Sustainability of Village Institutions Promoted by NGOscesc-india.org/Doc-Archiv/VI-R1-AKRSP-GVM-07.pdf · Sustainability of Village Institutions Promoted by NGOs 39 Sustainability

Sustainability of Village Institutions Promoted by NGOs 49

Sustainability of VillageInstitutions Promoted by NGOs

Case Study on the Gram Vikas Mandal Promoted byAKRSP(I), Netrang, South Gujarat

Forestry & Livelihoods

Geevan C.P.&

Satyasiba Bedamatta

research studies AUGUST 2007

A K R S P - I

AKRSP(I) a profile

P R O G R A M M E A R E A S O F A K R S P ( I N D I A )

Bharuch, Surat and Narmada districts are some of the poorest areas in the state of Gujarat. A very

poor tribal community live on undulating and degraded land that was once heavily forested.

Junagadh district on coastal Kathiawar Peninsula faces a problem of salinity due to overexploitation

of groundwater. Natural resource are either degraded (like the dry Meghal River) or out of bounds

for the tribals and other disadvantaged people (such as around the Gir Protected Area).

Surendranagar district is one of the most drought-prone districts of Gujarat. Most villages in this

district face an acute shortage of water.

In MP, AKRSP(I) has begun work in Khandwa and Burhanpur districts which are home to marginalized

tribal populations who live in poverty despite the rich natural resources base.

Kutch district is extremely drought prone, AKRSP (India) provides training to organisations coping

with drought in the district. It works in collaboration with other AKDN agencies to drought proof

several villages.


Sustainability of Village InstitutionsPromoted by NGOs

Case Study on the Gram Vikas Mandal Promoted byAKRSP(I), Netrang, South Gujarat

Forestry & Livelihoods

Geevan C.P.&

Satyasiba Bedamatta

Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (India)


FOREWORD

The question of institutional sustainability of diverse institutional arrangementspromoted as part of village development initiatives is of enormous significancefrom both theoretical and practical perspectives. Almost all rural developmentprogrammes in India mandate the promotion/capacity building of villageorganisations as a key component of their intervention. The experience of civilsociety initiatives on this question in the development sector in the last few decadesis also much debated. However, there have been very few attempts to documentthe emerging practices and to reflect on the experiences in varied contexts.

Aga Khan Rural Support Program (India) initiated a discussion forum on thisissue with NGO practitioners and academicians. The deliberations culminated ina decision to sponsor some focussed studies on the accumulated experiences ofNGOs and community institutions promoted in the last few decades. Theconsultations among various NGOs wholeheartedly supported the idea and itwas agreed to promote the effort as a combined initiative involving several NGOs(BSC, DSC, FES, MYRADA, PRADAN, SEWA MANDIR) who will facilitate thefield studies.

The study itself is envisaged as a participative process that provides space for thefield staff and community leadership to reflect on institution building experience.This document is one of the first in the set of case studies in this series. It covers awide canvass spanning the early phase of some of the oldest village organisationspromoted by the AKRSP.

I am happy to note that the study has been able to stimulate a wholesome debateand reflection at various levels, more so within the AKRSP, as the documentbrought to life many little known facets of the people�s institutions and the complexlandscape of institution building. I am sure this document is a useful step forwardin coming to terms with some of the broader issues of the institutional sustainabilityquestion. Let me also acknowledge the support of the Aga Khan Foundation,Ford Foundation and the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust in this effort.

Apoorva OzaChief Executive OfficerAKRSP (India)

Sustainability of Village Institutions Promoted by NGOs42

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Geevan C.P. obtained doctorate from the School of Environmental Sciences,Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and has about 25 years of workexperience on different aspects of environment and development. He currentlyheads the Centre for Environment and Social Concerns (CESC), Ahmedabad � aresource centre for interdisciplinary work in environment and development. Email:[email protected]

Satyasiba Bedamatta worked as a researcher in this study and is currently at theCentre for Inter-disciplinary Studies in Environment and Development (CISED),Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore. Email:[email protected]

Mailing Address:Centre for Environment & Social Concerns [CESC]R-1, Sagar Apartments (Opp. Sarthi Hotel), BodakdevAhmedabad 380054 (Gujarat, INDIA)web: www.cesc-india.orgTel/Fax: +91-79-26853297; Mobile: 9824283954email (Office): [email protected]


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We acknowledge the initiatives of the Village Institution Task Force constituted by theAKRSP (I) and the various discussions within the Task Force that prepared the groundsfor this study. This work forms part of a larger multi-location research initiated by theTask Force partnered by several NGOs and supported by the AKRSP (I).

Dr Somnath Bandyopadhyay has the ingenuity of posing well nigh impossible as �do-able�! Once again, he dared us to delve into the rather difficult waters of institutionalanalysis. We embarked on this with considerable trepidation. We wish to thank himfor encouraging us to undertake this stupendous task. As we took the first hesitantsteps into the fuzzy space of institutional sustainability, Apoorva Oza had the foresightof insisting on enunciating a theoretical edifice for the study. With hindsight, we thankhim for asking us to prepare a working paper on the subject and getting it circulated.This also helped to buy in other NGO partners into this study.

We are grateful to the different NGO partners who organised team meetings to listento our approach and contributed proactively to improving it. The suggestions fromthese meetings have shaped and strengthened the study framework. In particular, wewish to thank Dinesh Parmar and Gita Oza of BSC; Sachin Oza of DSC; JagadeeshRao and Subrat Singh of FES; Yashmin Mistry, Lathamala and Vidya Ramachandranof MYRADA; D Narendranath and Achintya Ghosh of PRADAN and Neelima Khetanand Hemang Bhati of Seva Mandir for their encouragement and support.

This work is enriched by the wholehearted participation by the AKRSP (I) NetrangSpear Head Team (SHT) who shared their insights, field experiences and perceptions.The team contributed immensely by organising two workshops involving the SHTleadership and the cluster-level leadership besides several rounds of discussions in whichthe entire SHT leadership participated. In particular, we record the appreciation ofinputs provided by Suneel Padale, Natwarsinh Gohil, Thakarshi Darva and MahendraPatel. The village community has supported the fieldwork and provided insights.

We are thankful to Christopher Gibbs, K.V. Raju, Tushar Shah, Ram Prasad and AliShariff for the critical comments and suggestions. We thank Niraj Joshi for the logisticalsupport provided during the study. Jyotirmayee Acharya has shouldered theresponsibilities of bringing this into print. The work has benefited greatly from severaldiscussions, comments received through email and the review workshop in early March2006 attended by the NGO partners of the larger study.


CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.3 Interventions by AKRSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1.4 Gram Vikas Mandal (GVM) � The VI in Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2 Method/ Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2.1 Defining Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.2 Framework for investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.3 Selection of Study Villages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3 Natural Resources & Environment � Netrang Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

3.1 Forest Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

3.2 Succession of Forestry Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3.3 Land Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4 Group Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4.1 Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4.2 Leadership and Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4.3 Inter-Village Conflict Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

5 Institutional Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

5.2 Relations with Other Organisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5.3 Rules/Norms for Resource Use and Benefit Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

5.4 Forest Resources � Rules and Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5.5 Summary of Institutional Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

5.6 Relation with External Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

6 Organisational Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

6.2 Key Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

6.3 Member Centrality, Savings and Livelihood Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29


6.4 Building Social Capital � a Multi-Layer approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

6.5 Gender Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

6.6 Restructuring the GVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

6.7 Silent Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

6.8 Close Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

6.9 Emerging Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

7 Concluding Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

7.1 Resources, Rights, AKRSP & Forest Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

7.2 Livelihood Enhancement & Institutional Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

7.3 Inclusive Approach to Non-Members. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

7.4 Success of GVM as a Pan Village Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

7.5 Exit Strategy & Post-Exit Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

7.6 Issues for Further Probe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

ABBREVIATIONS

AKRSP Aga Khan Rural Support Program (India)CFM Community (based/ managed) forest managementCPR Common Property ResourceDFO Divisional Forest OfficerFD Forest DepartmentFDL Forest Department Land/ ForestlandFPC Forest Protection CommitteeGVM Gram Vikas MandalGW Group WellsJFM Joint Forest ManagementMVM Mahila Vikas MandalNGO Non-governmental OrganisationNRM Natural Resources ManagementNTFP Non-Timber Forest Products (includes firewood)PIM Participatory Irrigation ManagementSHG Self-Help GroupsSHT Spear Head TeamVKS Van Kalyan SamitiWSD Watershed Development


1 Introduction

1.1 Background

There is currently an overriding emphasis on theneed for achieving institutional sustainability asa normative principle in development action,particularly in the planning and implementationof medium to long-term projects (Chambers,1983; Shah, 2003). Institutions are humanlydevised constraints that structure political,economic and social interaction. They consist ofboth formal rules and informal constraints(North, 1990). Village Institutions (VI) work asmechanisms to ensure norms to govern orregulate the access of villagers or outsiders toresources and specify relations among them.Often the norms � formal or informal - are wellunderstood, respected and observed by thevillagers. From a development perspective, VI�sare crucial vehicles through which developmentinitiatives by Non-Government Organisations(NGO) are endorsed, empowered andimplemented.

The challenge of sustainability is to ensureperpetuation of appropriate institutionalarrangements. The experience of civil societyinitiatives in the development sector in the lastfew decades has underlined the importance ofthe sustainability of village institutions and theneed for a better understanding of thesustainability question in the context of VillageInstitutions (VI) and Village Level Organisations(VLO). As a follow-up to the discussions on thisquestion, Aga Khan Rural Support Program(India) [AKRSP] constituted a Village InstitutionTask Force and subsequently initiated studies onsustainability in the context of natural resourcesmanagement.

This research forms a part of the larger effortinitiated by the Task Force and is envisaged as apartnership involving several NGOs. Seven NGOpartners1 with a credible track record indevelopment work spanning more than a decadehave agreed to participate in this study. Thisreport emerges from the first case study carriedout to develop and test the investigationframework as well as to establish the feasibilityand utility of the outputs from such an effort.This preliminary effort has given valuable insightsinto the post-exit functioning of the Gram VikasMandal, a VI model promoted by the AKRSP inthe tribal areas in Gujarat falling under the aegisof the AKRSP�s Netrang Spear Head Team2

(SHT).

1.2 Objectives

The focus of this study is on the factors favouringfor the sustainability of the Village Institutionspromoted by NGOs. Related to this inquiry are agamut of questions on the policies and practicesof stakeholders that affect the sustainability. Theprime difficulty in this investigation is the lack ofan unambiguous understanding or definition ofsustainability and universally agreed measuresfor institutional sustainability. In particular, wehave seen that given the multiplicity of visionsand diverse approaches to development, differentNGO who promote the VI have their own viewson sustainability. Therefore, in this study we haveadopted an approach that tries to examineinstitutional sustainability within a logicalframework that incorporates the vision of theNGO. The objectives of the study are:

1. Prepare a status report on the interventionsand institutional issues that appear to be

1 1) Aga Khan Rural Support Program (India) � AKRSP, 2) Behavioural Science Centre (BSC), 3) Development SupportCentre (DSC), 4) Foundation for Ecological Security (FES), 5) Mysore Relief & Development Agency (MYRADA), 6) SevaMandir and 7) Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN)

2 The team of professional supervising programmes implemented through several cluster-level offices of the AKRSP.


�special� or �specific� to the Village LevelInstitutions that have exhibited potential forlong-term sustainability

2. Analyse and critically review thesustainability question, exit strategies of thepromoting NGO and post-exit support needsof the village level institution

3. Examine the capabilities of VIs for adaptingto new challenges under changingdevelopment scenarios

4. Examine the merits of community-basedinstitutional approaches in natural resourcemanagement to effect livelihoodsenhancement

1.3 Interventions by AKRSP

The interventions by AKRSP since 1985 in theprogram areas serviced by the Netrang SHTinclude enhancing the productivity of landowned by the poor tribal communities,development of water resources, communityinitiatives in agricultural input supply andmarketing, several micro finance, credit andsavings initiatives, empowerment of women,forestry activities leading to the protection andregeneration of large tracts of degraded forestland, overall increase in the quality of life,incomes, livelihood diversification and significantcapacity building of the communities

The early phase of AKRSP�s efforts in the programarea under Netrang SHT was conditioned by theneed for better natural resource managementgiven the high level of forest degradation and thedire need for soil-moisture conservation measuresin these hill tracts. The initiatives by the AKRSPin the region preceded the official recognitionaccorded to community-based forestry, land

regeneration or irrigation management. Theseefforts, thus, happen to be precursors to themainstream approaches such as Joint ForestManagement, Watershed Development Programand Participatory Irrigation Management. Thecommunity efforts for protection of forest (onland owned by the State Forest Department) aswell as regeneration of forests on revenue land(the land owned by the State Revenue Department)were part of the early efforts in the region. Whenthese initiatives were started there was no enablingpolicy environment to support such efforts and theAKRSP had to undertake considerable lobbyingto ensure that these efforts are not choked by thelocal administration. As of now, the activities inthe 225 villages span several sectors such as:Forestry, Soil and Water Conservation (SWC),Irrigation and Participatory IrrigationManagement (PIM), Watershed Development,Joint Forest Management, Micro Credit, Energy(Biogas), Agriculture and Animal husbandry. Thedata gathered from the case study villages duringthis study show that the interventions haveresulted in significant positive changes in thelivelihood patterns in different villages.

1.4 Gram Vikas Mandal (GVM) –The VI in Focus

The pan-village organisation � Gram VikasMandal (GVM) � was the main vehicle for entry-level activities as well as later interventions inforestry and soil-water conservation. The GVMis primarily envisaged as a multi-stakeholder,membership-based organisation that will bringabout wise use of the natural resources therebyhelping to enhance livelihood systems. The GVMmodel and shaping it to meet the institutionalneeds of managing common property resources3

3 Common Property Resource - a form of property rights regime in which certain degree of controls and regulation areenforced through mutual agreement among the users of the resource, without anyone exercising individual ownershipright. The forest land in this specific context is de facto CPR as it is legally under the ownership of the State ForestDepartment.


(CPR) such as forests and village land marks aphenomenal effort on the part of the AKRSP inattempting to develop sustainable villageinstitutions. As of now, many of the GVMspromoted in the early phase are neithersupported directly nor monitored by AKRSP.During the consultations with the Netrang SHT,the consensus was that, although, the strategynow lays greater emphasis on leaner organisationswith narrow interests, the question of whetherGVMs have survived and how the institutionalarrangements for resources sharing andmanagement have evolved autonomously ofAKRSP is of considerable interest from the pointview of understanding the sustainability of villageinstitutions.

The Mahila Vikas Mandal (MVM) was promotedto facilitate the participation and empowermentof women, since within GVM, despiterepresentation, women were relegated to amarginal role in the decision-making. Right fromthe beginning, these organisational modelsemphasised savings as a key element. GVMcomplemented by MVM was the main vehicle ofcommunity mobilization in the early phase whencommunity forestry and land regeneration wasthe focus. However, this is not the case now. Atpresent, the organisational development favoursthe formation of interest groups and subsequentlyfederating the interest groups to take advantageof the economies of scale and improvingfunctional efficiency. However, in the context ofmanaging natural resources requiring collectiveefforts and self-regulation, such as in the case offorest conservation, irrigation and landmanagement, the evidence from this and otherstudies show that GVM has proved to be verysuccessful.

GVM – The VI in Focus

� Promoted as a representative institution of thewhole village

� Multi-purpose institution - social transformation,NRM, savings, credit, marketing, etc

� Not an adaptation or strengthening of traditionaltribal institutions/ organisations

� Doubling up as project vehicles requiringconformity with project and legal requirementssuch as JFM, WSD, etc

� Subject to vigorous and disciplined organizationaldevelopment efforts � more of design and craftingthan evolution

� Persistent efforts by AKRSP to ensure that it isrelevant and meaningful to the needs of thecommunity and NRM

Model appears to be well rooted in the community,almost as if VI evolved from within

Method/ Approach

The theoretical framework for the study ofsustainability relies considerably on the largebody of literature on institutional analysis(Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988; Uphoff 1982; North1990). A major challenge in the Netrangprogramme area is that of managing CommonProperty and Open Access Resources. Theparameters for the study are drawn from themajor studies on institutional arrangements forthe management of the commons and a series ofworking papers on the concept of social capitaland its measurement. A systematic checklist wasprepared based on these theoretical literature andempirical studies. This framework was thenapplied to analyse the empirical observations andrelate them to the design principles4 that impactsustainability of the GVM promoted by theAKRSP in the Netrang programme area.

4 Ostrom (1990) defines �Design principles� as essential elements, or conditions that help to account for institutionalsustainability in CPR�s.


1.5 Defining Sustainability

According to Honadle and VanSant (1985),sustainable institutions are those that survive overtime as identifiable units, recover some or evenall their costs, and supply a continuing stream ofbenefits. Multiple criteria must be satisfied aslongevity, cost recovery or benefit flows bythemselves are just not enough. The meaning ofinstitutional sustainability, as expressed here, isanalytic, not normative and intends to capturewhy institutions tend to persist or perish; not toascertain whether they ought to sustain. Dietz etal (2002) believe institutional sustainability to bethe continued use of an institution over time withadaptation occurring in day-to-day rules withinthe broad framework of stable institutionalarrangements.

Measurement of sustainability is widelyrecognised as an immensely difficult problem, asconventional monitoring and evaluationmethods, mostly using economic analysis, areconsidered insufficient to detect or quantifysustainability (Brown et al., 1987; Carpenter,1993; Chopra, 2001; Landell-Mills, 1998). Thesustainability question, therefore, poses a hugedilemma on one hand of whether a particulardefinition ought to be adopted and used in anormative sense and on the other, havingadopted one definition or another, whetheradequate and agreed measures or evaluationframeworks are, indeed, available to test it.

In the absence of a universally accepteddefinition, we have adopted an eclectic approachthat lays emphasis on the following:

� Survival or durability of village levelorganisations over a long period or whatOstrom calls the long endurance of self-governing CPR institutions as one key aspect

(i.e., the village level organisation continuesto be fostered by the village community evenafter the NGO has ceased to directly supportor guide it and enjoys considerable legitimacyin the village)

� The VI has a significant role in the NRMactivities with the sanction of the community

� Norms and practices evolved through thevillage level organisation persist and isperceived as beneficial by the villagecommunity

The current capabilities of the VI in these differentaspects may vary. Also, the VI many not exist inthe same form as it was in its earlier phase whenit was supported directly by the promoting NGO.The factors that appear to strengthen or weakenthe sustainability on various counts are examinedusing a framework developed from a review ofthe writings of the leading thinkers on the subject.

1.6 Framework for investigation

Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) and Baland andPlatteau (1996) identify specific conditions thatare most likely to promote local institutions tomanage CPR�s5 . Their research representsdiverse approaches to empirical comparativeresearch, and relies on different datasets. Wadecollected data from 31 villages in a single districtin South India; Ostrom focuses primarily onspecifics of institutional arrangements inaccounting for successful governance of CPR.Baland and Platteau used wide-ranging casesand economic literature on property rights(Agarwal, 2002). There is considerableconvergence in these studies.

Their investigations are focussed on four themes:1) Resource characteristics, 2) Groupcharacteristics, 3) Institutional Arrangements and4) Relationships between group and external

5 For some other frameworks to analyse CPR�s, see Oakerson (1992) and Edwards and Stein (1998)


forces and authorities such as markets, state andtechnology (Fig. 2-1). Taken together, the workpresented here uses the common elements drawnfrom such studies as the basis for analysissustainability of institutional arrangements tomanage the �Commons� in order to ascertainthose design principles that have affected, eitherpositively or negatively, the sustainability of theVI being studied. The conceptual framework forexamining local organisations in naturalresources management has been presented in aconcise review by Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick(1995) of the theoretical and empirical literatureon the institutional sustainability by Ostrom(1990, 1992), Wade (1988), Burdhan (1993),Bromley and Cernea (1989).

The institutional changes brought about throughthe GVM was studied through a multi-trackapproach that involved discussions with theAKRSP team, interactions with the villagers andfield studies to ascertain the functioning of villagelevel institutions. These changes were mappedacross the periods when AKRSP was activelyguiding the GVM and after its exit throughinterviews and focussed group discussionsconducted with the members of the VI, officebearers of the VI, non-members, NGO staff, andNGO leadership.

1.7 Selection of Study Villages

The six villages included in this study are chosenfrom the 225 villages under the Netrang SHT. Theinterventions include forestry, watersheddevelopment and irrigation management. Duringthe consultations with the SHT it was decided toinclude only forestry and soil-water-conservation(SWC) in this set of studies. The selection criteriaimplied that only those VI from which AKRSPhas exited qualify. This meant that only about 25to 30 villages would be the candidates for thestudy. Since the lessons of the study must benefitthe long-term interests of the SHT, theinvestigators requested the SHT leadership toshort list about ten candidate villages. Out ofthese, six were chosen representing differentsituations � more general cases, as well those withspecific features: social heterogeneity, special roleof women�s mobilization, remoteness of thevillage, final harvest problem, forestry, forestry+ SWC and/or watershed (Table 2-1). They couldbe considered as a 20 to 25% statistical sample.However, these are considered here only asillustrative cases of the working of the GVMmodel under a very wide spectrum of the villagelevel situations. The fieldwork was carried out inAugust � September 2005.

Figure 1-1: Analytical framework used to study the sustainability of village organisations

Physical Characteristicsof Resources

GroupCharacteristics

InstitutionalArrangements

Relation withExternal Agencies

Local Organisationfor NRM

Outcome in terms ofResource Management

& Livelihoods


2 Natural Resources & Environment– Netrang Region

The region receives high rainfall (more than 1200mm per annum) and is part of the humid part ofthe Gujarat State. In ecological terms, the forestsin the region consist of mixed moist-deciduousand dry-deciduous types. Large parts of theforests were transformed into teak forests duringthe British rule for production forestry. The regionbelongs to the talukas affected by high levels ofsoil erosion (Geevan et al, 2002) and the districtsof Bharuch and Surat are part of a region thathas witnessed a general decline in dense forestcategory during the last three decades (Dixit etal, 2001). The forest degradation and soil erosionhas adversely affected the agriculturalproductivity of the hill tracts of the region. Theearly 1980�s had also saw the state governmentallowing the conversion of forestlands intoagricultural land on large-scale. The massive treefelling by the paper and pulp industry denudedlarge tracts of bamboo forests. The forest dwellingtribal communities dependent heavily on forestresources were mute spectators to the large-scaleforest loss and had no role or say in themanagement of the resources, until the adoptionof the JFM policy.

2.1 Forest Resources

The AKRSP began working in the region at a timewhen the forest resources had been degraded andthe communities dependent on the forestresources had little incentive or options for helping

in the regeneration or conservation. Theconditions were such that there was nearcomplete alienation of the local communities fromthe management of forests, huge uncertaintyassociated with the future flow of benefits, lackof properly defined boundaries over which anyform of resource regulation could be attemptedand the difficulties in limiting benefits only tothose who help in the regeneration (i.e.,difficulties of excludability). Against thisbackground, the AKRSP attempted to encouragecommunity initiatives to conserve forests in theself-interest of the community. Forestry wasinitiated �informally� on forestland under forestdepartment without any explicit agreement aswell as on common land of the village andrevenue land belonging to the revenuedepartment. The flow of benefits was to beensured in different forms, over differentcommunity managed patches and over varioustime frames. There is need for more reflection andanalysis on the related strategic aspects, whichis not attempted here.

The tree species such as teak, shisam, etc can fetchvery high market value in mature form. Even thetimber of younger trees is highly valued. Theharvest of mature trees in certain cases can beobtained only after about 10 to 15 years. Maturebamboo can harvested in a growth cycle of about5 to 7 years. Grass is available in the first fiveyears of the plantation phase, and it graduallydecreases as the canopy cover thickens inhibiting

Table 1-1: Glimpse of the 6 Villages Studied

AKRSP Village Start of HH Remarks Forest SWCCluster Office Intervention Prot. (Ha) (Ha)

Netrang 1. Bharada 1994 90 Chaudhury 1, rest Vasava 190 185

2. Rajvadi 1995 300 Vasava (91), Chaudhury (105), Gamit (104) 296 50

3. Sakva 1989 88 Vasava 82, Tadbi 2, Patel 4 72 200

Dediapada 4. Kanjay 1995 58 Vasava 57, Gauda (grazier) 1 51 58

5. Mulkapada 1991 250 Kotwalia (65), rest Vasava 30 148

Sagbara 6. Moti Nal 1996 386 Marwadi 1 50 500


undergrowth. Year-round supply of smalltimber, dry wood, etc is possible. Pruning andlopping is done once in a year. Thus, the resourceavailability and benefit flows vary both over timeand in quality, as well as its end uses. Fodder toois available from some of the trees. Soundmanagement entails judicious scheduling of theextraction, choice of species mix, tree density, etc.

Table 3-1 presents rich detail of the forestry effortsin the region. The area under CFM varies a lotfrom village to village and is somewhat unrelatedto the demography of the village. Bharada hasover 2 ha of CFM area per HH, while a very largevillage like Moti Nal (4.3 times the number of HHin Bharada) has only 0.1 ha per HH (i.e., 1/20th

of Bharada). In the case of Rajwadi too, a villagewith more than 3 times the number of households

than Bharada, the CFM area available per HH ishalf that of Bharada. It is possible that withcertain approaches to livelihood improvementsand resources management, the communitiescould significantly reduce their dependence onforest resources. Even in the best cases, this wouldbe a very gradual process and in the short tomedium term, a community traditionallydependent on forest would continue to havefairly high levels of such dependence. Therefore,it is necessary not to underestimate the need forCFM efforts and appropriate village institutionsunder such conditions.

Our field observations and careful synthesis ofthe qualitative and quantitative informationshows that among the six villages, in terms offorest resources Bharada is the best, followed by

Table 2-1: Characteristics of the Forest Areas associated with GVM

Villages Community Area CFM Plots (!) Fuel Green Grass Grazing Small NTFP FinalForestry Per Ha added Wood Fodder Timber (@) HarvestArea (*) (ha) HH (ha) & (Year)

50 (1994)30 (1995)

Bharada 190 2.120 (1996)

H M H H H L Due45 (1997)30 (1998)15 (2005)

55 (1995)30 (1996)61(1999)

Rajvadi 296 1.0 50 (2001) H L H M H L Due40 (2002)50 (2003)10 (2005)

Sakva 72 0.845 (1989)

H L L H M L Due27 (1995)

Kanjay 51 0.920 (1995)

H M H H H L Due31 (2003)

Mulkapada# 0 0.0 30 (1992) L L L H M L Denied

Moti Nal 50 0.120 (1998)

H M M H M L Not due30 (2004)

(*) Area under JFM or Community Forestry with or without AKRSP support; # No CFM now(!)CFM (community forestry management) plots added in different years: CFM plots started in different years result in diversity of age andspecies; includes JFM areas with Adikar Patra and community forestry areas without formal permissions(@) NTFP – Fruits, berries, honey, herbs, etc. There are no commercially important NTFP in these forests and there is not much demand forthe available itemsH: High, M: Moderate, L: Low (based on the qualitative and quantitative data collected during fieldwork)


Rajwadi and Kanjay. Despite the enormousenhancements in agriculture-based livelihoodsand improvements of land resources, thesevillages show considerable interest in CFM,indicating their huge stake in forest resources, notwithstanding livelihood diversification and theconsequent expected decline in their dependenceon forest. In the context of sustainability, theactual degree of dependence needs to be properlyassessed, as institutional arrangements are closelylinked to the resource management challenges.

2.2 Succession of Forestry Efforts

The community forestry efforts in the region wereinitiated by the AKRSP in the mid 1980�s. Amongthe study villages, the earliest CFM effort is of1989 in Sakva village followed by Mulkapada in1992 (Table 3-1). The six villages studied exhibitmuch variation in the progress of CFM. The CFMeffort in Mulkapada village, one of the earliest tojoin the effort, however, was limited to just one.Sakva, Kanjay and Moti Nal villages had two,while Bharada and Rajwadi had 7 and 6 efforts,respectively. In terms of resource availability, asuccession of CFM, even if they are in smallpatches, has major implications.

As one forest patch on which regeneration workhas been successfully carried out gets older, theflow of benefits undergoes major changes. Interms of the NGO support, the early phaseinvolves plantation and other forestry efforts thatprovide employment and wage labour to thecommunity. All rules/ norms are also strictlyenforced in this period. As the trees grow andthe canopy thickens, undergrowth of grass isinhibited, reducing the abundance of grass andshrubs. Before the trees mature, there is plenty ofgreen fodder available from the trees that are nottoo tall. However, once the trees become very tall,these are beyond the reach of both people andgrazing animals. Some of the trees also serve assources of fuel wood. The forest department,

which regulates the access rights, permits certaintypes of activities depending on the status of theregenerated forest. When there is no successionof CFM efforts, only the old mature trees that donot provide a mix of benefits are left.

Another important aspect of the CFM is that theeffort acts as a pivot around which village levelsocial mobilization activity gets organized. Thereis a flurry of activity involving the GVM once aCFM is started. When there is a succession ofCFM, with or without the formal permission oradhikar patra, there are various stages of socialcapital development and the same VLO goesthrough various levels of capacity building. Also,the VLO has many, many opportunities todevelop its negotiation capabilities vis-à-visexternal agents and agencies. However, delaysand non-issuance of permissions (adhikar patra)is a factor that de-motivates the villageorganisations (Gupta and Joshi, 2004). Whenthere is a succession of forestry efforts it resultsin several forestry plots of varying age, possiblywith greater vegetation diversity mix as well. Solong as there are forest tracts to regenerate and aproper schedule is followed, there will becommunity managed forest patches at differentstages of growth. Once a patch is cleared for finalharvest of timber, the cycle could start all overagain. A series of CFM efforts provides theopportunity to alter the tree species mix to suitthe ecological needs and match community�schanging requirements.

The forest resources as a renewable and managedresource must be understood in terms of thespecies diversity, the flow of benefits that couldbe realized, the mix of forest resources that thecommunity associated with its managementactually need, and the possible harvesting cycles.We have not been able to examine these aspectsin sufficient detail and to discuss how far theforestry efforts have incorporated suchconsiderations into the resource management


regimes or into the norms adopted by the villageinstitutions. We do feel that the subject merits adetailed probe in the long-term interest of the JFMprogram. However, our observation is that theseare important combination of factors having abearing on the sustainability of village institutionsinvolved in forestry management.

The CFM is an experience that transports thegroup involved in it through a huge learningprocess encompassing experimentation in socialmobilization and institutional changes.Therefore, the net outcome from a series of suchefforts would be very different from a single effort,even if the single effort happened to be a greatsuccess. In resource terms, a single JFM wouldinevitably tend to over-emphasise the finalharvest, as there are no dynamic changes in theresource characteristics after the even age standin the forestry tract under the single effort hasmatured. In the absence of any other managedforest resource, all hopes are pinned on the finalharvest. The final harvest, however, isqualitatively very different from the regular andperiodic resource flows. It is the long-term assetaccrued from the CFM after testing the patienceof the VLO for more than a decade. Despite asea change in policy environment, there isabsolutely no certainty that the community willbe accorded full rights to the final harvest. Whena series of CFM is undertaken, one after another,with a gap of one or two years in between, notonly is the Village Level Organization very activein the CFM, but also there are multiple layers ofbenefits including the wage labour opportunityavailable from the plantation and the soil/waterconservation activities being carried out in aproject mode. When we look at the data on thesesix villages all these aspects need to be kept inmind.

For example, if we take the case of Rajwadi witha new forestry effort every year from 1999 to

2005, except 2000 and 2004, it is quite evidentthat a succession of CFM has yielded a rich streamof benefits. The community needs a mix ofresources and if multi-layer forest stands ofuneven age classes are under communitymanagement, diverse flows could be realized.Additionally, when a new CFM activity is started,the group also gets employment for about amonth. Once a decade or so has elapsed, thequestion of final harvest no longer remains ahypothetical one. It becomes a �live� issue withthe FD very reluctant to keep its word or honourthe terms of the contract and pass on the benefitsof final harvest due to the community. The FD isin no hurry to resolve the question of final harvest.Instead, the community becomes party to addingmore area under CFM (informal JFM). In fact, ifthe benefits from final harvest is allowed, andthe timber or bamboo, as the case may be, isharvested, then the CFM cycle can re-start by re-planting the area from where the final harvestwould be taken. Without allowing final harvestdue in 2003-2004, another 60 ha was added tothe informal JFM of Rajwadi. At the same time,many villages with active VLO have no new JFM,neither formal nor informal. The Rajwadi villagecontinues to work with the FD despite thereluctance of the department to grant the groupthe benefits of final harvest. Our field leveldiscussions indicate that the series of forestryefforts inhibits them from embarking on aconfrontation with the FD. After all, the lessonof Mulkapada is all too evident: better accept theunfair arrangements with FD, than risk theclosure of the CFM option altogether. Theinformal and formal CFM arrangements thusprovide opportunities for the communities toengage in a dialogue with the FD, irrespective ofthe ambiguities regarding the fate of final harvest.

The discussions with the villagers also point toanother aspect of resource flows: the mereexistence of a CFM plot does not imply that all


the forestry resource needs are fully met from theCFM areas. In fact, while varying degrees ofcommunity protection is accorded to the CFMareas, large forest tracts exist, de facto, in a stateof open access. The field discussions clearly showthat the actual dependence of different villageson forest resources has not dramatically reduced.The gap between the supply from CFM areas andthe actual demand appear to be met from theopen access forests under the de jure control ofthe forest department.

2.3 Land Resources

AKRSP was quick to realize that as important asforestry was the need for soil moistureconservation measures since the small and

fragmented agricultural land on hill slopessuffered from low productivity and faced varyingdegrees of soil erosion. The importance ofagriculture had gradually increased in thelivelihoods of the communities with the 1980�smarking a major shift in the livelihood systems.One part of the AKRSP�s strategy was of makingthe agriculture more productive and agriculture-based livelihoods more secure. The soil and waterconservation (SWC) activities covering bothcommon and private land resulted in large-scaleimprovements in the land resources, reducing soilerosion by treating vast areas of the hill slopesand helping the tribal farmers to protect each plotwith farm-bunds6 . Both physical barriers usingstones and live fencing with certain species of

6 Village like Munkapada, has a long history of making farm-bunds. During 1970�s one Christian missionary organisation(Adibasi Samajik Kendra, Nibalda), had promoted SWC activities.

Table 2-2: Land resource characteristics in the study villages

Villages Agric. Irrig. % HH Irrig. Major Pasture SWC SWC SWCLand Area with 2 Sources Crop (ha) & Farm Area to- AGL (Ha) crops/ Bunds (ha) AGL(Ha) Year (Year) (%)

Bharada 216 10 22 Wells: 1 common (FD); Tuar, juar, paddy 3 1997 185 86(14%) Check dams: 1 (FD)

Rajvadi* 415 10 > 17 Wells: > 30 (Pvt.); Cotton, Paddy, 0 1997 50 12(2%) 2 Common (FD); juar, tuar, wheat,

Diesel Pumps: > 25 makfali

Sakva# 220 40 28 Wells: 5(Pvt); GW: 1 Pulse, juar, paddy, 0 1990 200 91(18%) (CA-12 Ha; 20 HH); tuar, Sugarcane,

Bore-wells: 15 (1 HH) cotton

Kanjay 125$ (!) 17 River – 1; Wells: 6 (Pvt.); Paddy, tuar, Juar, 0 1996 58 461 Panchayat cotton

Mulkapada 158 (!) 2 Wells: Private 3 Paddy, cotton, 1 1994 148 94tuar, juar, makfali

Moti Nal 357 > 60 > 13 River; CD 2 (FD), Cotton, paddy, 0.5 1996 500 98Ha 1 AKRSP); GW 3; tuar , juar, Wheat,

Pvt Wells: 6; makfaliDiesel pumps: 33

* In Rajvadi, there are more than 30 wells in the agricultural land indicating that there must be more irrigated land than is recorded. We metfew elder farmers having 20 years of experience who said that production has increased. 15 HH have encroached 25 Ha of forestland foragriculture.# One HH has around 100 Ha land with 15 bore wells, so irrigated land must be more.$ Officially reported agricultural area is 92 ha; Report from field studies is 125 ha; some forestland has been encroached for agriculture(!) Not enough informationCA – Command Area; CD: Check Dam; GW – Group Well


plants were undertaken as project-basedactivities. SWC measures have been carried outon 85% to nearly 100% of the land in Bharada,Sakva, Mulkapada and Moti Nal. In the case ofKanjay it is about 45% while in Rajwadi the SWCis considerably low (Table 3-2).

The agricultural land is private7 and theindividual land-owning households quicklyadopted the SWC measures. Where it wasnecessary, the GVMs stepped in to mobilizecollective efforts even to help out in the landimprovements on private land. The interventionsinitiated by AKRSP covered almost all aspects ofimproving the land resources and these changesin turn, as the field observations show, haveresulted in huge spin-offs and multiplier effectsthrough an overall increase in the number oflabour-days per year in the agricultural sector.The interventions include enhancing theirrigation facilities as well. Additionally, in somevillages the livelihood patterns have changed dueto significant increase in the share of incomesfrom livestock sector. Certain villages today havelarge income flows from livestock-based economicactivity, particularly due to the emergence of milkproduction for the market and tie-ups withmarketing arrangements.

The NRM strategy envisaged by the AKRSPappears to have struck a meaningful balancebetween forestry and productivity increase fromland resources. There are, however, difficultiesin quantifying the status of the land resourcesbefore intervention and now, as detailed technicalinformation is not available. The only data wecan present is that of land use pattern,agriculture, etc (Table 3-2), which will help toget a better picture of the land resources. The data

represents the current status. The changes infarming practices have resulted in considerablediversification of the cropping pattern in Rajvadi,Moti Nal and Sakwa.

The perceptions and accounts by villagers indicatethat they do recognize a significant change in theland productivity and quality. There are, ofcourse, many other equally or more importantfactors such as the capacity building effortsundertaken to enhance the skill levels of thecommunities in intensive agriculture and othersuch activities, which would explain theperceived change. Notwithstanding such factors,while we discuss the resource characteristics, itis important to note that the village institutionspromoted by AKRSP were engaged in acombination of forestry and improvements inland resources, even though the relative emphasison forestry, land and water would vary fromvillage to village. This combination and the endresults of a somewhat holistic approach involvingforest, land and water resources developmenthas its implications on institutional developmentand the discussion on institutional sustainability.

Bharada, Rajwadi, Sakva, Kanjay and Moti Nalare well endowed with irrigation sources (Table3-2). Although data on irrigated area availableto us do not give an unambiguous picture, theirrigation sources observed during the field visitsand the proportion of households cultivatingmore than one crop in a year clearly point to thelarge extent of irrigated land in these villages.Thus, Mulkapada is the only village in the casestudies that lacks significantly large extent ofirrigation facilities. In all five villages excludingMulkapada there has been several efforts toenhance the irrigation systems. Apart from

7 Some of the farmland may include encroachments on forestland. The property rights are subject to certain limitations inforest villages. Besides, there are also encroachments on forestland that are regularised for agricultural use. In such landparcels, too, property rights are subject to certain limitations.


AKRSP, the State Forest Department too hashelped in enhancing irrigation facilities. AKRSPhas helped in creating Group Wells that acts asan irrigation source to multiple farmers, asopposed to private wells for the benefit of a singlefarmer who owns it. The group wells alsodemand collective action and cooperation amongthe users. In institutional terms, the changes inirrigation management and corresponding groupefforts mark a major forward step, following inthe footsteps of collective action to managecommon resources such as forests orpasturelands.

3 Group Characteristics

3.1 Background

This area has tribal population exceeding 90%,consisting primarily of the Vasava, Chaudhary,Kotwalia, Dhadia, Tadvi and Gamit communitiesof the Bhil tribe. The population characteristicvaries from village to village (see Fig 4-1). TheVasava tribe dominates all these villages, exceptin Rajvadi where three tribes � Vasava,Chaudhary, and Gamit are present in almost

equal proportions. In Mulkapada, a quarter ofthe households are Kotwalia, which is accordeda lower social status among the tribalcommunities in the region. The Kotwalias havevery little dependence on agriculture and areknown for their skills in the craft of makingbaskets and other such items from bamboo. Theinadequate cooperation between Kotwalias andVasavas creates some difficulties in Mulkapada.Among the study villages, Rajvadi, Mulkapadaand Moti Nal are large villages in terms of numberof households while Kanjay, Sakva and Bharadaare very small. Kanjay is a remote village locateddeep inside the forest and is not connected byproper road. It is almost completely inaccessibleduring monsoon. Bharada, Rajvadi and Knajayare the so-called Forest Villages8 and areadministratively under the Forest Departmentwith limitations on property rights over the land.

All these tribal communities are relatively newto agriculture with many being third generationagriculturalists. However, agriculture is atpresent the dominant livelihood option for a largenumber of households. The AKRSP�s interven-

Figure 3-1

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

Demographic Character

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Bharada Rajvadi Sakva Kanjay Mulkapada Moti Nal

Nu

mb

er

�� Male

�� Female

8 Forest Settlement Village comprising of forest areas deemed to be villages, but the property rights are subject to severalrestrictions, preventing any transfers of the property


tions in all these villages used the GVM model asthe entry level organizational model and wenton to develop this Village Level Organi-zation(VLO) as a pan-village organization. Except forthe two villages � Mulkapada and Moti Nal,which has GVM membership of less than 50% ofthe households, the other four villages have nearly100% membership (Table 4-1). In the case ofKanjay, all households, including newhouseholds in village, are allowed to be members.Also, in Kanjay, both husband and wife areconsidered as members of the GVM.

When we analyze the sustainability of the GVM,i.e., the group we are concerned with, we needto clearly understand the group characteristics.The group characteristics are summarized inTable 4-1. Since detailed profiles of themembership of the GVM are not available, in mostcases, the features of the group presented in theTable 4-1 relate to that of the village under theassumption that the GVM is truly representativeof all sections of the village. In cases such as thatof Moti Nal, where the membership is less than50%, the non-members actively participate in thefunctioning of GVM, almost completely blurringthe distinction between members and non-members. In the other village with less than 50%

membership, i.e., Mulkapada, the GVM is hardlyfunctioning at present. However, in the pastwhen it did function, the GVM did carry thewhole village with it.

Bharada, Sakva and Mulkapada have very largeproportion of landless households (Fig. 4-2). Theinterventions in three villages � Bharada, Rajvadiand Kanjay � appear to have radically loweredseasonal out migration from very high levels tovery low levels (Fig. 4-3). The interventions seemto have made very little impact on out-migrationin Mulkapada with the seasonal migration levelremaining high. In terms of forest resources underthe guardianship of the community, Rajvadivillage possess the largest area in absolute terms(296 ha) followed by Bharada with 190 ha.However, per household availability ofcommunity managed forest area is very high forBharada. Unlike other four villages, these twovillages had a succession of forestry effortsinitiated either by AKRSP or by the FD between1994 and 2005. The interventions promoted bythe AKRSP have also resulted in the creation ofa large number of organizations within these twovillages (Table 4-1). In addition to theorganizations promoted by the AKRSP, atpresent, the Van Kalyan Samitis (VKS, equivalent

Figure 3-2

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��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

L an d H o ld in g in S ix S tu d ied V illa g es

0

5 0

1 0 0

1 5 0

2 0 0

2 5 0

3 0 0

B h a ra d a R a jva d i S a kva K a n ja y M u lka p a d a M o ti N a l

No

. o

f H

�� L a nd le ss�� < 1 ha�� 1 to 2 ha�� > 2 ha


of the Forest Protection Committee � FPC �constituted under the JFM guidelines) promotedby the FD are also functioning in Bharada,Rajvadi and Moti Nal. In Bharada and Rajvadithe GVM and VKS are effectively the same, whilein Moti Nal these are quite separate, but worktogether.

The interventions have resulted in considerableimprovements in the status of women and theirrole in the village life. Unlike in the past, thewomen�s role is not confined to the house, butthey now have a leading role in many of the villagelevel activities and in economic activities. Thedramatic change in gender equations at the villagelevel has been brought about through the workof women�s organizations, spearheaded by theMVM, with a savings and self-help approach. Aneloquent testimony to this change is the allotmentof 31 ha of forestland under JFM as a special caseto the MVM by the FD and the efficiency withwhich MVM have been managing the forestryactivity. The CFM in Rajvadi also presents a fineexample of excellent coordination andcooperation between the GVM and the MVM.Interestingly, at present, in the organizationalstatistics of AKRSP, the functioning GVM ofRajvadi do not find a place and all the CFMactivities are attributed to the MVM.

3.2 Leadership and Collective Action

Collective action is used to describe the processand consequences of individual decisions tovoluntary co- coordinated behaviour (Deshpandeand Narayanmoorthy, 2003). The circumstancesfavouring collective action are much debated.Undoubtedly, one of the most important rolesplayed by the VI promoted by any NGO is tocatalyse or initiate collective action, even bringingtogether sections of the village community thatmay not be traditionally inclined to work togetherfor various reasons. Many NGOs consider suchan inclusive approach as the hallmark of theirinterventions. AKRSP has tried to promote widervillage level unity and collective action throughthe VLO such as GVM. Exposure visits andtraining programmes are an importantcomponent of the leadership development efforts.The exposure trips included visits to Orissa,Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.

Leadership and collective action are veryimportant factors in the sustainability of villagelevel organizations. The six villages exhibitconsiderable variation in the leadership levelsand experience in collective action. We haveexamined these two aspects by looking at thehistory of the village institutions in each of thestudy villages. We have also examined major

Figure 3-3

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Migration (Approx % of HH)

0

20

40

60

80

100

Bharada Rajvadi Sakva Kanjay Mulkapada Moti Nal

Ap

pro

x %

of

HH

�� Before �� Now


Table

3-1

: G

roup C

hara

cte

risti

cs

Vil

lage

Vil

lage

Com

posi

tion

HH

Villa

ge L

evel

GV

MV

LOs

Lead

ersh

ipO

ther

Com

munit

yA

gric

.Li

velihood

Mig

rati

on

Typ

eO

rgan

isat

ions

Mem

b.

(LD

) &

Villa

ges

Man

aged

Lan

dPat

tern

(2)

in F

ore

stry

(%)

Co

llec

tive

wit

hFo

rest

.B

IN

ow

Act

ion (C

A)

confl

icts

ove

rA

rea

Ava

il/

LD

CA

Fore

st R

es.

HH

Bh

ara

da

RV

&D

om

inat

–90

GV

M (1

994)

100

12G

GK

hab

ji,

HV

HLa

ndle

ss >

20%

AG

R;

FLB

;V

HV

LFS

V (1)

Vas

ava

(~100%

)V

KS

(1998)

Tabda

Larg

eLS

K;

SMhold

ings

- H

Raj

wad

iFS

V3

trib

es:

300

GV

M (1

995)

8711

GG

Punia

mba

&V

HM

Landle

ss –

LA

GR

; SK

L;V

HV

LC

how

dhar

y,V

KS

(2003)

Pat

-Khuda

Even

dis

trib

ution

LSK

; SM

Gam

it &

Vas

ava;

of l

and

Alm

ost

in e

qual

Smal

l hold

ings

–pro

port

ions

VH

Sakva

RV

Dom

inan

t –88

Only

GV

M93

9M

PM

otia

LM

Landle

ss >

20%

LSK

; A

GR

;V

HL

Vas

ava

(1989)

Larg

eFL

B;

SKL;

hold

ings

– H

SM;

DM

(1 H

H w

ith

100 h

a, i.

e.,

>46%

of

agri

c.La

nd)

Kan

jay

FSV

Dom

inan

t –58

Only

GV

M100

5G

MB

eld

aL

MLa

ndle

ss –

VL

LSK

; A

GR

;V

HV

LV

asav

a (~

100%

)(1

995)

Med

ium

– V

HFL

B,

SM

Mu

lkap

ada

RV

Dom

inan

t –250

GV

M –

1991

448

PP

Cham

ba,

No

No

Landle

ss >

25%

FLB

; A

GR

;V

HH

Vas

ava

(now

– d

efunct

)B

abda

&Larg

eD

M,

SM25%

Kotw

alia

Bad

wa

hold

ings

- H

Moti N

alR

VD

om

inan

t –386

GV

M (1

995)

4710

GG

Khopi,

LV

LLa

ndle

ss –

LLS

K;

AG

R;

ML

Vas

ava

(~100%

)V

KS

(1998)

Kakarp

ad

aM

ediu

m –

SM

& H

oliam

liV

H (~

70%

)

Notes:

BI

– B

efore

Inte

rven

tion;

G –

Good;

H –

Hig

h;

L –

Low

; M

– M

ediu

m;

Now

– C

urr

ent/ W

ithout

AK

RSP

support

; P –

Poor;

VH

– V

ery

Hig

h;

VL

– V

ery

Low

FSV

: Fo

rest

Set

tlem

ent

Vil

lage

co

mp

risi

ng

of

fore

st a

reas

dee

med

to

be

vill

ages

, b

ut

the

pro

per

ty r

igh

ts a

re s

ub

ject

to

sev

eral

res

tric

tio

ns,

pre

ven

tin

g an

y tr

ansf

ers

of

the

pro

per

ty.

SM

- Seaso

nal

Mig

rati

on

(1)

Th

is v

illa

ge h

as t

wo

falias (

stre

ets

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instances collective action vis-à-vis the role ofGVM, response of the VI at the time of unforeseenevents and the role of the GVM leadership. Wehave examined the leadership quality afterlooking into few factors like day-to-dayfunctioning of the GVM, conflict managementability, utilization of funds and saved money andability to cooperate with other organization. Thecollective action have been examined bydiscussing with the villagers factors like conflictmanagement, response to crisis situations, orexternal threats, etc.

Among the six villages, there are quite a bit ofevidence of collective action in Bharada, Rajvadiand Moti Nal. A few instances are discussed herebriefly. All these tribal villages have a strong senseof customary �territoriality� of forest areas by eachvillage. However, inter-village conflicts over forestresources are common (see snapshot of theseconflicts given in the following sub-section). Inthe 1990�s the FD assigned to the Tabda village,a forestland customarily �owned� by Bharada.This is an example of how the state alters inter-village relations ignoring the traditional rights orthe customary norms. This fuelled the simmeringconflicts between the villages. The conflictreached a high point in 1999 when Tabdavillagers beat up a member of the GVM ofBharada. The GVM discussed this issue with theFD. After discussion with FD many times, theBharada villagers realised they will not get anyhelp from FD. The resentment slowly but surelybuilt up against forest department also. In 2000,the villagers started agitation against FD for therestoration of their traditional entitlement overthe forest assigned to Tabda. Since a series ofmeetings with the FD turned out to be futile,village meeting convened by the GVM of Bharadadecided to resort to indefinite hunger strike. After

this, the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO),Mamlatdar9 and police intervened to solve theproblem by restoring customary rights of theBharada village. After this the GVM enforced100% benefits to the Bharada and put an end toany resource sharing between Bharada andTabda village. It was agreed that Tabda villagerswould not graze their cattle in that forest area.The GVM of Bharada thus led a protracted socialmobilization to protect their traditional rights/entitlements over resources.

The leadership and collective action of GVM andMVM of Rajvadi have additional significancebecause of the socio-cultural heterogeneity. Thevillage is large (300 HH) and comprises of threedifferent tribal communities having nearly equalproportion of households. The GVM membershipconsists of 87% of the households. The householdsare distributed in 8 falias (hamlets) and each faliaelects its representative in the GVM committee,ensuring democratic representation of eachhamlet in the GVM committee. The village has afunctioning GVM and MVM as well as a VKSpromoted by the FD. The discussions with thevillagers indicated that they adopted the systemof elected falia representative to strengthen theGVM and its collective capabilities. It may benoted that MVM in Rajvadi also has the uniquedistinction of being awarded forestland underJFM. The Rajvadi village presents excellentcooperation and coordination between GVM andMVM. Women also take up the responsibilitiesof patrolling. The AKRSP does not directlysupport the GVM and in almost all reporting,AKRSP takes note of the work of MVM only,whereas both GVM and MVM are active andfunctioning VLOs. Between 1995 and 2005, theGVM and MVM have carried out a series of sevenCFM activities covering 296 ha and evidently all

9 A state government official responsible for revenue and administrative matters covering several villages in a block(taluka)


this has lead to considerable strengthening of theVLOs and the capabilities for collective action.For all practical purposes, the VKS and theleadership of GVM are the same. This has alsohelped to maintain good relations with the FD.

In Moti Nal in spite of a majority of the villagebeing non-members of the GVM, both membersand non-members work collectively to ensureproper distribution of benefits from forestresources and ensure harmony of the villagecommunity life. The non-members also shareresponsibilities and contribute to costs of resourcemanagement. The non-members, too, have accessto credit (dhiran) from the GVM. Apparently, thevillage level socio-cultural and community valuesare strengthening collective action and the groupcharacteristics. In particular, the whole villageaccepts the leadership of GVM despite themembership being a minority. To strengthen thecollective action and the legitimacy of decisions,the GVM committee involves sarpanch, thetraditional chief and 5 elders (traditionalleadership) in the decision making process. TheGVM leadership maintains good relations withthe AKRSP. In Moti Nal, too, there is goodcooperation and coordination between GVM andMVM. When required, even the GVM mantry(secretary) attends MVM meetings. There are 10VLOs promoted by the AKRSP in the village,including 5 SHGs.

In Kanjay, while the leadership quality appearsto be fairly good, no outstanding instances ofcollective action are reported. The GVM of Sakva,a village with nearly as many HH as Bharada(Table 4-1), is beset with serious leadershipproblems with members not heeding the currentGVM leadership. There are also instances wherethe leadership seems to have been beaten up by

the members. There is very little cooperationbetween GVM and MVM. The GVM is associatedwith an apex organisation called KVS and getsbenefits from the activities of the KVS.

On the face of it, the conditions in Mulkapadawould not appear to be very different fromothers. However, it represents a case where aproperly functioning organisation andinstitutional arrangements have undergone a neartotal breakdown. It is a large village with 250 HH.Apart from the inherent problems of coordinationand cooperation between the Vasava andKotwalia communities, many external factorshave affected the functioning of GVM. Theproportion of landless households is very high,there is very little decline in migration and theirrigation facilities have not improved much. Atpresent Mulkapada presents a dismal picturewith regard to the status of GVM and collectiveaction. Some of the problems relating to themanagement of savings fund remain a difficulttheme and bitterness about having lost theirsavings lingers.

The crisis of leadership, collective action andinstitutional arrangements in Mulkapada revolvesaround the denial of final harvest rights overmature bamboo and handing over of the bambooat a highly discounted price10 to a papermanufacturing company. Additionally, theAKRSP, which played a key role in promotingand strengthening the GVM, appear to have beencaught on the wrong foot when the final harvestproblem exploded into a crisis. The complexitiesof the situation are noted in an internal reviewby the AKRSP (Gupta and Joshi, 2004). Theexternal elements and the issue of usufruct rights,that is central to the co-management of forestsowned by the State to be managed by the

10 The contract between the company and the Gujarat State Forest Department granted exclusive harvest rights to thecompany over the bamboo resources in Dangs, Surat and Rajpila forest divisions at a nominal rate of Rs.5/- per ton for 40years from 1960-61.


community, has clearly played havoc with thegroup and the institutional arrangements. Thishappened despite the fact that the MulkapadaGVM was considered to be functioning very wellbefore this crisis. Also, unlike Bharada or Rajvadi,which had a series of forestry programmes,Mulkapada had just one � the single JFM initiatedin 1992. The roots of the crisis of collective actionin Mulkapada seem to lie in the external legalframework and do not point to any intrinsicdesign flaws of the GVM model. In fact, duringthe fieldwork, a cross section of villagersemphasised that they would like the GVM to berevived and CFM restarted, as the village seemto have lost all the gains it had earlier madethrough the GVM.

The crisis also brings out the sustainabilityquestion of an organisation promoted by an NGO

very sharply. Among the villagers, there is atremendous feeling of helplessness, and there isa widely pervasive understanding that theresponse from AKRSP to the crisis is far belowwhat the villagers expected. However, accordingto the AKRSP Netrang SHT, there has been ahuge effort from their side in response to thecrisis. Surely AKRSP team has no doubtresponded to the crisis in the best way it can andlobbied to work out a solution. However, overthe years, the AKRSP�s overall approach toorganisation development shifted away from theGVM model and this has contributed to thestrengthening of the villager�s perception thatGVM is not being supported. This feeling is verystrong in Mulkapada, where three new SHGshave been created, which is perceived by manyof villagers as the undermining of the GVM.

3.3 Inter-Village Conflict Scenarios

In the 1990�s the FD gave JFM rights to Tabda villageover 110 ha of the forest area customarily consideredas belonging to Bharada village. This intensifiedthe conflict between the two villages. The conflictbecame a crisis in 1999 when Tabda villagersattacked a member of the Bharada GVM. The GVMthen led a prolonged agitation that ended with thegranting of JFM rights over these forests to Bharadaafter the intervention of the DFO, Mamlatdar andpolice. The other inter-village conflict involvesKhabji, an adjacent village, whose agricultural landsis almost surrounded by the JFM of Bharada.


There are conflicts with other villages regarding theforest resource use. The adjacent villages, namely,Pingot, Fokadi, Pat-Kheda, Khokada, Kabchiaviolate the CFM norms of Rajvadi, leading to conflictsover grazing and fuel-wood collection.

Sakva village has conflicts with adjacent villagesover resource use. In 1998, one man from Motiavillage cut sugarcane for fodder from a private landof Sakva. This eventually led to a violent incidentresulting in one death.

The village is situated inside the forest (forestvillage) and the competing claims of differentvillages are indicated in. There are no other villageexcept Belda village, around Kanjay village. Hencethere are not many inter-village conflicts, barringoccasional violations of norms by Belda villagers,which are often penalised. For example, in 2004,the Kanjay GVM confiscated the buffalo of a womanfrom Belda village who violated the norms set bythe GVM, which was released only after she paidthe penalty.


In 1999, the Babda villagers burned down bambooin the JFM area of Mulkapada. The forest protectedby Munkapada village was encroached by Babda,Chamba and Badwa villages. It is very difficult forMunkapada village to stop such encroachments dueto the proximity and the traditional entitlement ofother villages to the same forest resources. Now theFD has started re-forestation in the area earlierallotted to Munkapada under JFM and denying JFMoption to Munkapada.

The disputes between Moti Nal and Khopi villagesare very old. It covers socio-cultural issues andclaims over forest resources. The Khopi andKakarpada villages often violate the grazing normsset by the GVM of Moti Nal.

4 Institutional Arrangements

4.1 Introduction

Before we discuss the institutional arrangements,which are at the core of the sustainability puzzle,it is necessary to understand the different intereststhe main actors have in the making or breakinginstitutional arrangements. One of the keyconcepts embodied in the membership-basedorganisations is that the institutionalarrangements must address the core interest ofthe members. There is always a lurking dangerthat when an outsider is the architect of the

institution building, the institution may notactually address the interest of the members;instead it may be addressing issues as perceivedby the designer (i.e., the NGO or another agency).For example, to the Forest Department, theinstitutional arrangements of JFM are primarilyfor the protection and conservation of the forest,while the community participating in the co-management regime is in search for a mechanismthat would provide the requisite flow of forestresources, and allow them to manage the forestin order to realise those flows. On the other hand,sometimes it may happen that the involvement


of a NGO in institution building may be in pursuitof project goal or a donor given objective such asequitable or sustainable use of natural resources.

The sustainability question with thepredominance of forestry, as is the case inNetrang is embedded within a triangle with thecommunity, NGO and the FD at each of thevertices. In a long-term perspective, the FD isaverse to amending the rights regime, while thecommunity is keen to redefine the rights tousufruct and final harvest. The NGO is placed ina somewhat ambivalent position between FD andthe community, and has only the option ofworking as an intermediary to mediate. Thus, inNetrang, the denial of rights to final harvest andthe absence of formal contracts covering the JFMis a matter of concern to the AKRSP. However,in the face of the intransigence of the FD, theNGOs tend to adopt a strategy that minimisesthe importance and significance of the finalharvest. The development, design and evolutionof institutional arrangements are to a great extentshaped by these differing interests of the keystakeholders.

The other aspect of NRM related institutionalarrangements concern land and water resources.The water resources management relates mostlyto irrigation and has been discussed in acompanion study11 (Shariff, 2005). It will sufficeto mention here that this is a very differentproblem from that of forest management. In thecase of land resources, there are both commonand private lands. While direct benefits arederived from both, the excludability is not anissue on the private land. On the other hand, it isa major concern on the common land resourcesand proper institutional arrangements are neededto control open access. In the case of private land

resources, therefore, the challenge of institutionalarrangements is less complex. AKRSP has goneon to promote narrow interest, membership-based small organisations to the address the needsof particular user groups such as farmers and liftirrigation users. The pan-village institutions haveonly a very limited role in such contexts.However, given the fact that people havedependence on multiple resources derived fromforest, common land and private land, the pan-village institutional arrangements do have animportant role and relevance.

There is also another transient feature to theprocess of developing institutional arrangements:those driven by projects. Some of the institutionalinitiatives are at times modified to suit projectneeds such as the GVM committee doubling upas a Forest Protection Committee to function inaccordance with the JFM norms or a GVMcommittee taking on the role of the WatershedDevelopment Committee in keeping with theneeds of a watershed development project. Theseare essentially transient phases and in the longrun, the institutional arrangements are structuredwith the core interests of the members/ users asthe pivot.

During the field studies, we have examined theinstitutional arrangements in community forestryon the basis of a checklist covering the followingthemes:

a) Members vs Non-Members; Access rules forbenefits, input rules for members to contribute

b) Monitoring, sanction and allocation rulesc) Conflict resolutiond) Access rights to forest resources with the FD

and community as unequal partners in co-management

11 Submitted as a M.S. dissertation to the London School of Economics and Political Science. An abridged version has beenpublished by AKRSP.


4.2 Relations with Other Organisations

In Bharada, Rajvadi and Moti Nal, there is goodcooperation between GVM and MVM. The MVMand GVM work together to manage thecommunity managed forestland. In Moti Nal, theGVM mantri (secretary) attends the MVMmeetings when necessary. There is not muchcoordination between GVM and MVM in Sakva,while MVM does not exist in Kanjay andMulkapada.

As a result of the VI policy followed by AKRSP,many smaller groups such as SHGs and usergroups were formed. In all the villages westudied, the GVM members interviewed felt thatthere is a shift in the AKRSP�s policy in favour ofsmaller organisations and a large majority of therespondents from GVM membership were notvery clear about the emerging role of GVM vis-à-vis these smaller interest groups and user groups.It remains a grey area. The field-level discussionsduring this study indicate that it would haveperhaps helped the functioning of GVM and thesmaller groups if the transfer of certain functionsof the GVM to the smaller organisations werediscussed in greater detail with the GVM througha more informed process.

The formation of large number of small focussedinterest groups was followed by the creation ofapex organisations bringing these different groupsinformally under a federated structure. Theseapex organisations are expected to play animportant role by gradually providing the largersupport to smaller organisations such as marketlinkages, and capacity building. However, theresults are rather mixed with many of the villagesstudied having very weak or no links with theapex organisations. In some cases, the apexorganisations have weakened. Three villages �Bharada, Rajvadi and Sakva � have functionallinks with federations to achieve economies ofscale in matters such the procurement of seeds,

use of tractors, purchase of fertilizers, marketingof certain products, etc.

Discussions with the GVMs studied underscoredthe village level impression of a clear preferencefrom the side of AKRSP towards smallerorganisations. In Bharada, the shift does notappear to have had much adverse impact on thefunctioning of the GVM, while in the case ofKanjay, it is difficult to hazard a guess since thesmaller organisations are rather new. However,in Mulkapada this has added to the crisis thatthe GVM has undergone following the denial offinal harvest rights. In fact, in Mulkapada thereis strong desire for the revival of the GVM. InMoti Nal, the impact on GVM from the formationof many smaller groups is somewhat ambiguous.

4.3 Rules/Norms for Resource Use andBenefit Sharing

In six villages GVMs have adopted their own rulesand norms for the resource use and sharing thebenefits. Some of these are somewhat �standard�norms for fodder and fuel wood sharing. TheGVM developed the Chitti system (lottery) toensure unbiased distribution of the nearly equalshares. As far as the present status is concerned,the GVM has modified the norms according tochanged circumstances and requirements byconsidering issues like resource availability, roleof non-members, need to protect the vulnerableindividuals or groups (widow, poor HH, singlesenior citizen HH) in the community. Forexample, in Moti Nal, the GVM has compromisedwith the non-members in sharing of the benefitsfrom the JFM. The existing norm is that non-members should participate in the protection/patrolling activities. Table 5-1 gives the details ofthe rule/norm for resource use and benefitsharing. In all villages, the rules and norms havebeen evolved after the formation of GVM,covering sharing of costs and benefits, rulesrelating to contribution, sharing of fodder and


grass, sharing fuel wood and small timber forhousing.

4.4 Forest Resources – Rules and Norms

The norms and rules for the sharing of forestresources and benefits vary across the villages(Table 5-1). In most cases, the principle used is ofensuring equal share to all members. However,in many instances, the non-members too areallowed to share certain benefits. The norms alsovary depending on the type of resource or benefit.In the case of grass and fodder, relaxation is

allowed for non-members in many cases. In theearly phase of community forestry, grazing banis strictly enforced and this is relaxed in the laterphase. The sharing norms on grass collection andgrazing are imposed as per decisions of the GVM.In Bharada and Kanjay, the GVM has 100% HHas members and the exclusion of non-membersis of little practical relevance.

In the case of pruning, non-members are notallowed any share in all villages except Moti Nal,with the Rajvadi allowing non-members to collectfuel wood. Although there are norms adopted

Table 4-1: Norms for Resource and Benefit Sharing

Villages Grass Pruning Final HarvestMembers Non-Members Members Non-Members Members Non-Members

Bharada Equal share * Equal share * Equal share. *(heap) Plus provision But not yetChitti (lots) system for GVM

Rajvadi Earlier equal Earlier, no share Equal share Only fuel wood Equal share Not allowedshare by Chitti Now,(lots) system non-membersPresently, allowedthe normsare diluted

From MVMplots,restrictedonly to members

Sakva First year equal Not allowed in 1995-98 Not allowed Equal share Not allowedshare; followed the 1st year; pruning, equalby free grazing followed by share Chittito the villagers free grazing (lots) system

Kanjay Equal share- * Equal share * Equal share *Chitti (lots)system

Mulkapada Earlier equal Earlier, not First few years Not allowed 2001-02: Denial As per agreedshare allowed equal share of full rights by norms notNow no CFM norms; Now FD, followed allowed

no norms. by breakdown Afterof agreed norms; breakdown,Each member non membersmanaged to get got benefitsapprox. 100mature bambooseach

Moti Nal Norms set in Allowed Each HH can Same norms Equal share No clarityGVM meetings use 15 days as members(vary from time to collectto time)

* All households are GVM members


for the final harvest, the enforcing of this remainhypothetical since forest department has so farnot permitted full rights to final harvest in any ofthe JFM plots. Given the experience ofMulkapada, where the denial of such rightscreated a crisis situation, how effectively thenorms regarding sharing of final harvest couldbe enforced would depend on the forestdepartment. The norms � whether strong or weakand the diversity of it � show the vitality andcreativity present in the GVM. Even the worstcase shows that as VI model, the GVM has beenquite a success in institutional sustainability. Theinclusive norms covering non-members such asthat adopted by Moti Nal appear to run counterto some of the theoretical positions on member

centrality in the defining of norms. However, thismay have been forced by the role of the forestdepartment and the uncertainty associated withthe rights to final harvest of high value maturetimber.

4.4.1 Cost Sharing in Community Forestry

There is a huge cost associated with the protectionof the JFM (Shah, A. 2003), which is often notdocumented in the discussion on JFM. The costsinclude wages to watchmen, various labour costs(paid and unpaid), patrolling costs (on wagesbasis or by volunteers), etc. A major componentof the protection activity is patrolling. Theaccompanying table (Table 5-2) gives the detailsof the protection/patrolling cost across the villages.

Table 4-2: Protection/ patrolling costs in community forestry

Villages Patrolling Norms

Bharada Earlier phase, GVM employed two watchmen (during 1996-2003), Rs. 800.00 per watchman per month

Cost sharing norms: If members not patrolling has to give Rs. 20.00 as fine; Now the GVM rule is 6 members team forpatrolling. 2005, FD provided one watchman

Rajvadi 8-male and 2 women member team; Additionally, at present, 4 watchman paid by FD- Rs 2100.00/month each

Sakva 10 members team (now patrolling not working effectively)

One watchman paid by GVM for 6 years; Rs 700.00/month

Initial 2 years one watchman: Rs 300.00/per month paid by AKRSP

Kanjay 3-member team (male) per day

Mulkapada 3-member team (earlier) per day; Now no patrolling

Moti Nal From 1999- voluntary patrolling- 5 people team (even non-members also); Initial 2 years, 6 watchmen paid by GVM(villagers) at Rs 20.00/ HH/month; From 2004, one watchman paid by FD, Rs 2000.00 per month

Note: Patrolling is round the year (365 days almost); the FD has provided watchmen wherever there is a Van Kalyan Samiti promoted by it.

Table 4-3: Penalties for Violation of Community Forestry Norms

Timber Fuel wood Bamboo Grass Grazing Grazing cow/ Grazingone tree (one bhar) buffalo bullock goat

Bharada 500 (500) 500(500) 500(500) 51 (51) 51 (51) 51 (51) 51 (51)

Rajvadi 70 (125) 20 (50) 25 (80) —— 30 (40) 25 (30) 20 (25)

Sakva 151 (151) Confiscate Confiscate Confiscate Trapping the Trapping the Trappinganimal animal the animal(dhor dabba) (dhor dabba) (dhor dabba)

Kanjay 1001(1001) 500 (500) 500(500) 51 (51) 51 (51) 51 (51) 25 (25)

Mulkapada# 101(101) 51 (51) 101(101) 51 (51) 51 (51) 51 (51) 51 (51)

Moti Nal 501(551) 551 (551) 101(101) 22 (22) 51 (51) 51 (51) 51 (51)

Note: The figures in parenthesis are for other villagers# At present, norms are not working, as GVM itself is not functioning


4.4.2 Penalties for Violation of CommunityForestry Norms

The graded sanctions and penalties are imposedby the GVM in different villages. Penalties arelevied from other villagers who break the normsadopted by the GVM. In villages such as Sakva,which has a leadership crisis, the old norms haveceased to work and villagers have resorted toconfiscation as the penal measure. This very oftenaggravates conflicts, as there is little room foramicable settlement or negotiation. There is notmuch variation in the penalties across villages(Table 5-3)

4.4.3 Norms for Vulnerables

During the implementation period, the GVM tookcare to ensure that all labour from poor HH areemployed in the SWC and JFM activities. Duringthe work on farm bunding almost all the labourerswere from the poor households. At present, theGVM norms in the new schemes also favour thepoor. The GVM also helps widows, single seniorcitizen HH, poor HH by giving extra share. InBharada, the fuel wood and share given to theGVM is used to support such vulnerable personsor groups. Thus, the VI has maintained certainsocial welfare measures to support the weaker

Table 4-4: Institutional Arrangements

Villages % Members & Monitoring & Allocation Input Rules Conflict Access OverallMembers Access Rules Sanction Rules Rules Member’s Resolution Rights Rating*

Contribution Role

Bharada 100 Equal access Shift from Equal share Labour, H Adhikar Hwatchman to Lottery patrolling. Patravoluntary system Labour (42% ofpatrolling & contribution CFM)graded penalties for cutting Pruning

and sharing allowed

Rajvadi 87 Only members Watchman to Earlier equal Labour, M. Adhikar Mhave share of voluntary patrolling. share by patrolling patrapruning & timber; Working.; Penalty Lottery system (30% ofAt present, non- for violating norms; Now open to CFM)members allowed Removal from non-members Pruning.benefits of grass membership for not too; Dilution Allowed& fuel wood attending meetings of norms.

or patrolling 3times consecutively

Sakva 93 Only to the Watchman to Earlier equal Labour. L Adhikar Lmembers voluntary patrolling share. Patrolling. PatrDilution of norms Not effective Now not very (62%New families Dilution of effective CFM)excluded penalty system

Kanjay 100 Equal access Voluntary patrolling Equal share Labour. H No H(effective) (Lottery Patrolling AdhikarStrict penalties system) Effective patrafor violating norms (0%)

Mulkapada 44 Breakdown Breakdown Earlier equal Earlier L No JFM Lshare; Now, patrolling nowBreakdown Now, (0%)

Breakdown

Moti Nal 47 Equal access to FD watchman Equal share Labour, H Adhikar Hthe members. & Voluntary Non- patrolling. patraNon-members patrolling members (Non-members (40%)sharing protection allowed also)responsibilities &getting benefits


sections of the village. In some cases, the GVM isalso providing credit to poorer households fromits fund (e.g., Sakva and Moti Nal). In Kanjay,disadvantaged individuals such as widows areexempted from patrolling duties.

4.5 Summary of Institutional Arrangements

The overall findings on the functioning ofinstitutional arrangements facilitated by the GVMare summarised here. The access and allocationnorms adopted by the different GVMs have triedto ensure equal rights to all members throughdifferent means. In the absence of formalagreements, some of the norms enforced by theGVMs are subject to the supporting role of theFD. The formal access rights to forestland oradhikar patra has been provided only to less than50% of the area under different levels ofcommunity forestry (Table 5-4). In all cases, thecommunity has ensured proper patrolling of theCFM area and is even paying wages towatchmen. In the case of Moti Nal the non-members, too, are almost equally responsible forpatrolling. The GVMs have acquired a highdegree of legitimacy in the village, giving it a bigrole in conflict resolution within and betweenvillages. Overall, among the villages studied,Bharada and Kanjay perform well, whileRajwadi and Moti Nal are moderate, Sakwa islow and Mulkapada represents a case ofinstitutional breakdown triggered by factorsexternal to the group, rather than any inherentdeficiency of the GVM model

4.6 Relation with External Factors

The most important external �drivers� of the GVMare the AKRSP and the Forest Department.Others, such as the markets, panchayat, etc donot play such a crucial role in the functioning of

the GVM. While AKRSP proactively tries to helpand sustain the GVM, the Forest Departmentdoes not have any long-term view of the role ofthe GVM, as they are only keen to promote pliableFPCs. To the FD, the GVM brings in largerdemocratic system with accountability to thecommunity, which they find ratheruncomfortable to deal with, unlike the FPC. TheGVM model promoted by the AKRSP creates anempowered pan village organisation andinstitutional framework that has considerablecapabilities. The relations of GVM with externalagencies must be seen within the framework ofNGO as an external agency trying to empowercommunities and enhance livelihoods, thecommunity being placed in a situation of heavydependency on forest resources12 bereft of anyusufruct rights over these resources owned by theState and the Forest Department being reluctantto implement co-management options concedingformal usufruct rights to the community. Allother external actors, though important, are notas central to the institutional sustainability of thevillage institutions promoted by the NGO forNRM in the context of forestry, agriculture andlivestock.

The AKRSP strategy has been two pronged: a)develop institutional framework for the bettermanagement of forest resources through the co-management regimes partnering the communityand the forest department and b) concurrentlydevelop community capabilities and institutionsfor livelihood enhancement with agriculture asa major livelihood source, gradually reducing thedependence on forest resources as well. This is,indeed, a sound approach given the fact that thetribal community had already made a qualitativeshift to settled agriculture. The AKRSP�s role as

12 The decline in the dependence of the communities on forest resources is a rather gradual process, and does not seem tobecome an insignificant factor in the near to medium term.


an external interlocutor helping to developsustainable village institutions must be seen interms of the strategies adopted. The majorstrategic shift, if one may call it that, is offocussing on narrow interest groups to enhancelivelihoods and incomes from private efforts, asopposed to collective action for resourcemanagement linked to livelihoods. This and theconfusion in the minds of the GVM members onthe future of GVM was a recurring theme in thediscussions at all levels during this study. Thereis some ambiguity whether this strategy istantamount to negating the need for GVM or isit merely one of a greater emphasis on promotingsmall, narrow interest groups. A clearunderstanding on the conditions under whichGVM or a pan-village institution is relevant andwhere the smaller narrow interest groups canwork either in tandem with a pan-VLO or fullyautonomously of it is, perhaps, very crucial indetermining the exit strategy and sustainabilityof GVM like VLOs. In fact, this brings up thequestion of exit strategy, a critical aspect of the

institutional sustainability of a VI promoted byan NGO.

The discussions with GVM members, leadershipand with the staff of the AKRSP SHT show thatthe �exit� or �withdrawal� or the �role shift� ofthe AKRSP, of when and how it did happen, isopen to many interpretations. The exit strategyseem more a case of gradual diminishing of theimportance assigned to the relations with GVMby the SHT, than one of a long process of dialogueinvolving the GVM itself, which is, perhaps, thereason for the confusion on the perceived�undermining� of the GVM by many in the GVM,and assertion by many in the SHT that, on thecontrary, they have not attempted to deliberatelyreduce the importance of GVM. This confusionor differences in perceptions or approach takesthe attention away from the raison ïçtre of theGVM model, embedded in institutional needs ofco-management for resource regeneration underunequal terms with the powerless community onone side and all powerful exclusive owner of the

Table 4-5: GVM and Forest Department

Villages Forest Department

Bharada Better relations after VKS; New CFM activity - 2005Neglect of customary norms by FD created conflictsAgitation against FD leading to intervention by local admin, police etc for dispute settlement and enforcing newnorms in 1999Ambiguity reg. Long-term rights on CFM assets in the absence of adhikar patra and legal deedsVery Good working relationship, regular meetingsFD help in irrigation facilities – diesel pump, main storage, distribution pipes & tanksGVM collects water charges Rs.5/- per hour of pumping

Rajvadi Better relations after VKSNew CFM activity - 2005Conflicts over encroachment of forestland for agriculture31 ha of JFM with MVM; Regular meetings with FD

Sakva Poor coordination and cooperationNo VKS; GVM plays the role of VKS

Kanjay No VKS; GVM plays the role of VKSPeriodic meetings with FD for pruning permissionCFM activity from 2003

Mulkapada Denial of rights to final harvest of bamboo from JFM; overlapping rights to Central Paper MillsNo GVM or VKS; No forestry or forest protection activity at present

Moti Nal VKS exists along with GVM committeeNew CFM activity - 2004


resource on the other. The institutional failure inMulkapada needs to be seen against thedifficulties posed by the inflexibilities ingrainedin the approach of the FD and the role that anNGO can play in negotiating with the FD toensure a fair deal to the community. TheMulkapada and Rajvadi present sharp contrasts.However, they are nothing but two sides of thesame coin. In both cases, the external factors areplaying a key role in bringing about eitherinstitutional breakdown or sustainability. Thevariety of experiences involving FD in the sixvillages (Table 5-5) clearly emphasise thesignificance of these external influences on theinstitutional sustainability. In all the villages,AKRSP has exited from GVM, but it is still presentin the villages through the support provided toSHGs, user groups, federations, manch etc. Theseorganisations are working with the direct supportand guidance of AKRSP. The relations withAKRSP are shaped by how the GVM coordinatesor cooperates with the other organisationspromoted by the AKRSP.

5 Organisational Development

5.1 Introduction

One of the most significant aspects of a VIpromoted by an NGO is the organizationaldevelopment (OD) effort that goes into thecrafting of the VI, as distinct from what could becalled self-evolved institutional arrangements.The OD effort is linked to the perspective thatthe NGO has of how it envisages the future roleand functionality of the VI. Here we haveprovided an overview of the OD efforts thatcreated and nurtured these village levelorganizations since 1985. The OD efforts and thedevelopment of VIs as more or less autonomousentities in many cases are, unfortunately,insufficiently documented. What we have israther generalized picture of the OD efforts,without too much specifics of the particular

inputs that has gone into the development of eachVI.

5.2 Key Features

In the early phase, the social mobilization washeavily �process� oriented with very few �projectmode� features such as targets and/or rigid timeframes. The field staff enjoyed considerablefreedom to determine the progress of a �process�and choose the path needed for a particular VIto reach a certain stage. Moreover, in those earlydays there was almost ten staff to cover just sixvillages, which is unthinkable today. There werehuge uncertainties about which VI model canwork in the given context and what kind ofcapacity building is needed. Neither blue printnor design for the proposed �social engineering�existed. Much of these efforts were trial and errorexperiments in social mobilization, which by itselfwas an effective process that taught the localcommunity as well as the AKRSP team quite alot from the positive and negative outcomes. Thisis a rich experience with unique narratives foreach village and the special relationship the NGOstaff tended to develop with what were seen asthe villages for which a particular staff wasconsidered primarily responsible. In the earlyphase the scale of operations were very small inall aspects with very large staff to village ratiosthat are simply unthinkable as per current norms.Additionally, there was not too much pressurefrom the donors for implementation of strict time-bound work-progress norms and activities in mostinstances tended to follow the edict - slow andsteady shall win the race!

Although the process-oriented approach was notparticularly amenable to the many variants ofstructured performance monitoring frameworksthat are in vogue today, this approach combinedwith a very large staff to village ratio did entail avery close and well-informed engagement withthe community life by the AKRSP team. It also


meant that each staff was, in a sense, moreaccountable to the organisation building processin the villages under their ambit both in technicalas well as moral terms. There are instances inwhich individual staff wanted to or actually tookfull responsibility for what certain individualsstrongly rued as avoidable errors. There areinstances of the NGO team going as far as to sharemonetary losses incurred as a manifestation of adeep sense of accountability to the work andcommunity.

Without necessarily having a well-structuredmonitoring framework, an effective system ofclose monitoring of the OD and socialmobilization processes arose, buttressed by thepersonal commitment to villages under thecharge of an individual staff and a stronglycohesive team spirit that emerged from a sharedexcitement in being engaged in the pioneeringand challenging work in the remote area. Thescale of operations and the high staff to villageratio also meant that the top levels of the NGOwere even directly involved in village level workand monitoring of the OD process. From thediscussions, it can be concluded that the processoriented work was very closely monitored andevaluated through micro-level approaches as theNGO leadership from top to bottom there wereclosely aware of grassroots situations andchallenges.

5.3 Member Centrality, Savings andLivelihood Security

In the case of AKRSP, the reflection sessions witholder field staff clearly point to the changebrought about by the infusion of professionalleadership into the NGO and its impact on thesituation analysis, the NGO team structure, thereorientation of the work at grassroots and theapproach to problem solving. In their view, theprofessionals helped to transform their field workand the technical capabilities, reorienting the trial

and error approach into a team effort that wasinformed by some clear thinking on the ODstrategies supported by guidelines for situationassessments. What could be discerned from thediscussions is a clear shift in the OD strategytowards emphasising the membership-centralityprinciple and the conscious efforts to reinforcethe idea of VI as a membership-basedorganisation. The OD strategy began to focus onrealising the concept with clear entitlements andincentives to members. The concept of amembership-based community organisation was�drilled into� the VI of a tribal community towhom such an idea was almost completely alien.The OD process willy-nilly taught such acommunity to comprehend and enforce the�member centrality principle� so that the benefitsharing sharply differentiates between membersand non-members. It could also be surmised thatthis also constituted a departure in the approachto community mobilization as it was practicedby the field staff initially.

Two new significant elements were added to therepertoire of OD strategy:

a) Centre-staging of savings as the pivot in thecrafting of the GVM

b) Diversifying from forestry to livelihoodsecurity as a well-defined goal for the basketof interventions and mobilization efforts

These two elements, undoubtedly, qualify to bedescribed as the �defining characteristic� or thehallmark of the AKRSP effort in the Netrang,which, going by the trends of that period, couldvery well have been structured similar to thecommunity forestry model that was thenemerging in many parts of the country. Most ofthe community forestry models of that periodtended to see forest regeneration as an end in itselfand made very little or no effort to re-shape thestructural aspects of the livelihood security of thecommunities associated with the forestry effort.


The insistence on savings almost as a prerequisitefor the formation of the VI and the huge capacitybuilding in the non-forestry sectors seem to havebrought about a synergistic effect instrengthening the community�s livelihoodsecurity. The AKRSP effort thus incorporatedimportant departures and complex ODchallenges ensued from this. A brief discussion iscalled for on this rich experience, which is neitherwell undocumented nor figures in the discourseon JFM experiences in the country.

5.4 Building Social Capital –a Multi-Layer approach

The changes in overall OD strategies were partlya reflection of the change in the villages and toan extent the shift in professional managementushered in by successive CEOs and otherdevelopment professionals associated with theseefforts. For example, during his association withAKRSP, Anil Shah who served as the CEO forabout a decade emphasized the concept of �Self-Reliant Communities�. The shift to savings andthrift in the building of the GVM evolved fromthis overriding stress on promoting self-relianceand the Herculean OD effort to craft thecommunity organisations that can achieve thisgoal. This effort also laid considerable emphasison going beyond forestry and promoting thesavings habit, albeit by compulsion � the so-calledcompulsory savings approach, which entailed allthose who worked on project activities as wagelabour to deposit a part of their wages as savingsthat was kept aside in the GVM fund.

The professional skills of CEOs such as BarryUnderwood and Apoorva Oza infused a morestructured approach to the OD, based on well-defined evaluation and monitoring systems andperformance benchmarks, while retaining closelinks with the field-level situations. Twoimportant layers that were added to thestrengthening of social capital were:

a) Stress on gender equity and promoting theincome generating and financialmanagement capabilities of women

b) Institutional diversification to leverage thestrength of narrow interest groups naturallyinclined to the membership centralityprinciple

5.5 Gender Concerns

While the GVMs developed and occupied aprominent place within and outside the village,the AKRSP devoted attention to remedy some ofthe glaring infirmities in the functioning of theGVM. A major concern was that despitepersistent efforts to ensure that women do notremain marginalised in the decision-makingwithin the GVM, there was no significant change.Autonomous women�s organisations, the MahilaVikas Mandal (MVM) were promoted. This meantthat in many villages with a GVM also had aMVM, which facilitated women to not onlyinfluence decision-making of the GVM, but alsoaddress a whole lot of issues of gender andempowerment in a larger context, in the private,family and public domains. The functioning ofwomen�s organisations ushered in a newdynamics into the institutional development,which became further reinforced with theformation of women�s SHGs at a later stage.

5.6 Restructuring the GVM

The promotion of narrow interest groupsnecessarily involved a restructuring of the GVMsthat had become overloaded with multiple rolesand responsibilities. With the accumulation ofsavings, the GVM had begun to disburse loans,some of which proved very difficult to recover,as in many cases the social and kinship relationsinfluenced this, making the proper fundmanagement very difficult. In fact, it became clearthat the GVM was not designed for such a roleand was unable to transform itself to play such arole. The AKRSP team began to realise that the


size of funds was beginning to have ratherunsavoury consequences on the GVM itself, asthis was increasingly playing a role in shapingthe power and influence of the VI leadership.Eventually, with good intentions, a re-structuringprocess was started around 1997 aimed at endingthe role of GVM in managing the savings fund.

The task of restructuring GVM proved to be avery difficult one involving the promotion of SHGgroups and micro-finance institutions, which waslooked upon with suspicion by many in the GVMleadership. Since a few of the GVMs had begunto develop as �power centres� and as the cloudof elite capture loomed large over many GVMs,the AKRSP team placed the re-structuring of theGVM on a fast track mode, in contrast to the earlyphase when it was built patiently brick-by-brickthrough a highly process-oriented approach.Starting from a very open and transparentprocess-oriented phase, the restructuring becamea somewhat painful and hurried exercise fraughtwith misgivings. It is evident that GVMs paid aheavy price as some of the gains in social capitalformation accrued over a decade wasjeopardized in a quite a few cases partly due tothe pace at which this exercise was executed andto a degree due to the time tables set for theformation of new SHGs that were to fill in thevacant institutional gap.

However, on the whole it stands as an eloquenttestimony to the robustness of the GVM modelthat it refused to fade away and continued tooccupy a legitimate place, despite the proliferationof other narrow interest institutions. This was,perhaps, not entirely anticipated and after itbecame evident that GVMs are not redundant inthe institutional map, a better understanding isemerging on how to bring about a better balanceamong the different village institutions.Objectively, the GVMs together with a variety ofother village level organisations � SHGs, user

groups, interest groups, federations, etc �dramatically transformed the institutionallandscape in the region, building resourcemanagement capabilities and increasinglivelihood security.

5.7 Silent Advocacy

While considering the OD efforts associated withthe GVM, it must be kept in mind that since manyof the initiatives by AKRP in the region werepioneering efforts which lacked any firm policyand legal enabling environment, considerableeffort had to be put into prolonged dialogue withthe government to ensure some degree oflegitimacy to the institutional arrangements thatwere emerging. This was the difficult terrain onwhich the institutional development wasprogressing. It can be said that one of thesupporting strategies which the AKRSP used toovercome the policy and legal barriers was toeffectively bank on the abilities of successive CEOsand the clout of some of the well-intentionedgovernment functionaries (serving and retired)to silently lobby for creating an enablingenvironment or obtain tacit approval. However,these efforts did not result in the establishinglasting and reliable paths for the villageinstitutions to traverse over the highly perilousterrain of the co-management of state ownedforest. Much of the negotiated arrangementsdepended on individuals within and outside thegovernment. It also critically hinged on theattitude of middle and lower functionaries. Theseconstraints continue to plague the institutionalspace in forestry, despite policy and legal support.The OD efforts in a crucial phase of theestablishment of the GVMs were unfoldingagainst the backdrop of action on three tracks:a) intense grassroots involvement b) middle-levelengagement with the Govt Officials and c) top-level lobbying, mostly as silent efforts (in contrastto open �advocacy�).


5.8 Close Monitoring

The whole approach to crafting of villageinstitutions gradually changed from a ratheramorphous early stage to a highly structured oneas it is today. The inputs from professionals aswell as field staff have gone into this. The processof initiating a community-based organisation tosteering it to a stage where it can functionautonomous of the NGO involves considerabledesigning, close monitoring and perhaps evenwhat could be construed as excessively �tight�management13 . The important milestones in thisendeavour are the development of tools forhelping this process such as a) InstitutionalMaturity Index � IMI and b) Logical Frameworkfor Organisation Development � Log-FID, anextension of the LFA (Logical FrameworkAnalysis) used in project planning andimplementation to the realm of OD.

5.9 Emerging Thinking

Some of the reviews and assessments carried outby the AKRSP of the program impacts have leadto a special focus on the poorest, as it was seenthat often the poorest seem to be marginalisedeven within development interventions. There isrecognition that institutions of the poor must bepromoted as basic building blocks of a largernetwork which could work in coordination withthe larger cluster or area programs. As result ofsuch an approach, several new institutionalapproaches have emerged. The separateorganisations for the most marginalised andsocially excluded communities such as that of theKotwalia in Netrang is an example. Since the poorhave diverse livelihoods, the initial work withthem may be as individual households rather thanthrough group formation and this is an approach

which AKRSP(India) has been trying out. Also,in order to derive benefits of aggregation for agri-input supply and marketing, as also negotiatewith the government agencies, farmer groupfederations and women�s group federations havealso been promoted in the last 5-8 years whichhave changed the institutional landscape andreduced AKRSP(India)�s staff�s direct role andinteraction with older village organizations.

It is seen that only when these organisations beginto function with some degree of autonomy andconfidence, the other institutions begin to concedeground and space to the hitherto excludedcommunities, eventually leading to morebalanced albeit negotiated partnerships betweenthem. These more recent developments are notcaptured in this study. However, there is scopefor reflecting on the experience of the GVM inthe cases where a more simplistic social inclusionapproach was attempted, as documented here,by allowing the marginalised group to be formallyrecognised as equal members of the villageinstitution, whereas de facto this was not the case.Presently, within AKRSP, there is a recognitionthat the task of crafting sustainable institutionalframeworks and scaling them up would ofnecessity be a far more complex and diverse taskthan that envisaged in some of the models thatare currently favoured in the developmentdiscourse as universal solutions. Based on theexperiences from a variety of contexts andinstitutional models, AKRSP appear to be re-assessing the design principles and organisationaldevelopment strategies employed to promotesustainable village institutions and evaluating thepossibilities for strengthening them throughappropriate aggregation mechanisms.

13 See for e.g., the observation made in the Report on JFM prepared by Manish for AKRSP


7. Concluding Discussion

The discussion in the preceding chapters of thisreport provides an analytical exploration of theGVM functioning against the background of theAKRSP�s exit from providing direct guidanceand support. The village level organisations suchas the GVM and MVM appear in most cases tobe well rooted in the community as functionalentities barring the rare exceptions. The studiespoint to the close linkages among the differentfactors considered causing one factor to respondto the changes in the other.

Among the study villages, the earliest CFM effortis of 1989 in Sakva village followed by Mulkapadain 1992. The six villages studied exhibit muchvariation in the progress of CFM. The CFM effortin Mulkapada village, one of the earliest to jointhe effort, however, was limited to just one.Sakva, Kanjay and Moti Nal villages had two,while Bharada and Rajwadi had 7 and 6 efforts,respectively. In terms of both resource availabilityand institutional functioning, a succession ofCFM, even in small patches, has majorimplications. Overall, among the villages studied,Bharada and Kanjay perform well, whileRajwadi and Moti Nal are moderate, Sakwa islow and Mulkapada represents a case ofinstitutional breakdown triggered by factorsexternal to the group. The crisis of leadership,collective action and institutional arrangementsin Mulkapada revolves around the denial of finalharvest rights over mature bamboo and handingover of the bamboo at a highly discounted priceto a paper manufacturing company by the ForestDepartment.

At a general level, the following observations arevalid for most of the GVMs, including the onecase of institutional breakdown discussed in thisstudy.

� Appear to be well rooted in the communityas functional entities with some exceptions

� Displays considerable adaptability todifferent situations

� Resource management challenges are specificto the JFM framework of co-managementmodel and the implications of this on VIcannot be minimised for short or long-termbenefits or usufruct rights

� More active and functional when there are aseries of forestry efforts that ensures diverseresource flows/ benefits

� Impact of the presence of a multiplicity oforganisations (SHGs, Federations, etc) isambiguous with respect to GVM (bothpositive and negative)

The study shows that the GVM model presents acase where a high degree of institutionalsustainability has been achieved through thesystematic efforts in organisational developmentand capacity building of local communities. It hasalso shown the enormous creativeness of thecommunity to innovate and adapt to the needfor change in the institutional space. This studysuggests that the type of pan-village VLOpromoted by AKRSP was an institutional needthat got readily adopted and adapted to thecommunity needs in conformity with the diversityof group characteristics and therefore becameeasily amenable to adaptation and change in thehands of the community. However, theuncertainties in usufruct rights, central to the co-management of state owned forests by thecommunity disturb the institutionalarrangements. The fact that final harvest cyclescould vary between 5 to 15 years or morenecessitates the village institutions in JFM tooutlast these cycles so that they are in a positionto assert their rights over the final harvest. Itfollows that once the uncertainties in rights tothe timber and non-timber produce are ensured,many possibilities open up for the VIs involved


in JFM to embark upon sustainable livelihoodstrategies under a production forestry model.

5.10 Resources, Rights, AKRSP &Forest Department

It is all too evident that both the usufruct rightsand ownership rights are affecting the modes ofcollective functioning, individual behaviourtowards resource management, the role ofexternal agencies such as the NGO and theresource itself. All these are important forinstitutional sustainability. The functioning ofGVM in Bharada and Rajvadi clearly illustratesthe case where the relative abundance ofresources makes a positive influence on groupcohesion, while the Moti Nal shows how theGVM has been able to bring members and non-members together for resource managementdespite the extremely small area assigned to thegroup for forest protection. At the same timeBharada and Rajvadi has also been fortunate toreceive continuous cooperation from eitherAKRSP and/ or Forest Department, resulting indiverse flow of resources through a series of JFMefforts spread almost evenly over the last onedecade. The scheduling of a series of forestryefforts emerges as an important insight.

The experience from soil and moistureconservation shows how the GVM has been ableto successfully adopt ways of catering to theneeds of both common and private land. Withland resources, village level collective action isimportant in the overall SWC; but is lessimportant subsequently. After the initial SWCactivities, small user groups are more crucial forland resources management on private farmland.However, across the study villages we haveexamples of meaningful coordination betweenthe GVM and other organisations, despite thelack of clarity on the future of GVM vis-à-vis landresources management as illustrated by the

examples of GVM helping to organise SWC workon private land.

The sustainability of the GVM is delicately poisedbetween the support it can get from an NGO andthe unequal relations with the FD. The formalaccess rights to forestland or adhikar patra hasbeen provided only to less than 50% of the areaunder different levels of community forestry. Thefact that major issues remain unresolved in thissphere is fully recognised by the AKRSP and hasalso been pointed out in other studiescommissioned by the AKRSP. However, this isthe Achilles heel of the GVM and the leastdeveloped aspect of its development. It is a greyarea that calls for more thought and action. TheGVM�s capacities in the complex terrain ofproperty rights, enforceability of contracts,negotiations with the state (represented by theForest Dept.), etc are hardly sustainable given theinternal deficiencies in technical and knowledgecapacities of the GVM. The relevance of GVM istwo fold: firstly, as a pan village institution forsustainable resource management, and secondly,to ensure that a capable VI is present to leveragenecessary arrangements with external agents,other villages, the NGO and the State.

5.11 Livelihood Enhancement &Institutional Stability

The interventions covered almost all aspects ofimproving the land resources and these changesin turn have resulted in huge spin-offs andmultiplier effects through an overall increase inthe number of labour-days per year in theagricultural sector. The interventions includeenhancing the irrigation facilities as well.Additionally, in some villages the livelihoodpatterns have changed due to significant increasein the share of incomes from livestock sector.Certain villages today have large income flowsfrom livestock-based economic activity,


particularly due to the emergence of milkproduction for the market and tie-ups formarketing arrangements. The increase inavailability of grass and fodder from thecommunity-managed forests has helped toimprove livestock-based livelihood options andpositively affected the GVM by enhancing theinstitutional legitimacy. This has alsostrengthened or contributed to external linkagessuch as the relations with milk marketingcooperatives. The reduction in distress migrationand increase in livelihood options made possiblewith greater resource security appear to haveenhanced the institutional stability, partly byincreasing the stakes in the GVM of those whohave managed to benefit from the newinstitutional arrangements.

5.12 Inclusive Approach to Non-Members

The functioning of GVM model in Moti Nal makesa very interesting case from the point of view ofinstitutional sustainability because it isfunctioning with a new community forestry effortstarting in 2004 without the active guidance ofAKSRP after a gap of six years since the firstforestry effort supported by AKRSP. This case alsopresents an unusual case of an inclusivearrangement in NRM where the leadershipprovided by the member-based organisation,accommodates non-members as well in allaspects, blurring the distinction between membersand non-members with respect to decision-making, resource management responsibilitiesand benefit sharing. In addition, the Van KalyanSamiti promoted by the Forest Department, too,is functioning in tandem with GVM committee.Many of these are institutional changes that haveemerged autonomous of AKRSP after the exitbereft of any guidance from AKRSP even thoughthe organisation has a presence in the villagethrough other activities. The inclusivearrangements, we suspect, is perhaps influenced

by the uncertainties associated with the rights tofinal harvest and the reluctance of the forestdepartment to concede these rights even in asingle case.

5.13 Success of GVM as a Pan Village Model

Although GVM is a membership-basedorganisation, being pan-village in character itincorporates considerable heterogeneity ofinterests, although there is convergence when itcomes to the needs for forest resources. In otherwords, despite diverse interests, the commoninterest in forest resources or rather resourcesecurity provides a sufficiently strong basis forcollective action and adoption of norms thatsacrifice individual interests substantially. Wehave seen that, starting with more or less thesame prescription and approach for developmentof village institution provided by the AKRSP, avariety of institutional arrangements haveemerged demonstrating the vitality of the modeland its sustainability. The concepts introducedfrom outside has been gradually altered to a greatextent in many instances to bring them closer totraditional practices. The GVM developed as apan-village institution without conflicting withindigenous institutions, more by �evolution� thanby design.

While the sustainability of the GVM model isdemonstrated by its functioning in differentvillages after the exit of the NGO, the implicationsof a shift in the NGO�s perception of the VI alsoappears to be a factor having a bearing on theinstitutional sustainability, as such a shift has thepotential to inhibit the functioning of the VI,particularly when uncertainties surfaceregarding the post-exit roles and relations. Itseems quite evident that the GVM model has notonly been appropriate to the NRM and socio-cultural context, but it has also been able toeffectively absorb the capacity building inputsfrom the AKRSP. The degree of development


achieved, even in the worst case considered inthe study � the Mulkapada GVM and theinstitutional issues associated with it �demonstrate that while the GVM has greatstrengths in terms of its role as a pan villageinstitution, the issues of external linkages are fartoo complex in so far as JFM is concerned.

The fact that pan-village institutional forms havesustained despite alternatives that have beenpromoted by the AKRSP itself in these villagesshows that are strong motivations for pan-villagenorms and inter-village negotiating arrangementsdictated by the specific resources managementchallenges. The most critical aspect of institutionalsustainability is the need for creating mechanismsnecessary to mediate the linkages with externalagencies. Clearly, the village level institutions bythemselves cannot address this as it involveslarger actors external to the village and policyenvironment. Neither does the current JFMframework addresses these issues. Theinstitutional sustainability of GVM as aninstrument for community-based forestry in a co-management context is not one that involves theVI alone, but also of redrawing institutional spaceinvolving external actors and the VI.

5.14 Exit Strategy & Post-Exit Role

The exit or withdrawal strategy of the NGO canbe very challenging in such a complex context,where the community is not entirely �free� tomake its own decisions on NRM and its decisionsare subject to various limitations imposed by legalor policy frameworks. The field studies indicatedthat there is widespread confusion regardingwhat the �exit� or �withdrawal� meant to theGVM. The organisational developmentapproaches articulated in documents of theAKRSP do not dwell sufficiently on the difficultiesinherent in the JFM framework or the forestryresources management, particularly when thevillages have a high dependency on forest

resources. It appears that so long as villages havea significant dependence on forest resources, arethink is perhaps called for in the exit strategy.

The challenge of promoting institutionalarrangements and building capacities to facilitateJFM as a just and fair system, perhaps, needs tofind a place in the exit plan. What could betermed second-generation issues in JFM, nowpose major challenges and remain as un-addressed issues in the context of institutionalsustainability. It appears that exit process inNetrang was somewhat, ambiguous and at thisstage it is difficult to assert what would have beenthe implications of a more structured exit. Theinference is that exit process to facilitatesustainability, ought to be informed by a clearunderstanding of the different phases ofinstitutional development. The exit process needsto be supported by better tools kits than areavailable today to the field staff.

Another important issue that emerges from thestudy is that of the post-exit role of the AKRSP,which is also not a well-defined area either inthe organisational development guidelines or inthe field-level practice. This assumes addedsignificance when the NGO continues to havepresence in the village, and yet maintains a ratherambivalent attitude to the VI (GVM) from whichit has exited. The situation leads to considerableuncertainties as well as provide fertile ground formisunderstandings when other forms of villageorganisations are encouraged by the NGO. Thereare also unresolved issues of post-exit role of theNGO in the VI�s relationship with other externalagencies particularly in terms of the VI�sexpectations as well as felt needs.

5.15 Issues for Further Probe

The case studies from Netrang have helped tosharpen the study and better define the lines forfurther probing. In the end, this study has to


discuss in concrete terms factors that seem tofacilitate sustainability of village institutionspromoted by NGOs. The case study on Netrangprovides some clues facilitating discussion onwhat could be considered as �good� practicesfavouring sustainability. But these are limited toone VI model and certain situational peculiarities.This study, however, has helped to develop awell-structured study framework forinvestigating the sustainability question inconcrete terms. To sum up, some of the questionsthat must be incorporated in the studies to followare stated here for discussion:

� Significance of village cohesion, leadershipand traditions of collective action

� Aspects of institutional arrangements inreducing uncertainty (time, quantity,location, quality, etc) felt in flow of benefits/resources

� Sensitivity of the NGO�s VI developmentstrategy to the characteristics of the resource,property and access rights regime andnegotiating arrangements

� Importance of exit strategy and the process:scheduling, phasing, measuring, role of theVI, etc

� Post-exit role and relationship of the NGOvis-à-vis the VI

� Role of NGO in re-drawing the institutionalspace for VI to negotiate with externalagencies

A synthesis of the experiences from differentcontexts and approaches will help to drawgeneral conclusions on the issues that are centralto the study.

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Shariff, M.A. (2005), Sustainability of Village InstitutionsCreated Through NGO Interventions. M.S.dissertation to the London School of Economics& Political Science (unpublished)

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AKRSP(I):Recent Publications

research studies

Joint ForestManagement in

AKRSP (I)�sSouth Gujarat

Programme Area:Issues, challenges

and options

Manish VermaFreelance Researcher

2005

research studies

AKRSP(I)�s experi-ence in prompting

micro irrigationdevices in Saurashtra,

Gujarat

Apoorva OzaKirit Jasani

Shailesh Dungrani

2004research studies

Land ownership as aLivelihood issue for

women

Koyal K. Mandal


Navi Kshitij(in Gujarati)

Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (India)/Anandi


Canal Irrigationmanagement by

tribal communities

Aditi Mukherjee et. al

2003

research studies

Enhancing Entrepre-neurship in MicroIrrigation, mainly

drip irrigation: a casestudy of AKRSP(I)�s

Junagadh programmearea

Sudarshan Panda

IRMA


Anaj Suraksha -Food Security indrought proofing

Kirti Patel et. al


A Study of savingsand credit situation

in Surendranagarprogramme area

Dharmistha Chauhan


Manavtano Marag(in Gujarati)

Published by CharkhaSupported by AKRSP(I)/Unnati

2002

research studies

Gender and Irrigationin India; The

Women�s irrigationgroup of Jambar,

South Gujarat

Barbara van Koppen, et. al


Common poolresources in Semi-

arid India

Ashok Kumar Gupta


Cost Benefit Analysisand Water use

Efficiency - A casestudy of

Motasakhpar Village

Study Team of AKRSP(I)


Emergence of jointforest management:Journalistic docu-

ment

Armin Sethna

2000

research studies

Sustainability ofVillage Institutions

created throughNGO interventions

The Case of AKRSP(I) PromotedParticipatory Irrigation

Management Societies in SouthGujarat

Mohammed Ali Shariff


Impact of AKRSP(I)�sIntervention on

drought coping bypeople: The case of

SurendranagarProgramme are

Niraj JoshiAshok Pingle

Biswaranjan Patnaik

2004documentation

Gender and theNatural Resources -

Experiences andAchievements of

AKRSP(I) Gujarat

Geeta Menon

2005


Sustainability of Village InstitutionsPromoted by NGOsCase Study on the Gram Vikas Mandal Promoted byAKRSP (I), Netrang, South GujaratForestry & Livelihoods

This research is part of a series of case studies on the sustainability of village

institutions promoted by NGOS in the context of natural resource management

and livelihood improvement. It is envisaged as a partnership involving several

NGOs with a credible track record in development work spanning more than

a decade. This report emerges from the first set of studies. It focuses on the

autonomous functioning of the Gram Vikas Mandal – a village institution

promoted by the AKRSP in the forested tribal areas of South Gujarat, after the

AKRSP stopped actively guiding or supporting it. The study is based on intensive

field investigations, focussed group discussions with community as well as in-

depth dialogue with the NGO team and leadership.The vitality of the village

institutions working autonomously of the NGO and the conditions under

which that happens are documented in this work. This study also point to the

constraints of the institutional space encountered by village-level organisations

working under a co-management framework for forest resources.

AGA KHAN RURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME (INDIA)central office9/10th floor, corporate houseopp. dinesh hall, ashram roadahmedabad 380 009Tel: +91-79-66312451/61Fax: +91-79-66312471Email: mail.akrspi.org

registered officesorijini house, 2nd floor6, bhagwandas margnew delhi 110 001

research studies

Documents

Sustainability of Village Institutions Promoted by NGOscesc-india.org/Doc-Archiv/VI-R1-AKRSP-GVM-07.pdf · Sustainability of Village Institutions Promoted by NGOs 39 Sustainability