Submission to Standards Committee on Lobbying the Scottish Parliament

8/4/2019 Submission to Standards Committee on Lobbying the Scottish Parliament

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SubmissiontoStandardsCommitteeConsultationonLobbyingthe

ScottishParliament

WilliamDinan, DavidMiller, PhilipSchlesinger

StirlingMediaResearchInstitute

UniversityofStirling

Introduction

The StirlingMediaResearchInstitute has been engaged inanongoing

programmeofresearchintothepublicrelationsandlobbyingindustryin

Scotland, theUKandEuropesince 19961.Wehave beenencouraged bythe

StandardsCommitteesrecognitionoftheimportanceoflobbyingasamatter

ofbothprofessionalandpublicconcern, andwewelcometheopportunityto

respondtotheconsultationpaper. Ourcontributionisofferedinthespiritof

independentacademicanalysis.

Wehavemonitoredthegrowthanddevelopmentofthelobbyingindustryin

Scotlandandinterviewedawiderangeoflobbyistsandpublicrelations

professionalsrangingacrossthecommercial(consultancyandin-house)and

voluntarysectors. Aspartofourresearchactivity, theSMRIhas beena

corporatememberofASPAsinceitsinception.Whenwejoined, itwasmade

clearwewereresearchersandnotinanywayengagedinprofessional

lobbying. OurresearchattheUKandEuropeanlevelshasalso broughtusintocontactwithcommercialandvoluntarysectorlobbyistswhoworkin

otherjurisdictions, andhas broadenedourperspectiveontheissuesrelating

tolobbying.

WhatisaLobbyist?

Weacceptthatawidevarietyoforganisationsengageinlobbying. Butitis

hardlyaseriousargumenttosay, aslobbyistssometimesdo, thatlobbying

consultancieshavenothingtodowithlobbying. Thisis becausemany

lobbyistsareextremelykeennottodescribethemselvesaslobbyists. They

useallsorts

ofeu

ph

emismssu

ch

as

poli

ticalco

nsultants

,a

dvocat

es

,pu

blicaffairsadvisersgovernmentrelationscounseletc. Whateverlabeltheyuse,

andhowevermuchtheyclaimtohelpthedemocraticprocess byenabling

dialogueandmutualunderstanding, itremainsthecasethattheyworkfor

clientswhohirethemtopursuetheirownsectionalinterests.

1Political Communication and Democracy Economic and Social Research Council, Award No. L 126 30

100228, (1996-1998) and Political Communication and the Scottish Parliament, Award No. L 327 253003 (1999-2000).


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Wecertainlyacceptthatallorganisationshaveademocraticrighttolobby

theirMSPsandthe Executive andthatall organisationshave arightto

employprofessional advisers. It is, however, fanciful topretend(assome

lobbyistsdo)thatthe abilityto employadvisers isnotsystematically limitedbyresources. Infactlobbyingconsultanciesoverwhelminglyworkfor

businessinterests, whoalsoprovide byfarthelargestproportionoftheir

income.

TheLobbyingIndustry

Itisworthnotingthatmanyofthe biggerlobbyingandpublicrelations

consultanciescurrentlyactive inScotlandare themselvesowned bylarge

multinational communicationconglomerates.

Forexample, mostAPPCScotlandmemberagencieshaveoffices bothin

BrusselsandLondon, andareaffiliatedto, orowned by, communications

conglomerateswithaglobalreach. Scotlandismerelyalocaloutpostofthe

global communications economy. Ofthe eight lobbyingcompanieswith

offices in Scotlandwhoare membersofthe APPC, sixare owned by

multinational communicationconglomerateswithglobal reach:

StrategyinScotland

(partofWestminster Strategy, inturnpartofthe international

Graylinggroup, owned bythe Lopexcommunicationcorporation);Shandwick

(the Scottish branchofthe Interpubliccommunicationconglomerate);GPCScotland

(partoftheglobalGPCnetwork, owned bytheOmnicomgroup, which

hasotherinterestsinScotlandthroughCountrywidePorterNovelli,

whoare membersofASPA);CitigatePublicAffairs

(a branchofCitigate Dewe Rogerson, owned bythe communications

corporationIncepta);GJWScotland

(the Scottishoffice ofGJWGovernmentRelations, recentlyacquired by

BSMGW

orldwide);

APCOScotland

(partofAPCOWorldwide).

These corporationshave theirown interestsacrossthe mediaand

communicationindustries. Oneofthekeyconcernsforthefutureisthe

extenttowhichtheiractivitiesindiffering branchesofthecommunication

industriesmight involve aconflictofinterest. This issue hasnotyet beenof

publicconcern in Scotland. Butatthe UKandglobal levelscommunications

conglomerates increasinglypromote the sectional interestsoftheirclients

throughlobbyingandpublicrelationsactivitieswhilealsoowningnews


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organisationswhicharesupposedtoreportdispassionatelyonthesame

clients. For example ITN andthe PRgiantBursonMarstellerjointlyown

Corporate Television Newswhichmakescorporate videosandvideonews

releases. Therehaverecently beenallegationsthattheprioritiesofCTNs

clientscanaffectITNreportingofpublicissuessuchastheroleofShellin

Nigeria, Shell beingaCTNclient(Monbiot 1998;Whitehead 1998). Whether

theseparticularallegationshavesubstanceornot, theissueofapotential

conflictofinterestisclear. AsthingsstandinScotlandthereareanumberof

prominent broadcastjournalistswho bothworkfororganisationswhich

providemediatrainingtolargeScottishandmultinationalcorporationsand

whoarealsoexpectedtodispassionatelyreporttheactivitiesofthose

corporations.

Suchpotentialconflictsofinterestarecurrentlynotwidelyknownorairedin

Scotlandandarelikelytoremainhiddenintheabsenceofstatutory

regulationwhichwouldrequirethedisclosureofclientsandfees by bothPR

andlobbyingconsultancies.

Lobbyingtradeassociations

Lobbyingtradeassociationsexistlargelyinordertodefendthesectional

interestsoftheirindustries. Bothofthededicatedlobbyingtrade

organisationsintheUK(APPC, ASPA)havecomeintoexistenceinthelast

sixyearsasaresultofjournalisticexposureofallegedlobbyingmalpractice.

Oneoftheirmainaimsinpracticeistoresistproperdemocraticscrutinyof

theiractivities. Tothisendtheywillattempttoportraylobbyingasaharmlessordemocraticallyhelpfulactivityorclaimthattheyrepresenta

widerangeofopinionandinterestsandnotsimplythosewhicharenarrowly

corporate. BothASPAandtheAPPCengageintheformerandASPAinthe

latter. ItistruethatASPAdoeshavememberswhoarenotfrom

corporationsorconsultancies, buttheseareverymuchjuniorpartnersinthe

enterprise. ASPAcurrentlyhasaround 25 paid-upmembers. Ofthese,

aroundtwo-thirdsarefromcorporateorconsultancy backgrounds. Inessence

thetradeassociations(andthewiderPRassociationssuchastheIPRand

PRCA)areself-interestedactorsinthisdebate.

Thecaseforregulation

AtpresentthesystemofregulationinScotlandisverysimilartothatof

Westminster. TherhetoricofanopenScotlanddistinctfromWestminster

hasnotsofar beenachievedinpractice. Statutoryregulationoflobbyingin

Scotlandwould beasignificantdeparturefromthepracticeatWestminster

andcouldprovideamodelto befollowedin London.

TheStandardsCommitteehasalreadydevisedacodeofconductgoverning

theactionsofMSPs. Thiswasawelcomefirststepinprovidingforprobityin

Scottishpubliclife. However, itisourviewthatonlystatutoryregulationof


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alllobbyistsinScotlandwouldguaranteethehigheststandardsofbehaviour

ofall those involved inthe political process. Moreover, itcouldprovide the

publicwith important informationaboutthe political processand increase

publicconfidence inthe Parliamentasan institution.

Objectionstoastatutoryregisterofoutsideintereststendtofocusonthe

difficultyindefininglobbyistsandthe impracticalityofmaintaininga

registerofoutside interests. There is infactmuch evidence tosuggestthat

these objectionsare misplaced. Ifastatutoryregisteroflobbyists includesall

thosewholobbythenthedifficultyofdistinguishing betweendifferenttypes

oflobbyists(commercialconsultants, in-housecorporate, voluntarysector)

becomeslessproblematic. Manystatesinthe UShave managedtoproduce

systemsofregistrationwhichcancope withthe varietyofoutside interests

whoseektoshape publicpolicy2.

Thereisalsoevidencethatthesesystemsarepracticableand, accordingto

evidence tothe NeillCommittee, thattheycanmake importantinformation

availabletothepubliccheaplyandeffectively byelectronicinformation

gathering, storageandretrieval, providingeasyaccesstoallwhowishit

(NeillCommittee 2000: 86). ContemporaryexperiencefromtheStateofNew

York(whichhasrecentlyenacted, andimplemented, theNewYorkState

LobbyingAct 1999)suggeststhis. Itisinaccuratetoclaimthatallstatutory

regulationiscumbersomeandineffective.

StatutoryregulationcanworkandwouldhelptoimprovethetransparencyofgovernanceandaccessibilityoftheParliament. Butstatutoryregulationis

notapanaceaforalltheillsofdemocracyinScotland. Itisonlythefirststep

inensuringsoundstandardsinScottishpubliclife. Ourresearchsuggests

thatthereisaneedtomakesignificantreformsofthewholecultureof

governance, especiallyinasmallcountrylikeScotlandwherepersonal

networkscan besoimportant(aswashighlightedduringLobbygate).

Statutoryregulationcould beconceivedasthe beginningsofarolling

programmeofreformofthecultureofsecrecywhichaffects bothlobbyingand

thecivilserviceinScotland.

IntheUS, corporationshavetriedto by-passstatutoryregulation bysetting

upcitizensgroupswhichdonothaveto beregistered, or bysupplyingfree

entertainmentandleisureopportunities(Silverstein 1998: 221-227). This

2For example, see the registration systems of the following US states:

Missouri, http://www.moethics.state.mo.us/mec/lob.html;Ohio, http://www.jlec-olig.state.oh.us/lobby.html;Texas, http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/guides/lobby.htm#Part%20IINew York, http://www.nylobby.state.ny.us/LobInstruct.html andhttp://www.nylobby.state.ny.us/LobInstruct.html


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suggeststheneedforalllobbyiststo becovered byastatutoryregisterifthey

repeatedlycontactMSPsorofficialsasignificantnumberoftimesayear. In

addition, there isthe questionoffundraisingdinnersandother events

organised bypolitical partieswhichare attended bysignificantnumbersoflobbyistsandtheirclientsandofdonationstopoliticalparties. Allofthese

lobbyingactivitiesshould bepublic, transparentand, abovealldisclosedina

centralregister.

Thetargetsoflobbying:ParliamentandExecutive

Wenotethattheconsultationpapermentionslobbyingonlyinrelationto

Parliament. The surveycarriedout bythe Committee wasofMSPsonly.

The Parliamentcertainly isatargetforcommercial andother lobbyists, but

lobbyingtakesplace anywhere thatpublicpolicy ismade. In Scotland,

lobbyistspredominantlytargettheExecutive.

Itismanyyearsnowsince MPsinWestminsterwere the majortargetsof

lobbyingactivity. The cashfor questionscase in 1994 didshowthat lobbyists

still targetMPs(LeighandVulliamy 1997). Butmore important isthe

targetingofministersandcivil servants by lobbyistsandtheirclients. Thisto

someextentlay behindthecash-for-questionsaffairassomeofittookplace

whenNeilHamiltonwasagovernmentminister. Accessspecificallyto

ministers(andnotMPsorMSPs)wasalsocentralto boththeDrapergate

andlobbygatescandals.

Itiscrucial, therefore, thatthedeliberationsoftheCommitteetakethelobbyingofministersandcivilservantsintoaccountinconsidering

regulation. Itmay bearguedthatthisis beyondtheremitoftheCommittee.

Wewouldpointhowever, totheNeillCommitteeanditsrecommendation

thataclearwrittenrecordofallcontactswithoutsideinterests bekept by

governmentdepartments:

Wedonotthinkthatcompliancewithanewrequirementtotherecord

would be burdensomefordepartments, andwe believethatitwould

encouragehighanduniformstandards. (Neill 2000: 91)

Ofcourse, sucharecordwouldhaveto beregularlyandpubliclyreportedfor

itto beofanyuseinpromotingtransparencyoraccountability. Thekeypoint

forus, thenisthatforanysystemofregulationtoworkitwouldhaveto

applytoMSPs, ministersandtheirstaff(i.e. civilservants, includingthosein

public bodies, quangos, NDPBs, nationalisedindustriesandthelike.) It

shouldalsoapplyevenwheretheremay besomecurrentorfutureexemption

underFreedomofInformationpracticeorlegislation(ScottishExecutive

1999). The blanketexemptionintheFreedomofInformationconsultation

documentforcommercialconfidentiality, shouldhavenoplaceinobscuring

theuseoflobbying, publicrelations, hospitalityandothergiftsinkind. This


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isparticularlythecasewherecorporationsorothersstandtogain

significantlyfromcontractswithParliamentorthe Executive or in bidding

forPPP/PFIprojectsandthe like.

Itwould beratherironiciftheParliament, bornfromacommitmenttoopen

updecisionmaking, weretoendorseasystemofregulationwhichwasless

openthanthatinLondon. Ourrecommendationwould be thatministersand

civil servants be requiredtokeeparecordofmeetingsorothersignificant

contactswith lobbyists, theirclientsandotherspecial interests in line with

therecommendationsoftheNeillCommittee. Thisrecordshould beputinto

thepublicdomain3atregularintervals perhapsonceeveryparliamentary

session.

Theroleofthepublicinpublicconsultations

WerecognisetheStandardsCommitteesgenuineinterestinpublic

consultationontheregulationoflobbying. Wealsonotetheconcernto

ascertainwhetherthepublicfindsiteasytoaccesstheParliament. Butwe

alsonotethatthisconsultationhasnot beenveryextensivelypromotedtothe

public. TheconsultationdocumentisavailableontheParliamentwebsite,

butacopyofthedocumentwassentouttoonly 35 organisations. Itis

unlikely, therefore, thatthepublicwillhavemuchgenuineopportunityto

participateinthisdebate. Whileweacceptthatafairrangeofnon-

governmentalandnon-corporateorganisationshave beenconsulted(although

thepercentagerepresentingcorporateinterestsisratherhighat 20%), itis

notclearhowthepublicinterestmighthaveanyobviousroleinthisconsultation. Allthosethathave beenaskedtorespondtotheconsultation

aregroupswhowillhaveaparticularinterestintherulesgoverning

lobbying. Totheextentthatthereisacrisisofconfidenceingovernancein

Scotland, thisconsultationwilldolittletocounteractthatproblem. There

areanumberofwaysinwhichpublicviewscan betakenaccountof. From

opinionpollsandfocusgroupresearchtonewinitiativesinpublic

consultationsuchasthatadopted bythePetitionsCommittee, thereareways

andmeansoftappingintoandrespondingtopublicconcern.

ItisimportantthattheStandardsCommitteeisnotundulyswayed bytheweightofevidence, butratherits quality. ANeillCommitteeinsiderrevealed

tousthatthiswasaproblemwiththeirrecentreviewoflobbyingat

Westminster(Neill 2000). Asmostoftheevidencewasprovided bypolitical

insidersandactorswithvestedinterestsintheoutcomeofthereview, it

becamedifficulttosustaindetachedpublicinterestarguments.Wewould

3

By the public domain, we do not mean that it should be lodged only in SPICe. It needs to be easilyaccessible in printed form and via both the Executive and Parliament websites.


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recommendthattheCommitteetakepublicconcernsseriously byattempting

tofindoutwhattheyare andthenactinguponthem.

WeRecommend: Statutoryregulationofall those engaged in lobbying in Scotland; Disclosure ofresources expended in lobbyingcampaigns, which itemises

expenditure byoutsideinterests(clientsandtheiragents)oneachpieceof

legislationtheyhave lobbiedon;

Thepublicationanddisseminationofinformationintheregisteroflobbyists, includingdetailsofall significantcontactswithMinisters,

MSPsandofficials;

The adoptionofan electronicsystemofregistration, whichwouldfacilitatedatagathering, storage, retrieval andaccessto informationheld inthe

r

egist

er

of

lobbyi

sts

.

ResponsestoquestionsinAnnexAoftheconsultationdocument

SECTION1 LobbyingActivity1.1

TheStirlingMediaResearchInstitute(SMRI)has beenstudyingthe

lobbyingindustryinScotland, theUKandEuropesince 1996. Strictly

aspartofthisresearchthe SMRIhas beenacorporate memberofthe

Associationfor ScottishPublicAffairs(ASPA)since its inception in

1998. One ofourmembers,WilliamDinan, has beenacommitteememberofASPAforthe lastyear. Oursubmissiontothe Committee

reflectsourknowledgeofandresearchonthelobbyingindustry. It

doesnotexpresstheviewsofASPAoranyothersectionofthelobbying

industry.

SECTION2 AccessingtheParliament2.7

Ourresearchsuggeststhatthe rulesandproceduresthatgovernthe

Parliamentare indeedwell understood byprofessional lobbyists.However, ourresearchhasalso broughtusintocontactwithothercivic

groupsandmembersofthepublicwhoareinterestedinaccessingthe

Parliament. Forthese non-professionalsthe Parliamentandthe

Executive are oftennotseenasopen, accessible ortransparent. This,

we believe, seriouslyunderminestheCSGsoptimismthattheopen

natureoftheScottishParliamentwouldhopefullyencourage

individualsandgroupstoapproachMSPsdirectly, therefore, tosome

extent, makingtheneedforspecialistlobbyingorganisations


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redundant4.Whileweagreethattheindividualconstituenthasas

muchrightastheprofessionallobbyisttomakerepresentationstothe

Parliament(andExecutive), wemustrecognisethatsuchindividuals

simplydonthavethenecessaryresources(time, money, and

experience)tolobbyinthesamewayasprofessionallobbyists.

Statutoryregulationwillnotcreateatwo-tierlobbyingsystem, asthis

alreadyexistsandisfirmlyinplaceinHolyrood. Onewaytotackle

thisimbalance, inourview, istoopenuptheactivitiesoflobbyiststo

publicscrutiny. InNewYorkoneconsequenceofengaginginstatutory

regulationoflobbyistswastheproductionofaguidetolobbyingfor

citizensandcitizensgroups, thusattemptingtousestatutory

regulationasarealcatalystforopeningupand broadeningaccessto

law-makers. Werecommendanapproachwhichseesstatutory

regulationasthe beginningofaprocesswhichwillhelptoreinvigorate

democracytotheextentthatitwidensparticipationanddemystifies

commerciallobbyingactivity.

Furthermore, thefactthatthelobbyingindustryitselfisnotinfavour

ofstatutoryregulationindicatestheydonot believethatanyspecial

advantagemight begained bythis. Theindustryiskeenonvoluntary

codesprecisely becausetheywillnothavetodiscloseinformationabout

theirclients, feesandtactics, whichisinthepublicinterest.

SECTION3 RegulationofLobbyistsandCodeofConductStatutoryRegulation3.1 Yes.We wouldstronglysupportthe establishmentofastatutory

registrationschemeforprofessionallobbyists.

3.2 The main benefitofintroducingstatutoryregulationoflobbyists inScotlandwould be to ensure thatParliamenttakesdistinctive actionto

police lobbyingwhich is inadvance ofthe systemsoperated in both

WestminsterandBrussels. Thiswould beextremelysignificant

evidencethattheParliamentwasattemptingtoliveuptotheCSGs

provisionsonopenness. Astatutoryregisterwouldprovideapublic

recordoftheresourcesdevoted byoutsideintereststoshapingpublic

policyinScotland. Atpresent, theprinciplesofopennessand

transparencythattheScottishParliamenthas beenfoundeduponlack

concreteform. Aregisteroflobbyistsandtheirclientswould beavery

effectivewayofauditingtheactivitiesofoutsideinterestswhoseekto

44

Report of the Code of Conduct Working Group to the Consultative Steering Group,http://www.scotland.gov.uk/government/devolution/ccwg-11.asp.


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influencepolicymaking. Oneoftherecurrentproblemsintryingto

understandthe nature andscope oflobbyingactivityhas beenthe

absence ofanyreliable dataonwhat lobbyistsactuallydo, andwhat

resourcesare devotedto influencingpolicy. Thiskindofinformationwillnot bedisclosed bylobbyistsunlessParliamentrequiresit. A

statutoryregisteroflobbyistswouldallowsuchimportantinformation

to enterthe publicdomain.

3.3 The drawbacksofstatutoryregulationare, inouropinion, moreimaginedthanreal. ThereisevidencefromtheUnitedStatesand

Canadathatregistrationsystemscan beadministeredeasilyand

efficiently, especiallyin electronicform, whichhasthe advantage of

beingrelativelycheapandaccessible. The onlydrawbackwe cansee is

that itwouldthreatenthe unaccountable, opaque andsecretive

conductofsomelobbyists. Themainargumentsusedagainstthe

existingsystemsofregulation bylobbyiststendto bethattheydonot

workandare complicatedandsubjecttoloopholes. Butinfactthese

systemshave securedameasure oftransparency. There certainly isa

concern insome places(suchasthe US)thatthe systemsofregulation

inplacearesubjecttoloopholesandthatcorporationsandlobbyists

havefoundwaystogetroundthem(Silverstein 1998). Inourviewthis

isonlyanargumentforhavingmore, notless, effective regulation.

3.4 Forastatutoryregistrationscheme tohave the full confidence ofthepublic, the Parliament, andthe lobbyingcommunity, itshould beadministered byanindependentcommissionerorcommission. Given

the scale oflobbyinginScotland, sucha bodycouldprobablyoperate on

apart-time basis, withthe administrative supportofParliamentary

staff.

VoluntaryCode

3.5 AsacorporatememberofASPA, theSMRIisaffiliatedtoASPAscodeofconduct. However, sincewedonotengageinanylobbyingactivities,itsprovisionshaveneveractivelyappliedtous.

3.6 ThecreationoftheASPAcodeofconductwasseen bysomeintheorganisationasawayofestablishingself-regulationasthenormfor

Scotland, andasawayofseeingoffstatutoryregulation.

3.7 Basedonourresearch, itwouldappearthatASPAsvoluntarycode(andindeedthatoftheAPPC)isnot beingmonitoredinanysystematic

way, andthatenforcementisalsoproblematicinprinciple. Infact, it

wouldappearthatthesevoluntarycodesareonlypolicedsporadically


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andinformally. Duringourresearch, weweretoldofacasewhere

professional lobbyistswere offeringpreferential accesstoministers.

These self-same lobbyistswere signatoriestoacode which explicitly

prohibitedsuch behaviour. Thatthis eventhappenedonlyashortwhileaftertheLobbygateaffairservestohighlighttheinadequacies

ofself-regulationonthepartoflobbyists.

ItishardlylikelytoinspirepublicconfidenceintheParliamentifthe

regulationandpolicingoflobbyingislefttotheindustryitself, or

industryappointedagents. Anarrangementwherebylobbyistsare

abletositinjudgementonthemselvesoughttogiveriseto questions

aboutconflictofinterest.

Furthermore, thereremainreallegaldoubtsovertheabilityoflobbyist

tradeassociationstoenforcesanctions bytheapplicationoftheircodes.

Inparticulartheremay belegaldifficultiesforASPAorAPPC

Scotlandinnamingandshaminglobbyistsinmembercompanies. It

has beensuggestedtous bylobbyistsinLondon, thatlobbying

companieswhichhavemembersnamedandshamedmightwellresort

toorthreatentoresorttolawiftheir businessisadverselyaffected by

atradeassociationjudgement. Suchpressuresarenotconduciveto

self-regulation.

3.8 Theadvantageofvoluntarycodeshas beenthattheyhavegivenlobbyistsguidanceonhowtheyshould behavewhenincontactwith

MSPsandtheirstaff. However, asthesecodesarevoluntarytheydo

notnecessarilyapplytoallthoseengagedinlobbyingtheScottish

ParliamentorExecutive. Thisisaseriousregulatory blindspot. Again,

withnoobviousmechanismstoeffectivelypolicethesecodes, their

valueasregulatoryinstrumentsis questionable.

3.9 Wedonotseeany benefitsto begainedthroughtheintroductionofavoluntarycodeofconductforlobbyists.

3.10 Voluntarycodesareoftenineffectual. Iflobbyistsarenotcompelledtosignuptosuchcodes, andarenot bound byanyindependentlyapplied

sanctionifthey breachthesecodes, thentheirimpactcanonly be

cosmetic. Itisourviewthatvoluntarycodesarepoorsubstitutesfor

statutoryregulation. TheweakandineffectualregulationinBrussels

andWestminsteraretestamenttothat.

3.11 AlthoughwethinkonlyastatutorycodewillsatisfytheCSGsaspirationsforopennessifavoluntarycodewereto beintroducedit

shouldapplytoallthosewholobbyinScotland, includingcommercial


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consultants, in-houselobbyistsincommercialcorporationsandthe

voluntarysector. The code shouldmake explicitprovisionforthe

disclosure ofthe resourcesdevotedto lobbying. Furthermore itshould

applytothe Parliamentandtothe Executive. Any informationwhichisdisclosedshould bemadewidelyavailabletothepublicinprinted

formandontheweb. Itissimplynotenoughto buryit bymaking

disclosure onlytoSPICe orsome otherpartofthe Parliamentary

apparatus.

References

Greenwood, J. (1997)RepresentingInterestsintheEuropeanUnion,

Basingstoke:Macmillan.

Leigh, D. andVulliamy, E. (1997)Sleaze:TheCorruptionofParliament,London:

FourthEstate.

Monbiot, G. (1998)Dressedforthejob, JournalistJul/Aug: 20-21.

NeillCommittee(2000)ReinforcingStandards:ReviewoftheFirstReportof

theCommitteeonStandardsinPublicLife, Volume 1:ReportCm 4557-I,

p.86.

ScottishExecutive(1999)AnOpenScotland, Edinburgh:ScottishExecutive.

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library2/doc07/opsc-01.htm.

Silverstein, K. (1998)Washingtonon $10MillionaDay:Howlobbyists

plunderthenation, Monroe, Maine:CommonCouragePress.

Whitehead, B. (1998)WhydidITNkillmystory?, Journalist, Oct/Nov: 14-

15.

Documents

Submission to Standards Committee on Lobbying the Scottish Parliament