8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 1/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 2/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 3/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 4/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 5/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 6/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 7/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 8/42

8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 9/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 10/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 11/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 12/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 13/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 14/42

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8/13/2019 Syria and the War in Iraq

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/syria-and-the-war-in-iraq 15/42

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a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a0028a28a00fffd9}}}}}\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg1}{\bkmkend Pg1}\par\pard\ql \li3592\sb0\sl-368\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li3592\sb0\sl-368\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li3592\sb0\sl-368\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li3592\sb0\sl-368\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li3592\sb0\sl-368\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li35

92\sb0\sl-368\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li3592\sb368\sl-368\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex97 \ul0\nosupersub\cf2\f3\fs32 SYRIA AND THE WAR IN IRAQ \par\pard\ql \li5191\sb8\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 By Eyal Zisser* \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1357\sb264\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Many in the West believed that Bashar al-Asad's ascension to power in Syria presaged a \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 turn away from Pan-Arab nationalism and toward a more pro-Western position.However, \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 three years into his rule, Bashar al-Asad has not brought about any such change. On the \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 contrary, Bashar has adopted a policy sometimes even more radical than that of hisfather, \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Hafiz al-Asad. Syria's conduct during the war with Iraq in 2003 illustrates Bashar's policy \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 of brinksmanship. \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-275\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\r

i1331\sb10\sl-275\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 The rise of Bashar al-Asad to rule in Syria in June 2000 aroused great expectations among \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 many, both inside and outside Syria.The hope was that the young ruler, conversant with \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Western ways of thinking and living, would revolutionize Syria in everything having to do \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 with his regime's policies, both on thedomestic scene and, perhaps first and foremost, \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 concerning Syria's foreign policy.(1) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1345\sb5\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 However, the years that have passed since Bashar rose to power have shown that it was \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 not t

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he sort of revolution he had in mind. Conversely, while he may have understood the \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 need for the introduction of change and reformin Syria, he was not able to withstand the \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 regime's ruling Old Guard's wish to retain the status quo that had existed in the country for \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 decades. It also became clear that there was nothing behind the image of a young, dynamic \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex108 leader, open to and favoring the West. Indeed, the soft and moderate tone that had \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 characterized Bashar before he took office was quickly replaced by an entirely different \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 tenor emerging from the Presidential Palace in Damascus. Bashar adopted, or perhaps was \up0\expndtw-4\charscalex100 forced to adopt, militant and radical pan-Arab positions. This was particularly prominent in \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 view of thePalestinian intifada and the question of Israeli-Arab conflict, and to a greater \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 extent later on in connection with the war in Iraq. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1345\sb4\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 In the opinions of many, his conduct bore witness to several conclusions: that he was \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 firmly ensconced in the Arab nationalist and anti-Western framework, that he aspired to \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 take his father's place as the leader of the radical camp in the Arab world, and that he \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 lacked experience, self-confidence, and possibly an orderly decision-making apparatus or \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 evenexperienced advisors close to him. All of this, many concluded, led the young leader \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 in Damascus into places his father had refrained from going.(2) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1356\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \ex

pndtw0\charscalex104 The war in Iraq was one of the most important tests for Bashar in his short time in \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 office so far. While it is still too soon to assess the implications of that war for Syria, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 especially the implications of Bashar's behavior during that war, several points can be \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 made. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1323\sb6\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100First, Syria chose to place itself at the head of the Arab camp opposing the war and was \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 prominent in its sharp, even belligerent,criticism of Washington's decision to go to war. \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Moreover, Syria not only supported Iraq rhetorically, but also when the war actually broke \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 out, Syria continued to turn a blind eye to the smuggling of weapons into Iraq via Syria and \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 allowed Arab (mainly Syrian) volunteers to cross the Syrian border into Iraq.

 \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1358\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Second, Syria's behavior during the war led Washington to adopt a threatening tone, \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 unprecedented in its severity, towards Damascus. The accusations leveled against Syria by \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 the United States bear witness to the potential for disaster inherent in the path along which \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 relations between the two countries have been moving in recent years. Damascus, \par\pard\li1620\sb257\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx3419 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 44\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg2}{\bkmkend Pg2}\par\pard\ql \li4747\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li4747\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Syria and the War in Iraq \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \pa

r\pard\qj\li1560\ri1345\sb21\sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 apparently surprised at the tone that Washington had adopted towards it, began to take\up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 steps to placate the Americans, thus preventing aSyrian-American confrontation. It would \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 also appear that Washington, for its part, has not closed the door on Syria and still hopes \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 that the two will be able to work cooperatively in the future. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1355\sb0\sl-277\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Bashar's behavior during the war gained him immediate political rewards in Syrian and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 inter-Arab public opinion, which may have been his aim, but at the same time it created \up0 \expndtw0\chars

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calex107 bitter resentment towards Syria among most of the Arab regimes, including the Gulf \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 States, Egypt and Jordan. Thus, a great deal now depends on the United States and the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 degree of its determination to settle scores with Syria because of the latter's policies in \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 recent years. While Bashar, like his father, did demonstrate his awareness of the constraints \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 facing Syria, he was less cautious and thus crossed red lines, which ultimately brought him \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 into confrontation with Washington.\par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1356\sb0\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 The Americans left the door open for him to change his policies, but the newrealities in \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 the region--the presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops on Iraqi soil, the \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100euphoria in Washington in the wake of America's dramatic victory in Iraq--couldbring that \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 moment of truth sooner than expected. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb275\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE BASHAR ERA--INITIAL MOVES \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1354\sb5\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Against the background of Syria's poor relations with most of the countries of the world \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 and the sense of socio-economic stagnation and suffocation at home, Bashar al-Asad's rise \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 to power was received as a welcome breeze. There were many inside and outside Syria \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 who hoped that Bashar would bring with him the opening of a new era in Syria's relations \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 with the world. This hope was focused both on style--a new, open

 one replacing the feeling \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 of isolation, suspicionand suffocation characterizing the rule and policies of Hafiz al\up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Asad--as well as a change in content, a foreign policy recognizingthe new regional and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 international realities, opening itself up to substantial changes and the adoption of an \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 unequivocal pro-Western orientation. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1351\sb6\sl-274\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 It is important to mention thepositive impression that Bashar made on quite a number \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 of Western leaders as well as journalists who met him before he rose to power. They \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 described him as a young, open-minded, very intelligent man well versed in details and \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 quitein control of facts. He appeared not to need his aides or previously prepared notes in \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 order to lead a fluent matter-of-fact discu

ssion on any subject with those he met. Bashar's \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 deep familiarity with Western ideas and the openness which he displayed (even declaring \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 that he was a jazz fan), and, of course, his penchant for surfing the Internet, only \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 strengthened that impression.(3) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1347\sb4\sl-277\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 There appeared to be good reason whymany chose to view him as a representative of \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 the younger generation of Arab leaders destined to take the helm in the Arab world. \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Among those mentioned together with Bashar were King Abdallah II of Jordan, King \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Muhammad VI of Morocco, and the crown princes of a number of the Gulf monarchies. \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 These young leaders frequently met with Bashar even before he rose to power and these \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 meetings provided Bashar with some

experience in the sphere of foreign policy as well as \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 granting a measure of legitimacy to his rise to the presidency, since his counterparts \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 appeared willing, even enthusiastic, tomake him one of their own.(4) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1357\sb6\sl-274\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Nevertheless, there still remained some doubt as to whether Bashar actually belonged to \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 the group of young monarchs who had, until they rose to power, spent most of theirlives, \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 and certainly their formative years,in Western educational institutions and environment. \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 King Abdallah II frequently and staunchly claimed that Bashar, like him

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, belonged to the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Internet generation.(5) However, the passage of time, especially after he rose to power, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 revealed that Bashar did not really belong to that group and that the differences between \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 him and the otheryoung monarchs were greater than the similarities. It even seems that \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Bashar felt himself closer to Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah, also one of the \par\pard\li1560\sb217\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx10106 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 45

{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1531\shptop1005\shpright10377\shpbottom1025\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz16\shplid0{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg3}{\bkmkend Pg3}\par\pard\ql \li5416\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li5416\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Eyal Zisser \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1338\sb21\

sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 younger faces in the Arab world, than to Kings Abdallah II and Muhammad VI. Indeed, \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 contacts between Bashar and the young monarchs, which had apparently focused on \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 mutual personal interests, ended as soon as the members of this young group rose to power \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 and faced the stormy domestic, regional and inter-Arab realities. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1339\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Bashar's policies, at least in the early stages of his rule, reflected the continuation of \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 those of his father, i.e. he continued cautious maneuvering between East and West while \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 attempting to straddle the fence. On the one hand, attempts were made to promote a \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 political dialogue with the countries of Western Europe, the moderate Arab countries and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 even with the United States. On the ot

her hand, there was the desire to preserve close ties \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex109 with Iran and promote relations with Iraq. In addition, there were clear attempts on \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Bashar's part to exploit the change in rule in Damascus in order to turn over a new leaf in \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 his country's relations with the world at large while shaking off the residue of the past, \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 especially personal residues that hadfrequently clouded Syria's relations with its \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 neighbors. A particularly prominent aspect of these attempts was that they were designed \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 to improve relations with Jordan, Turkey, and to a certain degree, with Iraq, with which \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Syria had been in serious conflict for several decades. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1334\sb0\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 However, it quickly became clear that regional realities were stronger than Bashar and \up0 \expndtw0\ch

arscalex102 that smiles and good will alone could not erase the substantive differences of opinion on \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 key issues or the residues of the past which had for so long overshadowed Syria's relations \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 with its neighbors. Moreover, when he was faced with his first crisis, on more than one \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 occasion, Bashar's balanced, placating statements and his smile hid the folly of youth and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 immature positions and policies. Since Bashar lacked practical experience in the sphere of \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 foreign policy and also, apparently, a comprehensive view of Syria's place and role in the \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 regional and international arenas, it is not surprising that he was m

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a and the War in Iraq \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1357\sb28\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 organization's general intentions, an expression of the new balance of power created \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 between Damascus and the organization following the death of Hafiz al-Asad.(7) \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 Nevertheless, from the moment the intifada broke out, Bashar tried to exploit the new \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 realities emerging in the region to promote his personal status as well as Syria's standing as \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 a regional power. These new regional realities provided a golden opportunity for him to \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 establish his personal and political status as the head of the Arab rejectionist camp, or at \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 least as the head of a camp whose opposition to Israel was staunch and uncompromising. \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 The mood of the public on the streets of Damascus as well as in the other Arab capitals \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 substantially contributed to Bashar's increasingly tough policy. He wanted to create the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 image of being close to the heart of the Arab man-on-the-street and willing to do his \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 bidding. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1342\sb4\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Nevertheless, it would appear that the basis for his policy vis-a-vis the crisis into which \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 the regionhad deteriorated was not only calculated reasoning arising from Bashar's desire\up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 to exploit the opportunity afforded him by the Palestinian intifada to prove his abilities as a \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 leader at home and abroad. In his reaction to the renewed flare-up in Israeli-Palesti

nian \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 relations, the young leader was revealed, according to many in Israel and in the West, as \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 emotional and hasty to say nothing of immature and inexperienced. His immaturity led him \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 far afield to places where he most probably did not want to go. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1341\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 At the same time, one could sense that behind these moves, especially his reactions to \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 what was happening in the region, there lurked a hostile and uncompromising worldview \line \up0\expndtw-1\charscalex100 regarding Israel, arising out of the residue left by the years of growing up in the house of \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 his father, Hafiz al-Asad. This worldview gathered dust during the years of the peace \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 negotiations between Syria and Israel and waspushed aside because of the expectations \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 and

even hopes of both these countries. However, it took very little to shake the dust off \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 this concept and rejuvenate it as a central component in Bashar's strategic thinking.(8) \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li1560\sb9\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 BASHAR, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1345\sb5\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 The terrorist attacks by Usama bin-Ladin'sal-Qa'ida organization on New York and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Washington on September 11, 2001 introduced a new era in Syrian-American relations. \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 The attacks brought about a sharp change in global and Middle Eastern realities, leading to \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 the formulation  of a new global and regional agenda. There were even those who \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 compared the attacks to the collapse of the Soviet Uni

on and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 in its wake. These events, of about a decade before, had had similar fateful implications for\up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 the entire world and for the Middle East and Syria in particular. It is therefore no wonder \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 that theUnited States, having emerged from the terrorist attacks even more determined \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 than ever to strike at its enemies, was quick to demand that Syria change its course and join \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 effortswith the international community to fight terrorism. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1336\sb5\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Syria's reaction was apparently identical with that which Damascus had presented to the \line \up0 \expn

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dtw-2\charscalex100 first President George Bush in the early 1990s. It adopted an evasive policy, desiring both \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 to eat its cake and keep its penny. On the one hand, it took steps to prevent a frontal and \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 direct confrontation with Washington. To thatend, it was prepared to cooperate with the \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 United States in its struggle against the al-Qa'ida organization. On the other hand, \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Damascus continued to adhere to its worldview and to courses of action that stood in total \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 contradiction to Washington's policies. These courses of action had the potential to \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 obstructAmerica's regional interests: the promotion of the Arab-Israeli, and certainly the \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Israeli-Palestinian, peace process; the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq; the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 isolation of Iran and possibly the overthrow of the regime of the Ayatollahs there; and the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 elimination of the military dimension of Hizballah's activity in Lebanon. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1357\sb9\sl-270\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Bashar recognized the need to minimize the potential damage to Syria from the bin \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Laden attacks on New York and Washington. He denounced them and even offered to \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 assist the United States in its efforts to apprehend those behind the attacks. FBI agents did \par\pard\li1560\sb218\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx10106 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 47

{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1531\shptop1005\shpright10377\shpbottom1025\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz16\shplid0{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg5}{\bkmkend Pg5}\par\pard\ql \li5416\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li5416\sb1

96\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Eyal Zisser \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-277\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1336\sb27\sl-277\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 arrive in Syria in early 2002 to investigate some al-Qa'ida activists who had been in Syria \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 or who had maintained ties with Syrian citizens.(9) The Americans were grateful to the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Syrians for their assistance, and President Bush even called Bashar al-Asad to thank him \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 for it. Senior American officials were quoted as saying that the information provided by \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Syria had helped prevent attacks on American targets in the Gulf, and thereby saving many \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 American lives.(10) Yet Syria's aid ultimately revealed little and concealed much. While \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 providing this aid, Syrians turned a blind eye towards the presence in Syria and in Leba

non \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 of bin Ladin activists and possibly of other Islamic activists involved in terrorism.(11) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1349\sb6\sl-274\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 In addition, Syria continued to devote efforts to promoting its relations with other \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 members of the "Axis of Evil," as George W. Bush defined North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex108 Hizballah. Indeed, one of the prominent names on the FBI's list of 22 most wanted \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 terrorists is that of 'Imad Mughniyya, Hizballah's head of operations, who had been \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 involved in the attacks onAmerican targets in Lebanon and the bombing of the Israeli \line \up0 \expndtw-2

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\charscalex100 embassy and the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. The names of two more of the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 organization's activists appear on the same FBI list as well. As is known, these people \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 operate openly in Lebanon under the Syrians' watchful eye.(12) It is no wonder that \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that he did not discount the possibility of \line\up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 the use of force against Syria because of its support for terrorism. Armitage subsequently \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 defined Hizballah as the "A-team of terrorists," and as "an element against which the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 United States has an open account that it hopes to settle sooner or later."(13) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1350\sb5\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 In addition to the Americans' focusing on the continuing assistance that Syria is \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 providing to the terrorist organizations, senior officials in the UnitedStates have begun \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 attacking Syria because itis arming itself with advanced and non-conventional, mainly \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 biological and chemical, weapons.(14) On the eve of the war withIraq, Secretary of State \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 Colin Powell did indeed declare that the United States was keeping an eye on Syria's \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 interest in weapons of mass destruction and the support itgranted to Hizballah.(15) \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1361\sb1\sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ: THEY WALKED TOGETHER \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 UNAWARES\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 ? \par\pard\qj \li1560

\ri1324\sb0\sl-277\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Alongside thesefoci of disagreement, the increasingly close relations between \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Damascus and Baghdad were a major issue for Washington. Indeed, since Bashar rose to \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 power, therewere perceptible efforts to turn over a new leaf in his relations with Iraq under \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Saddam Hussein. However, it should be  mentioned that the trend toward improved \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 relations between Syria and Iraq had begun in 1997, under Hafiz al-Asad. These relations \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 had been on a downward course since the beginning of the 1980s because of Syria's \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, as well as the personal, politicaland ideological \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 differences that arose between the fellow Ba'th regimes, Syrian and Iraqi.(16) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1339\s

b0\sl-274\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 However, in 1997, Asad sensed that Saddam Hussein no longer posed a real threat to \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Syria and he apparently wanted to use closer relations between the two states as a \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 bargaining chip against the United States and Israel. The Syrians were horrified by the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 election of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel and by the possibility of the \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 exacerbation of Syrian-Turkish relations to the point of armed conflict. In any event, while \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Hafiz al-Asad did renew relations between Syria and Iraq, he acted cautiously, refraining \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 from introducing anything of substance to these relations, certainly not turning them into \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 any kind of a strategic or intimate alliance.(17) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1357\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 So far, in anything that

 has had to do with his relations with Iraq, Bashar has been \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 revealed in all his inexperienced youth. He has demonstratedextreme daring, certainly in \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 comparison with his father's cautious policies. His government did not hesitate to express \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 explicit and unequivocal support of Iraq, even to the point of attempting to establish a \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 unified pan-Arab front against the American intention of attacking that country. Damascus \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 also became the focal point of pilgrimages by senior Iraqi officials, led by Deputy Prime \par\pard\li1560\sb212\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx3482 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 48\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charsc

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alex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)

{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1531\shptop1005\shpright10377\shpbottom1025\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz16\shplid0{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg6}{\bkmkend Pg6}\par\pard\ql \li4747\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li4747\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Syria and the War in Iraq \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1332\sb21\sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Minister Tariq 'Aziz,and Vice Presidents 'Izat Ibrahim al-Duri and Tariq Yasin Ramadan, \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 who were cordially welcomed in the Syrian capital.(18) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1346\sb5\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 In addition, Syria's relations with the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein cooled, and \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 the Syrians put limits on their activities.For example, a radio station run by the Iraqi \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 opposition operating in Syria was shut down in early 2001 and the publication o

f anti-Iraq \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 newspapers in Damascus was outlawed.(19) However, the Syrians continued their contacts \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 with Kurdish movements, a move designed to ensure a certain amount ofSyrian influence \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 in Iraq in the event of anAmerican attack and even more so in the event of the Iraqi state's \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 political breakdown. The Syrians feared the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 state in northern Iraq, which could have implications for the Kurdish populationin \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Northeastern Syria. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1356\sb6\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Moreover, in the autumn of 2000, the Iraqis began exporting oil via Syria. The Iraqi oil \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 flowed through Syria via the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline in amounts between 150,000 to \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 200,000 barrels

per day (bpd). This oil was transferred to Syria for local use, allowing \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Syria to increase exports of its own oil. Washington was quick to protest to the Syrians for \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 their crass violation of the boycott of Iraq. However, in response to that protest, Bashar \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 explained to Secretary of State Powell and later to President Bush that the flow of oil had \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 been part of a technical examination of the pipeline, which had been idle for almost two \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex109 decades, and that with the completion of the examination, the flow of oil would be \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 stopped.(20) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1336\sb6\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 At the end of 2000, it was reported that shortly after the Palestinian intifada broke out, \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Saddam Hussein moved Iraqi forces to the Syrian border perhaps as a warning signal to \up0 \

expndtw0\charscalex100 Israel but clearly in order to exploit the situation to improve his regional standing.(21) In \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 the summer of2002, reports were published that Syria had turned a blind eye to the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 smuggling of weapons from Eastern Europe to Iraq via Syria involving Firas Talas, son of \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas and a well-known businessman in Damascus. This \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex108 time, the Syrians were quick to deny these reports.(22) Finally, in late 2002, it was \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 reported that the Syrians hadallowed Iraq to hide some of its weapons of mass destruction \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 in their territory and even assisted in the transfer of Iraqi weapons

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to Hizballah. These \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 reports were also denied by the Syrians.(23) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1350\sb5\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex108 After Bashar rose to power, Syria continued to refrain from any kind of strategic \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 alliance with Iraq or even from renewing diplomatic relations between the two countries. \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Apparently, it was the Old Guard surrounding Bashar that prevented the development of \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 closer relations between Syria and Iraq. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz proposed, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 during a visit to Damascus, that Syria should ratify the "National Action Treaty" that the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 two countries had signed in the late 1970s when relations between the two countries were \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 good, but that Saddam Hussein canceled whenhe rose to power in 1979. Syrian Defense \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Minister Talas reacted with derision, stating that "Hafiz al-Asad died without ever learning \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 why Saddam cancelled the Treaty, or why he was so quick to accuse Syria of plotting a \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 coup against him."(24) It is possible that the Syrians' fear of Iranian and the Gulf States' \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 reactions prevented Asad from getting too close to Iraq. After all, it was Bashar al-Asad \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 who called Saddam Hussein "a beast of a man" during a visit to Kuwait even before he \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 succeeded his father.(25) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1356\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 Ties between Syria and Iraq, both during Hafiz al-Asad's rule and that of his son \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Bashar, were first and foremost of

economic significance. Iraq became a milk cow for \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Syria because of the dramatic increase in trade between the two countries, which reached \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 at least \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 $3 billion by the end of \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 2002.(26)  The increase in trade between the two \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1357\sb7\sl-273\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 countries\u8212?both direct and for goods transported through Syria to bypass UN sanctions--\line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 was accompanied by a series of economic agreements, including the establishment of a \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Syria-Iraq free trade zone and one on joint investments in the two countries. An airline \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 route between Baghdad and Damascus was inaugurated in blatant violation of the sanctions \par\pard\li1560\sb217\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx10106 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No.

 2 (June, 2003)\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 49

{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1531\shptop1005\shpright10377\shpbottom1025\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz16\shplid0{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart P

g7}{\bkmkend Pg7}\par\pard\ql \li5416\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li5416\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Eyal Zisser \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1351\sb21\sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 and, in July 2001, a railroad line was opened between Mosul and Aleppo. The resumption \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 of the flow of oil between Kirkuk and Baniyas amounted to about one-third of Syria's own \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 production. The Iraqi oil was sold to Syria at a reduced price and Syria used it for the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 domestic market, letting it increase its own oil exports and realize a nice profit.(27) \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb264\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-

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3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 ON THE EVE OF THE AMERICAN ATTACK ON IRAQ \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1356\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 American preparations to strike at Saddam Hussein created new tension in Syrian-U.S. \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 relations, with Syria quickly taking Iraq's side, conspicuously hosting Iraqis in the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Presidential Palace in Damascus. Syria also joined the attempts to thwart Washington's \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 efforts to recruit broad international support. On November \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 8, \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 2002, when Security \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1359\sb2\sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Council Resolution 1441, which included a strong demand that Iraq agree to renewthe \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 international inspections or suffer the consequences, came up for approval, Syria gave the \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 resolution its blessing. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1354\sb6\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 The Syrians did try, however, to present its vote as a "Syrian diplomatic victory," or, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 alternatively, as in response to the Arab consensus that Syria was called on to represent in \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 the Security Council. They even bragged that their vote had succeeded in foiling or at least \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 postponing the American attack on Iraq. The Iraqi press, however, did say Syria's vote on \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 the issue was a "betrayal of theArab cause." Nevertheless, official Baghdad refrained from \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 coming out strongly against the Syrians because it understood the pressure and constraints \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 on Damascus.(28) \

par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1355\sb6\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Together with its attempts to foil Washington's efforts in the international arena, Syria \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 adopted a staunch anti-Americanstance accusing Washington of having a "hidden agenda" \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 whose objective was the establishment of a new American order in the Middle East for \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 itself and on behalf of Israel. For example, Syrian Vice President `Abd-al Halim Khaddam \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 warned that: \par\pard\qj \li2280\sb0\sl-277\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li2280\ri1343\sb7\sl-277\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 \u8230?the American attack on Iraq is designed to bring about the partition of that \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 country, which is a strategic objective of Israel's. In fact it is part of the long\up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 standing Zionist aim of breaking up the national fabric of the countries of the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 re

gion... We are defending Iraq, which is an Arab country, and the fate of all the \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Arabs is bound up with its fate. We are not Finland and therefore we cannot relate \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 to Iraq's fate with equanimity. Iraq is a strategic hinterland for Syria in its conflict \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 with Israel. We supported Kuwait when Iraq invaded its territory, but today Iraq is \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 under attack and therefore we are standing at its side.(29) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1359\sb261\sl-280\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 The hostile attitude among the Syrian public toward the United States had already \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 begun in early \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 2002, following the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield. Actively \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1345\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 encouraged by the regime, this hostility took the form of street demonstrations near the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 American E

mbassy in Damascus and later in organized boycotts of American goods and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 cultural symbols. A popular committee was established in Damascus to encourage the \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 boycott of American products. Signs appeared in the windows of restaurants reading: "No \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 entry to Americans"(30) and the American consul in Damascus was escorted out of the \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 "Ocsigen" Restaurant in Bab Tuma,the Christian Quarter of Damascus. The owners of the \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 restaurant became heroes after that incident.(31) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1357\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Yet the street demonstrations in Damascus near the American Embassy were more \line \up0 \expndtw0\charsc

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alex100 subdued than similar events in the past. In December 1998, demonstrators protesting the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 American "Desert Fox" attackon Iraq broke into the ambassador's residence and caused \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 damage. One of the demonstrators even took the American flag down from the roof of the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 building. This createda diplomatic incident between the United States and Syria, \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 especially after Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas called the behavior of that \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 demonstrator "an act of heroism." The Syrians were forced to apologize, disassociate \par\pard\li1560\sb202\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx3482 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 50\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs,Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)

{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1531\shptop1005\shpright10377\shpbottom1025\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz16\shplid0{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart P

g8}{\bkmkend Pg8}\par\pard\ql \li4747\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li4747\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Syria and the War in Iraq \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1321\sb21\sl-280\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 themselves from Talas's statement, and pay compensation to the United States for damage \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 caused to the Ambassador's residence and to the American Cultural Center during the \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 demonstrations.(32) This time, the Syrians refrained from taking any unnecessary chances \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 and prevented the demonstrators from getting anywherenear the American Embassy.(33) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1352\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 On the eve of the outbreak of the war, Syria adopted an even harsher tone in its protest \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 against the United States. Bashar declared that the United States "is interested on

ly in \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 gaining control over Iraqi oil and redrawing the map of the region in keeping with its \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 worldview." He added, "In the past we did not sense the danger closing in on us in the face \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 of fateful developments including the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 establishment of the State of Israel, but the danger to the Arabs inherent in the war in Iraq \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 is no less than any of those."(34) He warned the Arabs about the friendship of the United \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 States, which, he said, is "more fatal than its hostility."(35) Bashar also compared the \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 United States to "a car speeding towards a concrete wall, but even if the power of an \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 American car will allow it to penetrate a concrete wall, it is liable to discover that on the \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscal

ex100 other side of the wall there would be no bed of roses either, but it would lead to an abyss... \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 since Bush does not understand that for the Arabs honor is more important than anything \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 else, even food."(36) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1349\sb0\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 From the moment the war broke out, Syria was mobilized, even if mainly verbally, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104against the United States. This mobilization reached one of its pinnacles when Foreign \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 Minister Faruq al-Shara declared before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the People's \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Assembly, "We want Iraq's victory,"(37) Subsequently, al-Shara even compared

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 the United \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 States to the Third Reich and President Bush to Adolf Hitler.(38) In an interview to the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Lebanese newspaper Al-Safir, Bashar warned that Syria might become the next U.S. target, \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 adding that in view ofWashington's moves, "Syria does not intend sitting idly by."(39) The \line \up0\expndtw-2\charscalex100 Syrian authorities also allowed, and even encouraged, thousands of demonstrators to go out \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 onto the streets of Damascus and other cities all over Syria to protest against the American \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 attack on Iraq. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1346\sb0\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 Simultaneously, the Syrian media mounted their own campaign against the United \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 States.(40) Radio Damascus said, for example, that the American-British attack violated \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 the most basic human values, humanrights, and was also in gross violation of international \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 law. "Our experience proves that the interests of Israel are controllingAmerican policy and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 not the interests of the United States. After all, it was the supporters of the Likud among \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 the Zionists in the corridors of the American Administration who ledto the attack on Iraq." \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 Radio Damascus also declared, "The forces of evil in the world have conspired to gain \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 control over the wealth and resources of the Arab Nation. The super power in the world is \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 acting today in a biased way inorder to achieve its aims and its Satanic arms bring harm to \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 peaceful peace-loving peoples."(41) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1346\sb0\s

l-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 The United States, especially Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, quickly \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 responded by accusing Syria of granting assistance to Iraq by smuggling night-vision \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 goggles and other equipment into Iraq, and accused Syria of allowing Arab volunteers to \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 reach Iraq via Syria. A short while later, senior American officials also accused Syria of \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 allowing Iraqi leaders to escape from Iraq via its territory.(42) Secretary of State Colin \line \up0\expndtw0\charscalex107 Powell threatened to impose sanctions on Syria,(43) andPresident Bush, in a strong \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 message to theSyrians, accused them of developing chemical weapons, which was \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 troubling for the United States and could force it to take action against Syria.(44) At first, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 th

e Syrians dismissed these accusations out of hand, but they were undoubtedly disturbed \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 by the strong language employed. In fact, in a matter of days, they were quick to close their \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 border with Iraq, and to start sending conciliatory messages to Washington, saying they \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 wished to resume a dialogue with the American administration.(45) \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb264\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 SYRIA AND THE INTER-ARAB ARENA \par\pard\li1560\sb216\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx10106 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 51

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{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}

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{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft3609\shptop7610\shpright4394\shpbottom7630\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz125\shplid1{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 785}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(785,20);(785,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg9}{\bkmkend Pg9}\par\pard\ql \li5416\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li5416\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Eyal Zisser \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-277\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1355\sb27\sl-277\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 Against the backdrop of American accusations, there were visible attempts by \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 Damascus to press the Arab states to defend it against Washington. However, Syria's \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 relations with the Arab states had also suffered because of Damascus's positions on Iraq. \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Indeed, Damascus did not hide its dissatisfaction with the pro-American stand that Arab \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex108 states, including Egypt, had adopted or, more correctly, with the position of passive \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 bystander that many had adopted. At the March 2003 Arab Summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Egypt, Bashar's stron

g speech was notable for the accusing finger he pointed at those Arab \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 states that were not lending Iraq their support but preferred to remain as uninvolved \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 onlookers.(46) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1348\sb0\sl-277\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 A short while before, the Syrians had foiled an initiative by Egyptian President Husni \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Mubarak to convene the summit at an earlier date, claiming that in view of the fact that the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Arab states intended to do nothing regarding the expected American attack onIraq, there \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 was no point in doing so. Subsequently, Syria foiled an Egyptian initiative to send a \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 delegation of Arab foreign ministers to Iraq to pressure Saddam into complying withthe \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 demands of the UN and even to resign as Iraqipresident. Egyptian newspapers were quick \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 to accus

e Syria, because of its positions on the matter, of having defeated a Cairo-ledinter\up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Arab effort to prevent the war.(47) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1348\sb0\sl-280\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 Bashar, for his part, explained Syria's position in an address to the Syrian People's \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Assembly on March 10, 2003. He declared: \par\pard\qj \li2280\ri1419\sb250\sl-275\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 We proposed the minimum which is not granting assistance [to the United States] \line \up0\expndtw-1\charscalex100 in its attack on Iraq. After all, if the Arabs want togrant assistance [to the United \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 States] what point is there in convening a summit Conference? There is no logic in \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 convening a summit Conference unless someone wants to `cover himself' for the \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 assistance he isgranting \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 [to the Americans].\u8230? Whoever w

ants to assist the \par\pard\qj \li2280\ri1414\sb5\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Americans should announce that, but he should not expect us to agree to that or to \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 accept it [by our very presence at the summit].... We did not propose that the Arab \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 states remove the [U.S.] military bases existing in their territories and we did not \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 demand the implementation of the joint Arab defense agreement [and come to the \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 aid of Iraq]. Neither did we demand the adoption of steps againstArab states that \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 would assist [the Americans], and neither did we call for an end to the occupation \line \up0 \expndtw0\cha

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rscalex100 [of Iraq by the United States]. Nevertheless, we were accused of being radicals. \line \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 The truth is we did not fulfillour obligation, since you can compare our position as \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 Arabs to the positions of peoples and countries all over the world, and even \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 positions expressed in newspapers in the world, the British press, for example \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 [against the war]."(48) \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1334\sb8\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Syria's difficulties were clearly seen in its relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other \line\up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Gulf states. Particularly prominent in its criticism of Syria, albeit not outright, was Kuwait, \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 which had been the main victim of the rehabilitation of Saddam Hussein's status in the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 region from the end of the 1990s until his overthrow. The American offensive in Iraq had \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 resulted in a further worsening of relations between Syria and the Gulfstates because of \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 accusations by Damascus that, while maintaining a low profile and exercising utmost \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 caution, these states were collaborating with the United States inthe war against Iraq. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1347\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0\expndtw0\charscalex103 As in the past, the main target of these accusations was Qatar, where the American \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Headquarters in the Gulf had been established. The Syrian newspaper Aswad-Abyad even \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 accused Qatar of having become the "Zionist project No.2 in the Middle East and even an \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex108 American col

ony and a base for the subjugation of the Gulf and the control of our \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 treasures."(49) In previous years as well, there had been sharp differences of opinion \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 between thetwo countries because of Qatar's readiness to accept an Israeli representative \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 in Doha, which it did not close down even after the outbreak of the intifada.(50) \par\pard\li1560\sb202\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx3482 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 52\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 MiddleEast Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)

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{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg10}{\bkmkend Pg10}\par\pard\ql \li4747\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li4747\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Syria and the War in Iraq \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1344\sb28\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 Kuwait did not escape Syria's criticism either. Even before the outbreak of war, the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 Syrians had lectured the Kuwaitis. Syrian Foreign Ministe

r Faruq al-Shara said, at a \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 meeting of Arab Leagueforeign ministers, "There is no contradiction between Damascus' \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 support of Kuwait and its efforts to ease the sanctions against Iraq, which cause suffering \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 to the Iraqi People, whoare paying the price."(51) Kuwait, incidentally, did not hesitate to \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 threaten Syria, albeit obliquely, in its rebuttal. Members of the Kuwaiti National Assembly \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 suggested a discussion of a proposal to stop Kuwaiti investments in Syria(52) and the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 editor of the Kuwaiti newspaper al\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24-\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Siyasa even dared to compare the rule of Saddam \up

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0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 Hussein in Iraq to the rule of Bashar al-Asad, warning that if Damascus adhered to its \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 position, it might bring [on itself] an end like the one of Saddam Hussein. It is no wonder, \up0\expndtw0\charscalex106 then, that Bashar finally realized that Syria's relations with the Gulf States formed an \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 important element in Syria's foreign policy and that they had to be preserved; especially in \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 view of Washington's accusations against Syria and thefear that the former would take \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 practical measures against Damascus.(53) \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb264\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 CONCLUSION \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1355\sb4\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 The occupation of Baghdad by the United States shocked Damascus. Syrian television \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 refrained from broadcasting the masses on the city's streets, cheering and tearing down the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex105 statue of Saddam Hussein with the assistance of American troops. Yet, despite Syria's \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 denial of what had happened and quick announcement that it would not cooperate with any \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 pro-Western regime established in Baghdad, it also had to take into account the changed \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 situation for its own interests.(54) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1352\sb5\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 What motivated Bashar's harsh anti-American stance? First, there can be no doubt that \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 he was operating out of a real fear that Syria might be a future U.S. target following the \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 war in Iraq. Moreover, Bashar was influenced by his instinctive anti-American feelings and \up0

\expndtw0\charscalex100 refrained from balancing these instincts against Syria's strategic interests that might have \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 dictated more cautious behavior vis-a-vis the United States. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1358\sb6\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Second, Bashar was interested in strengthening his own position with the Syrian public \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 and the Arab public in general, by adopting a more populist stand. Given the regime's own \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 failure and his personal unwillingness to deliver reforms, shifting the blame for Syrian and \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex109 Arab problems to the United States seemed a good way of deflecting criticism and \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 opposition. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1343\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100Third, he probably did not expect such a quick, decisive and dramatic American victory \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 in Iraq. In any event, Bashar's policies wer

e authentic and anchored in his worldview, but \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 they were not an indication of maturity, self-confidence and mainly experience on the part \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 of the young leader in Damascus. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1353\sb6\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Washington and Damascus are ostensibly on a collision course. However, it is also true \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 that the United States is not eager for a confrontation with Syria, especially if Damascus \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 shows some flexibility of perhaps even the most minimal kind. Threats are more a way of \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 exercising pressure to change Syrian policy, on hosting terrorist groups or turning over \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 Iraqi officials, for example, than reflecting a preferred outcome. In this context, Powell \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 offered Damascus another chance to choose whether itwanted friendship or conflict with \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 the United State

s. He also included Syria in his first tour of the Middle East following the \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 war, and Bush praised Syria for having understood theAmerican message and their desire \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 to cooperate with the United States.(55) \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1349\sb5\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Washington's soft approach to Damascus stems from the fact that in the past Syrian was \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 careful not to cross red lines, and each time that it appeared to do so, it was quick to back \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 away. It can well assume that a warning will bring better behavior which is what Hafiz al\up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Asad, known for his extreme caution, would have done. In addition, the Americans were \up0 \exp

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ndtw0\charscalex105 happy to placate the regime in the past in order to encourage it to join the Arab-Israeli \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 peace process.(56) \par\pard\li1560\sb216\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx10106 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)\tab \up0\expndtw-3\charscalex100 53

{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1531\shptop1005\shpright10377\shpbottom1025\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz16\shplid0{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 8846}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(8846,20);(8846,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg11}{\bkmkend Pg11}\par\pard\ql \li5416\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li5416\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Eyal Zisser \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1332\sb21\sl-280\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 However, Bashar, unlike hislate father, may not fulfill these expectations. In that case, \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 Bashar might well pay a heavy price for his behavior . \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1349\sb4\sl-276\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Bashar al

-Asad's policies have been characterized by his adherence to the status quo and\up0 \expndtw0\charscalex107 the heritage of his father, however, much less cautiously. The breath of fresh air felt \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 following thechange in regime in Damascus quickly blew away and it became clear to all \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 that until Bashar formulated his own vision, objectives, worldview and agenda, and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex102 acquired sufficient experience, no substantial change was to be expected in his behavior \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 and in Syrian policies. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1350\sb5\sl-275\slmult0\fi300 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 Thus, Syrian policy continuesto vacillate between fear of the United States and the \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 desire to integrate into the world order which the United States leads on the one hand, and, \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 on the other, the nostalgia for the old order of the 1970s and 1980s in which Syria drew \up0 \expndtw0\charscale

x100 closer to Iran and at one point even to Saddam's Iraq, while continuing toextend its aegis \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 over Hizballah. Only the future will tell whether, in the final analysis, Bashar has come to \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex106 understand where the fine line exists between instinct and theformulation and \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 implementation of a realistic pragmatic policy based on Syria's political constraints and \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 regional realities which include the American conquest of Iraq and the presence of so many \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 American soldiers still in Iraq. \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1348\sb9\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 *Eyal Zisser isa senior research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern \line \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 and African Studies and a senior lecturer in the department of Middle Eastern and African \line \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 Studies,

Tel Aviv University. He is author of Asad's Syria at a Crossroads (Hebrew, \line \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 1999); Lebanon: The Challenge Of Independence (London, 2000); Asad's Legacy - Syria \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 In Transition (New York, 2000). He is also the author of "The Syrian Army: Between the \line \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Domestic and the External Fronts" in \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 MERIA\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Journal Vol. 5 No.1. (March 2001). \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb264\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf5\f6\fs24 NOTES \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1716\sb1\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 1. For more see Eyal Zisser, "Will Bashar al-Asad Last," \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Midd

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le East Quarterly,\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Vol. \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 7, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 3-13. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1359\sb17\sl-260\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 2. Eyal Zisser, "Who Really Rules Syria," \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Middle East Quarterly\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 2003), pp. 15-24. \par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1356\sb4\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 3. Interviews by the author with German and British Diplomats, Tel Aviv, November 12, \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 2001, and March 15, 2002. See also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (London), October 13, 1997; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Washington \line \tab \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 Post,\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 April 27, 2000. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1359\sb17\sl-260\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 4. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Yediot Ahronot\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 27, 1999; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Washington Post\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 27, 2000; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , June 13, \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 2000. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb7\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 5. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Yediot Ahronot\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 27, 1999. \par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1356\sb7\sl-273\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 6. Eyal Zisser, "Syria," in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.) Middle East Contemporary \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Survey (MECS), Vol. 24 (2000) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2002), pp. 536-541; \line \tab \up0\expndtw-3\charscalex100 see also Eyal Zisser, "Who Really Rules Syria," \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Middle East Quarterly\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , Vol. 10,

 No. 1 \line \tab \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 (Winter 2003), pp. 15-24. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1353\sb2\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 7.Eyal Zisser, "The Return of Hizballah," \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Middle East Quarterly\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 2002), pp. 3-12; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Yediot Aahronot\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 27, 1999. \par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1356\sb6\sl-273\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 8. Bashar al-Asad's speeches to the Arab summits in Cairo (October 2000), Amman \line\tab \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 (March 2001) and Beirut (March 2002), \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Syrian TV\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , October 22, 2002;\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Syrian TV\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , \line \tab \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 March 27, 2001, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); \line \tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 \ul0\nosu

persub\cf4\f5\fs24 Tishrin\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (Damascus), March 28, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb5\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 9. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , November 25, 2001; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Washington Post\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , July25, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex10010. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Washington Post\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , July 25, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Watan\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , (Kuwait), February 24, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 11. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Ha'aretz\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , September 2, December 25, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Yediot Ahronot\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , September 15, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 12. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , October 11, 2001; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-H

ayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , January 31, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24al-Jazira TV\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 13, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb8\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 13. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , September 10-11, 2002. \par\pard\li1560\sb218\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx3482 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 54\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June,2003)

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{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft5980\shptop14510\shpright6040\shpbottom14522\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz446\shplid8{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{

\sn geoRight}{\sv 60}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 12}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,12);(60,12);(60,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg12}{\bkmkend Pg12}\par\pard\ql \li4747\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li4747\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Syria and the War in Iraq \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1350\sb21\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 14. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , July 31, 2001; see also

 Dani Shoham, "Poisoned Missiles: Syria Doomsday \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Deterrent," \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Middle East Quarterly\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 13-22. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 15. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , September 10-11, 2002; April 14-15, 2003. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1346\sb18\sl-260\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 16. See Eberhard Kienle, Ba`th V Ba`th, The Conflict between Syria and Iraq,1968-1989 \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990).\par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1358\sb4\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 17. Eyal Zisser, Asad's Legacy - Syria in Transition (New York:

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 New York University \line\tab \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 Press, 2000), pp. 86-87; Eyal Zisser, "Syria," in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.) Middle \line \tab \up0\expndtw0\charscalex102 East Contemporary Survey (MECS),Vol. 24 (2000) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, \line \tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 2002), pp. 549-550. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1352\sb0\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 18. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , November 26, and December 13, 2001; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 INA\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Iraqi News Agency\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , Baghdad), \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 January 29, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-257\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 19. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Watan\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 12, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1345\sb13\sl-270\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 20. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Quds al-`Arabi\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24(London), October 10, 2000; see also Bashar's interview with the \line\tab \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Times\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , December 16, 2002. See \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Economist Intelligence Unit (EUI),\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Country Report \line \tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 (CR) - Syria - 2002, No. 1, pp. 2-5; See also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , October 29, 2002. \par\pard\ql\li1560\sb6\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 21. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Ha'aretz\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , January 24, 2001. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 22. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Ha'aretz\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , July 15, 2002, December 25, 2002. \par\pard\li1560\sb8\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx4119\tx4584 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex1

00 23. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Ha'aretz\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , December\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 25,\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 2002.  For the Syrian response, see \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Radio Damascus\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 ,\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi360 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 December 25, 2002, translated by FBIS. See also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Fox News\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 5, 14, 2003.\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 24. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Ra'y al-`Amm\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (Kuwait), December 24, 2001.\par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-261\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 25.\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 13, 2000. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb7\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 26. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , October 26, 2001,December 13, 2002. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1351\sb1\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \e

xpndtw-1\charscalex100 27. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Safir\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (Beirut), November 23, 2000; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 31, 2001, January 4, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-\line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Sharq al-Awsat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (London), August 30, 2001. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1359\sb0\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 28. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Tishrin\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , November 9, 2001; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Babil \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (Baghdad), November 9, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , November \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 11, 2001. \par\pard\li1560\sb1\sl-266\slmult0\fi0 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 29. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Sana\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24  (\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Syrian Arab News Agency\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 ), September 6, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\

f2\fs24 , November 14, 2002.\par\pard\li1560\sb2\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx3772\tx5545\tx5996\tx8414\tx8866 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 30. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Akhbar al-Sharq\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (London), April\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 18,\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 21,\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 2002, \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 ,\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\fi360 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 September 11, 2002.\par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 31. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Akhbar al-Sharq\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April

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18, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 21, 2002, April 1, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1348\sb5\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 32. Eyal Zisser, "Syria," in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.) Middle East Contemporary \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Survey (MECS),Vol. 23 (1999) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 560-\line \tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 561. See also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Tishrin\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , February 9, 15, 1999. \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1359\sb17\sl-260\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 33. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Sana\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 22, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Nahar\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (Beirut), March 23, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-`Arabiyya TV\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 25, \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 2003. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1332\sb4\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex103 34. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Safir\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 27, 2003; see also Bashar speech in the Arab summit in Sharm el-\line\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 Shaykh on March 1, 2003, \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Syrian TV\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , translated by FBIS. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 35. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 R. Damascus\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 10, 2003, translated by FBIS; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 10, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 36. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 R. Damascus\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 9, 2003, translated by FBIS; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Safir\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 10, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 37

. For al-Shara\u8217?s statement, see \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Sana\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 30, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\ri1359\sb5\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 38. The comparison was made during a press conference with the French Foreign Minister, \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-1\charscalex100 Dominique de Villepin. A\ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 l-Ra'y al-`Amm\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 13, 2003; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 12, \line \tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 39. For Bashar's interview see \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Safir\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 27, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 40. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 AP\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 28, and April 13, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 9, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Fox New

s\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 14, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb8\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 41. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 R. Damascus\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 27, 29, 2003, translated by FBIS. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 42. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 CNN\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 14, 2003; R. Monte Carlo, April 17, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 21, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 43. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April5, 2003; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 13, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Fox News,\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 April 15, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex100 44. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 CNN\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 13, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-5\charscalex10

0 45. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Tishrin\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 6,9, 13, 2003; See also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 CNN\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 13, 2003. \par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb224\sl-276\slmult0\fi0\tx10106 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)\tab \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex10055

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{\shp {\*\shpinst\shpleft1920\shptop10094\shpright5016\shpbottom10114\shpfhdr0\shpbxpage\shpbypage\shpwr3\shpwrk0\shpfblwtxt1\shpz499\shplid6{\sp{\sn shapeType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipH}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fFlipV}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn geoRight}{\sv 3096}}{\sp{\sn geoBottom}{\sv 20}}{\sp{\sn pVerticies}{\sv 8;4;(0,20);(3096,20);(3096,0);(0,0)}}{\sp{\sn pSegmentInfo}{\sv 2;10;16384;45824;1;45824;1;45824;1;45824;24577;32768}}{\sp{\sn fFillOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fFilled}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fillColor}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fLine}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn lineType}{\sv 0}}{\sp{\sn fArrowheadsOK}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn fBehindDocument}{\sv 1}}{\sp{\sn lineColor}{\sv 0}}}}\par\pard\sect\sectd\fs24\paperw11900\paperh16840\pard\sb0\sl-240{\bkmkstart Pg13}{\bkmkend Pg13}\par\pard\ql \li5416\sb0\sl-276\slmult0 \par\pard\ql\li5416\sb196\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 Eyal Zisser \par\pard\qj \li1560\sb0\sl-280\slmult0 \par\pard\qj\li1560\ri1343\sb21\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex104 46. See also Bashar speech

to the Arab summit in Sharm al-Shaykh on March 1, 2003, \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-4\charscalex100 \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Syrian TV\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , translated by FBIS. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 47. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , February 27, March 1, 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Akhbar\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 (Cairo), March 12, 16, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 48. For Bashar's speech, see \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 R. Damascus\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , March 10, 2003, translated by FBIS. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex10049. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Akhbar al-Sharq\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , January 19, 2003. \par\pard\qj \li1560\ri1347\sb5\sl-280\slmult0\tx1920 \up0 \expndtw0\charscalex100 50. Eyal Zisser, "Syria," in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.)Middle East Contemporary \line\tab \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 Survey (MECS),V

ol. 23 (1999) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), p. 548. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 51. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Watan\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , August 30, September 17, 2002. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 52. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 9, 13, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb1\sl-256\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 53. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Al-Siyasa\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 15, 2003; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 15, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb8\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 54. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Tishrin\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , 10 April 2003; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 R. Damascus\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 12, 15,2003, translated by FBIS. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-2\charscalex100 55. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 CNN\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 ,

 April 13, 2003. See \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 al-Hayat\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 21, 2003; see also \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , April 21, 2003. \par\pard\ql \li1560\sb4\sl-276\slmult0 \up0 \expndtw-3\charscalex100 56. \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Reuters\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 24, 2002; \ul0\nosupersub\cf4\f5\fs24 Ha'aretz\ul0\nosupersub\cf1\f2\fs24 , May 25, 2003. \par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-276\slmult0\par\pard\li1560\sb0\sl-

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