Study Guide Joint Cabinet Crisis: South China Sea 2030 · interventions or the cries of help from their allies in the region, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the recently-unified Korea

2nd – 5th of May 2019

Study Guide

Joint Cabinet Crisis: South China Sea 2030

History of Asia-Pacific 2019-2030

Website: http://euromun.org Facebook: EuroMUN Instagram: @euromun

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Table of Contents

JOINT CABINET CRISIS: SOUTH CHINA SEA 2030 ............................................................................................. 1

HISTORY OF ASIA-PACIFIC 2019-2030 .................................................................................................................... 1

WELCOME LETTER ............................................................................................................................................ 4

EUROMUN 2019 CRISIS: SOUTH CHINA SEA 2030 ........................................................................................... 6

2020S TIMELINE ................................................................................................................................................ 9

CHINA .............................................................................................................................................................. 11

THE THREE RULING CLASSES ................................................................................................................................. 13

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: LOOKING INWARDS ....................................................................................... 15

U.S ELECTIONS IN THE 2020S ............................................................................................................................... 15 THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE 2020S ............................................................................................................... 17

EAST ASIA: UNIFICATION AND MILITARISATION ............................................................................................ 18

KOREA ............................................................................................................................................................... 18 JAPAN ................................................................................................................................................................ 19 TAIWAN ............................................................................................................................................................. 19

ASEAN: A CLOSER UNION OF COMPETING INTERESTS .................................................................................. 20

CLIMATE SOLIDARITY PACT ................................................................................................................................... 20 EXCHANGE MECHANISM (AEM) ........................................................................................................................... 22 ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSE-FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ........................................................................................ 23 MYANMAR, LAOS AND CAMBODIA: THE PRO-CHINA VOTES ...................................................................................... 24

WORLD OUTSIDE ASIA .................................................................................................................................... 26

SOCIETY LEADING UP TO 2030 ....................................................................................................................... 29


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NAVAL SOVEREIGNTY AND A NEW NATURE OF WARFARE ON THE SEA ......................................................................... 29 CONFRONTATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA .......................................................................................................... 29 THE NEW NATURE OF NAVAL WARFARE ................................................................................................................. 30 UNCLOS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ................................................................................................... 33 SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS .......................................................................................................................................... 37 BIG DATA AND SURVEILLANCE ............................................................................................................................... 38 FINANCIALISATION AND TECH BOOM ...................................................................................................................... 40 URBANIZATION, CLIMATE AND POPULISM ............................................................................................................... 42 URBANIZATION ................................................................................................................................................... 42 CLIMATE ............................................................................................................................................................ 43 POPULISM .......................................................................................................................................................... 43 RACE FOR RESOURCES: WATER, FOOD, AND ENERGY ............................................................................................... 45 CHINA AND THE RACE FOR RESOURCES ................................................................................................................... 45 THE US, MIDDLE EAST, AND CHINA ....................................................................................................................... 45

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 47

REFERENCES & ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ...................................................................................................... 49


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Welcome Letter from the Secretariat Dear Delegates, The EuroMUN 2019 Secretariat would like to warmly welcome you to the 11th edition of this conference. We are excited to provide an academically challenging experience which will motivate you to engage in insightful discussion while exploring our lovely city through the planned social program. Hopefully, you will enjoy the various events that will accompany the sessions, such as our talent night, our delegate’s ball and our scavenger hunt through the city. Our conference attracts individuals from over fifty nations to the city of Maastricht. This means that you will encounter points of view that will be very dissimilar to your own. See this conference as an opportunity to push yourself outside of your comfort zone, alongside people who might seem different, but at their core, just like you, are looking to expand their horizons beyond what they are confronted with at home. Be respectful but don’t be afraid to challenge your beliefs and have them challenged in return. EuroMUN is a forum for discussion: take advantage of it, challenge yourself. The slogan for this year’s edition of EuroMUN is: Exploring the European Idea. The European Idea is not geographically limited, but it refers to the goals of European integration. It demonstrates a move away from wide-scale disputes and towards collaboration. Every institution, organization, body, and committee represented at EuroMUN reflects the same idea: the will to work together instead of against each other. That is what is at the core of this notion. On that premise, the secretariat would like to pose the following question to you: What does the European Idea mean to you? Is it being connected through a common history? Or is it about staying united through adversity, change and the distinct characteristics of our culturally rich community? Maastricht, the city where the Treaty on European Union was signed, provides the perfect backdrop to explore this concept. As the university hosts a diverse community of students from all over the world it truly demonstrates the possibilities the move towards collaboration can bring to the individual and the community. While we might not always fully appreciate the former, the benefits are not to be taken for granted. The environment in Maastricht and the assembly of delegates permit EuroMUN, now for the 11th time to provide this unique experience. Without each of these components, it would be impossible to replicate. We hope that you enjoy your time at the European Model United Nations Conference 2019. When in doubt: #fruitful The EuroMUN Secretariat


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Welcome Letter from the Crisis Team Dear Delegates, On behalf of the entire crisis team we would like to warmly welcome you to our Joint Cabinet Crisis which will revolve around South China Sea in the year 2030. This crisis is designed for all range of delegates, be this your first-time discovering the world of Model United Nations and Crisis, or if this is your twenty-fifth time plotting schemes to grab power and dominate the alternate world as we know. We would like to thank you for being part of this ambitious crisis project, which we hope to integrate all the aspects of day-to-day government decision-making and urgent scenarios where variety of choices you made could pan out wildly differently. The focus of this Crisis is to put you, delegates, in the shoes of current and future decision makers in Asia-Pacific. This project also shifts the focus from most crisis in Europe from historical trigger points of the continent itself to the future in Asia. Coming from Southeast Asia myself, the nuance of this topic gives me the personal motivation to deliver you the most authentic experience. It is definitely intriguing to see what you will make out of the resources you have at hand from different backgrounds, and see the limitless possibilities of future crisis, instead of historical. When thinking about a MUN topic in the near future, words such as “resource” “climate” “automation” “drones” might fly by your mind. It would be hypocritical of us the team then to negate this. We have assembled the crisis staff from various backgrounds and experiences who are ready to give you a full crisis experience. A holistic ride, where not just military aspects would be put forward, but you as delegates would also need to take vital decisions on economy, climate, diplomacy, elections and technology just like major political players all around the world deal with daily nowadays. We then ask each and every delegate to immerse yourself in this experiment. We will challenge each and every one of you on imagining and taking actions on where the future of Asia - and extrapolating it, the world as a whole - will head to in the next couple of decades. And hopefully by the end of EuroMUN you might reflect upon current worldviews and the issues of our generation. As the old adage says, it is easier to envision your goals at the very end and walk slowly backwards to see how to achieve or see them play out. Having said that, the staff is here to facilitate your crisis experience, and we are open to your queries and concerns along the way. The crisis team is here to make you have a great time. We look forward to meeting you all in Maastricht! Yours sincerely, Arkan Diptyo - Crisis Director Martin Galland - Assistant Crisis Director


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EuroMUN 2019 Crisis: South China Sea 2030

1st January 2030 - The unveiling of Nanhai International Airport & Harbour (NIAH) in the Spratly Islands by president Xi Jinping before Christmas has sparked international outcry. The Council of

European Union has scheduled a meeting on 5th January to decide their action on it while Secretary General of ASEAN has released a public statement calling for a boycott, to which

Canada & several countries in Latin America & North Africa has supported. However, Beijing is confident that NIAH will continue its operations and even reach profitability in the near future.

Meanwhile, report from a dissident in Hong Kong who fled to California via Taiwan in November has reached the White House. China is using force against protestors in Hong Kong. While the CIA finally confirmed the events, most of the world is still kept silent as Chinese Internet Great

Firewall has successfully filtered most of the protester’s uploads… This year’s EuroMUN Crisis will experiment in an area rarely done in other European crisis before - creating a future Crisis regarding a sensitive geopolitical issue. The Crisis team will transfer you, delegates, into 2030s in Asia, where tension arise once more in the South China Sea. This time however, the stakes will be higher than ever - ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations are going towards a better integration, making it the second regional supranational body after the European Union that can act on international level. In Beijing, the uncontested power of Xi Jinping since 2017 has created to a humongous economy and powerful government that control nearly all aspects of life while stifling dissent. Whereas the US, while no longer the sole military superpower in Asia-Pacific, must decide between their 2020s stance of withdrawing from foreign interventions or the cries of help from their allies in the region, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the recently-unified Korea. The issue itself is an ongoing one in our current date. What was previously a dormant claim from the nine-dash line being drawn up by Nationalist Kuomintang (Republic of China, current-day Taiwan) government in 1947 began to re-emerge in the 2000s. After ASEAN & China signed Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, China used the declaration as a base for its manoeuvres and lodged their “nine-dash map” claim to the UN in 2009. From then on, tensions rise. Arrests of local fishing vessels coupled with Naval & Air Forces exercises in early 2010s was then followed up by the Philippines v PR China case in the International Tribunal in The Hague. The decision was unilaterally rejected by Beijing, and they started building islands in the area soon after. While there has yet to be any international ground-breaking news headlines since the aerial photos of the island-building in 2017, the ambiguous status of the water continues to


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this day, with competing and at times overlapping claims between China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Now you might ask, how do we even begin preparing for a future Crisis? There is where this Study Guide comes in. Here we lay down this alternative “history of 2020s” in the next couple dozens of pages and the situation that has developed for relevant sides in this crisis. You can always couple your “future research” in this study guide with current information available online. As for the structure of the Crisis, you will be assigned a character in either of these 3 cabinets:

1. Beijing Cabinet (Politburo Standing Committee of Communist Party of China) - filled with highest-ranking Communist Party officials, from ministers to army officials and even well-connected billionaires

2. ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) - comprising of heads of government of each member state

3. Pacific Coalition (United States, Taiwan, Unified Korea, and Japan) - a mixture of heads of government and top diplomat/military/intelligence officials, and private sector interests.

Most of these characters are real life person in 2019, though information on them might vary in each case. A tip from our Crisis Team experience would be to use google chrome’s Translate button to get even more information in native languages. Additionally, please check on the character & country profile that we will allocate to you. These profiles, just like the study guide, will focus more on the “history of 2020” relevant to the characters and countries. We know that reading lengthy study guides might be a daunting task, thus we provide you now with a quick summary of what is happening in regard to this crisis 2020-2030 timeline:

● Xi Jinping, now 77 years old, is on the lookout for people worthy to succeed him as leader of China. However, he would like to ultimately annex as much South China Sea territory and integrate Hong Kong as smoothly as possible before he resigns.

● While in the past business leaders and the Politburo are not always intertwined, Chinese tech billionaires have been approved and appointed to Politburo positions since 2027, which create a rift between long-term career party bureaucrats and these new officials.

● The US economy hit a recession in 2020, which allowed the Democrats to sweep both Congress and Presidency. Under Bernie Sanders, US looked more inwards, withdrawing from more foreign interventions and focused on its economic and social homework, including passing of “Free College for All” and “Medicare for All” Acts.

● This inward-looking US was best exemplified by the 20-days war in 2026. What started as an assassination of Kim Jong-Un turned quickly into a free-for-all struggle to grab as many


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territories in North Korea. While peace talks ensured Korea was at last unified by the South, China forced the US to abandon its military bases and hand it over to Seoul government.

● Meanwhile, ASEAN continues its integration with creation of ASEAN Exchange Mechanism, Joint Defence Council and Yogyakarta Convention on Student & Professional Mobility. While a lot of these are adaptations of EU practices that went smoothly, a divide between the more developed countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, & Thailand) is apparent with the less developed ones (Lao, Cambodia, Myanmar & East Timor), preventing a united approach on China.

We hope you find this introduction helpful, and happy exploring the fate of Asia in the 2020s!


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2020s Timeline


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China China in 2030 is the most dystopian thing humanity has ever seen, excluding one time in mid 2020s when Facebook bought a small uninhabited archipelago on the Pacific and strategically blew up islands to create the biggest FB logo on earth for a commercial. In the last years China has achieved many engineering and urbanistic marvels that have cemented its place as the world's leading economy. High speed trains to communicate not only the west to the main economical and industrial centres of the east, but also to establish robust communication system that allows the transport of people living in the outer border of the Hebei region to go to work every day in Beijing. Bridges connecting Hong Kong and Macau to the Mainland and facilitating communications and transport on the Pearl River Delta. Nuclear power plants that have been constructed on the east coast of the country, and giant wind, and solar energy parks to supply the immense amount of energy required to power this country. But with great successes come some failures too: due to the unstoppable climate change some structures have been compromised, most notably the same nuclear power plants have to constantly invest more money to protect themselves from an ever more violent climate; and the underwater tunnel on the Bohai sea, connecting Yantai and Dalian had to be cancelled mid construction because of the seismic activity in the region. Overall China now has 2 of the biggest economical centres in the world, namely the Pearl River Delta and the Jing jin Ji area, and some of the most experienced engineers in the world. Within China, Macau and Hong Kong, government surveillance is immense. On top of monitoring your movements with incredibly advanced face recognition, at birth you are given a WeChat account with a score assigned to it. From that day until the day you die your score will increase or decrease. As everyone has access to WeChat, they can see your score and decide how they want to interact with you. Not only that, but some laws can be easier enforced, for example, the government can monitor whether you have read any Marx in the last year and modify your score. Entry to the Party is restricted to those with a score over 80 out of a hundred. More information on surveillance is given later in the study guide. However, the most consequential action taken by the Chinese Government was to tighten relations with the CEOs. Heads of tech, online shopping, real estate, etc. companies are now allowed to become members of the parties’ politburo after an intense background check. This has


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allowed a breeze of fresh air to enter the highest decision-making body of the People’s Republic of China but also means that the power of the Government is only greater than before. On the international politics side, China has become much more aggressive. Since the creation of the Ministry of Nanhai (South China sea) it has been made clear that China is not willing to remove its claims on the area, constructing move naval bases and artificial islands and vetoing a couple of Security Council resolutions that attempted to deal with the situation. It is similar with the Spratly Islands, last year China decided to open a commercial airport to allow tourism into the Islands although the international response was anything but favourable. It is becoming ever more difficult to define China’s position in International politics, on the one hand they are willing to negotiate and provide funds for the creation of infrastructure, as the Belt Road Project progresses, but they don’t give explanations for some of their more controversial actions. Finally, there are two issues that deserved to be looked at individually. Korea After the revolution of 2026 China was quick to intervene in Korea. As one of the most involved sides in the 20-days war, China managed to push the US to depart from its South Korean military bases, in exchange for letting a Unified Korea be a reality. China still shields several top-ranking figures from the previous Kim regime, guaranteeing them safety in exchange for de-nuclearization of the peninsula. However, China still feared some potential troubles at the border. Hence an agreement was struck between them and the new Greater Korean Republic (GKR) to impose a 10-km demilitarized zone (DMZ) and 50-km deindustrialized zone along the border. Hong Kong Ever since the one country two systems agreement came into place, setting the expiration date for the border on 2047, Chinese influence over Hong Kong has only grown larger. In 2015 we saw the first umbrella revolution that brought tens of thousands of Hong Kong citizens to the streets to protest China’s interventionism in Hong Kong affairs. While not having a major backlash on Chinese policies, it showed a general resentment of the citizens with China. Throughout the 2020s China progressively gained influence over the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, which allowed it to pass a lot of measures similar as the ones in the mainland, most importantly, increasing surveillance and control over the population. This created a split, on one hand you had the working classes which benefited from Chinese-promoted policies supporting China interventionism, and on the other a good portion of the middle class that strongly opposes it. President Xi Jinping authorized “Operation Pearl Star” which saw prominent anti-Beijing


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politicians “disappear” throughout 2028-2029. In December 2029 tensions erupted as the Legislative Council passed “Integration Act”, giving way to Hong Kong to fully integrate with mainland China by 2035. This has led to Umbrella Revolution 2.0 starting on Christmas 2029. The anti-interventionists revolted and took it to the streets, the violence is heavier than with the first revolution, and the police are struggling to keep it under control. However, Beijing has so far managed to keep the outside world uninformed of this due to the fortified Internet Firewall. Meanwhile on the high spheres, as China grew closer to the top rich in the mainland, Hong Kong billionaires took the opportunity to position themselves as pro-China and thus gain political benefits. An exception to this situation was the richest man in Hong Kong, Li Ka-shing, who took a very strong anti-Chinese position, and thus becoming a champion of the unrested Hong-Kongnese society. Sadly, he died and his two sons (Richard & Victor Li Tzar-kouii) crashed over who would get to inherit his father’s successor. In the end the board elected both the Li brothers defected to China, where they rose up the political ranks. Overall, China is arguably the most powerful economy in the world and without a doubt the most influential nation on earth, it is no coincidence that since 2018 Xi jinping has occupied the position of most powerful man in the world 12 times (according to Forbes).

The Three Ruling Classes

The Nouveau Riche (Tuhao), Old Guard (Laoren) and Bureaucrats (Guanfang) Following the 21st Chinese National Congress in 2027, the 3 main political groups within the Chinese Communist Party rose up. The struggle for Xi Jinping’s successor could finally manifest itself in the open. The 3factions formed had radically different views about the future of the country and how to exercise power. The Old Guard, or Laoren, sought to find ideological purity by mixing Marxism and Chinese Nationalism to guide China in its quest for international hegemony. The Nouveau Riche, or Tuhao, have finally got the recognition they thought they deserved for a long time as the main drivers of the Chinese economic miracle, and they have even higher ambitions albeit with a less aggressive international stance. Finally, there are the Bureaucrats, or Guanfang. They know that high aspirations can lead to demise and are seeking to maintain the status quo by keeping internal and external forces in check. The Old Guard – Laoren This faction is composed of the same people that rose to China’s top-level positions together with Xi Jinping in 2012. A decade ago Laoren had everything. They were the ones making the decisions as a cohort. Since then, everything has changed. Rapid economic development has left new


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generations of Chinese more interested in the material world rather than the Party’s ideology. While certain parts of the society would like to see Chinese influence on the world stage grow, it is becoming increasingly more nationalist rather than Marxist. Over the course of last decade, the Laoren have worked hard to develop a unique brand of ideology balancing the nationalist and Marxist sentiments to curb the power of the Nouveau Riche Tuhao but their efforts ultimately failed as the Tuhao were officially recognised by Xi Jinping at the 21st National Congress to hold political positions within the Politburo. However, the Hong Kong question has proven to be an effective tool in getting their power back. Invoking the great party leaders of old, they have argued for an aggressive policy against Hong Kong and have now set sights on targets abroad seeing that the population can still be swayed by rhetoric. The goal of the Laoren is to regain the spotlight within the party by swaying Xi Jinping’s opinion towards a more aggressive foreign policy. They believe that the new Tuhao are not capable enough to enforce Chinese international dominance. However, they must be careful. Their vision of China will not allow western brand of consumerism define the new Chinese society and now that they have tasted riches, the new Chinese middle class will not easily give up their relative freedom. The Nouveau Riche – Tuhao As the people responsible for Chinese economic ascent it was only a matter of time until the super-rich CEOs, managers, and industrialists demanded their place in the Chinese system of political power. They were granted that concession following the 21st National Congress 2027 but their final goals are still way beyond. They understand that the strength of a single party system allows them great freedom in their economic exploits, and they are seeking to steer the party away from ideology, retaining only the basics needed to control the population. Their main goal is to establish China as the dominant economy in the world and increase the levels of market freedom needed for higher profits. In terms of foreign policy, they favour less aggressive approach to allow greater credibility in economic dealings with the rest of the world, while still invoking heavy-handed and sometimes monopolistic market approach when it comes to exploiting new markets abroad. They are especially concerned with the US as they understand that it is better to not provoke the US to act aggressively in the Chinese influence sphere, but rather to confine them to a slow death of economic decline, preferably under the duress of a manufactured financial crisis. The main goal of the Tuhao is to use the best of the situation they found themselves in and prevent the Laoren from regaining the central role in defining the future course of the country. They must also find a solution to the oil problem as it poses the main barrier for Chinese economic supremacy. Finally, they must not fully neglect ideology because the mistake in that regard could lead to popular calls for greater freedoms effectively undoing their power grab.


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The Bureaucrats – Guanfang While the history of the Chinese Communist Party is marked by faction fighting for most of its history, the state’s army of bureaucrats ensured nothing gets too out of hand. The Guanfang faction in the Politburo is led by people who have climbed the Communist Party’s hierarchy and are now in their 50-60s. While President Xi abolished tenure limits back in 2017, their insights of the Party mechanism and up-to-date knowledge of the outside world makes them believe that they are the faction who should take over eventually. However, Guanfang presents to the outside a “neutral technocrat” image - by staying neutral and always fully committing to the party line regardless of the current faction, the Guanfang present a silent army within China. All of Chinese success would not be possible without them and they know that a bureaucratic rebellion can bring down any political entity within the country. Until now they have decided to stay away from direct spotlight and might chose to do so again but they recognise their role as a kingmaker in the new political dynamic of the Chinese Communist Party. Even more so, they recognise the opportunity to become the real rulers of Chinese politics by playing the Laroen and the Tuhao against each other. The Guanfang will seek to exploit the division between the Laoren and the Tuhao to increase their standing in the Party hierarchy. A skilled bureaucrat might even fancy the top job if they play their cards right. In this quest for increased power they must take care that their main purpose remains fulfilled, the stability of the Chinese political system. The state comes first, individual aspirations second. This also comes with a pragmatism of playing slow games with large external powers like the US and being assertive against countries they deem China can overpower, like some smaller countries within ASEAN.

United States of America: Looking inwards

U.S Elections in the 2020s

As the discontent grew under the Trump presidency, the United States increasingly turned blue. People called for internal focus, and support for the citizens. The race for the 2020 elections was starting off very even for both parties. While Trump held the advantage of being the incumbent, the Democratic candidates were gaining support with every new executive order signed. The campaigns were focusing on reducing the national debt, cutting military spending, and fostering international relations. As the democratic primaries drew to a close, Bernie Sanders emerged as the nominee, with Kamala Harris coming second and put as his running mate. With Bernie Sanders


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advocating for universal and single-payer healthcare, tuition-free tertiary education, reducing military spending, and emphasising on labour rights and environmental concerns, Bernie rode the so-called “Blue Wave”. The younger generations came out in force to rally around the democratic party, along with the LGBTQ+ and African American communities. Election night on November 3rd, 2020 was not near as close as 2016, resulting in Bernie gaining 52.7% of the electoral college. As the Democrats regained control of the White House, the same held true for the Senate. The House of Representatives also remained majority Democrat. With a clean sweep of Washington D.C., many people expected the term to start off on a high note. However, before any reform could be put in place, there was widespread clean-up that had to be attended to. A minor recession hit the country due to US-China Trade War as the administration worked to reverse the previous policies and bolster the economy again. With the recession lasting the first year of Bernie’s presidency, approval ratings did not start out the strongest. Through the next 2 years, the White House endeavoured to focus on the country internally and improving the lives of the citizens. As the next election in 2024 approached, many people were uncertain about the direction that the Democratic Party was going to take. As Bernie Sanders continued to age, the concern grew that he would not last another term. When Bernie announced his candidacy bid once again, he was already the favoured democratic nominee. The primary elections for both parties were settled, Bernie Sanders emerging victorious for the Democrats and John Kasich of the Republican party. The campaign heated up, with many jabs at Sanders for his age and the Recession in the beginning of his office. The election day approached with no definite frontrunner in the polls. The polls closed on election day with a winner, the incumbent. Bernie Sanders had obtained the presidency for the second time. The Republicans re-took the Senate, however the Democrats only trailed by 3 seats. Tragedy struck on February 17th in 2026 within the White House. President Bernie Sanders was found dead of a heart attack at the age of 84. As the country mourned the loss of their leader, the new President was sworn in. Making history as the first female president, Kamala Harris was sworn in midterm. Moving from the role of Vice-President to President was an abrupt change that Harris had to adjust to. Nominating Kirsten Gillibrand as her Vice-President was a bold statement; however, it was approved by Congress. Finishing out the last two years of the 2024 election cycle, Harris did not undertake any sweeping reform of the system. The administration focused on maintaining a positive rating and continuing the internal economic focus, thus further ignoring the decline of US international presence. The 2028 elections brought with it a new set of expectations. As an incumbent, Kamala Harris had an advantage going into the elections. However as there had never been an elected female president, there was no definite re-election in sight. Running against Ben Carson as the Republican


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nominee, Kamala Harris set her sights on making history once again. As the votes were tallied, the results came back in favour of the Democratic party once again. President Kamala Harris would remain in office until 2032.

The American Economy in the 2020s In the period 2016-2020, the Trump administration pushed their economic agenda, promising more jobs, more money and an overall better economic situation for all Americans. These promises initially resulted in high growth ratio in 2019 and 2020 of approximately 5% and 6% respectively. However loathed, the economic boom quickly turned into an economic bust, a period we now refer to as the 2020 US recession. The high economic growth overheated the economy, resulting in inflation, plummeting consumer confidence and a stock market crash. The high inflation and high unemployment rates sparked social unrest, while the government was unable to act due to limited monetary funds. Due to the large amount of government investments during the Trump administration, the amount of debt of the US to other nations and third parties grew higher and higher. The newly elected democratic government was unable to effectively implement economic policies fighting the recession, which resulted in a growing narrative against the global economy. This narrative quickly grew more and more apparent, resulting in a series of policies focusing on the USA pulling back from the global economy. This movement and narrative gained a lot of ground, especially after China overtook the United States as the world’s largest economy in the 2020’s. The USA lost its leadership in the economic sense because of stagnating growth in the developed world and a shift in demographics, whilst China managed to consistently accomplish their long-term growth goals. Losing its leadership in the economic sense, the United States started looking more inward to find means increase its productivity and eliminate poverty. In the 2020’s decade, more and more technological advancements were made, aiming to increase overall productivity and resolve arising societal issues. The use of technology such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics resulted in growth on both the supply and demand side, as humans shifted more and more to the “creative demand” side of the markets. Aside from the use of technology in the business world and manufacturing plants, big data and the internet of things (IoT) quickly gained a lot of ground and was used for optimizing production management and development of new products and services. However, despite its efforts, the US never regained its leading economic position.


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On the one hand, technology and data has brought the US a lot of wealth and growth in the last decade or so, however, this also came hand-in-hand with more power for technology companies and billionaires. This group of people quickly acquired large amounts of powers, which they effectively used to shape the policies of the United States, resulting in lower tax-income from tech-billionaires. In line with its policy of retracting further and further from the international economy, the US didn’t act upon the instalment of the ASEAN Exchange Mechanism (AEM). The only comment on the system remained that ACRU (the common reserve unit) keeps the ASEAN currencies artificially low. Secretary of State Tulsi Gabbard however noted down that AEM could be a model for a defence against increasing Chinese Yuan influence in Asia & Africa.

East Asia: Unification and Militarisation

Korea The 2020s did not start well for the Korean Peninsula. The wave of support and popularity that brought President Moon Jae-in to power in 2017 faltered as his government became unable to address the economic downturn in the South Korean economy. To make matters worse, his policy on North Korea bore no fruit as President Trump removed himself from further talks, annoyed that little to no progress was being made. These accumulated failures enabled a resurgence of the Liberty Korea Party - now free from corruption and cult scandals - to thoroughly defeat the Democratic Party with a hard-line economic and foreign policy platform. North Korea, on the other hand, continued to develop its nuclear arsenal. The number of missile tests gradually decreased as international pressure lessened, allowing Kim Jong-un to focus on structural reforms. The majority of the Old Guard that remained following the 2013 Purge were removed from power, giving way to a young and ambitious New Wave. This new wave would prove fatal to the Kim Dynasty, for in 2026, the Supreme Leader is successfully assassinated. The coup attempt goes badly however, causing both the South Koreans and China to intervene immediately to limit destruction and chaos. The Twenty-Day War ensued as China moves in with surprising speed to secure nuclear warheads. Thankfully, skirmishes between South Korea/US forces and Chinese troops were few and far between, allowing for peace talks to follow with ease. The talks did not include North Korean officials and therefore ultimately ended with Korean reunification under South Korea. The terms also included the creation of a 10 km DMZ, a 50 km ‘no heavy industry zone’ on the China-Korea border, and the removal of all US


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forces on the peninsula once complete denuclearisation had been accomplished. Following reunification, the South Korean Democratic Party and People’s Party merge for the 2027 elections with Ji Seong-ho (a former North Korean defector) as the leader of the new Korean Peace Party and were able to defeat the Liberty Korea Party.

Japan In the early years of the 2020s, Japanese politics focused far more on the domestic situation over foreign affairs. A scandal involving Shinzo Abe, combined with the inability of the LDP government to form a cohesive policy tackling economic and demographic problems in the run-up to the 2021 elections allowed a coalition of the CDP/DPP (centre and centre-left) to gain traction but ultimately only win the Lower Chamber in a still surprising win over the monolithic LDP. The new government attempted to bolster the economy through relaxed migration laws but could only do so in a limited fashion. Not unlike the last time a coalition defeated the LDP, the CDP/DPP alliance became mired in corruption scandals between 2023 and 2024. Snap elections are announced following a total breakdown of the government in November 2024. The Neo-LDP, revitalised and modernised by Abe’s political successor Taro Kono, sweep both chambers in a overwhelming victory. True to his political views, Taro Kono begins his term as Prime Minister by continuing to relax immigration policies in order to attempt to resolve the demographic problem. The scale however, remained quite limited, and would do little in the long run to help revitalise the workforce. Kono attempted to become more involved on the Korean peninsula, especially after its reunification, but with the withdrawal of American troops, the new Korean government began to distance itself from the half-a-century old Korea-US-Japan alliance. With the economy still failing and the demographic issue remaining critical in the short term, Kono’s platform for the 2028 elections was ingrained in increased militarisation and further posturing against China, riling up nationalistic sentiments in Japan and allowing the Neo-LDP to remain in power.

Taiwan

The first half of the 2020s represented a historical juncture in Taiwanese history. While the Kuomintang was able to win the Presidency in the 2020 elections, public opinion began to steadily return towards the DPP in light of increasingly aggressive statements by Xi Jinping and the PRC. The Taiwanese Independence referendum had been the long-term project of the Pan-Green coalition and was their platform that enabled their victory in the 2024 elections. The preparation of the referendum took the whole year as Chinese influencers tried their hardest to delay the vote


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and switch public and political opinion. On the eve of the 1st of January 2025 however, the referendum results were released - showing to the whole world the Taiwanese people’s commitment to changing their country’s name from the Republic of China into the Republic of Taiwan and formally declaring independence from the mainland. The PRC immediately moved in to coerce the Taiwanese government to back down but were met by a dedicated Taiwanese and American naval force that stalemated the standoff on the shores of Taiwan. Tensions eventually cooled down, with China blocking Taiwan’s accession to the UN as a member state and instead forcing it to be an observer.

ASEAN: A closer Union of competing interests

Climate Solidarity Pact In today’s Anthropocene era, the amount natural disasters increase due to humanity’s significant impact on the Earth’s ecology. The Earth’s temperature increases: the highest recorded in the modern era. Due to this, the polar ice caps are melting at an alarming rate, rising sea level throughout the entire globe. The rising sea levels also intensified periodically occurring natural disasters.

This triggered various natural disasters, especially in islands and coastal area. In the beginning of 2028, a massive tsunami has hit Samoa. Caused by an 9.8 earthquake on the Richter scale, it was the biggest and most destructive tsunami in recent history in this region. In difference to previous tsunamis, like the one in 2009 and in 2025, which have only caused relatively minor damage outside of the immediate region around Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu have also experienced tsunami waves in 2028, flooding the entirety of some minor islands and demolishing these nations’ infrastructure and claiming thousands of lives. On the Cook Islands, it has caused the complete destruction of the infrastructure of its main island, Rarotonga. New Zealand has also reported destruction of coastal towns along the pacific coast of its Northern Island.

Since the mid 2020s, Bangladesh have experienced regular massive floods. In 2028, a particularly deadly and destructive flood has hit large parts of the country, in especially densely populated regions hit Bangladesh, in the same year, pushing back the country’s development as funds have to be reallocated for the damages.

This chain of natural disasters displaced thousands of people, triggering a massive wave of refugees going to Southeast Asian countries and Australia. This prompted several nations to create an international treaty, the “Climate Solidarity Pact”, where the countries of the Association of Southeast Nations as well as Australia agreed to accept climate refugees. This helped resolve


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tension between Indonesia and Australia over East Timor ASEAN membership. Despite New Zealand being hit by these natural disasters, the nation refused to be a part of the pact as they want to take care of all displaced persons under their own term as well as to block more climate refugees from coming into the nation. However, New Zealand formed a bilateral agreement with Australia, in which Australia will take some of the refugees that are not New Zealand nationals.

The Climate Solidarity Pact is a novelty in international law regarding the international legal status of environmentally displaced persons (EDPs). In article 3 of the ASEAN-Pacific Climate Solidarity Pact, the member countries decide to accept a definition which relies on the distinction of “climate refugees” and “environmentally displaced persons”. The member countries of the pact distinguish therefore between persons displaced permanently, the climate refugees, which cannot return to their place of living due to a permanent and non-reversible destruction. The pact equally defines EDPs as persons which are temporarily displaced by natural disasters:

Article 3 of the ASEAN-Pacific Climate Solidarity Pact - Definitions relevant to the present Pact

1. Climate refugees are individuals, families, groups and populations confronted with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that inexorably impacts their living conditions, resulting in their forced displacement, at the outset or throughout, from their habitual residence. They shall be granted at least equal treatment to refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

2. Environmentally displaced persons, hereafter referred to as EDPs, are individuals, families, groups and populations which are displaced temporarily due to a sudden environmental disaster and shall not be considered climate refugees. They shall be granted a temporary residence permit.

The Climate Solidarity Pact also retakes certain aspects of the - now failed - Dublin agreement in Europe. After another major refugee influx from Yemen after the country was essentially split up into two puppet states of Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively, the Dublin agreement was decided to be unfit to deal with the effective handling of asylum requests

In article 19 of the Climate Solidarity Pact, the ASEAN member states and Australia agree to examine asylum requests for all climate refugees, as well as all requests for temporary residence permits for EDPs, if the person in question has not done son in another member state of the pact:

Article 19 of the ASEAN-Pacific Climate Solidarity Pact - State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States


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1. Member States of the Climate Solidarity Pact are responsible for the examination of the asylum application of any environmentally displaced person who applies at the Member States border or in their territory for asylum.

2. The application submitted to one of the Member State of this Pact shall be examined by a single Member State, the acceptance or decline of the application shall be determined in accordance to the definition of EDPs as outlined by article 3 as well as the criteria defined by articles 5 to 9 of the present pact.

In order for peripheral countries to not be overwhelmed by asylum requests, the ASEAN member states also ratified an additional protocol to the pact which sets up an ASEAN Climate Change Trust Fund, which allocates funds to countries that have experienced a disproportional influx of immigrants in comparison to other ASEAN member countries.

Exchange Mechanism (AEM)

The extroverted economy of Singapore was gravely affected by the US recession in 2020. Other ASEAN countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia had to deal with a less pronounced economic downturn over all, but certain sectors, especially the trade of electronic machinery, still experienced a considerable decrease in exports towards the United States. This economic development encouraged an increased regional cooperation between the ASEAN member countries. The idea in the making since 2021, but the decisive moment only came in 2024 during the February ASEAN Summit, hosted by Laos in Vientiane. The most important decision taken by the heads of states was to peg the national currency to the newly established the ACRU, the Asian Common Reserve Unit.1 Due to the still lingering effects of the US recession 5 years ago, it was decided to fully implement the policy only by 2029 in order to prevent spread of the sectorial recession between the affected countries. It was also agreed to leave a marge of ±3.5% to adjust the exchange rate of the national currencies in case of economic chocs. The ACRU and the Chinese Yuan have been capped at 25% fluctuation maximum, as requested by China. The provision applies itself to Myanmar, Lao, Cambodia, East Timor and the Philippines.

Since the implementation of the ASEAN Exchange Mechanism, the south-east Asian market has further regionalized. The decision had largely positive effects on the national markets of the ASEAN members. The ASEAN member countries are now talking about the implementation of a common trade policy in order to compete with larger economies such as China and the United States.

1 The Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) was decided to be unfit as a currency basket, as it also included the currencies of Japan, China and South Korea. The AMU still continues to exist, but has no function outside of the comparison of the ASEAN +3 economies. The ACRU on the other hand


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However, the creation of a unique currency is still very controversial on an ASEAN level, but free trade oriented and liberal parties and political currents in the different countries are largely augmenting in favour of a common currency.

From the side of the European Union and of the United States, the ASEAN exchange mechanism is criticized for keeping the value of the South-East Asian currencies artificially low. Still, the ASEAN Exchange Mechanism was accepted as a way to counter the dominance of the Yuan in Africa.

The increased regionalization of the ASEAN economy has had multiple effects on the economic development and growth of the member countries. While Indonesia stayed in the top spot when it came to GDP for most of the 2020s, Malaysia started to catch up in the middle of the decade and surpassed Indonesia as the biggest economy of ASEAN in late 2028. Singapore’s economy took a major hit in 2020/21 but recovered relatively fast and kept its high GDP per capita. The fastest growing economy in ASEAN is also its newest member: East Timor became much more attractive for investors since its adhesion to the Association - in especially for investors from other ASEAN countries. The economy of East Timor has an average growth rate of 16% per year since the adhesion, albeit slowing down significantly after a very quick initial increase.

Establishment of Defence-Foreign Affairs Council

After the disastrous response of ASEAN and the countless backlash from the international community during the Rohingya Crisis that started in 2015, ASEAN has decided to pool together their resources and established the Defence-Foreign Affairs Council. The council aptly named the ASEAN United Defence Council (AUDC) was founded at the 2022 Phnom Penh ASEAN Summit in Cambodia. The Rohingya crisis caused the organization to reassess the structure and working of ASEAN. In the early 2000’s, ASEAN have been criticized for their lack of strength and capabilities due to their non-intervention policy and flexible consensus. The ASEAN member states have an implicit rule of not intervening with each other’s domestic policy, this is due to their shared colonial history and fear of foreign intervention in their country. They also have the flexible consensus, this would mean that member states can simply agree to a policy but do not need to implement the policy. These factors combined caused ASEAN to be frequently called a “tiger without teeth” as most of their agreed policy are hollow and can be judged as inconsequential.

The foreign minister of Indonesia at the time, Retno Marsudi, spearheaded the campaign and the formation of the AUDC. The AUDC is styled after the European Union model with a head commissioner as the head. The AUDC overruled the traditional non-intervention model and any decision made by them are legally binding. The more conservative ASEAN member states reluctantly agreed after the 2021 establishment of China’s Ministry of Nanhai (Southern Sea) was


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formed as they see this as encroachment of China into the ever-disputed South China sea issue. Fearing a Chinese takeover and the lack of support from the growingly isolated United States, ASEAN agreed to create the AUDC. However, Philippines although agreeing to creation of the AUDC, has pulled an ‘empty chair’ tactics by not sending a representative for the first AUDC meetings. The AUDC was in charge of the group’s common foreign and security policy. Marsudi, being the incumbent foreign minister of Indonesia at the time, cannot appoint herself as the head commissioner, due to fear of clash of interest. Instead it was unanimously agreed by all the member states that the first head commissioner would the former Minister of Defence of Malaysia, Mohamad Sabu. Sabu was also one of the architects of the AUDC and is well known for his public speaking abilities. The AUDC is now an organ of ASEAN that meets 3 times a year and the meeting is represented by both the foreign minister and the defence minister of all of the member states. The AUDC have also effectively replaced the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM)

In 2024, along with Timor’s ascension to ASEAN, the AUDC created a new proposal for the ASEAN Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 2024 also saw a new president of the Philippines put in power. As the Philippines missed the drafting process, they are forced to agree to the new AFSP regardless as a show of good faith. The new AFSP is heavily based on the EU CFSP model. The AUDC defines the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP as well as common strategies to be implemented by ASEAN. In 2025, the high commissioner titled was renamed as the High Representative of the Association for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRA). In the first few years of its existence, the AUDC exceeded the expectations of its critics and ASEAN have taken the necessary steps in improving their conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the region. Plans have even been drafted to create a joint defence task force. In 2029, the Sabu’s term as HRA had ended, former President of Singapore, Halimah Yacob, was elected to be his replacement.

Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia: The Pro-China votes

During the latter half of the 2010’s, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia have strengthened their ties with their giant neighbour in the North, China. This all stems from the countries previous socialist rule and the need for trade and capital. At that time, the long-term consequences of these ties have not been clear.

In Myanmar, since State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi assumed office in March 2016, her government has strived to increase their ties with China. She has successfully pushed to resume the controversial Letpadaung mining project, to re-open the China–Myanmar oil pipeline, and has signed agreements on constructing a deep-water port in Kyaukpyu and establishing a China–Myanmar border economic cooperation zone. In return for Myanmar’s cooperation, Beijing has


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provided economic assistance and political support to the Myanmar government with respect to the Rohingya crisis and the peace talks in northern Myanmar. In the United Nations Security Council, China has threatened repeatedly to use its veto power with regards any talks about the Rohingya crisis. With ASEAN being a weak institution at the time, Myanmar saw this as an unmissable opportunity to assure political security and investment in exchange for its natural resources. Myanmar’s overdependence on China has significantly increased with the China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which includes the construction of the Myanmar–China Economic Corridor. The corridor, which was finished in 2025, connected China’s Yunnan province with three economic centres in Myanmar; Mandalay, Yangon New City and Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone. Myanmar has at this point become completely dependent on China’s resources and capital.

Laos’s relations with China have traditionally consisted of economic trade as well as aid. These relations were largely limited to road construction in the northern provinces of Laos, without directly challenging the interests of Thailand or Vietnam in the central and southern regions. In the BRI framework, China also included plans for Laos, in particular a 260-mile, $5 billion rail line that Beijing seeks to extend through Laos to Thailand which was completed in 2025. The railroad connected Vientiane to China’s extensive railways which resulted in a flood of Chinese investment to pour into the country. Already since the communist government of Laos has introduced a policy favouring the transformation of assets into capital in 2013, Chinese businessmen started buying up properties in Laos. This trend was intensified with the completion of the railroad and the value of Chinese investments has been increasing ever since the plan was especially appealing to Chinese investors, who acquired most of the high-end property in Vientiane. With the completion of the economic corridor, most of the valuable land in Laos ended up in the hand of wealthy Chinese which created problem for Laos.

Cambodia's economic relations with China have long been marked by a significant trade deficit, as Cambodia was importing more goods from China than it was exporting. While the annual growth of the deficit decreased in the early 2000s and was relatively stable through the 2010s, the deficit exploded due to multiple large-scale Chinese investment projects in Cambodia, including the Lower Se San 2 Dam, worth $781 million and a $3.8 billion deep-water port project on the Cambodian Coastline. However, there have been long-standing anti-Chinese sentiments from the Cambodians, primarily due to the Chinese support of Khmer Rouge regime. However, this has not stopped the Cambodian government to accept Chinese money. China is Cambodia’s largest foreign donor due to its significant Chinese minority, but many aid agreements between the two nations lack transparency, raising questions about whether Beijing is trying to buy influence in the country and how the money is being spent. With the launch of the BRI, Cambodia has become China’s premier partner and beneficiary. After Cambodia’s former Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Beijing in December 2017, he signed an investment contract of approximately US$7 billion with China,


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including the Greenway Group and Henan Transportation Investment Group’s highway project from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville. Same as Myanmar, Cambodia has become over-dependent on China by 2025.

All of the countries once saw China as a vital ally and trade partner and realized too late that China was using a debt-trap diplomacy. China’s BRI have long been criticized as a type of debt-trap diplomacy using Chinese contractors and pouring hundreds of millions of investments toward developing countries. As these countries are indebted to China, they have been forced to politically align more closely with China and therefore distance themselves from the United States. Although, they are pro-china in terms of politics and economy, the growth of ASEAN has persuaded them to agree on the creation of the AUDC. Still, it is not sure whether their loyalty will lie with the other ASEAN member countries in the future or change in favour of a definite alignment with China.

World outside Asia Europe: EU made a stride with integrating all of western Balkans into the Union in 2025. However following Emmanuel Macron’s departure from politics in 2027, the member states of the European Union struggle to find a common leader. Power struggles erupt, leaving inter-European relationships in a tense state. Whilst the Joint European Freedom Forces (JEFF) is still operational, single members have announced to severely cut their contribution funding or withdraw from the military union entirely. This goes in conjunction with a rise of nationalistic tendencies in Europe, manifesting in many democracies increasingly undermining EU regulations and sanctions, whilst executing hard ’repatriation’ measures on former and current refugees. Euro-scepticism seems to be at an all-time high with no signs to abate. China meanwhile continues to try to penetrate European industries, but with more stringent regulations, China’s Belt and Road initiative in Europe has mostly been operating only in Southern Europe and the Balkans. United Kingdom meanwhile remains in a “perpetual delay” of Brexit. The Middle East: While Syria & Iraq went through its own reconstruction in the first half of the decade, the same could not be said with Yemen. However, when King Salman of Saudi Arabia passed away right after his 89th birthday in 2025, the new King Muhammad (previously Prince Muhammad bin Salman/MBS) made a total departure from his previously hawkish views. Later in that year, Saudi & Iran signed a peace deal to carve up Yemen into the Shia North based in Sanaa & Sunni South


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with Aden as Capital. This was also probable after a new rank of Iranian leaders like Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani & President Bagher Ghalibaf entered office in 2023-2024. In 2028, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan and the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin met over their dispute concerning territorial claims on the northern part of the remainders of Syria. Following many months of initially fruitful deliberations both sides found themselves in a deadlock. Putin, trying to assert his dominance haphazardly challenged his Turkish counterpart to a duel. Erdoǧan, being the challenged party, exercised his right to choose the weapon. Plagued by steadily progressing dementia, he chose to wield a nuclear grenade launcher. In a blaze of nuclear glory, both leaders took their last breath as they were evaporated into a mist of radioactive bliss. The subsequent power vacuum did not remain undiscovered. Acknowledging the current disarray in Turkey and Northern Syria, the Kurdish parliament seated in Erbil, Iraq declared independence and the birth of the Free Republic of Kurdistan. The Kurdish Fighters managed to seize northern Iraq and establish a fortified front spanning from Mersin to Samsun on the Turkish side, all the while securing the Syrian region of Afrin. Iran, fearing the growing regional influence of Kurdistan, fortifies its borders, resulting in occasional clashes in Zagros Mountains. And while Saudi-Iran tensions are finally decreasing, the recent Kurdish developments have brought a renewed rivalry between Israel and Iran, as Israel have fully endorsed and supported Kurdish independence. Current Israeli PM Benny Gantz had previously made strides in easing tensions in the West Bank and giving concessions to Palestine, but with Iran going against the Kurds, Gantz might want to flex its strong military muscles, which he used as campaign promise to oust Benjamin Netanyahu from power in 2022. Russia: Distraught by their leader’s demise, the former KGB oligarchs, more known as Siloviki have started to run the government as part of an interim solution until Putin’s successor is determined. Having their own claims on political power, the billionaire oligarchy initially started to publicly defame individual Silovikis. This has now culminated in assassinations and detainment of political dissidents by the Siloviki. The conflict between the two main factions within the Russian federation is being exacerbated by Chinese covert involvement, with the extent of the interference is largely unknown to the outsider world. All that is certain is that Chinese interests are being maintained through the continued internal conflict inside Russia. The future of the proud Federation is uncertain. Although at the very least, this put both Brussels & Moscow’s attention away from each other and focuses more into their internal landscapes.


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Africa: As a result of heavy investments into African infrastructure and economy by the Chinese Government, the Yuan has started to establish itself all over the north-eastern half of the Continent. The African Union, together with the African Development Bank (AfDB) & African Export-Import Bank (Afrexim) even recognized the Yuan as a valid African-wide reserve currency in 2027. Along with increasing Chinese influence, several African states have fell into Chinese debt-traps, finding themselves either indebted to Beijing or giving up strategic ports and natural resources for 99 years to get debt forgiveness. This rings true especially across the Eastern African coast - Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Somalia, Djibouti and Tanzania all had fallen into these scenarios. Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia remain the 3 east African countries able to balance Chinese investment and their own development. South & Central Asia India, being the power behemoth of the region, failed to live up to its expectations. After 10 years of Narendra Modi at power, India managed to overtake US as the 2nd largest economy globally in 2024. However, this came at a massive social cost. Huge inequality and urban migration problem led to social clashes between Hindus & Muslims. The Modi government, being pro-Hindu did not help and massacres in large cities such as Colcatta and Mumbai happened prior to the 2024 elections. This led to the fall of Modi & BJP, leading to a more inclusive coalition government led by India National Congress (INC)’s Shashi Tharoor. PM Tharoor went to great lengths to repair the social fabric. However, this has led to India not being as active in the international stage. Whereas Nepal, Sri Lanka & Bangladesh managed to get themselves even more aligned to China. PM Tharoor passed away in 2028 and the leadership is now held by PM Rahul Gandhi. After a decade of looking inward, India is now trying to make up for the last decade internationally and is desperate to find partnerships to stop China from being more powerful in the region. Pakistan, meanwhile, after a decade of Imran Khan leadership, finally managed a balanced partnership with China. While being used as a way for China to connect its western provinces to the Arabian Sea, Imran Khan made sure Pakistani state-owned enterprise still rules supreme in its domestic market. Meanwhile Central Asia is still ruled by strongmen who, after Putin’s demise in 2027, saw the need for a transition to younger leadership. With Russia busy trying to find internal stability, these Central Asian nations are turning increasingly towards China to sell their products. Australia While Australia is not playing any role in the South China Sea, they have a lot at stakes. The land down under had quite some international developments during the 2020s. Canberra is pursuing an even closer bond with ASEAN, particularly Indonesia. This happens after a slew of scandals in


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2024 uncovered Chinese involvement in both Australian & Indonesian elections. Australia also hopes this rapprochement with Indonesia will help reverse several concessions that Australia made in the Timor Sea Oil & Gas dispute, where Indonesia helped East Timor recover a better income share of the resource. East Timor’s eventual ascension to ASEAN have also angered the Australian government, but with Chinese involvement unravelled but growing stronger in neighbouring Papua New Guinea and Solomon Island, Australia looks towards Indonesia and ASEAN as an ally they could use to neutralize Chinese, in return for economic favours.

Society leading up to 2030

Naval Sovereignty and a new nature of Warfare on the Sea

Confrontations in the South China Sea Naval warfare in the years leading up to 2030 was mainly characterized by a technological arms race. The development of aircraft carriers in especially, as well as the development of new naval missiles, have been central in this arms race. The two major naval forces in the South China Sea, China and the United States and their respective allies, have increased their capacities significantly in the last ten years. Currently, around 80% of naval capacities of the United States are located in the South China Sea, a large increase compared to the 60% in 2020 - especially considering the general expansion of US naval capacities in the same time span.

The South China Sea is crowded with both civilian and military vessels. As the Chinese navy has grown bolder in asserting its territorial claims, other countries have started moving their navies through the area, conducting ‘freedom of navigation exercises’. While the Chinese navy has remained more restrained when dealing with military forces, it has commonly warned off civilian craft, using water cannons and sonic weaponry in order to ensure compliance.

On a number of occasions, Chinese and foreign military ships have come close to colliding during the aforementioned “freedom of navigation exercises”. It is not uncommon to see Chinese naval ships modified with small water cannons on their bows patrolling the disputed areas. Acoustic weapons have also become a common sight on military ships in the region. However, the use of them has been limited since the Hughes Reef Incident in late 2028 in which two PLAN destroyers turned on long range acoustic devices (LRADs) on one US Navy destroyer after the US destroyer refused to change course. The US destroyer armed its weapons, but the incident was resolved after the PLAN ships deactivated their LRADs following a near collision with the US vessel. The US


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vessel left the area shortly after, and diplomats condemned China’s heavy-handed use of acoustic weaponry.

The tendency of the United States to employ aggressive navigation tactics has led to more collisions, in especially between the United States and China. China, convinced of the extent of their territorial waters, have started to shadow foreign vessels - both military and civil. The increased naval activity in the South China Sea has led to an equally increased probability for collisions in the region. The risk of collision due to the non-respect of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea has closely been monitored by the International Maritime Organization. But as the IMO has to rely, in light of the absence of enforcement mechanisms, on the mobilization of the international opinion, these efforts have not produced the desired results.

US analysts also suspect that the Chinese navy have conducted mining operations around their artificial islands. Large minefields would make navigation for US submarines treacherous in areas close to Chinese artificial islands. While the major shipping lanes are clear for now, there is no guarantee they will remain that way in the event of hostilities.

The New Nature of Naval Warfare There hasn’t been a naval battle between major naval powers since the second world war. With the primacy of aircraft carriers established, naval weapons technology moved towards longer and longer ranged weapons. Anti-ship missile technology now allows for engagements at ranges of 200-400 km, and further if the missiles are carried on aircraft launched from aircraft carriers. Submarines are stealthier than ever, and torpedoes are designed to sink large surface vessels by themselves. No one truly understands how devastating a naval engagement between major powers will play out, and hopefully, we’ll never have to find out.

Aircraft carriers

Aircraft carriers proved their worth in the second world war, changing the face of naval combat forever. Where there were once battleships slugging it out for supremacy, the threat to surface ships now comes from planes launched from far beyond the horizon. With the ability to project power in this way, aircraft carriers have become the ultimate goal for any naval power.

The United States has led the way, with 12 aircraft carriers in active operation - 10 Nimitz class and 4 Gerald R Ford class. Major fleets are built around aircraft carriers, allowing the countries with them to project air power across the world. The United States Navy currently keeps two


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Carrier Strike Groups permanently forward deployed in the Asian region, CSG 5, with the USS Ronald Reagan, a Nimitz class carrier, and CSG 10 with the USS John F Kennedy, a Gerald R Ford class carrier (As of 2030). The United States also operates 12 additional Wasp and Freedom class amphibious assault ships, which can only operate short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft and helicopters. While smaller than their standard aircraft carriers, these ships are still about the same size as the French nuclear-powered Charles De Gaulle fixed wing aircraft carrier. However, these ships are designed with amphibious assault in mind, not aerial or naval superiority.

While the United States still has the lead in the number of aircraft carriers, China has been developing its own native aircraft carriers. Starting with a retrofitted Russian carrier, the People's Liberation Army Navy has built up their carrier force to a respectable 4 active aircraft carriers. With one Type 001, one Type 001A, one Type 002, and one Type 003, the Chinese Navy has steadily been developing its carrier technology, culminating in the improvements seen in the Type 003, including electromagnetic catapults and a powerful nuclear reactor. These carriers are fully capable of carrying and launching fixed wing aircraft in addition to helicopters, and PLAN has been operating its own carriers in strike groups around the northern coast of China and more recently, the South China Sea.

Given the build-up of the Chinese navy, Japan has started building on its carrier capacity as well. However, their four carriers are only helicopter carriers, with no ski-jump or catapult system to help fixed wing aircraft launch. However, they have been modified to carry and launch a small number of F-35Bs, short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. While this has provoked some backlash from the Chinese, Japan regards these as necessary to ensure a sufficient self-defence force.

The other ASEAN states have only one outdated helicopter carrier between them, belonging to the Thai Navy. Originally designed for STVOL aircraft, HTMS Chakri Naruebet was converted into a helicopter carrier following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, due to a lack of funds to maintain STVOL aircraft and facilities. In the late 2020s, the Thai Navy began a refurbishment program, buying 6 AV8B Harrier IIs from the USMC and modifying the carrier to launch them. However, a lack of training still hinders the carrier from operating at maximum efficiency.

South Korea maintains a fleet of two Dokdo class amphibious assault ships, capable of launching helicopters and short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. However, much like the US navy’s Wasp and America classes, these ships are designed with amphibious assault in mind, not aerial or naval superiority.


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Submarine warfare

Submarines have also come a long way from the second world war. With submarine technology and tactics developed and honed in the Cold War, submarines are stealthier and deadlier than ever before.

The United States maintains the world’s largest submarine fleet, made up primarily of fast attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines. The US fleet comprises of just four classes of submarine, the Los Angeles, Seawolf and Virginia class attack submarines, and the Ohio class ballistic missile submarines. Combined, the submarine fleet totals 75 submarines. All of the US submarine fleet is nuclear powered, allowing them to be very stealthy and operate for long periods of time without ever needing to surface.

The Chinese submarine fleet is the second largest in the world, with 72 submarines. With only 8 Type 094 ballistic missile submarines, the PLAN’s attack submarine fleet actually outnumbers the US attack submarine fleet. However, half their fleet are aging Type 035 and Type 039 diesel electric submarines, and their Russian Kilo Submarines are also showing their age. However, their 25 newer Type 39A class diesel electric submarines are quieter than any other diesel electric submarine that has come before, and these will pose the largest threat to any other surface fleet in the region. However, as quiet as they are, the Type 39As are still louder than any of the US attack submarines at their quietest. China is currently developing the Type 042, a nuclear-powered attack submarine. While still in its testing phases, US analysts worry that it could rival the US navy’s aging fleet of Los Angeles class attack submarines.

The Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF) operates a fleet of 22 diesel-electric attack submarines, primarily the Soryu Class. Their submarine fleet is quite modern, with the oldest built in the early 2000s. While not as quiet as some of the newer Chinese submarines, their advanced technology should be able to make up the difference.

The Republic of Korea Navy maintains a fleet of 18 diesel-electric attack submarines. However, their primary deployment is against the DPRK, not in the South China Sea. Their latest submarine class, the Dosan Ahn Changho class, are equipped with vertical launch systems (VLS) to allow for cruise and ballistic missile launches.

Many oceangoing ASEAN countries maintain small squadrons of submarines. The Royal Malaysian Navy operates two Scorpene class submarines, the Republic of Singapore Navy operates four Invincible class submarines, the Philippine Navy operates two Improved Kilo class submarines purchased from Russia, the Vietnamese Navy operates 6 Kilo class submarines purchased from Russia, and the Thai Navy operates three Type 39A class submarines purchased from China. Of


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these, only Singapore has the funds and training to operate their submarine fleets at maximum capacity.

Regarding weaponry, torpedo technology allows for attacks at ranges of approximately 50 km, although attacking at a closer range (ca. 30km) is recommended to ensure that targets are destroyed. Most submarines are also capable of carrying and launching anti-ship or land attack cruise missiles, but without a vertical launch system such as those on South Korean or US submarines, their range is limited to under 75 km.

Missiles

Anti-ship missiles are the primary form of weaponry employed today. With ranges of up to 500 km, standoff weaponry allows navies to engage targets from (relative) safety. Missiles are also devastating when they hit, crippling a ship, if not outright sinking it. The latest anti-ship missiles carried by most actors in the South China Sea region have a range of at least 200 km. These missiles can be launched either from land-based missile batteries, from aircraft, or from other surface ships. Depending on the platform, missiles may have different range - a land or ship-based missile is likely to have a longer range than an air launched missile.

However, unlike torpedoes, missiles can be intercepted. A successful attack must then use a number of missiles, not just a single one. Close-in Weapons Systems (CWIS) are designed to intercept missiles either with their own missiles or by firing gun systems to shoot down the incoming missiles. All large naval warships in the South China Sea theatre are armed with CWIS. Missiles are thus programmed to avoid CWIS systems by ‘sea skimming’ i.e. flying very close to the sea in order to avoid detection until the last possible moment. However, with modern radar, ships are often given enough warning of incoming missiles to ensure that CWIS systems are functional. The United States and their NATO allies lead the way in missile technology, with their latest AGM158C missile capable of hitting targets 580 km away, and launchable from both aircraft and surface vessels. However, China has been developing its own indigenous missiles, with the YJ-18 surface launched missile and YJ-12 air launched missile reaching 300 and 400 km ranges respectively. Their latest missile, the YJ-10 is suspected to have a range of over 1500 km, a counter to the US AGM158C.

UNCLOS and Customary International Law

UNCLOS


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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 was the result of three Conferences on the Law of the Sea held between 1973 and 1982 (UNCLOS I, II and III). The convention has been signed and ratified by 167 countries and the European Union. Additional to the UNCLOS treaty, there is also an Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed and ratified by the member states to the treaty in 1994, when the treaty entered into force. UNCLOS is part of UN efforts to codify international customary law as set forth in the UN Charter. The convention also plays a significant role in environmental protection and integrates into the international environmental law process that started in the 1970s, as it aims to protect the seabed, the ocean floor and subsoil as a “common heritage of mankind”, as outlined in the preambles of the convention.

The Agreement was also signed – but not ratified – by the United States, despite them neither signing nor ratifying the Treaty. The ratification of the treaty and the agreement is topic of a heated discussion with the houses of the United States parliament. A small but very vocal minority of conservative lawmakers oppose the ratification of the treaty; however, the ratification of the treaty would be supported by the defence department. Despite this, some principles codified by UNCLOS are also applied by the United States, in particular the principle of freedom of navigation, which predates the treaty as a part of now customary law. Former United States president Ronald Reagan declared the provisions of the Convention with respect to navigation and overflight rights to be part of customary international law.2 The main opposition within the United States to the ratification of the treaty derives from the fact that the United States would have to accept the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and respect its rulings. In Asia and the Pacific, the only countries with sea access that have neither ratified the treaty nor the agreement are Cambodia and North Korea. The Marshall Islands have ratified the treaty, but not the agreement. In regard to other countries with interests in the South China Sea, Japan, China and South Korea are represented in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) with a judge.

Most importantly for the conflict at hand, the definition of different maritime zones according to economic use, which were defined during UNCLOS III, are of particular importance. All sides to the conflict over the claims to the South China Sea argue that their position is justified by the application of the UNCLOS principles as well as customary principles of international law outside of UNCLOS. Particularly China and Vietnam are arguing that their historical activities in the region to justify their current claims.

2 Stephens, Dale. “The Legal Efficacy of Freedom of Navigation Assertions” in International Law Studies, volume 80. 2006.


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The zones are defined the following way: Internal waters refer to rivers, canals as well as water within small bays.3 The passage of foreign vessels, both civil and military, is restricted or forbidden depending on national law of the country.4 The extent of the internal waters defines the baseline with which the extent rest of the zones is calculated. The extent of the internal waters normally corresponds to the mean low-water mark of a coastal state.5 The territorial sea extends at most 12 nautical miles (nm) from the baseline, as defined by article 3 of UNCLOS. If there are overlaps between the claims of territorial sea, the border is defined by the median point between the state’s baselines, if not agreed to otherwise.6

Figure 1.0 - Territorial Water, EEZ, and contiguous zone

Both military and civil ships have the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, as stated in article 17 of UNCLOS.7 The territorial sea is followed by the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Like all waters outside of the territorial sea, the EEZ is part of the international waters. The EEZ, as defined by Article 56 of UNCLOS, allocates a “sovereign right for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters suprajacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil […].”8 The EEZ extends to a maximum of 200 nm from the baseline.9 In difference to the territorial sea, other states also have certain rights within, in especially the freedom of navigation and overflight, as defined by article 58 of UNCLOS.10 It is also allowed for the coastal state to build artificial islands and installations

3 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Article 8, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf [accessed 15 March 2019] 4 Articles 2, 8, 9, 10, 11. 5 Ibid. Article 5 6 Ibid. Article 15. 7 Ibid. Article 17. 8 Ibid. Article 56. 9 Ibid. Article 57. 10 Ibid. Article 58.


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and structures in the EEZ, as explained in Article 60 of UNCLOS.11 However, as detailed in §8 of the provision, “artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of the own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”12 Article 76 defines the continental shelf of a coastal states the following way: “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin […].”13 The continental shelf extends at least as far as the exclusive economic zone, so 200 nm from the baseline, even if it’s geographically not the case, and no more than 350 nm.14 Apart from the continental shelf, in and on which coastal states enjoy certain rights, the overlying waters extending further than the EEZ are parts of the high seas.

Principle of Freedom of Navigation

The principle of freedom of navigation is a basic principle of international law of the sea. The principle entered into conventional international law in 1984 with article 87a:

1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:

a. freedom of navigation; b. freedom of overflight; c. freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; d. freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under

international law, subject to Part VI; e. freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; f. freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.

2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.15

11 Ibid. Article 60. 12 Ibid. Article 60 §8. 13 Ibid. Article 76. 14 Ibid. Article 76 §5. 15 Ibid. Article 87.


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The United States Navy invokes primarily the principle of freedom of navigation to challenge claims of other countries, in this case China. Since 1983, the United States have repeatedly conducted so called “Freedom of Navigation Operational Assertions”, or FONAs.16 Since 2026, 80% of the FONAs were conducted in relation to the South China Sea. The United States has itself not limited to the assertion of power vis-à-vis of its rivals, but also towards allies in the region, such as the Philippines.17 They have also significantly increased in aggressiveness since the announcement of the Chinese government to build a new aircraft carrier that is significantly larger than the largest American one. These “assertive operations” have also led to an increased spending on anti-ship missiles by China.

The United States claim that UNCLOS does allow, due to its ambiguity in formulation, excessive claims to coastal states. Despite not being part of the convention, the United States Navy conducts FONAs for the following reasons if believed to be contrary to the spirit of UNCLOS: Excessive and very broad claims for historic bay status, territorial sea limits beyond the 12 nm range, imposition of a multitude or safety conditions on “innocent passage” which effectively denies the right, and denied passage rights within international straits most importantly.18

Sovereignty Claims The sovereignty claims of China over the South China Sea within the nine-dash line are, according to the argumentation of the Chinese government, rooted in customary law of discovery, occupation and historic title. The Chinese government argues that it has a historical claim over the islands and the waters argued to be territorial waters, as it has been historically significant for Chinese trade and that islands, reefs, shoals and rocks were already documented well by Chinese dynasties from the fifth century onward. It is further argued that since the early twentieth century until the beginning of the 1970s, the claims of the Chinese government over the South China Sea have been international clear but not contested and that China therefore has the historical claim over the region, based on the silence of the international community.19 However, China has not formally filed a claim for the recognition of its sovereignty over the territory, nor has it ever defined the claim outside of the nine-dash line. The nine-dash line, as it is non-continuous, does not

16 Stephens, Dale. “The Legal Efficiacy of Freedom of Navigation Assertions” in International Law Studies, volume 80. 2006. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. p. 240 19 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications”, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 98-124.


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conform to the standards of a demarcation line. It is further not geographically defined, and was unilaterally changed multiple times, first reducing it by two lines, then adding another one.

The Chinese claims interfere with the claims of the following countries: Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. The earliest contestation of the Chinese claims came from Vietnam, with which China later defined parts of the extend of its territorial waters in 2000. The Vietnamese claim from the late 1960s extended the Vietnamese territorial claims to the Nansha Islands. Since then, Vietnam has progressively occupied more of the islands. Malaysia also has claims to five reefs in the Nansha Islands.

Big Data and Surveillance

While during the late 2010’s the political impact of efficient data collection and processing of data through AI had become a known threat in scandals alike that surrounding Cambridge Analytica, facial recognition systems and the Internet of Things already revolutionised surveillance and data collection opportunities and the first social credit system was rolled out in China, by 2029 these technologies have advanced far further, yet due to the rising complexity of the tasks and the sheer amount of processing capabilities necessary, only a few major players lead the way, with many a competitor left far behind, either being forced into bankruptcy or into mergers with one of the large US or Chinese conglomerates dominating the scene. The race for “true” AI, by now considered the new space race, is still ongoing, with supercomputers being the key resource in the race. Due to the massive investment needed to gain even marginal progress, a cooperation between the Chinese state and their tech industry is currently in the lead, mainly since they control 300 of the world’s 500 most powerful computing centres. A close second in this race is a joint venture of American companies led by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, unexpectedly so, as by 2029 the US has fallen far behind when it comes to supercomputers, only sporting a quarter of the top 500. Even though the race is still ongoing, some of the spoils the process has yielded are already in use in the defence industry, particularly in the area of homing missiles, as experts presume that most major navies have put the first supersonic low altitude anti-ship missiles into service. Additionally, the advances in both reliable and cost-efficient wearables has allowed the Internet of things to arrive on the battlefield, as every soldier is monitored through health trackers, body cams and a weapons monitor while also wearing a set of AR glasses, allowing him to be fed information in real time, just as his information is transmitted to his superiors, allowing real time data analysis with artificial intelligences - self-taught through permanent wargames against themselves - to assist


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commanding officers in optimising their decisions. The exploitable vulnerabilities of such massive top-secret clouds have been discussed ever since the US intelligence agencies decided to adopt a joint data cloud provided by Amazon Web Services in 2018, but until now no successful attack on such a system is known. Still, there have also been small revolutions in old technologies. For example, the Chinese equivalent to GPS, BeiDou, has been fully operational for several years, with its satellites according to some analysts being positioned in a fashion allowing particularly precise navigation in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Another strategic asset where power has shifted is web hosting and cloud computing, as Tencent Cloud and Alibaba Cloud have gained significant market share outside of China, breaking the stranglehold Amazon Web Services used to have on the internet with the same competitive prices with which Chinese phone manufacturers have managed to gain significant market share outside the US. Also considering the role Huawei and ZTE have managed to play in constructing phone towers and other digital infrastructure, China has become the main player in what many are calling data colonialism, as raw data collected in the whole world is being processed and utilised to various ends in China. While American companies are attempting the same, internal competition and patents have prevented them from consolidating quite as much information. Until now these efforts have mainly been used for commercial purposes. Their destructive potential in an all-out conflict has thus not been revealed to the world. One of the most controversial developments has occurred in surveillance technology, especially as improvements in AI have made facial recognition ever more efficient. After at first being opposed by many civil liberty proponents, the everlasting fear of terror attacks was enough to convince the public – even in liberal democracies – that ubiquitous surveillance through cctv is necessary, in turn allowing the analysis of movement pattern of every person. Because the software necessary is quite advanced, the market is dominated by the same players as AI research, leaving most of the world at the mercy of Chinese and US tech giants’ goodwill not to exploit this oligopoly. In China these advances in surveillance technology have been combined with the now mandatory social credit system, allowing a level of government control and influence on the individual exceeding even the capabilities of most brutal and far reaching secret services of the Warsaw Pact. There is some ongoing speculation that the Chinese security agencies are even using AI in order to pre-empt criminal activity based on the data gathered. Outside of China social credit systems have mostly been averted successfully, most recently in the EU, where this level of data collection was ruled to be illegal, as it violates the GDPR. In most


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developing countries few companies attempted to roll out such a program, as only a relatively small share of the population could participate. One of the few countries enthusiastically supporting such a system is Japan, where the government has adopted it, hoping that better hard information may improve dating behaviour and permanently increase the birth-rate. Recent reports by the UN also note that the system includes active discrimination by only matching immigrants with immigrants and keeping Japanese natives matching with each other. In the US only private companies have begun to implement such systems to score their employees. The exception would be companies specialising in criminal and financial background checks, who for years have attempted to establish a registry of social scores, yet their efforts have mostly been futile, as they lack the data collection capabilities necessary. The main company with such capabilities, Facebook, is rumoured to either use such a system as part of their algorithms or even plan on publishing it as a feature to their platform.

Financialization and Tech Boom

It has been termed a finance game of musical chairs where every party is aware that most of the chairs will disappear when the music stops, but everyone still clings onto an unrealistic confidence that their chair will not. Financialization’s cyclical rhetoric based on ideas of “this time is different” and we are in a “new age,” have allowed bubbles and increases in private debt to be continuously diminished in the name of new innovations and expansions within the world of finance. Financialization did not only cause the 2020 recession but it has been its pseudo solution, reintroducing an unstable economic climate in the 2030s. As China overtook the United States as the world’s leading economy, and as the Yuan dominates Africa it is clear that the economic causes and effects which shifted the tectonic plates of the global political and economic structure do not lie far from financialization. It is evident that this is not just a game of nations but a game of finance and markets. In the years leading up to 2020 after JPMorgan Chase launched JPM Coin, its own cryptocurrency, with Goldman Sachs and Apple jointly following in their footsteps, the merger of tech and finance permeated the world economy. The majority of investment banks pegged their currency to the dollar with the ambition to expedite transactions and settlements between investors leading to an unimaginable amount of market saturation. However, in an attempt to cope with and counteract the economic influence of China’s AliPay and WeChat pay, Beijing’s central bank adopted its own digital currency, which was able to in a limited sense shield China from some of the crash’s effects in 2020. Albeit technology’s capacity to decentralize, using it to assist the ends


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of financialization centralized commercial powers, leaving governments increasingly incapable of coping with the effects of a volatile market. Share buybacks gained exponential popularity right before 2020 at the end of a credit cycle. Due to the fact that the reduction of outstanding shares is able to increase per share earnings, money was quickly fed back to investors and they dominated the market, transcending their previous sole use as “spare cash”. It is thanks low interest rates that made it cheaper to gain share buybacks that they were able to gain popularity and quickly incur awfully rated investment grade bonds. In spite of the low quality of investment grade bonds and the likelihood of default, this financialization permeated markets regardless. It must be noted that this inevitable bubble caused by buybacks was not just a product of financialization alone, its interactions with tech advancement led to the bubble which propagated 2020’s crash. It was through the tokenization of assets that value was established during periods of fluctuating interest rates. However, as tech advancements made it increasingly simple for investors to compete, the finance sector got too large relative to the economy. Everything came crashing down, and economic growth quickly came to a halt. In fact, the size of the corporate bond market strikingly increased from $13 trillion to $19 trillion in the two years preceding 2020 validating incessant OECD concerns before the crash that debt in the bond market would be unmanageable. As financialization directly affects the objectives of firms and through its mechanism restricts firm behaviour, it is able to centralize the economy. Yet the decentralization technology aids created a systematic paradox. This has yet again created a context where economic growth is just as likely as harsh, immediate stagnation. However, investors remain focused on meeting per share targets in the short term. As a consequence, this has reduced long term investments in development and human capital. In fact, while America’s international role decreased along with its economic productivity, advancements in technology across markets increased which consequently provided larger freedom to tech investors. This soon incentivized US economic structures to seek advancement via the merger of tech and financialization. Therefore, while developed economies continue using technology to maximise the benefits of financialization, developing countries, especially emerging economies in Asia, have been working to secure their economic structures and develop their currencies (ex. Asian Common Reserve Unit and the ASEAN Exchange Mechanism). These markets, unlike the US, consider short term investments more inconsequential compared to long term human capital and development investments. These realities will inevitably deepen the divide in the economic objectives of the global economy as financialization has encouraged different regions to advance varying objectives. Theories explicating how financialization is a by-product of a decline in productive economies and a retreat of a dominant


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global power should put to question what international imbalances, both economic and political, define financialization’s continued rise post 2020.

Urbanization, Climate and Populism

Urbanization Urbanization is a process that started during the Industrial Revolution, which refers to the expansion of cities (urban areas) in a country.20 This includes the movement of people from rural areas to more urban areas.21 The United Nations Population Funds linked urbanization with economic growth, as cities provide more opportunities for social mobilization, jobs, access to better education and health services, as well as more rights.22 However, urbanization can also be linked to a growing inequality, as poverty is highly concentrated in urban areas.

The world in 2030 is a rapid wave of urbanization. East Timor’s ascension to ASEAN in 2024 increases its economic prospect as Singapore gave the nation financial aid due to their ascension. Cities in East Timor are experiencing rapid growth, with people moving out of rural areas to live in cities. This boosted their economy, with more and more exports coming out of the country due to an increased amount of skilled labour. Today, East Timor has risen as one of the most rapidly developing country in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the Yogyakarta Convention unveiled in 2024 brought about free movement of skilled labour, implemented by Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Coupled with a framework introduced by ASEAN in 2025 regarding increased infrastructure investment between countries, ASEAN has become central in promoting urbanization in Southeast Asian countries. This development can especially be seen in Indonesia where Jakarta became the largest single metropolis in the world with 35 million people in 2028.

China, as one of the world’s strongest economy, has also participated in this race to urbanization. In 2025, they concluded the infrastructure that connected the Jing-Jin-Ji area, making the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei megalopolis with a total population of 130 million. More people are moving to cities, boosting the country’s economy even further.

20 Nordqvist, Christian. "What Is Urbanization? Definition and Examples." Market Business News. August 07, 2018. Accessed March 05, 2019. https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/urbanization/. 21 Ibid. 22 "Urbanization." United Nations Population Fund. Accessed March 05, 2019. https://www.unfpa.org/urbanization.


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However, as mentioned earlier, urbanization is often linked to increased inequality. Despite the fact that urbanization led to a stronger national economy, the rate of unemployment increased, as job offers could not keep up with the amount of people moving into the city.

Climate The rapid rate of urbanization has further damaged the climate. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change reported that rapid urbanization increased the impact of climate change, as more people became more vulnerable to its effects, particularly those living in more impoverished areas.23 Torrential rain and storm surges are seen becoming more and more frequent in big cities. Not only that, desertification became more common as arable land area needed to sustain urban population. The increased temperature of the Earth due to global warming also increases sea level, threatening population living in coasts, delta regions, and islands.

This prompted several nations to declare a climate emergency, as more parts of the world became more habitable due to the changing climate and increased temperature. Despite efforts from developed nations to reduce the effects of climate change, urbanization efforts from developing nations intensified the effects of climate change due to increased used of coal and petrol.

The increased rate of natural disasters due to the changing climate created a number of climate refugees, particularly from Pacific Islands, Maldives, and Bangladesh. This surge of movement of refugees started in 2028, alarming various nations. Due to this, the ASEAN-Pacific Climate Solidarity Pact was created in the same year, which prompted signatories to accept climate refugees.

On the contrary, major cities in China has experienced a change in air quality as air pollution decreased and it becomes easier for the population to breathe. This is due to the fact that in 2029, China completely moved away from coal and petrol, and currently they have the largest hydroelectric dam and wind farm in the world. However, their nuclear energy programmed has caused and increased in seismic activity in the west coast, causing earthquakes to be more frequent. Aside from that, most of East China experienced many unexpected monsoons and storms, which is an unavoidable impact from a worldwide crisis of climate change.

Populism

23 "Rapid Urbanization Increases Climate Risk for Billions of People." UNFCCC. Accessed March 05, 2019. https://unfccc.int/news/rapid-urbanization-increases-climate-risk-for-billions-of-people.


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Populism as defined by Cas Mudde is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups”, with the ordinary people against the “corrupt elite”.24 A rise of populism can be seen in the years leading up to 2030 due to the growing inequality in newly urbanized nations.

In the Philippines, Manuel Pacquiao was elected as President in 2024, who is a popular revolutionist leader that led the EDSA.III. Pacquiao attempted to reverse the effects of the Duterte regime. His efforts focus on the attempt to eliminate the “corrupt elites” in the nation, which he uses to appeal to the people. However, several pro-China people are still in the country’s government and congress until today, which slowed down Pacquiao’s attempts. In the same year, a renewed Neo-Liberal Democratic Party (NLDP), with Taro Kono as its leader, emerged as the majority in Japan due to the failures of previous parties to address the recession and demographic crisis in the country. The NLDP appealed to the people with promises to create a better policy that would propel up the people against the corrupt elites.

Meanwhile, Malaysia retracted its Bumiputera/Malays First policy, which had previously prioritized Malay-descents to get a seat as the Prime Ministers. In 2024, Malaysia elected its first Chinese PM, Lim Guan-Eng. Differing from its counterparts in Asia, Malaysia appealed to the minority with promises to bring forth equal representation in the country’s government. Moving forward to Northern Asia, a coalition of the Democratic Party and the People’s party defeated the Liberty Korea Party in South Korea in 2027. Their promises of doing what is best for the people and democracy helped in their victory. On the contrary, China declared a penultimate, which formalized business ties that give CEOs the opportunity to hold positions in the Politburo Standing Committee. This includes Yang Huiyan, the richest woman in China and Victor Li Tzar-Koi, son to the richest man in Hong Kong. This stirred up controversies in the country, as the people see more “corrupt elites” are taking control of the government. Several movements attempting to unseat these “elites” and reversed the penultimate have started to form, mostly undergrounds but gathering support from the people.

Hence, a pattern of populism can be seen in Asia. Despite the fact that it existed for decades, the effect was intensified due to the growing inequality. Leaders used it to appeal to the people, carelessly omitting empty promises with no clear planning. However, some did succeed in uniting their countries against an unnamed, unfaced, “corrupt elites”.

24 Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. “Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series. 2016.


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Race for Resources: Water, Food, and Energy

China and the Race for Resources

The year is 2030, and the world’s oil supply is dwindling. China—as one of the world’s largest consumers of oil—is searching for a solution. From importing $116 billion dollars’ worth of oil a year in 2018, the country has now tripled that figure (Commodity.com, 2018). Years ago, it placed its hopes into the African continent, building investment and trading ties. However, plans were derailed when it soon turned out that the oil reserves in Nigeria, Angola, and Libya were not as inexhaustible as originally thought. It has been five years since the last of Africa’s oil (in Nigeria) has trickled away, proving many of China’s efforts in the region to have been fruitless. This presents a great challenge to China, which has invested considerable resources into ensuring their claim on African oil—even to the extent of placing missiles off the coast of Libya (Telegraph, 2011)(Mu & Ye, 2011). Russia has also seen its liquid wealth drying up, meaning that all eyes are turned to the Middle East, where the OPEC countries now own the lion’s share (Telegraph, 2011). More so than many other countries in the world, China depends on a steady supply of fuel, having one of the highest automobile usages—having risen by around 10 mbd in the last twenty or so years (Telegraph, 2011). The country has also invested over $50 billion into military arsenal in the Pacific—possibly aimed at deterring U.S. vessels. After having pioneered new personal flying devices, and a special kind of gas-guzzling tractor, Beijing is under great pressure from its domestic population to provide for their ever-growing fuel needs. Resource shortage has meant that farming methods have slowed (in some places halted), that gas stations have shut down, and that transport of goods has become disruptively slow. Meanwhile, the ruling party has made the decision to funnel a large amount of what fuel is still available into its fleet of war machinery, apparently in a last-ditch attempt to lay claim to the world’s oil supplies. In the year 2029, a Communist party defector was jailed indefinitely for revealing this information to the rest of the gas-starved country. Since then, the social unrest that had been growing has seen a series of sporadic spikes and lulls, as the vox populis cries out, and is censored. As political discontent rumbles, the leaders of the country are ever more desperate to find a solution to their drought.

The US, Middle East, and China

With its historical reputation of interfering in international affairs, it is no surprise that the United States poses a threat to China’s acquisition of oil. Having long been established in the Middle East, the rival gas-guzzler is keen to protect its interests. Despite protests that its international


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behaviour frequently breaches national sovereignty, the United States continues establishing military bases around and in the remaining oil producers. Reactions in the Middle East are mixed. Saudi Arabia, and UAE have previously held good relations with the military behemoth and have seized the opportunity as one of the world’s few oil producers left. Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, however, still bear scars from past ‘interventions’. Tired of the U.S. using democracy as an excuse to invade and seize resources, these countries saw a rise in insurgent groups that burnt U.S. military bases, vandalized embassies, and even attacked U.S. citizens living in the area. But what is China’s role in all this? Many national leaders in the area have been struggling to quell the rising tide of resentment but have struggled due to a surprising amount of equipment, funding, and intelligence on the part of the supposedly unorganised groups. Suspected, but unconfirmed, is that the U.S.’s biggest oil rival is fuelling this fire, providing weaponry, information, and training in the hopes of weakening the U.S.’s claim. In the past, these kinds of tactics have torn nations apart, however this time, there seems to be a popular sympathy on the side of the rebels. Could a unified nation expel its foreign invaders? If they succeed, what will China do next? With the soil cleared of American footprints, perhaps China can finally take its first steps toward becoming the dominant power in the region.


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Conclusions We hope that this study guide has been useful in conveying the underlying issues that the Asia-Pacific faces in wake of the 2030s. While it may seem easy to focus entirely on military and geo-strategic enterprises during the crisis, there are a multitude of different ways you can interact with the crisis and your fellow delegates in this imagined future. Delegates will have to take into account diplomatic, social, and economic issues and possibilities alike, from the demographic crisis in Japan to the increasing regionalism of ASEAN. The start of the 2030s also signifies election season for the majority of countries in the region, meaning that delegates in office will have to pay attention to their popularity, and be wary of other delegates that can rise to power. Additionally, a great deal of importance can be placed on new technologies, especially with the looming changing climate with natural disasters occurring at an increasing rate. The future is yours to change, whether or not that is for the betterment of the region or your characters’ interests - that is for you as a delegate to decide. As for each Cabinet specifically, the issues to tackle can be summarized as the following: Beijing Cabinet

1. Who and which faction will ultimately be the one rewarded with position as successor of Xi Jinping and the current ruling circle, after first finalizing Xi’s aspirations of integrating Hong Kong plus annexing and controlling most vital positions in South China Sea?

2. How would the introduction of wealthy businessmen affect the government policymaking? Will the tension between the Guanfang/Meritocrats and Tuhao/Nouveau Riche creates internal division that threatens to drive the cabinet in two separate ways?

3. Will China plays the game of compromise and secret deals, or blatantly plays posturing the power in face of an increasingly powerful government & military that confronts mounting international pressure regarding not only S. China Sea issue, but Chinese interventions in international affairs?

ASEAN Cabinet

1. With a much more integrated economy and military how would ASEAN respond this time around with China’s heightened provocations to the South China Sea issue? Will they still not be able to pull off a united voice just like in 2010s?

2. Unlike the EU with its parliament, ASEAN controlling powers still lies with the government of its member states. Seeing the rift of opinions (pro-China, anti-China) and imbalance of economic powers, will ASEAN develop its own enforcement mechanisms to keep the


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member states in line, or will it actually break into smaller blocs? Or are there any alternative compromises which will be made?

3. Some of ASEAN members are undergoing transitions in either government or economic terms. Whereas some are still under strongmen rule, how will the Association balance its aspirations for a united voice against Chinese encroachment while keeping stability in these trying times internally?

Pacific Coalition Cabinet

1. After nearly a decade of American Democrat government that looks more and more inwards rather than asserting an international presence, how would the US react internationally to this escalating tension in the South China Sea, and what will their allies (South Korea, Japan & Taiwan) adapt to the measures adopted?

2. Which other sides/countries should the Asian allies contact to in the possibility of US even distancing itself further from the current tensions? Or would they also look inward and strengthen own capabilities? Will they bow to Chinese pressures or play a game to look the other way while saving themselves?

3. With the bigger and greater concentration of economic power in the hands of Tech billionaires, what will these private sector players do in regard to the South China Sea? Will they take sides, playing opportunistic, involve themselves with government or the contrary?

We hope these points will help you to base your plans and decisions in navigating the treacherous waters of early 2030 situation in Asia-Pacific. If you are new to crisis, it would also be beneficial to take a look at some examples of good directives in this website. Until then, have a good time plotting and scheming and see you all in Maastricht!


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References & Additional Resources Mu, X., & Ye, H. (2011). Understanding the Crude Oil Price: How Important Is the China Factor? Energy Journal, 32(4), 69-91. Commodity.com. (2018). “China’s Top 5 Commodity Imports.” Commodity.com. Retrieved 15.03.2019. https://commodity.com/china/#Chinas_Top_5_Commodity_Imports Swami, Praveen. (2011). “Why oil is so important to China.” Telegraph.co.uk. Retrieved 15.03.2019.https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/8369641/Why-oil-is-so-important-to-China.html

Figure 2.0 - Convoluted claims in the South China Sea, source: South China Morning Post http://multimedia.scmp.com/south-china-sea-disputes-maps/


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Figure 3.0 - Enlarged area of Spratley Area claims & island/reefs by de-facto control (Coloured Dots), source: South China Morning Post http://multimedia.scmp.com/south-china-sea-disputes-maps/

Documents

Study Guide Joint Cabinet Crisis: South China Sea 2030 · interventions or the cries of help from their allies in the region, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the recently-unified Korea