Supplier-supplier relationships and their implications for buyer-supplier relationships

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 49, NO. 2, MAY 2002 119

Supplier–Supplier Relationships and TheirImplications for Buyer–Supplier Relationships

Thomas Y. Choi, Zhaohui Wu, Lisa Ellram, and Balaji R. Koka

Abstract—Many researchers have investigated the dynamics ofbuyer–supplier relationships and have, in general, posited the im-portance of long-term, cooperative relationships. However, the re-lationship between suppliers (i.e., supplier–supplier relationship)and its potential impact on the buyer–supplier relationship havenot yet been considered. This research addresses a void in the liter-ature, especially given that many buyers now work with a smallersupplier base and deliberately try to foster certain types of sup-plier–supplier relationships. Building on the existing buyer–sup-plier and strategic alliance literature, we propose three archetypesof supplier–supplierrelationships. This research further illustratesthe strategic role of the buying firm in structuring these relation-ships and explores the managerial implications of different types ofsupplier–supplier relationships from the perspectives of both thebuying firm and its suppliers.

Index Terms—Buyer–supplier relationships, competition, coop-eration, co-opetition, supply chain management, supplier–supplierrelationships.

I. INTRODUCTION

M ANUFACTURERS in the United States have undergonedrastic changes during the last two decades. A frenzy of

downsizing has swept through the corporate world [85], and thequest to reduce the time required to bring a product to marketat a reduced cost has become a new strategic frontier [16], [42],[76]. In order to do more with less time and money, firms have in-creased their reliance on suppliers for design and manufacturing.Subsequently, these changes have brought salience to the topic ofbuyer–supplier relationships and have motivated researchers tostudy this area [11], [20], [22]–[27], [43], [44], [58], [94].

Generally, these authors support the increasing importance ofgood buyer–supplier relationships and substantiate the strategicrole played by suppliers. Indeed, an increasing number ofbuying firms now have cooperative and long-term buyer–sup-plier relationships [40], [44], [47], [98]. Often suppliers areregarded as strategic partners of buying firms, and thus theyhave a significant impact on the buying firm’s operation [94].However, it is interesting to note that such published workshave examined the buyer–supplier relationship mainly ina dyadic context [4], [49], whereby suppliers typically arelumped together as one node and the buyer as another node.

Manuscript received August 23, 1999; revised November 15, 2001. Reviewof this manuscript was arranged by Department Editor J. K. Liker.

T. Y. Choi is with the Departments of Management and Supply ChainManagement, College of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ85287-4706 USA (e-mail: [email protected]).

Z. Wu and L. Ellram are with the Department of Supply Chain Management,College of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4706 USA.

B. R. Koka is with the Department of Management, College of Business,Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4706 USA.

Publisher Item Identifier S 0018-9391(02)05131-0.

Though useful, researchers should move beyond the dyadicbuyer–supplierrelationshipsandexaminationoftherelationshipswithinthelumpedsuppliernode, inorder tounderstandmorefullythecomplexdynamics thatexistbetweenabuyerand itssuppliersas well as among suppliers [73]. As the operations of suppliersbecome more intimately intertwined with those of buyers, boththe exchange of information and the need for cooperation amongthe firm’s suppliers becomes more critical for the success of thebuying firms [76]. For instance, the dramatic fashion in whichsuppliers came together to save Toyota’s production flow after afire at one supplier’s plant highlights the importance of relation-ships among suppliers for buyer’s performance [69].

Furthermore, by deliberately trying to foster certain types ofsupplier–supplier relationships, many buyers suggest that the re-lationship between suppliers is important [5], [6]. Some buyersprefer to have their suppliers not communicate with each other,lest they lose the benefit of competitive pressures. At the sametime, the trend toward buyers working with a smaller numberof suppliers leads to a context more conducive for suppliers todeveloping working relationships among themselves. With theadvent of Just-in-Time (JIT) II and value analysis involving sup-pliers [68], many suppliers are now explicitly directed by thebuyer to work together on various projects [29], [93]. Cost, time,and competitive pressures have thus forced suppliers into intri-cate interdependencies between one another resulting in a com-plex flow of information, materials and capital, or lack thereof.Consequently, buyers as well as suppliers need to recognize thecomplexity engendered by this environment in order to managethese relationships effectively.

Simply put, a complex environment arises from the relation-ships not only between a buyer and its suppliers but also be-tween suppliers. Specifically, we argue that the nature of theinteraction between the suppliers has profound implications forthe buying firm because it affects the exchange of informationbetween the suppliers. This exchange has the potential to affectthe power balance between the buying firm and suppliers be-cause of its impact on the bargaining power between them.

Therefore, we take this first step toward consideringsup-plier–supplierrelationships. In discussing these relationships,we posit that our context must entail suppliers in the same in-dustry, whose products are substitutable rather than complemen-tary. Such suppliers are in the same business and the compo-nents or subassemblies they make to a great extent overlap witheach other. Also, both the products and manufacturing processof these suppliers are most likely compatible. Here, the sup-pliers have a common business interest and are strategicallybound—what one decides will have an impact on the others.Thereby, it becomes meaningful for these suppliers to consider

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120 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 49, NO. 2, MAY 2002

Fig. 1. Dyadic buyer–supplier model.

strategic choices in terms of what types of business relationshipsthey would seek.1

First, we consider a brief overview of the extant literatureon buyer–supplier relationships, and then proceed to sup-plier–supplier relationships. We categorize supplier–supplierrelationships into three archetypes: competitive, cooper-ative, and “co-opetitive.” While we recognize that mostsupplier–supplier relationships have elements of competitionand cooperation, analyzing these three types of relationships asarchetypes is necessary to understand the inherently differentdynamics underlying these relationships. Subsequently, wedevelop propositions that address the managerial implicationsof these relationships from the perspectives of the buying firmas well as the suppliers.

II. OVERVIEW OF BUYER–SUPPLIER

RELATIONSHIP LITERATURE

A dyadic buyer–supplier relationship, as depicted in Fig. 1,represents a common framework. A solid line is used to signifya link between two firms. The relationship in this context hasbeen discussed in two types: cooperative or competitive.

Historically,thedynamicsandevolutionofabuyer–supplierre-lationshiphavebeencharacterizedby the intermittentdominanceof cooperative and competitive buyer–supplier relationships.For example, according to Helper [44], the U.S. automotiveindustry had a “voice” (cooperative) buyer–supplier relationshipin its early stages, which subsequently evolved into the “exit”(competitive) relationshipup to the early 1980s.Then, asoriginalequipment manufacturers (OEMs) became more reliant on theirsuppliers, the dynamics of such relationships began to changeagain. In recent years, an increasing number of U.S. buying firmshave begun moving toward cooperative relationships with theirkey suppliers [17], [20], [40], [43], [45], [53], [92].

In a cooperative relationship, the buyer and suppliers worktogether as a team moving toward a common goal, sharing in-formation and resources to solve problems, improve products,and streamline processes [32], [38], [39], [57], [58], [59], [63],[86], [87]. The need to work together is engendered by sev-eral factors. First, shorter product life cycles have increased the

1In this context, we realize the presence of so-called complementators [13]could lead to cooperative relationships between suppliers from different indus-tries. While we acknowledge that the dynamics between those suppliers may bedifferent from those that are competing with each other, it does not invalidateour basic contention that buyers have to recognize the dynamics between sup-pliers in order to more effectively manage their supplier relationships.

pace of innovation with the result that very few firms can de-velop products independently [30]. Second, the trend towardmass customization has forced buyers and suppliers to jointlydesign, develop, and manufacture customized products that in-crease switching costs. Third, such customization has resultedin the need for high asset specific investments that require in-creased levels of information exchange and trust. Buyers thatrecognize their interdependence on the suppliers work towardlonger-term contracts, more consensual decision-making andjoint problem-solving approaches.

One successful example comes from Toyota’s joint R&D ef-fort with its steel supplier, Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC). Inthe early 1980s, NSC and Toyota worked together to developthe technology for a corrosion-resistant steel sheet coating [61].With a proposal initially from NSC, Toyota assigned a team ofmembers from several plants and corporate functions (i.e., mate-rial research, vehicle evaluation, body production, and body en-gineering) to work with the representatives from NSC. This jointteam worked together from the evaluation of initial samples andpilot testing to large-scale production. Within four years, Toyotawas able to apply the new material to all of its models. This jointinvestment gave Toyota cutting-edge technology. At the sametime, NSC, which remained as a main source of such steel, wasable to license the technology to other steel makers.

In general, the decision to carry on acompetitive relation-ship is based on the logic of economic risks. As firms engagein transacting a contract with external suppliers, risks associ-ated with the transaction influence the type of relationship thateventually emerges [75], [89], [90], [91], [96]. Risk, such as ap-propriation risk and technology diffusion risk, provides one pri-mary reason for competitive relationships between buyers andsuppliers. Moreover, risk associated with forward integration bysuppliers and backward integration by buyers may also result ina competitive relationship. Again, the higher the risk, the morecompetitive the relationship will become. Finally, the commodi-tization of a product may also result in competitive relation-ships. In other words, for commodities that are readily avail-able in an open market, the buying firm will most likely focuson price as the primary determining factor when selecting sup-pliers, which leads to a competitive relationship.

The following example illustrates the risk associated incases where a supplier firm moves as competitor into a marketniche presently occupied by the buying firm. Thomson Con-sumer Electronics of France was a manufacturer of electroniccomponents and subsystems [12]. Thomson would normallysupply parts to JVC (a large, high-quality VCR manufacturer).However, through an alliance with JVC, its employees beganto learn the high precision technologies necessary for manufac-turing VCRs, and eventually Thomson expanded its capabilityto design and produce complete VCRs. Many buying firms fearsuch diffusion risks; therefore, as a defensive mechanism, theymaintain arms-length interactions, conduct tough negotiations,and practice short-term contracts. This type of competitiverelationship is also price-driven and often antagonistic. In suchsituations, the buyer typically has the bargaining power withless dependency on the supplier.

In summary, the researchers have described the buyer–sup-plier relationship as taking one of two forms: cooperative or

CHOI et al.: SUPPLIER–SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR BUYER–SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS 121

competitive. On the one hand, the relationship is said to be com-petitive when it occurs in a win–lose context, where the cost ofexiting the relationship is low and the concern over the relation-ship revolves around economic risk (e.g., fear of losing tech-nology, market share, or potential profit). On the other hand,when the relationship leads to a mutually beneficial situation, itis considered a cooperative relationship. Overall, both types ofbuyer–supplier relationships describe a state of interdependency[8], [36], [82], where the future of buyer and supplier becomesintertwined as what one firm does either cooperatively or com-petitively affects the other.

III. SUPPLIER–SUPPLIERRELATIONSHIP ARCHETYPES

Although rich in description of relational prerequisitesand contexts [4], [40], [41], [43], [49], [54], [94], the currentbuyer–supplier literature has paid little attention to the role thatsupplier–supplier relationship plays in affecting the buyer’sbargaining power and purchasing effectiveness. Implicit in thisobservation is the assumption that buyer–supplier relationshipsare independent of the relationships that exist among thesuppliers. However, a few studies do recognize how buyerswork with several suppliers and actively foster desired sup-plier–supplier relationships, suggesting that in many of thecurrent business environments such an assumption may not bevalid [5], [6], [19], [25], [28], [37], [51], [64].

For instance, Kamath and Liker [51] found that someJapanese automakers encouraged their suppliers to competewith each other. They would invite two sets of guest engineersfrom two first tier suppliers to compete side-by-side to seewho could come up with the better design [51]. Asanuma[5] points out that, when negotiating for a new contract,buyers develop initial estimates cooperativelywith suppliersbut then instigate competitive relationshipsbetweensuppliersto maintain rigorous negotiations. In another study [6], hedescribes the “two-vendor policy” in the Japanese auto industrywhere the buyer pressures the two suppliers to cooperate whilesimultaneously protecting the status of each supplier duringthe life of a given model. Similarly, Cross’s [19] treatment ofBritish Petroleum’s (BP) supplier management strategy shedslight on the relational dynamics between BP’s suppliers. Herevealed the challenges faced by BP in managing the conflictsbetween the competing suppliers. Even though they neededto work together to meet their commitments, BP found itsIT suppliers reluctant to share their best practices with eachother. All these studies thus indicate that supplier–supplierrelationships do play a role in how well a buyer can execute itsrequisite activities involving suppliers. At the same time theymake an implicit assumption that the buyer can manipulate thedynamics between the suppliers, meanwhile ignoring the effectof information exchange and the attendant dynamics due tosuch supplier–supplier relationships on the buyer. Therefore, itis imperative we consider more carefully the relationships thatexist between suppliers.

As a first step, we propose three archetypes of supplier–sup-plier relationships: competitive, cooperative, and co-opetitive.Epitomizing supplier–supplier relationship characteristics, thethree archetypes are classification schemes that categorize

Fig. 2. Competitive supplier–supplier model.

supplier–supplier relationships into mutually exclusive sets[7], [23], [33]. We consider each of the three archetypalrelationships as a distinct configuration of relational variablessuch as communication pattern [15], [65], power and control[84], and the nature of product(s) exchanges [73] between thetwo suppliers.

An archetype approach is consistent with the stated researchfocus in this study, that is, to develop testable propositions forfuture empirical research. As Doty and Glick [23] point out,each archetype is an ideal type that simply indicates a theoreticalrelationship between the different variables. For each archetype,all the relationships between the different variables need to fit si-multaneously. In other words, a difference between the differentarchetypes is not just a difference in the value of the variables,but also in how they fit together.

In reality, however, the empirical relationship types usuallyare not perfect ideal types. That is, the relationship variables donot fit well altogether. This, according to Doty and Glick [23],explains the performance differences between the ideal type andempirical one. In order to assess this performance difference,however, we need to understand the implications of the idealtypes and then empirically test how the relationship between thevariable differs. Classifying supplier–supplier relationships intothese three ideal types is thus the first step in developing theoryand propositions regarding the nature and implications of theserelationships.

The three relationships in the supplier–supplier context havebeen depicted in Figs. 2–4. All three models show differing re-lationships between the suppliers symbolized by different typesof lines. The competitive model shows a vertical line between thesuppliers to signify the arms-length relationship that may some-times be hostile, whereas the cooperative model shows a hori-zontal line with double-arrow heads to signify the interactive re-lationship. Finally, the co-opetitive relationship is depicted by abroken line, which signifies a relationship that combines simul-taneous cooperative and competitive relationships. Next, each ofthese three types of relationships is considered in greater detail.

A. Competitive Supplier–Supplier Relationship

In competitive supplier–supplier relationships, supplierskeep each other at bay without direct lines of communication.They know of each other’s existence [60] and such knowledgeis gained mainly through the buyer or the media. Exchangesbetween the suppliers are discrete, and the communicationoccurs minimally and in a very focused context [24]. Forinstance, consider two firms that supply plastic parts to a major


Fig. 3. Cooperative supplier–supplier model.

Fig. 4. Co-opetitive supplier–supplier model.

automaker. Each knows that the other firm also supplies partsto the same automaker and competes for the same work. Inactuality, it is not uncommon for one supplier to manufactureusing a blueprint drawn up by a competing firm. Even thoughthe competing firm received the job of product development,the current supplier realizes that it won the manufacturing jobduring the quoting and contracting phase. In other words, thesesuppliers do not engage in mutualistic behaviors (i.e., sharinginformation or resources to resolve managerial problems), andthe occasional exchange of information or coordination ofoperations is typically done through the buying firm based onthe buyer’s purchasing needs. The buying firm interacts witheach individual supplier independently and serves as a routerof information exchange between suppliers.

In fact, the buying firm could play a more active role in struc-turing a competitive supplier–supplier relationship [51]. The“wall” between the suppliers, as shown in Fig. 2, could be in-tentionally built by the buying firm, as a buying firm often usesdual sourcing policies to exploit market competitiveness [81].The buying firm then enjoys the benefits of being the interme-diary between the suppliers. The buyer is interested in main-taining a competitive relationship between the suppliers to facil-itate lower prices and minimize the chance of collusion. At thesame time, the buying firm must act as a conduit to coordinatenecessary information and material exchange between the sup-pliers to ensure smooth operation of its plants. In other words,the buyer controls the flow of information between the suppliersthat it can leverage for its own benefits.

B. Cooperative Supplier–Supplier Relationship

The second type of supplier–supplier relationship is illus-trated in Fig. 3. In the cooperative supplier–supplier relation-ship, the suppliers work together closely, exchange ideas, andeven engage in joint venture projects. Despite the independent

ownership, there is a high degree of a free flow of informationbetween them [66]. The suppliers contribute resources and ex-pertise such as technological know-how, human resources, andproduction capacity to accomplish shared objectives. Such re-lational exchanges tend to occur over long periods of time andentail complex social interactions at various levels within the in-volved suppliers.

We term such exchanges “cooperative” relationships whenthey result in little or no competition between the suppliersvis-à-visthe buyer. In other words, they present a united frontto the buyer. For instance, throughout the 1980s, stainless steelproducts were sold to China by a marketing consortium of sixJapanese steel firms that included Nippon Steel, NKK, Sum-itomo Metal, Kobe Steel, Kawasaki Steel, and Nisshin Steel.The members of the consortia typically presented a commonfront to the buyer by having one of the members conduct themarketing negotiations. Once the deal was finalized, the sixcompanies apportioned the order based on both their demandand inventory situation [2], [3].

Such cooperative relationships can often stray into practicesthat can be termed collusive. For instance, in several industries,such as airlines and steel, price increases and decreases occur intandem. Such cooperative behavior may also result in demandmanagement as well as partitioning the market among them-selves in order to reduce competition. The critical element in thecooperative supplier–supplier relationship is the active focus ofthe suppliers to reduce or limit their competitive actionsvis-à-visthe buyer. While we recognize that such purely cooperative rela-tionships between suppliers are relatively rare and may even beillegal in some countries, we include it as a theoretical archetype[23] that defines one aspect of supplier–supplier relationship.

C. Co-opetitive Supplier–Supplier Relationship

Co-opetition is a concomitantly competing and cooperatingrelationship [10], [13]. It represents a relationship in disequilib-rium, where both suppliers recognize that competition is neces-sary for self-preservation and survival, but cooperation is alsonecessary for learning and market expansion [14], [26]. In thiscase, direct communication and exchange of materials betweenthe two competing suppliers facilitate the overall efficiency andcompetitiveness of both parties.

Researchers have used game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemmain particular, to understand the concomitant competition andcooperation among organizations [10], [13], [73], [78]. Thesestudies were used to analyze the mechanism that facilitatescooperative behavior among organizations that are also com-peting, and the circumstances that would permit outcomes inthe “mixed-motive” game structure. For example, Heide andMiner [41] suggested that anticipated interaction and frequencyof direct contact among competing firms increases co-opetitivebehavior.

Industrial clusters (e.g., gambling houses in Las Vegas orhigh-tech companies in Silicon Valley) offer one exampleof a business context in which the competing firms form agroup with mixed motives. Such industrial clusters in the samegeographical proximity provide competing organizations themutual benefits of easy access of resources, flexibility, andfaster innovation [50], [78]. However, in general, the competing


firms in industrial clusters may not necessarily interact directly.In other clusters, such as the trade network, competing firmshave direct links with one another [48]. In such networks, firmsof similar businesses (i.e., a group of suppliers) organize intoformal or informal groups. When suppliers form a loosely-cou-pled trade network, they exchange industry information andpromote common interests. Such a network enables these firmsto gain increased exchanges of goodwill with other members,business competencies, credibility of the organizations, andaccess to new resources. However, the survival of the individualmembers will depend on how they leverage their competenciesvis-à-vistheir competition.

Theultralightsteelautobody(ULSAB)project isanothergoodexample of such behavior. It consists of a consortium of 35 steelfirms working toward the development of a lighter steel productthat could become a competitive substitute for plastic. The coop-erative behavior of the steel firms changes to competition whenapproachedbythebuyersfromother industries(e.g.,constructionand appliances industries). Further, in the auto industry, each ofthesteel firmsis individuallycompetingwiththeothersforashareof the auto market. In a nutshell, they are cooperating to enhancevaluecreation(increasethesizeof thepie),butcompetewitheachother to appropriate the value (share the pie).

D. Comparison and Contrast of Three Types ofSupplier–Supplier Relationships

Table I gives an overview of supplier–supplier relationships.The rows reflect the characteristics of the three types of sup-plier–supplier relationships along the dimensions identified inthe first column.

The first row focuses on theproduct-market characteristicsthat influence the type of relationship between the suppliers.Suppliers in industries that exhibit characteristics of perfectcompetition are likely to demonstrate competitive relationships.Typically, such markets consist of a large number of suppliersoffering products that are undifferentiated and, therefore, easilysubstitutable. Also, the concentration ratio2 would be very lowin that there would not be select few suppliers that dominate themarket. Consequently, the buyer typically has low switchingcosts. Such a context coupled with the lack of direct contactbetween the suppliers provides the buyer with high bargainingpowervis-à-visits suppliers.

Suppliers in monopolistic industries3 are likely to exhibit co-operative relationships. Such industries have high concentrationratios with two or three firms keeping the bulk of the marketshare, which leads to a condition more conducive for close coor-dination. Typically the products are highly differentiated (fromother industry products) and, therefore, not substitutable. Con-

2Concentration ratio, also known as “five-firm concentration ratio,” refers tothe market share controlled by the five largest firms in the industry. Typically,industries where the five largest firms together own a market share of 75% aresaid to have a high concentration ratio.

3Monopolistic industries refer to the industries where monopolistic compe-tition exists. Firms in the same industry are said to exhibit monopolistic com-petition when they move away from perfect competition by differentiating theirproducts from their competitors’ products. Thus, in many high tech industries,firms work toward monopolistic competition by establishing standards that lockin buyers, thereby increasing their switching costs.

TABLE IDYNAMICS IN SUPPLIER–SUPPLIERMODELS

sequently, the buyer has very high switching costs, and the bar-gaining power in this context lies with the suppliers.

Suppliers in oligopolistic industries are likely to exhibitco-opetitive relations. Though such industries have fewerfirms, they are largely of similar size with very similar resourcebases and competencies. For instance, in 1987 competing U.S.semiconductor suppliers formed a co-opetitive relationship byfounding a research consortium called Sematech, mainly tomaintain competitiveness against their Japanese counterparts[46]. At the time, 14 suppliers participated in this venture,and together they accounted for 80% of the semiconductormanufacturing industry, exhibiting a relatively small numberof players and moderate level of concentration ratio. In thisenvironment, the products are moderately differentiable andthe buyers have moderate switching costs.

The second row addresses the types ofinformation ob-tained by one supplier regarding another supplier. Generally,only objective information is exchanged in a competitivesupplier–supplier relationship. This information, such as pre-dictable demand, competitors’ product features and productioncapacity, can be obtained through indirect sources available inthe market or from the buying firm.

The information in a cooperative supplier–supplier relation-ship is exchanged directly because the two suppliers engage indirect interactions. Both mutual trust and shared business ob-jectives necessary in a cooperative relationship facilitate a sub-jective and socially complex information flow that is more tacitand not easily captured in explicit documentation. Although ob-jective information can certainly be shared in this relationship,both direct and subjective information remains the hallmark andthe primary reason for carrying on the cooperative relationship.

The information exchange in a co-opetitive relationship oc-curs when there are common interests between competing sup-pliers. The competitive side of this relationship constrains andlimits the flow of information, whereas the cooperative side en-


courages the flow of direct information. Thus, the information ina co-opetitive relationship can best be characterized as guarded.As suspected in a relationship in disequilibrium, there is usuallytension between what is shared and what is withheld [13].

Timeorientations also vary according to the type of relation-ship, as time horizon is a key indicator that distinguishes amongdifferent interfirm relationships [96]. Asanuma’s study [5] of thecontractual framework for part suppliers in the Japanese automo-tive industry and Helper’s analysis [44] of the U.S. automotivesupplier relationshipdepictedverydifferent timeorientationsandrelated interorganizational relationships. When two suppliers arecompeting for a buyer’s contract, the interaction between them isbased on short-term transactions. However, when two supplierscooperate with each other, the interaction tends to occur acrossseveral different cross-functional areas, and thus the operationsof the two firms continue on a long-term basis.

The time orientation in the co-opetitive supplier–supplier re-lationship does not necessarily require a long-term orientation,although a long duration is possible. The timeline depends onthe way in which the interaction between the suppliers evolves.The relationship could last as long as the involved suppliers en-gage in mutualistic behavior as they face common threats or op-portunities in the market. However, competition could replacemutualistic interactions between the suppliers when the threatssubside or opportunities fade.

Different relationship bases also exist across differentmodels. Typically, competitive supplier–supplier relationshipsare confrontational, self-centered, and possibly antagonistic;cooperative relationship is characterized by mutual trust; andco-opetitive supplier–supplier relation is based on strategicinterests rather than mutual trust [14]. In this case, the coop-erative relationship would be replaced by competition or viceversa, as the needs of mutual reliance change [97]. For instance,competitive behavior can dominate the relationship whenthe pursuit of self-interest is considered strategically moreimportant than fending off common threats faced by suppliers.

Thus, while product-market characteristics indicate the con-straints within which particular types of supplier–supplier rela-tionships are more likely to occur, they are not completely deter-ministic. As the discussion on time orientation and relationshipbases of these relationships implicitly indicates, organizationalactions and goals also have an impact on the type of relationshipthat can evolve between suppliers. Such a view is substantiatedby the studies cited earlier such as Asanuma [6], Cross [19], andKamath and Liker [51], who point out how buyers and suppliersmake a strategic choice in fostering particular relationships thatbestfit theiroverallstrategy.Inotherwords,abuyer’ssupplyman-agement strategy and supplier’s alliance strategy are critical de-terminants in defining the type of supplier–supplier relationship.

Proposition 1: The type of supplier–supplier relationshipis a function of the nature of the industry, the nature of theinformation exchanged between the suppliers, the time ori-entation of the relationship, the buyer’s supply managementstrategy, and the suppliers’ alliance strategy.

Proposition 1 highlights the contingent nature of the manage-rial implications of the different relationship archetypes. Theo-retically, the archetypes are an ideal form with the requisite char-acteristics on the dimensions listed, but, practically, when they

are played out in the real world, they deviate from the ideal forms[23] and are subject to managerial decisions. Clearly, the emer-gent relationships and their associated benefits are contingent onthe product-market characteristics as well as the strategies of thebuyingandsupplier firms. Inotherwords, it isup to theconcernedmanager to identify the likely implications of each archetype andmanage them in such a way as to maximize the benefits while re-ducing the adverse effects. In keeping with the differing manage-rial imperatives of the buyer and supplier, we discuss these impli-cations separately from the perspective of each.

IV. M ANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THETHREEARCHETYPES

The former discussion on the differing characteristics of threesupplier–supplier archetypes suggests that the managerial im-plications for each of these types are likely to be different. Itfollows that this research takes a step toward a more generalmodel of relationships in supply chain. We develop argumentsand propositions that delineate the pros and cons of each of thesetypes separately, not to promote one type over the other, butto give all types equally critical treatment. In other words, thepropositions will identify variables within each type that affectbuyer performance either positively or negatively.

As discussed previously, one of the key implications of dif-ferent supplier–supplier types is their impact on the relative bar-gaining power between the buyer and the suppliers. Anothermay be their role in affecting the creation of synergy and cost-re-duction. Also important is their effect on the inherent risk ofappropriation and technology diffusion. We focus the followingdiscussion on three factors: relationship types, bargaining powerand outcomes, and risk. We consider the managerial implica-tions of each model from the buyer’s perspective first and fromthe supplier’s perspective second.

A. Managerial Tradeoffs From the Buyer’s Perspective

Table II summarizes the pros and cons of the three sup-plier–supplier types and the propositions underlying theserelationship types from the buyer’s perspective.

Competitive Supplier–Supplier Relationship

Market mechanisms encourage competitive supplier–sup-plier relationships. Competitive relationships prevail when thesupplying components are standardized, low in complexity, oreasily available from alternative sources [52], [56]. As Table IIindicates, from a buyer’s perspective, the benefits of a compet-itive supplier–supplier relationship are twofold: leverage oversuppliers and information control. To explain, a competitiverelationship gives the buyer greater leverage over the suppliers[72], which enables the buying firm to exert pressures on thesuppliers to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Competitivebidding, forexample,establishesamarketmechanismthat forcesinterested suppliers to compete in hopes of winning contracts.

Information control is another benefit of maintaining acompetitive supplier–supplier relationship. A competitiverelationship impedes information sharing between suppliers,which safeguards the internal information of each supplier andeffectively sets up barriers to communication between them.In addition to gleaning information regarding competitors in


TABLE IITRADEOFFSFROM THE BUYER’SPERSPECTIVE

the marketplace, the supplier is reliant on the buying firm fornecessary information about the technology and productionstrengths of its rivals. The buyer then serves as an informationintermediary between two competing suppliers, resulting inincreasing bargaining power for the buyer.

Proposition 2a: When the buyer displays high bargainingpower vis-à-visthe suppliers, competitive supplier–supplierrelationships can positively affect buyer performance.

A competitive supplier–supplier relationship is not conduciveto synergistic efforts among suppliers. Given that such relation-ships are more likely in a perfect market environment, the ini-tiative to work together is unlikely to emerge from the suppliersthemselves. In such cases, lack of information sharing and opencommunication between suppliers impose extra managerial bur-dens on the buying firm; its managers must coordinate the neces-sary exchange of new ideas, the management of quality control,and the improvement of production processes. Such extra ad-ministrative efforts result in increased transaction costs for thebuying firm.

Proposition 2b: When synergistic activities betweenthe suppliers are lacking, competitive supplier–supplierrelations can negatively affect buyer performance.

It is also true that the buyer can pit suppliers against each otherto attain maximum competition among suppliers. However, ifthis sort of competitive supplier–supplier relationship persists,it could be construed as abusive and ultimately backfire on thebuyer. In such a case over the long run, the buyer–supplier rela-tionship will become strained, and a confrontational relationshipmay ensue, potentially disrupting the daily operation and evendamaging the buying firm’s credibility. For example, when GMinitiated cost-cutting programs, it disclosed the bidding infor-mation of its suppliers and requested another round of biddingbased on the disclosed prices, pitting one supplier against an-other [53]. In the short run, GM trimmed purchase costs; how-ever, this conduct created a rift in supplier relationships to theextent that for some time suppliers refused to share the newesttechnology with GM.

Cooperative Supplier–Supplier Relationship

When suppliers have a cooperative relationship, the buyingfirm enjoys the synergies created by the open communicationand information sharing between the suppliers. Such informa-tion and knowledge sharing includes understanding of product

design, engineering processes, and different manufacturing andmanagement practices. For instance, Johnson Control, Lear, andTextron are large supplier firms that supply interior subassem-blies (e.g., instrument panels, seats) to automobile manufac-turers. As suppliers to Daimler-Chrysler, they work together tocreate new ideas for product and process improvement in a pro-gram that they refer to as the “Tech Teams.” These firms worktogether over the lifetime of an automobile model resulting in arelationship that spans several years. Such durations encourageboth the exchange of information as well as the development ofmutual trust between the suppliersvis-à-visthe buyer. In thiscontext, Daimler-Chrysler discourages competitive bidding be-tween its suppliers, thus ensuring that the competitive elementis muted between them while enhancing the cooperative natureof the relationship between its suppliers.

Such a cooperative environment also offers buyers an oppor-tunity to better understand the suppliers’ capabilities. As long asthe suppliers share a cooperative relationship, it becomes moreconducive to hedge against unexpected changes in demand [81]or disruption in production. For instance, when Toyota’s pro-duction came to halt after a fire in a supplier plant that wasthe sole-source for an inexpensive yet critical part, other sup-pliers worked together cooperatively without squabbling aboutprice or proprietary data sharing to ramp up the production of themissing part within two days after the fire [69]. In other words,outsourcing capacity can be considered greater if the suppliershave a cooperative relationship than if they do not. For instance,when two suppliers have a close working relationship, it be-comes easier for the buyer to find comparable products fromthe suppliers as a team as seen in the case of Daimler-Chrysler’sTech Teams program.

Proposition 3a: When suppliers display flexibility andsynergistic activities, cooperative supplier–supplier rela-tionships can positively affect buyer performance.

There are certain risks for the buyer if suppliers have a co-operative relationship. One risk comes from potential collusivebehavior on the part of suppliers. Cooperative suppliers maybe tempted to overstep the legal boundary, leading to anti-com-petitive conduct. The collusion between suppliers may shift thepower and cost structure in the supply chain. For instance, theflour-producing mills may collude and unilaterally impose afixed price on flour. If this happens, the bakery is now forcedto re-evaluate the power as well as cost structure and consideradopting a new strategic approach to deal with the suppliers, asdiscussed in the case of reverse marketing [62].

Further, borrowing from transaction cost economics, abuying firm faces two risks when faced with such opportunisticbehaviors. Forward integration, called appropriation risk, maythreaten the very existence of the buying firm [67], [77], [88].As cooperative exchanges between suppliers enhance the sup-pliers’ managerial and technological capabilities, they mightattempt to vertically integrate the buyer’s business. Such risksare considered high, especially when the buying firm cannotsustain its core competitive advantage or create new devel-opment opportunities. Suppliers may use a “me-too” strategyand imitate the buying firm’s distinctive core value-creatingtechnologies [90], and expose the buying firm to yet anothertype of risk—technology diffusion risk.


Proposition 3b: When suppliers display collusive be-havior and increase appropriation risks, cooperativesupplier–supplier relationships can negatively affect buyerperformance.

Co-opetitive Supplier–Supplier Relationship

When suppliers walk the fine line of competing and cooper-ating with each other, it puts the buying firm in a position whereit can take advantage of both competitive pressures and coop-erative working relationships. In other words, the buyer can si-multaneously maintain leverage position and tap into enhancedsupplier knowledge and capacity. The interplay between coop-eration and competition, as illustrated previously, is determinedby market environment and each supplier’s business needs.

More specifically, higher variety of products and more sup-plier resources may be available to the buyer, given the equalsize of supply base. In addition, when opportunity arises, thebuyer can choose one supplier over the other, taking advantageof the competitive relationship that exists between suppliers. Atthe same time, since the suppliers also have cooperative rela-tionships, the switching cost may be comparatively low, as thespecifics of the business transaction and the buyer policy mightalready be familiar to the supplier.

Proposition 4a: When the buyer displays high bargainingpower and suppliers display synergistic activities, co-opet-itive supplier–supplier relationships can positively affectbuyer performance.

Conversely, the buyer assumes the risk of potentially facingthe disadvantages of both types of supplier–supplier relation-ships. Because of this risk and of the inherent uncertainty in aco-opetitive relationship, the buyer must stay vigilant and re-main flexible and adaptive. In particular, uncertainty may arisefrom two fronts—new ideas emerging from the cooperative re-lationships between suppliers forcing changes in the buying firmitself and the potential opportunistic behaviors by the suppliers.

Therefore, the buyer must be alert to the changes in supplierdynamics and product features. The buying firm is naturally in-terested in leveraging any synergy coming out of a cooperativesupplier, but at the same time, it needs to respond proactively toavoid any potential pitfalls of opportunistic behaviors from thesuppliers.

Proposition 4b: When suppliers display opportunistic be-haviors and increase the risk of technology appropriation,co-opetitive supplier–supplier relationships can negativelyaffect buyer performance.

B. Managerial Tradeoffs from the Supplier’s Perspective

Table III summarizes the different managerial implicationsof the three supplier–supplier types and the propositions under-lying these relationships from the supplier’s perspective.

Competitive Supplier–Supplier Relationship

Suppliers may prefer to remain at arms-length from other sup-pliers, as the tension from competition helps to retain the con-fidentiality of trade secrets and prevent dissemination of com-pany information. For instance, some niche firms with uniquetechnology (e.g., airbag manufacturers) avoid cooperative rela-

TABLE IIITRADEOFFSFROM THE SUPPLIER’SPERSPECTIVE

tionships if they can afford to be a lone player in the market.One of the reasons that some privately owned companies (e.g.,Science Applications International Corporation) opt not to gopublic is to safeguard their technological know-how or uniqueproduction processes. They retain their ability to command apremium price in a niche market when market entry is difficultif not impossible.

Competition can also help instill a sense of urgency in a sup-plier’s corporate culture to continuously improve and to keepmediocrity at bay. This is perhaps best captured in the title ofAndy Grove’s book [31],Only the Paranoid can Survive. Forinstance, what keeps a large supplier like Intel well ahead ofits competitors is its relentless drive for faster processor speedthrough continuous product engineering. Finally, a dominantsupplier in a given industry can resort to the tactics of claimingthe existence of market competition to fend off anti-trust liti-gation. For example, to argue against the Justice Department’sallegation of monopolizing the software market, Microsoft’slawyers asserted that the traditional software industry is rapidlybeing overshadowed by the emergence of the Internet, wherepowerful rivals, especially America Online Inc., offer a coun-terweight to Microsoft’s monopoly on the desktop [95]. Hence,the presence of a competing supplier firm, whether it imposes areal threat or not, helps alleviate such concern.

Proposition 5a: When the risk of technology appro-priation by the other suppliers decreases, competitivesupplier–supplier relationships can positively affect sup-plier performance.

Unless a supplier is already a dominant player (e.g., Intel orMicrosoft), competitive supplier–supplier relationships can puta supplier in an inferior bargaining positionvis-à-visthe buyeras it tries to outbid other suppliers time after time for new con-tracts. Suppliers in the same market niche supplying to the samebuying firm are always unaware as to what the other supplier isdoing; meanwhile, a supplier in this type of relationship mustcarefully guard what it does from the other supplier.

What this means is that a supplier could miss the opportunityof technological or process development attained by competi-tors or by potential joint efforts with other suppliers. Without thesharing of information and knowledge with other suppliers inthe same market, every new technological or process improve-ment may come with a high price tag—hiring a key person away


from the competing supplier or developing a new technologyfrom the ground up.

Proposition 5b: When suppliers display low bargainingpower vis-à-visthe buyer and lack of synergistic activities,competitive supplier–supplier relationships can negativelyaffect supplier performance.

Cooperative Supplier–Supplier Relationship

A cooperative supplier–supplier relationship promotesinformation and knowledge sharing between suppliers, evento the extent of cultivating a sense of teamwork. This type ofteamwork emphasizes continuous improvement and ongoingproblem-solving in product/process design, engineering andR&D activities, which in turn lead to reduced cycle time andproductivity improvement [18], [21], [87]. For instance, in theCanadian biotechnology industry, suppliers with cooperativerelationships were able to gain higher level of performance bysharing information and knowledge [9].

Cooperative relationships also provide an opportunity for co-ordinated activities (e.g., consolidated purchasing) to reduce thesuppliers’ upstream purchasing cost. For instance, two or moresuppliers can form a consortium to purchase common itemstogether. These suppliers use consolidated purchases in largerquantities at lower prices to achieve economies of scale andthus reduce the purchase cost per item [45]. In the meantime,the human resources involved in routine procurement activitiessuch as placing orders can be reduced as well.

Finally, such cooperative relationships also enable the partnerfirms to reduce competition. The use of joint ventures to de-crease over-capacity in the industry is one way of reducing com-petition. More importantly, the information exchange betweenthe firms makes it less likely that the buyer can play one againstthe other, resulting in more informed bidding processes for thesuppliers.

Proposition 6a: When suppliers display synergistic activ-ities and collusive behavior, cooperative supplier–supplierrelationships can positively affect supplier performance.

When two suppliers work together closely (e.g., strategic al-liance), the supplier with a more advanced technology can po-tentially face the risk of technology diffusion. In fact, previousstudies have shown that organizations end up with very dif-ferent outcomes in strategic alliance [12], [80]. In other words,the outcome of a cooperative relationship does not necessarilyguarantee that the exchanges or sharing would necessarily occurin an equitable manner for both suppliers. Therefore, the sup-plier needs to be cognizant of the opportunistic behaviors of itspartner and take extra caution when sharing its core competencywith potential competitors.

Proposition 6b: When suppliers increase the risk oftechnology appropriation, cooperative supplier–supplierrelationships can negatively affect supplier performance.

Co-opetitive Supplier–Supplier Relationship

Co-opetitive relationships provide the suppliers, who wouldnormally have a competitive relationship, with temporary op-portunities (e.g., joint venture) or semipermanent opportunities(e.g., strategic partnership) to work together. The supplierscould form a learning alliance to exploit their market positions

or technical capabilities [34], [35], [55]. Together, they maymove into a new market segment that each alone may be unableto enter, or they can obtain additional resources that they havetraditionally lacked.

Furthermore, as we discussed before, a blatant establishmentof cooperative relationship between suppliers may be an ap-parent signal to the buyer of possible loss of buyer leverage.However, the co-opetitive relationship may help suppliers carryout a cooperative venture with other suppliers without alarmingthe buyer, which in the end may lead to the attainment of higherleverage against the buyer.

Proposition 7a: When suppliers display synergistic activ-ities leading to increased access to resources and marketexpansion, co-opetitive supplier–supplier relationships canpositively affect supplier performance.

The co-opetitive relationship between suppliers does not nec-essarily mean that the competition between them is automati-cally attenuated by the presence of cooperation. Participatingsuppliers are still uncertain of how such a delicate relationshipcould evolve and how the relationship will effect their own posi-tion in the buyer–supplier relationship. For instance, a supplierlocked into a joint venture with other suppliers to develop a newproduct can never be sure of how much each partner might even-tually gain from this co-opetitive relationship. Even when theytemporarily gain leverage over a buyer, this new position for thesuppliers may not be a permanent one and they must hedge withregard to how much leverage they will actually exercise.

Proposition 7b: When suppliers display low bargainingpower vis-à-visthe buyer and increase uncertainty betweeneach other, co-opetitive supplier–supplier relationships cannegatively affect supplier performance.

Furthermore, by forging a co-opetitive relationship withother suppliers, a supplier often blunts the opportunity ofhaving a similar relationship with other suppliers. For instance,according to Afuah [1], when suppliers with co-opetitiverelationship introduced the complex instruction set computer(CISC) standard in the microprocessor industry, other groupsof suppliers that had been working on the reduced instructionset computer (RISC) standard saw their market share shrinkbecause buyers considered the CISC standard to be morecutting edge. Consequently, the suppliers that had been lockedinto a co-opetitive relationship to develop the RISC standardended up incurring a high opportunity cost.

V. DISCUSSION

We have taken a step beyond a dyadic buyer–supplier rela-tionship and have examined the complex dynamics when rela-tionships between suppliers influence their relationships withbuyers. We developed three archetypes of supplier–supplier re-lationships and considered how these relationships between sup-pliers affect the buyer–supplier relationship. We also consideredthe managerial implications of the three relational archetypesfrom the perspectives of both buyers and suppliers and devel-oped testable propositions for each of the archetypes.

From a theoretical standpoint, we have eschewed a continuumfocus in favor of archetypes for several reasons. A continuumseems to indicate that all the variables, if we give a value to


the measurement scales, move in one direction from one end ofthe continuum to the other end. As pointed out earlier, for eacharchetype all the relationships between the different variablesneed to fit simultaneously. In other words, difference betweenthe different archetypes is not just a difference in the value of thevariables but also in how they fit together. As shown in Table I,the way the different variables fit together affects the nature ofrelationship between the suppliers.

What this understanding also implies is that the firms (manu-facturing or service) may not have the luxury to choose betweendifferent relationship types. As articulated in Proposition 1, thenature of the product (e.g., whether tangible goods or intangiblegoods such as service) and the type of market (e.g., emerging ormature market) may force the buyers and suppliers into a par-ticular relationship type with its attendant advantages and disad-vantages. The implication is that both the buyers and suppliersneed to recognize the particular type of relationship between thesuppliers and decide how to minimize the disadvantages whilemaximally leveraging its benefits. In other words, the benefitsapplicable to a particular type of supplier–supplier relationshipare contingent on how these relationships fit into the overallstrategy of the individual buyers and suppliers. Also, the dif-ferent supplier–supplier relationships bring a dynamic perspec-tive to bear on the ability of the buyers to manage their supplychains. The buyers need to understand how relationships be-tween the suppliers can potentially change their competitive ad-vantage. For instance, events such as mergers and acquisitions,joint ventures, and other alliances, as well as other competitiveactions among the suppliers, need to be proactively evaluatedby the buyer with a goal of understanding how such activitiesaffect the dynamics and bargaining power for its own supplychain. The propositions in this study are thus the first step to-ward engaging in more empirical and case-based research thatresults in developing a theory of supplier–supplier relationshipsthat may provide such understanding.

Based on our literature review of buyer–supplier relation-ships, a competitive supplier–supplier relationship might beideal from the buyer’s perspective because it increases itsbargaining power [4]. At the same time, a cooperative sup-plier–supplier relationship might be ideal from the supplier’sperspective because it increases bargaining powervis-à-visthebuyer while reducing competition between suppliers. Puttingthese two observations together points to an apparent tensionbetween suppliers and buyers where suppliers may benefitfrom a cooperative supplier–supplier relationship while thebuyers are engineering the supplier–supplier relationship to thecompetitive end of the spectrum.

However, we have demonstrated in this paper that the relation-ship dynamics between the buyer and suppliers are much morediverse and complex than suggested by these initial observations.Indeed, there are several other reasons that attenuate this simple,bidirectional tension. As pointed out in the propositions, a com-petitive supplier–supplier relationship has benefits for the sup-pliers also; the competitive relationship helps the suppliers pre-serve their competitiveadvantage.Acooperative relationshiphasbenefits for the buyers because it enables them to take advantageof the potentially creative synergy between suppliers. In otherwords, there are no ideal relationship types that apply in all situa-

tions, either for the buyer or the supplier. Future researchers maywant to examine the contingencies under which particular typesof relationship are more appropriate than others.

In particular, more studies are needed to examine the dy-namics of co-opetitive relationships. Such studies need to ex-plore how the intricate balance of two conflicting forces playout in otherwise competitive organizations. In addition, moreempirical studies are needed to understand the governance struc-ture that maintains and allows stability in co-opetitive relation-ships. Human and Provan’s [48] case study on trade networksis one of the pioneering research efforts to understand the gov-ernance structure of co-opetitive inter-organizational relation-ships. Future investigation of more general co-opetitive sup-plier–supplier relationship governance structures beyond tradenetworks is needed to fully understand this issue.

Also, by implication, we demonstrated that managerial issuesof buyer–supplier relationship change when we consider the re-lationships between suppliers. What this observation implies isthat unless we expand beyond a simple dyadic buyer–suppliercontext, we will not be able to understand fully the overarchingyet intricate dynamics of buyer–supplier relationships. Thus, wemust consider relationships in a triadic context, beyond a dyadiccontext, if we are to understand more generally and deeply aboutthe relationships that exist in the supply chain or network.

To be sure, the buyer–supplier context we have considered inthis paper isnot fully triadic. What we have done is to againlump suppliers into one large node, but we pried open this onelarge node, took note of the supplier–supplier relationships thatlie inside, and considered their impact on the overall dyadic re-lationship. To take on the relationships in a triadic context, wewould have to look at a single firm, either a buyer or a supplier,and consider the managerial implications for each of the twofirms attached to it in a triad. In other words, a triad would re-quire considering all three links individually given the types ofrelations that exist in the other two links. Types of triads in theindustrial context have been suggested formerly by the networktheorists—buyer–supplier–supplier, supplier–buyer–buyer, andsupplier–buyer–end user [83].

Optimally, this research will serve as an intermediate step be-tween the studies of dyadic buyer–supplier relationships and thestudies of triadic relationships and beyond. We look forward tonew analyses focusing on the development of a general modelof firm relationships in the supply network.

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Thomas Y. Choi received the Ph.D. degree from theUniversity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in industrial andoperations engineering.

He is currently an Associate Professor of Opera-tions Management and Supply Chain Management atArizona State University, Tempe, as well as the Divi-sion Chair for the Operations Management Division,Academy of Management. His research interests in-clude the properties of supply networks and relation-ships therein from the perspective of the complexitytheory and social networks. He has received research

grants from the National Science Foundation and the Institute of Supply Man-agement, among others.

Zhaohui Wu received the MBA degree fromBowling Green State University, OH. He is pursuingthe Ph.D. degree at Arizona State University, Tempe.

He has worked as a project manager in a Chineseinternational trading company and as a buyer ina U.S. aerospace company. His current researchinterest is interfirm relationships management in asupply network.

Mr. Wu is a member of Decision SciencesInstitute, the Institute of Supply Management, andthe Academy of Management.

Lisa Ellram received the M.B.A. and B.S.B. degreein accounting from the University of Minnesota,Twin Cities, and the Ph.D. degree in businesslogistics with a minor in industrial engineering fromOhio State University, Columbus.

She is a Certified Purchasing Manager and a Certi-fied Management Accountant. She is currently a Pro-fessor of Supply Chain Management at Arizona StateUniversity, Tempe, where she is a Dean’s Councilof 100 Distinguished Scholar. She is also the Chair-person of the Educational Resource Committee for

the Institute of Supply Management. Her research interests include all aspectsof supply chain management, with a particular emphasis on supply manage-ment, cost management and social responsibility. She is currently engaged inresearch related to strategic cost management in the supply chain and dynamicscalable enterprise systems. She has co-authored three books, and received re-search grants from the National Science Foundation and the Center for Ad-vanced Purchasing Studies.

Balaji R. Koka received the Ph.D. degree from theUniversity of Pittsburgh, PA, in strategic manage-ment.

He is an Assistant Professor in the Department ofManagement at Arizona State University, Tempe. Hisresearch interests focus on examining the implica-tions of strategic alliances and the firm’s institutionalcontext on firm performance. His research has beenpublished in theStrategic Management JournalandtheJournal of International Business Studies.

Dr. Koka is a member of the Business Policy andStrategy Division of the Academy of Management.

Documents

Supplier-supplier relationships and their implications for buyer-supplier relationships