Supreme Court-philippine Guardians Brotherhood vs. Comelec GR 190529 April 29, 2010

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Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court

Manila

EN BANC

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD,INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE “FGBF GEORGE”

DULDULAO, Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 190529

Present:

PUNO, C.J., CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI ) seeks in this petition for certiorar i [1]

and in the motion fo

reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC ) Resolution No. 8679 dated October

13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s motion for

reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of

registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, theregistration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the followinggrounds:

x x x x

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/190529.htm#_ftn1






(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per

centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for theconstituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and Regulations Governing the

Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System – which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679

deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,

organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed

to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections . Nevertheless, the COMELEC

stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can

personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad

cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other

arguments, PGBI asserted that:

(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invokeSection 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registeredwith the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with theCommission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire toparticipate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a defermentof its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, ithas the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under thesame conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as “MINERO” v. Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the instantcontroversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI’s; (b)MINERO, prior to delisting , was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC ) andthe exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted toprevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with thesame Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.

[2]

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First , the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.[3]

The

provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the

exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and

apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second , the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did no

participate at all in the 2004 elections.











Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained

of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected

parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have been filed

out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was

obviously filed months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari , arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC when it moved

to reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also

known as “MINERO” v. Commission on Elections(Minero);[4]

we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling

that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Courtdisqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate atall in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in thetwo preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed tha

the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts tha

Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the

interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of theSenate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 – there areactually two grounds it states: “ Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its failureto obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either of the last two(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered”

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The secondis, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either of the last twopreceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.[5]

[Underscoring supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1) bu

not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) bu

not in the two (2) preceding elections.











Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the court’s docket.

THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBI’s right to

due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting

from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First , the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party

remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or

coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum

(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has

registered .[6]

The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other

things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive

word.[7]

Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Second , Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited

congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a

party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list

vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily

gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the

law’s clear and categorical language and the legis lative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a

mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in

jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely

abusive interpretation of the law.[8]

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and

National Transparency v. COMELEC [9]

(Banat ) where we part ly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in

RA 7941 as follows:


















We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the twopercent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes itmathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in thedistribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of themembers of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in

light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify

for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banat ’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which

qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less

than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingen

on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of

Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat . The disqualification should now

necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two precedingelections for the constituency in which it registered .

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be

mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two

preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in

two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered . This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941

should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,[10]

and as an exception to the

application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are

established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in

a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by al

courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined

and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[11]

The doctrine is grounded on the necessity

for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicialpractice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it willadhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Staredecisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisissimplymeans that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to thosethat follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. Itproceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,











like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event havebeen put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by acompetent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

[12]

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case

override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting

it aside.[13]

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous

application of the law – an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone canno

sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in

general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now

abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election

and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something that is not covered by Section 6(8)

of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to

address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the

legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should

bring this concern to the legislature’s notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI

was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due processwe have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is

the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A

formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties

are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is

absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.[14]

We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not

denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due

process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No

8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009

which denied PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09 -004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party

list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice















WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CJOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION



Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above

Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

[1] Filed under Rule 65 of the RULES OF COURT.

[2] Rollo, pp. 42-48.

[3] Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. – Any party, organization or coalition already registeredwith the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization or coalition shall file with theCommission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

[4] G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007; see rollo of G.R. No. 177548, pp. 46-48.

[5] Rollo, pp. 74-75.

[6] Numbering supplied.

[7] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 204 (2003); see also The Heirs of George Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company,Inc. G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009.

[8] See Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010 where we held that the use of wrongconsiderations is an act not in contemplation of law – a jurisdictional error for this is one way of gravely abusing one’sdiscretion.

[9] G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009.

[10] Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch [5 US] 137, 2 L ed 60 [1803]) holds that “it is emphatically the province and duty ofthe judicial department to say what the law is.”

[11] See Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009, citing Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008550 SCRA 132.

[12] Id ., citing Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation , G.RNo. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180.

[13] Ibid .

[14] Bautista v. Comelec , 460 Phil, 459, 478 (2003).

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Supreme Court-philippine Guardians Brotherhood vs. Comelec GR 190529 April 29, 2010