SudanNeg(Scholars)2

8/13/2019 SudanNeg(Scholars)2

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GDI SCHOLARS SUDAN NEG

1NC CHINA NRG CONTAINMENT DA ......................................................................31NC CHINA NRG CONTAINMENT DA ......................................................................42NC DA OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................52NC UNIQUENESS CHINA DIVERSIFY SUPPLIES...................................................62NC UNIQUENESS CHINA DIVERSIFY SUPPLIES...................................................7

US-SINO RELATIONS UQ: GOOD ..............................................................................82NC LINK FRONTLINE................................................................................................92NC LINK FRONTLINE..............................................................................................102NC LINK FRONTLINE..............................................................................................112NC LINK FRONTLINE..............................................................................................12CHINA DA: SUDAN OIL LINK EXT..........................................................................13CHINA DA: SUDAN OIL LINK EXT..........................................................................14CHINA DA LINK: SUDAN KEY SUPPLIER..............................................................152NC CHINA DA INTERNAL LINK: RESOURCE COMPETITION WAR..............16

CHINA DA: CONTAINMENT INTERNAL LINK......................................................17CHINA OIL DA: LINK CENTRAL ASIA OIL ............................................................18

CHINA INTERNAL LINK MAGNIFIER: OIL = SECURITY AGENDA ....................191NC CHINA DA: LASH-OUT DA...............................................................................201NC CHINA DA: LASH-OUT DA...............................................................................211NC CHINA DA: LASH-OUT DA...............................................................................222NC: OVERVIEW ENCIRCLEMENT DA...................................................................232NC ENCIRCLEMENT INTERNAL LINK FL............................................................242NC ENCIRCLEMENT INTERNAL LINK FL............................................................25CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: LINK ZERO-SUM GAME ........................................26CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: LINK ZERO-SUM GAME ........................................272NC CHINA-ENCIRCLEMENT DA: AFRICA KEY TO CHINA PRESTIGE ............282NC CHINA-ENCIRCLEMENT DA: AFRICA KEY TO CHINA PRESTIGE ............29

2NC CHINA-ENCIRCLEMENT DA: AFRICA KEY TO CHINA PRESTIGE ............302NC CHINA-ENCIRCLEMENT DA: AFRICA KEY TO CHINA PRESTIGE ............312NC CHINA-ENCIRCLEMENT DA: AFRICA KEY TO CHINA PRESTIGE ............322NC CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: SPHERE OF INFLUENCE I/L..........................332NC CHINA DA IMPACT MODULE: BLUE NAVY..................................................34CHINA DA IMPACT: RUSSIA-SINO AXIS WAR......................................................35CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: IMPACT LASHOUT.................................................36CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: IMPACT EXTENSIONS ...........................................37CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: IMPACT EXTENSIONS ...........................................38CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: IMPACT EXTENSIONS ...........................................39CHINA DA IMPACTS: WAR ON TERROR................................................................40CHINA DA IMPACT: SINO-INDIA WAR..................................................................41CHINA DA: EXPANSION GOOD CASPIAN DEVELOPMENT ................................42CHINA DA IMPACTS: CHINA EXPANSION GOOD KAZAHSTAN/SECCESSIONWARS ..........................................................................................................................43CHINA ENERGY EXPANSION SOLVES SECCESSION...........................................432NC CHINA OIL DA: CHINA ECONOMY MODULE ...............................................442NC CHINA OIL DA: CHINA ECONOMY MODULE ...............................................45CHINA DA: A2: CHINA WILL GET OCS OIL ...........................................................46


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CHINA DA A2: CHINA DEPENDENT ON MIDDLE EAST OIL ...............................47A2: CHINA WILL GET OIL FORM RUSSIA..............................................................48CHINA OIL DA: A2: CHINA NO HAVE INFRASTRUCTURE TO PROCESS OIL ..49A2: CHINA OIL DA CHINA NO HAVE TECH........................................................50A2: CHINA HAS DOMESTIC RESERVES .................................................................51

AFF ANSWERS ************** ...............................................................................52CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD FL...........................................................................55CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD FL...........................................................................56CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD FL...........................................................................57CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD FL...........................................................................58AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DA .................................................................................59CHINESE ARMS SALES TO SUDAN PERPETUATE THE WAR.............................59Meanwhile, there are a number of outstanding issues that remain to be ironed ...............59OIL DEVELOPMENT FUELS SUDAN WAR.............................................................59AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DA .................................................................................60AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DA .................................................................................61

A2: CHINESE ADVENTURISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST..........................................62A2: CHINESE ADVENTURISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST..........................................63CONTAINMENT GOOD EXTENSIONS ***..............................................................64CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: GLOBAL OIL SUPPLY/CHINA...........................65CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: CENTRAL ASIA/SASIA/GLOBAL OIL ..............66CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: IRANIAN HEGEMONY RISKS NUCLEAR WAR......................................................................................................................................67CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: IRAN OIL RELATION MILITARY

SUPERIORITY.............................................................................................................68CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: IRAN-SINO AXIS JACKS US-SINO RELATION69


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1NC CHINA NRG CONTAINMENT DA

A) POST-IRAQ WAR AMERICA HAS INCREASED CONTROL OF MIDDLE EAST OIL

CAUSING CHINA TO DIVERSIFY ITS SOURCES TO THE SUDAN CHINA FEARS

AMERICA TAKING OVER ITS OIL, THIS RISKS AGRESSION

WULEI, PROFESSOR OF CHINESE POLITICS AND IR @ YUNNAN UNIVERSITY, 6-13-2K3(PROFESSOR, WILL OIL BE THE NEXT CONFLICT IN SINO-US RELATIONS, ALEXANDERS

GAS AND OIL CONNECTIONS VOL. 8 ISSUE 12 P. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntn32461.htm

DOA 7-8-2K4)


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1NC CHINA NRG CONTAINMENT DA

C) THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL-NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST

JOHNSON, STAFF WRITER, 4-26-2K1(CHALMERS, TIME TO BRING THE TROOPS HOME, THE NATION P.

http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010514&c=1&s=johnson)


5/69


2NC DA OVERVIEW

THE IRAQ WAR TIPPED OFF CHINA THAT THEY ARE BEHIND IN THE

GLOBAL RACE TO SECURE OVERSEAS OIL SOURCES. CHINA IS

BEGINNING ENERGY DIVERSIFIATION PROJECTS NOW, SWITCHING

FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO REGIONS LIKE THE SUDAN. CHINESEINVESTMENT IN THE SUDAN IS PART OF CHINAS GET WHAT

AMERICA DOESNT WANT STRATEGY. THE PLAN RESULTS IN

INCREASED AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE SUDAN MAKING CHINA

FEAR A HARD-LINE NRG CONTAINMENT STRATEGY BY AMERICA. OUR

IMPACT EVIDENCE SAYS THIS WILL RESULT IN A SINO-AMERICAN

HOT-WAR. A US-SINO WAR WILL RESULT IN NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.

OUR DA IMPACTS ARE BIG:

A) TURNS THE CASE: CHINESE-US WAR IN THE SUDAN WILL RESULTIN GREATER VIOLENCE FUELING THE CIVIL WAR WHICH IS THE

INTERNAL LINK TO INSTABILITY IN NORTH AFRICA.

B) PROBABILITY: POST-IRAQ WAR RESOURCE WARS AREBECOMINING THE MOST LIKELY CONFLICT.

C) MAGNITUDETHIS WAR WILL BRING IN THE BIGGEST NUCLEARPOWERS RISKING GLOBAL NUCLEAR ANHILIATION.


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2NC UNIQUENESS CHINA DIVERSIFY SUPPLIES

IRAQ WAR JACKED CHINESE OIL SECURITY -- CHINA MUST FIND NON-MIDDLE

EASTERN SOURCES OF OIL IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN NRG SECURITY

WULEI, PROFESSOR OF CHINESE POLITICS AND IR @ YUNNAN UNIVERSITY, 6-13-2K3

(PROFESSOR, WILL OIL BE THE NEXT CONFLICT IN SINO-US RELATIONS, ALEXANDERSGAS AND OIL CONNECTIONS VOL. 8 ISSUE 12 P. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntn32461.htm

DOA 7-8-2K4)


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2NC UNIQUENESS CHINA DIVERSIFY SUPPLIES

EVENTS POST 911 HAVE RECONFIRMED THE NEED FOR STABLE CHINESE OIL

SUPPLIES LARGE POPULATION REQUIRES CHINA TO GO HUNTING

UMBACH,SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AND HEAD OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME AT

THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 2K3(FRANK,FUTURE CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINAS

FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, DGAP PUBLICATION SESSION 5 P.http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/planungsstab/china_round_table/5-umbach.pdf)


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US-SINO RELATIONS UQ: GOOD

SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION INCREASING

SCHURMANN, 6-24-2K4

(FRANZ, CHENEY AND CHINA TALK OIL, P.http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_12556.shtml)


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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

CHINA IS INCREASING ITS COMMITMENT TO NORTH AFRICA IN ORDER TO DIVERSIFY

ITS OIL DEPENDENCY. THEY REALIZE THE MIDDLE EAST IS TOO UNSTABLE AND

AMERICA IS COMPETING FOR THE SAME OIL. THE PLAN WILL BE PERCEIVED BY THE

PRC AS AMERICA PURSUING A ENERGY CONTAINMENT STRATEGY. THE PLANRESULTS IN A STRATEGIC INBALANCE CAUSING SINO-AMERICAN WAR.

CHINA VIEWS SUDAN AS A CRITICAL LYNCHPIN FOR ITS OIL SECURITY

The National Interest Summer 2004China's current involvement in Sudandemonstrates both the type of

situation in which China might find itself in the future and Beijing's

potential response. China has already deployed 4,000 troops to Sudanto

protect its investment in an oil pipeline developed with the Malaysian firm

Petronas. China is concerned that Sudan'songoing civil war could disruptthe pipeline, so it has moved to ensure the project's security. While there

has been little international attention focused on China's role in the

Sudan,it could set an important precedent.China may also attempt to enhance its political relationship with the

commodity producing countries in various parts of the world by promoting

bilateral free trade agreements (FTA). Beijing, for example, is now holding

talks with the Australian government about a potential FTA because of

Australia's large reserves of natural gas, coal, iron ore and other raw

materials. And at a recent Africa-China summit conference in Addis Ababa,

China pledged to boost its two-way trade with Africa to $30 billion by 2005

from $12.4 billion during 2002. China intends to broaden its imports of oil

and a variety of other commodities as well as to promote more investment.Brazil, for example, is very excited about the potential for developing a

"strategic partnership" with China. Brazil views a close relationship withChina as a pillar of its foreign policy because it wants to promote a

network of alliances with other developing countries to challenge Americanhegemony. The Brazilians believe China can play a major role in such a

system. China actually regards itself as an emerging superpower, not just a

developing country, but it will accommodate Brazil's ambitions because it

plans to expand massively its trade with Brazil. Chinese firms are planning

a $2 billion investment in Brazil's aluminum industry and a $1.5 billion

investment in the steel sector.


10/69


2NC LINK FRONTLINE

AMERICAN EMBARGOS ON SUDAN GIVE CHINA DE-FACTO ACCESS TO CRITICAL OIL

RESERVES

DOWNS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY SCHOLAR AND FELLOW AT RAND, 2K(ERICA, CHINAS QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY P.

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1244/MR1244.ch3.pdf)


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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

AND, CHINA WILL PERCEIVE AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN SUDAN AS

TOE-STEPPING ENERGY CONTAINMENT STRATEGY

Downs, Princeton University Scholar, 2000(Erica, Chinas Quest for Energy Security, p. 45)http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1244/MR1244.ch4.pdf

Chinas recent shift from a net oil exporter to a net oil importer means that energy security is another

issue the United States could exploit to pressure China. The Chinese government is uncomfortable with

the fact that the United States Navy dominates the sea- lanes stretching from the Persian Gulf to the

South China Sea through which the bulk of Chinas oil imports must pass. There is a concern that ifSino-U.S. relations sour, the United States could use its superior military power to disrupt Chinas oil

supply. Indeed, an article in the Chinese international affairs journal World Economicsand Politics

contends that the United States could use its control of Middle East oil to check China. 5 Another

Chinese commentary goes even further and argues that the United States has already implemented an

energy containment policy against China. This policys objective, according to the article, is to

weaken China by gaining control of the energy resources in western China and blocking Chinas accessto oil imports. 6 The United States currently is not pursuing such a policy, but Chinese analysts clearly

consider the interruption of its oil supply as a possible future containment measure.


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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

CHINA IS PROMOTING A GO-OUT STRATEGY FOR OIL SUDAN AND NORTH AFRICA

HAVE BECOME CRITICAL REGIONS TO CHINA FOR OIL SECURITY AND PETRO-

SOURCE FLEXIBILITY

DA, ANALYST AT CHINA FOUNDATION 4-28-2K4(SHAO, OIL SECURITY A PRIORITY FOR CHINA,

P.http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Apr/94221.htm)


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CHINA DA: SUDAN OIL LINK EXT

CHINESE PRESENCE IN AFRICA IS NOT ONLY ABOUT CHINESE PRESTIGE ITS

CRITICAL FOR CHINA OIL SECURITY

UMBACH,SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AND HEAD OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME ATTHE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 2K3(FRANK,FUTURE CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINASFOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, DGAP PUBLICATION SESSION 5 P.http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/planungsstab/china_round_table/5-umbach.pdf)


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CHINA DA: SUDAN OIL LINK EXT

CHINA STRATEGICALLY IMPORTS OIL FROM NON-US SUPPLIERS LIKE SUDAN ITS A

SECURE CHANNEL OF OIL



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CHINA DA LINK: SUDAN KEY SUPPLIER

CHINESE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT SUDAN MASSIVE OIL INVESTMENTS PROVE ITS A

KEY NRG SUPPLIER FOR CHINA




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2NC CHINA DA INTERNAL LINK: RESOURCE COMPETITION

WAR

GROWING CHINESE DEMAND FOR NRG WILL PIT CHINA AGAINST AMERICA FOR

STRATEGIC COMPETITION OF WORLD RESOURCES

DAILY TIMES (PAKISTAN) 7-12-2K4

(CHINAS COURTSHIP OF MIDEAST OIL RAISES US GUARD, P.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_24-9-2002_pg5_13)

CHINA VIEWS AMERICA AS THE BIGGEST THREAT ITS ENERGY STABILITY

LUFT, IAGS ANALYST, DOA 7-9-2K4 (GAL FUELING THE DRAGON: CHINAS RACE INTO

THE OIL MARKET, INSTITUTE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY P.

http://www.iags.org/china.htm)


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CHINA DA: CONTAINMENT INTERNAL LINK

ANTI-CHINESE RESENTMENT ENSURES BUSH-CONTAIMENT STRATEGY TO SECURE

AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS



DOA 7-8-2K4)


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CHINA OIL DA: LINK CENTRAL ASIA OIL

AMERICAN FORWARD PRESENCE IN CENTRAL-ASIA GENERATES CHINESE FEAR OF

ENCIRCLEMENT AND LOSS OF STRATEGIC OIL SUPPLIES



DOA 7-8-2K4)


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1NC CHINA DA: LASH-OUT DA

A) POST-IRAQ WAR AMERICA HAS INCREASED CONTROL OF MIDDLE EAST OIL

CAUSING CHINA TO DIVERSIFY ITS SOURCES TO THE SUDAN CHINA FEARS

AMERICA TAKING OVER ITS OIL/LAND, THIS RISKS AGRESSION

WULEI, PROFESSOR OF CHINESE POLITICS AND IR @ YUNNAN UNIVERSITY, 6-13-2K3(PROFESSOR, WILL OIL BE THE NEXT CONFLICT IN SINO-US RELATIONS, ALEXANDERS


DOA 7-8-2K4)


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1NC CHINA DA: LASH-OUT DA

D. The Impact Is Nuclear War

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, professor of history, Georgetown University School of ForeignService Washington Quarterly Winter 1996

War in the Taiwan Strait, of course, would have extraordinarily destabilizingrepercussions for the Asian region. Sea lanes vital to trade would be closed. The armsrace already beginning in Asia would be given impetus as war confirmed fears ofChina's aggressiveness. Japan, which has balanced its opening to China with expandedeconomic ties to Taiwan, would face immediate loss. Were it to do nothing, its ties tothe United States would be gravely compromised. More likely, as former ambassadorOkazaki Hisahiko has noted, Japan would have no choice but to allow the UnitedStates to use bases on Japanese soil to support Taiwan and might feel compelled toparticipate in operations if passivity endangered the U.S. -- Japan security alignment.n12 As a result, extensive Japanese investment on the island and on the mainlandcould disappear. War would also be extremely costly for the Chinese. Modernization

depends on foreign technology and investment, which can only be increased throughpeace and stability. Competitors for power in China may be correct in believing theycan rally people behind a nationalistic banner of irredentism, but the subsequent painwould be just as likely to undo whatever forces adopted this foolhardy route to the top.Were such a conflict to engulf the United States, the potential for nuclear exchangewould elevate a terrible error into a catastrophe.


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2NC: OVERVIEW ENCIRCLEMENT DA

POST THE IRAQ WAR CHINA HAS PUT EMPIRE BUILDING ON TOP OF

NATIONAL-PRIORITY. AFRICA IS A NEW VENUE OF INTEREST.

AMERICAN ENAGEMENT IN THE REGION SENDS A GREENLIGHT TO

CHINA THAT AMERICA IS EMPIRE BUILDING. CHINA WILL FEEL

CONTAINED RESULTING IN LASH OUT AGAINST AMERICA ANDTAIWAN. THIS WILL CAUSE THEM TO INVADE TAIWAN WHICH WILL

DRAW IN BIG NUCLEAR POWERS CAUSING A SINO-GLOBAL NUCLEAR

WAR. OUR DA IMPACTS ARE BIG:

D) TURNS THE CASE: CHINESE-US WAR IN TAIWAN WILL CRIPPLETHE GLOBAL ECONOMY WHICH WILL DEVASTATE THE ABILITY

FOR NORTH-AFRICAN NATIONS TO GET OUT OF POVERTY

ENSURING THE CYCLE OF WAR.

E) PROBABILITY: POST-IRAQ WAR TERRITORIAL WARS AREBECOMINING THE MOST LIKELY CONFLICT, ITS PART OF BUSHSIMPERIAL AGENDA.

F) MAGNITUDETHIS WAR WILL BRING IN THE BIGGEST NUCLEARPOWERS RISKING GLOBAL NUCLEAR ANHILIATION. (CA TUCKER)


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2NC ENCIRCLEMENT INTERNAL LINK FL

SUDAN IS A NEW THEATER FOR CHINA, ALL OF OUR LINK EVIDENCE IS DESCRIPTIVE

OF CHINAS WANT TO INCREASE OIL PROJECTS IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO

MAINTAIN POWER AND LEGITIMACY. THE PLAN HAS AMERICA TOE-STEP ON CHINAS

LAND IN NORTH AFRICA CAUSING A SINO-LASH OUT.

Its A Zero-Sum Game To China; US Prestige Directly Trades Off With Chinas

Nancy Chen, Special to The Herald, The Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.) May 22, 1999The Chinese are also raised to believe that their country is moral and good. Theybelieve they represent the rights of developing countries, and the same moral fervorand idealism of communism that existed during the Cold War still is very much alivein China. From their perspective, the conflict between capitalism and communism is atthe forefront of all international actions. They still call U.S. actions in Kosovo"hegemonic" because we want to force Yugoslavia's government to act in a certainway. We say we are protecting the rights of the Albanian minority. In this zero-sum

game, a U.S. gain is a Chinese loss. It is a struggle between who has the moral highground, capitalist America or communist China. When the U.S. bombed the Chineseembassy in Belgrade, the Chinese felt they had gined the upper hand in this moralstruggle.


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2NC ENCIRCLEMENT INTERNAL LINK FL

China Sees The World In Zero-Sum Terms: Gains For The US Are A Loss For

China

Agence France Presse,September 23, 1999

China's Communist leadership, once just a ragged band of soldiers, is struggling after50 years in power to find its place on a world stage dominated by the United States.Regarded with suspicion in the early days of the People's Republic when manycountries still recognised the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan,China is hoping to use its anniversary celebrations on October 1 to prove it has arightful place in the international community. "China's biggest problem is the UnitedStates. US power faces them wherever they look: east, west, north, south," saidAndrew Nathan, of Columbia University's East Asian Institute. "(But) they've committedthemselves to an economic development policy that depends on good relations with the West." Since late supreme leader DengXiaoping threw open China's doors to foreign investors in 1979, ending almost two decades of political turmoil and isolation,

China has been gradually building up its confidence in foreign affairs. "The rest of the world views China as one of the world'smost dynamic economies and a respectable and responsible power," ran an editorial in a recent edition of the China Dailynewspaper, of a kind that peppers the official press. Sino-US ties, formally established in 1979 after a landmark visit by US

President Richard Nixon in 1972, have formed the backbone of China's foreign policy in the post-Deng era. But the bilateralrelationship has been far from smooth, with China seeing itself in the post-Cold War world as one of the few large countrieswilling to stand up to US "hegemonism." Since the bloody crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement

earned international condemnation, Beijing has made it clear it sees pressure on human rights as an excuse used by rich Westerncountries to interfere in the internal affairs of poorer ones. Sino-US ties reached a high point with a 1998 visit by US PresidentBill Clinton during which he discussed human rights and democracy with President Jiang Zemin on live television. But the

honeymoon period was soon over, marred by wrangling over human rights, allegations that China stole US nuclear secrets, andthe war in Kosovo. Beijing strongly opposed NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia even before its Belgrade embassy was hit

by NATO missiles, saying it constituted "gunboat diplomacy." The bombing, which killed three Chinese journalists, sparked a

backlash of anti-foreign sentiment in Beijing."China has been extremely weak in the past and is verysensitive on that issue --we have been invaded and suffered foreign interference on a number of occasions," said JiaQingguo, professor at Beijing University's school of international relations. "But globalisation is an objective reality. China mustaccept this reality and go with the tide of history," he said. Some analysts say, however, that China's foreign policy thinking stillhas a long way to go to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Concepts like globalisation are still relatively new among

China's veteran leaders. "They pretend a lot of that stuff but they don't really mean it," said a Western diplomat. "They havea very realpolitik zero-sum game approach -- if someone is gaining we must belosing."


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CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: LINK ZERO-SUM GAME

China Sees Prestige As A Zero Sum Game.

Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1, 2000Beijing is also concerned over what it sees as a recent "pro-India tilt" in Washington'sSouth Asia policy following President Bill Clinton's recent visit to the subcontinent,

and a cold-shouldering of the Pakistani military regime. Since China is effectively'checkmated' in East Asia by three great powers - the USA, Japan and Russia - Beijinghas long seen South and Southeast Asia as its spheres of influence, and India as themain obstacle to China achieving its strategic objective of regional supremacy insouthern Asia. Viewing the major power relationships in zero-sum terms, Chineseleaders see US overtures towards India as an effort to further contain China. Beijingfears that if US- China relations deteriorate into a new Cold War, India could play thesame role in the US security calculus vis-a-vis China that China had played against theSoviet Union between 1971-89.

Its a Zero-Sum Game Vis--vis Taiwan.

Sun-Sentinel(Fort Lauderdale), May 20, 2000During a recent visit to Taiwan, I met with President-elect Chen Shui-bian and otherpolitical and business leaders to discuss major economic issues. Chen, of course, is notknown for his pro-PRC views. The prospect of his election drew inappropriate anddestabilizing threats from China's Communist government in an unsuccessful effort todeter Taiwanese voters from electing Chen. Since his March 18 election, however,Chen has publically declared himself in favor of China's membership in the WTO andthe normalization of U.S.-China relations. He views closer U.S.-Chinese economic tiesas essential to promoting "democratization" of China. To many in Congress, Chen'sposition seems something of a paradox: How could the democratically elected leaderof Taiwan -- a country that has the most to fear from a more economically powerful

China -- support a measure that is a top priority of China's Communist government?This is because America's relations with China and Taiwan have been viewed strictlyin zero-sum terms: What's good for China is bad for Taiwan and vice versa.


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CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: LINK ZERO-SUM GAME

The Developing World Is A Zero Sum Game To China Because Of Taiwan.

Financial Times(London) October 12, 1998, Monday

With the loss of its most important diplomatic ally - South Africa - last year, Taipei isnow officially recognised by fewer than 30 - mostly tiny - states, the most strategicallysignificant of which is Panama. Although Taiwan's economic clout has earned strongsubstantive ties from most industrialised countries, Taipei keenly feels its internationalposition to be precarious and under constant siege from Beijing. Despite its relativelystrong economic position, Taipei's efforts to play a role in the international rescueefforts during the Asian financial crisis were rebuffed under pressure from Beijing.Taiwan is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, which led the bailoutplans in affected Asian countries. Meanwhile, the governments on both sides of theTaiwan Strait continue to play the undignified game of trying to outbid each other togain the recognition of small, cash-strapped countries. For reasons of "face", neither

side appears ready or willing to give up this zero-sum game, although Mr Li hintedthat Taipei may be rethinking its value.


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2NC CHINA-ENCIRCLEMENT DA: AFRICA KEY TO CHINA

PRESTIGE

Assistance To Africa Is Key To China's Prestige.

Ian Taylor, formerly of the University of Hong Kong, research student at the Universityof Stellenbosch, South Africa, Contemporary Review, Oct 97, Vol. 271 Issue 1581, p192

Secondly, China postures an image of being of the Third World, if not its leader. Thisposturing projects China onto the international stage as a major player in its own right.If this image is to be sustained, Beijing feels compelled to maintain an active interestin areas such as Africa. With Taiwan sniping at its heels, China is propelled to involveitself in the tug of war on the continent and provide funds and aid to African nations.Even though the amounts involved seem large, the loyalty of African states isrelatively cheap for an increasingly economic buoyant China. This loyalty all serves tobolster China's image and help project Beijing as a 'concerned' state involving itself inthe economic rehabilitation of Africa.Stemming from this is the third, perhaps more calculating, reason why China indulgesin competition with Taiwan for recognition. This is the realisation that Third Worldnations provide a valuable support constituency to enable China to withstand criticismfrom the West over its human rights abuses. This reached added piquancy followingthe opprobrium heaped on Beijing after Tiananmen Square. It did not go unnoticedthat most African states either remained unmoved by the West's reaction or activelysupported the crackdown (Namibia's Sam Nujoma for example conveyed his'congratulations to the Communist Party on their victory in quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion'). Aware of their own tenuous grip on power, often maintainedby less than democratic means, many African leaders sympathise with Beijing whenits human rights record is criticised. In return, it is relatively simple for China to playto this constituency by turning the criticism into an issue of 'interference' in statesovereignty and neoimperialism. This explains why in April 1996 a motion by the

United Nations Human Rights Commission to censor China's human rights record wasdefeated by 26 votes -- 14 of them African.Beijing has found in Africa a highly useful constituency that can be mobilised todefend China at international fora and this helps rationalise Beijing's willingness toindulge in a political competition with Taiwan for recognition by African states. Withlarge nations such as South Africa, Beijing's economic and political clout ensures thatit will always be the victor. However, with the smaller states this factor is not soimportant: the provision of aid and economic assistance is.


29/69



PRESTIGE

Clout In Africa Is Key To Soothe Encirclement Fears.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Post associate editor South China Morning Post, October 1, 2000Indeed, Mr Jiang and his foreign policy team are also exerting a lot of effort handlingthe downside of Sino-US relations: to counter what Beijing perceives as an "anti-China containment policy". In the wake of Kosovo, Mr Jiang's advisers are convincedWashington is using its muscle in the Asia Pacific region to " encircle and contain"China. Ways and means the US is said to be using include the US-Japan militaryguidelines as well as the deployment of the Theatre Missile Defence system in theregion. Partly to help beat this policy of " encirclement and containment" - and partlyto ensure a peaceful environment for its economic development - Beijing has wagedan aggressive policy of good neighbourliness. The mainland leadership hassuccessfully mended fences with former adversaries, such as India and Vietnam.Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have also stabilised withBeijing's decision to at least temporarily keep a low profile on the Spratly Islandsissue. A key goal of Beijing's foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific area is to improve tieswith Japan. The mainland leadership is eager for more Japanese investment. Moreimportantly, it wants to pry loose the Japanese-American alliance - and lessen thepossibility that should some form of conflict break out between China and the US overissues such as Taiwan, Tokyo would not provide bases for US forces. Amelioration ofties with Japan has proven tricky, however, given strong feelings among ordinaryChinese that Tokyo has not made a formal, written apology for wartime atrocities.During his visit to Japan later this month, Premier Zhu Rongji is likely to follow thenew line laid down by Mr Jiang in May, that both countries look to the future in aneffort to forge a strategic partnership for the new century. The biggest success story ofChinese diplomacy last year was its consolidation of what some Western observers

call a quasi-alliance relation with Russia. The administration of new presidentVladimir Putin has pledged to boost military as well as commercial ties with themainland. Some of the newly acquired Russian hardware, such as Kilo-classsubmarines and 27 aircraft, were deployed in war games conducted by the People'sLiberation Army along the southeast coast in the past several months. Moreover,Beijing has played a substantial role in building up the so-called Shanghai Five -China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - into a regional bloccommitted to goals including thwarting Washington's alleged effort to forge a "uni-polar", or US- dominated world order. Some Chinese diplomats think vigorousopposition by the Shanghai Five was one factor behind Mr Clinton's decision to leavethe decision of the deployment of a national missile defence system to his successor.

Beijing has also made impressive headway towards reviving its position as leader ofthe Third World, seen as another thrust in its effort to bolster a multi-polar globalsystem. At the UN Millennium Summit, Mr Jiang pledged to fight for Third World


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PRESTIGE

CONTINUES2/2

concerns, including more assistance from the developed world and the writing off ofbad debts. Later this month, Bejing will host a Sino-African forum that will highlightthe People's Republic's close ties with more than 40 African countries. Diplomaticsources said some African countries have reservations about being used as a pawn inBeijing's long-standing competition with Washington for global influence. They arealso dissatisfied with the present level of Chinese economic aid. However, theextraordinary meeting itself will go some way towards boosting China's clout inAfrica - and the entire Third World.

China Sees Africa As A Key Battleground.

Barry ShelbyWorld Press Review, Sep 96, Vol. 43 Issue 9, p26But meanwhile Beijing has consolidated its relations with larger African countries,including Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Sudan. By October, 1995, Sino-African tradereached $3.17 billion, Marie[Delphine Marie writes in the Africa-oriented businessbiweekly Jeune Afrique Economie of Paris] writes. She quotes a Western diplomat:"As during the cold war, Beijing sees this conflict as a battle of endurance."


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PRESTIGE

Africa is Critical To China's Global Prestige.

Richard J. Payne, Illinois State U Distinguished Professor of Political Science, CassandraR. & VeneyIllinois State University Assistant Professor of Political Science AsianSurvey, Sept 1998v38 i9 p867

The end of the cold war, radical economic policy changes in the PRC, and the generalabandonment of Africa by the West have created opportunities for Beijing to exert itsinfluence in Africa to achieve its foreign policy goals of national reunification,economic development, and championing Third World causes. Converging Africanand Chinese interests facilitate the accomplishment of China's foreign policyobjectives. Given the rivalry between Taiwan and China as well as the growingimportance of economics in foreign relations in the aftermath of the cold war, tradeissues are essentially inseparable from the PRC's goals of frustrating Taiwan's effortsto gain international recognition as an independent country. Yet the softness ofAfrican states, manifested by political instability and low levels of governmentalauthority, renders the attainment of China's foreign policy objectives in Africa difficultand of uncertain duration. Nevertheless, China is likely to continue to focus on Africato consolidate its status as a great power, one that can command international respect.South Africa's recognition of the PRC marks a significant diplomatic breakthrough forthe latter's Africa policy. It clearly demonstrates China's willingness and ability toemploy its growing economic power and enhanced international political status toachieve its foreign policy objectives in Africa and elsewhere.


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2NC CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: SPHERE OF INFLUENCE I/L

Incursions Into Chinas Perceived Sphere Of Influence Cause China-US Tension.

Leon T. Hadar, adjunct scholar, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, 1/23/96

http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-248.htmlWhile misperceptions on both sides of the Pacific can be exacerbated by the waypresidential leadership, bureau-cratic factors, or domestic politics affects U.S. policytoward China, there is another, possibly more profound and systemic, dimension to thecurrent Sino-American tensions. The end of the Cold War, like any other revolutionarychange in the international system, tends to produce new confronta-tions betweenvarious powers that want to dominate or at least influence the new global structure. Inmany cases, the international competition ushered in by a new era is between risingand hegemonic powers. A rising "have-not" power usually strives to change the statusquo, including the rules of the international military and economic game, in a way thatwill benefit its interests and help it to translate its new economic power into military

and diplomat-ic influence. The hegemonic "have" power wants to preserve the globalstatus quo, thereby maintaining its dominant economic and military position.Sometimes, as in the case of Great Britain and Germany during the early 20th century,the rivalry erupts into a major hegemonic war. Sometimes, as in the rivalry betweenthe United States and Great Brit-ain in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the tension endsin a gradual and peaceful transition of dominant status from the old to the new power.In still other instances, as in the case of the United States, Germany, and Japan in thepost-World War II era, it evolves into a peaceful, albeit com-plex, sharing of economicand military influence.(63)The Chinese leaders and people believe that with thegeostrategic and geoeconomic changes taking place in the world, their nation shouldand could gain its rightful place in the ranks of global great powers. The consensus

that unites "moderates" and "radicals," or conservatives and reformists, in Beijing isthat, in the aftermath of the Cold War, "the world has moved from a bipolar system toa multi-polar system," according to a Western diplomat in the Chi-nese capital. "Chinaintends to be a pole or significant actor" in that system. That means "defining its ownsphere--and even using confrontation with the U.S. to send a signal to other countriesthat dealing with Taipei, for example, is courting trouble."(64) The rhetoric of topClinton administration officials suggests that while the United States is expectingoccasion-al problems with Beijing, Washington is nevertheless willing to peacefullyaccommodate the rising power of China. "Our policy is engagement, notcontainment," insists Lord. He adds, however, "We're not naive. We cannot predictwhat kind of power China will be in the 21st century. God forbid we may have to turn,

with others, to a policy of contain-ment. I would hope not. We're trying to preventthat."


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2NC CHINA DA IMPACT MODULE: BLUE NAVY

CHINESE NAVAL MODERNIZATION

A) CHINESE FEAR OF LOSING ITS OIL SUPPLY WILL RESULT IN NAVAL

MODERNIZATION TO SECURE OIL TRANSPORT


(PROFESSOR, WILL OIL BE THE NEXT CONFLICT IN SINO-US RELATIONS, ALEXANDERS


DOA 7-8-2K4)

B) BLUE WATER MODERNIZATION WILL IGNITE WAR AND DESTABILIZE SOUTH-EASTASIA

BLANCHE, ANALYST AT THE MIDDLE EAST, 12-1-2K2

(ED, TANKER TERROR: THE SHIPPING LANES IN THE GULF, THE MIDDLE EAST P. LN

< Its expanding navy is starting to operate in the South and East China Seasand is expected to extend its operations into the Indian Ocean as well sometime

in the future, with a little help from Pakistan. Submarine forces are alsoemerging or are being upgraded in Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore amid a

new arms race--focused on building bluewater navies capable of long-range

missions with state-of-the-art warships--that could ignite a host of regional

flashpoints. "Submarines don't lend themselves to confidence-building," said Sam Bateman,

a former commodore in the Australian Navy and now a professor of international

affairs at Hawaii's East West Centre. And that makes them dangerous in a region

riven by myriad political fault lines from the disputed Taiwan Strait to

territorial quarrels in the South China Sea, including the oil -rich SpratlyIslands claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia andVietnam.

C) ASIAN WARS RESULT IN NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION

ToshimaruOgura and Ingyu Oh, Professors of Economics and Political Economy at Waiikato University,

MONTHLY REVIEW, April, 1997,p. 30 (BLUEUN0019)

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi-or virtual nuclear armament. Although these

countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to

possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region-nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and

its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among those countries would threaten to

escalate into global conflagration.


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CHINA ENCIRCLEMENT DA: IMPACT EXTENSIONS

No Other Conflict Is More Risky

Richard K. Betts, Professor of Political Science, Director of the Institute of War andPeace Studies, Columbia University, &Thomas J. Christensen, Associate Professor Of

Political Science, MIT, The National Interest Winter 2000/2001The possibility of war with China over Taiwan is arguably the mostdangerous threat that U.S. security policy faces in the coming decade. No otherflashpoint is more likely to bring the United States into combat with a majorpower, and no other contingency compels Washington to respond with suchambiguous commitment. U.S. policy regarding the defense of Taiwan is uncertain,and thus so is the understanding in Beijing and Taipei -- and in Washington --over how strongly the United States might react in different circumstances.Because Taiwan is more independent than either Washington or Beijing mightprefer, neither great power can fully control developments that might ignite acrisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled

escalation.Traditional questions about Chinese intentions and capabilities miss the markin analyzing the likelihood of war and the probable course war would take. A PRCattack on a Taiwan following the pursuit of formal independence from the Chinesenation would be viewed (quite sincerely) in Beijing as purely defensive, to

preserve generally recognized territorial sovereignty. Many outside China would

view the attack as a sign of belligerence. But military activity against anindependence-minded Taiwan might have little relevance to Beijing's behavior onother issues, even for other sovereignty disputes such as those over the Senkakuor Spratly Islands.The niceties of balance of power calculations could prove relativelyunimportant in determining whether China would use force over Taiwan andwhether it would do so effectively. U.S. efforts to create a stable balanceacross the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain

circumstances, but certainly not all. Moreover, such efforts would miss themajor point of cross-strait strategic interaction. China's military strategy ina conflict over Taiwan would likely be to punish and coerce rather than tocontrol, tasks for which its military may be able to use force to great effect.The PLA's ability to mount a Normandy-style assault on the island is not thetoughest question. Geography (the water barrier), together with U.S. supplies,would provide powerful means to Taiwan for blocking such an invasion, evenwithout direct U.S. combat involvement.

A greater challenge would be a blockade by the PRC, which has a large numberof submarines and mines. Taiwan's proximity to the mainland and its dependenceon international trade and investment enhance the potential effect of blockades-- or coercive campaigns involving ballistic and cruise missiles -- even if themilitary impact would be modest. The PRC might thus be able to damage severelythe island's economy regardless of the number of F-16s, AWACS aircraft andtheater missile defense batteries the island can bring to bear. Moreover, to

break a blockade by sweeping the seas would likely require a direct attack onChinese vessels. If Chinese forces had not already targeted U.S. ships by that

point, it would be up to Washington to decide to fire the first shots against anuclear-armed country that was attempting to regain limited control of what it

believes is its own territory.Some think that the United States should give Taiwan military assistance ordefend it directly even in the extreme case that it openly declares legalindependence. Many assume that the United States could deter an attack from themainland and that, if worse came to worst, the United States would prevail in a


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war should deterrence fail. These assumptions, unfortunately, are suspect.Before being deterred, Beijing would have to weigh the costs of inaction againstaction. The perceived cost of inaction against Taiwanese independence is veryhigh. No leader can count on survival if labeled the next Li Hongzhang, the

diplomat who ceded Taiwan to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.ard K. Betts, Professor of Political Science, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, & Thomas J.

Christensen, Associate Professor Of Political Science, MIT, The National Interest Winter 2000/2001

Many in Beijing believe that the United States lacks the national will topursue a war against China to save Taiwan. If the prospect of casualties did notdeter the United States from intervening, the reasoning goes, even low levels ofcasualties would frighten it into early withdrawal. Following this logic, Chinaneed not defeat the U.S. military in wartime or close the gap in military powerin peacetime. Rather, the strategic requirement is much lower: to put a numberof American soldiers, sailors and airmen at risk.It is dangerous that so many Chinese seem to subscribe to this "Somaliaanalogy." Washington would probably not be deterred by fears of casualties if

it decided that Taiwan was being bullied without serious provocation, any morethan it was deterred from attacking Iraq in 1991 by high pre-war casualtyestimates. Nor is it likely that, once the United States had made the momentousdecision to gear up for combat against a power like China, it would quit easilyafter suffering a small number of casualties.Thinking over the long term, however, it is hard to imagine how the UnitedStates could "win" a war to preserve Taiwan's independence against a resoluteChina. Too many analyses inside the Beltway stop at the operational level of

analysis, assuming that tactical victories answer the strategic question.Sinking the Chinese navy and defeating an invasion attempt against the islandwould not be the end of the story. Unless the U.S. Air Force were to mount a

massive and sustained assault against mainland targets, the PRC would maintainthe capability to disrupt commerce, squeeze Taiwan, and keep U.S. personnel atrisk. As one American naval officer put it, as a nation much larger than Iraq or

Yugoslavia, "China is a cruise missile sponge." This will be doubly true onceChina builds more road-mobile, solid-fuel missiles and learns better ways tohide its military assets.

Moreover, strikes against the mainland would involve huge risks. Recall thatfor three years, while Chinese forces were killing U.S. soldiers in Korea, theTruman administration refrained from carrying combat to the mainland for fear

of a wider war -- and this at a time when China had no nuclear weapons and itsSoviet allies had fewer than China now has. China maintains the capacity tostrike the U.S. homeland with nuclear missiles, and to strike U.S. bases in the

region with both conventional and nuclear missiles. China has or is feverishlyobtaining increasingly sophisticated systems, including Russian sa-10 airdefense batteries, stealth detection technologies, anti-ship missiles, land

attack cruise missiles, accurate ballistic missiles, and new submarines. Any ofthese could give the United States and its regional allies pause before wideninga campaign against the Chinese mainland.

And if the issue is a PRC blockade of Taiwan, who will bear the onus of

starting a war between China and the United States? If a conventional engagementleaves U.S. naval forces in control of the Taiwan Strait, can anyone beconfident that Beijing would not dream of using a nuclear weapon against theSeventh Fleet? And then what? Such a scenario of nuclear escalation seemsfancifully alarmist to many in the post-Cold War era. But is it any more so thansuch concerns ever were when defense planning focused on crises with the SovietUnion? Is this an experiment a U.S. commander-in-chief should run?


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THIS IS THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR GLOBAL NUCLEAR

EXCHANGE

John Omicinski, writes for Gannett News ServiceDes Moines Register January 23, 2000If India feels good about being able to incinerate hundreds of thousands ofpeople, then Jonathan Schell is right in the thesis of his article in thecurrent Harper's magazine: The 20th century may, indeed, have been infected withseeds of absolute evil that could eventually destroy humankind.Adolf Hitler, he said, may have left behind him as a legacy the 20th- centuryvirus of self-destruction that infected the globe first in World War I.India, Pakistan, Israel or China -all politically paranoid -could touchoff a multipolar nuclear shooting match that would be hard to stop, because itwould be over in a matter of hours.Has the ease with which we live with the idea of such massive killing come

down to us as a legacy of Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot and the other killers? Schellreminds us that as far back as World War I, democracies seemed acquiescent inthe notion that millions were dying and a generation was being wiped away in aslaughter in the trenches.Did that mean we would accept anything, even a nuclear holocaust?If nuclear weapons become an everyday component of the arsenals of democraticstates, Schell contends, we will have changed dramatically. "If this happens,can liberalism (small-L) itself survive, or will it find itself sucked, as in1914, into a vortex of destruction that it cannot stop?"By and large, nukes dropped off the news radar screen when the Berlin Wallcollapsed and the Cold War ended. In 1997, President Clinton boasted that our

children were growing up free from the "shadows of . . . the threat of a nuclearholocaust." Schell calls this the "official fantasy" that everyone seems to have boughtinto. He accurately contends that we are now more at risk of a nuclearconflagration, because the arms-control momentum of the '80s and '90s hasstopped while the warheads are spreading.

Our Impact Has The Greatest Potential To Escalate To Superpower War

Bob Deans, Palm Beach Post Washington Bureau Palm Beach Post, November 21, 2000Tuesday

An overview of the U.S. foreign policy landscape released last week by RAND, a think

tank based in Santa Monica, Calif., said Taiwan is "the most intractable and dangerousEast-Asian flashpoint, and the one with the greatest potential (for bringing) the UnitedStates and China into confrontation in the near future." Indeed, warns RAND, a China-Taiwan confrontation, though unlikely, is possible before a new administration gets allfour wheels on the road in Asia. "Attempting to avoid such a confrontation," the groupadvises the incoming president, "should be a top priority for your administration."


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CHINA DA IMPACTS: WAR ON TERROR

CHINA IS A CRITICAL TO US SUCCESS IN THE WAR ON TERROR AND GETTING NORTH

KOREA TO AGREE TO SIX-PARTY TALKS

CHINA QUARTERLY FORECAST 2K4

(FOREIGN POLICY, CHINA QUARTERLY FORECAST REPORT 2ND QUARTER P.EBSCOHOST)


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CHINA DA IMPACT: SINO-INDIA WAR

CHINA AND INDIA WILL FIGHT OVER UNHINDERED ACCESS FOR OIL THROUGH THE

INDIAN OCEAN THIS RISKS ESCALATING ARMS RACES


< Increasing strategic rivalry between the People's Republic of China and India could lead to a rapidly

escalating arms race between these two countries, in particular between their naval and air forces, due to

heightened competition for energy resources and strategic access to the Persian Gulf through the Indian

Ocean as a consequence of unilateral strategies to ensure reliable energy supplies. Moreover, seeing as the

Asian region has made the increased use of natural gas a top priority for the next decades, the continent's

high level of dependence upon imports of crude oil from the Persian Gulf will increase due to growing

imports of natural gas from the region and from the Russian Far East. While natural gas pipelines are beingconstructed from Siberia and Sakhalin, it is more likely to be liquid gas that will be transported from the

Middle East to Asia in tankers. >


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CHINA DA: EXPANSION GOOD CASPIAN DEVELOPMENT

CHINA HAS STAKE IN THE CASPIAN REGION INSTABILITY RISKS JEOPARDIZING

CHINESE NRG DEMANDS



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CHINA DA IMPACTS: CHINA EXPANSION GOOD

KAZAHSTAN/SECCESSION WARS

CHINA ENERGY EXPANSION SOLVES SECCESSION

A) KAZAHSTAN-CHINA PIPELINE IS CRITICAL TO STABILIZE CENTRAL ASIA AND TO

CONTAIN UIGHUR SEPERATISM LEFT UNCHECKED RESULTS IN TAIWAN AND TIBETSECESSION

DOWNS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY SCHOLAR AND FELLOW AT RAND, 2K

(ERICA, CHINAS QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY P.http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1244/MR1244.ch3.pdf)

B) Self determination conflicts escalate to nuclear war

Kamal Shehadi, Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,December 1993, Ethnic Self Determination And the Break Up of States, p. 81

This paper has argued that self-determination conflicts have direct adverse consequences on

international security. As they begin to tear nuclear states apart, the likelihood of nuclear weapons

falling into the hands of individuals or groups willing to use them, or to trade them to others, willreach frightening levels. This likelihood increases if a conflict over self-determination escalates into

a war between two nuclear states. The Russian Federation and Ukraine may fight over the Crimea

and the Donbass area; and India and Pakistan may fight over Kashmir. Ethnic conflicts may also

spread both within a state and from one state to the next. This can happen in countries where more

than one ethnic self-determination conflict is brewing: Russia, India and Ethiopia, for example. The

conflict may also spread by contagion from one country to another if the state is weak politicallyand militarily and cannot contain the conflict on its doorstep. Lastly, there is a real danger that

regional conflicts will erupt over national minorities and borders.


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2NC CHINA OIL DA: CHINA ECONOMY MODULE

investing in overseas oil exploration and development projects to

profit from hikes in international oil prices but rather to help stabilizethe economy during an oil shock. In the event of another oilshock, the Chinese government will be able to pressure state-ownedoil companies to forgo windfall profits from higher international oil

prices by requiring them to supply Chinese industries at artificially

Low prices, cushioning the impact of the shock on Chinas economy.>

B) Collapse of Chinas economy would cripple the US economy and create an

unstable power vacuum in Northeast Asia

Hwee, 1998 (Yeo Heng, Captain in the Singapore Armed Forces, The US-Japan-China Triangle:Maintaining Peace And Security In A Troubled East Asia,

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1998/Vol24_2/6.htm)In 1994, US trade with North-East Asia amounted to US$300 billion. While security paves the way

for viable economics, economics in turn determines in a relative sense, the inclinations of foreign

policy. Instability in North-East Asia will upset the US economy as much as the Asian ones. The UShad provided assurance that it would continue to remain engaged in North-East Asia. The bilateral

relationships that the US has developed with various nations in the Asia-Pacific have been the

principal basis for US presence in the region since the 1950s. They have been the pillars on which

the US relied upon in the containment of Soviet influence in the Cold War and can still be mutually

exploited to influence regional events. To eliminate or undermine them would be to inject an

essence of instability in the region whereby great power rivalries may occur.

C) THE IMPACT IS WORLD WAR THREE

Walter Russell Mead, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1998,p. M1.


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CHINA DA A2: CHINA DEPENDENT ON MIDDLE EAST OIL

CHINA WILL AVOID GREATER COMMITMENT ON MIDDLE EAST OIL OUT OF FEAR OF

AMERICA THEY WILL LOOK ELSEWHERE

TROUSH, VISITING FELLOW CENTER FOR NEASIA POLICY STUDIES BROOKINGS

INSTITUTE, FALL 1999

(SERGI, CHINAS CHANGING OIL STRATEGY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICYIMPLICATIONS, CNAPS WORKING PAPER P.http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_troush.htm)

CHINESE NEED FOR OIL WILL EXPONENTIALLY EXPAND MIDDLE EAST OIL IS TOO

UNSTABLE OF A IMPORT HUB

UMBACH,SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AND HEAD OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME AT

THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 2K3

(FRANK,FUTURE CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINASFOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, DGAP PUBLICATION SESSION 5 P.http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/planungsstab/china_round_table/5-umbach.pdf)

< With its 1.3 billion population, it is already the worlds second-largest consumer of primary energy, the

thirdlargest energy producer and a major contributor to global carbon dioxide emissions. Present Situation

and Future Forecasts of Chinas Increasing Oil and Gas Demands Since 1990, China has been a net

importer of energy, in November 1993 it also became a net importer of oil products and in 1996 of crudeoil. The anticipated annual economic growth by around 4.8 percent will drive up Chinas energy demand,

though on a lower scale (around 2.7%). Due mainly to vigorous transport demand, Chinas oil demand willrise to 40 percent until 2030. With such a projected annual increase in primary oil demand, Chinas oil

consumption of 5mb/d in 2001 may more than double by 2030 to 12mb/d according to the IEAs World

Energy Outlook 2002. According to the IEAs latest projections, net oil imports will rise from 1,7 mb/d in2001 to 4.2 mb/d in 2010, around 8 mb/d and 9.8 mb/d in 2030 which is almost equivalent of the United

States in 2000, more than the present total crude oil production of Saudi Arabia as the largest oil producer

in the world and more than the projected net imports of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand

combined. If these energy developments will be confirmed, Chinas share of imports in total oil demand

may expand from 34 percent in 2001 to 82 percent in 2030. Foreign Policy Implications in General Regional dimension: it is notonly China's energy requirement that has increased, regional demand has increased throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region,accounting for 82 percent of the increase in the global demand for oil in the period 1990-1997. At the same time, in the decade from1983 to 1993, the four Asian economies Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea accounted for no less than 36 percent of the global

increase in demand for primary energy. While thus in 1992, Japanese oil imports still accounted for 77 percent of total Asian oilimports, by 2010 this figure will probably has dropped to 37 percent as a result of the far greater increase in China, India and the other

Asian states. While Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam are still currently net exporters of oil, some of these states are likely tobecome net importers in 2010. At present, Asia, led by its four economies Japan, China, South Korea and India, imports already more

than 60 percent of its oil which can rise to almost 90 percent in 2020 3 and with that a corresponding increase in Asian

vulnerability to any oil supply interruption as the result of regional conflicts and internal instabilities in the

Persian Gulf. The gap between a rapidly rising demand for energy and limited own energy reserves will

therefore become larger and can only be filled by a sharp increase in energy imports. No matter what form

the solution to questions of energy security in East and South Asia takes, it cannot ignore the energy policydimension of China.>


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A2: CHINA WILL GET OIL FORM RUSSIA

CHINA WILL NEVER LOOK TO RUSSIA FOR OIL HISTORIC ANIMOSITY

TROUSH, VISITING FELLOW CENTER FOR NEASIA POLICY STUDIES BROOKINGSINSTITUTE, FALL 1999(SERGI, CHINAS CHANGING OIL STRATEGY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS,CNAPS WORKING PAPER P. http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_troush.htm)


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A2: CHINA OIL DA CHINA NO HAVE TECH

CHINA LACKS THE NECESSARY REFINING TECHNOLOGY TO USE MIDDLE EAST

CRUDE




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A2: CHINA HAS DOMESTIC RESERVES

CHINA IS RUNNING OUT OF DOMESTIC OIL SUPPLIES

TROUSH, VISITING FELLOW CENTER FOR NEASIA POLICY STUDIES BROOKINGS

INSTITUTE, FALL 1999

(SERGI, CHINAS CHANGING OIL STRATEGY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS,CNAPS WORKING PAPER P. http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_troush.htm)


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CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD FL

TURN: CHINESE-NAVAL MODERNIZATION

A) CHINA WILL PURSUE A BLUE-WATER NAVY TO ENSURE FREE-FLOW OF FROM

SUPPLIERS



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CHINESE CONTAINMENT GOOD FL

TURN: NAVAL MOBILITY

A) CHINESE OIL INVESTMENTS SPONSOR TERRORIST GROUPS AND GIVE IRAN THE

NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY TO BLOCK AMERICAN NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION

LUFT, IAGS ANALYST, DOA 7-9-2K4 (GAL FUELING THE DRAGON: CHINAS RACE INTOTHE OIL MARKET, INSTITUTE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY P.

http://www.iags.org/china.htm)


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TURN: IRANIAN PROLIFERATION

A) CHINA INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST RESULTS IN IRANIAN HEGEMONY

WHICH RISKS PROLIFERATION AND CHEMICAL-NUCLEAR WAR

RUBIN, Senior Resident Scholar at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of the Middle EastReview of International Affairs,3-19999(BARRY,CHINAS MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY, MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS VOL. 3, NO. 1)


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TURN: US-SINO RELATIONS

A) CHINAS INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST RISKS DESTABILIZING SANCTION

REGIMES, SUPPLYING WMDS AND JEOPARDIZING SINO-US RELATIONS

RUBIN, Senior Resident Scholar at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of the Middle East

Review of International Affairs,3-19999(BARRY,CHINAS MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY, MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS VOL. 3, NO. 1)


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TURN: SINO-ISRAEL RELATIONS

A) CHINESE EXPANSIONISM KEY TO SOLIDIFY SINO-ISRAEL RELATIONS

RUBIN, Senior Resident Scholar at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of the Middle EastReview of International Affairs,3-19999(BARRY,CHINAS MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY, MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS VOL. 3, NO. 1)

< Arab-Israeli Peace Process Historically, China had taken a strongly anti-Israel stance. But China shifted

from total support for the PLO and Israel's destruction to establish diplomatic relations with Israel after the

Madrid Conference. Subsequently, Beijing supported the Oslo agreements and the Israel-Palestinian and

Israel-Jordan peace processes, advocating the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

China only took, however, a secondary role in promoting mediation, though suggesting that regional peace

and stability was the most important goal. In practice, China gave little material help to the Palestinians

while developing its relationship with Israel very rapidly. Despite its small size, Israel became an important

investor in Chinese development projects and supplier of high-technology weapons. (24) Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu told the Chinese that "Israeli know-how is more valuable than Arab oil." (25)

Whether or not that is true, Israeli technology did have a high value for Beijing. Moreover, like many

countries, China thought good relations with Israel would help its relations with the United States. Thus,China-Israel Barry Rubin Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1999) 52

relations have become important independent of the peace process's current status or outcome. >

B) MIDDLE EAST WAR WILL GO NUCLEAR

David, Professor of Policy Science at Johns Hopkins, Israel Affairs, Spring/Summer 1996, p. 95 (HARV4860)Internal conflict in the Middle East heightens the likelihood of nuclear use in several ways. Widespread domestic turmoil may

prevent a state from exercising control over its nuclear weapons despite its best efforts to do so, and nuclear weapons couldthus fall into the hands of terrorists. That terrorist groups are so prevalent and powerful in the Middle East is not reassuring,

especially since terrorist groups are likely to have fewer inhibitions about launching nuclear strikes. Nuclear weapons mighteven fall into the hands of insurgents in a civil conflict; because civil wars are often more brutal and destructive than interstatewars, the intensity of feelings could overcome any inhibitions that threats of retaliation would engender. It is doubtful that

nuclear deterrence could have been relied upon to keep the peace if a Lebanese faction had gained control of nuclear armsduring that countrys civil war.


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A2: CHINESE ADVENTURISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

NO IMPACT EVEN IF CHINA DEVELOPED A TRUE-BLUE NAVY THEY WONT BE A

MATCH FOR THE US NAVY



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CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: GLOBAL OIL SUPPLY/CHINA

AMERICAN FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA CRITICAL TO OIL

SECURITY



DOA 7-8-2K4)


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CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: CENTRAL ASIA/SASIA/GLOBAL

OIL

AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE, CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA IS CRITICAL TO

MAINTAIN CONTROL OF GLOBAL OIL AND CONTAINMENT OF CHINA



DOA 7-8-2K4)


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CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: IRANIAN HEGEMONY RISKS

NUCLEAR WAR

CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST INCREASES IRANIAN AGRESSION


Review of International Affairs,3-19999

(BARRY,CHINAS MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY, MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL



68/69


CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: IRAN OIL RELATION

MILITARY SUPERIORITY

CHINESE DEPENDENCY ON IRANIAN OIL INCREASES IRANIAN MILITARY BY TRADING

WEAPONS FOR OIL


Review of International Affairs,3-19999




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CHINA CONTAINMENT GOOD: IRAN-SINO AXIS JACKS US-

SINO RELATION

CHINESE-IRANIAN RELATIONS WILL JACK US-SINO RELATIONS

RUBIN, Senior Resident Scholar at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies and Editor of the Middle EastReview of International Affairs,3-19999



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