SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS: THE NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM ON REFORMERS

Mehmet Ali KARADEMİR & Didem BÜYÜKARSLAN

International Political Economy

Abstract

In our essay we discuss on the highly criticized structural adjustment loans (SALs) provided by the World Bank and IMF to the developing and least developed countries especially focusing on the period after 1970s and early 1980s. We mention academic discussion about the weaknesses and responsibilities of both borrower nations and the multilateral institutions after providing an introduction with the historical chronology of transformation especially in adjusted regions. We try to look through the subject from various angles although they are all the proves of the failure. however the criticized points and responsible side at each –or the weak points- is different from the rest. Besides discussing on the reasons of the failure we try to focus on to different basic region that were distinguished in applications –Asia and Latin America- as well as discussing the situation Africa in minor in order to see the consequences from to opposite angles in order to mace a decision on the responsibility issue.

Introduction:

‘Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize’ quotes a an international political economy professor and mentions that those ‘became mantra of a generation of technocrats…’ talking about the economic executives in 1990s who ambitiously imposed Washington Consensus ideas to developing world.1 In fact, the aggressive liberalization had started at early 1980s –even 1970s- in a transition process from Keynesian interventionist approach through a ‘market fundamentalist’ movement that aims the exploitation of or minimizing the restrictions on the free movement of the market itself. However through the 1980s –accelerated and enhanced by debt crisis- and early 1990s liberalization and privatization started to be regarded as the unique way for development and the only measure of development was the economic growth (GDP).

Furthermore the Bank and IMF were highly politicized and associated with western ‘core’ policies.2 By the way they aimed to converge ‘west &east’ or ‘north & south’ life style politically and economically, in other words, they targeted the modernization of developing country in terms of economic policies and especially imposing U.S. government type. They thought that by the help of liberalization the overall welfare would converge and the measures would equalize. Fed by the ‘consensus’ rules the structural adjustment programs asked states to provide stabilization by strict fiscal policies and to shift through a more open market especially by liberalizing the trade and capital flow. Forcing them to reduce public investment –and even trying to democratize them or interfering other sovereign issues- those international monetary institutions prevented autonomous development programs.

More interestingly some of the –maybe the most of- developing countries were willing to implement those adjustment programs. ‘such was the enthusiasm for reform in many of these countries that Williamson’s original list of do’s and don’ts came to look remarkably tame and innocuous…’ as an impressive statement especially to describe the moods of transition economies and Latin Americas.3 Most of the developing economies liberalized their financial markets and reduced trade barriers more than needed; some of them even signed free trade agreements.

However some events through and after mid 1990s created confidence crisis in World Bank conditional loans. One of the most important one is the unexpected success of ‘Asian Miracle’ which were not, by many means, ‘good boys’ for institutions that they did not implemented the adjustment programs and succeeded though. The other examples from the top can be listed as the ‘African failure’ and more significantly ‘Mexican Crisis’ in 1994 which was the only complete success of World Bank SALs. That leads some scholars to claim that ‘‘empirical evidence for huge gains from free market policies is, at best, fuzzy’’4. However we will discuss the regional consequence on detail especially for Asia and Americas later in this paper. Thus we will first focus on the reasons why the SALs failed?, what were the consequences on social and economic issues? And who were to blame for the failure? in the next section.

Measures of Failure, Success, and Consequences

It is already very obvious that the SALs failed to succeed any progress in the targets as it is accepted by the very self of the World Bank so far. The implementers could not even catch their 1990 levels in economic size or activities even after more than ten years and many other chaotic consequences both in terms of economic and social welfare forced the Bank to revise and ‘reorient’ its regulations. As stated by Rodrik (2006) it is not the point to discuss success or validity of Washington Consensus anymore; it is to define the alternative to replace it completely. However we will discuss the advices in the conclusion more detailed.

As it is clear that the SALs were not success stories we should define the weak points and failures. While observing the critiques we came across a variety of discussion all of which were interesting. The most interesting point is that it was even criticized by the orthodox liberals some of whom were the executives or researchers sponsored by WB itself. However their discussion was that the Bank couldn’t use the bullwhip effective enough and that was the reason for the failure. That is a kind of orthodox liberal view which usually puts blame on the borrower states’ domestic policies but that time the arrow was directed to World Bank applications that failed to force governments to reform. The other critiques were as we well now were affected by the basic international relation theories such as Realism, Marxism (and sub-theories) and Liberalism. And subject they discussed frequently is social and economic consequences of the adjustment programs and the reasons of those consequences.

Failure in implementation came to be matter of discussion among orthodox liberals frequently and as you may also reckon, the blame were to put on the shoulder of ‘advisee’ who failed to implement the regulations and as a small difference, on the Bank Government which could not use the bullwhip efficiently. However the so called empirical research found no regression among the success of SALs and World Bank intervention or preparation process. The one thing to be careful about the claim is that the measure of success here is the level of implementation instead of consequences and the other point is that the Bank-related factors are not taken individually to the regression modeling.

Other than the ‘usual suspects’ of liberals –such as domestic political stability, identity of governments, power distribution in domestic context, domestic regimes, or willingness to implement the reform packages etc- the weaknesses discussed here are related to the Bank. The strongest idea is that the Bank was not efficient in discriminating the recipients of loans. According to that point World Bank devoted more resources to the failed programs especially to salvage them as well as the amount of administrative resources spent for those failed (35%) programs.5 Another issue which was related to the Bank was the disbursing the full amount even if the adjustment programs were not implemented completely or even partially. They also blamed World Bank of being inconsistent in ‘punishing the non-reforming countries’. By the effects of those mentioned reasons 35% of the adjustment programs failed to be ‘adjusted’ however that didn’t attribute any responsibility to Bank on the negative consequences of the programs although the domestic regulations are still the those who ‘fell short’6; even those who implemented the reforms most efficiently.

However it is stated that ‘‘the evidence that macroeconomic policies, price distortions, financial policies… have predictable, robust and systemic effects on national growth rate is quite weak’’.7 That provides a strong opposition to the ‘empirical study’ that allocates the responsibility of failure to the domestic policies although the concept of success is different in each. A quotation from the World Bank report ‘…Learning from a Decade of Reform’ states that ‘‘When you get right down to business, there aren’t too many policies that we can say with certainty deeply and positively affect growth’’. The exact idea of that quotation derives attention of both World Bank and scholars to other points to discuss.

As the ‘check list’ of liberalization didn’t work the measures of Washington consensus was started to be questioned. The imposed or even forced-regulations to those who needed the western capital were criticized to be too straight; too standard to fit the modes of different states. Furthermore the ‘Augmented Washington Consensus’ or by other name, ‘Monterrey Consensus’ (2002) was also blamed of being straight, which tries to deal with human capital and institutional regulations as well as economic growth –although it again gives the priority to economic growth as the initiative of social welfare. The policy regulations of the Bank were so insisting that its one of the most prior exposition ‘privatization’ was ridiculously proposed for the bank itself as ‘privatization of World Bank’.

Alternatives were proposed by scholars to be implemented. Thus it was the only way of liberalizing or of developing to implement the exact expectations of the ‘consensus’. The Bank is asked to broaden its objectives of development and offer different implementations for each target. By the help of tailoring the reform efforts according the undergoing context of the countries they could address the real weakness In front of the development which was not succeeded by the standard lists. However the aim of the revised regulations, which targets institutional reforms that would provide both growth and development of social welfare of states, were approved by the scholars.

The social consequences of the adjustment, which was highly criticized led to shift from a modernist approach to a post-modern way of thinking in the utterances of the World Bank governor –although not in the operation yet. What were those social consequences? One of the most important one is the impression on the labor markets. It is believed to be that many aspects of trade and financial market liberalization leads to unemployment in domestic market (short-term capital flows, high interest rates, privatization are some of those aspects). Deagriculturalizing and domestic firms’ bankruptcy because of cheap import are other consequences which were criticized separately as well as related to labor market issues.

Besides the expectations of structural adjustment led countries to reduce the public investment on health, education, environment etc which was also related to gender inequalities (putting the burden of reduced government budget on women). ‘Race to the Bottom’ theory implies that the competitive arena created by the ambitious liberalization led to unemployment of unskilled labor both in DCs and LDCs however DCs could compensate it although LDCs fell short in increasing the social welfare. Moreover the real wage and overall output in developing countries decreased after implementing the structural adjustment programs.

Other part of the social institutions that was criticized was focused on directly the institutions. The basics of those were named as ‘institutional mismatch’ which criticizes the rigidity of structural adjustment as leading the governments to regulate policies and institutions for liberal economy although the infrastructure is not ready for that. The other was named as ‘institutional overshooting’ that implies the fact that South pays more with higher standards to attract foreign investment and to receive benefit from open market such as; higher interest rates.8 This was the part of the World Bank critique separately, in terms of institutional issues. However further discussion insists both on governmental and the Bank’s responsibility on that issue other than ‘race to the bottom’ infers.

The Bank and domestic government are criticized not to make reforms on institutions. As usual the Bank’s responsibility is to put it forward as a condition for lending. The governments are to create or regulate appropriate institutions in order to provide efficiency of policy regulations. In fact the institutional reforms are meant to be more important than the policy regulation as Rodrik expresses ‘‘policies, do not exert any independent effect on long-term economic performance once the quality of domestic institutions is included in the regression’’.

The interference on sovereignty and prevention of autonomous development, which is related to and inferred from the sub-topics we mentioned above, is the most frequently criticized general aspect of SALs. As we mentioned above the Bank forced the sovereign states to obey the imposed rules which were the exposition of North’s interests or at least their ways. This attitude led to the failure most as the techniques that were implemented in DCs didn’t fit the LDCs because of the weak points –of both the Bank and domestic governments. We will see how are the observations from different regions now which are the basic representatives of different implementations and will be able to discuss the current regulations being illuminated by the differences of consequences too.

Regional focus: implementers vs. Interventionists

As a result of monetarist economic policies in the core countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, global interest rates dramatically higher and triggered a debt crisis in the developing world. They restructure their economies to correct ``disequilibrium'' under the control of the world's two most powerful international financial institutions (IFIs), World Bank and the IMF. One of the most important targets, the stabilization phase of adjustment focuses on demand restraint policies, usually affected by large reductions in government expenditure by using tools such as subsidy removals, public sector employment as cuts, and the introduction of user fees.

Structural adjustment involves a re-organization of the real exchange rate by using devaluation, privatization, liberalization of interest rates and tax reform, reductions for import/ export barriers (removal/reduction of tariffs, quotas, and taxes) in order to improve the economy's relative trading position.

Over the ten last year period (1958-68), the Bank lending growth was not increasing significantly but the expansion of its lending to Latin America was even more substantial than most of its previous performance. The whole period extending from 1958 to 1977 stands out as a "golden era" for Latin America for its access to the Bank's resources. After 1977, the Bank's growth in Latin America became very limited due to the previous year expansion policy. In 1981-84 period, when overall Bank lending in real terms expanded at the rate of 19.8 per cent per year, whereas it’s lending to Latin America grew only at 3.5 per cent per year. Those data explain clearly the reason of the very limited grow after the “golden era”.

Regarding to the explosion of the debt crisis in 1982, the Bank repeatedly offered optimistic assessments about the ability of the developing countries to continue to accumulate and service their external debt but when the crisis emerged the Bank was slow to react and that reduced its seriousness.

The recession and the related debt crisis that hit Latin America very seriously made Bank operations become weak in that region. The sharp contraction of investment affected the World Bank's project-based operations in a contradictory way. The region's aggregate negative net transfer of resources and following decline in domestic credit availability, who have forced countries to postpone development projects.

The change in sectoral strategies also explains the decline of Latin America and the decline in total Bank lending. It is for sure that such "structural adjustment" and "sector" loans that are most appropriate for countries suffering from strong shortages of foreign exchange. The Bank also diversified into industry, especially for development finance companies and small-scale enterprises. Latin American industry was discriminated against in the beginning of the period, but at the end it was getting more than its fair share, mostly as a consequence of the growing importance of Bank lending through development finance companies in developing countries.

Third World governments, especially in Latin America, were administratively determining prices and sending signals that produced inefficient investment decisions by both public and private firms. Government prices give harm to the allocation of resources by consumers, savers, producers and investors.

The global recession reduced the demand for investment capital and the structural adjustment lending is also limited by the overall size of the Bank. To allow for Bank lending expanding to $45-50 billion over three years, the Bank management has negotiated a General Capital Increase during 1985. The new wave at some quarters of the Bank is the idea that "policy reform" and "external financing" are two alternative ways of obtaining a given growth objective: if there is more of one, there is less need for the other.

Only five countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have received structural adjustment loans: Jamaica has received three, while Bolivia, Guyana, Panama and Costa Rica have signed one each. However, the results were so far from being supporting.

The abundance of SALs in Latin America is due to the limits on both supply and demand, but the Bank has been hesitating to increase lending to some countries due to their poor credit ratings. The Bank has also been cautious about adding further debt to countries whose debt service ratios were already poor. Some Latin American countries have preferred to avoid loans that would subject their macroeconomic policies to World Bank supervision; actually anxious to rid themselves of the IMF, they have no willing to continue with outside

intervention. Latin America countries have preferred to adopted the Special Action Program (SAP) instead of being controlled by the IMF

The Bank's approach to policy making ought to be much more experimental and country-based than the existing one. Unless it expands its staff enormously, which seems unlikely, the Bank will not have enough trained professionals to deal at an operational level with the huge and specific development problems of each of its member countries, especially Latin America countries; who is a region who need a lot of intention. Consequently, the pursuit of the present course towards policy-based loans can only lead the Bank to a subordinate role to the IMF. This suggests that the Bank’s cooperation may be important to Latin America for restructure the formers structural adjustment programs, provided that a set of sensible proposals is put forward for negotiation.

The Bank's decision to increase balance of payments responded to the current needs of many developing countries. A number of additional reforms should be considered to lead the program effectively.

Contrarily to the other regions of the world, East and Southeast Asia looks like they had benefited from the globalization quite well.

When we look to the liberal economy process and the specific of that region, it’s easy to say that this was not a miracle but was rather a burst of growth. The region is separated onto two deferent part; the ``first-tier'' East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) and the ``second-tier'' Southeast Asian NICs (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand). Most of the Asian NICs, and especially those of Southeast Asia, are generally a part of ``Chinese network of capital'' which links it to the important markets of China. Historical links with Japan made also the growing trade with most dynamic post-war economies .The Asian NICs also benefited from very important financial help of US military and economic aid. By the 1980s the ``second-tier NICs'' received massive Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) because of their regional specifics and their low wages advantages.

In Thailand the declining rate of profit in manufacturing led to open a new door for capital, but at first caused to capital changing between sectors. .As a short history of its crisis, the baht informally pegged to the US dollar to ignore the risks of rapid and unpredictable currency depreciation brings along. Unfortunately, this prevention caused to an overvalued baht. The decrease in export competitiveness, expulsing current account deficit actually gave the signals of breaking about the crisis.

The decrease of the yen compared to the dollar from 1995 put some pressure on the ``first-tier'' NICs as Japanese exports became more competitive. As part of helped by the US economical liberalization efforts in the 1990s, the South Korean government abandoned its control over large-scale investments that had been used to prevent excess competition domestically. This resulted in excess capacity in such key sectors as cars, ships, steel, petrochemicals and semi-conductors.

In Indonesia the structural adjustment process has been even more challenging due to the political crisis that they had. Structural adjustment in Indonesia also followed by exchange rate flexibility, state expenditure reductions, financial sector restructuring, wage discipline, and privatization/.This, for sure, make the connection more open between economics and politics.

In Korea, industrial bankruptcies were also driven by excessive and short-term foreign borrowing by banks and firms, as a result of capital account liberalization in the 1990s, a problem also seen in Thailand. Two of the most desirable factors in developing countries are; reduce the level of unemployment and make economies more variable so that they are better able to resist to external shocks which led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and an important increase in the current account deficit. An important key for the SAP was to benefit of Korean powerful labor unions to improved their labor market flexibility'. The strong resistance of Korean labor to such demands was met by bringing it to the table in tri-partite. As in Thailand, the economic situation in Korea deteriorated more rapidly than expected in 1998, with a nearly 7% decline in GDP. Much of this deficit was the result of increased spending in support of financial sector restructuring, along with support for small and medium sized enterprises and export promotion.

Mexico's experience with SAPs was not so different from other examples. They were using import substitutions as a strategy against the debt crisis. Mexico applied SAPs for six years in 90s. Contrarily to assumption this resulted in a change to import oriented industrialization. From the late-1980s the share of foreign direct to portfolio investment in Mexico declined dramatically. Mexico was able to attract foreign investment because it had previously met all the IMF conditions, and, as in many of the Asian NICs, the Mexican government pegged the peso to the US dollar.

Problems of dependency are likely to be much more in Thailand and Indonesia, which have relatively basic levels of technology development and will be increasingly dominated by the decisions of transnational companies.

In Latin America it was a kind of disappointment for the structural adjustment policies of authoritarian governments which was partly responsible for the shift towards electoral democracy in East and Southeast Asia as the structural adjustment may lead to democratic reversals, rather than democratization.

As a result of the contraction in private capital markets and the expansion in its own lending, the World Bank has become a more significant source of funds for Latin America. However, the Bank has had difficulty paid funds because the region's financial crisis has reduced the availability of investment projects and of counterpart funds. SALs and sector loans have not, by the way, played as constructive and important a role in Latin America as their potential allows. They have been restricted by several limits regarding their funding and the content of the accompanying conditionality. In order to facilitate the adjustment process, the Bank should intensity its efforts to increase the flow of private capital to developing countries through selective expansion of its co financing, guarantee and insurance schemes. In addition, the Bank should consider decentralizing its operation in order to place staff in closer touch with governments and thereby improve the quality of policy dialogues. For their part, the developing countries should more take care in the appointment of their Executive and Alternative Directors, to insure a greater quality and continuity of expertise and leadership.

Is the Bank changing?:

Having faced the negative effects of the structural adjustments especially in Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa; the World Bank decided to reform itself –or they were forced to do so. Prior to the transformation is the collapse of the system in Latin America and most other ‘adjusted areas’. Thus it was understood that a fixed list of ‘do’s and don’ts can work well everywhere however this realization could not achieve an operational acceptance although the need for institutional reform led the Bank through revision of the Washington consensus.

Thus the institution gave priority to the creation or reformation of the institutes that would provide the security and efficiency of the liberal market conditions. Some aspects like ‘security of property rights’ came to be important predictors in terms of investment and development. Market fundamentalism lost its priority to ‘institutions fundamentalism’ and privatization also lost insistence by the acceptance of the ‘market failure’. States’ importance (willingness to develop and logical intervention esp.) gained importance.

Moreover the most important differentiation in the concept was the broadening the objectives of development shifting from being focused on economic growth. The consequences especially in Africa led the executives to think more deeply in social welfare. Therefore the restrictions on public investments were relaxed in some occasions, being affected by the cross-border activists. The radical reduction in the welfare and increasing poverty levels provided international forums through the late 1990s and protests against those multilateral organizations aimed ‘‘to erode the intellectual and political underpinnings of current order’9 and they were successful in it to some extend that World Bank proposed an accelerated move to create a dialog and collaboration mood with NGOs seriously –especially with those so called reformists. Thus they understood that growth in itself was not enough to measure the development although most interestingly the existing measure also didn’t show any remarkable positive consequence.

Getting in to a new start through ‘fifty years enough’ campaigns the newly proposed order included the social welfare , reduction gender discrimination and income inequality led by the adjustment programs and other independent variables too. The importance of GDP, which was the temple of ‘growth’, is replaced by HDI (human development index) that included the availability of public social services and purchasing power of the population to the measure. Investment on human capital by proper and available education, life expectancy at birth etc gained priority in estimating the level of development and growth. The replacement of ‘material aspects’ with ‘non-material aspects’ can be regarded as post-modern movement in the new order. However those proposals stayed as a positive start for a long time and no significant operational action occurred till recently. Furthermore the economic growth maintained priority in action as it was regarded to be the initiative for the proposed ‘holistic’ development.

Conclusion and Advices:

We can obviously observe a trend in which the interventionist liberalism increases and looses dominance in international economy and restarts to gain its importance, starting from the post-war period through structural adjustment era and rapid crisis in Latin America, Asia as well as Russia and Turkey till recently. Sociology’s dominance over discussion of development in developing and poorest countries ( Sarah Babb 2005) also shows the similar trend with interventionist approach. The chaotic mood of limitless liberalization gives their dominance back gradually. However their suggestions could not still gain an important ground policies yet (maybe after the discussions on the Global Financial Crisis 2007-08). Up until the early 2000s it is clearly proved that the SALs were failure from many vantage points.

First of all, they prevent the autonomous development programs as well as they do not provide any tailored offer for different needs and interests. We can resemble the institution to a shoe maker which produces a color and a unique size of a pair of shoes to fit each foot around. Let alone the interests of the states they do not even consider about needs –whether it is cold or hot to wear their shoes- not even their size. In a context where there are few other

alternatives around which are no efficient in capacity or not available because of the monopoly created by the Bank and the Fund and their cross conditionality, most of the countries are obliged to wear the shoes produced by them accepting the case to lose their foot health by a small size or falling to the ground with a loose one. If they are lucky or have a bargaining power they may have a more proper one if not able to have the certain solution for themselves. Trying to create a uniform policy environment all over the universe was not logical, of course, and expecting the same performance and capabilities from each by artificial regulations could not be feasible. Transforming the ‘structural adjustment programs’ into ‘comprehensive development framework’ as a more ‘holistic’ approach as Pender states (2001) the Bank increased the amount of variety of sizes and identified itself as the ‘image advisor’ (knowledge bank) and the customer as the ‘owner of the process’ and gives a minor decision right on the size however ‘if you don’t wear the color I advice you, I won’t sell the shoes’ is the threatening mood between the lines.

A logical solution for the straightness of the programs in terms of conditionality comes from Dani Rodrik who puts priority to the analytical preparation for each target country. He advices three step action: first to figure out the most significant constraints in front of the growth, than prepare a creative policy design that targets the point and finally institutionalize the process10. That was the basic idea that inspired the World Bank report ‘Learning from a Decade of Reform’ which revised the Washington Consensus and gave importance to the institutional reform although it couldn’t gain the flexibility that purposed by Rodrik (2006). Supporting idea is discussed by Sarah Babb too (2005) as one of the most problematic issues in the liberalization process is the ‘political mismatch’ that can be understood both as the conflict between the old and new institutions and as the conflict between the existing institutions and the new policy reforms. As a complex system, human’s social life can’t be standardized as well as it can not be treated by medicines; each state has different sickness and the significance of each sickness is distinguished. Therefore they should be treated with great consciousness and ‘conscience’ as careful as a doctor who is responsible on human life.

One of the other issues, to be discussed in this section is the insistence of limitless liberalization separate from the subject we mentioned above. The uncontrolled liberalization of trade and especially financial industry led developing countries to deteriorate their domestic output and social welfare – the increasing unemployment, reduction in public investment etc. the income inequality was one of the data which implies the corrupted nature of the order that is imposed. Therefore the states should be left more autonomous in their policy regulations at least to compensate the losses of the poor that are led by the liberalization of the market.

The government should be more interested in public investment in social services and give up ‘race to the bottom’ mode to attract foreign investment that leads the countries to lose level of welfare by the real wage decrease, deterioration of equality and social institutions. As it is observed in empirical works, the liberalization process adopted by the adjustment regions dramatically coincides a corruption in the quality of democracy although the theoretical or technical aspects of democratization are met highly on the contrary. Moreover the liberalization process –though it led the wage decrease in DCs as well as LDCs especially of those unskilled labor and reduction social institutions- costs much higher in LDCs as they couldn’t compensate the losses in terms of social welfare. The reason is that, LDCs were the recipients of the aid and who needed capital, while DCs were donors. Therefore we can easily infer from the order’s regulation to the benefits of the donors that the institutions were highly politicized and associated with the North. However the –most crucial maybe- the problem is the Bank’s and other institutions’ meeting the expectations of being ‘‘international’’.

References:

1) Dani Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

2) John Pender- From ‘Structural Adjustment’ to ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’: Conditionality Transformed? 2001

3) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

4) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

5)Dollar&Swensson- What Explains the Success or Failure of SAPs? 1998

6) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

7) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

8)Babb- Social Consequences of Structural Adjustments 2005

9) Sarah Babb- Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment 2005

10) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006