Subterranean Sources of Juvenile Delinquencyin China: Evidence from Birth Cohort Surveys

David Drissel

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract This article examines possible reasons for the dramatic rise in Chinese juveniledelinquency rates that have occurred since the start of economic reform. The article focuseson the degree to which relatively recent modifications in the ideology and practice ofChinese communism have engendered new social pressures and strains on young people.Delinquents’ social values are compared with those of non-delinquent youth, drawingheavily from data collected in a longitudinal birth cohort study. The dataset is assessed forevidence of subterranean values; i.e., subculture-based reflections of principles foundwithin the dominant political culture; based on the theory that youthful deviance anddelinquency in China are fueled primarily by the relatively rapid diffusion of often-contradictory market-based precepts. The lingering impact of Maoism is also assessed,particularly with regard to incongruous ideological influences on youth.

Keywords Juvenile delinquency . Subterranean values . Maoism . Chinese communism .

Youth subcultures . Birth cohort . Economic reform

1 Introduction

In the years following the advent of economic reform in the People’s Republic of China,juvenile delinquency rates began skyrocketing, while youth subcultures became increas-ingly commonplace. Previously forbidden and repressed by communist authorities,identifiable youth subcultures began appearing soon after China’s opening to the West inthe late 1970s. Though Chinese officials have instituted substantive reforms in theeconomy, they have remained unwilling to fully acknowledge the social, cultural, andpolitical implications of those reforms. While the communist party has substantiallyloosened its totalitarian grip and orchestrated Western-style modernization from above,anachronistic institutions and structures have continued to play a significant role in shapingsociety and influencing public policy. Mao Zedong’s egalitarian exhortations are still

Asian CriminologyDOI 10.1007/s11417-006-9011-y

D. Drissel (*)Iowa Central Community College, 330 Ave. M, Fort Dodge, IA 50501, USAe-mail: drissel@iowacentral.com

espoused in schools and within various government agencies, as economic efficiency andentrepreneurship are extolled in the latest party propaganda. Markets are celebrated andwealth accumulation is encouraged, even as capitalism is officially denounced and socialismpraised.

This article grapples with such inherent contradictions, investigating the degree to whichmodifications in the ideology and practice of Chinese communism have engendered newsocial pressures and strains on young people, potentially contributing to substantially higherrates of juvenile delinquency. Though official statistics indicate that China has a relativelylow rate of crime and delinquency compared to other countries,1 the growing incidence ofcriminal and delinquent behavior in China has generated alarm and fueled officialcrackdowns.

Meanwhile, growing numbers of Chinese young people - particularly those who live inmajor cities - have adopted the iconoclastic style and nonconformist demeanor of variousWestern-influenced youth subcultures (e.g., punk rockers, hip-hoppers, head bangers, goths,hippies, skateboarders, ravers, and club kids), apparently spurning the traditional socialvalues and norms of their parents. Such rebellious Chinese youth are often referred tosimply as linglei (i.e., “alternative lifestyle”); which was formerly a term of societal derisionthat in recent years has been redefined as a mostly positive appellation by China’s youth.2

What is the connection, if any, between such emerging youth subcultures and rising ratesof juvenile delinquency in post-Mao China? Has the influx of Western ideas and popularculture somehow fueled the precipitous growth of delinquent behavior? Has theintroduction of more “pragmatic” communist values tied to economic reform in someway encouraged this trend? What role does the highly competitive and cutthroat economicenvironment of post-Mao China play in this regard?

These questions will be addressed by comparing the social values of Chinesedelinquents with those of non-delinquent youth, drawing heavily on data taken from alongitudinal birth cohort study of Chinese juveniles. The dataset includes responses frominterviews with young people conducted in the early 1990s by Marvin Wolfgang andupdated several years later by Friday, Ren, Weitekamp, and Leuven (2003).3 Therespondents include both offenders and non-offenders born in 1973 in the Wuchangdistrict of Wuhan - a populous commercial and residential city located in central China.4 Asa replication of an earlier birth cohort study conducted by Wolfgang, Ferracuti, and Sellin(1972) in Philadelphia, the dataset features interviews with all known delinquents as of1990 when the cohort reached age 17. In the aftermath of Wolfgang’s death in 1998, Fridayet al. revised and reconfigured the cohort data, conducted follow-up interviews, andcollected additional residential, demographic, and criminal history data on offenders andnon-offenders identified.

1 According to recent Interpol figures, China was ranked 111 out of 113 countries surveyed for the incidenceof crime (Jensen, 2003:21).2 During my most recent trip to China in June-July 2005, I talked to over 50 teenagers and young adultsabout linglei and related youth subcultures. The vast majority of youths described linglei in relativelypositive terms. Several even described themselves as linglei or panni (“rebel”). Many young people told methat linglei is not simply external (e.g., bizarre clothes, piercings, tattoos, dyed hair) but also internal. Lingleiwere said to be independent thinkers and individualists, living their lives as they see fit within an otherwisehighly collectivist and conformist society.3 The Wolfgang-Friday cohort study was the first of its kind to be conducted in a developing country andapparently the only one to ever focus on a nation-state currently governed by a communist party.4 The capital of Hubei province, Wuhan has a population of 6,532,563 and the Wuchang district is the mostpopulous area of Wuhan.

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Included in the dataset is a summary of respondents’ educational ambitions and schoolgraduation rates, family socioeconomic status, incidence of family quarrelling and domesticdisputes, number and type of delinquent acts, reasons for committing delinquent acts,opinions about labor, personal interests and priorities, rates of chronic offending anddesistence, and other pertinent information.

This article will examine the Wuhan cohort database for specific evidence ofsubterranean values; i.e., subcultural reflections of principles found within the dominantpolitical culture; based on the theory that youthful deviance and delinquency in China arefueled primarily by the relatively rapid diffusion and elaboration of new values associatedwith de facto capitalization (e.g., hierarchic self-interest, entrepreneurship, materialism,consumerism, personal enrichment). Perspectives of respondents concerning the acquisitionof money and power, type of ideal job, work ethic, educational ambitions, leisure pursuits,reasons for committing delinquent acts, popular culture and literary interests, and peergroup influences and subcultural affiliations are analyzed. The lingering impact of Maoismand related orthodox communist values are assessed, particularly with regard tocontradictory ideological influences on teens and young adults.

2 Economic Reform and Delinquency

As the first generation to come of age in the post-Mao era, members of the 1973 Wuhancohort presumably experienced the full impact of reforms in Chinese business and industry,foreign trade, agriculture, and technology. Since the dawn of economic reform in the late1970s, China has witnessed unprecedented levels of economic expansion, averaging GDPgrowth rates of nine percent annually from 1978 to 2003. The ongoing transformation ofnumerous collective enterprises into share-holding companies, joint ventures, and privatefirms has transformed the economy and culture, and helped spur this growth. Reversingdecades of egalitarian leveling, over a million Chinese millionaires have emerged in recentyears while poverty has become widespread (Levy, 2002:52).5 China now has more incomepolarization than does the U.S., with the top 20 percent of Chinese households controlling50.2 percent of national income, in contrast to 44.3 percent possessed by the wealthiest fifthin the U.S. (Cao & Dai, 2001:78).

Undoubtedly, there have been clear “winners” and “losers” in post-Mao China, withmarginalized groups (e.g., laid-off workers, informal workers lacking ties to establishedenterprises, rural migrants living in the cities, retired workers) becoming increasinglyvulnerable to the negative externalities of economic reform (Wu, 2004: 401–2).Significantly, there has been a relatively large increase in the number of young people“waiting for jobs” (daiye qingnian), to use the common Chinese euphemism forunemployment. More than 80 percent of all jobless in China are young people, comparedto 47 percent in 1978 (Bakken, 1995:12).

Coinciding with dramatic changes in the economy have been unprecedented increases incrime rates, contributing to widespread speculation that the two phenomena are somehowlinked. Chinese scholars such as Jianming Xiao have argued, for instance that“modernization inevitably causes crime to increase” (paraphrased by Liu & Messner,2001:3). The growing gap between the rich and poor coupled with other forms of inequalityin China are often cited as factors leading to higher rates of crime. The fact that China’s

5 The official Chinese poverty rate is 7 percent, but the World Bank estimates it to be around 33 percent.

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overall crime rate first began increasing in the late 1970s and accelerated as economicreform gained momentum has further fueled such speculation.

In recent decades, the Chinese communist government has strongly asserted the need formaintaining law and order, justifying this goal by invoking the specter of impending “socialchaos.” Though China has maintained relatively low crime rates in comparison with othercountries, the nation has indeed experienced a “crime wave” of sorts, with dramaticincreases in such rates from the late 1970s through at least the early 1990s (Jensen,2003:20). Official records reveal that China’s criminal case rate increased from 56/100,000in 1978 to 200/100,000 in 1991,6 with a quadrupling of the rate from 1988 to 1991. In thedecade of the 1980s alone, crime increased in China by 160 percent (approximately 20percent annually) and remained at relatively high levels from the 1990s to present (Friday etal., 2003:10; Rojek, 2001:99).7

Similarly, juvenile delinquency rates have jumped significantly in recent years, thoughremaining well below those of most other countries. For more than two decades after thefounding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the country maintained extremely lowrates of juvenile delinquency. However, soon after China’s reform policies began in 1978,such rates began to increase dramatically. The number of reported delinquent perpetratorsyounger than 18 years of age increased from 112,063 in 1985 to a high of 205,046 in 1989.Though such perpetrators had decreased to 152,755 by 1995, this figure was still a greatdeal higher than that found in the pre-reform period (Xiang, 1999:61–63).

A 1992 report on juvenile delinquency estimated that only 0.3% of teens and youngadults under the age of 25 had committed a criminal or delinquent offense (Curran & Cook,1993:296); though juveniles aged 14 to 258 commit a relatively large percentage of crime inChina (Gang, 1992:23).9 Moreover, China’s rate of juvenile delinquency as a percentage ofoverall criminal activity ranked very high in comparison to other countries. Bakken (1995)notes that Chinese juveniles aged 14 to 18 commit offenses at two to three times the ratio ofyouth in other countries surveyed. Recent figures indicate that the ratio of cases involvingjuvenile delinquents compared to the number of criminal cases in society at large hasjumped from 11.8 percent in 2000 to 18.9 percent in 2003.10 Authorities arrested 69,780youthful offenders in 2003, which was an increase of 12.7 percent over 2002.11

Such increases in China’s crime and juvenile delinquency rates are startling,particularly given the fact that serious crimes such as robbery, rape, homicide, aggravatedassault, theft, and fraud increased tenfold from 1979 to 1990. According to recent reports,

6 This rate is considerably lower than that found in many Western countries, with Germany, for instance,having a rate of 7,625 out of 100,000 and the U.S. registering 4,266.8 out of 100,000 according to 1999figures (Friday et al., 2003:10).7 Chinese crime and delinquency figures may be somewhat misleading and artificially low due to the factthat many offenses go unreported, while Chinese police have substantial leeway in handling public safetyviolations informally.8 The Chinese juvenile justice system has jurisdiction over offenders between the ages of 13 to 25.9 Gang (1992:23) notes, “Adolescent crimes committed in China went up as the average age of the criminalsdropped. Investigations show that the average age of youngsters who violated laws for the first time is nowabout 14 years old compared with 16.7 prior to 1990 and the number of teenage criminals continued toincrease each year.”10 Figures provided by Huang Jingjun, National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political ConsultativeConference member. From 2000 to 2003, the yearly figures were 11.8 percent, 12 percent, 13.4 percent, and18.9 percent respectively (News Guangdong, March 11, 2005).11 The same report indicates that 317,925 juveniles were arrested from 1998 to 2003, accounting for 7.3percent of the total number of criminal suspects arrested in that period (China Daily May 29, 2004).

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96.8 percent of juvenile delinquents arrested and incarcerated since the early 1990s havebeen held on charges of robbery, murder, sexual assault, and personal abuse (China Daily,June 6, 2004). Drug-related offenses have likewise shown a marked increase, especiallyamong youthful offenders (Travis, 2004:1). Prostitution has become increasingly commonin urban areas, with massage parlors, karaoke bars, and hair salons often serving asdaytime fronts for illicit nighttime activities. Youth gangs have proliferated also, with agrowing proportion of offenders identifying themselves as gang members. ThoughChinese gangs are mostly informal cliques, others have developed with clearly definedleaders, membership rosters, territorial turf, and esoteric initiation rites (Zhang, Messner,Lu, & Deng, 1997:292–294).

In general, crime and delinquency are concentrated in urban centers and particularly inlow-income neighborhoods. Major cities such as Wuhan, Beijing, Shanghai, andGuangzhou have witnessed much higher jumps in crime and delinquency rates than thenational average.12 A related demographic trend has been the mass migration of teens andyoung adults from the countryside to major cities, often working for relatively meagerwages.13 As a result, many migrating youth leave home at an earlier age than in the pastand are much less influenced by their families due to physical separation. Many Chinesesociologists have speculated that this trend has seriously weakened the socializing role ofthe family and contributed to soaring rates of delinquency and other forms of deviance(Curran & Cook, 1993:306). Such social phenomena apparently have fueled the ranks ofemerging subcultures, as well as street gangs, by providing a steady pool of potential“recruits” from the new “army” of impoverished and migrating youths.

Many other factors have apparently contributed to spiraling rates of delinquency,including a dramatic demographic shift for China that began in the early 1980s due to asudden increase in the youth population. Baby boomers born during the CulturalRevolution period had finally reached adolescence and young adulthood, leading to amajor generational shift. This trend peaked in 1988 when young people accounted for 75.7percent of all criminal offenders.14 The figures have declined slightly every year since thattime, as the number of Chinese youths entering their teen years has steadily decreased innumber,15 though the rates remain very high compared to the pre-reform period (Bakken,1995:6, 11–12). However, such demographic explanations alone appear insufficient toexplain such a massive increase in delinquency rates, particularly when such illicit behavioris occurring within a highly punitive and authoritarian setting.

3 The Social Values of Youth Subcultures

Youth subcultures in China, as in the West, can be defined as groups of teenagers andyoung adults sharing certain common cultural features and appearing to have collectivevalues, norms and roles that differ substantially from the larger culture (Johnston & Snow,

12 Crime has increased most rapidly in so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that have maintained theleast government oversight of industry and the most open foreign trade policies (Curran & Cook, 1993:308).13 Solinger (1999:21) notes that the overwhelming majority of migrants are young to middle-aged, andmostly male.14 In contrast, Chinese juveniles reportedly committed approximately 10–20 percent of all offenses in the1950s and 30 percent in the 1960s (Feng, 2001:125).15 More recent estimates place the proportion of criminal offenders under age 25 at 65 to 70 percent(Du, 1995).

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1998:474). Those who identify with certain subcultures tend to have a distinctappearance, demeanor, argot, slang, and slogans. Other common traits include sharedsymbols, myths, behaviors, networks, rituals, and collective identities. Western andWestern-influenced (hybridized) youth subcultures tend to embrace particular musicalgenres and other verbal and written communication forms, with a primary reliance onalternative methods of information dissemination (e.g., amateur publications andpamphlets, posters, graffiti, independent and bootleg recordings of music, tattoos andother body modifications, web sites) that tend to circumvent centralized social control orbureaucratic oversight.

For years, criminologists in the West have debated the demographic (i.e., social class)origins of seemingly distinctive social values embraced by adherents of various youth sub-cultures. Some have argued that such values develop primarily within the subculture (e.g.,Cohen, 1955, Miller, 1958, Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967); while others have maintained thatthey are actually subterranean reflections of core values originating within the dominantculture (e.g., Hagan, 1991; Matza & Sykes, 1961). The former viewpoint depicts delinquentvalues (e.g., distain for education, glorification of violence) as emanating from the lowerclasses and in direct opposition to the values and norms of middle class life (e.g., the ethicof hard work and educational achievement), while the later viewpoint essentially blamesdelinquent behavior on inherent contradictions and normative inconsistencies within thedominant culture or strata.

In enunciating the first viewpoint, Cohen (1955) contends that delinquents from workingclass backgrounds typically reject prevailing middle class standards promoted by educationalinstitutions and family life. Delinquents adjust to their environment through “a process ofreaction formation, in which the academic success typically denied working-class boys iscontemptuously redefined as the ‘bookish knowledge’ of ‘sissies’; whereas ‘street knowledge,’which is learned from friends in the delinquent gang, is regarded as superior to other forms ofknowledge” (cited in Beirne and Messerschmidt 1991:440–44). Miller (1958) reports thatdelinquents typically reflect the “focal concerns” of the working and lower classes (e.g.,“trouble, toughness, smartness, excitement, fate, and autonomy”) that differ greatly from thoseof the middle class. Such distinct values are derived from the “structural position” and socialclass origins of delinquents (Beirne and Messerschmidt, 444–445). Elaborating on this thesis,Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) argue that distinct values associated with a “subculture ofviolence” are particularly widespread among crime-prone, impoverished groups.

In contrast, Matza and Sykes (1961) postulate that the dominant culture contains conflicting“edge” (a.k.a. “subterranean”) values that exist side by side with more cautious and austere“mainstream” values. The authors theorize that the U.S. and other capitalist societies primarilypromote conforming-producing values such as stability, predictability, austerity, and security.But such societies also encourage people to seek the accumulation of “big money,” as well asto engage in periodic recreational activities that lead to the reinforcement of risk-orientedvalues such as adventure, excitement, hedonism, and thrill seeking. For the most part, suchvalues are permitted by the dominant culture only during ephemeral periods of leisure that arelargely demarcated from the workplace. The authors argue that the delinquent tends to blursuch leisure/work distinctions. As Matza and Sykes note:

“The delinquent has picked up and emphasized one part of the dominant value system,namely, the subterranean values that coexist with the other, publicly proclaimed valuespossessing a more respectable air” (717).

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Rather than being in direct opposition to middle class standards, such subterraneanvalues are “familiar and within limits tolerated by broad segments of the adult population”(quoted by Hagan et al., 312). Delinquent youth therefore do not actually violate the valuesof the dominant culture per se but instead go beyond the acceptable parameters normallytolerated within a given setting. They then attempt to free themselves from social controlsthat typically impose limits by rationalizing and justifying such behavior. Such“neutralization” techniques effectively shield delinquent youth from experiencing shameor guilt when their activities are detected (Sykes and Matza cited in Beirne andMesserschmidt 453–454). When apprehended or discovered, delinquents typically seek toblame others for their infractions (e.g., peers, family, and school) and engage in variousforms of neutralization. Such neutralization tactics as “denial of responsibility,” “denial ofinjury,” “denial of victim,” “condemnation of condemners,” and “appeal to higher loyalties”are fairly common among delinquents.

Hagan (1991) applies this theory more specifically to subcultures, concluding thatsubterranean values permeate popular culture and are transmitted to subcultures primarilythrough movies, television, magazines, music, and other media. Hagan maintains that thepresence of such values indirectly encourages the coalescence and development of deviantyet relatively harmless “party subcultures” which are prevalent in society and overlap withsmaller and potentially more dangerous “delinquent subcultures.”

In a more recent study involving the role of subterranean values in shaping Germandelinquent subcultures, Hagan, Hefler, Classen, Boehnke, and Merkens (1998) found thatsuch values are particularly pronounced in countries where market principles areintroduced rapidly. The authors determined that youth in the former (communist-dominated) East Germany were much more likely than their West German counterpartsto express “hierarchic self-interest” and other subterranean values tied to economiccompetition and individualism. The authors conclude that the globalization of marketforces had engendered new value contradictions and a heightened potential for “anomicamorality” among youth within transitional societies. Under these conditions, subterra-nean values associated with capitalism such as egocentrism, materialism, and greedbecame particularly pronounced. The authors report that East Berlin youth were “morevulnerable” than their West Berlin counterparts to “the accentuation, exaggeration, anddistortion of these market-driven values,” thus providing fertile ground for escalatingrates of delinquent behavior (321–323).

This finding adds weight to the contention that delinquent youth subcultures are notonly more likely to develop in complex modern societies, but are also more apt to emergein countries that are undergoing profound socioeconomic, systemic transformations.China - which is evolving from a totalitarian, economically centralized, and predomi-nately rural society to an authoritarian, decentralized, and increasingly urban society -seems to fit this description. In fact, China had “moved from the ranks of the world’s mostegalitarian societies to one of the most unequal in its distribution of income, wealth, andopportunity” by the early 1990s (Perry and Selden 2001:5).

In contrast to the former East Germany, the communist party remains in charge of China andis orchestrating market reforms from above while continuing to promote seemingly conflictingvalues and policies in other respects. One could therefore theorize that contemporary China -with its evident ideological disjuncture - is more prone to experience exaggerated contra-dictions between “mainstream” and “edge” values than the former East Germany, therebyengendering an even stronger impact on delinquent behavior among youth.

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4 Paradigm Shift in Chinese Values

Prior to the launching of economic reform, the social integration process in communist-dominated China unequivocally emphasized utopian or “proletarian” values such asideological purity, self-sacrifice, communalism, benevolence, heroism, conformity, equality,frugality, generosity, and eagerness to work for the collective good (Liu & Messner,2001:7). Since that time, antithetical “bourgeois” values more in line with a marketeconomy have been introduced such as pragmatism, individualism, self-sufficiency,consumerism, entrepreneurship, efficiency, financial enrichment, upward mobility, authen-ticity, and an eagerness to work for oneself. Government slogans exhorting people to makemoney through hard work (e.g., “getting rich is glorious”) have seemingly supplantedaltruistic admonitions of the past (e.g., “to serve the people”).

The “new” China, as Rojek (2001) observes, “seems to be predicated on anindividualism that counters communalism, and on a frenzied striving for wealth andmaterial goods that weakens, if not destroys, the very essence of interpersonal obligations”(96). Hanser (2002:190) notes that competition has always existed in China, but “theparadigm has clearly shifted from one in which competition was characterized by anexplicitly political, virtuocratic set of criteria to an increasingly profit-seeking framework inwhich success or failure is built on autonomous choices and individual ability, initiative,and effort”. Subterranean values that are indirectly linked to economic reform such asdomination, hedonism, narcissism, thrill seeking, risk-taking, immediate gratification,fatalism, and toughness have become visibly apparent in China as well, most obviously viathe Internet and Western-influenced movies, novels, magazines, TV shows, popular music,and newspaper tabloids.16

This apparent paradigm shift in values has generated a great deal of controversy andconcern within China. In recent years, many Chinese criminologists and other socialscientists have referred to an “ideological crisis among China’s youths,” lamenting thatmany - if not most - young people no longer share their traditional ideals and values. Thestrong inference of such a viewpoint is that the communist party has allowed Maoism to besupplanted by a new set of Western-influenced values, leading many young people toabandon the traditional foundation of Chinese communist society.17

Kwong (1994) questions this widely held assertion, noting instead that the origin of theso-called “youth ideological crisis” was sparked by conflicting values and ideals existingwithin China’s political culture. She contends that the egalitarian Maoist values of yearspast constituted an “official utopian ideology” that in some respects was minimized but notdiscarded after Deng Xiaoping and other reformers assumed the reigns of power. Ratherthan completely breaking with the past, economic reformers enunciated new market-basedvalues while clinging to the Maoist mantle in order to maintain political legitimacy. TheDengist pragmatic values constitute what Kwong terms the “advertised official ideology.”Many new problems in Chinese society are related to conflicts and contradictions that haveemerged between the values of the new advertised official ideology and those of the olderutopian ideology. Rather than presenting their revamped positions on the market and private

16 For a discussion of media sensationalism of crime in tabloid newspapers and other periodicals, see Zhao(2002).17 For example, Cheng Zhiang has argued that the values of socialism have been systematically discardedand are in danger of being replaced by “philistinism,” “egoism,” “money worship,” “hedonism,” and otherWestern-influenced beliefs and practices (1999:48–53).

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property within a completely different ideological context, the reformers portray themselvesas good communists in the tradition of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. As Kwong contends:

(The reformers) ignored the contradictions. Instead they emphasized the pragmaticbenefits and called themselves socialists. Continuing to label themselves socialists,however, introduced elements of tension and hypocrisy in the official culture (249).

Such contradictory messages are particularly evident in the ideal youth culturepromulgated by the Chinese educational system. Chinese youth are taught at a very earlyage to believe in such utopian Maoist ideals as self-sacrifice, heroism, conformity, andausterity, but are simultaneously exposed in other ways to the newer values of the“advertised” ideology. Such reformist values such as individualism, entrepreneurship, andmaterialism are touted by the regime, despite relatively obvious contradictions with certainutopian values. New market-oriented policies have given rise to corruption andmalfeasance, which further undermine the official utopian ideology.18 As Kwong explains,young people are thereby compelled to selectively filter, modify, reject, and internalizeaspects of both official ideologies (251).

5 Evidence of Subcultures in Birth Cohort Surveys

Within the original Wuhan birth cohort identified by Wolfgang, 81 out of 5,341 peoplestudied had acquired criminal records by the time of the first interview.19 This was arelatively small number of offenders when compared to longitudinal studies of delinquentsin other countries, with the Wuhan sample representing only 1.5% of the population.Gender was an obvious factor in the cohort sample with 76 males (2.8 percent) and onlyfive women (0.2 percent) designated as offenders. The researchers matched a controlsample of 81 respondents that had similar parental economic status and occupation,demographic background, and lived in comparable neighborhood school districts. Thesample of offenders was labeled “Group A,” while the non-offending control sample wasdesignated “Group B.” Interviews were conducted with all 162 persons between 1991 and1992 while the respondents were 18 years old, defined as juveniles under Chinese law.20

The most frequent crimes committed by offenders in the sample were as follows: 61.8percent committed burglaries or thefts, 20.6 percent were arrested for fights and injuries,and 17.6 percent were involved in hooliganism or other altercations. The vast majority ofthe offenders (97.1 percent) were arrested for the first time between the ages of 15 to 17,with 12.3 percent of the sample being repeat offenders with at least two arrests. It isimportant to note that none of the offenders violated the law single-handedly (at least at thetime of arrest); 52.9 percent acted with two to five other people while 47.1 percent actedwith at least six others.

18 According to Transparency International, China has one of the most corrupt economies in the world (citedin Link et al. 2002:7).19 It is important to note that this 1973 birth cohort did not include any representatives of the so-called“floating population.” The mass exodus of rural peasants to the cities did not begin until after 1978, therebyprecluding a presence in this particular urban cohort. For this reason, the incidence of offending among thoseliving in Wuhan of the same age as the original cohort may be underrepresented.20 Friday et al. (2003) later revised the cohort sample in 2000 and made projections concerning offendingrates for those at age 18 and 27.

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Though the Wuhan study did not focus on the existence of delinquent subcultures per se,a number of factors examined by the researchers indicate the existence of differentialassociation, distinct peer influences, and other demographic affinities. To begin with, thestudy states that none of the offenders acted alone. This fact effectively demonstrates thesaliency of peers and the probable presence of subcultural or gang formations. Importantdemographic data also point to the presence of dysfunctional family and educationalenvironments shared by many offenders. For instance, the study found that the parents ofoffenders tend to have substantially lower educational levels than the non-offendingsample. This factor was statistically significant for the offenders’ fathers in particular. Whilemany of the offending sample’s fathers (40.7 percent) completed middle school butadvanced no further, a much smaller percentage (17.3 percent) completed college.Conversely, only 24.7 percent of the non-offenders’ fathers completed middle school,while 30.9 percent finished college.

Seeming to follow in their fathers’ footsteps, a majority of offenders obtained lowerlevels of education than those in the control group. Only 11.1 percent of offendersgraduated from senior middle school (i.e., equivalent to American high school) and nonecompleted college.21 In contrast, 50.6 percent of non-offenders received senior middleschool diplomas while 16 percent completed a higher education degree. Offenders reportedmuch lower expectations for education, with 50 percent even stating that they had noeducational goals or plans whatsoever. Dropping out or being expelled from school waslikewise more common for offenders than non-offenders. While 23 percent of offenders leftschool prior to graduation, only 4.5 percent of non-offenders dropped out. Not a single non-offender in the sample was expelled from school, in contrast to 17.3 percent of offenders.

Putting these figures in context with the larger population, only one in four Chinesestudents gains admittance to college; due in part to intense competition for a very limitednumber of places. The so-called “narrowing gate” phenomenon,22 or winnowing of studentsthrough competitive placement as they progress through the school system, effectivelylimits educational opportunities for the majority. The potential strain of dishonor and familystigmatization can be enormous and devastating for those who are shut out of the system(Curran & Cook, 1993:304–305). Job prospects are seriously compromised for youngpeople lacking adequate education. Even when employed, such undereducated youngpeople become particularly vulnerable to the “vagaries of the labor market” and aretypically the first to be laid off (Hansen, 2002:198).

Family and socioeconomic background appears to be important in other respects as well,with the fathers of offenders in the cohort sample most likely to be employed as industrialworkers (43.8 percent) or self-employed business operators (28.8 percent). In contrast, non-offenders’ fathers most often worked as technicians, teachers, or in other white-collarprofessions (44.5 percent total). Though 8.8 percent of the offenders’ fathers wereunemployed at the time of the interview, none of the control group’s fathers were out ofwork. Delinquents were more likely than non-delinquents to identify their “ideal job” asbeing a blue-collar worker or private businessman. This data seems to confirm Miller’stheory, cited earlier, that a lower or working class background is a common precondition fordelinquent behavior.

21 Gang (1992:23–24) cited comparable figures, noting that approximately 80 percent of juvenile delinquentsin China do not graduate from senior middle school.22 This term was coined in Taiwan where competition with other students intensifies as each grade iscompleted, with opportunities to attend the “better schools” seriously contested from a young age.

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In addition, newspapers and books were much less common in the households ofoffenders than non-offenders. Corporal punishment was more frequently administered fordelinquents than the control group. Advanced technological devices and appliances wereless common in the offenders’ homes and positive interactions with parents were lesscommon as well. Significantly, divorced or frequently quarreling parents were almost twiceas likely to be found in the homes of offenders (59.3 percent) as non-offenders (35.1percent).

6 Evidence of Subcultures Related to Peers and Pop Culture

Family, educational, and socioeconomic factors combined would seem to indicate acommon, at-risk, offender profile;23 one that was more inclined to be influenced by otherlike-minded offenders. According to the Wuhan study, exposure to negative peer influenceswas particularly pronounced for offenders (83.7 percent) compared to non-offenders (only20.5 percent). Delinquent respondents, in contrast to the control group, generally spentmore time with their peers and claimed that their friends were especially prone to fighting,truancy, trouble-making, and missing work. Most noteworthy in this regard was the findingthat “respondents who indicated that they were exposed to delinquent peers were nearlyseven times more likely to be offenders than those who were not exposed to delinquentpeers, controlling for the importance of friends as role models” (Friday et al., 2003:66).

Delinquents, in contrast to non-delinquents, were much more likely to have a friend(“capable buddy”) who served as an informal role model.24 When asked for the “mainreasons” why they committed crimes, offenders most often blamed “the influence of friends”(37 percent). Other important reasons cited (in rank order) include the influence of TV andfilm (21 percent), being loyal to one’s friends (17.3 percent), and being fond of dressing up,playing, and accumulating money (16 percent).

In many respects, the Wuhan cohort data seem to reflect Cohen’s observations involvingthe so-called “street knowledge” of offenders contrasted to the “bookish knowledge” ofnon-offenders. This was particularly evident in divergent responses to questions involvingoffenders’ and non-offenders’ reading and television viewing preferences. Offenders’primary interests (in rank order) included war stories, detective stories, martial arts and fairytales, comedy, historical stories, and scientific knowledge. Such stories of war, crime, andmartial arts often glamorize violence and reward brute strength and individual fightingskills. Non-offenders selected more highbrow pursuits such as scientific knowledge andphilosophy of life, followed by war stories and fairy tales, historical stories, and detectivestories.

Several Chinese criminologists have noted the disproportionate interest of delinquentsfor Western-influenced popular culture and have blamed related music, movies and booksfor inciting crime and inspiring street gangs. Rock and roll (yaogun)25 and related fashion

23 Friday et al. (2003:85) note that the delinquent sample is defined as “being at risk” due to the “absence ofbonds or rather loose bonds to conventional societal norms.24 Significantly, a “capable buddy” was selected by 58 percent of offenders as a role model, but by only 29.6percent of non-offenders.25 During the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath, rock and roll was officially banned in China.Beginning in the early 1980s, rock music tapes were smuggled into China from the West and disseminatedwidely, leading eventually to the de facto decriminalization of the genre by communist authorities in the early1990s. For more on the evolution of rock music in China see Jones (1992).

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trends are often cited as negative influences in this regard. For instance, Xincai (1995:79–81) postulates that when young people “follow the fashion” by embracing the latestclothing, recreation, and music trends they are much more prone to adopt inappropriatesocial values as a consequence. In particular, he expressed his deepest concern for youthwho copy “the hair-styles and clothes of movie stars and pop singers,” noting that “thedesire to be trendy” inevitably leads to delinquent behavior.

A number of Chinese criminologists also cite martial arts movies as an important factorfueling delinquent behavior (e.g., Ge, 1986; Du, 1995; Qiancheng, 1987; Xincai, 1988;Zhiang, 1999; Zimu, 1999). Dong (1995) surveyed 322 youthful offenders incarcerated indetention centers during 1988 and found that martial arts was the most popular genre oftelevision programming, novels, and movies, according to 33.5 percent of respondents.

Ironically, martial arts movies - often imported from the US, Hong Kong, and Taiwan - haveapparently helped generate a resurgence of traditional, pre-communist, “secret societies”(Dutton, 1998: 180). An increasing percentage of juvenile delinquency in China is gangrelated, with recent surveys indicating as high a rate as 70 percent (Xiang, 1999:64). Manyyouthful adherents of such gangs have adorned themselves with various tattoos, worn assubcultural badges of honor. As a form of “ink punishment” meted out in traditional China toshame the offender and warn fellow residents in the community of potential danger, the tattoohas been rehabilitated as a ritual of rebellion for many youth (Dutton, 1998:180).26

In sum, offenders in the Wuhan cohort, in contrast to the non-offending sample, weremore likely to come from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds, achieve less education, havemore limited educational and occupational aspirations, grow up in dysfunctional families,gain heightened exposure to negative peer influences and role modeling, and develop astrong interest in Western-influenced (and often violent-laden) genres of popular cultureand related rituals.

7 Evidence of Subterranean Values held by Offenders

Even though there are many distinct subcultural attributes that distinguish offenders fromnon-offenders in the cohort group studied, there is also evidence that many values of thedelinquents surveyed reflect the “advertised” pragmatic ideology of post-Mao China. Whenasked to list “the most important things in life,” offenders responded by answering “money”(86.4 percent), “power and influence” (75.3 percent), “freedom and enjoyment” (61.7percent), “position” (35.8 percent), and “happiness in social contacts” (14.8 percent).27

Non-offenders responded to the same question with somewhat different priorities, listing“knowledge” (50.6 percent), “position” (39.5 percent), “money” (38.3 percent), “a stablelife” (30.9 percent), and “achievement in career” (29.6 percent) as their top choices. Someof the values embraced by offenders had significantly less support among the control group,such as “power and influence” and “freedom and enjoyment.” Even more significant was

26 A recent survey conducted among teens at educational institutions in China found that 7.6 percent hadtattoos. The study also revealed that tattooed youth are more likely to have been arrested than those withouttattoos (Jian, 1998:183).27 According to Gang (1992:23), a survey conducted in Zhejiang Teenager Education Center (a reformatoryfor juveniles under age 18) found that “all of the youngsters wanted to satisfy their strong desire for money,ease and comfort by hook or by crook. Their pursuit of these things was influenced by the idea that ‘money isall powerful and ease and comfort come first’ in society.” This survey also found that 72.3 percent ofoffenders had “a strong sense of independence.”

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the finding that many of the values embraced by non-offenders had little or no supportamong the delinquent group, including “maintaining a stable life,” “achievement in career,”“reputation,” and “good behavior.”

Without exception, the top values listed by a majority of offenders are subterraneanreflections of the reformist regime’s agenda, i.e., they are tied to the de facto capitalization ofChina. The egocentric and megalomaniac accumulation of “big money” is tacitly encouragedby economic reform. Wielding power and influence over subordinates is tied to upwardmobility, inequality, and a post-socialist stratification system that has emerged in recentdecades. Economic freedom and enjoyment, spurred on by trade liberalization and higher levelsof disposable income for young people, is inadvertently fueling conspicuous consumption,narcissism, profligacy, greed, hedonism, and even intolerance. Such values are on the fringe ofthe new official ideology; emerging as market-driven reforms and platitudes are taken to theamoral extreme. As Matza and Sykes (1961) contend, most societies normally toleratenarcissistic and hedonistic behavior during intermittent periods of leisure and recreation, butnot otherwise. Chinese delinquents are blurring this distinction and essentially incorporatingselected reform-related subterranean values into their everyday lives.

Meanwhile, the official utopian ideology continues to reverberate throughout Chinesesociety, as evidenced by the preferred values of the non-offending sample. Acquiringknowledge and a stable life are traditional Confucian values and decidedly non-materialistic; therefore essentially Maoist when combined with proletarian exhortations.Frugality and self-sacrifice are prerequisites for achieving knowledge through educationand continue to be stressed by the government and other institutions of society. Thoughaccumulating money was listed as important to non-delinquent respondents, it was morethan two times as important to offenders.

The control group was more likely to report that they were involved in “social activitiesof public interest;” i.e., altruistic community service and volunteerism. Rather thanfocusing on financial remuneration as a motive for such work, non-offenders participatedbecause they believed that these “activities were rewarding in terms of broadening one’sknowledge” and developing societal awareness (Friday et al., 2003: 44, 71). Evidently, thetraditional Maoist exhortation to “serve the people” was valued by non-offenders but notby most offenders. Conformist values in line with Maoism were also evident in therelatively strong emphasis that non-offenders placed on maintaining a good reputationand obeying the rules. It is instructive to note that while 12.3 percent of non-offenders hadlisted “good behavior” as important in life, none of the offenders selected this value asimportant.

The responding groups had major differences in the value placed on work and labor,with offenders being much more likely than non-offenders to state that “labor is tiresomeand they do not like it” (Friday et al., 2003: 44). Paradoxically, a majority of offendersrevealed that their future occupational goals were focused mainly on industrial work ormenial jobs, but seemed unwilling to compete effectively for such jobs. A majority ofoffenders reported that they value money more than anything else and desire to be wealthy,but dislike work. This attitude is consistent with Matza and Sykes’ (1961) argument thatdelinquents tend to prefer leisure to work, though often blurring the lines between the twoin subterranean fashion. Offenders’ hierarchic self-interest in accumulating wealth isthereby coupled with an apparently languid work ethic. The conundrum for offenders is tofind a way to make money without laboring for it. Resorting to thievery and other propertycrimes ostensibly would resolve this contradiction for individual offenders. Indeed, by farthe most common crime for the offending sample is theft and burglary (61.8 percent). Thistype of crime far exceeds all others committed, including fighting and hooliganism.

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Subterranean values are also apparent in offenders’ popular culture interests andsensibilities. War stories, detective stories, martial arts, and fairy tales are directly tied torisk-oriented values such as adventure, excitement, and thrill seeking. These values are onthe edge of the regime’s pragmatic ideology, as entrepreneurship, stockholding, speculation,and other risky values have garnered official sanction. The influence of popular cultureimported from the West and other parts of Asia reinforce these risk-oriented values, with getrich quick schemes and “lifestyles of the rich and famous” parables apparently sparking theinterest of desperate youth.

Chinese delinquents therefore appear to be influenced by the officially “advertised”values of economic reform, but go far beyond the parameters established by the regime. Atthe same time, because offenders in the sample largely come from underprivilegedbackgrounds, they are more likely to develop a sense of relative deprivation,28 therebyencouraging an even greater reliance on unconventional (i.e., illegal) tactics for achievingwealth and power.

8 Conclusion

The People’s Republic of China is in a decades-long socioeconomic transition withoutcommensurate political changes and is therefore prone to experiencing major ideologicalcontradictions. Ruled by communists who have orchestrated a market transition fromabove, the regime has systematically ignored many value-laden incongruities existingbetween economic reform and Maoism. After decades of promoting collectivism, theChinese communist party introduced and promoted antithetical values tied to individualismbeginning in the late 1970s. Rather than present their economic agenda in a completelydifferent ideological context, such “pragmatic” communist reformers wrapped themselvesin Mao’s mantle. Despite unprecedented levels of inequality and corruption, Maoist valuesof the ideal youth culture continue to be promulgated in schools, government agencies, andelsewhere. While the new rich flaunt their wealth, a growing number of unemployed andunderemployed youth languish in poverty.

A close examination of the Wuhan cohort data reveals that the vast majority of offendersborn in 1973 were indeed of lower or working class origin, which has been cited by Miller,Cohen, and other criminologists as a common precondition for delinquent behavior. Mostoffenders in the cohort also had dysfunctional family backgrounds and relatively low levels ofeducational achievement (especially when compared to the control group), thereby lackingsocial status. Offenders tended to share comparable tastes in Western-influenced “lowbrow”popular culture and an aversion to hard work, differing markedly in this regard from non-offenders. Exposure to negative peer influences was especially pronounced for offenders, witha large number claiming to be influenced by friends while committing delinquent acts.Significantly, all of the offenders studied were arrested for violating the law in concert withother youths. The presence of like-minded, trouble-making peers coming from similar at-riskbackgrounds, associating together on a regular basis and seeming to model behavior after oneanother, demonstrates the presence of relatively defined subcultures of delinquency.

However, the offenders studied overwhelmingly expressed a tacit affinity for subterraneanvalues, tied in large measure to the ideology of economic reform. Rather than originating from

28 This term was coined by Ted Robert Gurr, who referred to the potential collective violence orrevolutionary consequence of growing gaps between the rich and poor (cited by Perry and Seldon, 2000:14).

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within the delinquent subculture, as Miller and others would claim, the values of the Wuhanoffenders closely mirrored China’s relatively “mainstream”market-based values, albeit taken tothe amoral extreme. Apparently internalizing important cues and concepts from thegovernment, media, and popular culture, young offenders have elaborated and expanded uponsuch market-based values as materialism, consumerism, enrichment, and risk-taking. Thoughoften overstated and distorted, selected market-influenced values have been adopted by youthliving on the margins, thereby contributing to higher rates of delinquency.

As indicated by their obsession with accumulating money and power, youthful offenderswere much more likely than their non-offending counterparts to reveal hierarchic self-interestand other egocentric sentiments. Lacking adequate cultural and educational resources foracquiring wealth and power through legitimate means, delinquents have embraced alternativeenrichment strategies such as engaging in theft, fraud, burglary, robbery, drug dealing,prostitution, and even organized crime. A top priority for such offenders is accumulating wealthwhile avoiding hard work (as many of China’s nouveau riche often appear to do as well),which inevitably places them at odds with law enforcement.

In contrast, non-offending youth within the cohort have more thoroughly internalized thetraditional values of Maoist ideology such as volunteerism, self-sacrifice, and societalconformism. Though non-offenders indicated that they have developed a relatively strongappreciation for making money via the market economy, a majority said that accumulatingknowledge and receiving non-material rewards for civic activities were even moreimportant. Non-offending respondents revealed unabashed support for traditional/utopianChinese values, thereby embracing “serving the people” and other communitarian andaltruistic ideals overtly. Ironically, most non-offenders were better prepared than offendersto earn large sums of money in China’s market-driven economy, due in large measure to thebenefits accrued from their own cultural and social capital.

These and other value-laden incongruities are linked to the presence of two overlapping -yet distinct - ideologies in present day China: the official utopian ideology and theadvertised official ideology. Young people are thereby subject to an incongruousinstitutional socialization process that stresses the twin icons of Mao and the Market.Despite a paradigm shift in the regime’s policy orientation, the party and related institutionshave continued emphasizing contradictory values. Ideological purity commingles withpragmatism, self-sacrifice with self-interest, financial austerity with credit card debt, classleveling with social inequality, and generosity with greed. Globalization only exacerbatesthese contradictions, with Western-influenced popular culture disseminating capitalistvalues through style, argot, consumption, and assertions of collective identity. Socialnonconformity and amoral individuality become “cool” in the guise of kung fu movies androck music, thereby enhancing peer group solidarity in impoverished local neighborhoods,effectively linked with hybridized subcultures.

Paradoxically, a majority of offenders in the Wuhan study could be described as workingclass, therefore resembling the ideal proletarian construct of conventional Marxism/Maoism. With relative deprivation factored in, such youth would seem tailor made forcollective action in opposition to the new “bourgeois” values of communist party reformers.Why, then, would working class youth embrace such mainstream market-driven values,even in subterranean form?

The answer lies in the ideological contradictions that exist within Chinese society. Suchyouth have been raised in an environment in which money and conspicuous consumption -rather than ideological zeal and Fredness_ - are preferred and more openly touted. Whenyoung people are told to enrich themselves and take risks, while being encouragedsimultaneously to embrace equality and benevolence, they are left with a social conundrum.

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Witnessing the lifestyles of the rich and the famous - vicariously through pop culture and ineveryday life when encountering yuppies on the street - raises youthful expectations that aresoon dashed by the reality of limited educational and occupational opportunities. Suchcontradictions fuel rampant amorality and anomie in China, as Hagen (1998) first noted inreference to the East German case.

It is also paradoxical that two of the top reasons cited by offenders for committingcriminal acts were “the influence of friends” and “being loyal to one’s friends.” On thesurface, such group-based altruism appears at odds with the otherwise egocentric andnarcissistic motivations of a majority of the offender sample. However, the main differencebetween the altruistic tendencies of offenders and non-offenders is the likely beneficiary ofsuch self-sacrifice. “Loyalty” carries divergent connotations depending on the context, withoffenders demonstrating devotion to a peer group or gang, rather than society at large.

Moreover, citing loyalty to friends as a rationale for committing crime could beconstrued as an attempt at neutralization. To paraphrase Matza and Sykes (1961), such an“appeal to higher loyalties” is one of several neutralizing techniques employed bydelinquents, particularly after being discovered, apprehended, or incarcerated. In somerespects, subcultural affiliation is a kind of neutralization technique. Committing crimes ingroups lends itself to an expression of both group loyalty and societal defiance. Delinquentslikely will perceive group-based crime as lessening their responsibility for an offense,thereby neutralizing or at least minimizing personal culpability.

Caught between conflicting sets of regime-promulgated values, Chinese youth are buffetedby multiple expectations and pressures to conform to a variety of disparate roles. Such strainshave taken their toll, particularly with regard to economically disadvantaged youth. Oftendenied educational and social welfare benefits, young people from impoverished or otherwisemarginalized backgrounds experience relative deprivation. In response, scores of young peopleare fashioning new collective identities linked to Western-influenced subcultures. Ironically,many of the egocentric and hedonistic values found within these subcultures mirror those ofeconomic reform - taken to the extreme. Until the Chinese government leadership fullyaddresses the inherent contradictions within their political and socioeconomic system, juveniledelinquency rates will likely continue to soar.

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