Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Options and Technology

Suppression of Enemy Air Defence

Options and Technology

Geoff Tithecott, Capability Manager RF countermeasure

8 June 2017

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© 2017 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved

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Russian A2/AD Range.

(August 2016, source: Institute for the Study of War)

S-400 ‘triumf’

Engagement Radar

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Russian IADS in Syria.

(Source: Institute for the Study of War)

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Threat Radar Types - IADS

Surveillance

AI and ATC Strategic SAMS Short range SAMS

Airborne Early

Warning

(Source: www.ausairpower.net)

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Land

Maritime

EW/Surveillance

Target track

Key

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Airborne Electronic Attack Missions

Stand In Jamming• Requires less RF power

• Typically used against Early

warning and surveillance

Radars

• Platform is vulnerable

Escort Jamming• Medium RF power

• Used against surveillance

and fire control radars

• Platform can be vulnerable

Stand off Jamming• Very high power

• High gain antennas

required

• Can be combined with

radar functionality

Missile

engagement

zone

//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1b/EA-18G_Growler_VX-9_from_below_2008.jpg


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Air Launched Decoy / Stand in Jamming• ALD

– Simulates high-value attack platform signature with low-cost decoy.

– Stimulates enemy IADS

• Consume processing and operator workload with false tracks

• Consume missile inventory

– Retransmit received RF

• amplified to simulate required RCS

• modulated to simulate engine or rotor blade effects and specular effects

• SIJ– Degrade or Deny enemy IADS detection of friendly aircraft.

– Obscuration and confusion techniques to protect strike package

• Multiple realistic false targets (Consume processing and operator workload)

• Noise cover pulse (more effective if real-time engagement geometry is

known)

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Technology Challenges

• RF signal density

• Jammer SWaP

• Low frequency antennas

• Antenna field of View

• Range

• Price

Gremlins Source darpa.mil

Raytheon MALD Source raytheon.com

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Escort jammer• Escort Jamming (EJ): EJ protects a group of aircraft (usually in formation with the

escort platform – or at least on a similar azimuth with respect to the target radar)

whilst also protecting the jamming platform.

• Whilst Support Jamming aims to protect other platforms, a Support Jammer system

would have a significant self-protection capability but will also require other features

such as off-board EW

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Support Jamming Challenges

• Power and sensitivity

• The field of view

• Pop up Threats

• RF management - interoperability

• Pod considerations

• Role Fit

• Aerodynamics

• Prime Power

EA-18G Growler

Raven bomb bay with steerable antennas



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Jammer TechnologyThe jammer will comprise Antennas, Transmitter and

Techniques Generator

• Antennas

• The frequency coverage and gain dictate number and size of

the antennas and largely the solution

• Low band antennas are large

• Fixed, Mechanically or electronically steered

• Transmitter

• Travelling wave tube or increasingly solid state GaN Active

phased arrays

• Techniques Generator

• DRFM based

• Programmable with a wide range of techniques

• Ability to handle multiple threats

Compact TG Modular DRFM

Jamming Resource

Microwave power modules

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Technology - Receiver• A support jammer is typically cued from a RWR or ESM with a wide field of

view, high sensitivity, excellent DF capability and high POI. This can be

provided by the platform or included as part of the support jammer solution.

• Need to be able to extract required signal in a complex environment

• Provide accurate angle information

• Digital receivers are the preferred Approach

– High sensitivity

– Compact

– Flexible processing

• Number of Channels

• Dynamic range

• Bandwidth

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Podded Options (Typhoon example)

Centre line 1000L drop tank

Source Eurofighter.com

Jammer

Size / Power

Self Protection

• S 20-30 L

• P 1-2 KW

Electronic Attack

• S 400-600 L

• P 5-6 KW

EA + A/B

• S 700-900 L

• P 8-10 KW

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Stand Off jammer

• Stand-Off Jamming (SOJ): SOJ provides coverage of an area to protect

other assets (usually not in formation with the SOJ platform). This

generally requires very high power jamming outputs as it is necessary to

attack the target radar through its side-lobes.

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Stand off Jammer Challenges• EW receivers and waveform generators integrated with AESA can provide many

operational benefits but also introduces compromises that must be considered

• Field of Regard

• Timeshared resource limitations

• Different frequency range and bandwidth requirements

Signal Processing

4 Channel Receiver

ECM / DRFM Receiver

Central processor

Beam former

AESA Phased

Array

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Trade-Offs in Phased Array Design• Trade off between number of elements (cost) and available prime power

– complexity increases with number of elements

– Prime power reduces with number of elements

Medium Power

Phased Array

Prime Power EIRP # Modules ERP per Module

20 kW 1 MW 167 36 W

10kW 1 MW 333 9 W

5 kW 1 MW 667 2.3 W

2kW 10 kW 17 36 W

1kW 10 kW 33 9 W

500 W 10 kW 48 4.4 W

333 W 100 W 1 100 W

167W 100 W 2 25 W

111W 100 W 3 11 W

High Power

Phased Array

Power

Combined

= Increasing complexity

Increasing

ERP

ECM solid state TR MMIC

ECM solid state Power Module

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Communications Jamming• An integrated system is dependent on networks. But when forced to

become mobile there is still a dependency on RF communications

• A SEAD solution should include an RF communications jamming

capability.

• This introduces further Challenges:

− Sensitivity: many data links are covert using frequency hopping and direct

sequence spread spectrum techniques.

− Location of receiver

− Signal environment. .

− Interoperability:

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Conclusions• SEAD is a complex and increasingly important task where many individual elements

need to be combined to produce an overall effect.

• SEAD involves more than just Airborne EA

• Solution is dependent on existing capability, force mix and operational need.

• Points to Note

− Solutions must be interoperable with existing equipment.

− Pods can be role fit

− require enhanced ESM which may be best achieved as an internal fit

− Self protection should not be forgotten. Pop up threats and unanticipated events happen.

• It is quite possible that a range of solutions will be adopted.

− This could be beneficial as it makes it difficult to robustly counter.

− However a common core is desirable to help affordability

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

Documents

Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Options and Technology