Sufgar Cane Aff Cuba

7/27/2019 Sufgar Cane Aff Cuba

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Plan Text

The United States federal governmentshould authorize the licensing ofAmerican companies to participate in thedevelopment of Cubas sugar ethanolindustry and allow Cuban sugar ethanolimports.


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Contention 1: Sugar Ethanol ShiftCuban sugarcane-based ethanol market is superior to

American corn-based ethanol. It will slow therate of climate change, pesticide use, and deadzones.

Specht 13[Jonathan-J.D. Wash. U St. Louis, Legal Advisor, Raising Cane: Cuban SugarcaneEthanols Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States, EnvironmentalLaw & Policy Journal, Univ. of California Davis, Vol. 36:2,http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf]

IV. Environmental Effects of Ethanol Assumingthat Cuba is able to meet all thechallenges standing in the wayofcreating a sugarcane-based ethanol industry,including the

removal of U.S. legal barriers , and it begins importingethanol to the U nited S tates, the U nited S tates wouldbenefit environmentally in two ways. First, Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol woulddirectly benefit the United Statesby reducing the negativeenvironmental effects of corn-based ethanol production, tothe extent to which it replaced domestically produced corn-based ethanol. n55 Second, byreducing greenhouse gas emissions , Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would indirectly benefit the United Statesas well as the rest of the world by reducing the speed ofglobal climate change. n56 A. Environmental Effects of

Corn-Based Ethanol A chief argument in favor of thedomestic corn-based ethanol industry is that it isenvironmentally beneficial because it reduces greenhousegas emissions. n57 Scientists, industry advocates, and critics hotly contest the degree to whichgreenhouse gas emissions are reduced by replacing a percentage of U.S. gasoline consumption withdomestically-produced corn-based ethanol. It is beyond the scope of this Article to weigh in on whichevaluation is correct. n58 [*182] Nonetheless, the factors that go into these scientific evaluations, are

important for understanding the larger picture of the ethanol issue, and thus will be discussed.Using any form ofethanol as a transportation fuel combatsclimate change because the carbon released whenethanol is burned was captured out of the atmosphere by

the plants used to make the ethanol. Contrastingly, the carbonreleased when gasoline is burned had been stored in theearth for millennia in the form of crude oil. n59 This simple fact iscomplicated by the reality that the entire process of getting ethanol intothe fuel tanks of drivers - from growing crops , to creatinga refined product, to delivering blended ethanol to gasstations - is reliant on fossil fuels. According to one report, "If corn growthrequired only photosynthesis, if ethanol were produced using solar power, if corn were instantly
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transported to ethanol plants, and if no land use changes were needed to grow the corn, then displacing agallon of gasoline with ethanol would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by approximately [the equivalent

of] 11.2 kilograms of [carbon dioxide]. However, fossil fuels are used to growcorn and produce ethanol." n60 The debit side of thedomestic ethanol industry's climate-change ledger beginsto subtract from the credit side before the corn it uses iseven planted. "America's corn cropmight look like asustainable, solar-powered system for producing food,but it is actually a huge, inefficient, polluting machinethat guzzles fossil fuel." n61 While advocates for corn production would dispute thischaracterization of the industry as "inefficient" and "polluting," it is undeniable thatconventional corn production techniques use largeamounts of climate change-exacerbating fossil fuels.Conventional (non-organic) corn production techniques involve annualapplications offertilizers and pesticides, both largelyderived from fossil fuels. n62 The process by whichincentives for ethanol production change land usepatterns and thereby impact climate change , known as indirect landuse change (ILUC), happens roughly as follows. n63 By increasingdemand for corn, corn-based ethanol production drives upthe price of corn. As the price of corn [*183] increases,farmers want to grow more of it. By making corn more appealing to farmers togrow than other crops, and thereby increasing national levels of corn-production, the corn-based ethanol industry makes thenegative environmental effects of corn production morewidespread. Conventional corn-growing techniques involve

applying more pesticides and fertilizers to corn than isusually applied to other row crops such as soybeans. n64 This effectis exacerbated when high corn prices disincentivize croprotation. n65 A common technique in American agriculturetoday is rotating corn and soybeans. n66 Because soybeansare a nitrogen-fixing crop (that is, they take nitrogen out of the atmosphere andrelease it into the soil), corn grown on land that was used to grow soybeans the year before requires a

lesser input of nitrogen fertilizer. By boosting the price of corn relativeto other crops like soybeans, however, the domestic ethanolindustry encourages farmers to use the same piece of

land to grow corn year after year. Growing corn on thesame land in successive years rather than rotating it withsoybeans significantly increases the climate changeeffects of corn production because "nitrogen fertilizerapplications are typically fifty pounds per acre higher forcorn planted after corn" and "nitrous oxide has a globalwarming potential more than 300 times that of [carbon


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dioxide]." n67 Additionally, the application of fossil fuel-derivednitrogen fertilizer has other environmental impactsbeyond exacerbating climate change. The collective nitrogen runoffofthe Mississippi River basin has caused a process calledhypoxia, which kills off most marine life , in a region of the

Gulf of Mexico.Scientists have linked the so-called DeadZone to corn production and, thus, to the domesticethanol industry. n68


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Scenario 1: Dead Zones

Dead zones collapse ocean biodiversityCarlisle 2K

[Elizabeth Carlisle 2000 The Gulf of Mexico Dead Zone and Red Tides,The Louisiana Environment,http://www.tulane.edu/~bfleury/envirobio/enviroweb/DeadZone.htm]

As the fresh, nutrient-enriched water from the Mississippiand Atchafalaya River s spread across the Gulf waters,favorable conditions are created for the production ofmassive phytoplankton blooms . A bloom is defined as an increased abundanceof a species above background numbers in a specific geographic region. Incomingnutrients stimulate growth of phytoplankton at thesurface, providing food for unicellular animals. Planktonic remainsand fecal matter from these organisms fall to the ocean floor, where they are eaten by bacteria, which

consume excessive amounts of oxygen, creating eutrophic conditions. Hypoxic watersappear normal on the surface, but on the bottom, they arecovered with dead and distressed animal, and in extreme cases,layers of stinking, sulfur-oxidizing bacteria , which causethe sediment in these areas to turn black. These hypoxicconditions cause food chain alterations, loss ofbiodiversity, and high aquatic species mortality .

Ensures planetary extinctionCraig 03[Robin Kundis- Associate Professor at Indiana University School of Law, TakingSteps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection, McGeorge Law Review, Winter, 34McGeorge L. Rev. 155]

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as theydo for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates.For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coralreefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmentalfluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. 856 Waste treatmentis another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. 857

More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global

geochemical cycling ofall the elements that represent thebasic building blocks of living organisms , carbon,nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as otherless abundant but necessary elements." 858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore,human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs theplanet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is oftencritical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems.Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of


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disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more

stable." 859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent ontheirbiodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degreeof interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valuedcomponents is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on

sustaining the rest of the reef system. 860 Thus, maintaining and restoring thebiodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining andrestoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-usebiodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like theExxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. 861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marinewilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or evenprimary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerableforce and merit." 862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we knowabout the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United Stateshas traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harmto the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sureabout causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystemshould inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what weare doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especiallywhen the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in

the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if wekill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most ofthe biosphere with us . The Black Sea is almost dead, 863 its once-complex andproductive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish anddolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of


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Scenario 2: Monoculture

Domestic corn-ethanol production is the root ofmassive species loss and ecosystem destruction

in the Great PlainsSpecht 13[Jonathan-J.D. Wash. U St. Louis, Legal Advisor, Raising Cane: Cuban SugarcaneEthanols Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States, EnvironmentalLaw & Policy Journal, Univ. of California Davis, Vol. 36:2,http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf]

Incentivizing farmers to grow consecutive corn crops instead of alternating with soybean crops is only theleast damaging of the environmentally detrimental land use changes that the domestic ethanol industry

encourages. Land is primarily converted to corn production inone of three ways : land that is already used to growanother crop is converted to corn production, land that is used for

pasture or is enrolled in a program like the ConservationReserve Program n69 is converted to cropland, or native habitat isplowed and converted to [*184] cropland. n70 Each of these hasvarying levels of negative environmental effects. All three types ofland use conversions are underway in the Great Plains states, which have ramped up corn production inresponse to demand from the ethanol industry. n71 While it is not the only reason corn production isincreasing in these states, n72 the corn-based ethanol industry and thus the governmental policiesencouraging it are clearly factors driving land use conversion. "While many factors influence land-use

changes, the relationship between ethanol incentives andhabitat destruction is fairly clear. Ethanol incentives increase demand for corn,which in turn increases corn prices. Increased corn prices lead to land being converted from other uses tocorn production." n73 Converting pasture or Conservation Reserve Program Land to croplandcauses more damage than changing crop rotation patterns in already cropped land. n74 Yet,

the most environmentally damaging way of convertingland to crop production is to plow native habitat and plantit with row crops. n75 This process is underway now in theGreat Plains, with devastating environmental effects. Althoughthe most recent data is from 2007, the USDA's census of agriculture (published every five years) providesa clear picture of the trend lines of U.S. agricultural production. This picture is one of greatly increasedcorn production in the Great Plains states. According to the Census of Agriculture, the number of acres ofcorn production in North Dakota has increased from 592,078 acres in 1997 to 991,390 acres in 2002 n76to 2,348,171 acres in 2007, n77 representing more [*185] than a doubling over five years and close to aquadrupling over ten years. Similarly, in South Dakota, the number of acres in corn grew from 3,165,190 in2002 to 4,455,368 in 2007, n78 an increase of forty-one percent over five years. In Nebraska, the numberof acres in corn (for grain) increased from 7,344,715 in 2002 to 9,192,656 in 2007, n79 a more modest butstill significant increase of twenty-five percent over five years. While a major portion of this increasein corn production in the Great Plain states is attributable to farmers converting land already

used to grow other crops or pasture to corn production, n80 much of it also derives fromplowing native habitat. "Recent dramatic increases in corn plantings have been heavilyconcentrated in the Prairie Pothole Region, displacing other crops as well as sensitive prairie

pothole habitat." n81 The trend of replacing native habitat withfields of corn is an extremely worrying development, and is arguably thestrongest reason for displacing at least some domestic corn-based ethanol with Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol. Therefore,this trend will be discussed in some depth.Increased corn production is


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degrading two environmentally significant habitats in the Great Plains, grasslands andwetlands. According to The Nature Conservancy, "grasslands and prairiesare the world's most imperiled ecosystem ." n82 While grasslands oncestretched across the entire central portion of the United States, it has lost between eighty-three and

ninety-nine percent of its original tall grass prairie habitat. n83 U.S. grasslands are the

native habitat of a number of threatened and endangeredspecies, such as the greater prairie [*186] chicken, n84 which cannot live in cornfields. n85 Inaddition to reducing the overall amount of habitat available to native species, the process of plowinggrassland to grow crops fragments habitat by splitting it into disconnected segments. n86 The negativeeffects on wildlife of converting grasslands to corn fields, and thereby also fragmenting what habitat

remains, are well-documented. "In counties with high corn [production]increases, the average number of grassland [bird] species wasfound to decline significantly from 2005 to 2008." n87 Furthermore, inaddition to providing habitat for wildlife, grasslands act asa carbon sink , keeping centuries' worth of accumulatedatmospheric carbon in underground root systems. n88 When

native grassland is plowed to growcrops like

corn, the carbonstored in its soil is released into the atmosphere, further exacerbatingclimate change and counterbalancing the greenhouse gasbenefits of replacing fossil fuel-based gasoline with corn-based ethanol. n89 Taken together, the environmental costs ofincreasing domestic corn-based ethanol production by plowing nativegrasslands in the Great Plains starkly outweigh their benefits. "Plowing up ournation's last remnants of native grasslands to grow more corn for ethanol is like burning the Mona Lisa for

firewood." n90 Along with grasslands, wetlands are the other majorhabitat type in the Great Plains that are being damagedby the domestic corn-based ethanol industry. The draining ofwetlands to convert them to agricultural production is a practice in American agriculture that predates thedomestic ethanol industry. n91 This trend has been exacerbated by a number of legal and policy factorsunrelated to ethanol production (including a 2001 Supreme Court decision interpreting the [*187] Clean

Water Act). n92 To the extent that it increases demand for cornand thus the price of corn, however, the domestic ethanolindustry is clearly a factor driving the conversion ofwetlands to corn production. This conversion process is aland use change with wide-ranging environmentalconsequences. The Prairie Pothole region of the Dakotasand surrounding states - which is composed of a mixture ofgrasslands and wetlands - is a habitat of international

significance. n93 Nearly forty percent of all species ofmigratory birds in North America - over 300 species -utilize this habitat at some point in their life cycles oryearly migrations. n94 The region is where "millions ofducks and geese are born each year." n95 The two greatestthreats to North American ducks are the destruction ofwetlands and the degradation of prairies, both of which


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are being driven by the expansion of U.S. corn production.n96 In addition to providing habitat for wildlife, both grasslands and wetlandshelp to clean up pollution and prevent flooding. n97 "Those areaswith native vegetation, and the soils beneath their surface, also retain the water longer throughout theseason and use up the water through evapotranspiration." n98 Thus, converting grasslands and wetlandsto cropland for corn increases the risk of flooding. n99 Taken together, the consequences of

converting grasslands and wetlands in the Great Plains to increase corn production for thedomestic ethanol industry are devastating.If we proceed along thecurrent trajectory without changing federal policies [including thosepromoting corn-based ethanol],the prairie potholeecosystem may be further degraded and fragmented, and the manyservices it provides will be impossible to restore. The region will no longer be able tosupport the waterfowl cherished by hunters and wildlife enthusiasts across the country. Grasslandbird populations, already declining, will be unable to rebound as [*188]nesting sites are turned into row crops. Water will become increasinglypollutedand costly to clean as the grasslands and wetlands that once filteredcontaminants disappear. n100

Monoculture model independently causes extinctionLeahy 7[Stephen- international environmental journalist, Biodiversity: Farming Will Make orBreak the Food Chain, Inter Press Service, 5-3-07,http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/05/03/945/]

"Ifall agricultural lands adopt the industrial, monocultural model,there will be enormous impacts on water and other essential servicesprovided by diverse ecosystems," Jackson told IPS. Societies need to recognizethe value of ecosystem services and encourage farmers to use methods that benefit biodiversity, she

says.Biodiversity refers to the amazing variety ofliving thingsthat make up the biosphere, the thin skin of life that coversthe Earth and is, as far as we know, unique in the universe. The trees, plants,insects, bacteria, birds and animals that make up forestecosystems produce oxygen, clean water, prevent erosionand flooding, and capture excess carbon dioxide, among otherthings. "There is an unbreakable link between human healthand well being and ecosystems," Walter Reid, director of the MillenniumEcosystem Assessment (MA) and a professor with the Institute for the Environment at Stanford University,told IPS last year. The MA is a 22-million-dollar, four-year global research initiative commissioned by theUnited Nations, and carried out by 1,360 experts from 95 countries. Its mission has been to examine waysto slow or reverse the degradation of the Earth's ecosystems, including a look at what the future may be

like in 2050.The more species and diversity there are in anecosystem, the more robust it is. Remove some species and it will continue tofunction. However, like a complex house of cards, removing keycards or too many cards results in a collapse. For many ecosystemssuch as oceans, scientists do not know what the key cards are orhow many lost species is too many.


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Scenario 3: Climate Change

Global Warming is happening most recent and bestevidence concludes that it is human induced

Muller 7-28-2012 [Richard, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a formerMacArthur Foundation fellow, The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all]

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my

mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following anintensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded thatglobal warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warmingwere correct. Im now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely thecause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis bythe Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter

Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of theearths land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover,

it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from thehuman emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are strongerthan those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], the United Nations group thatdefines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C.concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. Itwas possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could bebecause of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be

natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statisticalmethods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, whichallowed usto determine earth land temperature much further back intime. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases fromurban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from dataselection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; weused virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed goodstations and poor ones) and from human intervention and dataadjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstratethat none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historictemperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of knownexplosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautifulsunsets and cool the earths surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to ElNio and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the flattening of therecent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has

caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting theshape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solaractivity and even to rising functions like world population.By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbondioxide (CO2), measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice.


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CO2 is the primary driver of climate change outweighs all alt causes

Vertessy and Clark3-13-2012[Rob, Acting Director of Australian Bureau of Meteorology, andMegan, Chief Executive Officer at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation,State of the Climate 2012, http://theconversation.edu.au/state-of-the-climate-2012-5831 ]

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions account for about 60% of the effectfrom anthropogenic greenhouse gases on the earthsenergy balance over the past 250 years. These global CO2 emissions are mostly fromfossil fuels (more than 85%), land use change, mainly associated with tropical deforestation (less than10%), and cement production and other industrial processes (about 4%). Australia contributes about 1.3%of the global CO2 emissions. Energy generation continues to climb and is dominated by fossil fuels suggesting emissions will grow for some time yet. CO2 levels are rising in the atmosphere andocean. About 50% of the amount of CO2 emitted from fossil fuels, industry, and changes inland-use, stays in the atmosphere. The remainder is taken up by the ocean and land vegetation, inroughly equal parts. The extra carbon dioxide absorbed by the oceans is estimated to have caused about a

30% increase in the level of ocean acidity since pre-industrial times. The sources of theCO2 increase in the atmosphere can be identified fromstudies of the isotopic composition of atmospheric CO2

and from oxygen (O2) concentration trends in the atmosphere. Theobserved trends in the isotopic (13C, 14C) composition of CO2 in theatmosphere and the decrease in the concentration of atmosphericO2 confirm that the dominant cause of the observed CO2increase is the combustion of fossil fuels.

Global warming makes global agricultural productionimpossible resulting in mass starvation

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and ClimateAnalytics, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4C Warmer World Must be Avoided, A report for the World Bank,November,http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf)

The overall conclusions of IPCC AR4 concerning food production andagriculture included the following: Crop productivity is projected to increase slightly atmid- to high latitudes for local mean temperature increases of up to 1 to 3C depending on the crop, andthen decrease beyond that in some regions (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, SPM}. At lower latitudes,especially in seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop productivity is projected to decrease for even smalllocal temperature increases (1 to 2C) which would increase the risk of hunger (medium confidence) {WGII

5.4, SPM}. Globally, the potential for food production isprojected to increase with increases in local average

temperature over a range of 1 to 3C, but above this it isprojected to decrease (medium confidence) {WGII 5.4, 5.5, SPM}. These findings clearlyindicate a growing risk for low-latitude regions at quite low levels of temperature increase and a growingrisk for systemic global problems above a warming of a few degrees Celsius. While a comprehensivereview of literature is forthcoming in the IPCC AR5, the snapshot overview of recent scientific literature

provided here illustrates that the concerns identified in the AR4 areconfirmed by recent literature and in important casesextended. In particular, impacts of extreme heat waves deserve mention here for observedagricultural impacts (see also Chapter 2). This chapter will focus on the latest findings regarding possiblelimits and risks to large-scale agriculture production because of climate change, summarizing recent
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studies relevant to this risk assessment, including at high levels of global warming approaching 4C. Inparticular, it will deliberately highlight important findings that point to the risks of assuming a forward

projection of historical trends. Projections for food and agriculture overthe 21st century indicate substantial challengesirrespective of climate change. As early as 2050, the worlds population isexpected to reach about 9 billion people (Lutz and Samir 2010) and demand for food is expected to

increase accordingly. Based on the observed relationship between per capita GDP and per capita demandfor crop calories (human consumption, feed crops, fish production and losses during food production),Tilman et al. (2011) project a global increase in the demand for crops by about 100 percent from 2005 to2050. Other estimates for the same period project a 70 percent increase of demand (Alexandratos 2009).Several projections suggest that global cereal and livestock production may need to increase by between

60 and 100 percent to 2050, depending on the warming scenario (Thornton et al. 2011). Thehistorical context can on the one hand providereassurance that despite growing population, foodproduction has been able to increase to keep pace withdemand and that despite occasional fluctuations, food prices generally stabilize or decrease in realterms (Godfray, Crute, et al. 2010). Increases in food production havemainly been driven by more efficient use of land, rather

than by the extension of arable land , with the former more widespread inrich countries and the latter tending to be practiced in poor countries (Tilman et al. 2011). While grainproduction has more than doubled, the area of land used for arable agriculture has only increased by

approximately 9 percent (Godfray, Beddington, et al. 2010). However, although theexpansion of agricultural production has proved possiblethrough technological innovation and improved water-useefficiency, observation and analysis point to a significantlevel of vulnerability of food production and prices to theconsequences of climate change , extreme weather, andunderlying social and economic development trends. There aresome indications that climate change may reduce arable land in low-latitude regions, with reductions most pronounced in Africa, Latin America, and India (Zhang and Cai2011). For example, flooding of agricultural land is also expectedto severely impact crop yields in the future: 10.7 percent of South Asias agricultural land is projected to be exposed to inundation, accompanied by a 10 percent intensificationof storm surges, with 1 m sea-level rise (Lange et al. 2010). Given the competition for land that may beused for other human activities (for example, urbanization and biofuel production), which can be expectedto increase as climate change places pressure on scarce resources, it is likely that the main increase inproduction will have to be managed by an intensification of agriculture on the sameor possibly even

reducedamount of land (Godfray, Beddington et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2010). Declines innutrient availability (for example, phosphorus), as well as the spreadin pests and weeds, could further limit the increase ofag ricultural productivity. Geographical shifts in production

patterns resulting from the effects of global warmingcould further escalate distributional issues in the future.While this will not be taken into consideration here, it illustrates the plethora of factors to take into accountwhen thinking of challenges to promoting food security in a warming world. New results published since2007 point to a more rapidly escalating risk of crop yield reductions associated with warming thanpreviously predicted (Schlenker and Lobell 2010; Schlenker and Roberts 2009). In the period since 1980,patterns of global crop production have presented significant indications of an adverse effect resultingfrom climate trends and variability, with maize declining by 3.8 percent and wheat production by 5.5

percent compared to a case without climate trends. A significant portion ofincreases in crop yields from technology, CO2 fertilization,


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and other changes may have been offset by climatetrends in some countries (Lobell et al. 2011). This indication alone castssome doubt on future projections based on earlier cropmodels. In relation to the projected effects of climate change three interrelated factors areimportant: temperature-induced effect, precipitation-induced effect, and the CO2 -fertilization effect. Thefollowing discussion will focus only on these biophysical factors. Other factors that can damage crops, forexample, the elevated levels of tropospheric ozone (van Groenigen et al. 2012), fall outside the scope ofthis report and will not be addressed. Largely beyond the scope of this report are the far-reaching anduneven adverse implications for poverty in many regions arising from the macroeconomic consequences ofshocks to global agricultural production from climate change. It is necessary to stress here that evenwhere overall food production is not reduced or is even increased with low levels of warming, distributionalissues mean that food security will remain a precarious matter or worsen as different regions are impacteddifferently and food security is further challenged by a multitude of nonclimatic factors.

4 degrees of warming make sustaining biodiversityimpossible the impact is extinction

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and ClimateAnalytics, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4C Warmer World Must be Avoided, A report for the World Bank,November,

http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf)

Ecosystems and their species provide a range of important goods and services for human society. Theseinclude water, food, cultural and other values. In the AR4 an assessment of climate change effects on

ecosystems and their services found the following: If greenhouse gas emissionsand other stresses continue at or above current rates, theresilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded by anunprecedented combination of change in climate, associated disturbances (for example, flooding, drought,wildfire, insects, and ocean acidification) and other stressors (global change drivers) including land use

change, pollution and over-exploitation of resources. Approximately 20 to 30percent of plant and animal species assessed so far arelikely to be at increased risk of extinction, if increases inglobal average temperature exceed of 23 abovepreindustrial levels. For increases in global average temperature exceeding 2 to 3above preindustrial levels and in concomitant atmospheric CO2 concentrations, major changesare projected in ecosystem structure and function ,species ecological interactions and shifts in speciesgeographical ranges , with predominantly negativeconsequences for biodiversity and ecosystem goods andservices, such as water and food supply. It is known that past large-scale lossesof global ecosystems and species extinctions have beenassociated with rapid climate change combined with otherecological stressors. Loss and/or degradation of ecosystems, and rates ofextinction because of human pressures over the lastcentury or more, which have intensified in recent decades, havecontributed to a very high rate of extinction by geological standards. It is well establishedthat loss or degradation of ecosystem services occurs as aconsequence of species extinctions , declining speciesabundance, or widespread shifts in species and biome


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distributions (Leadley et al. 2010). Climate change is projected to exacerbate the situation. Thissection outlines the likely consequences for some key ecosystems and for biodiversity. The literature tendsto confirm the conclusions from the AR4 outlined above. Despite the existence of detailed and highly

informative case studies, upon which this section will draw, it is also important to recall that thereremain many uncertainties (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp,2012). However, threshold behavior is known to occur inbiological systems (Barnosky et al. 2012) and most modelprojections agree on major adverse consequences forbiodiversity in a 4C world (Bellard et al., 2012). With high levels ofwarming, coalescing human induced stresses onecosystems have the potential to trigger large-scaleecosystem collapse (Barnosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, while uncertainty remains in theprojections, there is a risk not only of major loss of valuableecosystem services, particularly to the poor and the mostvulnerable who depend on them, but also of feedbacksbeing initiated that would result in ever higher CO2 emissions and thus rates of globalwarming. Significant effects of climate change are already expected for warming well below 4C. In ascenario of 2.5C warming, severe ecosystem change, based on absolute and relative changes in carbonand water fluxes and stores, cannot be ruled out on any continent (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, & Lucht,2011). If warming is limited to less than 2C, with constant or slightly declining precipitation, small biomeshifts are projected, and then only in temperate and tropical regions. Considerable change is projected for

cold and tropical climates already at 3C of warming. At greater than 4C ofwarming, biomes in temperate zones will also besubstantially affected. These changes would impact not onlythe human and animal communities that directly rely on theecosystems, but would also exact a cost (economic and otherwise) on society as a whole, rangingfrom extensive loss of biodiversity and diminished land cover, through to loss of ecosystems services suchas fisheries and forestry (de Groot et al., 2012; Farley et al., 2012). Ecosystems have been found to beparticularly sensitive to geographical patterns of climate change (Gonzalez, Neilson, Lenihan, and Drapek,

2010). Moreover, ecosystems are affected not only by local changes in the mean temperature andprecipitation, along with changes in the variability of these quantities and changes by the occurrence of

extreme events. These climatic variables are thus decisive factors indetermining plant structure and ecosystem composition(Reu et al., 2011). Increasing vulnerability to heat and droughtstress will likely lead to increased mortality and speciesextinction. For example, temperature extremes have already been held responsible for mortalityin Australian flying-fox species (Welbergen, Klose, Markus, and Eby 2008), and interactions betweenphenological changes driven by gradual climate changes and extreme events can lead to reduced

fecundity (Campbell et al. 2009; Inouye, 2008). Climate change also has thepotential to facilitate the spread and establishment of

invasive species(pests and weeds) (Hellmann, Byers, Bierwagen, & Dukes, 2008; Rahel &

Olden, 2008) with often detrimental implications for ecosystemservices and biodiversity. Human land-use changes are expected to furtherexacerbate climate change driven ecosystem changes, particularly in the tropics, where risingtemperatures and reduced precipitation are expected to have major impacts (Campbell et al., 2009; Lee &

Jetz, 2008). Ecosystems will be affected by the increasedoccurrence of extremes such as forest loss resulting fromdroughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and


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agricultural expansion (Fischlin et al., 2007). Climate change alsohas the potential to catalyze rapid shifts in ecosystemssuch as sudden forest loss or regional loss of agriculturalproductivity resulting from desertification (Barnosky et al., 2012). Thepredicted increase in extreme climate events would also drive dramatic ecosystem changes (Thibault andBrown 2008; Wernberg, Smale, and Thomsen 2012). One such extreme event that is expected to haveimmediate impacts on ecosystems is the increased rate of wildfire occurrence. Climate change inducedshifts in the fire regime are therefore in turn powerful drivers of biome shifts, potentially resulting inconsiderable changes in carbon fluxes over large areas (Heyder et al., 2011; Lavorel et al., 2006) It isanticipated that global warming will lead to global biome shifts (Barnosky et al. 2012). Based on 20th

century observations and 21st century projections, poleward latitudinal biomeshifts of up to 400 km are possible in a 4 C world (Gonzalez etal., 2010). In the case of mountaintop ecosystems, for example, sucha shift is not necessarily possible, putting them atparticular risk of extinction (La Sorte and Jetz, 2010). Species thatdwell at the upper edge of continents or on islands wouldface a similar impediment to adaptation, since migration

into adjacent ecosystems is not possible (Campbell, et al. 2009; Hof,Levinsky, Arajo, and Rahbek 2011). The consequences of such geographical shifts, drivenby climatic changes as well as rising CO2 concentrations, would be found in bothreduced species richness and species turnover (for example, Phillipset al., 2008; White and Beissinger 2008). A study by (Midgley and Thuiller, 2011) found that, of 5,197

African plant species studied, 2542 percent could lose all suitable range by 2085. It should beemphasized that competition for space with humanagriculture over the coming century is likely to preventvegetation expansion in most cases (Zelazowski et al., 2011) Speciescomposition changes can lead to structural changes of theentire ecosystem, such as the increase in lianas in tropical and temperate forests(Phillips et al., 2008), and the encroachment of woody plants intemperate grasslands (Bloor et al., 2008, Ratajczak et al., 2012), puttinggrass-eating herbivores at risk of extinction because of a lack of foodavailablethis is just one example of the sensitive intricacies of ecosystem responses to external

perturbations. There is also an increased risk of extinction forherbivores in regions of drought-induced tree dieback,owing to their inability to digest the newly resident C4grasses (Morgan et al., 2008). The following provides some examples of ecosystems that have beenidentified as particularly vulnerable to climate change. The discussion is restricted to ecosystemsthemselves, rather than the important and often extensive impacts on ecosystems services. Boreal-temperate ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to climate change, although there are large differencesin projections, depending on the future climate model and emission pathway studied. Nevertheless there is

a clear risk of large-scale forest dieback in the boreal-temperate system because of heat and drought(Heyder et al., 2011). Heat and drought related die-back has already been observed in substantial areas ofNorth American boreal forests (Allen et al., 2010), characteristic of vulnerability to heat and drought stressleading to increased mortality at the trailing edge of boreal forests. The vulnerability of transition zonesbetween boreal and temperate forests, as well as between boreal forests and polar/tundra biomes, iscorroborated by studies of changes in plant functional richness with climate change (Reu et al., 2011), aswell as analyses using multiple dynamic global vegetation models (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Subtle changeswithin forest types also pose a great risk to biodiversity as different plant types gain dominance (Scholzeet al., 2006). Humid tropical forests also show increasing risk of major climate induced losses. At 4Cwarming above pre-industrial levels, the land extent of humid tropical forest, characterized by tree speciesdiversity and biomass density, is expected to contract to approximately 25 percent of its original size [seeFigure 3 in (Zelazowski et al., 2011)], while at 2C warming, more than 75 percent of the original land can


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likely be preserved. For these ecosystems, water availability is the dominant determinant of climatesuitability (Zelazowski et al., 2011). In general, Asia is substantially less at risk of forest loss than thetropical Americas. However, even at 2C, the forest in the Indochina peninsula will be at risk of die-back. At4C, the area of concern grows to include central Sumatra, Sulawesi, India and the Philippines, where up to30 percent of the total humid tropical forest niche could be threatened by forest retreat (Zelazowski et al.,2011). There has been substantial scientific debate over the risk of a rapid and abrupt change to a muchdrier savanna or grassland ecosystem under global warming. This risk has been identified as a possibleplanetary tipping point at around a warming of 3.54.5C, which, if crossed, would result in a major loss of

biodiversity, ecosystem services and the loss of a major terrestrial carbon sink, increasing atmosphericCO2 concentrations (Lenton et al., 2008)(Cox, et al., 2004) (Kriegler, Hall, Held, Dawson, and Schellnhuber,2009). Substantial uncertainty remains around the likelihood, timing and onset of such risk due to a rangeof factors including uncertainty in precipitation changes, effects of CO2 concentration increase on wateruse efficiency and the CO2 fertilization effect, land-use feedbacks and interactions with fire frequency andintensity, and effects of higher temperature on tropical tree species and on important ecosystem servicessuch as pollinators. While climate model projections for the Amazon, and in particular precipitation, remainquite uncertain recent analyses using IPCC AR4 generation climate indicates a reduced risk of a majorbasin wide loss of precipitation compared to some earlier work. If drying occurs then the likelihood of anabrupt shift to a drier, less biodiverse ecosystem would increase. Current projections indicate that fireoccurrence in the Amazon could double by 2050, based on the A2 SRES scenario that involves warming ofapproximately 1.5C above pre-industrial levels (Silvestrini et al., 2011), and can therefore be expected tobe even higher in a 4C world. Interactions of climate change, land use and agricultural expansion increasethe incidence of fire (Arago et al., 2008), which plays a major role in the (re)structuring of vegetation(Gonzalez et al., 2010; Scholze et al., 2006). A decrease in precipitation over the Amazon forests maytherefore result in forest retreat or transition into a low biomass forest (Malhi et al., 2009). Moderating thisrisk is a possible increase in ecosystem water use efficiency with increasing CO2 concentrations isaccounted for, more than 90 percent of the original humid tropical forest niche in Amazonia is likely to bepreserved in the 2C case, compared to just under half in the 4C warming case (see Figure 5 inZelazowski et al., 2011) (Cook, Zeng, and Yoon, 2012; Salazar & Nobre, 2010). Recent work has analyzed anumber of these factors and their uncertainties and finds that the risk of major loss of forest due to climateis more likely to be regional than Amazon basin-wide, with the eastern and southeastern Amazon beingmost at risk (Zelazowski et al., 2011). Salazar and Nobre (2010) estimates a transition from tropical foreststo seasonal forest or savanna in the eastern Amazon could occur at warming at warming of 2.53.5Cwhen CO2 fertilization is not considered and 4.55.5C when it is considered. It is important to note, asSalazar and Nobre (2010) point out, that the effects of deforestation and increased fire risk interact withthe climate change and are likely to accelerate a transition from tropical forests to drier ecosystems.Increased CO2 concentration may also lead to increased plant water efficiency (Ainsworth and Long,2005), lowering the risk of plant die-back, and resulting in vegetation expansion in many regions, such asthe Congo basin, West Africa and Madagascar (Zelazowski et al., 2011), in addition to some dry-landecosystems (Heyder et al., 2011). The impact of CO2 induced greening would, however, negatively affectbiodiversity in many ecosystems. In particular encroachment of woody plants into grasslands andsavannahs in North American grassland and savanna communities could lead to a decline of up to 45

percent in species richness ((Ratajczak and Nippert, 2012) and loss of specialist savanna plant species insouthern Africa (Parr, Gray, and Bond, 2012). Mangroves are an important ecosystem and are particularlyvulnerable to the multiple impacts of climate change, such as: rise in sea levels, increases in atmosphericCO2 concentration, air and water temperature, and changes in precipitation patterns. Sea-level rise cancause a loss of mangroves by cutting off the flow of fresh water and nutrients and drowning the roots(Dasgupta, Laplante et al. 2010). By the end of the 21st century, global mangrove cover is projected toexperience a significant decline because of heat stress and sea-level rise (Alongi, 2008; Beaumont et al.,2011). In fact, it has been estimated that under the A1B emissions scenario (3.5C relative to pre-industriallevels) mangroves would need to geographically move on average about 1 km/year to remain in suitableclimate zones (Loarie et al., 2009). The most vulnerable mangrove forests are those occupying low-reliefislands such as small islands in the Pacific where sea-level rise is a dominant factor. Where rivers arelacking and/ or land is subsiding, vulnerability is also high. With mangrove losses resulting fromdeforestation presently at 1 to 2 percent per annum (Beaumont et al., 2011), climate change may not bethe biggest immediate threat to the future of mangroves. However if conservation efforts are successful inthe longer term climate change may become a determining issue (Beaumont et al., 2011). Coral reefs areacutely sensitive to changes in water temperatures, ocean pH and intensity and frequency of tropical

cyclones. Mass coral bleaching is caused by ocean warming and ocean acidification, which results fromabsorption of CO2 (for example, Frieler et al., 2012a). Increased sea-surface temperatures and a reductionof available carbonates are also understood to be driving causes of decreased rates of calcification, acritical reef-building process (Death, Lough, and Fabricius, 2009). The effects of climate change on coralreefs are already apparent. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has been estimated to have lost 50percent of live coral cover since 1985, which is attributed in part to coral bleaching because of increasingwater temperatures (Death et al., 2012). Under atmospheric CO2 concentrations that correspond to awarming of 4C by 2100, reef erosion will likely exceed rates of calcification, leaving coral reefs ascrumbling frameworks with few calcareous corals (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). In fact, frequency ofbleaching events under global warming in even a 2C world has been projected to exceed the ability ofcoral reefs to recover. The extinction of coral reefs would be catastrophic for entire coral reef ecosystemsand the people who depend on them for food, income and shoreline. Reefs provide coastal protection


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against coastal floods and rising sea levels, nursery grounds and habitat for a variety of currently fishedspecies, as well as an invaluable tourism asset. These valuable services to often subsistence-dependentcoastal and island societies will most likely be lost well before a 4C world is reached. The precedingdiscussion reviewed the implications of a 4C world for just a few examples of important ecosystems. The

section below examines the effects of climate on biological diversity Ecosystems arecomposed ultimately of the species and interactions

between them and their physical environment.Biologically rich ecosystems are usually diverse and it isbroadly agreed that there exists a strong link betweenthis biological diversity and ecosystem productivity, stabilityand functioning (McGrady-Steed, Harris, and Morin, 1997; David Tilman, Wedin, and Knops, 1996)(Hector,1999; D Tilman et al., 2001). Loss of species within ecosystems will hence have profound negative effectson the functioning and stability of ecosystems and on the ability of ecosystems to provide goods and

services to human societies. It is the overall diversity of species thatultimately characterizes the biodiversity and evolutionarylegacy of life on Earth. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, speciesextinction rates are now at very high levels compared tothe geological record. Loss of those species presentlyclassified as critically endangered would lead to massextinction on a scale that has happened only five timesbefore in the last 540 million years. The loss of thosespecies classified as endangered and vulnerable wouldconfirm this loss as the sixth mass extinction episode(Barnosky 2011). Loss of biodiversity will challenge those reliant on ecosystems services. Fisheries (Dale,Tharp, Lannom, and Hodges, 2010), and agronomy (Howden et al., 2007) and forestry industries (Stram &Evans, 2009), among others, will need to match species choices to the changing climate conditions, whiledevising new strategies to tackle invasive pests (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, and Courchamp,2012). These challenges would have to be met in the face of increasing competition between natural and

agricultural ecosystems over water resources. Over the 21st-century climatechange is likely to result in some bio-climatesdisappearing, notably in the mountainous tropics and in the poleward regions of continents,with new, or novel, climatesdeveloping in the tropics and subtropics (Williams,Jackson, and Kutzbach, 2007). In this study novel climates are those where21st century projected climates do not overlap with their20th century analogues, and disappearing climates arethose 20th century climates that do not overlap with 21stcentury projected climates. The projections of Williams et al (2007) indicate that in a4C world (SRES A2), 1239 percent of the Earths land surface may experience a novel climate comparedto 20th century analogues. Predictions of species response to novel climates are difficult becauseresearchers have no current analogue to rely upon. However, at least such climates would give rise todisruptions, with many current species associations being broken up or disappearing entirely. Under thesame scenario an estimated 1048 percent of the Earths surface including highly biodiverse regions such

as the Himalayas, Mesoamerica, eastern and southern Africa, the Philippines and the region around

Indonesia known as Wallacaea would lose their climate space. With limitations on howfast species can disperse, or move, this indicates thatmany species may find themselves without a suitableclimate space and thus face a high risk of extinction. Globally,as in other studies, there is a strong association apparent in these projections between regions where the

climate disappears and biodiversity hotspots. Limiting warming to lower levelsin this study showed substantially reduced effects, with


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the magnitude of novel and disappearing climates scalinglinearly with global mean warming. More recent work by Beaumont andcolleagues using a different approach confirms the scale of this risk (Beaumont et al., 2011, Figure 36).Analysis of the exposure of 185 eco-regions of exceptional biodiversity (a subset of the so-called Global200) to extreme monthly temperature and precipitation conditions in the 21st century compared to 19611990 conditions shows that within 60 years almost all of the regions that are already exposed tosubstantial environmental and social pressure, will experience extreme temperature conditions based on

the A2 emission scenario (4.1C global mean temperature rise by 2100) (Beaumont et al., 2011). Tropicaland sub-tropical eco-regions in Africa and South America are particularly vulnerable. Vulnerability to suchextremes is particularly acute for high latitude and small island biota, which are very limited in their abilityto respond to range shifts, and to those biota, such as flooded grassland, mangroves and desert biomes,that would require large geographical displacements to find comparable climates in a warmer world. Theoverall sense of recent literature confirms the findings of the AR4 summarized at the beginning of thesection, with a number of risks such as those to coral reefs occurring at significantly lower temperatures

than estimated in that report. Although non-climate related humanpressures are likely to remain a major and defining driverof loss of ecosystems and biodiversity in the comingdecades, it is also clear that as warming rises so will thepredominance of climate change as a determinant ofecosystem and biodiversity survival. While the factors ofhuman stresses on ecosystems are manifold, in a 4Cworld, climate change is likely to become a determiningdriver of ecosystem shifts and large-scale biodiversityloss (Bellard et al., 2012; New et al., 2011). Recent research suggests that large-scale loss ofbiodiversity is likely to occur in a 4C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving atransition of the Earths ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Such damages toecosystems would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on whichsociety depends (e.g., hydrologyquantity flow rates, quality; fisheries (corals), protection of coastline(loss of mangroves). Barnosky has described the present situation facing the biodiversity of the planet asthe perfect storm with multiple high intensity ecological stresses because of habitat modification anddegradation, pollution and other factors, unusually rapid climate change and unusually high and elevated

atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the past, as noted above, this combination of

circumstances has led to major, mass extinctions withplanetary consequences. Thus, there is a growing riskthat climate change, combined with other humanactivities, will cause the irreversible transition of theEarths ecosystems into a state unknown in humanexperience (Barnosky et al., 2012

4 degree warming is inevitable with current carbonusage trends deceasing carbon emissions solve

Potsdam Institute, 2012 (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and ClimateAnalytics, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4C Warmer World Must be Avoided, A report for the World Bank,November,http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf)

The emission pledges made at the climate conventions inCopenhagen and Cancun, if fully met, place the world on a trajectoryfor a global mean warming of well over 3C. Even if thesepledges are fully implemented there is still about a 20


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percent chance of exceeding 4C in 2100.10 If these pledgesare not met then there is a much higher likelihoodmore than40 percentof warming exceeding 4C by 2100, and a 10 percent possibility of this occurring already by

the 2070s, assuming emissions follow the medium business-as-usual reference pathway. On a higherfossil fuel intensive business-as-usual pathway, such as the IPCC

SRESA1FI, warming exceeds 4C earlier in the 21st century. It isimportant to note, however, that such a level of warming can still beavoided . There are technically and economically feasible emission pathways that could still limitwarming to 2C or below in the 21st century. To illustrate a possible pathway to warming of 4C or more,Figure 22 uses the highest SRES scenario, SRESA1FI, and compares it to other, lower scenarios. SRESA1FIis a fossil-fuel intensive, high economic growth scenario that would very likely cause mean the global

temperature to exceed a 4C increase above preindustrial temperatures. Most striking inFigure 22 is the large gap between the projections by 2100 of current emissions reduction pledges and the

(lower) emissions scenarios needed to limit warming to 1.52C above pre-industriallevels.This large range in the climate change implications of the emission scenarios by2100 is important in its own right, but it also sets the stage for an even widerdivergence in the changes that would follow over the subsequentcenturies, given the long response times of the climatesystem, including the carbon cycle and climate system components thatcontribute to sea-level rise. The scenarios presented in Figure 22 indicate thelikely onset time for warming of 4Cor more. It can be seen that mostof the scenarios remain fairly close together for the next few decades of the 21st century. By the 2050s,however, there are substantial differences among the changes in temperature projected for the different

scenarios. In the highest scenario shown here (SRES A1FI), the median estimate (50percent chance) of warming reaches 4C by the 2080s, with a smallerprobability of 10 percent of exceeding this level by the 2060s. Others have reached similar conclusions(Betts et al. 2011). Thus, even if the policy pledges from climate convention in Copenhagen and Cancun

are fully implemented, there is still a chance of exceeding 4C in 2100. Ifthe pledges are not met and

present carbon intensity trends continue, then the higheremissions scenarios shown in Figure 22 become more likely ,raising the probability of reaching 4C global meanwarming by the last quarter of this century. Figure 23 shows aprobabilistic picture of the regional patterns of change in temperature and precipitation for the lowest andhighest RCP scenarios for the AR4 generation of AOGCMS. Patterns are broadly consistent between highand low scenarios. The high latitudes tend to warm substantially more than the global mean. RCP8.5, thehighest of the new IPCC AR5 RCP scenarios, can be used to explore the regional implications of a 4C orwarmer world. For this report, results for RCP8.5 (Moss et al. 2010) from the new IPCC AR5 CMIP5 (CoupledModel Intercomparison Project; Taylor, Stouffer, & Meehl 2012) climate projections have been analyzed.Figure 24 shows the full range of increase of global mean temperature over the 21st century, relative tothe 19802000 period from 24 models driven by the RCP8.5 scenario, with those eight models highlightedthat produce a mean warming of 45C above preindustrial temperatures averaged over the period 2080

2100. In terms of regional changes, the models agree that the most

pronounced warming (between 4C and 10C) is likely to occur overland. During the boreal winter, a strong arctic amplification effect is projected, resulting intemperature anomalies of over 10C in the Arctic region. The subtropical region consisting of theMediterranean, northern Africa and the Middle East and the contiguous United States is likely to see amonthly summer temperature rise of more than 6C.


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Contention 3: SolvencySugar cane ethanol is the answer to the worlds

addiction of fossil fuelsNewsweek 7 [Sugar Rush, Newsweek,http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/04/15/sugar-rush.html , accessed 79/13]

He won't be the last. Thanks to global climate change, sugar now is in bigdemand. The drum-beat ofalarm over global warming has setbusinesses clamoring for a piece of the sugar-cane action. There areplenty of other ways to make ethanol, of course, and scientists the world over are busy tinkering with everything from

switchgrass to sweet potatoes. U.S. farmers make it from corn, but with the scarcity of arableland there's just so much they can plant without crowding out other premium crops, like soy beans. (Meantime, thecombination of limited land and surging demand have sentcorn prices through the roof). So far nothing beats sugarcane

which grows in the tropicsfor an abundant, cheap source of energy. Unlikebeets or corn, which are confined to temperate zones and must be transformedinto carbohydrates before they can be converted into sugarand finally alcohol, sugarcane is already halfway there. Thatmeans the sugar barons like Ometto spend much less energy than thecompetition, not to mention money. The moral imperative offinding a substitute for fossil fuels has lent an air ofrespectability to new ventures to produce biofuels from sugara marked contrast to the sugar barons of old, known for their ruthless ways and their appetite for taxpayers' money. "Thedistillers who ten years ago were the bandits of agribusiness are becoming national and world heroes," Brazilian president

Luiz Incio Lula da Silva. Lula declared recently. "[E]thanol and biodiesel are morethan an answer to our dangerous 'addiction' to fossil fuels.

This is the beginning of a reassessment of the global strategyto protect our environment."

Cuban sugar based ethanol is essential to replace oilbased fuelits the best solution for a transitionaway from oil-based fuel dependenceallowingaccess to the U.S. market is key

Specht 13[Jonathan-J.D. Wash. U St. Louis, Legal Advisor, Raising Cane: Cuban SugarcaneEthanols Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States, EnvironmentalLaw & Policy Journal, Univ. of California Davis, Vol. 36:2,

http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf]

"The United States of America cannot afford to bet our long-term prosperity and security on a resourcethat will eventually run out." n1 This dramatic quote from President Obama opens the White House's forty-

four page Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future. n2 The resource referred to, oil, isindeed finite. "The output of conventional oil will peak in2020," according to estimates from the chief economist forthe International Energy Agency. n3 The transportation
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sector has increased its oil consumption over the pastthirty years in the United States while residential,commercial, and electric utilities have decreasedconsumption. n4 Simply put, America's oil problem is anautomobile problem . [*173] There are a number of ways the

U.S. transportation sector could reduce the amount of oilit consumes: raising vehicle fuel efficiency standards further; increasing and improving light railand other public transportation options; building more walkable communities so daily errands could bemade without using an automobile; encouraging people to live closer to where they work; and increasing

the availability of electric cars. n5Yet, even using all of these strategiescomprehensively will not change a fundamental fact ofour oil-based transportation system - in certain areas (like ruralcommunities and outer suburbs) the automobile is essential fortransportation , and liquid fuel is extremely convenient forautomobiles. With a liquid fuel engine, a driver can "re-charge" his or her car in a few minuteswith a substance that is widely available from Boston toBoise and everywhere in between. With the conveniencesof oil, however, come costs. Oil is a finite resource, and itsconsumption pollutes the air and contributes to climatechange . Furthermore, it is expensive n6 and will only get moreexpensive in the future. n7 However, any realistic plan fordealing with a future of reduced oil use must includeliquid fuels that are similar in convenience and availabilityto gasoline, given the geography of the United States, the state of the current domestictransportation system, n8 and the ease of using liquid fuel for the personal automobile.This doesnot mean, however, that corn-based ethanol, thus far the major liquid-fuelpetroleum alternative pursued by the United States, is the best answer. While it hasbenefitted the Midwest economically, the domestic ethanol industry has also contributed to anumber of negative environmental effects.There is, however,another liquid fuel option other than fossil-fuel based [*174]gasoline and corn-based ethanol. The ObamaAdministration's energy plan includes a wide range ofstrategies to reduce U.S. fossil fuel consumption, yetonestrategy is notably absent from the Blueprint: replacing apercentage of U.S. gasoline with ethanol imported fromoutside the United States. n9 A number of influential

commentators, such as Thomas Friedman n10 and TheEconomist, n11 have called for the United States to encourage theimportation of sugarcane-based ethanol from countries like Brazil. Butthe possibility of importing ethanol from Cuba has beenlargely ignored by influential opinion-makers as well asthe United States government. n12 While by no means asilver bullet for solving the United States' energy


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problems, importing ethanol made from sugarcane grownin Cuba would bring a number ofenvironmental andeconomic benefits - partially offset by regionalized economic harms - to the United States.This possibility, at the very least, deserves much greater consideration and evaluation than it has thus farreceived.

And, joint ventures jumpstart the Cuban ethanolenergy industry

Alonso-Pippo et al. 8[Walfrido Alonso-Pippo- former Vice-President of the Solar Energy Department at the University of Havanaand a former member of the Cuban National Renewable Energies Front, where he was a specialist inbiomass energy use, Carlos A. Luengo, John Koehlinger, Pierto Garzone, Giacinto Cornacchia, Sugarcaneenergy use: The Cuban case, Energy Policy, Vol. 36, Issue 6, June 2008,http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508000840 ]

The rise of v of sugar-based bioenergy.Cuba's own acuteenergy and hard currency shortages further point to an incrementalincrease in sugarcane energy use asthe country's firstviable renewable energy source. No other source ofrenewable energy in Cuba has the potential thatsugarcane has. International experiences in developingsugarcane energy, particularly that of Brazil and to a lesser extentMauritius, have demonstrated that the technological andenvironmental barriers to sugarcane energy productionand use can be overcome. Aside from providing analternative energy source to fossil fuels, sugarcaneethanol production and sugarcane biomass powergeneration have, in the face of an oversupply of sugar and low sugar prices, beenpromoted in several countries to save domestic sugarindustries.The main weakness to the introduction ofethanol fuel production and sugarcane biomass powergeneration in Cuba continues to be the lack of hardcurrency required to modernize Cuban sugar mills. TheCuban government has already utilizedjoint ventureswith foreign natural gas, oil (in the case of the Caribbean offshore exploration mentionedpreviously) and nickel mining companies to secure the capitalinvestment and technology needed to exploit its naturalresources. Thejoint venture agreement for a recently

constructed natural gas power plant could serve as amodel for modernization of sugar bioenergyinfrastructure. Under this agreement, the foreign partner owns a third of the plant's output,participates in the plant's management, and receives a proportion of the plant's profits. While the legal,institutional and political barriers to investment in Cuba are high, heavy recent foreign investments insugar ethanol production facilities in Brazil suggest the feasibility of similar investments in Cuba. Whetherthe modernization and recovery of the Cuban sugar agro-industry comes to pass is of course an openquestion. The authors offer no predictions. What has been argued though is that, despite the prolonged

decline outlined above, the Cuban sugar industry nonetheless
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remains well-positioned to participate in the growingglobal movement toward the development of sugarcaneas a viable alternative source of energy.

Sugar ethanol importation from Cuba is superior to

alternatives and solves impacts from domesticcorn ethanol productionno environmentaldamage

Specht 13[Jonathan-J.D. Wash. U St. Louis, Legal Advisor, Raising Cane: Cuban SugarcaneEthanols Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States, EnvironmentalLaw & Policy Journal, Univ. of California Davis, Vol. 36:2,http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf]

B. Environmental Effects of Sugarcane-Based EthanolIffuture legislation does not revive theUnited States ethanol tariff that expired at the end of 2011 and the trade embargo

against Cuba is kept in place, Brazil will likely be theprimary beneficiary. n109 The argument can be made that Brazilian sugarcane-basedethanol is a more environmentally beneficial fuel source than domestic-corn based ethanol, because of the

nature of sugarcane-based ethanol (discussed below). n110 Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol comes, however, with its own set ofenvironmental consequences.The full debate over theenvironmental consequences of the Brazilian biofuelproduction n111 is largely beyond the scope of thisArticle. Still, the primary issue in this dispute is worthnoting, because it accentuates one of the most significantdifferences between the U.S. corn-based ethanol industry

and the potential Cuban sugarcane-based ethanolindustry. In Brazil, the expansion ofsugarcane productionto meet demand for ethanol production has led to landuse changes [*190] that parallel the expansion of cornproduction for ethanol in the United States. Clearingportions of the Amazon rainforest - one of the mostsignificant repositories of carbon on Earth n112 - wouldrepresent an environmental cost of ethanol productionthat outweighs its benefits. The Amazon region, however, is largely unsuitable forsugarcane production. n113 But, sugarcane production is contributing to

destruction of another sensitive habitat, the bio-diverseCerrado savannah region ofBrazil. n114Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would have the environmental benefits ofBrazilian sugarcane-based ethanol without its mostobvious negative factor, damaging habitat in the Cerrado. Theenvironmental effects of biofuels depend on a number offactors. Whether or not a given type of biofuel is environmentally beneficial "depends on what


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the fuel is, how and where the biomass was produced,what else the land could have been used for, how the fuelwas processed and how it is used." n115 Taken together, thesefactors point to sugarcane-based ethanol grown in Cubaas one of the most environmentally friendly biofuels

possible. The environmental benefits of using sugarcane toproduce ethanol are numerous. First, it is much more energyefficient to derive ethanol from sugarcane than corn. Makingethanol from corn only creates approximately 1.3 times the amount of energy used to produce it, but

making ethanol from sugarcane creates approximatelyeight times the amount of energy used to produce it. n116Second, unlike much of the corn presently grown in Great Plains states, sugarcane grownin Latin America does not need to be irrigated. n117 Third,sugarcane requires relatively small amounts of chemicalfertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides. n118 Fourth, whereas most

U.S. ethanol refineries are powered by coal or natural gas,n119 sugarcane ethanol refineries can be powered bybagasse, a natural product left over from the sugarrefining process. n120 In fact, refineries powered with bagassecan even produce more electricity than they need and sell[*191] power back to the electric grid. n121 Fifth, although corn can only beplanted and harvested once a year, in tropical climates sugarcane can becut from the same stalks multiple times per year. n122 Each ofthese factors in favor of sugarcane ethanol is true of ethanol from Brazil as well as of any

potential ethanol from Cuba. However, there are additionalenvironmental factors that clinch Cuban sugarcane-basedethanol as one of the most environmentally friendly fuelsources available to the United States under current technology. n123First, because Cuba is closer to the United States, transportingethanol from Cuba to the United States would require lessenergy than transporting ethanol from Brazil to the United States (especially if it is usedin Florida, an option further explored in the section on economic effects). n124 Another reason Cuban

sugarcane-based ethanol could be one of the most environmentally friendly fuelspossible is that Cuba could produce a significant amountof ethanol without any negative impacts on native habitat.A striking amount of Cuban agricultural land - fifty five

percent as of 2007 - is simply lying fallow and is not cultivatedwith anything. n125 Although its character may have changed due to years of neglect, thisland is not virgin native habitat like the grasslands ofNorth Dakota or the Cerrado of Brazil. Cuba thereforecould greatly increase its production of sugarcane , andthus its production of sugarcane-based ethanol, withoutnegative impacts on wildlifehabitat. While it is not environmentally perfect -


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no form of energy is - Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would raisefewer environmental concerns than the fuel sources itwould displace: petroleum, domestic corn-based ethanol,and Brazilian sugarcane based ethanol. Therefore, from a purelyenvironmental perspective, changing U.S. law and policy in order to

promote the importation of Cuban sugarcane-basedethanol should be encouraged.


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Contention 4: Impact DebateNo great power war interdependence, democracy ,

deterrenceRobb 2012[Doug, US Navy Lieutenant, Now Hear This Why the Age of Great-Power War Is Over, May, 5/2012 [Lieutenant, USNavy, , US Naval Institute, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over]In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This

interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security andphysical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end,maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication andprotected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather thandrive them apart (witness Chinas response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these securitytasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense. Democratic Peace Theorychampioned by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnistThomas Friedmanpresumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas,

authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total waran argument advancedby philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace. Consider, for example, Chinasunceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organizedopposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largelyby social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economicallymore capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tungs regime. As these trendscontinue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable. In terms of the military, ongoingfiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues. All the more reasonwhy great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common securityproblems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorismmissions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called deterrence andreassurance. As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent againstunlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destructionhowever unpalatableactually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies fordecades.These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic resultsfor both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, When you aint got nothing, you aint got nothing to lose. Great-

power war is not an end in itself, but rather a way for nations to achieve their strategic aims. In the currentsecurity environment, such a war is equal parts costly, counterproductive, archaic, and improbable.

Miscalc is impossibleQuinlan 2009[Sir Michael, visiting professor at King's College London, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and formersenior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems,Prospects, Oxford University Press]

One special form ofmiscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators,though it wasscarcely everto be encounteredat least so far as my own observationwentin the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneouslytriggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was beingsubjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particularto the hypothesis that if a delivery systemnormally a missilethat was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclearor a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through

its early warning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclearcounter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the proposals for giving the US TridentSLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of thoseproposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. Theflight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before

arrival on target made its characterconventional or nuclearunmistakable.No government will need, and no

nonlunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the

execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning information alone without knowing the true nature of the

incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to anyrealisticpolitical or conflict-related context thought to render the episode
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-overhttp://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-overhttp://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-overhttp://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over


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plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuringby explicit communication if necessarythat there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch.

Intervening actions check escalationTrachtenberg 2000(Prof of History, Pennsylvania (Marc, The "Accidental War" Question,

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/inadv(1).pdf)The second point has to do with how much risk there really is in situations of this sort. It should not beassumed too readily that states underestimate the degree to which they lose control of the situation whenthey engage in a crisis. States can generally pull back from the brinkif they really want to; prestige willbe sacrificed, but often states are willing to pay that price. The history of international politics in thecentury that just ended is full of crises that were liquidated by one side accepting what amounted todefeat, sometimes even humiliating defeat; and in the July Crisis in 1914, the German government choseat the most critical moment to let the war come rather than press for a compromise solution.9 The keything here is that in 1914 and 1939 political leaders had not totally lost control, but had chosen to acceptwar rather than back off in a crisis. Their aversion to war was not overwhelming. But when both sides verymuch want to avoid a full-scale armed conflict, the story is very different. This was the case during theCold War. People sometimes seem to assume that peace was hanging by a thread during that conflict, andthat we were lucky to make our way through it without a thermonuclear holocaust. But I don't think this istrue at all: and in general I think it is very unlikely that a great war would break out if both sides aredetermined to avoid it. These arguments about how war could break out almost by accident werefrequently made during the Cold War itself--and indeed were made by responsible and experie ncedofficials. A British document from March 1946, for example, argued that the Soviets did not want war, but

the kind of tactics they used with the West might lead to a war that neither side wanted: "although theintention may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian leadersmay misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with American or ourselves."10 A year later, aBritish Foreign Office official warned that the fact that the Soviets had military superiority in Europe mightmake them careless, and that they might "misjudge what measures can safely be taken without producinga serious crisis." Events might get out of control and a situation might develop that could "lead todisaster."11 What is wrong with this point of view? It assumes that the Soviets would not be cautious, thatthey would not frame their actions very carefully with an eye to the American reaction, that in decidinghow far to go they would not gauge very closely how the Americans reacted to the measures they hadtaken up to that point. This point of view assumes also that the Soviets would find it very hard to drawback if it became clear that they had overstepped the bounds and had thought the American reactionwould not be as vigorous as it in fact was--or indeed that they had not made the mental reservation thatthey could draw back, in necessary, when they decided to embark on a provocative course of action.Basically the assumption is that the Soviets did not care enough about what a war would entail to takethese rather elementary and normal precautions. This point of view also assumes that the Americanresponse would be very rigid and "spring-loaded": a slight Soviet infringement, and the Americans

immediately take the plunge into general war--as though there are no intermediate measures of a politicalor military nature that would be taken, no process that would unfold within which the two sides would testeach other out before resorting to e

Documents

Sufgar Cane Aff Cuba