Humb. 37628 3261

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY the 2$th of JUNE, 1946

tyRegistered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 26 JUNE, 1946

The War Office,May, 1946

OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT FROMDECEMBER 7TH, 1940, TO FEBRUARY 7TH, 1941.

The following despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on 2ist June,1941, by GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALDP. WAVELL, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., Com-mander-in-Chief in the Middle East.

PART I.—FIRST PSASE-»-BATTLE OF SimBARRANI—DECEMBER 7 TO 13, 1940.

I. Introductory.1. In a former despatch I gave a summary

of events in the Middle East Command down tothe I5th November, 1940. The presentdespatch will deal with events in one part ofthe Middle East only, the Western frontier ofEgypt and Cyrenaica, from the 7th December,1940, when the counter-offensive against theItalian army began, down to the 7th February,the date on which Benghazi surrendered.

2. In the previous despatch the advance ofthe Italians to Sidi Barrani was described. Inaccordance with our pre-arranged policy, littleopposition had been offered to the enemy'sadvance, and it was not proposed to opposehim in strength until he reached our prepareddefences at Mersa Matrah. It was not, how-ever, intended that the defence should be apassive one. On the 2ist September I hadissued orders for a counter-stroke to be pre-pared against the enemy, so soon as he becameengaged with the defences of Matruh. I foundthat General Wilson, Commander of BritishTroops in Egypt, and General O'Connor, Com-manding the Western Desert Force, had alreadymade the preliminary arrangements for such acounter-stroke. During the next month, as ourdefences and our forces grew in strength, so theplan for the counter-stroke was developed; anda scheme was eventually prepared for strikingat the enemy as he approached Matruh. Thisplan was studied in detail by the commanders

and troops concerned, and all possible arrange-ments made to put it into effect, if the enemyadvanced against Matruh in the manner thatwe judged most probable.

2. Preparation of Plan of Attack.

3. About the middle of October, when theenemy had been stationary for a month andthere seemed no immediate probability of hisfurther advance, I began to consider thepossibility of an early offensive action in spiteof our numerical inferiority. The enemy'sdefensive arrangements seemed to me to bethoroughly faulty. He was spread over a widefront in a series of fortified camps which werenot mutually supporting and were separated bywide distances. His defences seemed to lackdepth.

On the 20th October I issued a personal noteto General Wilson instructing him to considerthe possibility of an attack on the enemyforward camps. The plan I directed him toconsider was an attack at both ends of theenemy's line, by the 7th Armoured Divisionreinforced with some mobile infantry battalionsagainst the enemy's right flank on the escarp-ment near Sofafi, and by the 4th IndianDivision, reinforced, if possible, by one addi-tional brigade, against the camps immediatelyeast of Sidi Barrani, near the coast. If theinitial attacks were successful, I proposed thatthe Armoured Division should exploit itssuccess northwards towards the coast and the4th Indian Division westwards. I stated thatthe operations'would be dependent on all thetroops being made mobile and being able tomove 30 to 40 miles in a night, so as to coverin two successive nights the distance betweenour front and the enemy's and to attack on

3262 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946

the morning following the second night march.I suggested that it would probably only bepossible to stage an operation lasting four orfive days, since that appeared to be the limit forwhich supply arrangements could be made.

4. Meanwhile, General Wilson and GeneralO'Connor had also been considering plans foran offensive. After discussion with them, itwas agreed that there were objections to anattack on the Sofafi group of camps owing totheir comparative strength and to the greaterdistance from our starting base at which theylay. It was decided to make the attack againstthe enemy's centre, leaving his flanks, on thecoast and at Sofafi, to be contained by smallforces. I directed that detailed plans and pre-parations should be put in hand at once.

At this time Mr. Eden, the Secretary ofState for War, visited Egypt and was madeaware of the plans, to which he gave approvaland promised his full support. It was largelythis support which enabled us to obtain the airreinforcement on which the success of the plangreatly depended.

The provisional date originally selected wasin the last week of November. It soon, how-ever, became obvious that the preparations forthe attack, especially the provision of addi-tional transport and the re-equipment of theartillery with 25-pdrs., would not be completedin time. Further, the invasion of Greece byItaly at the end of October brought a demandfor support from Greece, and instructions fromthe War Cabinet to send certain troops fromthe Middle East to occupy Crete and to assistGreece. It looked at one time as if this mightcause the postponement or abandonment of theplan, since it very seriously weakened the airsupport available and also removed from theWestern Desert some anti-aircraft guns,engineers, transport and other troops which ithad been intended to employ in the operation.Owing to the intervention of the Secretary ofState, reinforcements of aircraft were promised,and it was decided to stage the operation if theair situation made it at all possible. The datewas postponed till about the end of the firstweek in December.

5. In order to maintain secrecy, as fewpersons as possible were made aware of theplan. Its details were worked out by GeneralsO'Connor, Creagh (commanding 7th ArmouredDivision), and Beresford-Peirse (commanding4th Indian Division). General Wilson andmyself visited the Western Desert at frequentintervals and discussed the progress of the planand the additional troops required in theWestern'Desert. Practically nothing whateverwas put on paper, and not more than a dozensenior commanders and staff officers knew ofthe plan until shortly before its execution.

6. On the 25th and 26th November a train-ing exercise was held near Matrah, which was,in fact, a rehearsal of the proposed operation.Entrenched camps were marked out on theground to represent the enemy camps to beattacked, though this was of course known onlyto the few who were aware of the forthcomingoperation. To the troops it was represented asa training exercise in attack on enemy camps,and it was intimated that a further exercisewould be held at a date early in December. Asa result of this exercise it was possible to makeseveral improvements in the plan of attack,

and General Wilson issued a paper laying downcertain methods, which were used in the actualattack and proved to be sound.

7. Co-operation with the Royal Navy wasarranged through a naval liaison officerattached to General O'Connor's headquarters,and the air plan was drawn up by Wing Com-mander Collishaw, commanding the Air Forcein the Western Desert. Needless to say, bothRoyal Navy and Royal Air Force co-operatedmost whole-heartedly, both in the plans forattack and in maintaining complete secrecy.

3. Enemy's Position and Strength.8. The Italian force East of the Egyptian

frontier was believed to consist of 6 or 7divisions (of which two or three were Libyandivisions, two were Blackshirt divisions andtwo Metropolitan divisions) and an armouredgroup. The total strength was believed to beabout 80,000 (63,000 Italian, 17,000 Libyan),with 250 guns and 120 tanks.

9. These forces were distributed in a series offortified camps, from the sea East of SidiBarrani to the escarpment about Sofafi, adistance of about 50 miles, in echelon from theleft flank. The camps were usually circular,with an anti-tank obstacle round them anddefences consisting for the most part of stonesangars. There was a gap of over 20 milesbetween the enemy's right flank at Sofafi andthe next camp at Nibeiwa. It was through thisgap that General O''Connor intended to passthe attacking force. Arrangements were madeduring the planning stage to prevent the enemyestablishing a camp to close this gap.

To the North of Nibeiwa lay the Tummargroup of camps, occupied by the 2nd LibyanDivision, and to the North-East of these lay theenemy's most advanced camp near the seacoast at Maktila, occupied by the ist LibyanDivision. There 'were further fortificationsround Sidi Barrani, but there did not otherwiseseem to be any organised second line ofdefence.

4. Plan of Attack.10. The troops taking part in the attack

were: —7th Armoured Division ... General Creagh.4th Indian Division .,. General 'Beresford-

Peirsei6th Infantry Brigade ,.. (Brigadier Lomax,

attached to the 4thIndian Division.)

7th Battalion R.T.R. ... (Infantry tanks.)Matruh Garrison Force ... (Brigadier Selby—a

brigade groupmade up from theMatruh Garrison.)

Total force consisted of approximately 31,000men, 120 guns, 275 tanks, of which more thanhalf were light tanks, 50 were infantry tanksand remainder cruisers, and 60 armoured cars.

n. In view of the limited amount of trans-port available it was necessary to form dumpsof ammunition, water and petrol in the desertbetween our lines at Matruh and those of theenemy. This was successfully accomplished,apparently without attracting the enemy'snotice. Several days' supplies for the wholeforce were actually stored some 20 to 30 milesin advance of our fortified lines, covered onlyby our advanced patrols.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946 3263

12. The general plan of attack was asfollows: —

The Support Group of the 7th ArmouredDivision was to observe the group of enemycamps round Sofafi and prevent the enemyfrom these camps intervening in the battle.The remainder of the Armoured Division andthe 4th Indian Division were to pass throughthe gap between the Sofafi camps andNibeiwa camp. A brigade of the 4th IndianDivision with the 7th Battalion R.T.R.(Infantry tanks) was then to attack Nibeiwacamp from the West, while the ArmouredDivision covered the attack and preventedany intervention from the enemy to theNorth.

After the capture of Nibeiwa camp, anotherbrigade of the 4th Indian Division, againsupported by 7th R.T.R., was to attack theTurhmar groups of camps from the West. Itwas intended that their capture should con-clude the first day's operation. Meanwhile,the Matruh Garrison force was to observe andcontain the enemy camp at Maktila.

If the attacks on Nibeiwa and Tummarwere successful, it was intended to attackand capture Sidi Barrani on the followingday, and thereafter exploit success as farWestward as possible.13. Although our forces were numerically

inferior to those of the enemy, their morale,training and equipment was believed to besufficiently high to compensate for this. Theenemy had so far shown little enterprise orpower of manoeuvre.

The plan involved a preliminary movementof some 70 miles for the majority of thetroops over open desert. This was to becovered in two marches on successive nights(the whole force being mechanised ormotorised), the attack taking place on the earlymorning following the second night march. Itwould thus be necessary for the whole force tospend one day in the open desert, within about30 miles of the enemy, and it was feared that,if the enemy observed this movement, heavyair attacks would be made by his numericallysuperior air force. This risk, however, had tobe taken, and it was hoped to counter it byconcealment and dispersion and by the pro-tection of our fighter aircraft and anti-aircraftguns. In fact, the enemy made no attackwhatever.

5. The Battle of Sidi Barrani.14. Operations began on the night of the

7th/8th December, during which the wholeforce moved forward over the desert. Themovement was made without difficulty, owingto good training and discipline, and the troopsreached their appointed positions up to time.

During the 8th December the force remainedin the desert, expecting attack by the enemyair force which never took place. Next nightthe force moved forward again and took up itspositions .for the next dayjs attack. This move-ment also was made without a hitch.

15. The attack on Nibeiwa was begun at0700 hours on th'e Qth December by nthIndian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Savory—consisting of 2nd Cameron Highlanders, i/6thRajputana Rifles and 4/7th Rajput Regiment)and the 7th battalion R.T.R. The enemy forceholding this camp was believed to consist ofsome 3,000 men with a considerable number of

guns and tanks, under General Maletti. Duringa short bombardment the 7th R.T.R. movedforward and entered the gerimeter at 0735hours. They soon destroyed the enemy tanksand then met an extremely hot fire fromartillery and weapons of all descriptions. Thisthe heavy armour of the 'Infantry tanksresisted, to the surprise and demoralisation ofthe enemy. The leading infantry battalion,2nd Cameron Highlanders, advanced in M.T.behind the tanks to within 700 yards of theperimeter, where they debussed and enteredthe camp. By 0830 hours the camp was com-pletely in our hands. General Maletti waskilled.

16. At 0830 hours the Commander of the4th Indian Division ordered the 5th IndianInfantry Brigade (Brigadier Lloyd—consistingof ist Royal Fusiliers, 3/ist Punjab Regimentand 4 /6th Rajputana Rifles) to move to theWest of t-he Tummar camps in readiness foran attack on them. The i6th British InfantryBrigade -(Brigadier Lomax—consisting of 2ndQueens, 2nd Leicesters and ist Argyll &Sutherland Highlanders) was moved up to aposition just west of Nibeiwa. The artillery

.and 7th R.T.R., having refilled at Nibeiwa,also moved into position for the attacks onTummar camps. The third brigade of theIndian Division, the 7th Brigade, .was held inreserve. It took charge of prisoners and pro-tected the line of communications, but took nopart in the actual fighting.

At 1330'hours the artillery concentration onthe Tummar camps began and at 1350 hoursthe 7th R.T.R., now reduced to 22 tanks,entered Tummar West from the North. Theleading infantry, ist Royal Fusiliers, followedin lorries 20 minutes after the tanks, anddebussed within 500 yards of the camp. Eventsinside the camp followed much the samesequence as at Nibeiwa, except that there werefew enemy tanks in this camp. After theoccupation of Tummar West the Commander4th Indian Division ordered an attack to belaunched against Tummar East. Just as theadvance began with the 7th R.T.R. leading,followed by one battalion, 4/6th RajputanaRifles, an enemy counter-attack was met butquickly repulsed. By dark the greater part ofTummar East was in our hands.

17. At 1615 hours, in view of the successfulprogress of operations, the Commander of the4th Indian Division ordered the i6th InfantryBrigade to push forward as far as possiblebefore darkness towards Sidi Barrani. Tworegiments of artillery were to join the brigadeduring the night, while the 7th R.T.R. were torefit as far as possible and be ready for opera-tions 'next day.

18. Meanwhile 7th Armoured Division hadsuccessfully fulfilled its r.61e of protecting theleft flank" of the 4th Indian Division and cuttingthe Sidi Barrani-Buq Buq road. By 1000hours 4th Armoured Brigade, moving West ofthe enemy camps, had got astride the SidiBarrani-Buq Buq road. The 7th ArmouredBrigade remained in reserve. During thisadvance the 4th Armoured Brigade captureda number of prisoners and vehicles and in-flicted considerable losses on the enemv.

19.. At dawn on the loth December the i6thInfantry Brigade advanced in lorries towardsSidi .Barrani with the object of getting astridethe roads leading Westwards and cutting off the

3264 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946

Italian forces. The nth Indian InfantryBrigade was moved up from Nibeiwa to nearthe Tummar camps, while the 5th IndianInfantry Brigade completed the occupation ofTummar East.

At about 0730 hours the right battalion ofthe i6th Brigade; 2nd Battalion Leicester Regi-ment, engaged a defended Italian -camp andcaptured it, after a short fight, with about 2,000prisoners {>f the 4th Blackshirt Division. Mean-while the remainder of the i6th InfantryBrigade continued their advance in a violentdust storm. • They suffered some casualties fromenemy fire but continued to push on, and wereassisted by the arrival of some 10 tanks of the7th R.T.R. which over-ran some enemy guns.The nth Indian Infantry Brigade moved upon the right flank of the i6th Brigade.

20. At about 1330 hours the Commander ofthe 4th Indian Division was at i6th InfantryBrigade Headquarters and ordered an attackon Sidi Barrani, placing part of nth IndianInfantry Brigade under Brigadier Lomax. Thisattack was launched at 1615 hours by the 2ndQueen's on the right and 2nd Cameron High-landers, on the left, supported by artillery fire,some tanks of the 7th R.T.R., and by an attack,by 2nd R.T.R. (cruiser tanks) North of theSidi-Barrani-Buq Buq road. The attack wascompletely successful, and Sidi Barrani wasin our hands when darkness fell, manyprisoners and guns being captured.

21. The force organised from Matruh Gar-rison had advanced towards Maktila campand established itself two miles East of Maktilaby the evening of the 8th December. Thisforce was a composite one, in which the 3rdBattalion Coldstream Guards was the onlycomplete unit. Detachments of Royal Artil-lery, 7th Hussars (light tanks), ist DurhamLight Infantry, ist South Staffords, machinegunners from ist Royal Northumberland Fusi-iers and ist Cheshires, as well as a numberof dummy tanks, made up the balance. It re-mained in observation of Maktila camp untilthe afternoon of the gth December, when, learn-ing that Nibeiwa had been captured, BrigadierSelby gave orders to move forward and en-deavour to prevent the withdrawal Westwardsof the ist Libyan Division. Owing to the com-parative weakness of the force and difficultgoing, it was unable to prevent the withdrawalof the enemy towards Sidi Barrani, but pur-sued them with all possible speed on the lothDecember.

The situation at nightfall on the loth De-cember was that Sidi Barrani had been cap-tured and the 2nd Libyan and 4th BlackshirtDivisions destroyed. East of Barrani, however,the ist Libyan Division from Maktila was stillof some fighting value, and an enemy campat Point 90' had not been attacked and remainedintact.

22. On the evening of the loth DecemberGeneral O'Connor issued instructions to theArmoured Division to send a force early thefollowing day to prevent any enemy withdrawalfrom the Sofafi area; to send another forceto Buq Buq to deal with any enemy in thatdirection; and in the event of further retreatto pursue the enemy towards Halfaya, SidiOmar and Sollum.

6. Exploitation after Sidi Barrani.23. I had always intended if possible to

send the 4th Indian Division to reinforce the

Sudan during the winter 1940/41, in order toenable our forces in the Sudan to recaptureKassala and to take the offensive against theenemy. I had proposed to relieve them inthe Western Desert by the 6th Australian Divi-sion as soon as this was ready and equipped.For several reasons, the principal of which wasthe availability of shipping, I had to decidewhile the battle of Sidi Barrani was still inprogress whether or not to carry out this relief.There was an opportunity to do so after theoperations of the nth December and thecapture of Sidi Barrani, since the supply organi-sation would only permit of a very limited forcebeing used for further pursuit of the enemy.I decided therefore to withdraw the 4th IndianDivision and to replace it by the 6th Aus-tralian Division as soon as this could be broughtforward. The i6th Infantry Brigade, whichhad been attached to the 4th Indian Division,remained in the forward area available forpursuit.

I should have liked also to employ the NewZealand Brigade Group which had been inthe forward area for some time and was avail-able, but the New Zealand Division itself wasnot complete, one brigade being in the UnitedKingdom, and I knew that it was the wish ofthe New Zealand Government that the divi-sion should be employed as a whole if possible.

24. From the nth December onwards theoperations consisted of a pursuit by 7thArmoured Division, followed up by i6th Infan-

• try Brigade.The 7th Armoured Division advanced at

first in two main groups, the 7th Armoured Bri-gade North of the escarpment towards Sollumand the 4th Armoured Brigade South of theescarpment towards Halfaya, Sidi Omar andCapuzzo. On the afternoon of the nth De-cember 7th Armoured Brigade made contactwith a long enemy column between Buq Buqand Sollum. It promptly attacked and bydusk had secured 14,000 prisoners, 68 guns andmuch other material. By the I5th Decemberall enemy troops had been driven out of Egypt,and the 7th Armoured Division had concen-trated South-West of Bardia. The 4thArmoured Brigade now cut the Bardia-Tobrukroad while the Support Group engaged theWestern and South-Western defences of Bardia.Meanwhile, the i6th Infantry Brigade movedup to the South-East face of the Bardia peri-meter, to cover our use of Sollum harbour. Thegreater part of the Italian army remaining inCyrenaica had withdrawn within the defencesof Bardia, which was now isolated. It wasdecided to capture Bardia with the 6th Aus-tralian Division as soon as ready, while 7thArmoured Division protected their left flankand prevented any movement along the Bardia-Tobruk road.

25. Thjs ended the first phase of the opera-tion, which may be called the Battle of SidiBarrani. It had resulted in the destruction ofthe greater part of five enemy divisions. Over38,000 prisoners, 400 guns, some 50 tanks andmuch other war material had been captured.Our own casualties were only 133 killed, 387wounded and 8 missing.

26. This outstanding success may be attri-buted to—

(«) Good co-operation between the threeServices;

(b) Effect of surprise;

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946 3265

(c) Fine leadership and fighting qualitiesdisplayed by all personnel.Our equipment, in particular the Infantry

Tanks, Cruiser Tanks and 25-pounders, provedto be excellent.

PART II.—SECOND PHASE—OPERATIONS FROMBARDIA TO TOBRUK—DECEMBER 15, 1940,TO JANUARY 21, 1941.

7. Bardia—Enemy Position and Strength.27. The enemy forces within the,perimeter of

Bardia comprised the greater part of four in-fantry divisions, together with guns and tanks.Some of these formations had taken part inthe later stages of the fighting after the cap-ture of Sidi Barrani.

28. The defences of Bardia, apart fromcoastal and anti-aircraft defences, consisted ofa perimeter seventeen miles in extent, lyingmainly on a level plain South-West of theescarpment. The perimeter itself consisted ofconcrete posts at intervals of some seven hun-dred yards, containing machine guns and anti-tank guns, each post being wired and havingan anti-tank ditch. Five hundred yards behindthe first line was a second but less elaborateline of support posts. Outside the whole rana continuous anti-tank trench and wire obstacle.Only at the Southern end of the perimeter wasthere an additional switch line, three to fourthousands yards from the outer line.

8. Plan of Attack on Bardia.

29. The troops available for the attackwere: —

7th Armoured Division: Major-GeneralCreagh.

6th Australian Division: Major-GeneralMackay.

i6th Infantry Brigade.7th Battalion R.T.R.: Now reduced to 26

tanks.ist Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusi-

liers: Machine-gun battalion.Corps Artillery: Consisting of one field and

one medium regiment.Two squadrons of the Australian DivisionalCavalry Regiment had been diverted to observeJarabub, to which a considerable enemy forcehad withdrawn. The role of 7th ArmouredDivision was to prevent the enemy reinforc-ing from or escaping to the North, and theassaulting troops therefore consisted of approxi-mately 20,000 men, 122 guns and 26 tanks.

30. The diminished resources of infantrytanks necessitated a bold employment of infan-try both in the assault and in the exploitation.This demanded a high expenditure of ammuni-tion for their protection. The period of six-teen days between the arrival of the first in-fantry outside Bardia and the launching of the-attack was occupied mainly in bringing uplarge additional supplies of ammunition fromrailhead at Mersa Matruh. The harbour ofSollum, which the enemy withdrawal behindthe defences of Bardia had put at our disposal,was used for this purpose, and its possessiongreatly facilitated the task.

31. The following was the general plan: —One infantry battalion, of the i6th Aus-

tralian Brigade, closely followed by en-gineers, was to attack at dawn at a pointdue West of Bar.dia, where the anti-tank

A 2

ditch and the wire nearly coincided. Coveredby a heavy artillery concentration, the bat-talion was to seize and hold a bridge-headwhile the engineers filled in the anti-tankditch at five separate points. This achieved,tanks and infantry were to enter the peri-meter and sweep South-Eastwards on a widefront as far as the road Bardia-Capuzzo andthe edge of the escarpment overlookingBardia. Thereafter units of the I7th Aus-tralian Brigade were to break into the peri-meter South of the original point of entry,and, driving still further to the South-East,contain the enemy forces manning the strong-est positions at the Southern end. The attackwould then be exploited East and North-Eastto Bardia.

While these operations were in progressdemonstrations were to be made against partsof the perimeter remote from the real attack;on the North by 7th Armoured Divisiop, andon the South by those units of I7th Aus-tralian Brigade not taking part in the attack.The area North of the road Bardia-Tobrukwas to be subjected to heavy bombardmentboth from the sea and from the air.

9. The Assault on Bardia.32. By the 27th December, the i6th and I7th

Australian Brigades were in position oppositethe defences, and on New Year's Day the igthAustralian Brigade also arrived. On the 3rdJanuary, at 0530 hours, the attack began. The2/ist Battalion Australian Infantry successfullyestablished the bridge-head, and the engineershad completed their task within 50 minutes.i6th and I7th Australian Brigades (BrigadiersAllen and Savige) captured .their objectives withsmall loss, in spite of a counter-attack by enemytanks. At 1745 hours on 4th January tanks andinfantry entered Bardia; and on the 5th thedefenders of the South-Eastern sector sur-rendered. 45,000 prisoners and 462 guns, ofwhich 216 were field guns, were taken—117light and 12 medium tanks were also cap-tured.

10. Tobruk.—Enemy Position and Strength.

33,, With the loss of Bardia, the Italian forcesremaining in Cyrenaica were: —

(a) At Tobruk: —6ist Sirte Infantry Division.Headquarters and Corps troops of

XXII Corps.Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft units of

Tobruk garrison.Remnants of the divisions from the for-

ward areas.(6) Further West—

6oth Infantry Division.(c) About Mechili—

Nucleus of .armoured formation underGeneral Babini.

Even before Bardia fell I had decided thatan attack on Tobruk was justified on bothoperational and administrative grounds. Bythe 6th January, 7th Armoured Division hadcut the roads Tobruk-Derna and Tobruk-Mechili, and was in contact with the perimeterand with enemy troops East of Derna andMechili, causing the enemy to abandon theaerodromes at Gazala, Tmimi and Bomba. Bythe 7th January, igth Australian Infantry Bri-gade (Brigadier Robertson) was in position fac-ing the Eastern defences, and the remainder of

3266 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1.946

6th Australian Division, with 7th R.T.R., wasalso moving Westwards.

34. The perimeter of Tobruk was 27 milesin length and resembled that of Bardia, exceptthat the anti-tank ditch was at many pointsnot deep enough to be effective. Anti-tankminefields were known to exist. The harbourand installations of Tobruk were well defendedwith coast defence and anti-aircraft guns.

ii. Plan of Attack on Tobruk.35. The following troops were available for

the attack: —7th Armoured Division.6th Australian Division.7th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment (con

sisting now of only 16 tanks).ist Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusi-

liers (Machine-gun battalion).ist Battalion Cheshire Regiment (Machine-

gun battalion).Corps Artillery, consisting of two field and

one medium regiments, one additionalmedium battery.

36. As at Bardia, preparations were made toprovide a heavy scale .of artillery support. Be-tween the 7th and the igth January, ammuni-tion was brought up and artillery positions pre-pared. Detailed and continuous reconnaissanceof the forward defences and aggressive patrol-ling against the perimeter at points distant fromthat selected for the attack were carried outwhile preparations went forward.

37. The general plan was as follows. i6thAustralian Infantry Brigade and infantry tankswere to penetrate the perimeter at a point onits Southern face where the anti-tank ditch wasshallow, and where the minefields could beeasily removed. The point chosen was mid-way between the roads Tobruk-Bardia andTobruk-El Adem, whose junction lay 8,000yards inside the perimeter at Sidi Mahmoud.Their task was to secure a line some 4,000 yardsfrom the point of entry, which would involvethe over-running of all the forward enemy bat-tery positions in this sector. When this linehad been 'secured, igth Australian Infantry Bri-gade was to form up within the captured batteryarea and advance under a barrage to the junc-tion of the two main roads, at Sidi Mahmoud.From this point, igth Brigade would exploitSouth-West, West and North; while units ofthe I7th Brigade would assume control of theground overlooking the declivities towards thesea. i6th Australian Infantry Brigade wouldthen concentrate near the road Tobruk-ElAdem. The infantry tanks were to be usedsolely to reduce the defensive and battery posi-tions in the Southern sector of the perimeter.

The task of the artillery, which amounted to146 guns and 20 howitzers, was: —

(a) To provide a barrage and flank con-centrations for the initial penetration by theleading battalion.

(b) To neutralise hostile batteries on theentry of the infantry tanks.

(c) To provide barrages for the protectionof infantry in the later stages of the advance,and a concentration on the Sidi Mahmoudarea.

In addition, a proportion of guns was to beengaged throughout on counter-battery roles.

7th Armoured Division, as at Bardia, was tomake- demonstrations against the defences fromthe North and to prevent either reinforcementor escape.

12. Assault on Tobruk.38. The attack was launched at 0530 hours on

the 2ist January, having been postponed forone day owing to- severe sandstorms, igthAustralian Brigade followed the i6th throughthe gap at 0830 hours. The fire of our artillerywas heavy and accurate, and the enemy opposi-tion was not great. Both brigades were estab-lished on their objectives by twelve noon withsmall loss. Armoured carriers of the DivisionalCavalry Regiment reached a "point on the edgeof the escarpment 3,000 yards above Tobrukearly in the afternoon, but were compelled towithdraw owing to accurate fire from the enemycoast defence and anti-aircraft guns at Tobruk.Determined opposition was encountered aboutPalastrino, a point in the middle of the peri-meter 9,000 yards South-West of Tobruk. Else-where successful exploitation carried theadvance to the edge of the escarpment overlook-ing the town. And by nightfall the Westernand South-Western portion of the perimeter,amounting to about one-third of the whole,was in our hands.

39. Early on the morning of the 22nd, thetown was entered without resistance. Duringthe night, fires and explosions had been seenand heard, and it was found that demolitionshad been carried out in the harbour and onother installations and stores. Further West,the Free French companies of the ArmouredDivision had penetrated the perimeter near thesea. No further resistance was offered. Thenumber of prisoners amounted to nearly 30,000,among whom were many specialists and a navaldetachment of over 2,000. 236 guns of 75 mm.and over, 87 tanks and much motor transportwere also taken, but many of these proved tohave been damaged before capture.

40. Co-operation by Royal Air Force andRoyal Naval units was excellent and invalu-able. For three nights before the battle theRoyal Air Force bombed Palastrino, SidiMahmoud, the harbour, the road leading upthe escarpment out of Tobruk towards SidiMahmoud, and other key areas. These areaswere also bombed from 0330 to 0600 hourson the first day of the battle, and thereafter atneed. The Royal Navy bombarded Palastrinoand the road leading out of Tobruk as well astwo areas on the North-West of the perimeternear the road Tobruk-Derna on the nightsI9th/20th and 2Oth/2ist January. In thecourse of this bombardment from both air andsea the cruiser San Giorgio was sunk in theharbour.

PART -III—FINAL PHASE—INTERCEPTION ANDFINAL DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY NORTH OFAGEDABIA, JANUARY 22-FEBRUARY 7.13. Preparations for further Advance.

41. The fall of Tobruk left the remainder ofthe Italian forces in Cyrenaica in two main de-tachments. The first comprised the 6oth Divi-sion, less one Infantry Brigade Group, in posi-tion just East of Derna. The second, whichconsisted of a formation of about 160 tanks,and the remaining Brigade Group of the 6othDivision, was in the area Mechili under thecommand of General Babini. The Northern

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946 3267

force held the coast road to Benghazi, whilethe Southern lay across the track which ledthere direct across the desert, at the pointwhere it is joined by the only tracks leadingSouthward through the Jebel Akhdar from thecoast.

The dispersal of the enemy in two forces, thestrong grounds for belief that no reinforcementshad yet reached Cyrenaica, the shortening ofour lines of communication by the capture ofTobruk and its harbour, and the additionalmotor transport and fuel, taken at Tobruk andBardia, offered the opportunity of a rapidadvance_on Benghazi and a decisive victory.

42. The enemy's position at Derna was astrong one, unless it were threatened by anadvance from Mechili. The first plan consideredwas to contain him at Dema until the forceat Mechili could be attacked and destroyed.The igth Australian Infantry Brigade wasmoved iforward in motor transport on the22nd January immediately after the fall ofTobruk, to relieve patrols of 7th ArmouredDivision who were in contact East of Derna.The bulk of 7th Armoured Division started onthe same day towards Mechili and gained con-tact with the enemy before that place by theevening of the 23rd January.

During the night the 26th-27th January theenemy force at Mechili withdrew North-West-wards towards Slonta, the Armoured Divisionand the Royal Air Force inflicting loss on himas he went. The flank of the enemy at Dernawas thus exposed, and the desert route toBenghazi opened. But 7th Armoured Divisionwas by now reduced to 50 cruiser tanks and95 light tanks; and our supply situation in theforward area did not yet permit of an advance.

43. I discussed the situation with GeneralO'Connor, and approved a plan for a rapidadvance by the .Armoured Division and an in-fantry brigade group South of the Jebel Akhdarby the desert route to cut the road South ofBenghazi, while the remainder of the forcepressed the enemy along the Northern route.The advance was to be made as soon as thesupply situation permitted, which was esti-mated as the I2th February, by which datealso a reinforcement of a fresh unit of cruisertanks was expected.

44. The 6th Australian Division sent the I7thAustralian Infantry Brigade to increase thepressure on Derna while the i6th AustralianInfantry Brigade was to join 7.th ArmouredDivision in the Mechili area as soon as depotsof supplies were established in that area. 7thArmoured Division was to show activity to theNorth-West, but to do nothing to attract atten-tion to the desert route South of Mechili.

14. Interception and Destruction of Enemy.45. Early on the 30th January the enemy

withdrew from his advanced positions East ofDerna whilst still holding his ground on theWadi Derna. By Monday the 3rd Februaryair reconnaissance proved beyond doubt thatthe enemy had decided on further withdrawal.Large columns were moving Westward, tankswere being entrained at Barce and general cessa-tion of hostile air activity indicated the aban-doning of aerodromes South of Benghazi. Itwas therefore decided to move, at once acrossthe desert without awaiting completion of forceor of supply arrangements. H.Q., I3th Corps,accordingly directed 7th Armoured Divisionto move on Msus with all available resources,

from where it could operate against eitherSoluch or Agedabia as required; 6th AustralianDivision was to press hard against the enemy'srearguard on the Northern route. The R.A.F.was ordered to bomb the railway terminals atBarce and Soluch and the junction at Benghazi,in order to interfere with the move of enemytanks to what might become a decisive flank.

46. 7th Armoured Division moved from itsposition about Mechili at first light on the 4thFebruary. The cruiser reinforcements had notarrived and the tank strength of this Divisionwas now the equivalent of one Armoured Bri-gade. Difficulties were further increased bylack of reconnaissance of the ground betweenMechili and Msus, which, for purposes of de-ception, had been previously forbidden. Thefirst 50 miles was extremely rough going, whichreduced the pace and took toll of vehicles; par-ticularly light tanks. West of Bir-el-Gerrarithe track improved and the advance was con-tinued in moonlight. By daybreak on the 5thFebruary the Division was just east of Msus,which had been occupied by our armouredcars.

From the administrative aspect the acceler-ated advance South-Westwards of 7thArmoured Division placed a severe strain onthe maintenance organisation since the stockingup of new advanced depots near Mechili hadonly just begun. The Armoured Division movedwith two days' rations, a sufficiency of ammuni-tion and petrol, but the margin was veryclose.

47. Early on the 5th February Commander,7th Armoured Division, .sent forward two de-tachments. The Southern (consisting of nthHussars (less one squadron), one squadronK.D.G., one battery each 3rd and 4th R.H.A.,one anti-tank battery and 2nd Rifle Brigade)was directed straight to the coast via Antelatwith orders to cut the main road Benghazi-Tripoli North of Agedabia. Antelat was tobe avoided if found to be occupied by theenemy. The 4th Armoured Brigade (7thHussars and 2nd R.T.R.) was to follow thisdetachment as soon as possible. The Northerndetachment (comprising ist R.H.A. and 1stK.R.R.C.) was directed on Soluch, via Scelei-dima.

At 1700 hours the same, day, situation I3thCorps was briefly as follows: —

(a) 6th Australian Division pressing hardon retreating enemy 6oth Division along thecoast between Derna and Barce.

(6) Northern detachment of 7th ArmouredDivision closing in on the main road Westof Soluch, having overcome enemy resistanceat Sceleidima.

(c) 4th Armoured Brigade approachingBeda Fomm.

(d) Southern detachment of 7th ArmouredDivision established since 1200 hours astridethe two main routes South-West of BedaFomm, with armoured car patrols, both tothe North and South.

(e) Remainder 7th Armoured Division inarea of Antelat.

(/) Advanced H.Q. I3th Corps moving to,or at, Msus.On this same evening a retreating enemy

column, strength approximately 5,000, mainlyartillery, but with a considerable proportion ofcivilians, and a number of guns, met the

3268 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946

Southern detachment block and, completelysurprised, surrendered. Meanwhile to theNorth a further enemy column was surroundedand captured by 4th Armoured Brigade.

48. From an early hour on the 6th Februarythe enemy main columns began to appear, andsevere fighting occurred throughout the day assuccessive enemy groujw, including a largenumber of tanks, attempted unsuccessfully tobreak through the 4th Armoured Brigade, laterreinforced by 7th Armoured Brigade (istR.T.R.) as more and more enemy tanks con-tinued to appear—84 were put out of actionduring the day's fighting. By nightfall thesituation was unchanged. The enemy's positionwas desperate, with a confused mass of vehiclesalmost 20 miles in length pinned to the roadsbetween our Armoured Brigades in the Southand the Northern detachment in the Solucharea, now beginning to turn South-West. Cer-tain enemy groups had, however, managed toevade the 4th Armoured Brigade by movingthrough the sand dune area between the mainroad and the sea. One group in particular,consisting of tanks strongly supported by in-fantry, repeatedly attacked the Southern de-tachment, now reinforced by a third R.H.A.battery, during the night 6th/7th February andearly morning 7th February. In all nine attackswere delivered against and Rifle Brigade, andalthough on one occasion tanks penetrated tothe Reserve Company areas, all were repulsed.These enemy attacks were pressed home withconsiderable vigour, but lacked co-ordination,ist R.T.R. (7th Armoured Brigade) had beenput under command of the Southern detach-ment early on the 7th February, but did notarrive in time to take part in this fight.

Shortly after dawn on the 7th February afinal attempt was made by 30 enemy tanks tobreak through. When this, too, failed, GeneralBerganzoli surrendered unconditionally.

49. Previously, on the 6th February, theCorps Commander had by wireless directed 6thAustralian Division to send a detachment, mademobile from divisional resources, along the coastroad to Ghemines, in order to complete theencirclement of the enemy. This detachment,comprising the equivalent of a Brigade Group,pressed on with great resolution and receivedthe surrender of Benghazi, but did not reachGhemines until about noon on the 7th Febru-ary, by which time all fighting had ceased.

50. The surrender completed the destructionof the Italian Tenth Army, whose commander,General Tellera, was killed during the action.Enemy losses in this final phase were approxi-mately 20,000 personnel, of whom the largemajority were captured, 120 tanks and 190guns.

PART IV.—SUMMARY AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.51. During the two months from the 7th De-

cember to the 7th February, the Army of theNile had advanced 500 miles. They had beatenand destroyed an Italian army of four Corpscomprising nine divisions and part of a tenth,and had captured 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanksand 1,290 guns, besides vast quantities of otherwar material.

In these operations we never employed alarger force than two divisions, of which onewas armoured. Actually three divisions tookpart, since the 6th Australian Division relieved

the 4th Indian Division after the Sidi Barranibattle. The 7th Armoured Division took partin the operations throughout, at the end ofwhich it was practically reduced to a skeleton.

Our casualties were extremely light andamounted to 500 killed, 1,373 wounded, 55missing only.

52. The outstanding success of these opera-tions was very largely due to the most capablecommanders of the formations engaged: Lieut.-General Sir Maitland Wilson, G.O.C.-in-C.Egypt; Lieut.-General R. N. O'Connor, com-manding Western Desert Corps; Major-GeneralM. O.'M. Creagh, commanding 7th ArmouredDivision; Major-General N. M. Beresford-Peirse, commanding 4th Indian Division; andMajor-General I. G. Mackay, commanding 6tbAustralian Division.

53. All combatant troops engaged displayedhigh fighting qualities and resolute skill inmanoeuvre. The 7th Armoured Division, dur-ing three months' continuous fighting in the vanof the battle, showed great tactical efficiencyand powers of endurance; the untiring work ofthe technical personnel which enabled so manyvehicles to be kept in action for so long aperiod was admirable.

Special mention must be made of one unit,the nth Hussars. As the only armoured carregiment in the force it was continually in theWestern Desert for a period of about ninemonths, from the entry of Italy into the wartill the fall of Benghazi. During this period italways supplied the most advanced elements inclose contact with the enemy. Seldom can aunit have had a more prolonged spell of workin the front line or performed it with greaterskill and boldness.

7th Royal Tank Regiment, equipped withinfantry tanks, assaulted five strongly defendedpositions (Nibeiwa, Tummar, Sidi Barrani,Bardia, Tobruk) in a little over one' month,and advanced more than 200 miles during thisperiod. The resolution shown in these assaultsand the technical skill and hard work by whichso many tanks were kept in action over so longa range deserve great credit.

The Royal Engineer units and Royal Corpsof Signals did much hard and admirable work.

54. The work of the ancillary corps, RoyalArmy Service Corps, Royal Army OrdnanceCorps, Royal Army Medical Corps, PioneerCorps, deserves all praise. Conditions in thedesert were difficult and onerous. Drivers oflorries or ambulances had to cover long dis-tances over bad tracks, sometimes in duststorms; mechanics in the field and at the Baseworked long hours on repair and maintenance;pioneers unloaded stores under air bombing orartillery fire.

55. The Army owes much to the Royal Navy,under Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, forits support through the operation, both in pre-arranged bombardments of enemy positionsprevious to the attacks on Sidi Barrani, Bardiaand Tobruk, and in answering emergency callsduring the actual attacks. The effect of theseaccurate bombardments on enemy morale alonewas very considerable, and did much to sim-plify the task of the Army. Lastly, the main-tenance problems in this quick-moving opera-tion over a distance of 500 miles would havebeen insurmountable without the Navy's assist-ance in keeping open the sea supply lines and

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 JUNE, 1946 3269

opening up of Sollum, Bardia and Tobruk, by enabling our ground forces to move freely,thereby shortening the L. of C. and releasing with little interference or loss from enemy airMotor Transport for the vital task of stocking attack. They also provided accurate informa-up successive Field Supply Depots. tion of enemy movements, and on many occa-

56. During the operations the Royal Air sions inflicted considerable loss on his forces.Force, under the able direction of Air Chief The Army owes a special debt to Air Comrap-Marshal Sir Arthur Lpngmore, obtained and dore R. Collishaw, commanding air forces inmaintained, in spite of inferior numbers, com- the Western Desert, for his whole-hearted co-plete superiority over the Italian air force. They operation and for the energy and optimismthereby contributed greatly to the successes won which were an inspiration to all.

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