Sun Blind?Author(s): Richard MarshallSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 178-179Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033963 .

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Letters to the Editor

Peter Samson on unhelpfulgiving; Richard Marshall on diplomacy in EastAsia; and others

BAND AID

To the Editor: Carol C. Adelman's enthusiasm for

remittances ("The Privatization of Foreign Aid," November/December 2003) raises troubling questions about Americans' generosity and the nature of overseas development.

There is no doubt that the billions of dollars sent home by immigrants in the United States are an important source of income for developing countries. Like the money sent home by U.S. soldiers stationed overseas, however, such giving is not really philanthropic but a form

of family income. Even if Adelman were right to classify remittances as a type of aid, this does not reflect well on U.S. gen erosity: most of these funds come from the very poorest members of society, the

majority of whom are not even American. Remittances, moreover, do not serve

the cause of development as effectively as targeted government giving. Although such funds are an important temporary source of income for millions of people in the developing world, they do little to alleviate deep-rooted problems there.

Relying on remittances makes it possible for developing countries to avoid the hard

work of structural change, which is the only real hope for lasting development. In the case of Cuba, remittance income-the

island's largest single source of hard currency-indirectly helps Fidel Castro's authoritarian regime remain in power.

It is too easy to argue that public institutions in the developing world are broken and that remittances are a

means to circumvent them. Any lasting attempt to lift people out of poverty and to provide equal opportunities for all requires effective health, education, and judicial systems. And that is where public, rather than private, giving can really

make a difference. PETER SAMSON

Fairfax, Virginia

SUN BLIND?

To the Editor: In "Japan's New Nationalism"

(November/December 2003), Eugene A. Matthews calls for U.S. leaders to temper Japan's moves to create a higher-profile military, because of the threat to other states in East Asia, particularly China. Yet so far, the silence from these countries has been deafening. Save for the occasional complaint from North Korea, few have expressed disquiet over Japan's recent mili taristic moves, such as its recent decision to dispatch troops to Iraq and its declared intention to build a ballistic-missile shield.

Could Beijing's seeming indifference be tacit approval for Japan's military rise?

[178] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume83No.2

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Letters to the Editor

As Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel elucidate in the same issue of Foreign Affairs ("China's New Diplomacy"), China is developing a more sophisticated foreign policy. Beijing may, in fact, recog nize that Tokyo's approach to its modern security interests makes sense, given Japan's global stature and the growing threat to the region posed by North Korea. China may also realize that, although Japan appears to be slightly more comfortable with a greater military role, its electorate is unlikely to allow the fiercely nationalistic Japanese soldier to reappear any time soon.

RICHARD MARSHALL

Honolulu, Hawaii

ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT

To the Editor: In "Clinton's Strong Defense Legacy"

(November/December 2003), Michael O'Hanlon acknowledges that U.S. military morale suffered during the Clinton pres idency, but he does not fully explain why.

Perhaps it was because of fundamental opposition to nation-building and peace keeping among the Pentagon leader ship. These criticisms harked back to the Vietnam War and to the "Weinberger

Doctrine," outlined in 1984, which argued against nonessential military interven tion. Colin Powell, as chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried the anti intervention argument forward in the early 199os, even getting into a public spat with former British Prime Minister

Margaret Thatcher over whether to intervene in the Balkans. In the late l990s,

General Wesley Clark was fired by the Pentagon leadership for arguing too pas sionately for U.S. involvement in Kosovo.

Such attitudes had a direct effect on military morale, because soldiers were

told by their leaders that peacekeeping missions such as Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans were wrongheaded and

would erode the military's war-fighting capabilities. Given this explanation, it is no wonder that troops in the Balkans felt misused and overworked.

The Pentagon's recent attempt to close the Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle

Barracks suggests that the Army is not get ting any more serious about low-intensity

missions, such as counterinsurgency and peacekeeping. In Iraq, meanwhile, we are again witnessing the negative effects on morale when soldiers do not support an operation. A change of attitude is desperately needed.

ALFRED R. BARR

Washington, D. C.

CRISIS PREVENTION

To the Editor: Kenneth Maxwell's bias is clear in his

reply to my criticism of his review of The Pinochet File: A Decdass~fled Dossier on

Atrocity andAccountability ("Fleeing the Chilean Coup," January/February 2004). He finds a "cruel coincidence" between a September 20, 1976, State Department cable and Orlando Letelier's murder at the hands of Chilean intelligence agents the very next day. This "cruel coincidence" leads Maxwell to conclude that "this was a tragedy that might have been prevented."

By whom, one might ask? Who does he think could have "prevented" Letelier's killing? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger? Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman? Me? The implication is outrageous, and

the facts are otherwise. Maxwell mis reads the cable: it was not an instruction to ambassadors in the field, but a cable from Shlaudeman, then in Costa Rica,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2004 [179]

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