Swedish Club Report -Collisions and Groundings -2011

7/28/2019 Swedish Club Report -Collisions and Groundings -2011

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Collisions and Groundings

2011

www.swedishclub .com

Conclusionat page 13 Read about preventionat page 8


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Proac tive . Reliable . Committed

C o n t e n t s Executive summary 4

Introduction 5Abstract o the fndings 5The accident 5

Immediate cause 6 Root cause 7 Prevention 8 Bridge Design 9Sa e manning 9

Statistics 10

Conclusion 13

Contact persons 14

Loss Prevention publications 14


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Proactive . Reliable . Committed

Main areas o concern f Poor communication onboard the vessel because o

poor MRM which is poor communication betweenbridge team members, poor communication with thepilot or the other vessel

f Ignoring the Sa ety Management System

f Level o crews experience

f Pilot onboard during 53% o all collisions incongested waters

f Fatigue is a particular problem on smaller coastalvessels, where it is not unusual to just have twowatchkeeping o cers onboard including the captain

Remedies f Support and belie rom top management in MRM

f Shoreside need to lead by example and ensure thatcorrect procedures are implemented and ollowed

f Educate the bridge team about the importance o MRM, veri y this during internal audits and inspections

f Crew seminars and Captain con erences held topromote sa ety and company values

f Trained and skilled employees who can identi y and

prevent the chain o errors at an early stage f Identi y the root cause in order to prevent reoccurrence

Executive summary




H& M: claims distribution, cost 2001 2011, limit >= USD 10,000 (Non capped)

The cost of vessels colliding and run-ning aground is substantial for our members. From the statistics shown inthe chart we can see that almost 50% of the cost of all HM claims relate to these categories. Reducing the num-ber of these types of incidents would generate substantial savings for bothmembers and the Club.

As per 2011-08-17.

f

Below is a list o core questions relatingto why does it happen and, how canwe prevent it rom happening again?

f Are there any special recurringproblems?

f Can preventive measures be appliedto all vessels?

fHow can communication improvewithin the organisation?

f How can atigue be prevented?

Introduction When radar was introduced, it was believed that it would mean theend o collisions at sea, but un ortunately that is not the case. Todays

vessels are equipped with many di erent tools and technologies toprevent them rom colliding or running aground, but un ortunatelycasualties still happen.

f Why is the Sa ety ManagementSystem ignored (SMS)?

Shipowners are currently investingmore money than ever in training andnew equipment. At the same time, theproblem o inexperienced crew has nev-er been more obvious than today, andit is di cult or shipping companiesto nd experienced crew. Equally, in aharsh economic climate, it may not be a

top priority to invest in implementing asustainable sa ety culture.

The cost o running vessels withinexperienced crew may prove to be

substantial. A new capesize bulker intodays market is a multi-million dollarinvestment. Managing these vessels withan inexperienced crew could be bad as-set management and exposes investorsto unnecessary losses. The average costo a collision involving a bulker over thepast 10 years is USD 1,400,000 and USD900,000 or a grounding. Investing intraining would be cheap in comparison.

The consequences or shipping com-panies are not purely nancial, but alsoinclude: loss o lives, damage to theenvironment and loss o reputation.

Abstract o the fndings Main areas o concern

f Level o crews experience f Lack o properly implemented

sa ety culture f Communication f Ignoring the Sa ety Management

System f Fatigue

Consequences f Loss o li e

f Environmental damage f Damage to property

f Loss o earnings f Criminalisation o sea arers

Remedies

f Implement a sustainable sa etyculture

f Buy in rom top management inimplementing Maritime ResourceManagement (MRM)

f Invest in urther enhancing crewsexperience and competence

f Identi y the root cause o casualties

The accidentIt might seem strange that vessels stillcollide and especially on the open sea,where two vessels might be the onlyones on the horizon.

The main reasons or a typical colli-sion include the O cer O the Watch(OOW) not ollowing the COLREGs orthe companys Sa ety ManagementSystem. Collisions are o ten causedby a combination o inexperience andsystematic issues in the organisation.This could mani est itsel in the at-titude that it has become acceptable,within the shore-based organisation(or onboard), to take unsanctioned

risks and make shortcuts.




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This collision led to the total loss of the bulker. The container vessel had a speed of over 20 knots at the time of the collision.

H& M grounding: average claim cost

&requency2001 2011, limit >= USD 10 000 (Non capped) H

& M collision: average claim cost

&requency2001 2011, limit >= USD 10 000 (Non capped)

As per 2011-08-17. As per 2011-08-17.

The above graph shows that 2007 wasa very expensive year, and that the costdropped substantially in 2008 whenthe recession hit. Interestingly though,the requency graph is stable until 2011where we see a huge increase. Otherwise

the cost graph changes more requently.The all in cost since 2007 probablyrelates to the high speeds o containervessels during the last economic boom,and with high speed comes high cost.During 2008 and 2009 container vesselsstarted to operate slow steaming, andthe cost o collisions ell signi cantly. Itis worrying that we are now seeing anincrease in both cost and requency.

The graph or groundings is a little

di erent to the graph or collisions.It is obvious that both the cost and

requency or groundings were muchhigher during the last economic boom.

Un ortunately there is an increase inrequency or 2011.

Both graphs shows that there isa connection between an economicboom and the cost o navigational er-rors, which a collision or grounding is.

Underlying actors include, high speed,pressure or the vessel to be on time,high demand or reight capacity andhigh commodity prices.

Immediate causeIt is becoming apparent that manyo the collisions happen because thecompanys Sa ety Management Systemand navigation procedures have beenignored. I the Sa ety Management Sys-tem had been ollowed, it is likely thatthis would have prevented the collision.Simply having a Sa ety ManagementSystem is not enough, as there must

be a belie at the company that thesystem must always be ollowed. Thisbelie has to be trans erred to the crewon the vessel. It needs to be one o thecompanys priorities to improve sa ety.Shoreside need to lead by example and

ensure that their Superintendents andSa ety departments are inspecting andveri ying that correct procedures areimplemented and ollowed. The di -

culty is how to implement this.The immediate cause o a collision

or grounding is usually as stated above,that the OOW did not ollow the Sa etyManagement System. To be more spe-ci c, the ollowing issues are recurring:

1. Poor lookout2. Inadequate bridge team management3. Assumptions4. Complacency


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This collision happened in restricted visibility.

H& M collision: cost & requency as per vesseltype 2006 2011, limit >= USD 10,000

The graph above shows that the cost and frequency for collisions are much greater for bulker and container vessels than for any other types of vessels. As per 2011-08-17.

The cost and frequency of groundings are more similar between the different vessel types, but container and bulker vessels still incur the greatest cost. As per 2011-08-17.

H& M grounding: cost & requency as per vesseltype 2006 2011, limit >= USD 10,000

PreventionSo how can a shipping company mini-mise the risk o their vessels colliding orrunning aground?

First, the company has to recognisethat this is a substantial risk, and that

the company can infuence it. It is notenough hiring a crew with the correctcerti cates and having an approvedSa ety Management System; there needsto be a company culture that states thatthese are our values and that ensuresthat all employees are trained to knowwhat is expected o them.

One o the main problems is thatthe Sa ety Management System iso ten ignored and that technology andinstruments provided are not utilised.The interesting question is how can thisbe allowed?

In a couple o cases the captain didvisit the bridge when the vessel wasin restricted visibility, maintaining ullspeed and had no designated lookout.Why was no concern raised? How couldthis be acceptable when it clearly statesin the Sa ety Management System that

a designated lookout has to be postedand that the captain should be on thebridge at all times during restrictedvisibility. In other cases the captainhas entered and le t the bridge dur-ing manoeuvring and obviously did nothave ull situational awareness. Most

people reading this will know that thisis not what a prudent mariner does, andeven the o cer on the bridge mighthave known that it is not the correctprocedure; yet it is happening timea ter time.

The reasons or collisions or ground-ings do not seem to change a lot overthe years, as the same mistakes arebeing made over and over again. Thereare some new errors, such as beingdistracted by mobile phones or o cersnot being properly trained to handlenew technology.

A major actor in preventing collisionsand groundings is an investment in thecrew. The Swedish Club has a ratingsystem or ship managers called ShipManagement Evaluation (SME). Thisrating system measures the operator byanalysing the answers to 20 questionsthat are related to the operation, sa etyand training o the crew onboard thevessels. Tanker and cruise ship managersscore the highest in this rating system,and it is interesting to see that the col-lision and grounding requency is alsovery low or them.

From the graphs we can see that ocusing on the crews competence and having an e cient organisation is a good investm ent.




Bridge DesignOn todays modern bridge there arenot only a lot o di erent navigationalequipment but also equipment thatmakes it possible to monitor all activ-ity onboard the vessel, cargo handling,

ballast operations, re alarms, securitycameras, communication and engineper ormance. Todays o cers havemultiple tasks to deal with during thevoyage that are not related to naviga-tion. This can increase o cers stresslevels especially i they are not con dentabout using the equipment, or have notreceived the proper training. To be ableto optimally utilize the equipment, thedesign and ergonomics o it has to beconsidered. It has been discovered thatpoor design and ergonomics have been acontributing actor to some accidents.

The objective o the modern bridgeshould be to have an e cient placewith a high sa ety level. The ideal bridgeshould be designed to be e cient duringcritical operations, such as piloting andmanoeuvring. The objective should bethat it is designed or teamwork where

two people can monitor each other andcarry out tasks equally.In the study Bridge ergonomics and

usability o navigational system as asa ety and quality eature carried outby the University o the Aegean, it was

ound that ergonomic problems were oneo the causes o a number o accidents.Two o these cases were groundings inFinnish waters, and it was ound thatpoor ergonomics and poor bridge design

were contributing actors.In the rst grounding the authorities

ound that the control panel or the bowthrusters was not ideally positioned asit was placed behind the o cers chair.The vessel was also equipped with a

joystick that could be used or manoeu-vring but wasnt used because it was notin a user- riendly position. The main rea-sons or this accident were the masterslack o amiliarization with the bridgeequipment and lack o proper MRM.

In the second grounding the pilotused the autopilot or an alternationbut realized that more rate o turn

was needed. However, instead o us-ing the available rate o turn joystick,hand steering or non- ollow up, hesimply used autopilot. The investiga-tion discovered that some o the bridgeequipment was not in an ergonomic and

user- riendly position. The pilot also hadproblems understanding some o theradars unctions and using it properly.Because o this he lost situational aware-ness. It was ound that the crew waswell-trained and the pilot was very ex-perienced, but the cause o the ground-ing was that the alteration was delayedby one and a hal minutes as the pilotused autopilot. The investigators oundthat one o the contributing actors to

the grounding was that the bridge wasdys unctional and not user- riendly.These two groundings show the impor-tance o bridge design. It is imperativeto make an evaluation when new bridgeequipment is installed, as there is a riskthat new equipment can increase therisk o an accident i it is not positionedin a user- riendly way, or ergonomicallydesigned. I the o cer has to use theequipment that is positioned poorly,he might lose situational awarenessmomentarily, which could be a contri-buting actor to an accident.

Sa e manningFatigue is also a growing problem on-board vessels. With ewer crew mem-bers onboard, the pressure on everyoneis growing. This is a particular problemon smaller coastal vessels, where it is

not unusual to only have two watch-keeping o cers including the captain,compared with larger vessels wherethree watchkeeping o cers plus thecaptain is the norm. To operate the ves-sel with only a sa e minimum manningmight be su cient or some trades andareas, but it might not be applicable inareas with dense tra c or many portcalls. To navigate a coastal vessel inEurope with two watchkeeping o cersincluding the captain might be accept-able according to the sa e manningcerti cate, but the vessels trade mighthave changed and the number o port

calls might have increased, which makesit almost impossible or the watchkeep-ing o cers to get enough rest.

The impact o atigue has also beenidenti ed by the Australian MaritimeSa ety Authority (AMSA) as a major

concern a ter some incidents in 2010.During the Port State Control inspec-tion they not only inspect the hourso rest but also ensure that the Stan-dards o Training, Certi cation andWatchkeeping or Sea arers (STCW)convention is ollowed. I the recordsare ound not to be in accordance withSTCW, there is a risk that the vessel willbe detained. In the Marine AccidentInvestigation Branch (MAIB) Bridge

Watchkeeping Sa ety Study reportrom 2004, it was identi ed that most

accidents around the UK happenedwhen there was only one o cer onthe bridge, and the major cause was

atigue. It was identi ed that this issomething that the International Mari-time Organization (IMO) should try toremedy through the STCW convention.

The recommendations made by MAIBwere proposed by the UKs Maritimeand Coastguard Agency (MCA) toIMO, but un ortunately there were nochanges to the STCW code during theIMO Manila con erence on 25 June2010 which rati ed the Manila amend-ments to the STCW code. The amend-ments did not implement any stricterregime or vessels sa e manning; inResolution 6 it states; REAFFIRMSALSO that any decision relating to

ships manning levels is the responsibil-ity o the Administrations and shipown-ers concerned taking into account theprinciples o sa e manning adopted bythe International Maritime Organiza-tion. This would have been an excel-lent opportunity to make sa e manningrequirements stricter. Now it is still onlyup to the pro essional company to en-sure that they have su cient crew, thatthe crew is trained and understands thecompanys values and policies. Fatiguewill probably become an even hottertopic in coming years.




Collision: cost and requency as per vessel size 2001 2011, limit >= USD 10,000

The collision frequency is highest for smaller vessels, but the cost is greatest for larger vessels. As per 2011-08-17.

Collision: requency as per vessel size and type 2001 2011, limit >= USD 10,000

Smaller container vessels have the highest frequency. Interestingly though, the largest vessels have the lowest frequency for all different vessels except for container vessels where it is more similar between different vessel sizes. As per 2011-08-17.

Statistics




Grounding: cost and requency as per vessel size 2001 2011, limit >= USD 10,000

The statistics above are different to the collision statistics, here the mid-size vessels have the highest frequency and the largest vessels the lowest frequency, but when large vessels run aground it is very costly. As per 2011-08-17.

Grounding: requency as per vessel size and type 2001 2011, limit >= USD 10,000

The graph above is slightly different to the graph for collisions. Small and mid-size bulkers have the highest frequency. The frequency for tankers and container vessels is very similar between the different sizes, for RoRo and ferries the smallest vessels have higher frequency. This still indicates that the manning level is a problem to be concerned about. This is even more worry-ing when most collisions happen in congested waters where small coastal vessels usually operate. As per 2011-08-17.




Collision: vessel age, 2006 2011 Grounding: vessel age, 2006 2011

Distribution between age groups in relation to collisions and groundings is even. This would indicate that equipment is of less importance while the crews experience and the companys safety culture is more relevant. As per 2011-08-17.




It is also very important to identi y the root cause

o the problem, because the immediate cause isprobably just part o a greater ailure in the system.Then, o course, the immediate cause needs tobe acknowledged and recti ed. The most com-mon immediate causes are: poor lookout, lack o communication, which is poor MRM, not using allavailable equipment and technical means as creware supposed to, not ollowing company procedures,complacency and poor voyage planning. These areissues that can be addressed through crew semi-nars, internal audits and concentrated campaigns

to highlight recurring issues. To be able to recti ythe root cause, it is essential that top managementimplements a sa ety culture, believes in the entiresa ety concept and leads by example. In the o cethis needs to happen by the directors constantlyinstructing their departments to review their proce-dures so that the real cause can be identi ed.

It is evident that there is a correlation betweena good economic climate and higher claims costs.During a boom there is more pressure on the ship-ping companies to deliver cargo on time, and theremight be more competition rom new operators.

There is also a problem with atigue on vessels,as the number o crew members onboard alwaysseems to decrease. This could be addressed withstricter sa e manning requirements; it is a di cultpolitical issue but something that cannot be ignored.

The overall conclusion is not very surprisingand shows that the companies with the ewestcollisions and groundings are those companies thatinvest most in their shore-based organisation and

invest most in training and equipment.

Main areas o concern

f Poor communication onboard the vesselbecause o poor MRM which is poor com-munication between bridge team members,poor communication with the pilot or theother vessel

f Ignoring the Sa ety Management System

f Level o crews experience

f Pilot onboard during 53% o all collisions incongested waters

f Fatigue is a particular problem on smallercoastal vessels , where it is not unusual to

just have two watchkeeping o cers onboardincluding the captain

Remedies f Support and belie rom top management

in MRM

f Shoreside need to lead by example andensure that correct procedures are imple-mented and ollowed

f Educate the bridge team about the impor-tance o MRM, veri y this during internalaudits and inspections

f Crew seminars and Captain con erences heldto promote sa ety and company values

f Trained and skilled employees who canidenti y and prevent the chain o errors atan early stage

f Identi y the root cause in order to preventreoccurrence

ConclusionAs discussed in the introduction, it seems that it does not matter how good the

technology or tools are on the vessels, as vessels still collide. The main reasons seemto be a less viable sa ety culture and a lack o experienced crew. The combination o these two areas, which concerns both the vessel and shoreside management, leads tonavigational errors. To be able to prevent a collision or grounding, it is imperativethat the operator believes that an investment in sa ety and training is an investmentand not a cost. I the company is willing to invest money and time in their crew, this

will most likely lead to the crew eeling more part o the company and the vessel, asthey eel that the company thinks they are an asset and not a cost.

All statistics rom The Swedish Clubs database rom 2001 until August 2011.




Contact persons

Anders HultmanLoss Prevention Project Co-ordinator

Tel: +46 31 638 426Mobile: +46 704 784 992

E-mail: [email protected]

Joakim EnstrmLoss Prevention O cer

Tel: +46 31 638 445E-mail: [email protected]

Loss Prevention publications f Claims at a glance f Bridge & Engine instructions f Main Engine Damage f Securing o Cargo or Sea Transportation


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Head Office Sweden Visiting address: Gullbergs Strandgata 6,411 04 GothenburgPostal address: P.O. Box 171,SE-401 22 Gothenburg, SwedenTel: +46 31 638 400, Fax: +46 31 156 711E-mail: [email protected]: +46 31 151 328

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JapanSuzuyo Hamamatsucho Building 5f,2-1-16 Kaigan, Minato-Ku,Tokyo 105-0022, JapanTel: +81 3 5442 5466, Fax: +81 3 5442 5922E-mail: [email protected]: +81 3 5442 5466

NorwayTjuvholmen All 3,House of Business, 6 th Floor,N-0252 OsloTel: +47 9828 0514E-mail: [email protected]: +46 31 151 328

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Swedish Club Report -Collisions and Groundings -2011