm: Modul RSU open loop & Valve

xxx.xxx BUS fail.


depending valve in the loop. This Valve is only operational by portable hand

pump.

Situation: One defective valve BUS

coupler in VRCS loop.

Check BUS coupler of depending valve!


to line operation.


One defective valve bus coupler within a loop



F-05784-00110-DOC 15/21 1.9



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS


Alarm: Modul RSU open loop & Valves

xxx.xxx BUS fail.


depending valves in the loop. These valves are only operational by portable hand

pump.

Situation: Two or more defective

valve BUS coupler in VRCS loop.



to line operation.


Several defective valve bus couplers within a loop



F-05784-00110-DOC 16/21 1.9



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS



xxx.xxx BUS fail.

VRCS: Operational, except the enclosed

valves within the loop. These valves

are only operational by portable hand

pump.

Situation: Two or more defective

valve BUS coupler in VRCS loop.



to line operation.


Defective valve bus couplers at loop termination



F-05784-00110-DOC 17/21 1.9

4.3 Loss of compartment



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS



xxx.xxx BUS fail.


depending valves in the loop of the compartments.

Situation: One or more

compartments loss.

Check of loops in the whole compartment!


to line operation, cut off of the

depending loop.


Failure due to loss of compartment



F-05784-00110-DOC 18/21 1.9

4.4 Loss of VRCS AFT cabinet



-----------------------Waterline


MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS


Alarm: Moduls RSU open loop & VRCS AFT connect fail .

VRCS: Operational, by the VRCS FWD

cabinet.

Situation: VRCS AFT cabinet loss.

Check VRCS AFT cabinet!


to line operation.


Failure due to loss of VRCS AFT cabinet



F-05784-00110-DOC 19/21 1.9

4.5 Loss of VRCS FWD cabinet



-----------------------Waterline

Modbus RS-485 or Modbus TCP Modbus RS-485or Modbus TCP

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC

MSB 3~230VAC

ESB 3~230VAC


CAN BUS


Alarm: Moduls RSU open loop & VRCS FWD connect fail .

VRCS: Operational, by the VRCS AFT

cabinet.

Situation: VRCS FWD cabinet loss.

Check VRCS FWD cabinet!


to line operation.


Failure due to loss of VRCS FWD cabinet



F-05784-00110-DOC 20/21 1.9

4.6 IAMCS interface failure routines depending on casualty levels

The HOBUS-V VRCS provides several stages of operating levels in case of casualties.

1. IAMCS: Normal Operation

VRCS: Interface 1: HOMIP 1: Control and Monitoring


VRCS: Operational by IAMCS

No act ion required

Casualty Level 1

2. IAMCS: Interface 1: Fail

VRCS: Interface 1: HOMIP 1: Alarm IAMCS connect fail



Check Interface HOMIP 1 to IAMCS

Casualty Level 2

3. IAMCS: Interface 2: Fail




Check Interface HOMIP 2 to IAMCS

Casualty Level 3

4. IAMCS: Interface 1&2: Fail



VRCS: Operational by HOMIP 1&2

Check Interface HOMIP 1&2 to IAMCS

Casualty Level 4



F-05784-00110-DOC 21/21 1.9

5. IAMCS: Interface 1&2: Fail

VRCS: Interface 1: FailHOMIP 1: Out of order

VRCS: Interface 2: Fail HOMIP 2: Out of order

VRCS: Actuator operational by magnet at bus

controller

Check Interface HOMIP 1&2 and

IAMCS

Casualty Level 5

6. IAMCS: Interface 1&2: Loss

Power: Loss

VRCS: Interface 1: LossHOMIP 1: LossTotal power: Loss

VRCS: Interface 2: Loss HOMIP 2: LossTotal power: Loss

VRCS: Actuator operational directly

by handpump

Total system check required!

Casualty Level 6

4.7 VRCS failure routines for power supply

The HOBUS-V VRCS provides MSB and ESB power supply including switch over.

No action required

Alarm: MSB Power Fail

VRCS: Operational

1. MSB & ESB Power supply: OK

2. MSB power supply: Fail

Check MSB power supply

3: ESB power supply: Fail

Alarm: ESB Power Fail

VRCS: OperationalCheck ESB power

supply

VRCS: Switch over to ESB power supply

LED: ESB Power: ON LED: MSB Power: OFF

VRCS: Switch over to MSB power

supply

LED: ESB Power: OFF LED: MSB Power: ON

4. MSB & ESB power supply: Fail

LED: ESB Power: OFF LED: MSB Power: OFF

VRCS: Not Operational

Check MSB & ESB power supply

VRCS: Operational

VRCS Power Supply Failure

Documents

System Design Concept for Safe Return to Port (SRtP