INSIGHTS FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S WEEKLY BALANCE

SHEET, 1942-1975

Cecilia Bao and Emma Paine

Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business

Enterprise

Studies in Applied Economics

SAE./No.104/May 2018

1

InsightsfromtheFederalReserve’sWeeklyBalanceSheet,1942-1975

ByCeciliaBaoandEmmaPaine

Copyright2017byCeciliaBaoandEmmaPaine.Thisworkmaybereproducedoradaptedprovidedthatnofeeischargedandtheoriginalsourceisproperlycredited.

AbouttheSeries

The Studies in Applied Economics series is under the general direction of Professor SteveH.Hanke,co-directoroftheJohnsHopkinsInstituteforAppliedEconomics,GlobalHealth,andtheStudyofBusinessEnterprise (hanke@jhu.edu).Theauthorsaremainly studentsatThe JohnsHopkins University in Baltimore. Some performed their work as research assistants at theInstitute.

AbouttheAuthorsCecilia Bao (rbao1@jhu.edu) and Emma Paine (epaine1@jhu.edu) are students at The JohnsHopkinsUniversityinBaltimore,Maryland.CeciliaisasophomorepursuingadegreeinAppliedMath and Statistics, while Emma is a junior studying Economics. They wrote this paper asundergraduateresearchersattheInstituteforAppliedEconomics,GlobalHealth,andtheStudyofBusinessEnterpriseduringFall2017.EmmaandCeciliawillgraduateinMay2019andMay2020,respectively.

Abstract

Wepresent digitizeddata of the Federal Reserve System’sweekly balance sheet from1942-1975 for the first time. Following a brief account of the central bank during this period,weanalyze the composition and trends of Federal Reserve assets and liabilities, with particularemphasisonhowtheywereaffectedbysignificanteventsduringtheperiod.

AcknowledgmentsWethankProf.SteveH.HankeandDr.KurtSchulerfortheiradviceandguidance.Keywords:FederalReserveSystem,balancesheet,BrettonWoodssystem,gold,WorldWarII,KoreanWar,VietnamWar,Treasury-FedAccordJELcodes:E51,E58,N22

2

IntroductionTheFederalReserve’sweeklybalancesheetshavebeendigitizedfrom1914upto1941aspartof a previous working paper by Justin Chen and Andrew Gibson in the Studies in AppliedEconomicsseries.1Thedigitizedbalancesheetsarealsoavailablefrom1976onwards, thoughfor theearly years apparentlyonly atmonthly frequencyandonly in subscriptiondatabases.However, there is a gap from 1942 to 1975 that has not been previouslymade available inspreadsheet form. This paper offers graphs and an accompanying discussion based on thebalancesheets.PurposeThis paper uses complete, weekly Federal Reserve balance sheet data to understand andanalyzehowsignificanteconomiceventssuchasWorldWarII,theBrettonWoodsSystem,andthe Treasury-Fed Accord affected the division of assets between gold, foreign assets,governmentbonds,andprivate-sectordomesticassets.WebeginthepaperbydiscussingtheeconomicenvironmentduringWorldWarIIandthepeacetimeexpansionthatfollowed.Wedivideouranalysisintothreeperiods:WorldWarIIandafter,1942-1950;theKoreanWarand after, 1950-1959; and theKeynesian era and thebeginningof theGreat Inflation, 1960-1975.ThefirstperiodextendsfrombeginningoftheSecondWorldWartojustbeforethebeginningof the KoreanWar. This period can be divided into years ofwartime financing and years ofpeacetimeexpansion.WewillalsoexaminetheimpactoftheFederalReserve’sfixedinterestrate structure during times of inflation and recession as well as the impact of the BrettonWoodsAgreementoninternationalmonetarycooperation.TheKoreanWarandtheaftermathsaw the establishment of the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, which granted the FederalReserve independence from the Treasury, changing the role of the Federal Reserve. TheBrettonWoods system, in which the U.S. dollar was the key currency, began to work on aworldwidebasisasitsfoundershadintendedneartheendoftheperiod,in1958.ThehightideoftheinfluenceofKeynesianeconomicsandthebeginningofwhatwaslatertermedtheGreatInflationsawachangeinhoweconomistsviewedtheroleoftheFederalReserveandmonetarypolicy.Intheearly1960s,manyAmericaneconomistsheldthebeliefthattherewasaninverserelationship between unemployment and inflation, and that the Federal Reserve could usemonetary policy to affect this balance. The stagflation of the Great Inflation altered thisthinking,andpresentedalargechallengetotheFederalReserveSystem.

1Chen,JustinandAndrewGibson,“InsightsfromtheFederalReserve’sWeeklyBalanceSheet,1914-1941,”JohnsHopkinsUniversity,InstituteforAppliedEconomics,GlobalHealth,andtheStudyofBusinessEnterprise,StudiesinApplied Economics (working paper series), No. 73, January 2017.http://sites.krieger.jhu.edu/iae/files/2017/04/Chen_Gibson_FederalReservePaper.pdf;accompanyingspreadsheetviahttp://sites.krieger.jhu.edu/iae/working-papers/studies-in-applied-economics/.

3

Chronology

Date EventDecember7,1941 JapaneseattackonPearlHarborbeginsU.S.roleinWorldWarIIMarch27,1942 TheSecondWarPowersActispassedApril30,1942 Fedpegs90-dayand1-yearTreasurybillratesat0.375%and0.85%July1942 FedremovesreserverequirementsonwarloandepositsJuly1944 BrettonWoodsconferencetakesplaceinNewHampshire;Bretton

WoodsAgreementsignedApril12,1945 VicePresidentHarryS.TrumanbecomesPresidentuponthedeathof

FranklinD.RooseveltSeptember2,1945 WorldWarIIendsFebruary20,1946 TrumansignsEmploymentActof1946,whichcommitsthefederal

governmenttoseektopromotemaximumemploymentApril15,1948 ThomasMcCabesucceedsMarrinerEcclesasFedchairmanJune25,1950 NorthKoreainvadesSouthKorea;KoreanWarbeginsMarch4,1951 Treasury-FederalReserveAccordrestoresindependencetotheFedApril2,1951 WilliamMcChesneyMartinreplacesMcCabeasFedchairmanNovember4,1952 RepublicanDwightD.EisenhoweriselectedPresidentJuly27,1953 KoreanWarendswithsigningofarmisticeandcreationoftheKorean

DemilitarizedZone;endofwartriggersrecessionof1953November1,1955 VietnamWarbegins(heavyU.S.involvementbegins1964)January1,1958 CurrenciesofWesternEuropeancountriesandtheircoloniesbecome

convertibleforcurrentaccounttransactionsNovember8,1960 DemocratJohnF.KennedyiselectedPresidentNovember1,1961 GoldPoolagreementbetweentheFedandEuropeancentralbanksNovember22,1963 LyndonB.JohnsonbecomesPresidentafterKennedyisassassinated1965-1982 TheGreatInflationMarch1968 GoldPoolcollapses;marketpriceexceedsofficial$35/ouncepriceNovember8,1968 RichardM.NixoniselectedPresidentFebruary1,1970 ArthurBurnsreplacesWilliamMcChesneyMartinasFedchairmanAugust15,1971 "Nixonshock"occurswhenNixonendsgoldconvertibilityforthe

dollar,whichendstheBrettonWoodssystemDecember18,1971 SmithsonianAgreementcreatesanewdollarpegat$42.2222/ounceJanuary27,1973 ParisPeaceAccordsenddirectU.S.involvementinVietnamWarFebruary1973 SmithsonianAgreementisreplacedbyfreefloatingcurrenciesOctober1973 OilcrisisbeginswhenOAPECproclaimsembargoontheUnited

States;1973-75recessionbeginsinNovemberMarch1974 EndoftheoilembargoAugust9,1974 NixonresignsthepresidencyaftertheWatergatescandal;heis

succeededbyVicePresidentGeraldFordApril30,1975 VietnamWarendswithNorthVietnam’sconquestofSouthVietnam

4

I.HistoryWorldWarIItotheKoreanWar(1942-1951)TheUnitedStatesenteredWorldWarIIasaresultoftheJapaneseattackonPearlHarboronDecember 7, 1941, just a few weeks before our analysis begins. The goals of the FederalReserve policy spanning the period from 1942 to 1951 can be divided into two categories:financing the wartime effort and planning for peacetime expansion. The production andallocation of supplies for themilitary resulted in the continuation of low interest rates andsupplyrestrictionsondurablegoods.Sincepriceswererisingatlessthanhalfofthe16percentgrowth in basemoney, the Federal Reserve had a harder time financing thewartime effortduringWorldWarIIthanduringWorldWarIbecauseinflationerodedlessoftherealvalueofmonetaryexpansion.OnApril30,1942,theFederalReserveannouncedafixedratestructurethatpeggedtheninety-dayTreasurybill rateandtheone-yearTreasurybill rateat0.375percentand0.875percent,respectively.2This resulted in long-term rates being capped at 2.5 percent until 1951,whichresulted inahigherdemand for realmoneybalancesby thepublic (because the rewards forholding less liquid assets were smaller than usual). Compared to short-term interest ratesduringandshortlyafterWorldWarI,whichrosetoashighas7.97percentin1920,short-terminterest rates during World War II remained low and flat, never exceeding 1 percent.3ThisstructurewaspartoftheFederalReserve’sgoaltoreducethefederalgovernment’sfinancingcosts. However, the result was an inability to control the composition of publicly held debtgoingforward.Thegeneralconsensuswasthatifrateswerenotpegged,bondpriceswouldbevolatile,causinginstabilityinthegovernmentbondmarket.4Themarketreactionalsoindicatedanticipation of future economic expansion and inflation. The fixed rate structure for interestratesmade all Treasury securities equally liquid,which eventually allowedbanks not only tolend for short periods at rates below long-termdebt, but also to buy longermaturitieswithhigheryieldsaftertheysoldTreasurybillsat0.375percenttotheFederalReserve.5TheSecondWarPowersActofMarch27, 1942gaveFederalReserveBanksauthorization toacquire direct or guaranteed obligations by purchasing from the Treasury, and removed theformer requirement that the remainingmaturityof the securitiesnotexceed sixmonths.OnApril11,1942,theFederalReserveintroducedauniformdiscountrateof1percentanda0.5percentpreferentialrateforloanscollateralizedbyshort-termgovernmentsecurities.6ByJuly1942,theBoardalsoremovedreserverequirementsonwarloandeposits,whichallowedbankstodeterminethevolumeofthereservesbybuyingorsellingTreasurybills.Becausebankswere

2Ibid.,594.Treasurybillsaresecuritieswithmaturitiesuptooneyear.Treasurysecuritieswithmaturitiesofmorethanoneyearuptotenyearsarecallednotes,andTreasurysecuritieswithmaturitieslongerthantenyearsarecalledbonds.3AllanH.Meltzer,AHistoryof theFederalReserve.Volume1: 1913-1951 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2003),586.4RobertL.Hetzel,“FromWWIItotheTreasury-FedAccord,”1.5Meltzer,AHistoryoftheFederalReserve,596.6Ibid.,601.

5

selling Treasury bills at such high prices after the announcement fixing interest rates, theFederal Reserve acquired all outstanding bills by 1945.7By the end of the war, short-termgovernmentsecuritieshadbecometheFederalReserve’sprincipalasset.TherapidgrowthoftheFederalReservemonetarybaseandthelowerthanexpectedoutflowofgoldpromptedtheFederal OpenMarket Committee (FOMC) to revise the securities allocation formula and theallocationofopenmarketpurchasesregardingTreasurybillstopreventthegoldreserveratiofromfallingbelow45percent.8During the war, the Fed also participated, as a distinctly junior partner to the TreasuryDepartment, in international negotiations to shape the postwar world financial system. Theconference of Allied nations at BrettonWoods,NewHampshire in July 1944 established theInternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and theWorldBank as apex institutions for internationalfinancial cooperation. The Bretton Woods agreements in effect made the dollar the keycurrency of the postwarmonetary system and therebymade the Fed into theworld’smostpowerfulcentralbank. Inprinciple,countries in theBrettonWoodssystemwereonanequalfootingbecauseallestablishedpeggedexchangeratesof theircurrencies intogold toensureexchangeratestability.Inpractice,theUnitedStateswastheonlymajoreconomyatthetimewhose government intended to allow foreign governments to convert its currency into goldwithout major restrictions after the war, and markets in dollar assets were much moreextensivethanmarketsingold.Thedollarwaspeggedtogoldat$35pertroyounce,whereithadbeensince1934.FromFebruary1945toOctober1945,therewasabriefpost-warrecessionwherenominalGNPdeclinedby9.7percentandrealGNPdeclinedby14percent.9Therecessionwasmuchmilderthanthosenumbersmakeitseem.Muchofthedeclinewasthesheddingofnolongerneededwartimeproduction.Governmentspendingfellby$39billion(18.9percentofGNP),butgrossprivate capital spending roseby$15billion (7.2percentofGNP), and for the first time since1941, private capital spending exceeded government spending in the third quarter of 1946.During this period, there was high monetary base growth and low interest rate volatility.However, since monetary actions were limited by the differences in opinion between AllanSproul,presidentof theFederalReserveBankofNewYork,andMarrinerEccles,chairmanoftheFederalReserveBoard, therewaswidespreadconcern that the transition toapeacetimeeconomywouldnegativelyaffectprivateconsumptionandinvestment.Intheyearfollowingtheendofthefirstpostwarrecession,therewasconstantdebatebetweenthe Treasury and the Federal Reserve regarding monetary policy, which resulted in limitedeffortsinraisingshort-termratesanddealingwithinflation.TheFederalReservefirstdecidedtoendpreferentialdiscountrateforloanssecuredbythegovernment.TheFederalReservehadwantedtheTreasurytouseitscashbalancetoreduceoutstandingmarketableshort-termdebt

7Ibid.,596.8Ibid.,605.9Ibid.,638.Atthetime,thestandardwaytomeasurethesizeoftheeconomywasgrossdomesticproduct(GNP)ratherthangrossdomesticproduct(GDP)asisnowusual.

6

by issuingmorenonmarketable long-termdebt;however, theTreasuryendedup justshiftingitssurplusfromcommercialbankstoFederalReserveBanks.Thetwoentitiesdidagreeonasix-pointprogramwherebyshort-termrateswould increaseto1.125percentbytheendof1947while raising discount rates and reserve requirements for central reserve city banks.10In thethird and fourth quarters of 1946, there was a large increase in the gold stock that causedgrowthofthemonetarybaseanda12percentriseinconsumerprices.11Inflationcontinuedtorise,from4percentinto10percentinsixmonths,whileinterestratesremainedstagnant.InanOctober 1947meeting, the FOMC issued a new directive for “maintenance of stable andorderlyconditions ingovernmentsecuritiesmarket.”12ThisdirectivesignaledthattheFederalReservewouldnowonlybecommittedtocontrollinglong-termrates.Thenextrecessionoccurredfrom1948-49andwascharacterizedbyadelayedresponsefromtheFederalReserve.However, theFedwasable to successfully spur recovery.At theendof1948,pricesbeganfallingandinflationdidnotreturnuntilthestartoftheKoreanWarin1950.The Treasury used its account surplus to retire debt from the Federal Reserve Banks whilepurchasingdebtfortrustaccounts;doingsoreducedthevolumeofpubliclyheldgovernmentdebtwithoutaffectingthemonetarybase.The1948deflationactuallyhadtwopositiveeffectsontheeconomy:itincreasedgoldinflowsandraisedtherealvalueofthemonetarybase.Thecommonbelief that theeconomywouldexpandduetoan increase inwartimedomesticandforeigndemandofgoodsaswell,asthefailuretodistinguishbetweennominalandrealrates,werepartofthereasonfortheonsetofthe1948-49recession.AfterHarryTrumanwaselectedPresident in 1948, long-termbond yields fell, prompting the Federal Reserve to sell its long-term securities while buying short-term securities. On June 21, 1949, the Federal Reservedecidedtoremovethepegonshort-termratesafterhavingestablishedtheconsensusthattheSystem could not control the size of excess reserveswhilemaintaining fixed interest rates.13Instead,theFedintroducedatargetrangeforTreasurybillrates.Bytheendoftherecession,production was rising at 25 percent, real GNP was increasing by 2.5 percent, and nominalinterestrateswererisingby0.07percentagepoints.14FromtheKoreanWartotheEndofthe1950s(1950-1960)The 1950swas a time of great change for the Federal Reserve System. The outbreak of theKoreanWarinJune1950spurredastrongeconomicrevivalintheUniteStates.Memoriesfromthe recent world war spurred producers and consumers alike to sharply increase theirinventoriesof physical goods, resulting in a rapid rise in the velocityofmoneyand inflation.Domesticpricesrose16percentfromJune1950toFebruary1951.15

10Ibid.,646.Centralreservecitybankswerethoseinthenation’smajorfinancialcentersandincludedmostofthelargestbanksinthecountry.11Idem.12Ibid.,652.13Ibid.,678.14Idem.15MiltonFriedmanandAnnaJacobsonSchwartz,AMonetaryHistoryoftheUnitedStates:1867-1960(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963),597.

7

Aspricesrose,theaccompanyingrise in interestratespushedupyieldsto levelsthatcreatedconcern.TheTreasuryreactedtothisbyannouncingitwouldmaintaintheexistingyieldsonitssecurities. From June 1950 to the end of that year, the Federal Reserve’s holdings ofgovernmentsecuritiesincreasedby$2.4billion,16orfromaround40percentofFederalReserveassets in June to 44percent by the endof the year. The rapid expansion and threat of highinflationthattheKoreanWarbroughtputpressureontheFederalReservetoslowthepaceofexpansion,alertingthegovernmenttothedangersofthesituation.Asadirectresultofthesepressures, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord was agreed in March 1951. The Accordessentially liberatedtheFederalReserveSystemfromtheTreasurybyseparatinggovernmentdebt management from monetary policy. The Accord put an end to the Federal ReserveSystem’s debt-support policy, freeing the Fed from the responsibility to support governmentsecuritiesatapeggedprice.TheFedgainednew independenceandcouldnowraise interestrateswithoutprior approval fromor consultationwith theTreasury. TheFedalsoadopteda“bills only” or “bills preferably” policy formonetary policy. Under this policy,which the Fedfollowed until February 1961, it sold only Treasury bills and no other securities, under thejustification that Treasury bills had a “broader, more nearly perfect market than othergovernmentsecurities.”17InJanuary1953,duetoconcernsoverinflation,theFederalReservetightenedmonetarypolicyby raising the discount rate 25 basis points to 2 percent. The tightening triggered a mildrecession frommid-1953 toAugust of 1954. The Fed began to easemonetary policy inMay1953bybeginningtobuyTreasurybills.TheFedloweredinterestratesagaininFebruary1954andApril-May1954,aswellasloweringreserverequirementsforcommercialbanks.TheFederalReservewent fromaperiodof easing rates inearly1954 to raising rates in late1954inordertorestraininflation.Thediscountrateincreasedfrom1.5percentto3.5percentinsevenstepsfrom1954to1957.18TheeconomicrecoverylasteduntilAugust1957,whenthecountryenteredanotherrecession. InOctober1957,theSovietUnionsetthefirstrocketandmanned capsule into space, beginning the SpaceRacewith theUnited States.DomesticU.S.concerns over increased defense and space spending triggered a rise in interest rates and areduction in stock prices. The Standard&Poor’s 500 index fell 7 percent over themonthofOctober.TheFederalReserverespondedslowlytotheeconomicdownturninlate1957duetoconcerns over high inflation. It was not until mid-December 1957 that the Fed reduced thediscountrateto3percent.Therecessionworsenedoverthewinter,andtheFedrespondedbyloweringthebankdiscountrateinFebruary,March,andtheendofApriluntilitreachedalowof1.75percent.19

16Ibid.,611.17Ibid.,632.18AllanH.Meltzer,AHistoryoftheFederalReserve,Volume2,Book2,1970-1986(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2010),117.19Ibid.,175.

8

Theperiod from late1958-60 saw recovery from the1957-1958 recession,and the returnofconcernoverinflation.ByDecember1959,theFedhadtightenedpolicyandrestoredthefreereserve and the fed funds rate to August 1957 levels. The tightening was able to preventinflation.Anewelementwasaddedin1958whenmanyWesternEuropeancurrenciesbecameconvertible for current account transactions. As had been envisioned in the BrettonWoodsagreements,mostglobaltradeingoodswasfinallyfreefromexchangecontrols,althoughmostcountriesstillappliedcontrolstocapitalflows,theUnitedStatesbeingthechiefexception.TheKeynesianEraandtheBeginningoftheGreatInflation(1961-1975)The 1960s saw economic thought in the United States dominated by Keynesian economics.President JohnF.Kennedybeganhispresidency in1961,andhisnewadministrationbroughtmanyKeynesianeconomiststoWashingtonD.C.TheyincludedPaulSamuelson,KennethArrow,RobertSolow,andJamesTobin;thelatterthreewerekeyindesigningtheKeynesianeconomicpolicy that would be implemented by the administration. Keynesian economic policy wasdominated by the belief that therewas an inverse relationship between unemployment andinflation,andthatthegovernmentcouldsetanoptimaltrade-offbetweenthetwo—abeliefthatwouldbechallengedinthe1970s.Theearly1960swereaperiodofeconomicexpansionandlowinflation.TheVietnamWarandtheexpansionoffederalsocialwelfareprogramsinthemid-1960swerethemaineventsthatdominated politics and monetary policy development. They resulted in a large increase ingovernmentexpendituresinthelatterhalfofthe1960s:expendituresrosefrom16.6percentof GDP in 1965 to 19.8 percent in 1968. The Vietnam War proved to be more costly andinflationaryeventhantheKoreanWar.Thefederalgovernmentranlargedeficits in1967and1968,andFederalReserveholdingsofTreasurysecuritiesincreasedmarkedlyovertheperiod.Productivity growth slowed. Thiswas the beginning of stagflation in theUnited States; from1965 through the 1970s the country would experience both rising inflation rates and risingunemployment.ThecombinationpresentedamajorchallengetotheFederalReserveSystem.The Federal Reserve responded by raising the discount rate over the period to a high of 6percentin1969inordertocombattherisingrateofinflation. Under the Bretton Woods system, member countries agreed to maintain pegged exchangeratesbetweentheircurrenciesandgoldoragold-convertiblecurrency,whichinpracticemeantmainlythedollar.Theworldmarketpriceofgold,however,showedsignsintheearly1960sofexceeding theofficial priceof $35per troyounce. In response, the Fedand sevenEuropeancentralbankscreatedtheLondongoldpool.Londonwasthenasnowthecenteroftheworldgoldtrade.Thepoolsoldgoldonthemarketwhenthemarketpriceexceededtheofficialpricebyamarginconsideredsubstantial.Eachcountryagreedtocontributeaspecifiedshareofthegoldandacceptaspecifiedshareof the losses.TheU.S. sharewas50percentandthe initialamountofthepoolwas$270million.ThepoolbeganonNovember1,1961.Itsexistencewasat first secret but was revealed to the world by a Swiss newspaper in 1962. After thedevaluation of the pound sterling in November 1967 the pool was increasingly unable tobalancetheoutflowofgoldwithbuybacksofgold,andmaintain itmission.TheUnitedStates

9

had sought tomaintain thepriceof$35.20perounceof goldby sellinggold reserves to theUnitedKingdom.However,inearlyMarch1968,$400millionworthofgoldwassoldinasingledayon the LondonGold Exchange. In response, theUnited States requested that tradingbesuspended,andtheLondonGoldPoolwasclosedpermanentlythreedayslater.Atwo-tiergoldmarketbegan,with transactions ingoldamongcentralbanksoccurringat$35perouncebutmarkettransactionsoccurringabovetheofficialrate.20The gold reserve ratio requirement behind Federal Reserve notes (paper money) was 40percent from1913, until changing to 25 percent in 1945.21 The percentage of gold reservesgrewafter1945aspeaceallowedtoFedceasewar financingandtightenmonetarypolicy tobringthevalueofthedollarintoclosercorrespondencewiththevalueofitsofficialequivalentingold.After1950, thegoldreserveratiobegantodeclineagaindueto the increase in totalFederalReservenoteliabilitiesandtheoutflowofgoldtoforeigninstitutions. InMarch1965,Congress voted to repeal the gold coverage requirement against deposits, which had statedthat deposit liabilities in the Federal Reserve had to be backed 25 percent by gold. The 25percent requirement forgoldbackingofnotes remaineduntil 1968. Thecollapseof thegoldpool inMarch1968spurredCongress toendthenotereserverequirement.Thegoldreserveratio stabilized at around 10 to 11 percent at the end of 1975, after the end of the goldstandard.ThecollapseofthegoldpoolwasonesignoftheFed’sunwillingnesstorestraingrowthofitsmonetary liabilities sufficiently to instill confidence that the official gold parity of the dollarwould persist. A less important but more tangible sign to average Americans was the U.S.Mint’sreductionofthesilvercontentofdimes,quarters,andhalf-dollarsfromthelongstandingratioof90percentto40percentin1965.After1970theMintstoppedmakingcoinscontaininganysilver,except forcommemorative issues.Silvercoins largelydisappearedfromcirculationbecausetheirvalueasmetalexceededtheirfacevalue.InNovember1968,RichardNixonwaselectedPresidentof theUnited States.WhenWilliamMcChesney Martin’s term as chairman of the Federal Reserve expired, Nixon’s economicadviserArthurBurnssucceededMartin.BurnsimmediatelysettoloweringtheFedfundsrate.BetweenDecember1969andAugust1971,foreignholdingsofU.S.governmentdebtincreasedas foreign central banks and governments honored their obligations to maintain a fixedexchangeratewiththedollarundertheBrettonWoodssystem.Thesepurchasesraisedmoneygrowth and inflation abroad, creating pressure for a revaluation of foreign currencies or adevaluationofthedollar.Finally,onAugust15,1971NixonendedtheBrettonWoodssystemby announcing that the United States would no longer sell gold at $35 per troy ounce. InDecember1971,theSmithsonianAgreementcreatedanewdollarstandard,peggingcurrenciesto the U.S. dollar at a new gold parity of $42.2222 per troy ounce that was only notionalbecause the U.S. government neither bought nor sold gold at the new price. The new

20Michael Bordo, EricMonnet and Alain Naef, “The Gold Pool (1961-1968) and the Fall of the BrettonWoodsSystem:LessonsforCentralBankCooperation,”NBERWorkingPaperSeries,No.24016,November2017.21JosephC.Ramage,"TheGoldCover,"EconomicQuarterly(FederalReserveBankofRichmond),(July1968),8.

10

arrangementdidnotchangetheFed’smonetaryexpansionorinspirelong-termconfidenceinthedollar. InFebruary1973 theUnitedStatesandothercountriesendedthe lastvestigesofthe Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates and began what Nobel prize winnerRobertMundellhascalledthe“nonsystem”offloatingexchangerates.From1973to1975theUnitedStatesexperiencedasevererecessiontriggeredbytheshockofNixon’seconomicpoliciesandfurtheredbythe1973oilcrisis.InOctober1973,PresidentNixonrequested $2.2 billion from Congress to aid Israel in the Yom KippurWar. In response, theOrganizationofArabPetroleumExportingCountries(OAPEC)institutedanoilembargoontheUnited States. The embargo raised the price of oil from $2.90/barrel in October 1973 to$11.65/barrel in January 1974.22Though the embargo was lifted in March 1974, higher oilprices persisted and so did inflation. For the Federal Reserve, the combination of risingunemployment and rising inflation challenged the existing understanding ofmonetary policyheldbymosteconomists.Afteran initial loweringof thediscountrate in1971and1972, theFederalReservereactedtothesharpriseininflationbyincreasingthediscountratetoanewhigh of 8 percent in 1974. However, the impact of the oil embargo was severe. Annual USconsumer price inflation in 1974 still exceeded 11 percent, and unemployment reached 8.6percent in 1975.23The tightening of the Federal Reserve did not serve to decrease rampantinflation.Overall, theperiodfrom1960-1975wasonedistinguishedbytheriseofstagflation.The rising inflation rate and unemployment rate presented a huge challenge to the FederalReserveSystem,onethatimpactedthebeliefsofmosteconomistsduringtheperiod.ThischallengetotheKeynesianeconomicthoughtfacilitatedtheriseofmonetaristthinkingintheUnitedStates. TheKeynesianmodelhad threemain flaws: themodeldidnotdistinguishbetween nominal and real interest rates, it presumed a tradeoff between inflation andunemployment, and it failed to distinguish between a one-time change in price levels andsustained changes in price levels.24Led by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, monetaristeconomictheorygainedinfluencebeginninginthe1960s.Monetaristtheorywascharacterizedbythebeliefthatchangesinthemoneysupplyplayedamajorroleininflationfluctuations,andthereforetheoverallhealthoftheeconomy.Thehighinflationofthe1970sweakenedbeliefinKeynesianeconomictheory,allowingmonetaristtheorytoriseininfluence.Onefeatureofthemonetaristresearchprogramwasthecollectionandanalysisofmonetarystatistics.Intheerawhenmonetarism rose to challengeKeynesianism,however, digitizationof statisticswas stillexpensive. Friedman, Schwartz, and their fellow researchers focused on annual or monthlymoney supply data. They left the Fed’s weekly balance sheet to be digitized by a latergeneration,ataskwehavetakenupandwhoseresultswewillnowdiscuss.

22 Michael Corbett, “Oil Shock of 1973–74,”Federal Reserve History (Web site),www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1973_74.23 “Unemployment Rate: Aged 15-64,” FRED database, 17 April 2017,fred.stlouisfred.org/series/LRUN64TTUSA156N.24Meltzer,AHistoryoftheFederalReserve,491.

11

II.DataandDiscussionTotalAssetsOver the duration ofWorldWar II, Fed assets rose significantly due towartime spending. AmodestincreaseinnominaltermsduringtheKoreanWarisevidentinthegraph.Afterthewar,assetsremainedfairlylevelfornearlyadecade.Inthemidtolate1960s,theVietnamWarandexpansionofsocialwelfarepushedupspendingsignificantly.Thestagflationofthelate1960sand1970spresentedachallengetotheFed,andFedassetsroughlydoubledbetween1965and1975,fromapproximately$60billiontoover$120billion.

TotalFedResources/GNP(graphonnextpage)During the final years ofWorldWar II, there was a sharp increase in total Federal Reserveresourcesasa shareofGrossNationalProductdue to theheavywar spending. In theyearsfollowing, Federal Reserve Resources fell as a percentage of Gross National Product as thenominalGNPgrewmuchfasterthanFedassets.Followingthepeakof22.71percentinJanuary1946,totalFederalReserveresourcesasashareofGNPfelltoaround7percentbylate1975.

12

AssetComposition(graphsonnextpage)In1942,goldreservesmadeupmorethan80percentofFederalReserveassets.TheSecondWar Powers Act of March 1942 gave commercial banks authorization to acquire direct orguaranteedobligationsbypurchasingfromtheTreasuryandgrantedtheFederalReservethepermanent authority to purchase long-term government securities. As a result, the FedexpandeditsbalancesheetthroughthepurchaseofU.S.governmentsecurities,providingthegovernmentwithwartime funding.Over thenext fewyears,U.S. government securities rosefrom about 9 percent of Fed assets in 1942 to 50 percent by late 1945. The Fed purchasedapproximately$21.7billioninU.S.governmentsecuritiesinthisshortperiod.TheFed’stotalassetsremainedrelativelystableoverthenext20years,untiltheearly1960s.After the early 1960s there was huge growth in the purchases of Treasury securities. ThegovernmentusedtheproceedsfortheVietnamWarandariseinsocialwelfarespending.While overall Federal assets rose, the amount of gold reserves gradually decreasedover theperiod.Due to the dissolution of the BrettonWoods agreement, theU.S. dollar transitionedfromagold-backedcurrencytoafiatcurrency in1971.Asaresult,goldreserveswanedoverthefollowingyears,fallingsharplyasapercentageoftotalassets,thoughlevelingoffindollarterms.TheU.S.goldstockisofficiallyvaluedat$42.2222pertroyounce,thepricestillonthebooks today, even though themarket value has a times been a largemultiple of the officialprice.

13

LiabilityCompositionNotes in circulation rose sharply duringWorldWar II, accounting for themajority of FederalReserveliabilitiesbytheendofthewar.Notesincirculationtripledfromthebeginningof1942untiltheendof1945,fromapproximately$8billionto$24billion.Afterwards,theamountofnotesincirculationheldrelativelysteady,risingonlyby$6billionto$30billionbytheendof1962,18yearslater.Inthemid1960snotesincirculationbegantogrowmorerapidly,perhapsmore fromrisingdemandabroad than fromdomesticdemand.Asgovernment spendingwasrisingduringtheperiod,theFedallowedthemonetarybasetoincreasetopreventachangeininterestrateswhenthebudgetdeficit increased.TheVietnamWarwastwiceasexpensive in

14

nominal terms as the KoreanWar, and ColdWar spending aswell as increased spending insocial welfare spending all contributed to a rising budget deficit. From 1961-64, the Fedincreasedthebaseenoughtofinance33percentoftheannualbudgetdeficit,from1965-71itincreasedthebaseenoughtofinance50percentofthedeficit.Asaresult, inflationrose.TheFedactedasitdidduetoitsbeliefinPhillipscurveoftheKeynesianmodel–thattherewasatradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Fed officials expected that by allowing forhigherinflation,lowerunemploymentandthereforeeconomicprosperitywouldoccur.

15

TheGoldStockandtheMonetaryBaseThe totalU.S.monetary gold stock, totalmonetary base, Fed gold reserves, and the FederalReserve’s portion of the monetary base grew substantially from 1942 to 1948. (The totalmonetary base also includes Treasury-issued currency such as silver certificates and coins,whichhoweverdiminishedinrelativeimportanceduringtheperiodofouranalysis.)Thegrowthofthegoldstockandthemonetarybasethenslowedsignificantlyfrom1948to1961.Thetotalgoldstockandmonetarybaseexperiencedsteadyincreasesupto1948followedbyastagnantperiodupto1961beforecontinuedsteadygrowthupto1975.Whilethetotalmonetarygoldstockwasstillgrowing,theFed’sgoldreserveshadbeguntotaperdownstartingin1942andcontinuinguntil1975,whenthelevelofgoldthattheFederalReservewasholdingwaslowerthan the levelofgold in themid1930s.25This revealsa shiftaway fromthegoldstandard inpracticewellbeforeitbecameofficial.Overall,althoughtheFedandtotalmonetarybaseswerefollowingsimilartrends,theFedmonetarybasewaschanging lessdramaticallythanthetotalmonetarybasefrom1942to1975.

25ChenandGibson,“Insights,”22.NotethatwefollowFederalReservepracticeinvaluinggoldattheofficialpriceof$35pertroyounceuntilDecember17,1971and$42.2222pertroyouncethereafter.AfterthecollapseofthegoldpoolinMarch1968,describedabove,theofficialpriceofgoldwasbelowthemarketprice.

16

BeforetheFedbeganoperations,goldhadbeenheldbytheTreasuryDepartmenttoprovideinternationalreservesandareservebackingforthepapermoneythattheTreasuryissued.Thebacking was called the gold cover. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 outlined gold reserverequirementstobeheldagainstFederalReservenotes(papermoney)andagainstdepositsofmember banks at the Fed. These requirements would also act to control the expansion ofdomesticmoneysupplybyplacinganupper limit.Thegold reserveratio requirementbehindFederalReservenoteswas40percentin1913beforechangingto25percentin1945.26Aswasmentionedabove,thegoldreserveratiorequirementbehindmemberbankdepositsatFederalReserve Bankswas 35 percent in 1913 before changing to 25 percent aswell in 1945.27Theratioofgoldreservestothemonetarybasegrewafter1945aspeaceallowedtoFedceasewarfinancing and tighten monetary policy to bring the value of the dollar into closercorrespondencewith the value of its official equivalent in gold. After 1950, the gold reserveratiobegantodeclineagainbecauseoftheincreaseintotalFederalReservenoteliabilitiesandtheoutflowofgoldtoforeigninstitutions.InMarch1965,thegoldcoverrequirementbehinddepositswasremoved.Asthegraphshows,theFedwasclosetofallingbelowtheminimumrequiredgoldcoveratthetime.Afterwardstheactualgoldreserveratiocontinuedtofall.ThecollapseofthegoldpoolinMarch1968spurredCongresstoendthegoldcoverrequirementbehindFederalReservenotes.Consequently,theFednolongerhadtomaintainanyminimumratioofgoldtoliabilities.26JosephC.Ramage,"TheGoldCover,"EconomicQuarterly(FederalReserveBankofRichmond),(July1968),8.27Idem.

17

WilliamMcChesneyMartin in 1968 rather unrealistically stated that the removal of the goldcoverrepresentedinternationalanddomesticconfidenceintheU.S.dollar.28Thefactthatthelaw regarding gold reserve requirements would be so quickly changed when it became alimiting factor to the growthof domesticmoney shows that the Federal Reserve, ultimately,had control over this rate of growth. The gold reserve ratio stabilized at around 10 to 11percentattheendof1975,aftertheendofthegoldstandard.StateandPrivateMoneyUnlikethethirtyyearsbefore1942,whenthereweresignificantchangesinFederalmonetarybaseandTreasurymonetarybasecomparedto“broadmoney,”suchasthequickdropoftheTreasurymonetarybaseasa shareof “totalmoney”and thequick riseof theFedmonetarybase as a shareof “broadmoney” from1914 to1919, in theperiodwe survey, therewas aconstant trend in thebehaviorofFederalmonetarybaseandTreasurymonetarybaseduringtheperioddiscussedinthispaper.29“Broadmoney”isthemostinclusivemethodofcalculatingmoney supply that includes the most liquid assets such as cash and cash equivalents (themonetary base,M0), and illiquid assets that households and businesses use to eithermakepayments or hold as short-term investments. In this paper, “broadmoney” from 1948-1958refers to theM3money supply as calculatedbyRichardG.Anderson.30From1959onwards,“broadmoney”referstoM4moneysupplycalculatedasalldepositsatcommercialbanksandthriftinstitutionsexceptlargedenomination.Timedepositsasaratioof“statemoney”issuedbytheFederalReserveto“privatemoney”reachedahighof20.1percentinJune1945beforebeginning a steady descent to approximately 10 percent at the end of 1975. In this paper,“privatemoney”referstotheM4moneysupplyandisdefinedasmoneyprivateorganizationslendtohouseholdsorbusinesses,while“statemoney”referstotheM0moneysupplyand isdefined as themonetary base issued by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The ratio of“statemoney”issuedbynon-FederalReserveentitiesto“privatemoney”showsarelativelylowconstanttrendwithchangesnogreaterthan1percentfrom1942to1975(seenextpage).Wecanobservethatin1975,“statemoney”was4.7timesaslargeinnominaltermsasithadbeen in1942 innominal terms,but“privatemoney”hadgrownmore than twiceas fastandwas10.1timesaslargein1975asin1942.Theratioof“privatemoney”to“statemoney”isanimportantmetric,referredto inthispaperasthegearingratio,thattrackshowbroadmoneysupply (M4) is growing.31There is a strong link between this growth in money supply andgrowth innominalGDP.Wecanattribute the steadygrowthof thegearing ratio from3.8 in1942 to8.1 in1975 toan increase ineconomicprosperityand interpret it as a sign that thecentralbankwascontinuingto“purchaseassetsfromthenon-bankpublic.”32

28Ibid.,10.29ChenandGibson,“Insights,”20.30RichardG.Anderson,“SomeTablesofHistoricalU.S.CurrencyandMonetaryAggregatesData,”FederalReserveBankofSt.LouisWorkingPaper2003-006,April.31Dataforthegearingratioareinthe“State&PrivateMoney”sectionoftheaccompanyingExcelworkbook.NotethatM3andM4includeM0heldbythepublicasaminorcomponent.32SteveH.Hanke,“StateMoneyandBankMoney:LiftingtheFogAroundQE,"CatoInstitute,6June2016.

18

GrowthRateoftheFederalReserve-IssuedMonetaryBaseTherecessionsfromFebruary1945toNovember1945andNovember1948toNovember1949hadthemostdramatic impactonthegrowthrateoftheFed’sportionofthemonetarybase.Thefirstrecessionsawgrowthinthemonetarybasedropfrom26.3percentyear-over-yearinOctober1944—thehighestinthewholeoftheperiodwesurvey—toalowof0.15percentin

19

May 1947. The growth rate remained relatively constant before a small hike at the end ofOctober 1948 at 6.53 percent.However, the second recession,which began in the followingmonth,causedafurtherdropofapproximately17percentagepointsinthegrowthrate.Forthefirsttimesince1930,theFedmonetarybasewasshrinkingyear-over-year,hittingalowof-10.9percentat theendofNovember1949.After thesecond recessionended inNovember1949,themonetarybasesoaredagainastheFedeasedmonetarypolicy.Althoughthegrowthrateofthemonetarybasewasnegativebetween1948and1949,deflationin1948actuallyincreasedtherealvalueofthemonetarybase.Asoutlined inthesectionabovediscussingevents fromWorldWar II totheKoreanWar, theTreasurywasabletocontroltheeffectsthatchangesinpublicallyheldgovernmentdebthadonthe monetary base by using its account surplus to retire debt from Reserve Banks whilepurchasingdebtfortrustaccountsaftertheKoreanWarof1950.Wecanseefromthegraphbelow that after the 1948-49 recession, subsequent recessions did not have such dramaticimpactsonthegrowthrateofthemonetarybase.

ThesevererecessionfromNovember1973toDecember1975,triggeredbyNixon’seconomicpoliciesandtheoilembargo,markedthefirsttimeinaboutadecadethattheyear-over-yeargrowth rate of the Fedmonetary base plummeted significantly. This decrease in the growthratereflectstheFederalReserve’stighteningpolicy inanattempttoreduceinflation.Wecanalsoobservean increase inthevolatilityof theannualizedgrowthratesweek-to-weekasthetime-axis on the graph approaches the 1975. This volatility could be attributable to the

20

challenge that the combination of rising unemployment and rising inflation imposed on theFederalReserveandthethen-currentunderstandingoftheeffectsofmonetarypolicy.FederalDebtThe 7 percentage point increase in Federal Reserve holdings of government securities as apercentage of net interest-bearing federal debt from 1942 to 1945 is a direct effect of theSecondWarPowersActof1942.TheactgrantedtheFederalReservepermanentauthoritytopurchase government securitiesof any remainingmaturity, resulting inmore freedom in thegovernmentsecuritiesmarket.TheonlysignificantdipsinFederalReserveholdingsbefore1974were from January 1949 toMay 1950, shortly before the KoreanWar, and August 1972 toFebruary1973.

AlthoughtheFederalReserve’sshareoffederaldebtoutstandingremainedrelativelyconstantfromtheten-yearperiodof1951to1961,itrapidlyascendedinthenextten-yearperiodfromabout13percentinthebeginningof1961toabout29percentin1971.ThisdramaticincreaseinFederalReserveholdingswasa resultof theFedhelping to finance increasedgovernmentexpenditures and increased deficits. It is evidence that theVietnamWar not only costmorethantheKoreanWar,butalsoputgreaterinflationarypressureontheU.S.economy.However,after1974,thepercentageofFederalReserveholdingsofgovernmentsecuritiesasashareoffederaldebtexperiencedadramatic7percentdropfrom32percentinMay1974to25percentinDecember1975.Theexplanation isthattheFed’sholdingsofTreasurysecurities increasedmuchmore slowly than total federal debt outstanding. Monetary policywas in a tighteningphaseduringtherecessionoftheperiod.

21

In comparison to theperiod from1914 to 1941,which saw large fluctuations in the ratio ofFederalReserveholdingsofgovernmentsecuritiestofederaldebt,therewasasteadiertrendfrom 1942 to 1975. During the 1914 to 1941 period therewere two instances of significantgovernmentdeficitincreaseandinflationarypressure,comparabletotheincreasesseenduringthe Vietnam War period from 1951 to 1961. The first instance was during World War I,particularly from 1915 to 1917, when the percentage of Federal Reserve holdings ofgovernmentsecuritiesasashareoffederaldebtgrew10percentagepoints.33Thesecondwasfromearly1930toearly1934duringtheGreatDepression,whenFederalReserveholdingsofgovernmentsecuritiespercentageroseabout11percentagepoints,from1percenttoahighof12.4 percent in October 1933. During the 1914 to 1941 period there were also episodes ofsubstantial decreases in Federal Reserve holdings of federal government securities, mostnotablyfromJune1922toNovember1923,whentheyfellbymorethanfive-sixths.34Nothingremotelycomparableoccurredduringtheerawehaveanalyzed.ConclusionDuringtheperiodfrom1942–1975,theFederalReservebegantoresemblefarmorecloselytheinstitutionweknowtoday.TheTreasury–FedAccordin1951enabledtheFederalReservetoactindependently,andremovedthepegoninterestratesthathadformerlyexisted.TheshrinkingoftheFederalReserve’sgoldreserveinthe1960s,whichisevidentinthegraphs,andtheFed’sreluctancetotightenmonetarypolicysufficientlytostoplosinggoldreserves,ledtotheendofthegoldstandard.ItisclearthattheendoftheBrettonWoodsgoldstandardcanbeattributedtothepoliciesthatchangedtheFederalReserve’sassetcompositionfrommainlygoldtomainlyTreasury securities.While the gold reserve ratio rose in the years immediately following thewar, the subsequent outflowof gold and riseof Treasury securities as the Fed’smajor assetmade thegold standardunsustainable.TheU.S.dollar transitioned to the freely floating, fiatcurrency that it is today.Theperiod from1942–1975alsowitnessedseveralhistoricaleventsthataffectedtheFed’sbalancesheet.WorldWarII,theKoreanWar,andtheVietnamWarallhadasignificant impactontheFed,visibletothenakedeye ingraphs.Thebeginningsofthe“Great Inflation” presented a large test to the Federal Reserve. The stagflation during thatperiod challenged Keynesian economic thought, giving rise to the prominence ofmonetaristtheory.Postscript:AccompanyingSpreadsheetsAn accompanying spreadsheet workbook contains all the important data, graphs andcalculations associatedwith this paper. It includes the fully digitizedweekly Federal Reservebalance sheets from1942 to the endof 1975. Theworkbook also contains a bit of data notexplicitlyusedinthepaperthatstillmaybeusefultootherresearchers.Fordatafrom1942to1975,wereliedentirelyontheweeklyH.4.1statements,whichareavailablefromtheFederal

33ChenandGibson,“Insights,”accompanyingspreadsheets–FedFederalDebtsheet.34Ibid.

22

ReserveBankof St. Louis’s FRASER (FederalReserveArchival System for EconomicResearch)Website.

23

ReferencesWebreferenceswerevalidasofNovember21,2017.Anderson,RichardG.“SomeTablesofHistoricalU.S.CurrencyandMonetaryAggregatesData.”FederalReserveBankofSt.LouisWorkingPaper2003-006,April.https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2003/2003-006.pdfBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem(U.S.),1942-1975.H.4.1,FactorsAffectingBankReservesandConditionStatementofF.R.Banks.https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/83Bordo,Michael,EricMonnetandAlainNaef.“TheGoldPool(1961-1968)andtheFalloftheBrettonWoodsSystem:LessonsforCentralBankCooperation.”NBERWorkingPaperSeries,No.24016,November2017.http://papers.nber.org/tmp/78619-w24016.pdf.Chen,JustinandAndrewGibson,“InsightsfromtheFederalReserve’sWeeklyBalanceSheet,1914-1941.”JohnsHopkinsUniversity,InstituteforAppliedEconomics,GlobalHealth,andtheStudyofBusinessEnterprise,StudiesinAppliedEconomics(workingpaperseries),No.73,January2017.http://sites.krieger.jhu.edu/iae/files/2017/04/Chen_Gibson_FederalReservePaper.pdf;accompanyingspreadsheetviahttp://sites.krieger.jhu.edu/iae/working-papers/studies-in-applied-economics/Corbett,Michael.“OilShockof1973–74.”FederalReserveHistory.Nodate.www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1973_74.Friedman,Milton,andAnnaJacobsonSchwartz.AMonetaryHistoryoftheUnitedStates:1867-1960.Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963.Print.Ghizoni,SandraKollen.“CreationoftheBrettonWoodsSystem.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bretton_woods_created?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3Hanke,SteveH."StateMoneyandBankMoney:LiftingtheFogAroundQE."CatoInstitute.OriginallyinCentralBanking,6June2016.Web.19November2017.http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/state-money-bank-money-lifting-fog-aroundqeHetzel,RobertL.“FromWWIItotheTreasury-FedAccord.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/wwii_to_the_treasury_fed_accord?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3

24

Hetzel,RobertL.“LaunchoftheBrettonWoodsSystem”.FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bretton_woods_launched?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3Mahon,Joe.“BankHoldingCompanyActof1956.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank_holding_company_act_of_1956?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3Meltzer,AllanH.AHistoryoftheFederalReserve.Volume1:1913-1951.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2003.Print.Meltzer,AllanH.AHistoryoftheFederalReserve.Volume2,Book1;1951-1969.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2010.Print.Meltzer,AllanH.AHistoryoftheFederalReserve.Volume2,Book2;1970-1986.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2010.Print.Sanches,Daniel.“TheSecondWorldWarandItsAftermath.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/wwii_and_its_aftermath?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3Steelman,Aaron.“EmploymentActof1946.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/employment_act_of_1946Ramage,JosephC."TheGoldCover."EconomicQuarterly(FederalReserveBankofRichmond),July1968:7-9.19November2017.https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?toc_id=389271&filepath=/files/docs/publications/frbrichreview/rev_frbrich196807.pdf&start_page=7.Richardson,Gary.“FederalReserve’sRoleDuringWWII.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/feds_role_during_wwii?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3Romero,Jessie.“Treasury-FedAccord.”FederalReserveHistory(Website).Nodate.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/treasury_fed_accord?WT.si_n=Search&WT.si_x=3“UnemploymentRate:Aged15-64.”FRED(FederalReserveEconomicData),FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,17April2017,www.fred.stlouisfred.org/series/LRUN64TTUSA156N.