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    In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. De Jesus andBibiana Roxa de Jesus, Simeon R. ROXAS and Pedro ROXAS de Jesus, petitionersvs. Andres R. de JESUS, Jr.G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985

    FACTS:

    After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted by Simeon, brother ofBibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, he delivered to the lower court adocument purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was then set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the

    compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed inaccordance with law. However, the lower court issued an order allowing the probate which was found to have beenduly executed in accordance with law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the allegedholographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending that the law requires thatthe Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. Thecourt then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the ground that the worddated has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.

    ISSUE:

    Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibian Roxas de Jesus is avalid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

    RULING:

    ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

    As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of its execution.However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and theauthenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB/61 appearing on theholographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should beallowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

    DOROTHEO vs. CA

    320 SCRA 12

    FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro and Aniceta. Aniceta died in 1969 without her

    estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes, claiming to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed

    a petition for probate of Alejandros will. In1981, the will was admitted to probate but private respondents did not

    appeal from the said order. In 1983, upon motion of the private respondents, the trial court ruled that the will was

    intrinsically void and declared private respondents as the only heirs of the late spouses.

    HELD: Probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated

    particularly on these aspects:

    Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedents last will and testament

    Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills

    The testamentary capacity of the testator

    And the due execution of the last will and testamentUnder the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing

    mind at the time of its execution.

    The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has

    been authenticated. It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testaments is

    always intrinsically valid.

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    GARCIA vs. GATCHALIAN

    November 25, 1967

    FACTS: The allowance of the will of Gatchalian was denied on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not

    acknowledge it before a notary public as required by law.

    HELD: An examination of the document shows that the same was acknowledged before a notary public by the

    testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.

    Compliance with the requirement contained in Article 806 to the effect that a will must be acknowledgedbefore a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity . As the

    document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be

    probated.

    Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio VivaresG.R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997

    Facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He bequeathed all his prop to his wifeAsuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in thepresence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio AVivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a petitionfor probate of the will. The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape filed anopposition. The court declared that the will was exec according w/ the forma prescribed by law. However, it ruled thatAsuncion was never married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio Vivares filed anappeals before

    the CA with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present ay comp. evidence that Asuncion was legally married toanother person. The CA affirmed the trial court's decision but with the modification that dispo in favor of Oning wasvalid.

    Ruling: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the willsought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with theformalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even byimplication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since theconsideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notablecircumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its faceand the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a wilmay be passed upon because "practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or thetestamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absoluteUnderexceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do andpass upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy ofthe provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did nothave to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of thedevisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probatecourt.

    DELA CERNA vs. POTOT

    December 23, 1964

    FACTS: Spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca executed a joint last will and testament whereby they

    willed that the 2 parcels of land acquired they during their marriage be given to Manuela, their niece.

    The will of Bernabe was admitted to probate by final order. The will of Gervasia was declared null and void by the

    CFI for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills.

    HELD: The final decree of the probate of the will Bernabe has conclusive effect. The error committed by the

    probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect

    the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A

    final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.

    But the CA should have taken into account that the probate decree could only affect the share of the deceased

    husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.

    It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death,

    reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

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    Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not

    exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the

    only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

    ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA

    September 14, 1993

    FACTS: The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who

    drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and

    the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

    Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already

    suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the

    notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who

    read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial

    will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

    HELD: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another,

    are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an

    instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was

    substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied

    the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all

    kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege

    In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three

    instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked

    that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.

    GARCIA vs. VASQUEZ

    32 SCRA 490

    FACTS: The oppositors challenged the correctness of the admission of the will for probate on the ground that the

    testatrix eyesight was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the

    testimonies of witnesses. The ophthalmologist testified that the vision of the testatrix remained mainly for viewing

    distant objects and not for reading print.

    HELD: Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of the 1960 will

    acquires striking significance. Upon, its face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment

    were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, so much so that the words had to be written very close to the

    top, bottom and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the word "and" had to be written by the

    symbol "&," apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective

    vision of Doa Gliceria. The typographical errors remained uncorrected thereby indicating that the execution thereof

    must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing

    the final disposition of one's worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidily written

    instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually

    retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so.

    Where Article 808 is not complied with, the said will suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution.

    LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN

    66 PHIL 547

    FACTS:Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3 rd person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt, he died. Butwhen he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been succession between Lorenzo and Anna. So

    Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from

    Lorenzo.

    ISSUE:Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?

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    RULING:No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to the extentof the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should only be to the value of

    the debts. But there was no property left. So the value of the inheritance is zero. The debts cannot be enforced

    against Anna because Anna inherited nothing.

    Johny Rabadilla v. Court of AppealsG.R. No, 113725; June 29, 2000

    Facts: Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla

    as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of a parcel of land in Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-in-interest of thepetitioner. The codicil was duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. The codicil stated that shouldthe devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicialso required Rabadilla to deliver75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuellay Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heirshall later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver thepiculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).In 1989, Maria Marlena brought acomplaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of thetestator. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court..

    Ruling:Yes. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrixintended a mere simple substitution. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla hadby virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations notextinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicilon the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. In the saidCodicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufructthereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, hiscompulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his(decedent's)obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heirreciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which isnow being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has acause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.Modal Institutions::*Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because whatthe testatrix intended was a substitution- the contention is without merit. In simple substitutions, the second heir takesthe inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case underconsideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to

    predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codiciprovides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the propertyreferred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

    AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. CA

    March 7, 2000

    FACTS: Private respondents set up the defense of ownership and questioned the title of Aznar to the subject lot, alleging that the

    Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being fraudulently made.

    Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta participated in the extrajudicial partition and that 2 person who

    participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta.

    HELD: Under Article 1104, partition made with preterition shall not be rescinded unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud

    In this case, there was no evidence of bad faith or fraud.

    As to the 2 parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is applicable. The participation of non-heirs does no

    render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding them.

    AJERO vs. CA

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    September 15, 1994

    FACTS: The petition for probate of the will was opposed on the ground that it contained alterations and corrections which were not

    duly signed by decedent.

    HELD: Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic

    will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be

    effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

    Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.

    Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on

    testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in

    disallowance of such changes.

    KALAW vs. RELOVA

    January 15, 1990

    FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that it contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the prope

    authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.

    HELD: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic will have not been

    noted under his signature, the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased

    corrected or interlined.

    However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by

    substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full

    signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains

    in the will after that which could remain valid.

    That change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her

    full signature.

    JABONETA vs. GUSTILO

    January 19, 1906

    FACTS: There were 3 witnesses as to the execution of the will of Jaboneta. Jena signed first, followed by Jalbuena. At that moment

    Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the room, Jena saw Javellana, the 3rd witness, took

    the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Jena. Nevertheless, afte

    Jena had left the room, Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Jalbuena. (pansin ko lang puro

    J ang surname sa testator ug witnesses .. hehe )

    HELD: The will should be admitted to probate. It is not required that the witness must see the actual signing of the other witnesses.

    The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to be that the testator may have

    ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence

    are vision and mental apprehension.

    The true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him signconsidering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription.

    The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being

    written, is of no importance. At the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document, he was actually and physically presen

    and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper

    direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so.

    MICIANO vs. BRIMO

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    November 1, 1924

    FACTS: The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G

    Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The will provided that his property be disposed of in

    accordance with the laws in the Philippines. Otherwise, if relatives does not respect such wish, any disposition favorable tot them shal

    be annulled.

    HELD: The Turkish laws should be followed.

    However, the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as

    he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, theyare presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, following the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION . It has

    not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are.

    It should be noted that the condition stated in the will is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law

    when such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition is considered unwritten.

    LLORENTE vs. CA

    November 23, 2000

    FACTS: Llorente, enlisted as a serviceman of the US navy, was married to a Filipina. He was later on admitted as a US citizen. When

    he went to back to the Philippines, he filed for divorce since he found out that his wife was having an adulterous relationship with his

    brother. Thereafter, he married his 2

    nd

    wife. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will and bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3children.

    HELD: Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issued best proved by foreign law which must be

    pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine

    law. The will was duly probated.

    The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children is glaringly shown in the will he executed. The

    SC does not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition

    and legal capacity.

    NB: In this case, it must be noted that Llorente was already an American citizen ***

    CANEDA vs. CA

    May 28, 1993

    FACTS: The oppositors of the probate of the will asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation

    clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the

    presence of the testator and of each other.

    HELD: Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of

    one another. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical

    and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication

    but subscription, on the other hand, is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of

    identification.

    What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that thetestator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages

    that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective

    signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

    What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereo

    in the presence of the testator and of one another.

    The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance o

    the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.

    RODELAS vs. ARANZA

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    December 7, 1982

    FACTS: The petition was opposed on the ground that the alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be

    produced, otherwise it would produce no effect.

    HELD: A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the

    standard writings of the testator. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted

    because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

    BAGTAS vs. PAGUIO

    March 14, 1912

    FACTS: Paguio suffered from paralysis of the left side of his body until his death. In the probation of his will, it was contended that he

    was not in full enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a will

    HELD: In this jurisdiction, there is a presumption in favor of mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of

    the will to prove the lack of the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. In this case, the testator has never been

    adjudged insane. Paralysis is not equivalent to mental incapacity.

    It is not necessary that a person must be in full possession of his mental and reasoning faculties to be able to be considered of

    sound mind. It is not necessary that his mind be unbroken, unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

    CRUZ vs. VILLASOR

    November 26, 1973

    FACTS: Of the 3 instrumental witnesses thereto, Atty. Teves, Jr. is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was

    supposed to have been acknowledged. As the 3 rd witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only 2

    witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will.

    HELD: The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was

    acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his

    having signed the will. If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having signed

    the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other

    to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.