Mind Association

Hands on PhilosophyAuthor(s): Roger TeichmannSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 109, Supplement: Mind! 2000 (Jan., 2000), pp. 33-35Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2659977 .

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Hands on Philosophy Yesterday afternoon saw the opening of the new lottery-funded Centre for Philosophical Research, only a few minutes from Junction 13 on the M4. At a ceremony witnessed by several onlookers, Prof. Armchair cut the tra- ditional ribbon and went on to sign copies of his new book, The Cutting Edge. "Philosophy can be proud," he said, "that it has finally become a drain on resources, however humble, along with the other serious sci- ences. I look forward to the day when lottery funds will prove inadequate, and international corporations will at last realize the potential offered by investment in philosophy."

The Centre already boasts a number of research projects. One of them is headed by Prof. Armchair himself and is a reaction to new doubts con- cerning counterfactual analyses of causation. In particular, the traditional view that other possible worlds must be causally inaccessible has come under attack, and the researchers in Prof. Armchair's team are hoping to test the rival hypothesis empirically.

"We figure that some of the possible worlds out there must contain indi- viduals thousands of times cleverer than homo sapiens" explained Dr. Picard, "who are bound to be pretty close to cracking the problem of get- ting in touch with other possible worlds. Of course, it may take some time before they get through to our world; so what we at the Centre are doing is trying to make this world a more probable one, so that it becomes an easier target, if you see what I mean." I asked him to clarify. "Well, essen- tially we're trying to maximize probable occurrences and minimize improbable ones. We're cutting down on wacky remarks, original thoughts, loud ties, odd behaviour generally. Instead, we talk a lot about the weather, drop objects so that they fall, and so on. That's a full-time occupation for all five of us in the team, so you can imagine the costs."

Across the corridor from the Modal Investigation Unit is the G. E. Moore Laboratory, in which researchers are hoping to produce small quantities of the non-natural property of goodness. One of the team, Prof. Bloomsbury, described their methods to me: "In an ideal world ha ha in an ideal world, of course, we'd be comparing two planets: one a barren, ugly place, the other fertile, beautiful and inhabited by living crea- tures with interests in the visual arts." He guided me to two large tanks, labeled A and B. "But we decided that a microcosmic version of Moore's thought-experiment should be possible. As you can see, in tank A we've assembled a few rocks, charred twigs and the like. Pretty nasty, don't you agree?" I nodded. "While in tank B, we have quite a little ecosystem var-

Mind!, Vol. 109 . Supplement . January 2000 C) Oxford University Press 2000

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34 Roger Teichmann

ious colourful flowers, a rock pool, a few small herbivores, and a postcard of Guernica by Picasso." He paused. "Actually, we may have to replace that with something else. It's possible that it's reducing experimental effectiveness."

Down the corridor, I found a small room with "Inverted Spectra" writ- ten on the door. Inside, research was actually in progress: a man and a woman were both sitting facing a panel of three colours-red, blue and yellow. Various wires led from each one's skull to that of a third person, a man, sitting blindfolded behind them. A woman in a white coat, who introduced herself to me as Prof. Elizabeth Quail, stood manipulating var- ious knobs at a nearby terminal. "We're waiting for the blindfolded one to tell us something," she muttered, flashing a glance at me through her half- moons.

I thought it best to leave them, and made my way out of the building and over to a small portakabin, with the curious legend "Stripping" on its door. Peeping in, I saw a collection of objects on a table. "Come in," invited the elderly man inside-Mr. Percy Futile, originally of Oxford. "We're stripping, as you can see. Only way to get to the substrate, don't you know." "The substrate?" I enquired. "Yes-it's what's left when you strip away all the properties from an object. Generally a matter of pulping 'em, I find." At this, he brought a large hammer down on the grey sphere in front of him. Its debris added to what was already scattered around on the floor. "The problem is ..." he paused to re-light his cigar. "... is that every time you get rid of one property, another blighter seems to pop into its place. Most frustrating. I'm beginning to think that digging may be bet- ter than stripping; you know, digging into the object until you find the sub- strate. Here, do you want to have a go on this melon?" He offered me a chisel for the job; politely declining I went on my way.

It had begun to rain as I approached a field nearby-also part of the Centre-in the middle of which four or five people seemed to be engaged in completely random activity. "You're very nearly right," said Tim, one of two observers with clipboards, whom I joined under his umbrella. "Tom and I are conducting the first ever scientifically respectable program of radical interpretation." "Really?" I replied with interest. "Yup. And those guys over there are our interpretees. They've been instructed to behave as unintelligibly as possible, to test the hypothesis that belief and thought require a minimum of intelligible behaviour."

At this point, one of the interpretees emitted an ear-splitting scream, took off his left shoe, and began strangling one of the others. "Hey, that's pretty good," murmured my companion; he jotted something down on his clipboard. "Shouldn't we ... er ... rescue ... ?" I began, "You mustn't interrupt the experiment!" said Tom, sternly. Meanwhile, the strangling

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Hands on Philosophy 35

had ceased, for no apparent reason ("Excellent," commented Tim). "How do you know whether they have any beliefs or thoughts?" I asked. "Oh, they tell us afterwards," explained Tim. "So far, they've all said they were thinking-things like 'How long do I have to go on like this?', 'What a silly shirt he's wearing', and so on. So it looks as if Davidson's theory is going to be disconfirmed."

A theory disconfirmed. Not much, you might think, but surely enough to justify this splendid new addition to the life of the nation: the Centre for Philosophical Research.

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