String Analysis for Dependable Input Validation

String Analysis for Dependable Input ValidationTevfik BultanVerification Lab

Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

[email protected] http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~vlab

VLab String Analysis Publications

With my students Fang Yu and Muath Alkhalaf•Verifying Client-Side Input Validation Functions Using String Analysis [ICSE’12]•Patching Vulnerabilities with Sanitization Synthesis [ICSE’11]•Relational String Verification Using Multi-Track Automata [IJFCS’11], [CIAA’10].•String Abstractions for String Verification [SPIN’11]•Stranger: An Automata-based String Analysis Tool for PHP [TACAS’10]•Generating Vulnerability Signatures for String Manipulating Programs Using Automata-based Forward and Backward Symbolic Analyses [ASE’09]•Symbolic String Verification: Combining String Analysis and Size Analysis [TACAS’09]•Symbolic String Verification: An Automata-based Approach [SPIN’08]

Web Software Everywhere• Commerce, entertainment, social interaction

• We will rely on web apps more in the future

• Web apps + cloud will make desktop apps obsolete

Road Block: Dependability

• Web applications are not dependable!

• As web applications are becoming increasingly dominant – and as their use in safety critical areas is increasing

• their dependability is becoming a critical issue

• Web applications are especially notorious for security vulnerabilities – Their global accessibility makes them a target for many malicious

users

Vulnerabilities in Web Applications

• There are many well-known security vulnerabilities that exist in many web applications. Here are some examples:– Malicious file execution: where a malicious user causes the

server to execute malicious code– SQL injection: where a malicious user executes SQL commands

on the back-end database by providing specially formatted input– Cross site scripting (XSS): causes the attacker to execute a

malicious script at a user’s browser

• These vulnerabilities are typically due to – errors in user input validation or – lack of user input validation

Why Is Input Validation Error-prone?

• Extensive string manipulation:– Web applications use extensive string manipulation

• To construct html pages, to construct database queries in SQL, etc.

– The user input comes in string form and must be validated and sanitized before it can be used

• This requires the use of complex string manipulation functions such as string-replace

– String manipulation is error prone

String Related VulnerabilitiesString related web application vulnerabilities as a percentage of all vulnerabilities (reported by CVE)

OWASP Top 10 in 2007:1.Cross Site Scripting2.Injection Flaws

OWASP Top 10 in 2010:1.Injection Flaws2.Cross Site Scripting

String Related Vulnerabilities String related web application vulnerabilities occur when:

a sensitive function is passed a malicious string input from the user

This input contains an attack It is not properly sanitized before it reaches the sensitive function

String analysis: Discover these vulnerabilities automatically

XSS Vulnerability A PHP Example:

1:<?php2: $www = $_GET[”www”];3: $l_otherinfo = ”URL”;4: echo ”<td>” . $l_otherinfo . ”: ” . $www . ”</td>”;5:?>

The echo statement in line 4 is a sensitive function It contains a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability

<script ...

Is It Vulnerable? A simple taint analysis can report this segment vulnerable using taint

propagation

1:<?php2: $www = $_GET[”www”];3: $l_otherinfo = ”URL”;4: echo ”<td>” . $l_otherinfo . ”: ” .$www. ”</td>”;5:?>

echo is tainted → script is vulnerable

tainted

How to Fix it? To fix the vulnerability we added a sanitization routine at line s Taint analysis will assume that $www is untainted and report that the

segment is NOT vulnerable

1:<?php2: $www = $_GET[”www”];3: $l_otherinfo = ”URL”;s: $www = ereg_replace(”[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://]”,””,$www);4: echo ”<td>” . $l_otherinfo . ”: ” .$www. ”</td>”;5:?>

tainted

untainted

Is It Really Sanitized?

1:<?php2: $www = $_GET[”www”];3: $l_otherinfo = ”URL”;s: $www = ereg_replace(”[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://]”,””,$www);4: echo ”<td>” . $l_otherinfo . ”: ” .$www. ”</td>”;5:?>

<script ...

Sanitization Routines are Erroneous The sanitization statement is not correct!

ereg_replace(”[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://]”,””,$www); – Removes all characters that are not in { A-Za-z0-9 .-@:/ }– .-@ denotes all characters between “.” and “@” (including “<”

and “>”)– “.-@” should be “.\-@”

This example is from a buggy sanitization routine used in MyEasyMarket-4.1 (line 218 in file trans.php)

String Analysis String analysis determines all possible values that a string expression

can take during any program execution

Using string analysis we can identify all possible input values of the sensitive functions

Then we can check if inputs of sensitive functions can contain attack strings

How can we characterize attack strings? Use regular expressions to specify the attack patterns

Attack pattern for XSS: Σ <scriptΣ∗ ∗

Vulnerabilities can be Tricky

• Input <!sc+rip!t ...> does not match the attack pattern – but it matches the vulnerability signature – and it can cause an attack

• 1:<?php• 2: $www = <!sc+rip!t ...>;• 3: $l otherinfo = ”URL”;• s: $www = ereg replace(”[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://]”,””, <!sc+rip!t...>);• 4: echo ”<td>” . $l otherinfo . ”: ” . <script ...> .”</td>”;• 5:?>

String Analysis If string analysis determines that the intersection of the attack pattern

and possible inputs of the sensitive function is empty then we can conclude that the program is secure

If the intersection is not empty, then we can again use string analysis to generate a vulnerability signature

characterizes all malicious inputs

Given Σ <scriptΣ∗ ∗ as an attack pattern: The vulnerability signature for $_GET[”www”] is

Σ <α sα cα rα iα pα tΣ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗where α∉ { A-Za-z0-9 .-@:/ }

Automata-based String Analysis

• Finite State Automata can be used to characterize sets of string values

• We use automata based string analysis– Associate each string expression in the program with an automaton– The automaton accepts an over approximation of all possible

values that the string expression can take during program execution

• Using this automata representation we symbolically execute the program, only paying attention to string manipulation operations

Input Validation Verification Stages

Parser/Parser/Taint AnalysisTaint Analysis

Vulnerability AnalysisVulnerability Analysis

Signature GenerationSignature Generation

AttackPatterns

Application/Scripts

VulnerabilitySignature

(Tainted) Dependency Graphs

Patch SynthesisPatch Synthesis

Sanitization Statements

Reachable Attack Strings

Combining Forward & Backward Analyses

Convert PHP programs to dependency graphs Combine symbolic forward and backward symbolic reachability

analyses Forward analysis

Assume that the user input can be any string Propagate this information on the dependency graph When a sensitive function is reached, intersect with attack pattern

Backward analysis If the intersection is not empty, propagate the result backwards to

identify which inputs can cause an attack

Front Front EndEnd

ForwardForwardAnalysisAnalysis

BackwardBackwardAnalysisAnalysis

Attackpatterns

PHPProgram

VulnerabilitySignatures

Dependency Graphs

Given a PHP program,

first construct the:

Dependency graph

1:<?php2: $www = $ GET[”www”];3: $l_otherinfo = ”URL”;4: $www = ereg_replace(

”[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://]”,””,$www);

5: echo $l_otherinfo . ”: ” .$www;

6:?>echo, 5

str_concat, 5

$www, 4

“”, 4

preg_replace, 4

[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://], 4 $www, 2

$_GET[www], 2

“: “, 5$l_otherinfo, 3

“URL”, 3

str_concat, 5

Dependency Graph

Forward Analysis

• Using the dependency graph we conduct vulnerability analysis • Automata-based forward symbolic analysis that identifies the possible

values of each node– Each node in the dependency graph is associated with a DFA

• DFA accepts an over-approximation of the strings values that the string expression represented by that node can take at runtime

• The DFAs for the input nodes accept Σ∗– Intersecting the DFA for the sink nodes with the DFA for the attack

pattern identifies the vulnerabilities• Uses post-image computations of string operations:

– postConcat(M1, M2)

returns M, where M=M1.M2– postReplace(M1, M2, M3)

returns M, where M=replace(M1, M2, M3)

Forward Analysis

echo, 5

str_concat, 5

$www, 4

“”, 4

preg_replace, 4

[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://], 4 $www, 2

$_GET[www], 2

“: “, 5$l_otherinfo, 3

“URL”, 3

str_concat, 5

Forward = URL: [A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*


Forward = [A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*


Forward = Σ*Forward = εForward = [Â-Za-z0-9 .-@/]

Forward = Σ*

Forward = :

Forward = URL

Forward = URL

Forward = URL:

L(URL: [A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]*<[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*)

Attack Pattern = Σ*<Σ*

∩

≠ Ø

L(URL: [A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*) =L(Σ*<Σ*)

Resulting Automaton

U

R

L

:

Space

<

[A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]

URL: [A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]*<[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*

[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]

Symbolic Automata Representation

• We use the MONA DFA Package for automata manipulation – [Klarlund and Møller, 2001]

• Compact Representation:– Canonical form and– Shared BDD nodes

• Efficient MBDD Manipulations:– Union, Intersection, and Emptiness Checking– Projection and Minimization

• Cannot Handle Nondeterminism:– We used dummy bits to encode nondeterminism

Symbolic Automata Representation

Explicit DFArepresentation

Symbolic DFArepresentation

Widening

• String verification problem is undecidable

• The forward fixpoint computation is not guaranteed to converge in the presence of loops and recursion

• We compute a sound approximation– During fixpoint we compute an over approximation of the least

fixpoint that corresponds to the reachable states

• We use an automata based widening operation to over-approximate the fixpoint– Widening operation over-approximates the union operations and

accelerates the convergence of the fixpoint computation

Widening

Given a loop such as

1:<?php2: $var = “head”;3: while (. . .){4: $var = $var . “tail”;5: }6: echo $var7:?>

Our forward analysis with widening would compute that the value of the variable $var in line 6 is (head)(tail)*

Backward Analysis

• A vulnerability signature is a characterization of all malicious inputs that can be used to generate attack strings

• We identify vulnerability signatures using an automata-based backward symbolic analysis starting from the sink node

• Pre-image computations on string operations:– preConcatPrefix(M, M2)

returns M1 and where M = M1.M2– preConcatSuffix(M, M1)

returns M2, where M = M1.M2– preReplace(M, M2, M3)

returns M1, where M=replace(M1, M2, M3)

Backward Analysis

echo, 5

str_concat, 5

$www, 4

“”, 4

preg_replace, 4

[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://], 4 $www, 2

$_GET[www], 2

“: “, 5

$l_otherinfo, 3

“URL”, 3

str_concat, 5


Backward = URL: [A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]*<[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*


Backward = URL: [A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]*<[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*


Backward =[A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]*<[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*


Backward = [A-Za-z0-9 .-;=-@/]*<[A-Za-z0-9 .-@/]*

Forward = Σ*

Backward = [^<]*<Σ*

Forward = ε

Backward = Do not care

Forward = [Â-Za-z0-9 .-@/]


Forward = Σ*

Backward = [^<]*<Σ*

Forward = :


Forward = URL


Forward = URL


Forward = URL:


node 3 node 6

node 10

node 11

node 12

Vulnerability Signature = [^<]*<Σ*Vulnerability Signature = [^<]*<Σ*

Vulnerability Signature Automaton

[^<]*<Σ*

<

[^<]

Σ

Non-ASCII

Vulnerability Signatures

• The vulnerability signature is the result of the input node, which includes all possible malicious inputs

• An input that does not match this signature cannot exploit the vulnerability

• After generating the vulnerability signature– Can we generate a patch based on the vulnerability signature?

The vulnerability signature automaton for the running example

[^<]

<

Σ

Patches from Vulnerability Signatures

• Main idea: – Given a vulnerability signature automaton, find a cut that separates

initial and accepting states– Remove the characters in the cut from the user input to sanitize

• This means, that if we just delete “<“ from the user input, then the vulnerability can be removed

[^<]

<

Σ

min-cut is {<}

Patches from Vulnerability Signatures

• Ideally, we want to modify the input (as little as possible) so that it does not match the vulnerability signature

• Given a DFA, an alphabet cut is – a set of characters that after ”removing” the edges that are

associated with the characters in the set, the modified DFA does not accept any non-empty string

• Finding a minimal alphabet cut of a DFA is an NP-hard problem (one can reduce the vertex cover problem to this problem)– We use a min-cut algorithm instead – The set of characters that are associated with the edges of the min

cut is an alphabet cut • but not necessarily the minimum alphabet cut

Automatically Generated Patch

Automatically generated patch will make sure that no string that matches the attack pattern reaches the sensitive function

<?php

if (preg match(’/[^ <]*<.*/’,$ GET[”www”]))

$ GET[”www”] = preg replace(<,””,$ GET[”www”]); $www = $_GET[”www”]; $l_otherinfo = ”URL”; $www = ereg_replace(”[Â-Za-z0-9 .-@://]”,””,$www); echo ”<td>” . $l_otherinfo . ”: ” .$www. ”</td>”;?>

Experiments

• We evaluated our approach on five vulnerabilities from three open source web applications:

(1) MyEasyMarket-4.1: A shopping cart program

(2) BloggIT-1.0: A blog engine

(3) proManager-0.72: A project management system

• We used the following XSS attack pattern:

Σ∗<scriptΣ∗

Forward Analysis Results

• The dependency graphs of these benchmarks are simplified based on the sinks– Unrelated parts are removed using slicing

Input Results

#nodes #edges #sinks #inputs Time(s) Mem (kb) #states/#bdds

21 20 1 1 0.08 2599 23/219

29 29 1 1 0.53 13633 48/495

25 25 1 2 0.12 1955 125/1200

23 22 1 1 0.12 4022 133/1222

25 25 1 1 0.12 3387 125/1200

Backward Analysis Results

• We use the backward analysis to generate the vulnerability signatures– Backward analysis starts from the vulnerable sinks identified during

forward analysis

Input Results

#nodes #edges #sinks #inputs Time(s) Mem (kb) #states/#bdds

21 20 1 1 0.46 2963 9/199

29 29 1 1 41.03 1859767 811/8389

25 25 1 2 2.35 5673 20/302,20/302

23 22 1 1 2.33 32035 91/1127

25 25 1 1 5.02 14958 20/302

Alphabet Cuts

• We generate alphabet cuts from the vulnerability signatures using a min-cut algorithm

• Problem: When there are two user inputs the patch will block everything and delete everything– Overlooks the relations among input variables (e.g., the

concatenation of two inputs contains < SCRIPT)

Input Results

#nodes #edges #sinks #inputs AlphabetCut

21 20 1 1 {<}

29 29 1 1 {S,’,”}

25 25 1 2 Σ , Σ

23 22 1 1 {<,’,”}

25 25 1 1 {<,’,”}

Vulnerabilitysignaturedepends ontwo inputs

Relational String Analysis

• Instead of using multiple single-track DFAs use one multi-track DFA– Each track represents the values of one string variable

• Using multi-track DFAs:– Identifies the relations among string variables– Generates relational vulnerability signatures for multiple user inputs

of a vulnerable application– Improves the precision of the path-sensitive analysis– Proves properties that depend on relations among string variables,

e.g., $file = $usr.txt

Multi-track Automata

• Let X (the first track), Y (the second track), be two string variables• λ is a padding symbol• A multi-track automaton that encodes X = Y.txt

(a,a), (b,b) …

(t,λ) (x,λ) (t,λ)

Relational Vulnerability Signature

• We perform forward analysis using multi-track automata to generate relational vulnerability signatures

• Each track represents one user input– An auxiliary track represents the values of the current node– We intersect the auxiliary track with the attack pattern upon

termination


• Consider a simple example having multiple user inputs

<?php

1: $www = $_GET[”www”];

2: $url = $_GET[”url”];

3: echo $url. $www;

?>

• Let the attack pattern be Σ < Σ ∗ ∗


• A multi-track automaton: ($url, $www, aux)• Identifies the fact that the concatenation of two inputs contains <

(a,λ,a),(b,λ,b),… (<,λ,<)

(λ,a,a),(λ,b,b),…

(λ,a,a),(λ,b,b),…

(λ,<,<)

(λ,<,<)

(λ,a,a),(λ,b,b),…

(λ,a,a),(λ,b,b),…

(a,λ,a),(b,λ,b),…


• Project away the auxiliary variable• Find the min-cut• This min-cut identifies the alphabet cuts {<} for the first track ($url) and

{<} for the second track ($www)

(a,λ),(b,λ),… (<,λ)

(λ,a),(λ,b),…

(λ,a),(λ,b),…

(λ,<)

(λ,<)

(λ,a),(λ,b),…

(λ,a),(λ,b),…

(a,λ),(b,λ),…

min-cut is {<},{<}

Patch for Multiple Inputs

• Patch: If the inputs match the signature, delete its alphabet cut

<?php

if (preg match(’/[^ <]*<.*/’, $ GET[”url”].$ GET[”www”]))

{

$ GET[”url”] = preg replace(<,””,$ GET[”url”]);

$ GET[”www”] = preg replace(<,””,$ GET[”www”]);

}

1: $www = $ GET[”www”];

2: $url = $ GET[”url”];

3: echo $url. $www;

?>

Technical Issues

• To conduct relational string analysis, we need to compute ”intersection” of multi-track automata– Intersection is closed under aligned multi-track automata

• λs are right justified in all tracks, e.g., abλλ instead of aλbλ– However, there exist unaligned multi-track automata that are not

describable by aligned ones– We propose an alignment algorithm that constructs aligned

automata which over or under approximate unaligned ones

Other Technical Issues

• Modeling Word Equations:– Intractability of X = cZ:

• The number of states of the corresponding aligned multi-track DFA is exponential to the length of c.

– Irregularity of X = YZ:• X = YZ is not describable by an aligned multi-track automata

• We propose a conservative analysis– We construct multi-track automata that over or under-approximate

the word equations

Composite Analysis

• What I have talked about so far focuses only on string contents– It does not handle constraints on string lengths– It cannot handle comparisons among integer variables and string

lengths

• We extended our string analysis techniques to analyze systems that have unbounded string and integer variables

• We proposed a composite static analysis approach that combines string analysis and size analysis

Size Analysis

• Size Analysis: The goal of size analysis is to provide properties about string lengths– It can be used to discover buffer overflow vulnerabilities

• Integer Analysis: At each program point, statically compute the possible states of the values of all integer variables.– These infinite states are symbolically over-approximated as linear

arithmetic constraints that can be represented as an arithmetic automaton

• Integer analysis can be used to perform size analysis by representing lengths of string variables as integer variables.

An Example

• Consider the following segment:

1: <?php

2: $www = $ GET[”www”];

3: $l otherinfo = ”URL”;

4: $www = ereg replace(”[Â-Za-z0-9 ./-@://]”,””,$www);

5: if(strlen($www) < $limit)

6: echo ”<td>” . $l otherinfo . ”: ” . $www . ”</td>”;

7:?>

• If we perform size analysis solely, after line 4, we do not know the length of $www

• If we perform string analysis solely, at line 5, we cannot check/enforce the branch condition.

Composite Analysis

• We need a composite analysis that combines string analysis with size analysis.– Challenge: How to transfer information between string automata

and arithmetic automata?

• A string automaton is a single-track DFA that accepts a regular language, whose length forms a semi-linear set– For example: {4, 6} {2 + 3k | k ≥ 0}∪

• The unary encoding of a semi-linear set is uniquely identified by a unary automaton

• The unary automaton can be constructed by replacing the alphabet of a string automaton with a unary alphabet

Arithmetic Automata

• An arithmetic automaton is a multi-track DFA, where each track represents the value of one variable over a binary alphabet

• If the language of an arithmetic automaton satisfies a Presburger formula, the value of each variable forms a semi-linear set

• The semi-linear set is accepted by the binary automaton that projects away all other tracks from the arithmetic automaton

Connecting the Dots

• We developed novel algorithms to convert unary automata to binary automata and vice versa

• Using these conversion algorithms we can conduct a composite analysis that subsumes size analysis and string analysis

StringAutomata

Unary LengthAutomata

Binary LengthAutomata

ArithmeticAutomata

Stranger: A String Analysis Tool

– Uses Pixy [Jovanovic et al., 2006] as a PHP front end– Uses MONA [Klarlund and Møller, 2001] automata package for

automata manipulation

ParserParser

DependencyDependencyAnalyzerAnalyzer

StringString AnalyzerAnalyzer

MONA Automata MONA Automata PackagePackage

Automata BasedAutomata BasedString ManipulationString Manipulation

LibraryLibrary

CFG

DependencyGraphs

Symbolic String AnalysisSymbolic String Analysis

DFAs

Pixy Front EndPixy Front EndString/Automata

Operations

Stranger Automata

Vulnerability Signatures+ Patches

PHP program

Attackpatterns

Stranger is available at:www.cs.ucsb.edu/~vlab/stranger

Case Study Schoolmate 1.5.4

Number of PHP files: 63 Lines of code: 8181

Forward Analysis results

After manual inspection we found the following:

Actual Vulnerabilities False Positives

105 48

Time Memory Number of XSS sensitive sinks

Number of XSS Vulnerabilities

22 minutes 281 MB 898 153

Case Study – False Positives Why false positives?

– Path insensitivity: 39 Path to vulnerable program point is not feasible

– Un-modeled built in PHP functions : 6– Unfound user written functions: 3

– PHP programs have more than one execution entry point

– We can remove all these false positives by extending our analysis to a path sensitive analysis and modeling more PHP functions

Case Study - Sanitization We patched all actual vulnerabilities by adding sanitization routines

We ran stranger the second time– Stranger proved that our patches are correct with respect to the

attack pattern we are using

Related Work: String Analysis

• String analysis based on context free grammars: [Christensen et al., SAS’03] [Minamide, WWW’05]

• String analysis based on symbolic/concolic execution: [Bjorner et al., TACAS’09]

• Bounded string analysis : [Kiezun et al., ISSTA’09]• Automata based string analysis: [Xiang et al., COMPSAC’07]

[Shannon et al., MUTATION’07]• Application of string analysis to web applications: [Wassermann and

Su, PLDI’07, ICSE’08] [Halfond and Orso, ASE’05, ICSE’06]

Related Work

• Size Analysis– Size analysis: [Hughes et al., POPL’96] [Chin et al., ICSE’05] [Yu et

al., FSE’07] [Yang et al., CAV’08]– Composite analysis: [Bultan et al., TOSEM’00] [Xu et al., ISSTA’08]

[Gulwani et al., POPL’08] [Halbwachs et al., PLDI’08]

• Vulnerability Signature Generation– Test input/Attack generation: [Wassermann et al., ISSTA’08]

[Kiezun et al., ICSE’09]– Vulnerability signature generation: [Brumley et al., S&P’06]

[Brumley et al., CSF’07] [Costa et al., SOSP’07]

THE END

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String Analysis for Dependable Input Validation