Synthetic Biology and Illegal Weapon Development

Promises, PromisesBrett Edwards

Overview

- Synthetic Biology and misuse concern- Promises about Synthetic Biology and

governance - Underperformance and narrowing of focus- The next steps: Re-invigoration or distraction?

Synthetic Biology (1)

• Defined initially by funding councils and research communities

• Promissory• Interdisciplinary• Controllable Biology• Application of engineering Principles?

Synthetic Biology (2)

• Six subfields (Lam et al 2009)– DNA circuits

• standard biological parts– Synthetic metabolic pathways

• biological synthesis of chemicals– Proto-cell creation

• model of a cell– Unnatural components

• New proteins, with functions– Synthetic microbial consortia

• Cells, working together

Range of misuse concernsScenario ExampleTerrorist misuse Terrorist group use technologies and scientific

knowledge to synthesis select-agent. Bad scientific practice A Scientist, through bad biosafety practice, allows

dangerous pathogen to escape ‘home-made’ lab. Criminal misuse of technology

The use of new techniques for the development of illegal drugs such as LSD.

Prank/ Publicity stunt

Student group release modified organism which cause harm or public panic.

State level misuse Scientists directly/indirectly contribute to covert weapons programme.

Inside Job Rogue scientist in biodefense programme orchestrates attack.

Why So much Synthetic Biology Chatter?

Synthetic Biologists National Security ELSI Community Gene Synthesis Industry Non-proliferation Bio-hackers

Early Anxieties 2003-2006Concerns about Gene- Synthesis technology

2003US/ UK government and emerging US SB

community

Concerns integrated in to EU then UK funding Criteria for Synthetic

Biology research networks

Concerns integrated into US NSF funding Criteria for

SynBERC - Concerns broadened to include:

State, terrorist and amateur misuse

Concerns prominent in ethics reports

SB community and industry identified as central in forward

looking responses

National focus of response

• Dual-use research– i.e identification of experiments of concern

• Dual-use Technology– I.e Industry screening of DNA sequences

• Dual-use techno-science– i.e changing innovation practices and relationship

of fields with existing governance systems

Key Promises

• Action of a responsible scientific community in developing responses

• Eventual response by state– Significant driver of self-governance response, also

added legitimacy• Anticipatory responses to ensure safe

development.

Policy developments and narrowing (2006-2012)

• Risk assessment and policy response activities in the US and UK- Narrowed to focus on terrorism and Laboratory

biosafety and biosecurity- Slow moving Federal Response US on both

research and tech concerns- Stalled response from UK government

Main out come

• Over-reach– US and UK institutions better at articulating

concerns than responding to them• NSABB/ Community/ Ethics bodies

• Externalisation of long term trend and militarization concerns

• Government adopts scientists/ industry responsibility and biosafety framing.

Examples

Forward looking concerns narrowed- Sloan report:

- Problem definition ‘feed back’- Industry outpaces government

- Absence of support for screening- uncertainty over future of screening

Consequential myths

• Belief that issue has ‘already been dealt with’ within some aspects of the community

• Belief that there has been a separate government strand of policy development

• Belief that Industry and Scientific community can identify fully respond to early ethical concerns (2003-2006)

Possible Contradictions

• Low substantive knowledge within much of the scientific community

• Absence of international agreement on gene-synthesis industry

• Continued case by case focus• Embryonic dual-use/ethics review in military investors• Absence of risk assessment criteria. • Struggles to implement ‘up-stream’ engagement

– Synbio communities– Regulators

Outcome

• We are waiting for the next ‘big thing’.– Threat/ incident/ tech-advance

Positives

• Synthetic Biology has become a ‘test- case’ often referred to at international level

• Evidence of awareness raising outreach• Expressed positions by key institutions to

some aspects of the field

New project

www.Biochemsec2030.org

Thanks! Brett Edwards

bwie20@bath.ac.uk