IV. CASE STUDY – THE ARAB – ISRAELI CONFLICT – SOURCES OF CONFLICT,

METHODS ON NEGOTIAITIONS EMPLOYED , FAILURES AND PERSPECTIVES

Between the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Wye River agreement in 1998, the negotiating

assumptions of Arabs and Israelis changed in ways that affected the two parties' behavior. It is the

aim of this article to reflect on two primary areas of change: perceptions of the role of the United

States in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and perceptions by each party-Arab and Israeli-of the role of

the other's domestic politics in the negotiations.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

In the early days of the Clinton Administration, conventional wisdom saw it as the most Israel-

friendly Administration ever. Both in its rhetoric and behavior, the Administration bolstered this

perception. Quickly, President Bill Clinton became one of the most admired men in Israel. No other

president visited Israel more often. Diplomatically, no other issue of US foreign policy received

greater attention than Arab-Israeli peace.

Yet, midway through his second term, President Clinton was being called proPalestinian by some

Israeli and US critics. Palestinian National Authority President Yasir `Arafat seemed more welcome

in the White House than the prime minister of Israel. The State Department found itself in the

unusual position of defending Palestinian compliance with signed agreements and criticizing Israel

for lack of compliance. How can one explain this contrast?

The author's intent in this section is to assess how Arabs and Israelis have viewed the American role

in the negotiations since the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978, and to assess

the changes in both perceptions and behavior. In particular, the article will examine the changing

Arab and Israeli views on the nature of the US role ("mediator" or "partner"); on the extent to which

US domestic politics mattered in the formation of US policy toward the Middle East; and the degree

to which US strategic calculations implied support for Israel's position in the negotiations.

Although the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed Arab and Israeli expectations of the US

role in the negotiations in important ways, Egypt already behaved toward the United States as if the

Cold War was over by the mid-1970s. It is thus useful to contrast Egyptian and Israeli expectations

of the US role in the Camp David negotiations in the 1970s, with the Arab and Israeli perceptions of

the American role in the 1990s.

The Central Role of the United States at Camp David

As soon as the confrontation between Egypt and Israel moved to the diplomatic front following the

1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed that the United States held "99

percent of the cards."' Egypt's approach to the United States was predicated on the assumption that

American economic and strategic interests in the Middle East were closer to those of Egypt than to

those of Israel. Although US domestic support for Israel was partly understood, Sadat emerged as

the first Egyptian leader who believed he could affect US domestic politics. As such, Sadat believed

that his expulsion of Soviet forces from Egyptian soil (1972), and his positive responsiveness toward

Washington after the 1973 war would present the United States with a strategic alternative to Israel.

This was especially so given the close relationship that Sadat had built with the leadership of Saudi

Arabia-an increasingly important state for the United States following the quadrupling of oil prices

in 1974-which manifested itself in the oil embargo of 1973-74. Even in the Camp David

negotiations, Sadat had reason to believe that Saudi Arabia would remain "on board," thus adding to

his strategic weight with the United States. President Jimmy Carter revealed recently that, in a

private meeting with then Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the latter assured him of Saudi

support on the eve of the Camp David Accords, and that Saudi leaders dispatched an immediate

letter of congratulations to him upon the completion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979.2

From this perspective, Egypt expected an active American role in the negotiations as a "partner," not

a mere "mediator" as Israel preferred. Whereas a mediator is concerned with reaching any settlement

agreeable to the parties, without much concern for the details of the agreement, a partner has

interests to advocate and would prefer certain outcomes over others. Egypt's expectation was that

American strategic interests would translate into pressure on Israel during the negotiations. As

Butrus Butrus Ghali, then Egypt's minister of state for foreign affairs, saw it, the Egyptian

competition with Israel for alliance with the United States was the "most important leverage" that

Egypt held in the negotiations, and the "secret weapon that Israel feared most."3

Israel, on the other hand, preferred a minimal American role in the negotiations, given that, left alone

with Egypt, it had a favorable military balance and it occupied territories that Egypt wanted back.

But Israel was also concerned about the strategic competition that Egypt brought to the table

beginning with the Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972. Former Israeli Defense Minister Ezer

Weizman wrote that "In driving out the Russians from Egypt [Sadat] brought the West closer to him,

thus necessarily diluting its loyalty to us."4 At Camp David, Weizman presented Israel's concerns

about an active American role this way:

My objections to excessive American involvement in the negotiations with Egypt stemmed from a

simple consideration: I foresaw that US interests lay closer to Egypt's than to ours, so that it would

not be long before Israeli negotiators would have to cope with the dual confrontation as they face a

Washington/Cairo axis.5

In fact, there was reason for such concern: Carter and Sadat had secretly agreed on a joint strategy

(that Carter apparently decided to ignore later) that would manipulate Israel into accepting a

settlement they considered acceptable.b Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin complained on the

fourth day of the Camp David negotiations that "the United States negotiators were all agreeing with

the Egyptian demand that the Sinai settlements be removed, and that this was no way for a mediating

team to act."7 He had told Carter, upon arriving at Camp David, that the most important agreement

he sought at Camp David was with the United States, and that an Egyptian-Israeli agreement was of

"secondary" importance, although also crucial. "He wanted the whole world to know that there were

no differences between Israel and the United States."8

Similarly, Sadat arrived at Camp David with the primary aim of building USEgyptian relations. He

could afford failure of the negotiations with Israel as long as the failure would be blamed on Israel

and would lead to closer US-Egyptian relations. Apparently expecting failure at Camp David, he

prepared his ambassadors on the eve of his departure to Camp David for a post-failure offensive to

place the blame squarely on Israel.9

Carter and members of the US delegation fully understood that improved relations with the United

States was the big prize for which both Israel and Egypt were vying. Early in the Camp David

negotiations, when Carter believed that Menahem Begin was not sufficiently compromising, he

considered going to the American people with a speech that blamed Israel for the failure. But on the

eleventh day of the negotiations, when Sadat-apparently expecting that Carter would blame Begin

for the failure-packed his bags to leave Camp David to protest Begin's position, Carter warned him

that "it will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt."lo Sadat

quickly reversed his plans, and agreement was reached within two days.

In short, the role of the United States was indispensable in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, not only

because both sides believed that relations with the United States were central for their foreign

policies, but also because each believed that there was serious room for competition for the prized

relationship. This cannot be said for other rounds of Arab-Israeli negotiations, beginning with the

Madrid Conference in 1991.

Changing Perceptions of the US Role Since Madrid

As the United States organized the Madrid Conference between Israel, on the one hand, and

Lebanon, Syria, and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the other, both Arabs and Israelis held

similar views of the American role in Middle East politics. Both sides came to the table with

minimal immediate expectations, and mostly because neither could ignore the only remaining

superpower, which had just won the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. And unlike Egypt in the 1970s, no

Arab party believed it was in a position to compete with Israel for a special relationship with the

United States.

On the Arab side, there was a common interpretation of the consequences of the end of the Cold War

for Middle East politics. In general, most Arabs believed that the loss of the Soviet Union as an ally

and as a global counterweight to the United States was detrimental to Arab interests. There was also

a sense that the United States would continue to pursue a policy that favored Israel because of the

increasing dominance of domestic American politics in the shaping of American foreign policy.ll

But for many Arab parties, especially Syria, it was better to be on the side of the only superpower, at

least until the global picture improved. There was also a general sense among Arab members of the

coalition against Iraq that President George Bush himself was more inclined than his predecessors to

be "fair" personally on Arab-Israeli issues, domestic politics notwithstanding.

On the Israeli side, the strategic calculations of the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir

were not substantially different from those in the Arab world. The consensus in Israel was that the

end of the Cold War and the end of the Gulf War put Israel in a very advantageous position.

American foreign policy would be dominant in regional politics, while domestic American politics

would be increasingly dominant in shaping American foreign policy. But the immediate problem for

the Shamir government, which came to Madrid reluctantly, was that the Bush Administration came

out of the Gulf War with great popularity, with President Bush enjoying 90 percent approval ratings

in opinion polls. Members of Shamir's government further believed that Bush himself was

"antiIsrael."12 In the end, both sides came to the negotiations as a way of deflecting pressure at a

moment of weakness as they perceived it: The Shamir government was concerned about an

undesirable US presidency and the Arab states were concerned about an unfavorable distribution of

power.

In the period between the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Accord between Israel and the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, Israeli and Arab views of the United States

changed somewhat. Part of this change was a result of the 1992 election of Prime Minister Yitzhak

Rabin in Israel and President Bill Clinton in the United States, each more closely sharing the

strategic view of the other than their predecessors had: Clinton with a more Israel-friendly agenda

and the Rabin government with more willingness to compromise in the negotiations. In contrast, the

Arab side saw the early days of the first Clinton Administration in negative terms. Indeed, the PLO,

which in the past saw Washington as the key to a deal with Israel, ultimately decided to negotiate

directly with Israel in Oslo without the United States, partly because it did not believe it could get

much out of the Clinton Administration.

The ascendance to power of the government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in 1996

resulted in yet another shift in the perceptions of both Arabs and Israelis of the American role in the

negotiations. Netanyahu, who had opposed the Oslo agreements, came to power believing that the

United States was not in a strong position to pressure Israel. He certainly did not believe that the

Clinton Administration was a friend of his government, since it had allied itself with his Labor Party

opponent in the elections, Shimon Peres, and it was seen to have meddled in domestic Israeli

politics. But Netanyahu believed that the Clinton Administration had little incentive to press Israel,

especially since he was confident about his ability to mobilize Congressional support for his

government. He had labored to build strong relations with Congressional Republicans and had much

personal experience in American politics.l3 His conclusion was probably this: given the American

dominance in the Gulf after the Gulf War, and the absence of the Soviet alternative for the Arabs, an

American president would certainly be more responsive to members of Congress than to Arab

leaders.

In this regard, the Netanyahu government believed not only that Arab leverage with the United

States diminished after the Gulf War in 1991, but also that Arab governments now cared much less

about the Palestinian issue. In his first year, he was confident that lack of progress on the

Palestinian-Israeli track would not jeopardize even Israel's own relations with other Arab states.

Behind this conclusion lay not only the difficult relations between the PLO and members of the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC)14 soon after the Gulf War, because of the PLO's position in support of

Iraq during that war, but also a general sense that American interests in the Gulf region were no

longer linked to American interests in the Arab-Israeli arena.

This issue of "linkage" had been at the heart of the American incentive to seek actively a settlement

to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Besides containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, US

regional interests primarily pertained to oil and Israel. That the two issues were linked was forcefully

demonstrated in the Arab oil embargo that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This linkage

provided added incentive for American diplomacy, not only by fueling the shuttle diplomacy of

former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1974, but also by providing a sense that resolving the

Arab-Israeli conflict was a strategic interest for the United States, justifying the kind of presidential

effort that President Carter later employed to mediate between Israel and Egypt in the Camp David

negotiations.

But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait propelled a different assessment, not only in Israel, but also in the

United States. In mobilizing support for its effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait, the United States had

every incentive to separate the war with Iraq from the continuing crisis on the Israeli-Palestinian

front, in order to prevent Iraq from exploiting any linkage. Aiding the United States in making its

case was the fact that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was obviously not linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict,

and that Arab members of the US-led coalition also had incentives in minimizing the links between

these issues, in order to minimize domestic opposition to their policies.

The relative success in separating Gulf issues from Arab-Israeli issues during the Gulf crisis created

a sense that these issues were not, in fact, linked. But the difficulty the United States ultimately faced

in mobilizing support among GCC states for its policy toward Iraq, and the growing hesitation in the

Arab world in general to continue the trend of normalization with Israel that followed the Oslo

Accords, were increasingly seen to be tied to the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. By

1997, President Clinton himself declared that the setbacks in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations

were complicating US policy toward Iraq.'s

The revived sense of linkage partly explains why neither Netanyahu nor Arab analysts fully

predicted American policy in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations by simply assessing the global

configurations of forces or by reducing US domestic politics simply to interest group politics. On the

one hand, the predictions were broadly correct: the strategic and economic American support for

Israel continued and grew following the end of the Cold War, seemingly unaffected by the ups and

downs of the Arab-Israeli negotiations. On the other hand, the United States did not always take

Israel's side in the negotiations, and increasingly took public positions that were critical of Israel's

policies. A gap, sometimes a large one, existed between Congressional positions, which were

predictably more supportive of the Netanyahu government, and the position of the Administration.

Behind these tensions between the Clinton Administration and the Israeli government were a number

of factors. First, despite clear support for Israel in the United States, presidents retain a certain

leeway in foreign policy, and both President Bush and President Clinton demonstrated this in their

policies toward Israel. Second, although US interests in the Gulf were theoretically easier to manage

in the absence of a perceived Soviet threat and with the presence of dominant American forces in the

region, the very presence of these forces in the Gulf, and the occasional need to employ them,

became a new interest for the United States that required the cooperation of Arab states. Given the

revival of "linkage," weakened as this may have been, no US president could ignore these external

issues. Third, a second-term president is always more sensitive to international issues than a first-

term president, not only because of the relative absence of electoral pressures, but also because of

increased familiarity with the issues, as well as the need to keep commitments that a president will

have made to foreign leaders. The fact that Clinton was the US president to host the signing of the

Oslo Accords, for example, is relevant as an explanation of the degree to which he would work to

implement these Accords. Finally, the domestic context of US policy toward the Middle East has

changed since the Oslo Accords. The American Jewish community, never a monolith, became even

more divided on US policy toward the peace process, with many Clinton supporters urging him to be

tough with the Netanyahu government, even as others advised him in the opposite direction.

One might ask if such "leeway" available to a president matters at all in the big picture, given that

the strategic, political, and economic relationship with Israel remains unaltered. Do nice words

toward Palestinian leader Yasir `Arafat, or criticism of Israel's settlement policy matter if they lead

to no further action?

Evidence suggests that this "leeway" matters. It is conventional wisdom, for example, that the Bush

Administration's linkage of loan-guarantees to Israel with the settlement policy of the government of

Yitzhak Shamir contributed to the downfall of that government in the 1992 Israeli elections. And

Netanyahu's forced decision to hold early elections in 1999 was in large part driven by tensions

within the government coalition over the US-mediated Wye River agreements. In the end, the degree

of American-Palestinian cooperation will be an important factor in the outcome of the final status

negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, not because the Palestinians could ever compete

with Israel in terms of close relations with the United States, but because having hostile relations

with the United States would gain them much less.

Projecting "Optimism" and "Pessimism" as a Negotiating Tactic

Arabs and Israelis have often employed "optimism" and "pessimism" as instruments of bargaining,

especially in their attempts to affect the American role. In the run-up to the Camp David conference,

Egypt consistently projected a "pessimistic" outlook on the state of the negotiations, so as to compel

American intervention, while Israel sought the reverse. In the Madrid negotiations, this tactic

remained a favored method of manipulating US reaction.

Even as the Madrid negotiations turned serious in 1992 with the ascendance of the Labor

government to power in Israel, the gap in the parties' positions remained large; how much each party

would ultimately get was seen to depend on the role of the United States. From the point of view of

Israel, the less involved the United States was in the negotiations the better, so long as American

economic and military aid kept coming-and there was no reason to expect otherwise, especially with

the election of Bill Clinton as president. Arabs, on the other hand, continued to prefer an active

American role, since the local military and political balance favored Israel.

The extent of American involvement in the negotiations has been partly a function of the degree of

perceived progress, and partly one of assigning blame for lack of progress. To secure the greatest

degree of US involvement in the negotiations, Arab parties have had an interest in projecting

stalemate and some pessimism. To reduce the extent of the American role (or, American pressure),

Israel has had an incentive to project a great deal of optimism. But each side has had to vary its

projections somewhat because neither has wanted to be blamed for lack of progress. With Yitzhak

Rabin as prime minister of Israel, the Arabs started with a tactical handicap in the game. The very

fact that, across the table, sat negotiators representing an Israeli government with an image of

willingness to compromise, especially when contrasted with the previous government, shifted the

burden to the Arab side to show some conciliatory gestures. No matter what Israel proposed, Arab

negotiators could not constantly express pessimism and gloom, lest they be accused of not trying.

For their part, the Israelis simultaneously sought to limit American involvement by indicating

movement in the negotiations, and to protect their new conciliatory image so as not to jeopardize a

package of $10 billion in loan guarantees to help Israel absorb new immigrants from the former

Soviet Union.

But the role of the United States in this game of perceptions was only one part of the story. The other

part had to do with the reality that the "Arabs" were not one, but many. This of course had always

been true, even in the days of the common rhetoric of pan-Arabism and unity. Still, most Arabs

understood that their hands would be strengthened if they cooperated with each other in dealing with

Israel. Israel, on the other hand, sought to conduct bilateral negotiations with each Arab state so as to

limit Arab leverage. Ultimately, Israel won out on this issue when the Madrid negotiations were

organized into simultaneous but bilateral sets of talks, although some issues were to be dealt with in

"multilateral working groups." Three central Arab delegations emerged in these negotiations:

Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian-Jordanian. But the most difficult issues clearly related to Syria and

the Palestinians.

The Israeli government of Prime Minister Rabin came to the negotiating table with clear priorities

that contrasted sharply with those of its Likud predecessor; Rabin preferred an agreement with the

Palestinians before an agreement with Syria. Yet, for tactical reasons, exactly the opposite priorities

were projected as soon as the negotiations began. Contrasting the preferences and the tactical

behavior of the two Israeli governments is especially telling. When former Prime Minister Shamir

concluded that, because of American determination, he could not avoid the Madrid process, he set

for himself a clear agenda. He would use the negotiations to hammer out a bilateral agreement with

Syria and stall on the Palestinian question. One Likud Party leader, Binyamin Begin, expressed the

government's priorities this way: "the problem is with [the Arab states] rather than with [Palestinian]

Arabs west of the Jordan River."16

The source of the Likud agenda was clear: On the one hand, they were ideologically committed to

retaining the West Bank ("Judea and Samaria"); on the other hand, following the defeat of Iraq in the

Gulf War, Syria emerged as the most important Arab military power. Sensing the vulnerability of

Syria, due to the decline of its former ally, the Soviet Union, and having watched the devastation of

Iraq's military, the Israelis thought a bilateral deal was possible. With an Israeli-Syrian agreement,

the Likud government would have fewer constraints in its ambition to control the West Bank. Once

the Madrid process began, the Israeli delegation projected exactly the opposite priorities. On the eve

of the negotiations, former Defense Minister Moshe Arens declared on American television that he

now was "optimistic" about a deal with the Palestinians, while a Palestinian leader praised "the new

tone from Israel.''17 In the first sessions of the conference, the negotiations with the Palestinian-

Jordanian delegation exhibited a conciliatory tone while the Israeli-Syrian talks were full of

recriminations bordering on obscenities.

These moves were clearly bargaining tactics. For their part, the Syrians understood Israel's priorities.

Preferring not to deal with Israel alone, they managed to forge a cooperative relationship with the

Lebanese, the Palestinians, and the Jordanians, and they toughened their rhetoric on the eve of the

negotiations. Meeting in Syria on the eve of the Madrid conference, representatives of Lebanon,

Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and the PLO agreed to "guarantee a unified Arab stand throughout all the

phases of the conference and the talks that complement it."18

Facing the possibility of strategic coordination between the Arab delegations that could prevent

independent bilateral agreements, the Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir expressed optimism on

the Palestinian question, hoping to lure Palestinians away from the Syrians. In frustration, the

Syrians could then be open to a bilateral pact with Israel.

When the Likud government's priorities became clear in Israel, leaders of the Labor Party, including

Rabin, cried foul. They criticized the Israeli government for planning to rush into an agreement with

Syria that could jeopardize Israeli security while ignoring the more pressing Palestinian question;

they accused the Likud government of sacrificing security and economic welfare for ideology. One

Labor leader, Ephraim Sneh, put it this way: "I am ready for far-reaching concessions on the

Palestinian issue, but less ready on security questions with Syria. I'm not in a hurry to make peace

with Syria."19

When Labor finally got the chance to try its hand at the table, it clearly sought a deal with the

Palestinians first. But the Palestinians, for their part, continued to coordinate their moves with other

Arab parties and demanded much more than Rabin was willing to offer. To get the Palestinians to

cooperate, Rabin's tactics were exactly the opposite of his real priorities.

For starters, Rabin kept the Likud-appointed negotiator, Elyakim Rubinstein, who was unpopular

with the Palestinians, as head of the team negotiating with the PalestinianJordanian delegation. In

contrast, he installed the respected and conciliatory Israeli scholar, Itamar Rabinovich, to negotiate

with the Syrians. The Syrians decided to play along, partly because they were under pressure to

show some gestures, and partly because they feared a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian deal. From there,

expressions of optimism and pessimism were easy to anticipate.

The secret contacts between the Israeli government and the PLO leading to the Oslo Accords

ultimately changed the degree to which Israel could play one negotiating front against another. Still,

there was much room for maneuver as Rabin continued this tactic. But when Netanyahu was elected

prime minister of Israel in 1996, on a platform that ruled out full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan

Heights, Israeli-Syrian negotiations were frozen-and so were the multilateral Middle East

negotiations. The Israeli ability to use one front of negotiations to affect the other all but

disappeared. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations became the only place to measure progress in Arab-

Israeli negotiations.

THE PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER PARTY'S DOMESTIC POLITICS

For many years, both Israelis and Arabs underestimated the influence of each other's domestic

politics on foreign policy. In one of the early sessions during the Camp David conference, for

example, Sadat explained to Begin that Egyptian public opinion would not allow him to make the

kind of concessions that Israel was demanding. Begin rejected Sadat's explanation on the grounds

that "the people of Egypt could be easily manipulated by Sadat, and their beliefs and attitudes could

be shaped by their leader."20 Begin went on to cite Sadat's ability to convince his people that the

Soviets were their best friends, only later to cast them as their worst enemies.zl From that point on,

Sadat and Begin had to be separated throughout the negotiations until an agreement was finally

reached.

This Israeli perception that the autocratic nature of Arab governments made domestic politics

irrelevant to the negotiations was bolstered by the absence of the kind of public upheavals in the

Arab world that many scholars had predicted following the 1991 Gulf War, and by an increasing

acceptance of this same thesis in Washington.

On the Arab side, there has been a prevailing assumption that little difference existed between the

two dominant parties in Israel, and that domestic politics were employed by Israeli governments to

justify intransigence. During the Camp David negotiations, for example, Egypt did not believe that

Israel's concern for public opposition to the dismantlement of settlements in the Sinai was more than

a ploy intended to minimize Israeli concessions.22

These perceptions began breaking down on a significant scale among Palestinian leaders after the

1991 Gulf War. But for much of the period of negotiations between Israel and Syria, and to some

extent between Israel and the Palestinians, the perception remained that little difference existed in

the foreign policy aims of Labor and Likud, except perhaps tactically.

The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a militant Israeli opposed to Rabin's peace policies did

much to change Arab perceptions, but many in the Arab world continued to believe that differences

within Israel were minor. This entrenched view propelled American diplomacy to highlight the

potential differences between a Likud government and the existing government of Shimon Peres on

the eve of the 1996 Israeli elections. The rhetoric of American diplomacy highlighted the conflict

between "supporters of peace and opponents of peace" on both sides. Implicitly, the Likud Party in

Israel, which opposed the Oslo Accords, fell on the "opponents" side of the divide. As Israeli troops

moved into Lebanese territory on a large scale in the spring of 1996, in an operation that led to the

death of dozens at Qana, the US government asked Arab negotiating partners to show restraint, on

the grounds that this operation could help prevent the electoral success of Netanyahu. In the process,

US diplomacy intensified its efforts to persuade Arabs that the differences between Labor and Likud

were consequential. By the eve of the elections, the United States appeared to have succeeded, as

Syria's Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar`a expressed his preference for Peres. This was enough for

Netanyahu to charge that Peres was Syria's candidate, suggesting that Peres would give more to the

Arabs in the negotiations. This American success also made the rehabilitation of Netanyahu in Arab

eyes an uphill battle following his surprise victory in the election.

On the Israeli side, a more differentiated view of Palestinian domestic politics certainly began with

the rise of Hamas as an alternative to the PLO, and the moves leading to Oslo were in part driven by

Israel's desire to prevent Hamas from taking over in the West Bank and Gaza.23 In general,

however, the prevailing view in Israel remained that public opinion was less important for Arab

politics, either because Arab leaders could help shape the opinions of their publics, or because they

could ignore them even if they could not shape them. This view has become difficult to sustain over

the past several years. First, it is clear that Arab governments have increasingly lost control over the

media within their own polities. The spread of satellite technology, and the emergence of some

relatively independent media with broad regional reach has guaranteed that no one in the region has

a monopoly on information. Second, although governments can disregard their publics most of the

time, public opinion has proven important in affecting some government decisions, such as the

boycott of the Middle East-North Africa Economic Conference at Doha, Qatar, in 1997. More

importantly, the weight of public opinion, especially elite opinion, has affected Arab-Israeli

relations, despite the peace agreements signed by governments. Jordanian and Egyptian elites, for

example, have been able to block fuller normalization of relations with Israel through social and

public pressure. In short both Israelis and Arabs have been slow to recognize the growing

importance of domestic politics for the foreign policy of the other.

Domestic Politics and Bargaining

In a previous work, the author argued that centralized governments are not as effective in

international bargaining as less centralized ones.24 In particular, Israel's decentralized government

enabled its leadership to extract more concessions from Egypt's centralized government on some

issues, even if one took into account that Israel had more objective leverage than Egypt held at Camp

David. This is because centralized governments lack effective hierarchies to minimize leaders'

mistakes and to provide fall-back positions when mistakes do occur. In Israel's case, the prime

minister, Menahem Begin, preferred not to negotiate directly, could not fully disregard his Cabinet

members, and ultimately could use Knesset ratification as a lever. In the case of the Egyptian

president, American negotiators could go to him directly to extract concessions, and he very often

overruled his aides in making concessions. Carter argued that, for all his strengths, Sadat was too

immune to internal criticism for his own good.25

Although this same structural weakness could have affected Syrian negotiations as well, President

Hafiz al-Asad's personal style, his remoteness from routine negotiations, and his complete insulation

from Israeli leaders, have minimized the negative consequences-although this same cautious style

may have also prevented the exploitation of a possible agreement with the Rabin government.26 The

unique case in this regard, however, is the case of the Palestinians.

When the Madrid Conference began on 30 October 1991, the Palestinian team had an accidental

structure that was hierarchical and less inclined to make mistakes. This structure was, in part, the

inadvertent consequence of the Israeli government's insistence that the PLO be excluded from the

negotiations. The outcome was that the PLO, which remained the invisible power behind the

Palestinian delegation, made all the final decisions, while distinguished Palestinians from the West

Bank and Gaza conducted the routine negotiations. The further exclusion of Palestinians from East

Jerusalem who were at the top of the local Palestinian leadership, created a second tier of

negotiators, as these leaders accompanied the negotiators as advisors, but did not attend the sessions.

The final decisions belonged to the PLO leadership and its chairman Yasir `Arafat. While this

arrangement minimized mistakes, it also encouraged stalemate.

Ultimately, it was partly this realization that propelled the Rabin government to seek direct contact

with the PLO. As Israeli negotiator Uri Savir pointed out, the local Palestinian negotiators were

simply receiving orders from the PLO anyway; "we were actually negotiating with Yasir `Arafat by

fax," at the same time that the PLO's weakness after the Gulf War made it more willing to

compromise.27

Once the 1993 Oslo Accords were concluded, the Palestinian team resembled the typical team of a

centralized polity. Rabin, Peres, and American negotiators had direct access to `Arafat when needed,

as his aides could be easily bypassed. But the difficult relationship that emerged between `Arafat and

Netanyahu, following the latter's election, once again created, inadvertently, a tier of separation that

minimized Netanyahu's ability to have direct influence with `Arafat.

CONCLUSION

It should be clear from the discussion above that Arab-Israeli negotiations, and the role of the United

States in these negotiations, have been affected by the tactics of the parties, and that these tactics

have not always been adjusted quickly to changes in the domestic politics of the key actors.

Although the contours of Arab-Israeli negotiations, and the US role in these negotiations, remain a

function of relative power, it is evident that much of what has happened in those negotiations has

been a function of domestic politics, and the effectiveness of each party in understanding and

adjusting to change in domestic politics.

It is easy to forget today, amidst the wreckage of Israeli -Palestinian peace efforts, that before the Al

Aqsa Intifada and the election of Ariel Sharon's government, there had been real progress toward

resolving this century -old conflict. Sharon and Palestinian extremists claim that progress was

illusory, and have reverted to a zero -sum struggle. But majorities in both societies, based on the

Oslo experience, now accept that peace will require major mutual compromises, two sovereign

states, and an end to Israel's occupation. There is a less precise, but implicit, understanding that

Jerusalem must be shared, most of the settlements must be evacuated, and few Palestinians refugees

will return to Israel. This convergence of views was unimaginable 15 years ago, and polls suggest

that it survives, conceptually, although there is little hope on either side that such a peace can be

achieved.

Much of the conceptual progress was made possible by Track - II diplomacy. A rich variety of these

unofficial exchanges beginning in the 1980s paved the way toward and sustained the official Oslo

Track-I negotiations after 1993. Track - II Diplomacy, Lessons from the Middle East, by four

distinguished analysts, two Israelis and two Palestinians, is a fascinating history of the Track-II

process in that era. In a lucid and succinct account, the authors, themselves frequent Track -II

participants, offer seven case studies as well as guidance for evaluating this technique.

The case studies described include Track -II dialogues in the 1980s that sought greater mutual

understanding but not agreement; unofficial talks prompting official negotiations that gave birth to

the Oslo Declaration in 1993; talks in 1992 -94 to explore security issues that fed into official Oslo

negotiations; the Stockholm negotiations on a final status "framework" (known as the "Beilin-Abu

Mazen Plan") that was rebuffed by Shimon Peres after Yitzhak Rabin's death (in November, 1995); a

few meetings between PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israeli settler leaders that ended

after Binyamin Netanyahu's election in 6 16 996; Israeli -Syrian talks in 1993 that helped to inform

subsequent official talks; and the multilateral Arms Control and Regional security talks that stalled

in 1995 over Israel's refusal to discuss nuclear weapons.

These Track-II efforts and the official negotiations that grew out of them ultimately failed to make

peace. But they created a community of like-minded, committed experts and peacemakers on both

sides. Leaders among them have persevered, notwithstanding the current logjam. Using the "Clinton

Parameters" of December 2000 and the Taba understandings of January 2001 as the point of

departure, unofficial Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have produced the latest Track -II agreement,

the Geneva Accord. This "virtual" agreement and a large inventory of other Track -II plans have

created a foundation for renewed official talks when the time comes. Indeed, because so much expert

Track -II work has been done, the question today is not "what will peace look like?" but "how to get

there?"

However, the guidelines in Track -II Diplomacy for success with this technique suggest that it is

unlikely to offer a path back to negotiations today. Track -II works when the political environment

offers encouragement. It did in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when moderation and pragmatism in

the Palestinian and Israeli political classes were growing, and Rabin and Arafat were willing to take

risks for progress. There is no such encouragement today, given the mutual violence, hatred, and

cynicism of the intifada, the crippling of the Palestinian Authority, and Sharon's determination to

avoid negotiations.

In particular, the current dismal environment precludes other requirements Track -II Diplomacy

poses for success: close contact between unofficial negotiators and government leaders and official

"mentors" who encourage their efforts. This rapport is totally lacking today on the Israeli side.

Indeed, Sharon has described the Geneva Accord as "treason." Yasir 'Arafat has offered general

support for the Accord, but he lacks a coherent strategy for renewed negotiations.

The Geneva group still hopes to rally both Israeli and Palestinian majorities that would press their

leaders to support the Accord. But this seems unlikely without new leadership, especially in Israel,

that is motivated for peace. Once this emerges, Track-II talks could lay the groundwork for a

sequential process: ending violence, restoring confidence and launching official negotiations to

implement the Phase 1 requirements of the road map as a bridge to final status talks based on a

shared vision of peace along the lines of the Geneva Accord.

International Dimensions: What Is the Role of Third Parties?Scott Lasensky, Gabriella Blum, Daniel B Shapiro, Howard Raiffa, et al. Negotiation Journal . New York: Apr 2005.

Vol. 21, Iss. 2; pg. 245, 13 pgs

Scott Lasensky: Introduction

The collapse of the Oslo Process in 2000 and the ensuing deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations

have predictably led to an intensified debate over the role of third parties. From the Saudi peace

plan, to the formation of the diplomatic "Quartet" (United Nations, the European Union, the Russian

Federation, and the U.S.), to calls for a new "trusteeship," outside intervention, as former U.S.

Ambassador Dennis Ross (2004: 772) has argued, is most often needed when the prospects for a

negotiated agreement are at rock bottom. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated in Israel's own

post-Oslo initiative, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's "unilateral disengagement" plan, which

relies on a considerable degree of explicit and implicit third-party involvement.

The growing demands for third-party intervention apply as much to the future of Jewish settlements

as they do to other aspects of the conflict. Whether it is the twin questions of borders and territory,

settler relocation, the status of settlement assets, or the future of the political process, virtually every

decision about the settlements raises questions that relate to the role of third parties.

These contributors were brought together to explore the potential promises and pitfalls of outside

intervention. Gabriella Blum examined Israel's expectations and interests vis-à-vis third parties.

Blum and Robert Malley explored what conditions to place on cooperation by outside actors.

Samuel Lewis and Daniel B. Shapiro looked at the track record for third parties, especially that of

the U.S. attempts to exert influence on the question of Jewish settlements - not simply what has been

the result in terms of Arab-Israeli relations, but within Israeli society? Howard Raiffa discussed how

outside actors could structure incentive strategies to promote cooperation on dismantling settlements.

These contributors brought together both theory and practice. These contributors, academics and

practitioners, represent the best tradition of public policy inquiry - reasoned, careful, and rigorous

analysis grounded in lessons learned from the real world.

As is often the case when assessing the role of third parties and the settlements, debate revolved

mainly around the U.S. Although views on the panel and among participants in the conference

varied, it is the view of this author that Washington could play a much more instrumental role.

Although it remains a stated American objective, limiting the growth of settlements has been

extraordinarily difficult for successive American administrations (the same could be said for Israeli

governments). Different presidents have tried different strategies. Former President George H. W.

Bush's administration, faced with a stalled peace process, unilaterally intervened in Israel's

settlement debate (e.g., the 1991-1992 loan guarantees episode) and employed a strategy of positive

and negative inducements (Arens 1995; Baker 1995; Lasensky 2004).

More than a decade later, President George W Bush also intervened in the Israeli debate on the

future of the settlements, but in this case at the invitation of an Israeli leader. The April 2004 Bush-

Sharon exchange of letters (Bush-Sharon Letters 2004) represents another attempt by the U.S. to

influence the course of Israeli political debate on settlements, but this time relying only on positive

inducements. But there is far more that could have been done, particularly in terms of shoring up the

majority in Israel that favors dismantling many of the settlements as part of an agreed two-state

solution. This is a view of the U.S. role also shared by Israelis.

Zeev Schiff, one of Israel's most respected security analysts, has called for greater American

intervention. "When it comes to the [settlement] outposts, the issue has involved the spreading of

one of the state of Israel's biggest lies - not only a lie that was told to the Americans . . . but an

ongoing lie that the Israeli public is being fed," Schiff writes. "The only viable conclusion," he says,

"is that. . . Washington must apply pressure to Israel for its own sake."

A concerted and sustained U.S. reproach could further loosen the stranglehold this issue holds over

Israeli politics and create space for a more serious internal debate. President Bush needs to know that

taking a tough line on settlements will have a tremendous effect on Israeli public discourse. Israelis

are extremely sensitive to friction with Washington because they attach almost existential

significance to the relationship. The case of Yitzhak Shamir's 1992 elections defeat is just one

example.

To be sure, Israeli settlements are not the cause of the Arab-Israeli or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,

nor are they the sole reason for the collapse of the Oslo Process and the resulting Palestinian

uprising. But settlements do endanger Israel by diverting military resources from strategic needs,

sapping scarce government funds, and providing Palestinians and the larger Arab world with a

legitimate focal point for animosity, thereby undermining U.S. interests as well.

An American reproach does not require setting new conditions on American aid, as some have

advocated and as the first President Bush tried doing. Rather, a sustained political intervention by the

White House would suffice. Moreover, it would be "well within the guidelines of the Quartet's Road

Map, which lies at the heart of official U.S. policy. Israelis must know that there is a political price

for building more settlements and part of the price is Washington's disfavor. It is a price neither

Sharon nor any other Israeli leader can bear for long. The Bush administration has so far chosen an

approach based on reassurance and positive inducements, but it remains an incomplete strategy, one

that falls short of realizing America's vast reservoir of influence on the settlements issue.

Gabriella Blum: Disengagement Plans and the International Community

My remarks are personal and do not necessarily represent the views of Israel's National security

Council. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never been lonely. Many Western states have had their

oar in it at one point or another, and many international actors continue to have a stake in it.

International involvement has increased over the last two years with initiatives to return parties to

the negotiation table, to curb violence, and to move forward. Examples include the Quartet's

Roadmap proposed in 2003; the Saudi peace plan, which was endorsed by the Arab League;

American proposals for trusteeship; and even the locally designed Geneva Initiative, which was

widely endorsed by international actors. Palestinians have also called for international involvement

and have won a significant victory recently in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and

International Court of Justice in their condemnation of Israel and its security fence.

The Israeli administration is keenly aware of this growing international interest and involvement.

Prime Minister Sharon presented his disengagement plan to the Knesset as a means to break out of

the stalemate while withstanding international pressure. He believes that a failure to do so will lead

to Israel making far-reaching concessions under intolerable international pressure while legitimacy is

given to terrorists. His attitude is a result of Israel being a "repeat loser" in the international

playground at the hands of the UN, the EU, and the Arab League.

The disengagement plan presents an interesting shift in this perspective. The plan's original title,

"The Unilateral Disengagement Plan," reflected the new policy that, in the absence of a negotiating

partner, Israel must risk taking unilateral action. However, there was an open call to international

actors to step in and intervene, to replace a nonexistent Palestinian partner with that of the

international community.

This approach was apparent from the plan's inception. Sharon took the plan to President Bush before

either the Knesset or most of his cabinet had even seen it. He sought to replace the traditional

process of negotiation seen during the Oslo Process with one in which the outcome was a product of

negotiation between Israel and the U.S. Thus the U.S. did not merely see the plan but was given the

opportunity to comment on it. The idea of maintaining a negotiating partner was important to Israeli

political opinion because large segments of the Israeli public resisted unilateral action.

The policy was also intended to minimize Israeli responsibility for Gaza following withdrawal by

allowing, and indeed inviting, international actors to have a role in offering humanitarian, economic,

and civic assistance that would surely be needed following withdrawal.

The policy invites international participation in both the economic and security spheres.

Economically, the international community has been requested to assist in Palestinian economic

recovery and institutional reconstruction. In response, the World Bank, under a wide international

mandate, has been engaged in a consultation with Israelis and Palestinians over the immediate post-

disengagement issues of trade, movement, industrial zones, and Israeli assets. But far more long-

term planning is needed over energy, water, employment, and so on. The generous financial aid of

the past has failed to yield satisfactory results, and the obstacles must be addressed.

In the security sphere, Israel faces many challenges: Palestinian factions are expected to escalate the

violence in order to foster the image of an Israeli retreat under fire. The evacuation of some seven

thousand people under fire will be almost impossible. There are also fears that Gaza will become a

second Lebanon, flooded with medium-range weapons.

Palestinian terrorism has an international context: it has long been financed through Saudi Arabia,

armed through Egypt, and politically guided through Syria and Iran. In countering these harmful

international effects, other international actors may have an important role to play. While exerting

pressure upon Syria and Iran is problematic, even if crucial, other tasks may be more easily

achieved. Thus, both Egypt and Britain have expressed interest in training Palestinian security

forces. In addition, Israel needs to pull out of the Philadelphia Corridor, and Egypt is best situated to

take over. But if a bilateral solution does not prove feasible because of Egyptian reluctance, there

may be calls for other international players to take a role there.

Politically, there has been an assumption that new Palestinian leadership would enable a resumption

of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and a return to the Road Map. But there has been no thought given to

how such a plan might come about. Again, the international community may have a role in

identifying and supporting a suitable leadership (while Israel's expression of approval would almost

inevitably undermine it).

The disengagement plan represents a shift from Israel's traditional aversion to any international

involvement, and this is not limited to the disengagement plan. However, limits must exist and

involvement must not be confused with replacement; Israel must accept its continuing relationship

with the Palestinians. International actors must also do everything they can to ensure that the

Palestinians are held accountable for their actions and resist the temptation to attribute violence to a

loss of control.

Daniel B. Shapiro: What Role for the U.S. Congress?

My remarks are personal and do not necessarily represent the views of Senator Bill Nelson. First,

although Congress's role is broader than simply writing the checks, it cannot lead on this issue

despite strong bipartisan support for both Israel and the peace process. This is partly because foreign

aid is generally unpopular with the public, which ensures that it is politically easier to respond to

requests for foreign aid than to actually propose them. Moreover, it is awkward to preempt the

requests of the parties that are more directly involved (i.e., the Israeli and American governments).

And, of course, members of Congress are mindful of special interest groups in the American-Jewish

and evangelical Christian communities.

This reluctance has led to a very odd congressional silence over the disengagement plan even though

President George W. Bush has endorsed it. Senate Resolution 393, which was passed in July 2004,

approved the president's endorsement of the disengagement plan, but it was a very low profile

resolution and has not been addressed in the House of Representatives. The leadership of the House

has close ties to both Jewish and Christian evangelical communities. The stiff competition for their

political contributions and votes in 2004, a presidential election year, exacerbated a reluctance to get

out in front of the Israeli government.

Moreover, some members have doubts about whether the disengagement plan will really happen or

be successful. There are questions about Sharon's true intentions and his political strength as well as

questions about the effect of an escalation of Palestinian activities. Some members are also reluctant

to reward Palestinian leadership, which has been dysfunctional and unwilling to take the security

measures demanded of it.

If Sharon receives approval in the Knesset, it is likely that next year there will be a proposal for a

large U.S. assistance package for disengagement. Early next session, Congress "will almost certainly

take up a supplemental appropriations bill for Iraq, which will be the vehicle for this assistance

package.

However, assuming the plan is passed and the Sharon government survives, we can expect

negotiations over an American financial package in support of the withdrawal to begin next year.

Israeli Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu already met with then U.S. National security Advisor

Condoleezza Rice for preliminary discussions. Legislatively, the timing is particularly apt. A

supplemental appropriations bill is likely to be on the floor next year pursuant to the Iraqi conflict. It

can serve as the legislative vehicle for the aid package and will be useful in linking the two issues.

The package can be framed as supporting the peace process and a two-state solution, or as helping

Israel deal with intense state security needs. The choice will affect the nature of the debate that

follows but not the ultimate result. Packages under the Clinton administration always provoked

greater debate and conditions when they balanced aid for the Israelis with aid for the Palestinians,

although packages framed as emergency security aid sailed through with minimal debate.

Consequently, it may be preferable for the Europeans to deal with Palestinian aid and security. One

key issue in the way the debate unfolds is how vigorously elements of the Je1WiSh and Christian

evangelical communities oppose the disengagement process and how effectively more mainstream

groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), support it.

The nature of the assistance is also likely to provoke legislative difficulties. For example, it is a long-

standing U.S. policy not to provide assistance to Israeli activities in the territories. This might have

to be reinterpreted to allow funding to help settlers leave the territories. Similarly, their destination

may provoke difficulties. What of those settlers who wish to use their compensation money to move

to the West Bank? Which West Bank settlements would be considered acceptable?

Regarding the form of assistance, direct cash assistance has been almost totally phased out by the

U.S. government. The new model of loan guarantees is more likely to be used. It has the advantage

of a dollar-fordollar reduction mechanism by which the U.S. can reduce the loan guarantee for

activities that it does not approve of.

Emergency military assistance in cash might also be considered. It meets the more traditional test of

responding to Israeli security needs and removes the specter of directing aid into the territories. It is

unlikely that Congress will place conditions on the annvial assistance package to pressure Israel to

take additional steps toward reconciliation and/or disengagement.

A likely scenario following Israeli-American consultations in the spring of 2005 would be a package

of military assistance for relocating military bases, loan guarantees for the removal of settlements

and the compensation of settlers with the dollar-for-dollar reduction mechanism, and perhaps, a

small amount of Palestinian aid, all of which are likely to form part of a supplemental appropriations

bill.

Significant questions are raised by this course of events: Is the U.S. investing long term in the

settlement removal enterprise? Will there be an expectation that the U.S. will play a similar role in

the West Bank? Does U.S. assistance make it harder for Israel to freeze the disengagement if it goes

poorly? And how much -will Israel's future choices be limited by U.S. involvement?

Howard Raiffa: West Bank Settlements and the Building of a New Palestinian Nation

To start with a deep methodological insight: if a problem appears intractable, couple it with a second

intractable problem and maybe, just maybe, the composite problem will be more amenable to a

solution. The original problem is the relocation of West Bank and Gaza settlers, an issue that is

internally divisive and engenders religious polarization. Moreover, compensating the settlers will be

extraordinarily expensive. It could cost more than $ 12 billion, and Israel may decide it is not worth

it. Additionally, a minority of settlers will not accept any financial compensation to move.

If the first problem is the relocation of the settlers, the second problem must be the creation and

development of the Palestinian state. The first problem is complicated by the fact that some settlers

may move from within the occupied territories to without; others may move from within to within;

and others may stay put. Over time, these movements create an extremely complex dynamism that

prohibits a simple static prescription for the movement of settlers.

The second problem, that of creating a new Palestinian state, is complicated by the internal divisions

between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the vitriolic rhetoric against

accepting a Jewish presence in the Arab Kingdom, the obstructionism of the late Yasser Arafat, and

the crushing unemployment of the Palestinian youth who see no future except their involvement in

the anti-Israel struggle.

While Israelis and Palestinians seem only partially interested in solving the problem, a large number

of states external to the conflict do want to solve it. Their guilty feelings can be tapped for the

financial wherewithal to implement some reasonable solutions. More specifically, the EU, Japan,

China, the U.S., and Russia might be willing to provide $5 to $8 billion per year over 10 years to

establish a Relocation and Development Commission (RDC) that will act as a master with the

managerial and arbitration skills to disburse funding aimed at ameliorating the problem.

The RDC would consist of four or five distinguished statesmen - preferably from small countries -

with managerial, negotiating, and intervening skills. A staff of analysts and communication experts,

a consulting firm, and an advisory group of Israelis and Palestinians for separate and joint

brainstorming would support it. The RDC would establish an escrow account with contributions of

about $1 billion per year with a rigorous investigatory team to prevent the misappropriation of funds.

Such a body could generate plans for exciting new communities in the Negev to be a lure for settlers

who reject financial compensation, and could also develop a comprehensive plan for the transfer of

property. Its funding would be aimed at compensating and relocating the settlers while developing a

Palestinian state and diverting the vitriolic anger of Palestinian youth against Israel. Projects would

range from small investments in clinics, schools, and athletic facilities to major public works aimed

at sanitation, infrastructure, and public health.

The underlying idea is based on the observance of repeated games of "prisoners' dilemma" in which

a pattern of cooperation develops but the lure of defection remains. The RDC could maneuver

Israelis and Palestinians into just such a tenuous but stable cooperative relationship through the

threatened withdrawal of funds. And it could avoid the destabilizing effects of end play by keeping

the ending indeterminate and receding. Progress on the fulfillment of objectives, such as increasing

the employment of Palestinians, should be carefully monitored. Suitable indices should be

constructed and periodic statistics reported. The RDC should establish incentives for exemplary

performance (e.g., bonuses, free vacations, etc.).

Glimpsing ahead to a brighter future may serve as an incentive for moving from a depressing "here"

to a more palatable "there." The transition has to be nurtured and managed, preferably jointly. We

need a permanent think tank to start thinking about this issue. The Program on Negotiation (PON)

has a place in devising brighter futures and helping to organize the launch of such a project.

Samuel Lewis: Lessons Learned

Terminology is an interesting aspect of the American approach. In the era of former President Jimmy

Carter, the U.S. described the settlements as illegal pursuant to the U.S. State Department's legal

advice based on the Fourth Geneva Convention. The State Department under former President

Ronald Reagan later threw out this advice. From then on, the word "illegal" with respect to Israeli

settlements disappeared from the American vocabulary. The preferred terminology became

"obstacles to peace," and no stand was taken on their illegality.

The Carter era saw one of the few relative success stories with the first Camp David Conference:

peace - albeit a cold peace - between Israel and Egypt has endured. But a sticking point toward the

end of that conference was the permanence of Israeli settlements in the Sinai. Neither the Americans

nor the Israelis were able to persuade former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that the small number

of Israelis in the Sinai, who were more interested in diving and fishing than in politics, could stay

there. Sadat was adamant that their continued presence would be seen as a continuing colonialism.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin finally agreed after he received a phone call from

Ariel Sharon, who was then Israel's secretary of Defense, assuring him that the Cabinet would

support him.

Israel also argued that it should keep an economic stake in the large modern airfields that it had built

in the Sinai after they were converted to civilian use. The Egyptians refused, and, after the Israelis

complained that they could not afford their relocation, the U.S. paid for it. In effect, despite Carter's

determination not to buy a peace that was of benefit to both parties, the U.S. did end up paying a

large amount of money, the "Sinai dividend," to both Israel and Egypt. It has formed the basis for

continuing economic assistance.

There is a very great difference between the way the Sinai settlers reacted and the way we can expect

the Gaza settlers to react. The Sinai settlers were totally uninterested in politics and were peaceniks,

if anything. Their attitude was simply, "If we have to give up our homes for peace, it is worth it."

They accepted the compensation agreements, and the settlements were abandoned without difficulty.

The story in the Sinai town of Yamit was a little different. While many grudgingly agreed to accept

compensation, the situation was complicated by a flood of protestors from the West Bank. It was

they who were violently removed from the settlements in 1983, dragged down from the roofs and

doused with foam so graphically and dramatically on the television news. And, incidentally, it was

Sharon who made the decision to destroy the town rather than turn it over to the Palestinians. He

justified this on the grounds that Yamit could otherwise form a base for terrorist activity, but it was

far more important that he demonstrated Yamit to be a unique event that would never happen again.

Another issue in those years was the attempt to incorporate a commitment to freeze the settlements.

Such commitments have appeared in many documents since but have rarely been effective. During

the last night of the Camp David Conference, everything hinged on getting a commitment from

Begin to freeze settlements while autonomy was discussed after the Camp David talks ended. But

there was no note taker. At the very end of the discussion, Carter apparently asked Begin, "Do you

agree?" To which Begin mumbled something that Carter interpreted as "Yes."

There may have been a genuine misunderstanding, but Carter and U.S. secretary of State Cyrus

Vance became convinced that Begin had doublecrossed them. The next morning, he agreed to a

settlement freeze for only the next three months. Begin insisted that what he said was, "I'll let you

know in the morning," or "I'll think about it." Carter made a strategic mistake that poisoned their

future relationship by not confronting him immediately.

It is interesting to compare Begin's relationship with the U.S. with Sharon's. Sharon has made a

career of sticking his thumb in the eyes of the U.S. and twisting it. But he learned from the events in

Lebanon and his years out of power that it is crucial for the prime minister of Israel to stay in good

terms with the U.S. president.

Now he is doing exactly what was done in the Begin years. He came to Washington, D.C. to discuss

the disengagement plan and have it endorsed by President Bush before he had even discussed it with

his cabinet. This approach works politically. Israelis have one consistent historical view of the U.S.:

a prime minister who cannot get along with Washington, D.C. is going to pay a political price.

Robert Malley: The Peace Process and the U.S.

American policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been entirely reactive during the last four

years. President George W Bush - who had promised to ride the parties hard - has ended up being

shepherded by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon. U.S. policy is now driven by the Gaza disengagement

plan, an approach that we would have been unlikely to reach had we created the plan from scratch.

But the disengagement offers an opportunity to rethink U.S. policy toward settlements as a whole

and to move from what heretofore has been an essentially unhelpful approach to one that can

contribute to a resolution of the conflict as a whole.

Settlements have been described in a number of shifting and fluctuating ways over the years and

across administrations, leading to confusion as to how we actually see them and what we ought to do

about them. Operationally, the policy tool of choice has not been, for some time now, evacuation,

but a freeze. That, in turn, has hampered our effectiveness because there is no such thing as an

airtight freeze of communities that live and breathe, and therefore, all freezes have been

accompanied by exceptions that, over time, ended up swallowing the rule. Some of these exceptions

made eminent sense, but they were, as a general matter, manipulated by successive Israeli

governments so that the policy was effectively neutered.

Notable examples, all of which provoke unavoidable problems of definition, include the issue of

Greater Jerusalem, tenders that have been accepted and are "in the pipeline," the concept of "natural

growth," the policy of allowing continued construction in existing settlements, and the policy of

allowing settlement expansion in areas that Israel is expected to annex.

One could argue that the U.S. was not forceful enough in policing these exceptions. One could also

argue that Israel was often disingenuous in invoking them. But I believe the problem lies elsewhere

and concerns the point in the peace process at which the issue of a settlement freeze was raised.

As a general matter, a settlement freeze was conceived of as a confidence-building measure,

something that would help the two parties get on the road to negotiations. But this is fundamentally a

mistaken category. Settlements are living communities. Resources have been poured into them; a

whole web of laws and incentives has been built around them. To actually, hermetically "freeze" a

settlement would be a difficult, dramatic, even wrenching gesture. It simply cannot be done as the

first step in an illdefined process. There are human lives and very strong feelings at stake that make

it a politically costly action. That cost has typically been underestimated, even more so given that the

settlements now form an integral and important part of the political and legal landscape of Israel.

One can only genuinely freeze a settlement (i.e., ban all building, moving in, refurbishment,

reconstruction) as a prelude to its evacuation.

Given that settlements constitute a genuine threat to the peace process and to the viability of a two-

state solution, but, that at the same time a freeze is so difficult to implement and to enforce, one must

ask one's self whether this is the right or realistic way to think of the problem. I would submit that a

better way to frame it is to ask one's self which settlements will be annexed and which will be

evacuated. Once that decision has been made, those that are to be evacuated can be dismantled or

allowed to wither (in effect, to freeze) without any more outside financial assistance. That, of course,

presupposes a political process in which the parties can agree as to the scope of territorial

concessions and settlement evacuation/annexation.

As for the process of evacuating Gaza, it presents some difficulties if accomplished in isolation of a

wider political process. That is because there are trade-offs (political, symbolic, as well as material)

that can only be accomplished in the context of a comprehensive solution. Nor can one ignore how

the disengagement will be perceived by the Palestinians and how they will react - this will have a

profound impact on the future of other disengagements and settlement evacuations. Should the

settlement evacuation take place under fire or under adverse conditions, which is more likely to

happen in the absence of a clear political understanding of what will happen next, the potentially

positive impact of the evacuation will be seriously diluted and polluted.

With regard to the issues of compensation and resettlement that were raised earlier, I note that these

are, of course, important to the settlers, but many of these issues are just as, if not more, relevant to

the Palestinian refugees. The disengagement plan as it is currently constituted (i.e., de-linked from

other permanent status issues) will miss the opportunity to tie the two questions, to think of symbolic

trade-offs, and to make an effort to promote the notion of equality in treatment between Israelis and

Palestinians.

The next U.S. presidential administration must seize the opportunity to think more broadly about

how the international community can expand the disengagement from Gaza into a more

comprehensive approach. This would promote the success of the disengagement plan and help

address the question of settlements more effectively. This ought to be done sooner rather than later.

As for this group, I would urge it to adopt the same approach to other final status issues so that we

may begin to think about the whole problem in a more holistic way.

Comments and Questions

Scott Lasensky:

There are several themes at play here. First, one of the roles for third parties in a negotiation such as

this is the provision of "reassurance." second, it is important to recognize that there have been

invited and uninvited third-party interventions, with the former usually being the more effective

means of conflict resolution. Third, there are already a large number of official intergovernmental

bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved on the ground, and we should consider

the credibility and/or utility of any threat to withdraw. These points are valid for Gaza and Israel's

disengagement plan there but also apply to the larger question of Arab-Israeli relations.

Gabriella Blunt:

We have been discussing the international community as a monolith, but it is not. And it is not only

the Israeli government that has problems making decisions. There are enormous obstacles in coming

to comprehensive decisions, and a division of labor would be one way of addressing these problems.

Samuel Lewis:

The real problem is getting the peace deal on the table with the Palestinians or other Arabs behind it

in such a way that an Israeli prime minister would feel it is worth the gamble politically at home to

do something about settlements because of the carrot of peace that is right in front of him or her.

Outside pressure only had leverage when the Israeli player could taste peace. We should not have

too much faith in international pressure on this issue, which is entangled in Israeli history, politics,

and faith.

Robert Malley:

We have to be realistic about how much can actually be achieved through international involvement.

Once Egypt and the U.S. get involved, it will become less clear whose head the gun is pointed at. If

the parties renege on their deals, will international investors just pull out? Or will they be sucked in

and incapable of walking away? It is a trap the U.S. has fallen into in the past, and it is likely to

occur in Gaza. Therefore, the international community must focus not on the specifics of the

withdrawal from Gaza but on a more comprehensive solution.

Daniel B. Shapiro:

The U.S. must put strong and specific conditions on its aid to the Palestinians to ensure that it has

maximum leverage over the process.