All statements of fact, opinion, or analysisexpressed in Studies In Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflectofficial positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Governmententity, past or present. Nothing in the contentsshould be construed as asserting or implying USGovernment endorsement of an article's factualstatetnents and Interpretations.

Maj. Stewart Bentley is a US Armymilitary intelligence officer.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHOOSEXEMPT ION 3929

NAZI WAR CRIMES 01 SCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2007

Studies in Intelligence (1997)

Of Market-Garden and Melanie

The Dutch Resistance and the OSS (U)Maj. Stewart Bentley

44This evacuation operation

to Britain of the royalfamily and a cadre of theDutch Government wascritical in establishing agovernment-in-exile and

the initial intelligencenetworks in Holland.

9/

On 10 May 1940, the German 10thArmy, spearheaded by airbornetroops, invaded the Netherlands.The rest of the Wehrmacht force com-mitted to "the overrunning of theWest" executed the Manstein Planthrough Belgium and the ArdennesForest. On 14 May 1940, the Dutchcommander ordered a cease-fire.Three days later, the entire Nether-lands was occupied by NaziGermany.-

The Dutch royal family, led byQueen Wilhelmina, along with some4,600 Dutch officers, sailors, sol-diers, and policemen, staged a DutchDunkirk, assisted by remnants of theDutch Navy and the entire merchantmarine. This evacuation operation toBritain of the royal family and acadre of the Dutch Government wascritical in establishing a government-in-exile and the initial intelligencenetworks in Holland. Additionally,the emigration to England of Dutchcivilians and members of the Dutcharmed forces from all over the Conti-nent and from overseas Dutchpossessions helped form the core of areconstituted Dutch Royal Army,Navy, and Air Force.

Stirrings of Resistance

The initial years of the German occu-pation of Holland were characterizedby the removal of Dutch Jews fromtheir homeland and harsh economicand political measures. The Nazisestablished their own puppet govern-ment at The Hague headed byDr. Seyss-Inquart and established aDutch National Socialist Party.

Some Dutch citizens eagerly joinedthe new party and to.ok positions inthe government. Others, however,joined with the purpose of pretend-ing to collaborate while remainingloyal co the government-in-exile,allowing them to keep an eye onDutch collaborators and steer policyand its implementation. TheLeegsma family was a good exampleof this tactic. Agardus Leegsma, hisbrother, and their father joined theNazi organized Dutch NationalPolice. The father had been a profes-sional soldier in the GuardsRegiment of the Royal Dutch Armyduring the interwar years. TheLeegsma family assisted various Resis-tance organizations during the Nazioccupation. During the liberation ofHolland, Leegsma and his brotherjoined different Allied units, servingas guides and combatants.

As the harshness of the occupationgrew, so did native Dutch unrest andresentment toward the Germans.Individual Dutchmen took it uponthemselves to strike back. With nocentral command, these brave indi-viduals began recruiting relatives,friends, and neighbors into the firstResistance organizations. The dan-gers were exceptionally high:captured members of the Resistancewere usually shot or sent to concen-tration camps. The primaryopposition initially came from theSocial Democrats and Catholicyouth leagues. The Dutch Commu-nists began actively resisting after theGermans invaded the USSR.

Members of the Dutch royal armedforces who had noz escaped to Britain

47

Dutch Resistance

Netherlands 1944 (U)

,The Hague•Delft

Rotterdam

Netherlands

Unclassified

743256 (6011.824) 7.97

48

Dutch Resistance

and successfully evaded German cap-ture secretly banded together andbegan collecting information. Underthe leadership of Dr. Johan Stijkel, aRotterdam lawyer, Maj. Gen. H. D.S. Husselman and Col. J. P. Boltonorganized a Resistance group ofyoung Dutch citizens. With the helpof radio expert Cornelius Drupsteen,they established a wireless link withthe British Secret Intelligence Service(SIS) and began passing informationto the Allies.

Resistance operations were primarilylimited to organizational and net-working functions, as well asgathering intelligence on the occupa-tion forces. Probably the most heroicand dangerous aspect of resistancewas the hiding and sheltering ofDutch Jews and young draft-ageDutch men and women by otherDutch, collectively known as onker-duikers ("underdivers"). The bestknown story is that of Anne Frank.

Individual Dutch were horrified andappalled at the spectacle of theirneighbors and friends being roundedup and taken away to an unknownfate. Most Dutch Jews who escapedcapture were smuggled out of Hol-land to England via Belgium throughFrance and then to Spain, or fromBelgium to France, and then to Swit-zerland. Smuggling someone out viathe Dutch coast was extremely dan-gerous, as the Germans increasinglyfortified the coast in anticipation ofan Allied invasion. Some young menand women as well as Dutch Jewshid throughout the war, participat-ing in underground activities. Theunderground networks established inthis manner later were instrumentalin hiding and exfiltrating Allied air-men shot down over Holland.

44By operating covertly andpassively, members of the

Resistance were able tofunction without attracting

too much attention.

99MI-9 and the Evaders

The British Military Intelligence Sec-tion 9 (MI-9) was set up to exploitavailable European Resistance net-works and assist Allied airmen shotdown over Europe in returning toEngland. MI-9, also known as IS-9,infiltrated agents, usually by para-chute, into occupied Europe. Theseagents would link up with a Resis-tance cell and organize the escape-and-evasion efforts in a particulararea, usually after being notified bythe Resistance of the presence ofdowned airmen. The agents broughtmoney, maps, and false papers toassist these airmen. The usual routewas either south to Switzerland or

• west to southern France and then toSpain and Portugal.

One such MI-9 agent was DickICragt, who parachuted into Hollandin 1943. He lost his equipment,including his radio, but continuedon armed only with a Colt.45. Hemanaged to link up with a DutchJew named loop Piller, living in thetown of Ernst, and they built a net-work designed to hide, protect, andeventually smuggle downed airmenout of Holland.

Initial Operations

By operating covertly and passively,members of the Resistance were ableto function without attracting toomuch attention. This allowed themto organize their cells, gauge the levelof the German counterintelligence

threat, and establish information net-works. The telephone was theirprimary means of communications,and they always used nicknames. Inface-to-face meetings, masks wereoften worn to ensure security.

The Dutch Resistance command andcontrol hierarchy was decentralizedand compartmented. Additionally,the creation of small groups by indi-vidual Dutchmen with no outsidelinks were widespread. Some of thesegroups' activities will never beknown, as many were captured andexecuted by the Germans. Initially,they used leaflets and undergroundnewspapers as means to enlist newmembers and raise money.

The Underground Press

Underground newspapers were help-ful, especially in areas where thetelephone lines were monitored anduse of radiotransmitters was too dan-gerous because of direction-findingoperations. These newspapers helpedcounterbalance Nazi propaganda andthe German-controlled media.Almost as soon as the occupationbegan, anti-Nazi leaflets began to cir-culate.3 Period photographs showsuch newspapers as Dc Union beingopenly distributed on city streetsdespite the obvious danger. 4 By1943, underground newspapers hadattained a collective circulation ofnearly 500,000. Although some wereamateurish, they were effective. Onesuch paper was produced by theLeegsma brothers working at TheHague. It was a translation and tran-scription of daily BBC broadcasts.5

Another newspaper was also a two-man effort. Working out of a hotelroom in Grave, Gerald Peijnenburgand a Dutch Jew in hiding wroteand copied Young Netherlands.

49

Dutch Resistance

Peijnenburg handled the distribu-tion, and most of his copies werepassed from person to person, ensur-ing some degree of security.6

Slow Growth

'Ile Resistance developed slowly forseveral reasons. Because of Holland'sgeographic proximity and culturalties with Germany, many Dutch weresympathetic to the ideas of Germannationalism, and a significant portionof the population joined the DutchNazi Party and even the Wehrmacht.There were also Dutch civilians whoinformed on their neighbors.

The swift German victory, combinedwith Queen Wilhelmina's seemingabandonment of the Dutch popula-tion, disillusioned and embittered_much of Holland. Many who collab-orated really believed that theGermans represented the future andfelt that the Nazis success was inevita-ble. For these citizens, occupationwas something merely to beaccepted. Ruthless German counter-measures towards any anti-Naziactivity further discouraged activeresistance. As the occupation grewmore repressive, a backlash againstthe Germans grew, which wasfanned by the government-in-exile.

The government-in-exile-made itspresence known through the judi-cious use of BBC broadcasts, listenedto covertly by the Dutch population.Queen Wilhelmina became a symbol

• of hope co occupied Holland, andCrown Prince Bernhard took anactive role in Allied planning for mili-tary operations in the Netherlands.

Geography also contributed to theslow growth of the Resistance. Thelack of mountainous and forested

By the middle of 1944,there were four major

Resistance organizations inHolland.

9 9terrain prevented the establishmentof hiding areas for large groups ofrnaquis, as was the case in France andYugoslavia. Moreover, the flat ter-rain, interdicted by many bodies ofwater, large and small, restrictedmovement to the established rail-roads, road networks, and bridges.These were easily controlled by theGermans, who established check-points to prevent complete freedomof movement. Gasoline was scarce,and many Dutch used bicycles fortransportation, sometimes riding onthe rims because of a shortage of rub-ber for tires. On the other hand, theGermans were plagued by the inces-sant sabotage of telephone lines andby damage to the railroads.

Major Resistance Organizations

By the middle of 1944, there werefour major Resistance organizationsin Holland. They did not coordinatetheir activities unless another group'shelp was absolutely necessary; mostof these groups did not answer to acentral headquarters. They con-ducted their operations as they sawfit, and members of these groupsoften did not realize to which groupthey belonged. Veterans often didnot know the identity of their partic-ular group until after the war. Afterthe Allied landings in France on 6June 1944, many groups adopted anaggressive Resistance role.

"Central Government OrganizationsFor Help To People In Hiding"(LO) was the most important organi-zation. Its primary goal was theprotection and exfiltration of

onkerduikers. Another activity cen-tered around the coupons used bythe Germans and the Dutch Nazigovernment to ration food and keeptabs on the population. The LOmade counterfeit coupons, and italso obtained authentic couponsfrom loyal Dutch citizens in theemploy of the Dutch Nazis. Othergroups conducted raids and robber-ies to steal authentic coupons fromgovernment agencies. Arid someDutch civilians gave up their owncoupons to the LO.

Besides keeping an eye on Dutch col-laborators, local LO groups engagedin whatever resistance they couldwithout endangering themselves.Occasionally, the Leegsma family atThe Hague was able to use its posi-tion in the police force to tip off theLO before the impending arrest ofan onkerduiker would occur. It wasalso able to funnel genuine food cou-pons to the LO.

While the LO maintained a low pro-file, the "Central GovernmentFighting Group" (KP) carried out sab-otage operations at the local level. Itsestimated strength was 550 membersnationally, but this figure is probablylow. Without central direction, theKP attacked targets of opportunity inand around the hometowns. Some-times this included the killing ofindividual German soldiers andDutch collaborators. But such activi-ties were dangerous. The Germanswould crack down on the local popu-lation in the locale where the murderoccurred; sometimes, they exacted atit-for-tat retribution. The Germanswould also step up their counterintelli-gence efforts in the area in an attemptto eradicate any underground cells. Asa result, the Resistance tended to tar-get railroad cracks, telegraph ortelephone lines, German supplypoints, and motor pools.

50

Dutch Resistance

The "Council of Resistance" (RVV)was a third organization whichengaged in both communications sab-otage and protection of onkerduikers.Allied planners regarded this group as"sound from the security point ofview." With several thousand mem-bers, the RVV was in radio contactwith the Bureau Inlichtingen7 (BI),the government-in-exile's intelligenceservice, and had demanded arms andammunition.

A fourth organization, the "Order ofService" (OD), focused on preparingfor the return of a Dutch Govern-ment following Holland's liberation.The OD was made up primarily offormer Dutch officers and govern-ment officials who found themselvessupplanted by the Nazis and byDutch collaborators. 8 Their two mainmissions were to collect intelligenceand develop "plans for the mainte-nance of administrative services andcivil order on the liberation of Hol-land." Although the OD was thoughtto have been penetrated, Allied intelli-gence estimated that most OD cellswere still loyal and could be dependedon to provide assistance during the lib-eration of Holland.

A subgroup of the OD, the "DutchSecret Service" (GDN) functioned asan intelligence agency for the OD.There were also some 20 other intelli-gence agencies in wartime Holland.9Most groups conducted some level ofintelligence operations, even if it wasonly counterintelligence for securitypurposes. When these groups wereorganized at the national level, theywere divided into regional geo-graphic areas of administration.

At the national level, the NationalSteunfonds (NSV) was an umbrellafinancial organization which receivedmoney from the government-in-exile

After D-Day, many of theDutch in the undergroundgrew impatient and wantedto conduct more aggressive

operations against theGermans.

99and conducted covert fundraising tofinance KP and LO operations.1"There was some overlap in the per-sonal responsibilities among memberof both the local and regionalgroups. For example, in theNijmegen district, the LO com-mander was also the chief of staff ofthe district OD. 1 1

Almost every town of any size hadone or more of these groups. It wasalso possible for one person to belongto more than one group. In somegroups, members simply were referredto by nicknames, and their true identi-ties will never be known. Many werenamed after their group's leader.

The Eindhoven and NijmegenUndergrounds

There were also other groups, estab-lished locally by individualDutchmen operating with no formal,structured links to other groups. InEindhoven, there was a group knownas the "Partisan Action Nederlands"(PAN). Although it functioned alongthe lines of the KP, it did not con-sider itself part of the KP.

PAN was founded by Hoynck vanPapendrecnt. He studied engineeringat the Technical University in Delftuntil April 1943, when the Germansclosed the Dutch universities andbegan forcibly relocating Dutchstudents to Germany, both as a man-power and professional talent pool.

Van Papendrecht went into hiding,and he eventually returned to Eind-hoven and established the PAN. InJune 1944, PAN had reached its fullstrength of 80 to 100 young menand women. The PAN had reachedseveral small cells operating in thesmall towns around Eindhoven,including the Group Sander, whichworked as a KP and an LO groupand was named after its leader.1'

Margarethe Kelder and her sisterwere members of this group. Theysmuggled downed Allied airmen andDutch onkerduikers to a crossing siteon the Belgium border, coordinatingtheir activities with a Belgian Resis-tance group. The female members ofthe PAN were primarily couriers, butthey were also valued intelligence col-lectors. In early September 1944,Kelder and another female Resis-tance member were asked to go intothe woods near Eindhoven to con-firm the presence of a Germanantiaircraft battery. On the pretext ofgathering mushrooms, they con-ducted their reconnaissance and,when confronted by German guardsnear the battery, were able to con-vince them of their innocence.

Another PAN group in a town northof Eindhoven conducted sabotageoperations. It put salt in gas and oiltanks of German vehicles and blewup railroad tracks using smuggledexplosives Rrovideci by miningengineers.''

After D-Day, many of the Dutch inthe underground grew impatient andwanted to conduct more aggressiveoperations against the Germans. ThePAN did so by conducting raidsagainst, among other targets, the20- to 30-man German garrison atthe Eindhoven airport on 5 Septem-ber 1944 14. It also began conducting

51

Dutch Resistance

a form of psychological warfare; PANmembers would approach Germansoldiers they knew and try to per-suade them of the hopelessness ofGermany's situation and to surren-der. Some PAN members werereported by German soldiers andarrested. The punishment for belong-ing CO a Resistance organization wassummary execution.

In June 1944, the PAN set up itsheadquarters in a house in Eind-hoven. Van Papendrecht had littlecontact with the other groups in theEindhoven area, including the RVV,which only numbered three of fourmembers, but he was aware of theirexistence. The PAN leader did con-duct some joint activities with themwhen he felt the operational need foroutside assistance. One of his outsidecontacts was the KP leader in Rotter-dam, Jan van Bijneri, whose non de

guerre was "Frank." "Frank" was hisperiodic source of weapons andexplosives, couriered by such womenas Margerethe Kelder and her sister.

To the east of Eindhoven, in thesmall town of Helmond, there was aKP Resistance group led by JohanRaaymaerkers, a former Dutch artil-lery captain who was a technicalengineer and owned his own factory.One of his members was Hans Ber-tels, who began distributing anunderground newspaper in 1941 inthe Helmond area. Bertels's contactwas a man named Knaapen, who pro-vided him with the newspapers andoccasional operations orders.

South of Eindhoven, in the town ofRoermond, was a small LO groupconsisting of only 15 members.Their headquarters was in a vault inthe local cemetery. Anya van Lys-sens, later awarded the MilitaryOrder of William for her actions in

44The Resistance

organizations were part ofthe largely unknown story

of the strategic OSSmission into occupied

Holland.

99the Resistance, was a member of thisgroup. The group had a radio withwhich it maintained contact with aBelgian Resistance group and smug-gled downed Allied airmen over theborder. By September 1944, it wascredited with saving the lives of 29airmen.

The Resistance groups in the Eind-hoven area had a total of severalhundred members. The local GDNwas led by Arie Tromp, a director forthe Phillips electrical firm office inEindhoven. His nom de guerre was"Harry." By placing their headquar-ters in the Eindhoven Museum,GDN members were able to comeand go without arousing German sus-picions. The GDN began receivingtaskings and orders from the BI fol-lowing its establishment inNovember 1942. Tromp and hisagents used the underground electri-cal cables in the Phillips factory,which also had telephone lines, astheir primary means ofcommunications. 15

There were several undergroundgroups in the Nijmegen area. In thecity itself, part of the Resistance activ-ities apparently were centeredaround the Saint Canisius College.Jules Jansen was an engineering pro-fessor at the college and one of theleaders of the local KP. He set up alaboratory in his house for the manu-facture of explosives and an indoorfiring range in his basement to teach

KP members the basics ofmarkmanship.

OSS Involvement

The Resistance organizations werepart of the largely unknown story ofthe strategic OSS mission into occu-pied Holland. This story essentiallybegan in May 1944, when Lt. JanLaverge constituted the one-manNetherlands Section of Special Intel-ligence (SI) of the OSS in London.The American-born son of Dutchémigrés, he had been personallyrecruited for the job by Col. WilliamDonovan. As planning progressedfor the invasion of Europe, Lieuten-ant Colonel De Vries, the chief of SI,asked Laverge to develop a plan forusing an OSS team to assist in theliberation of Holland. On 25 May1944, Laverge submitted his prelimi-nary plan, which called for twoofficers and three enlisted men withassociated vehicles and communica-tions equipment.

Following the Allied invasion ofFrance, Laverge looked forward tohaving a chance to operate an OSSmission in Holland similar to theOSS mission codenamed Sussexwhich had operated in France. InJuly 1944, the Netherlands Sectioncame under the control of SI's Conti-nental Division. De Vries ordered aresubmission of plans for the libera-tion of occupied countries, andLaverge reviewed the initial work.The OSS team designated for Hol-land would come under the controlof the Supreme Headquarters AlliedExpeditionary Force (SHAEF) mili-tary mission to Holland. The OSSteam grew to six officers and eight to10 enlisted men.

52

Dutch Resistance

Later that same month, Laverge con-sulted with the BI and used itscontributions for the final plan, sub-mitted on 5 August 1944. Both the B1and OSS approved die mission, whichwas given the codename Melanie. TheDutch Minister of War also approvedthe mission, which was to gather intel-ligence and focus on "transmittinginformation obtained from the Dutchintelligence nets, trying to recruitagents, and to extending Dutch nets

1into Germany." 6

After Laverge got the green light forthe mission, he began recruiting sol-diers for the team, choosing men hehad worked with before in England.The lieutenant also began buildingup his team to ensure maximum self-sufficiency. In addition to his radiooperators and two Dutch BI analysts,he recruited an American Armymechanic, a radio repairman, and aDutch-American major with no pre-vious intelligence experience. Thepresence of a major on the teamwould provide Laverge with enoughrank necessary to obtain resources.

Melanie Moves Ahead

As operations on the Continentspeeded up, so did Laverge's prepara-tions. The target date for the start ofthe mission kept getting moved for-ward, and Laverge began to feel thathe would not have enough time CO

prepare properly. The decision wasfinally made to deploy an advanceteam of two Dutch and two Americanofficers not later than 7 September1944, with the remainder of the teamco follow as quicldy as possible.

When the advance team arrived inNormandy, it reported to theSHAEF G2 Forward. On 9 Septem-ber, 1944 I.ieutenant Laverge metwith a Major Krick of the SHAEF

G2. Krick apparently offered little orno guidance to Laverge as to Mela-nie's intended intelligence gatheringpriorities and requirements. Accord-ing to Laverge's report to his OSSsuperior, Krick only made sugges-tions, which Laverge developed intothe following requirements:

• German unit composition and posi-tions behind the Siegfried Line.

• Location of enemy headquarters ofany kind and names of Germanslocated there.

• Locations of the planning and archi-val sections of German industrialinterests.

• Information on "controlling person-alities" at all levels of the Reich.

• Locations of command, control, andcommunications nodes.

The OSS team was attached andordered to report to Field MarshalBernard Law Montgomery's 21stArmy Group. In early September,Laverge moved his ream to the PalaceHotel in Brussels, in preparation fordeployment into Holland. He alsoreported in at Montgomery'sheadquarters.

Operation Market-Garden

In early September 1944, Montgom-ery, seeking to maintain the momen-tum of the Allied breakout fromNormandy, conceived an operation tooutflank the German "West Wall"defensive line. Encouraged by UltraSIGINT intercepts which portrayed adisintegrating German Army, Mont-gomery persuaded Supreme AlliedCommander General Eisenhower thathis bold plan of forcing a narrow corri-dor through Holland and establishing

a bridgehead across the Rhine Riverinto northern Germany's Ruhr Valleyindustrial complex held the promiseof a German collapse by the end of1944.

Montgomery's Operation Market-Garden had two parts. He proposeddropping the First Allied AirborneArmy to seize seven canal and riverbridges in Holland as well as thebridge across the lower Rhine at theDutch town of Arnhem (Market).Simultaneously, the British XXXArmored Corps would rapidlyadvance the 60 miles along a narrowroad corridor crossing the capturedbridges to link up with the airborneforces in Arnhem (Garden). Theoperation began on 17 September.

The Melanie mission, with no priorcoordination with the British )00:Armored Corps, deployed into Hol-land over the Albert Canal andreached Eindhoven on 21 September1944. The team established its baseof operations in a house at No. 2Vestdijk Street.

The Dutch telephone network was anextremely vital communications linkbetween Melanie and the Dutch Resis-tance cells scattered throughoutHolland. Using a TR-4 wireless tele-graph radio set, the team's radiooperators established contact with theOSS SI section in Paris. In additionto the TR-4, the team used a TR-1for local communications with theDutch Resistance groups in the Mar-ket-Garden area of operations. Eventhough the team was attached to the21st Army Group, it apparently didnot provide intelligence to Montgom-ery's G2. Instead, its reportingchannel was directly to Paris and theOSS Continental Division of SI. Theexclusion of the 21st Army Group G2from the intelligence reporting chainprobably was due to the sensitive,

53

Dutch Resistance

Members of the Eindhoven Resistance with troops of the 101st Airborne in front of the Eindhoven cathedral. Photo courtesy ' )F the author. (u)

compartmented nature of all OSS mis-sions. The team had no contact withthe 101st Airborne Division, whoseMarket-Garden objective was the sei-zure of Eindhoven and vital bridgesnearby. The only American para-trooper the OSS team saw was a oneGI who wandered past the house oneday and asked for a cigarette.

Laverge quickly made contact withArie Tromp, the chief of die Eind-hoven Resistance. With Tromp'sassistance, Laverge recruited fourDutch civilians co work as interpreters

and telephone operators. A Resistancemember named A. Jongbloed wasemployed as the mission's intelligenceand liaison officer with Dutch civilianauthorities in Eindhoven. The OSSteam used the operational Dutch tele-phone system co make contact withvarious Resistance groups throughoutHolland. This reporting networkbegan yielding excellent informationalmost immediately.

The team's first message to SI inParis, on 21 September 1944,reported that it had begun recruiting

possible agents for work behind theGerman lines. ° As the Market-Gar-den battle raged up and down thecorridor along "Hell's Highway,"18the OSS teamn continued its intelli-gence-gathering mission. On22 September 1944, the teamreported the location of the Gestapoheadquarters in Kleve, Germany, aborder town just east of Nijmegen,and the location of the telephoneexchange there. This informationwas passed via the telephone networkby Resistance members. A reportdated 24 September 1944 from a

54

Dutch Resistance

PAN Resistance members escorting German POWs during Market-Garden. Photo courtesy of the author. (u)

"reliable source" stated that, as of22 September, all "troops leavingRotterdam, except demolitionssquads." It also reported on otherconcentrations of enemy troops andartillery.°

In addition to the Melanie operation,which was to provide strategic intelli-gence on the situation throughoutHolland, OSS/SOE Jedburgh2°teams deployed with each Allied air-borne division during Market-Garden. The Jedburghs workedclosely with their respective divisioncommanders and staff. These teamsperformed combined civil affairs andunconventional warfare missions inmuch the same manner as latter-dayspecial forces units do, but they were

primarily concerned with obtainingtactical intelligence provided by Resis-tance members.

During Market-Garden, intelligencesupplied by the various Resistance net-works, because of its noncompart-mented nature, was passed throughthe Jedbutgh teams to the various tacti-cal commanders. They obtained infor-mation on the composition anddisposition of German forces, as wellas information on terrain and the con-ditions of the bridges. Once the para-troopers were on the ground, thisinformation flow continued. Some ofthe Resistance cells were aware insome form of Market-Garden beforeits execution, but the decentralizednature of the underground network

guaranteed that not everyone wouldknow the time and place of the attack.As Allied parachutes began blossom-ing, those previously unaware of theoperation reacted by mobilizing theircells and recovering arms caches.

During the operation, someResistance members carried outindependent actions. Others activelysought out airborne soldiers andattached themselves to any unit thatwould take them. I n cases wheretheir loyalties were suspect, Resis-tance members were presented to theJedburgh teams for vetting. Oncethis was done, the Dutch werefarmed out to different units as theneed arose.

55

Dutch Resistance

Resistance members and 101st Airborne troops consulting over a map near Eindhoven. Photo courtesy of the author. (u)

Jedburgh Team Claude, attached tothe British 1st Airborne Division, wastoo small to conduct effective opera-tions. One four-man ream per brigadewould have been enough, but not oneteam for the entire division. The split-ting of the team had disastrousconsequences, placing the entireresponsibility For the vetting andadministration of the available Resis-tance on the junior member of TeamClaude, Lieutenant Knottenbelt

The British plan for using the Resis-tance fell apart after Colonel Barlow,the officer in charge of civil affairs anduse of the Resistance in the Arnhem

area, was killed. Dutch naval com-mander Wolters was attached to theBritish division, but his stated missionwas focused on Dutch civil affairs afterthe liberation of Arnhem. Nothingwas ever planned about his actions orresponsibilities during the battle. Hisad hoc actions during the battle dem-onstrated his abilities. If Wolters'sresponsibilities had been broadenedbefore D-Day, he could have beeneven more effective.

The communications failures sufferedby Market forces, especially the 1st Air-borne Division, are legendary. TeamClaude's loss of communications

occurred because the team carriedonly one radio on the operation,which was lost during the initial dropon D-Day. Team Edward's inabilityto communicate with Team Claudeand the physical isolation of the twoteams prevented a clear assessment ofthe situation at Arnhem.

Intelligence Failure

Market-Garden ranks among themost serious intelligence failures ofthe war. Critiques of the operationhave focused on the overly optimisticinterpretations of SIGINT as well as

56

Dutch Resistance

A Dotal commando transporting 101 .st Airborne troops during the fighting outside Eindhoven. Photo courtesy of the author. (u)

on the failure of planners to creditairborne reconnaissance indicationsof recent German armored reinforce-ments in the Arnhem area.

Similarly, the operational planners, intheir haste to meet Montgomery'sdeadlines, paid too little attention toroute, terrain, and weather assess-ments; even these assessments sufferedfrom insufficient basic intelligenceinformation. Drop zones, especially atArnhem, were ill considered, and esti-mates of the road systems' ability tosupport the armored column werecritically flawed, though this latter

shortcoming was as much a planningfailure as it was an intelligence failure.

The Dutch Resistance was not alertedto the Arnhem drop because Britishintelligence believed the Germans hadpenetrated their Dutch networks. Ifthe British had heeded word fromtheir agents in Arnhem, they wouldhave been alerted to the presence ofthe two panzer divisions.

Carrying On

After Market-Garden, the Melaniemission continued to collect military,

economic, and industrial intelligence.A detailed report dated 14 December1944 provided the specifications on aMauscr small-arms factory in thetown of Oberndorf, Germany. Theteam also provided reports regardingGerman atrocities committed againstAllied prisoners and Dutch civilians.

The unleashing of German secretweapons such as jet aircraft and theV-2 rocket made information aboutthese weapons extremely critical.Melanie responded by providinginformation on the location ofV-2 launching sites with detailed

57

A Bridge Too Far

Operation Market-Gardenquickly turned into a militarydisaster. Although the Americanairborne divisions eventuallyachieved their objectives—the82nd Airborne parachuted intoGrave and Groesbeek andcontrolled the strategic rivercrossings while the 101stAirborne seized the bridges atEindhoven and Vegbe4 but notbefore the Germans were able todemolish one. The British 1stAirborne Division, reinforced bya Polish airborne unit, droppedtoo far from its target, theArnhem bridge. Furthermore,German strength in Arnhem wassubstantially greater thananticipated in the intelligenceestimates. The lightly armedparatroopers found themselves up

against two SS panzer divisionsrecently refitting in the area.Suffering from the loss in theairdrop of critical vehicles,artillery, and communications,the British/Polish force failed to

seize the bridge despite a heroicfight.The situation in Arnhem becameincreasingly perilous. The Britisharmored column which was tobreak through to relieve theairborne fisrces fell behind itsoverly optimistic schedule as thetanks crawled along the narrow,congested roadway. Theoperation ended less than 10 dayslater, with the British and Polishairborne troops surrounded inArnhem and the armored columnstalled 10 miles away.The British were able to pull backsome of their forces, but notbefore the Germans killed orcaptured more than 7,000paratroopers; the two Americanairborne divisions fighting alongthe corridor lost more than 3,500.With the debacle in Arnhem,hopes of an early end to the warquickly faded. In the words of theBritish airborne CommanderGeneral Boy Browning, Market-Garden was "a bridge too far."

58

Dutch Resistance

sketches. Information on industrialinfrastructure was also provided. A 3March 1945 report stated that V-2parts were being manufactured in theCroecke textile factory in Hohenlim-burg, Germany.

In late December, coinciding withthe German attack through theArdennes. Melanie developed intelli-gence indicating a secondary,supplementary German attack acrossthe Maas River. Major Van derGracht reported to his superior,Philip Horton, that in the period ofa few days more than 30 Germancommandos wearing British uni-forms had been captured inEindhoven, some only a few blocksfrom the team's quarters. Van derGracht also reported that Eindhovenhad received numerous V-2 attacks"with some accuracy." The threatbecame so ominous that Van derGracht made plans for the destruc-tion of those files which could not beevacuated.

On 8 February 1945, Melaniereported that Field Marshal Goeringhad established his headquarters in atrain with three coaches at the Nied-eraula train station and that he hadbeen there for several months. Dutchintelligence agents were routinelyable to report the locations of regi-mental and higher headquartersalong with descriptions of vehicleand uniform markings. Reports onGerman units were usually able toidentify the name of the commanderand sometimes what decorations hewore. This type of information came

1. B. H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Sec-ond World War (New York; G. P.Putnam's Sons; 1970), p.65.

2. E. H. Lockridge, Set Europe Ablaze(New York: Thomas Y. CrowellCompany, 1967), p. 247.

3. Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of TotalWar, 1939-1945 (New York: HarperTorchbook ed.; 1968), p. 145.

4. Photographic displays in theNational War and ResistanceMuseum, Overloon, Holland.

5. The BBC also broadcast messagesand codewords targeted at variousunderground groups. Some messageswould be orders to conduct certainoperations. Others were for the pur-pose of notifying particular groupsthat arms and supply airdrops wouldoccur at a predetermined location.

6. Author's interview of Gerard H. J.M. Peijnenburg, Dutch Secretary ofthe Army and Resistance member;Wassenaar, Holland, 18 June 1996.

7. Ultimately, the BI was responsible forestablishing a network of intelligenceagents inside occupied Holland. TheB1 also maintained communicationswith the Dutch Resistance, providingthe Allies with valuable HUMINT.

8. Author's interview of Hoynck vanPapendrecht, PAN founder andSroottrophen veteran; Eindhoven,

•

Dutch Resistance

from underground sources living inthe occupied towns and villages.

SI also tasked Melanie to conductbattle damage assessment reportswhich were forwarded on the resultsof Allied bombing raids in the Neth-erlands. Again, such reports couldonly be obtained through eyewitnessaccounts provided by Dutch Resis-tance members and Melanie agents.

A 24 December 1944 memorandumfrom Lieutenant Laverge states thatthe team had recruited nine Dutchcitizens—five observers and fourwireless telegraph operators—andwas training them in Eindhoven topenetrate German lines and collectinformation. 21 Armed with onlytheir wits and the TR-1 radio, theseDutch tried, with varying degrees ofsuccess, to accomplish their assignedmissions. From September 1944until May 1945, there were severalsecondary missions, involving at leastone agent. These missions involvedcontacting various Resistance groupsand establishing radio contactbetween the groups and Melanie forintelligence-gathering purposes.Some of the agents did not survive.

Operations in occupied Hollandwere extremely difficult and danger-ous for Melanie's Dutch agents.After an OSS bureaucrat had recom-mended shutting down the operationbecause of a perceived lack of results,Laverge responded angrily: "Frankly,if you knew about conditions in Hol-land like we do here, you don't seehow the hell those people [Dutchagents] can accomplish what we areasking." 22 The lack of archivalreports on the success or failure ofthese missions makes it impossible toevaluate them.

Melanie remained in Eindhoven forthe duration of war. Besides obtain-ing intelligence on the strategic andtactical military situation, the teamprovided economic, political, andsocial intelligence on large and smallurban areas and on rural communi-ties. Melanie was also able to puttogether a database on Dutchcollaborators.

From 25 to 31 March 1945, Melaniesent 251 reports, messages, and maps/sketches to the OSS/ETO SI section.From September 1944 to April1945, Melanie sent approximately3,200 courier reports and 750 cablemessages to the OSS SI section inParis. According to an afteractionreport written by the SHAEF G-2 in1945 evaluating Dutch intelligenceproduction and reporting, the Mela-nie mission "supplied more reportsfor SHAEF's Daily Digest than anyother OSS mission from September1944 to May 1945.23

Undeserved Obscurity

Despite its achievements, Melaniehas hardly been mentioned in mostOSS histories. The only sources onMelanie are surviving participantsand the declassified OSS records atthe National Archives at CollegePark, Maryland. The records includedaily situation reports, financialaccounting records, operationalreports, financial accounting records,operational reports, and debriefs ofDutch agents sent behind the lines.But there are important gaps in therecords, as some documents havebeen pulled from the files andreclassified.

But at least the SHAFE G2 gavesome credit where it was justly due,when he reported that Melanie

provided the most accurate and com-plete intelligence picture for itsassigned area of any intelligence oper-ation during the war. 24 As heindicated, Melanie's efforts and thecooperation and sacrifices of itsDutch Resistance agents contributedsubstantially to Allied intelligenceoperations in Holland at a crucialstage.

NOTES

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9. NARA RG 226, Entry # 148, Box26, Folder 378, Melanie DailyReport, dared 24 Sept. 1944,

10. OSS/SOE Jedburgh teams were jointAllied special operations teams whichinfiltrated into occupied territory torecruit and train local Resistance orga-nizations for strategic intelligenceoperations and sabotage.

11. NARA RG 226, Entry # 146, Box26, Folder 384, Memorandum dated24 December 1944, Subject: AgentRecruitment, Melanie Mission.

12. Letter from Capt. Jan 1.averge toCaptain Alden, SI Staff, 27 January1945, NARA RG 226, Entry # 190,Box 214, Folder 162.

13. Memorandum from Capt. Harry A.Rositzke, deputy chief, SteeringDivision; to Philip Horton, chief,Steering Division; "Evaluation ofDutch intelligence Production,"Sept. 1944-May 1945, dated 9 June1945.

14. Ibid.

Dutch Resistance

Holland; 14 June 1996. John W.Hackett, I Was a Stranger, (Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co.; 1978); p. 53.Sjors DeKruijff, "We Had Spread aBed for the Allies." Unpublishedmonograph, obtained from theHartenstein Airborne Museum, Arn-hem, Holland, 1996. DeKruijirsmonograph details Resistance activi-ties in the Arnhem area before andduring Market-Garden. Much of hismaterial is drawn from veterans' first-hand accounts on file at the StateArchives in Arnhem.

9: Authors's interview of Gerard H.J.M.Peijnenburg, Dutch Secretary of theArmy and LO member; Wassenaar,Holland, 18 June 1996.

10. Author's interview of Leo Heinsman,LO member; Beek-Ubbergen, Hol-land, 18 June 1996.

11. Author's interview of Gerard H.J.M.Peininenburg, 18 June 1996.

12. Author's interview of Hoynck vanPapendrecht; Eindhoven, Holland,14 June 1996.

13. Author's interview of MargaretheKelder-Groom; Eindhoven, Holland;14-15 June 1996.

14. Van Papendrechr was against the ran-dom killing of lone German soldiers.He seems to have regarded this asungentlemanly and serving nopurpose.

15. Author's interview of Jan I.averge,Captain, USA (Retired); OSS vet-eran; Richmond, VA., 2 November1995.

16. NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 214,Folder 162. Deployment Order, Mel-anie Mission, undated.

17. NJARA RG 226. Entry # 148, Box26, Folder 378, Melanie WeeklyReport.

18. XXX Corps' advance (the Gardenportion of the operation) to link upwith the three airborne divisions atEindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhemwas restricted to a narrow two-lanehighway and the areas the paratroopunits had secured. This road won thenickname "Hell's Highway" for theferocious fighting between the Wehr-mark and Allied units.

60