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System Architecture of Detector Control and Safety for System Architecture of Detector Control and Safety for the ATLAS Inner Detector Upgradethe ATLAS Inner Detector Upgrade
Didier Ferrère, DPNC Université de Genève
Susanne Kersten, Wuppertal University
2D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
New Inner Detector for ATLAS UpgradeNew Inner Detector for ATLAS Upgrade
Under consideration: • Current silicon tracker is expected to smoothly die with an integrated luminosity (< 600 fb-1) : Radiation damages and Inefficiencies at high rate. • A new ID is foreseen at phase 2 Upgrade of the machine and for data taking in ~2020• The electrical services between the counting rooms and the cavern remain a constraint for the new detector• All the hardware for the FE electronics, the DAQ, the power supply and the DCS will have to be renewed• The cooling is one of the critical challenges for the future silicon tracker with requested operational temperature down to -40°C• All the development has to fit in the framework of the existing ATLAS DAQ, DCS, Trigger with some restrictions under study
One ID layout under consideration
4 pixel layers3 Short-strip layers2 Long-strip layers
3D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
ATLAS Detector Control System to be UpdatedATLAS Detector Control System to be Updated
Pixel & Strip to be renewed
Cooling and ID environment to
be renewed
The new DCS structure has to fit in the ATLAS GCS
4D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
DCS MotivationsDCS Motivations
The DCS has to be defined as early as possible such it is integrated into the readout architecture together with the powering and the services.
Towards the specifications:• Define the needs Use cases (close to current tracker)• The detector safety and the interlock to be considered as the 1st requirement • Monitoring sources to be well evaluated• Minimize as much as possible the material and the services • Optimize the development effort • Limit access installation in the cavern DCS hardware in the counting room• Try to define a common Pixel and Strip DCS architecture if possible • Search for adequate sensors: Humidity, others?• Identify all the topics where early resources may be necessary• Define the prototypes for DCS investigations like power monitoring and control
Up to 180 kW to control and monitor during the operation in term of power, cooling, and environment across the all ID.
5D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Comments:• SMC is located at the stave end and steer 24 hybrids. In total and per stave there are 2 SMCs: one per side. • SMC (Super Module Controller) is a hybrid board which integrates the opto, the GBT, the DCS and some power regulations • 1 or 2 MCC (Module Controller Chip) steer the data of the 20 chips on a hybrid• The service bus is running below the Si-wafers and the front and back detector bias are separated.•There are 2 SMCs par Stave/SM electrically separated from the top and bottom side
Short Strip Barrel Stave LayoutShort Strip Barrel Stave Layout
Service bus
TTC, Data & DCS fibers
PS cable
DCS env. IN
Cooling In
Opto
GBT
DCSinterlock
SMC Hybrid
Module #1 Module #2 Module #12
Cooling Out
IPBeam Axis* the GBT (Giga Bit Transmission) is a chip for data transmission developed by the CERN PH-ESE group
MCC MCC MCC MCC MCC MCC
6D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Pixel Barrel Stave LayoutPixel Barrel Stave Layout
FE FEFE FE
GBT*DCS
FE FEFE FE
FE FEFE FE
FE FEFE FE
FE FEFE FE
FE FEFE FE
FE FEFE FE
FE FEFE FE
Module 0Module 7
End of Stave Card
half stave
Beam Axis
2 single sided staves sandwiched together back to back
GBT* DCS
Comments:• The construction of the staves varies between the different layers 24 - 32 modules/stave
There are 4 Front End chips/detector module• The DCS relevant building blocks are half stave/disk sector: up to 16 modules + 1 EoS card • For both Pixel and strip two options are considered for the powering:
- Serial powering- Parallel powering with 2 DC-DC stages
IP* the GBT (Giga Bit Transmission) is a chip for data transmission developed by the CERN PH-ESE group
7D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
ID Upgrade DCS ArchitectureID Upgrade DCS Architecture
ID DCS
Strip DCS Pixel DCS ID DCS Gen? Cool DCS
FE DCS DCS Chip
Elect. Opto at PS
Lines from staves to
counting room
DCS split at BOC/ROD
DCS Data with RO Data
DCS at PS
Not defined yet!Not defined yet!
‘Cooling Interlock’ ‘Strip Module Interlock’
‘SMC Interlock’@ « BBIM » @ « SMC »
@ PS card
@ « BBIM »
or
Pixel Stave
Elect.
‘Pixel Module Interlock’
@ « BBIM »
DCS Chip
Strip Stave Power SupplyEnv DCS
Elect.
Env DCS
SPI or I2C
FE DCS
DCS Data with RO Data
Opto
Lines from staves to
counting room
8D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Strip Architecture OverviewStrip Architecture Overview
Stave
RH
SCTDAQ
PS Crate
Cooling Temp
FE DCS
Hybrid Temp
Hybrid Power
EoS Card
Ibox Elmb
CAN Bus
CAN BusGlobal Interlock
ROD
BOC
5 GB/s optical linkTTC - DCS
Channel Interlock
LAN
Type 2 Type4 cables
Env. Structure
DetectorPS Type 2 Type 4 cables
SCTDCS
Elmb
CAN Bus
SPI bus or LVDS lines daisy chain
Option 2 Option 1/3
BBIM
RH
NTC
Matrix
9D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Pixel Architecture OverviewPixel Architecture Overview
Distance frominteraction point [m]
Control room
~100
DCS Master
Power SuppliesPixel DCSPixel DAQ
Readout Crate
diagnostics
InterlockCircuit
EoSController
Opto Board
symmetric to both sides
cable bundle from half stave
DCSDCS Environment
safetyControl –feedback
DCS
End of Stave Card
half staveshalf staves half staveshalf staves
~50
Detector volume
10D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Safety Interlock and Monitoring Sources Safety Interlock and Monitoring Sources
Strip Pixel
Cooling Interlock
NTCs / Stave 2 -
JustificationProtection against cooling
failure-
ActionPower cut of the
corresponding LV & HV stave-
Module Interlock
NTCs / Stave 48 16 4 lines
JustificationProtection against any heat excess. Reasons: Runaway,
Cooling failure, contact problem
Protection against any heat excess. Reasons: Cooling failure, runaway, contact
problem
ActionEither Disable LV locally or at
power supply
Power cut of the corresponding LV & HV
stave
Stave Card Interlock
NTCs / Stave 2 1
JustificationProtection against excess
heating of EoS CardProtection against excess
heating of EoS Card
ActionDisable the LV power on all
the staveDisable the LV power on all
the stave
Monitoring sources: NTCs, RH sensors, power supplies, FE temp & power.
11D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Interlock and Monitoring of Module NTCs forInterlock and Monitoring of Module NTCs forStripStrip
NTC NTC NTC
RESISTORS
ADC
REF
+V
+V
GND
GND
GND
NTC
REGISTERTRIPLE VOTE LOGIC
THRESHOLD from DAC with Triple vote logic
GND GND
Stave side – 24 hybrids
IC on SMC HYBRID
CLEAR
D F/F
+
-
OVER HEAT
OR
INTERLOCK
1 ADC 12bitsmultiplexed
1 interlock signal/ half stave
REF
Enable DAC with Triple vote logic
Asic either with GBT SCA or separated
GBTE-port?
1 2 3 23 or 24
Op
tion
3
Interlock steered on the stave card
12D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
LV Mod PS BotLV Mod PS Bot
HV PS Bot X 9-12HV PS Bot X 9-12
HV PS Top X 9-12HV PS Top X 9-12
LV Mod PS TopLV Mod PS Top
PS Crate
DCSDCSI-box
NTC-Cooling
NTC-SMC
I-Cooling/Mod
I-SMC-Top
I-SMC-Bot
I-Modue Top
I-Modue Bot
Top-side Stave Power-DCS cable
Bottom-side Stave Power-DCS cable
NTC-Mod (option3)
LV SMC PS BotLV SMC PS Bot
LV SMC PS TopLV SMC PS Top
Combining Interlocks at PS crate – Strip Serial PoweringCombining Interlocks at PS crate – Strip Serial Powering
13D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Interlock and Monitoring of Module NTCs forInterlock and Monitoring of Module NTCs forPixelPixel
On detectorOff detector
DCS chip
NTC
A
Interlock
• Temp. measurement of detector modules: NTCs are supplied from outside
• In case of environmental temp. measurement, the NTCs will be supplied by the DCS chip
Interlock steered in the counting room
14D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Towards a Common Radiation Hard DCS ChipTowards a Common Radiation Hard DCS Chip
Motivations:- Unification of some DCS hardware across the ATLAS ID- Optimize development effort and cost - Chip should be as flexible as possible in term of use in the all ID volume
Main features:
• Radiation hardness up to 1.3x1016 1 MeV neq/cm2 • Have to work with two protocols: I2C/SPI (low frequency), and GBT e-port (40 MHz)• Low power when running at low frequency with I2C or SPI: < 0.1W• About 32 analog input needed• Some DAC for power control and up 17 dig. Out (Bypass for pixel SP + reset)• Interlock function based on FSM with programmable temp limits (Strip)• SEU protection for all the relevant parts• Interlock decision need to be sure • Power supply reference for NTCs
AnalogMux32
I2C SPI GBT
a1
a32
Vref
SCK Din Dout
CE SDA SCL
FSM
VSupply VRef
Alarm flagDAC1 bit
dout
ADC10bit
E-link for Slow Control
NB: A DCS IC submitted by Wuppertal to study I2C and SPI
15D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
GBT-SCA – Slow Control in a Radiation Hard DCS ICGBT-SCA – Slow Control in a Radiation Hard DCS IC From A. Marchioro
On-DetectorCustom Electronics & Packaging
Radiation Hard Off-DetectorCommercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
Custom Protocol
I2C Master SCAController
SCLSDATA
D[0:7] A[0:15]
JTAGMaster
Clock Generation
E-Link
Monitoring ADC
Ch1Ch2
…Ch16
Monitoring ADC
16 x
I2C
Bus
es
MemoryInterface
PIA4 x PP[0:7]
Ext Reset*
I2C Master
e-LinkController
The “GBT Project” is part of the “Radiation Hard Optical Link Project” which aims at developing a radiation
hard bi-directional optical link for use in the LHC upgrade programs
16D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
ConclusionsConclusions
• The Inner Tracker Upgrade has to be renewed and is under development & prototyping construction based on silicon pixel and strip• The DCS has to be designed as a new system to fit with the detector requirements in term of safety and operation as well as with the ATLAS Global Control System• The key parameters of such a system are the control of the power and of the temperature of the complete tracker• Controllable power is needed at the detector parts using either serial powering or DC-DC conversion• New features are proposed for detector diagnostics like including DCS into FE chips• Strip and Pixel detectors have different requirements but need to unify system, effort and some hardware parts• A single radiation hard DCS IC is one of the illustration of it with some common specifications that are under investigation. GBT-SCA is a possible option now considered• Still a lot to investigate in term of steering DCS interlock and information at the counting room and linked to the Power Supply units
17D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Back-up slidesBack-up slides
18D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Back-up slidesBack-up slides Pixel - Disabling of serial powered modules Pixel - Disabling of serial powered modules
charge pump:
DCS chip produces pulses (between 0 and 3.3 V)
C1 is charged to U_GS (2.5 V due to inefficiency)
Bonn-Wuppertal Stave emulator system
DCS chip is simulated by COBOLT (DCS board with microprocessor)
19D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
DCS chips are running permanentlycheck that there is no temp. interlock check temp of opto board turn on cooling of opto boardsturn on power of opto board + monitor its power
check temp of modules and EOS turn on cooling of modulesturn on power of EOS controller and modules + monitor their power consumption
initialize opto board configure modulespower consumption → successful configurationstart tuning, calibration, etc … of data taking chain
Back-up slidesBack-up slides Pixel - Power Up SequencePixel - Power Up Sequence
20D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Back-up slidesBack-up slides Strip – DCS Operational SequencesStrip – DCS Operational Sequences
Pre-operation SMC ramp & Opto com Module ramp Operation
Cooling Interlock Active, Env. data accessible, PS
Module Interlock Active, Module temp, local PS accessible
DCS Cooling Survey
FE DCS, Hybrid power accessible
High data volumePossible but not desired
Medium data volume> 4.3x105 data/day/stave
Low data volume> 5x104 data/day/stave @ 0.1-1Hz
@ 0.1-1Hz
On request
Detector ColdDetector Cold
From
DCS syste
m w
ith optio
n 2
From D
AQ with
optio
n 1&3
A) B) C) D)
21D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Back-up slidesBack-up slides Strip – DCS Operational SequencesStrip – DCS Operational SequencesOperational phase Option 1 & 3 Option 2
Pre-operation
Cooling OFF
Access to Env DCS and monitor cooling Interlock NTCs (+ 1 Module side for option 3)
Access to Env DCS and monitor cooling interlock NTCs & module temps Module Interlock active
SMC ramp & Opto com
Cooling ONPower ramp-up on SMC for Opto settings and com. DCS ON – Monitor module temp + Env Module Interlock active
Power ramp-up on SMC for Opto settings and com. DCS ON – Monitor module temp + Env Module interlock still active
Module ramp
Cooling ON
Power ramp-up on FE hybrids.
Active protection + Bypass (SP) or Power En/Dis (DC-DC)
DCS diagnostics accessible
Power ramp-up on FE hybrids.
Active protection + Bypass (SP) or Power En/Dis (DC-DC)
DCS diagnostics accessible
Operation
Cooling ONActive protection + Bypass (SP) or Power En/Dis (DC-DC)
DCS diagnostics accessible
Active protection + Bypass (SP) or Power En/Dis (DC-DC)
DCS diagnostics accessible
E) Module temp failure
Cooling ON
SP: FE LV + HV inhibit (Case B)
DC-DC: Module power disable (Case C-D)
SP: FE LV + HV inhibit (Case B)
DC-DC: Module power dsiable (Case C-D)
F) Cooling failure
Cooling OFF
All power interlocked! (Case A) All power interlocked! (Case A)
22D. Ferrère HSTD7, Aug 29th Sept 1st, 2009 in Hiroshima
Back-up slidesBack-up slides DCS Data & Interlock versus the Construction Phase & TestDCS Data & Interlock versus the Construction Phase & Test
Hybrid & Module QA
Stave QA Integration & Tests
Barrel commissioning
ID commissioning
Cooling type Water Water or evaporative
No cooling Evaporative Evaporative
Power type Local power SMC power
Module power
SMC power (quick tests)
Final PS crate SMC and Module power
Final PS crate SMC and Module power
Type of test FE Readout FE readout chain
GBT-Opt com
Conn. tests
Full readout Full readout
PS DCS Custom survey Custom survey NO Final system – PS Mon
Final system - PS Mon
Environmental survey
No No Connectivity test
Yes Yes
SMC DCS No Yes Yes for com test Yes Yes
Cooling interlock
No No No Yes (Warm cool) Yes (Possibly warm cool)
Module interlock
Home made Home made No Yes Yes
SMC interlock No Home made No Yes Yes
NB: Modules are never tested un-cooled either individually or on the stave