Strike cases in labor

8/12/2019 Strike cases in labor

1/51

epublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 161596 February 20, 2013

ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO,Petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONALPHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

As an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or supplant an adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course. It is the inadequacy of a remedy in the ordinarycourse of law that determines whether certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.

The Case

The petitioners implore the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA)promulgated on May 30, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 entitled Roberto Bordomeo, AnecitoCupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena v. Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employmentand International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,dismissing their petition for certiorari by which they hadassailed the Order2issued on July 4, 2001 by Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department ofLabor and Employment (DOLE), to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Office dated March 27, 1998 STANDS and having become finaland having been fully executed, completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case.

No further motion shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.3

and the CAs resolution promulgated on October 30, 2003, denying their motion for reconsideration.

In effect, the Court is being called upon again to review the March 27, 1998 order issued by theDOLE Secretary in response to the petitioners demand for the execution in full of the final orders ofthe DOLE issued on December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 arising from the labor dispute in

International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI).

Antecedents

In 1989, the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union), representing the workers, had abargaining deadlock with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strikeand IPI ordering a lockout.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt1


2/51

On December 26, 1990, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, DOLE Secretary Ruben D.Torres rendered the following Decision,4to wit:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. finding the IPI Employees Union-ALU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file

employees of ALU including sales personnel;

2. dismissing, for lack of merit, the charges of contempt filed by the Union against the IPIofficials and reiterating our strict directive for a restoration of the status quo ante the strike ashereinbefore discussed;

3. dismissing the Unions complaint against the Company for unfair labor practice throughrefusal to bargain;

4. dismissing the IPI petition to declare the strike of the Union as illegal; and

5. directing the IPI Employees Union-ALU and the International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to

enter into their new CBA, incorporating therein the dispositions hereinbefore stated. All otherprovisions in the old CBA not otherwise touched upon in these proceedings are, likewise, tobe incorporated in the new CBA.

SO ORDERED.5

Resolving the parties ensuing respective motions for reconsideration or clarification,6SecretaryTorres rendered on December 5, 1991 another ruling,7disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the forgoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the motions for reconsideration filed by the International Pharmaceutical, Inc.

and the Workers Trade Alliance Unions (WATU) for lack of merit;

2. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions with fullbackwages reckoned from 8 December 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniorityrights and other benefits the "affected workers" herein-below listed:

1. Reynaldo C. Menor

2. Geronimo S. Banquirino

3. Rogelio Saberon

4. Estefanio G. Maderazo

5. Herbert G. Veloso

6. Rogelio G. Enricoso

7. Colito Virtudazo
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt4


3/51

8. Gilbert Encontro

9. Bebiano Pancho

10. Merlina Gomez

11. Lourdes Mergal

12. Anecito Cupta

13. Prescillano O. Naquines

14. Alejandro O. Rodriguez

15. Godofredo Delposo

16. Jovito Jayme

17. Emma L. Lana

18. Koannia M. Tangub

19. Violeta Pancho

20. Roberto Bordomeo

21. Mancera Vevincio

22. Caesar Sigfredo

23. Trazona Roldan

24. Carmelita Ygot

25. Gregorio Barredo

26. Dario Abella

27. Artemio Pepito

28. Anselmo Tareman

29. Merope Lozada

30. Agapito Mayorga

31. Narciso M. Leyson

32. Ananias Dinolan


4/51

33. Cristy L. Caybot

34. Johnnelito S. Corilla

35. Noli Silo

36. Danilo Palioto

37. Winnie dela Cruz

38. Edgar Montecillo

39. Pompio Senador

40. Ernesto Palomar

41. Reynante Germininano

42. Pelagio Arnaiz

43. Ireneo Russiana

44. Benjamin Gellangco, Jr.

45. Nestor Ouano (listed in paragraphs 1 & 9 of the IPI Employees Union- ALUsSupplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991)

3. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions thefollowing employees, namely:

a. Alexander Aboganda

b. Pacifico Pestano

c. Carlito Torregano

d. Clemencia Pestano

e. Elisea Cabatingan

(listed in paragraph 3 of the IPI Employees Union-ALUs Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March

1991).

No further motions of the same nature shall be entertained.8

IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly in this Court through a petitionfor certiorari (G.R. No. 103330), but the Court dismissed its petition on October 14, 1992 on theground that no grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance of the assaileddecisions.9Considering that IPI did not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, theentry of judgment issued in due course on January 19, 1994.10
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt8


5/51

With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE Secretary, theUnion, represented by the Seno, Mendoza and Associates Law Office, moved in the NationalConciliation and Mediation Board in DOLE, Region VII on June 8, 1994 for their execution.11

On November 21, 1994, one Atty. Audie C. Arnado, who had meanwhile entered his appearance onOctober 4, 1994 as the counsel of 15 out of the 50 employees named in the December 5, 1991

judgment of Secretary Torres, likewise filed a so-called Urgent Motion for Execution.12

After conducting conferences and requiring the parties to submit their position papers, RegionalDirector Alan M. Macaraya of DOLE Region VII issued a Notice of Computation/Execution on April12, 1995,13the relevant portion of which stated:

To speed-up the settlement of the issue, the undersigned on 7 February 1995 issued an orderdirecting the parties to submit within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the Order, theirrespective Computations. To date, only the computation from complainants including those that werenot specifically mentioned in the Supreme Court decision were submitted and received by this office.

Upon verification of the Computation available at hand, management is hereby directed to pay the

employees including those that were not specifically mentioned in the decision but are similarlysituated, the aggregate amount of FORTY-THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSANDNINE HUNDRED FIVE AND 87/100 PESOS (P43,650,905.87) involving NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (962) employees, in the manner shown in the attached Computation forming part of this Order.This is without prejudice to the final Order of the Court to reinstate those covered employees. 1wphi1

This Order is to take effect immediately and failure to comply as instructed will cause the issuance ofa WRIT OF EXECUTION.14

In effect, Regional Director Macaraya increased the number of the workers to be benefitted to 962employeesclassified into six groupsand allocated to each group a share in the P43,650,905.87award,15as follows:

GROUP NO. OFEMPLOYEES

TOTAL CLAIM

Those represented by Atty. Arnado 15 P4,162,361.50

Salesman 9 P6,241,535.44

For Union Members 179 P6,671,208.86

For Non-Union Members 33 P1,228,321.09

Employees who ratified the CBA 642 P23,982,340.14

Separated Employees 84 P1,365,136.84

TOTAL 962 P43,650,905.87

On May 24, 1995, Assistant Regional Director Jalilo dela Torre of DOLE Region VII issued a writ ofexecution for the amount of P4,162,361.50 (which covered monetary claims corresponding to theperiod from January 1, 1989 to March 15, 1995) in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty.

Arnado,16to be distributed thusly:17

1. Barredo, Gregorio P278,700.10
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt11


6/51

2. Bordomeo, Roberto P278,700.10

3. Cupta, Anecito P278,700.10

4. Delposo, Godofredo P278,700.10

5. Dinolan, Ananias P278,700.10

6. Jayme, Jovito P278,700.10

7. Lozada, Merope P278,700.10

8. Mayorga, Agapito P278,700.10

9. Mergal, Lourdes P278,700.10

10. Pancho, Bebiano P278,700.10

11. Pancho, Violeta P278,700.10

12. Rodriguez, Alejandro P278,700.10

13. Russiana, Ireneo P263,685.10

14. Tangub, Joannis P278,700.10

15. Trazona, Rolsan P275,575.10

TOTAL P4,162,361.50

On June 5, 1995, Assistant Regional Director dela Torre issued another Writ of Execution for theamount ofP1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of employees. Objecting to the reducedcomputation for them, however, the second group of employees filed a Motion Declaring the Writ ofExecution dated June 5, 1995 null and void.

On July 11, 1995, IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the 15employees by filing its Appeal and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order in theOffice of then DOLE Undersecretary Cresenciano Trajano.18

On December 22, 1995,19Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on IPIs appeal, recalledand quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, and declared and considered the case closed and

terminated.

20

Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the December 22, 1995 Order of ActingDOLE Secretary Brillantes.

On August 27, 1996, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing granted the Motion forReconsideration,21and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, subject to the deduction of thesum of P745,959.39 already paid pursuant to quitclaims from the awardof P4,162,361.50.22Secretary Quisumbing declared the quitclaims executed by the employees on
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt18


7/51

December 2, 3, and 17, 1993 without the assistance of the proper office of the DOLEunconscionable for having been entered into under circumstances showing vitiation of consent; andruled that the execution of the quitclaims should not prevent the employees from recovering theirmonetary claims under the final and executory decisions dated December 26, 1990 and December5, 1991, less the amounts received under the quitclaims.

Aggrieved by the reinstatement of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, IPI moved for areconsideration.23

On September 3, 1996, and pending resolution of IPIs motion for reconsideration, Regional DirectorMacaraya issued a writ of execution in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado torecover P3,416,402.10 pursuant to the order dated August 27, 1996 of SecretaryQuisumbing.24Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the amount of P3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPIwith China Banking Corporation, which released the amount.25Hence, on September 11, 1996, the15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of Judgment andQuitclaim/Release upon receipt of their respective portions of the award, subject to the reservation oftheir right to claim "unsatisfied amounts of separation pay as well as backwages reckoned from thedate after 15 March 1995 and up to the present, or until separation pay is fully paid. "26

Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release, Atty. Arnado stillfiled an omnibus motion not only in behalf of the 15 employees but also in behalf of other employeesnamed in the notice of computation/execution, with the exception of the second group, seekinganother writ of execution to recover the further sum of P58,546,767.83.27

Atty. Arnado filed a supplemental omnibus motion for the denial of IPIs Motion for Reconsiderationon the ground of mootness.28

In the meanwhile, the employees belonging to the second group reiterated their Motion Declaring theWrit of Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and void, and filed on May 15, 1996 a Motion for Issuanceof Writ, praying for another writ of execution based on the computation by Regional DirectorMacaraya.

On December 24, 1997,29Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27, 1996 order, denied IPIsMotion for Reconsideration for being rendered moot and academic by the full satisfaction of the May24, 1995 writ of execution. He also denied Atty. Arnados omnibus motion for lack of merit; and dealtwith the issue involving the June 5, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the second group ofemployees, which the Court eventually resolved in the decision promulgated in G.R. No. 164633.30

The employees represented by Atty. Arnado moved for the partial reconsideration of the December24, 1997 order of Secretary Quisumbing. Resolving this motion on March 27, 1998, Acting DOLESecretary Jose M. Espaol, Jr. held as follow:31

WHEREFORE, Our Order dated December 24, 1997, is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Motion for Reconsideration/Amend/Clarificatory and Reiteration of Motion for Issuance of Writ ofExecution dated January 12, 1998, filed by six (6) salesmen, namely, Geronimo S. Banquirigo,Reynaldo C. Menor, Rogelio Enricoso, Danilo Palioto, Herbert Veloso and Colito Virtudazo as wellas the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by Salesman Noli G. Silo, are herebyDISMISSED, for lack of merit. The June 5, 1995 Writ of Execution is now considered fully executedand satisfied.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt23


8/51

The Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by Roberto Bordomeo and 231 others, is likewiseDENIED, for lack of merit

SO ORDERED.32

Records reveal, however, that Virgilio Saragena, et al. brought to this Court a petition for certiorari to

assail the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 Orders of the Secretary of Labor (G.R. No.134118). As stated at the start, the Court dismissed the petition of Saragena, et al. on September 9,1998 for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners failure to comply with the requirementsunder Rule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.33The entry of judgment was issued on December7, 1998.

In the meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the DOLERegional Office,34demanding the following amounts from IPI, to wit:

For Roberto Bordomeo and 14 others P4,990,401.00

The rest of complainants 33,824,820.41

Total P 38,815,221.41

Again, on September 22, 1998, Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the RegionalOffice.35This time, no monetary claims were demanded but the rest of the complainants sought tocollect from IPI the reduced amount ofP6,268,818.47.

Another Motion for Execution was filed by Atty. Arnado on July 6, 1999,36seeking the execution ofthe December 26, 1990 order issued by Secretary Torres and of the April 12, 1995 notice ofcomputation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya.

Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued her Order37affirming the

order issued on March 27, 1998, and declaring that the full execution of the order of March 27, 1998"completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case."

Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragenaassailed the July 4, 2001 order of Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA (C.A.-G.R.SP No. 65970).38

On May 30, 2003, the CA rendered its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970,39to wit:

It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners andprivate respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records show that petitioners have alreadybeen granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is nothing for

this Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of adecision which has been executed. In this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executorydecisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correcterrors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such

judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack ofjurisdiction. (Pio Barreto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 127).

This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders ofthe Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 have
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt32


9/51

become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of theSecretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting theexecution of the decision in the case between petitioners and IPI.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE andis DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.40

The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,41but the CA denied the motion on October 30,2003.42

Hence, they commenced this special civil action for certiorari.

The petitioners hereby contend that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ANDGRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTIONWHEN IT:

A. HELD THAT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS (WHICH MERELYSEEKS FULL EXECUTION OF DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS 26 DECEMBER 1990

AND 5 DECEMBER 1991 WOULD AMEND SAID FINAL AND EXECUTORYJUDGMENTS.

B. FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE SET IN PDCPVS. GENILO, G.R. NO. 106705, THAT SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES HASTHE RIGHT TO PROVE THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO THE BENEFITS AWARDED

UNDER FINAL JUDGMENTS.

C. HELD THAT THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENTS HAD BEEN EXECUTED WHENTHE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES ADMIT THE CONTRARY.

D. HELD THAT DOLE SECRETARY DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION WHEN SHE REFUSED TO FULLY EXECUTE THE 1990 AND 1991DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ISSUE CORRESPONDING WRITS OFEXECUTION.

The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12, 1995 noticeof computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya, only the first two groups, that is,

the 15 employees initially represented by Atty. Arnado; and the nine salesmen led by Geronimo S.Banquirigo, had been granted a writ of execution. They further submit that the May 24, 1995 writ ofexecution issued in favor of the first group of employees, including themselves, had only beenpartially satisfied because no backwages or separation pay from March 16, 1995 onwards had yetbeen paid to them; that the reduced award granted to the second group of employees was inviolation of the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution; that no writ of execution had beenissued in favor of the other groups of employees; and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas thuscommitted grave abuse of discretion in refusing to fully execute the December 26, 1990 andDecember 5, 1991 orders.


10/51

In its comment, IPI counters that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for being an improperremedy, the more appropriate remedy being a petition for review on certiorari; that a petition forreview on certiorari should have been filed within 15 days from receipt of the denial of the motion forreconsideration, as provided in Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 45; and that the petition must alsobe outrightly dismissed for being filed out of time.

IPI contends that the finality of the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 orders of the DOLESecretary rendered them unalterable; that Atty. Arnado had already brought the December 24, 1997and March 27, 1998 orders to this Court for review (G.R. No. 134118); and that the Court haddismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners failure to comply withRule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari.

Firstly, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to be takento this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order raising only questions of law,

was the proper remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari onJanuary 9, 2004 to assail the CAs May 30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A. -G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA wasimproper. The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing ofthe petition for certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course under Rule45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinaryremedy,certiorari cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, likean appeal in due course.43

We remind them that an appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of discretioncommitted by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for that purpose.

It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a special civilaction forcertiorari can be a proper alternative remedy. We reiterate what the Court has discoursedthereon in Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores andVirginia Lopez,44viz:

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitutesufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not anadequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mereabsence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, thatmust usually determine the propriety of cert iorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate ifit will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, orresolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not marktime by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and

set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.

Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a properremedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond proceduralrequirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in orderthat a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily,the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy thecomprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of thediscretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt43


11/51

discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending controlover inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case"as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent asubstantial wrong or to do substantial justice.45(Emphasis supplied)

Even so, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for certiorari to comply with the

following requisites, namely: (1) the writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, a board, or anofficer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has actedwithout or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law.46

Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may bedeemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to aparty; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where theremay be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, andinsufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; ( f) where public interest is involved; and(g) in case of urgency.47Yet, a reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that thepetition does not come under any of the situations. Specifically, the petitioners have not shown thatthe grant of the writ of certiorari will be necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial

justice to them.

In dismissing the petitioners petition forcertiorari, the CA in effect upheld the Secretary of Laborsdeclaration in her assailed July 4, 2001 decision that the full satisfaction of the writs of execution hadcompletely closed and terminated the labor dispute.

Yet, the petitioners have ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the CA for doing so.

We do not agree. We find no just cause to now issue the writ of certiorari in order to set aside theCAs assailed May 30, 2003 decision. Indeed, the following well stated justifications for the dismissalof the petition show that the CA was correct, viz:

x x x x

It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners andprivate respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records show that petitioners have alreadybeen granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is nothing forthis Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of adecision which has been executed. In this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executorydecisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correcterrors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such

judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack ofjurisdiction (Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 127).

This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders ofthe Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 havebecome final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of theSecretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting theexecution of the decision in the case between petitioners and IPI.

There is nothing on the records to support the allegation of petitioners that the Secretary of Laborand Employment abused her discretion. The pertinent portion of the assailed order reads:


12/51

"Given that this office had already ruled on all incidents of the case in its March 27, 1998 order andthe Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 had already attained finality and had in fact beencompletely satisfied through the deposit with the Regional Office of the amount covered by the Writ,the subsequent Motions filed by Atty. Arnado can no longer be entertained, much less granted bythis Office. Thus, at this point, there is nothing more to grant nor to execute."48

x x x x

In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, thepetitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not a merely reversibleerror but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing theimpugned order.49Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown tobe grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power wasexercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that therespondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the dutyenjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lackof jurisdiction.50Under the circumstances, the CA committed no abuse of discretion, least of allgrave, because its justifications were supported by the history of the dispute and borne out by theapplicable laws and jurisprudence.

And, secondly, the records contradict the petitioners insistence that the two writs of execution toenforce the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE Secretary were onlypartially satisfied. To recall, the two writs of execution issued were the one for P4,162,361.50, laterreduced to P3,416,402.10, in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, and thatfor P1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of employees led by Banquerigo.

There is no question that the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, inclusive of the petitioners,received their portion of the award covered by the September 3, 1996 writ of execution for theamount of P3,416,402.10 through the release of the garnished deposit of IPI at China BankingCorporation. That was why they then executed the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release,

the basis for the DOLE Secretary to expressly declare in her July 4, 2001 decision that the fullsatisfaction of the writ of execution "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case."51

Still, the 15 employees demand payment of their separation pay and backwages from March 16,1995 onwards pursuant to their reservation reflected in the satisfaction of judgment andquitclaim/release they executed on September 11, 1996.

The demand lacked legal basis. Although the decision of the DOLE Secretary dated December 5,1991 had required IPI to reinstate the affected workers to their former positions with full backwagesreckoned from December 8, 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and otherbenefits, the reinstatement thus decreed was no longer possible. Hence, separation pay was insteadpaid to them. This alternative was sustained in law and jurisprudence, for "separation pay may avail

in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties.Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to bereinstated."52

Under the circumstances, the employment of the 15 employees or the possibility of theirreinstatement terminated by March 15, 1995. Thereafter, their claim for separation pay andbackwages beyond March 15, 1995 would be unwarranted. The computation of separation pay andbackwages due to illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond the date when they weredeemed to have been actually separated from their employment, or beyond the date when their
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_161596_2013.html#fnt48


13/51

reinstatement was rendered impossible. Anent this, the Court has observed in Golden Ace Buildersv. Talde:53

The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay.Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relationsbetween the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have

been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computingbackwages is usually the length of the employees service while that for separation pay is the actualperiod when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.

As to how both awards should be computed, Macasero v. Southern Industrial GasesPhilippines instructs:

[T]he award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal, forunder Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an employee who isdismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement orpayment of separation pay in lieu thereof:

Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. Thetwo reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasiblebecause of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. Ineffect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation payif reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.

The normal consequences of respondents illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement withoutloss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time compensationwas withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viableas an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of serviceshould be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment ofbackwages. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

x x x x

Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as his reinstatement has beenrendered impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held by the appellate court, thebackwages due respondent must be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed until hisactual reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005 when his reinstatement wasrendered impossible without fault on his part.

The Court, however, does not find the appellate court's computation of separation pay in order. Theappellate court considered respondent to have served petitioner company for only eight years.Petitioner was hired in 1990, however, and he must be considered to have been in the service notonly until 1999, when he was unjustly dismissed, but until June 30, 2005, the day he is deemed to

have been actually separated (his reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from petitionercompany or for a total of 15 years.54

As for the portions of the award pertaining to the rest of the employees listed in the April 12, 1995notice of execution/computation (i.e., those allegedly similarly situated as the employees listed in theDecember 5, 1991 order of the DOLE Secretary) still remaining unsatisfied, the petitioners aredefinitely not the proper parties to ventilate such concern in this or any other forum. At any rate, theconcern has already been addressed and resolved by the Court in G.R. No. 164633 .55


14/51

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for its lack of merit; AFFIRMS thedecision promulgated on May 30, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 153799 September 17, 2012

SOLIDBANK UNION, EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, EVELYN A. SIA, TERESITA C. LUALHATI,ISAGANI P. MAKISIG, REY S. PASCUA, MA. VICTORIA M. VIDALLON, AUDREY A. ALJIBE,REY ANTHONY AMPARADO, JOSE A. ANTENOR,1DEL CASTILLO, AUGUSTO D. ARANDIA,JR., RUTH SHIELA M. BAGADIONG, STEVE D. BERING, ALAN ROY I. BUYCO, MANOLO T.CABRERA, RACHEL2M. CASTILLO, VICTOR O. CHUA, VIRGILIO CO, JR., LEOPOLDODABAY, HUBERT DIMAGIBA, MA. LOURDES CECILIA EMPERADOR,3FELIX B. ESTACIO, JR.,JULIETA ESTRADA, MARICEL EVALLA, JOSE GUISADIO, ALEXANDER MARTINEZ,JOSEPHINE M. ONG, EDNA SARONG, GREGORIO S. SECRETARIO,4ROSIE UY, ARVIN D.VALENCIA, FERMIN JOSEPH5B. VENTURA, JR., EMMANUEL C. YAPTANGCO,6ERNESTO C.ZUIGA, ALVIN E. BARICANOSA, GEORGE MAXIMO P. BARQUEZ, MA. ELENA G. BELLO,MICHAEL MATTHEW BILLENA, NEPTALI A. CADDARAO, FERDINAND MEL S.CAPULONG,7MA. EDNA V. DATOR, RANIEL8DAYAO, RAGCY L. DE GUZMAN, LUIS E. DELOS

SANTOS, CAROLINA DIZON, JOCELYN L. ESTROBO, MINERVA S. FALLARME, HERNANE C.FERMOCIL, RACHEL B. FETIZANAN, SAMUEL A. FLORENTINO, JOEL S. GARMINO, LESTERMARK Z. GATCHALIAN, GONZALO GUINIT, FERDINAND S. HABIJAN, JUN HERNANDEZ, MA.ANGELA JALANDONI,9MANUEL LIM, MA. LOURDES LIM, EMERSON LUNA, NOLASCOMACATANGAY, NORMAN MAACO, CHERRY LOU MANGROBANG, EDMUNDO MARASIGAN,ALLEN M. MARTINEZ, ARLENE P. NOBLE, SHIRLEY ONG, LOTIZ E. ORTIZ LUIS, PABLITOPALO, GEOFFREY PRADO, OMEGA MELANIE QUINTANO, AGNES A. RAMIREZ, RICARDO D.RAMIREZ, DANIEL O. RAQUEL, RAMON REYES, SALVACIO ROGADO, ELMOR R. ROMANA,JR., LOURDES U. SALVADOR, ELMER S. SAYLON, BENNARD SIMBULAN, MA. LOURDESROCEL SOLIVEN, EMILY10C. SUYAT, RAYMOND11D. TANAY, JOCELYN Y. TAN, CANDIDO G.TISON, MA. THERESA12O. TISON, EVELYN T. UYLANGCO, MERVIN S. BAUTISTA,LEOPOLDO DE LA ROSA, DOROTEO FROILAN and JULIETE L. JUBAC, Petitioners,vs.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 157169

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,vs.SOLIDBANK UNION, EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, EVELYN A. SIA, TERESITA C. LUALHATI,
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt1


15/51

ISAGANI P. MAKISIG, REY S. PASCUA, MA. VICTORIA M. VIDALLON, AUDREY A. ALJIBE,REY ANTHONY AMPARADO, JOSE A. ANTENOR, AUGUSTO D. ARANDIA, JR., RUTH SHIELAM. BAGADIONG, STEVE D. BERING, ALAN ROY I. BUYCO, MANOLO T. CABRERA, RACHELM. CASTILLO, VICTOR O. CHUA, VIRGILIO Y. CO, JR., LEOPOLDO S. DABAY, HUBERT V.DIMAGIBA, MA. LOURDES CECILIA B. EMPARADOR, FELIX B. ESTACIO, JR., JULIETA T.ESTRADA, MARICEL G. EVALLA, JOSE G. GUISADIO, ALEXANDER A. MARTINEZ,

JOSEPHINE M. ONG, EDNA M. SARONG, GREGORIO S. SECRETARIO, ROSIE C. UY, ARVIND. VALENCIA, FERMIN JOSEPH B. VENTURA, JR., EMMANUEL C. YAPTANCO, ERNESTO C.ZUIGA,13ALVIN E. BARICANOSA, GEORGE MAXIMO P. BARQUEZ, MA. ELENA G. BELLO,MICHAEL MATTHEW B. BILLENA, LEOPE L. CABENIAN, NEPTALI A. CADDARAO,FERDINAND MEL S. CAPULING, MARGARETTE B. CORDOVA, MA. EDNA V. DATOR, RANIELC. DAYAO, RAGCY L. DE GUZMAN, LUIS E. DELOS SANTOS, CAROLINA C. DIZON,MARCHEL S. ESQUEJO,14JOCELYN L. ESTROBO, MINERVA S. FALLARME, HERNANE C.FERMOCIL, RACHEL B. FETIZANAN, SAMUEL A. FLORENTINO, MENCHIE R. FRANCISCO,JOEL S. GARMINO, LESTER MARK Z. GATCHALIAN, MA. GONZALO G. GUINIT, FERDINANDS. HABIJAN, JUN G. HERNANDEZ, LOURDES D. IBEAS, MA. ANGELA L. JALANDONI, JULIET. JORNACION, MANUEL C. LIM, MA. LOURDES A. LIM, EMERSON V. LUNA, NOLASCO B.MACATANGAY, NORAMN C. MANACO, CHERRY LOU B. MANGROBANG, MARASIGAN G.EDMUNDO, ALLEN M. MARTINEZ, EMELITA C. MONTANO, ARLENE P. NOBLE, SHIRLEY A.

ONG, LOTIZ E. ORTIZ LUIS, PABLITO M. PALO, GEOFFREY T. PRADO, OMEGA MELANIE M.QUINTANO, AGNES A. RAMIREZ, RICARDO D. RAMIREZ, DANIEL O. RAQUEL, RAMON B.REYES, SALVACIO N. ROGADO, ELMOR R. ROMANA, JR., LOURDES U. SALVADOR, ELMERS. SAYLON, BENHARD E. SIMBULAN, MA. TERESA S. SOLIS, MA. LOURDES ROCEL E.SOLIVEN, EMILY C. SUYAT, RAYMOND D. TANAY, JOCELYN Y. TAN, CANDIDO G. TISON,MA. THERES O. TISON, EVELYN T. UYLANGCO, MERVIN S. BAUTISTA, LEOPOLDO V. DE LAROSA, DOROTEO S. FROILAN, JULIETE L. JUBAC, SOLID BANK CORPORATION and/or itssuccessor-in-interest, FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, DEOGRACIAS N. VISTANand EDGARDO MENDOZA, JR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 157327

SOLID BANK CORPORATION and/or its successor-in-interest, FIRST METRO INVESTMENTCORPORATION, DEOGRACIAS N. VISTAN and EDGARDO MENDOZA, JR., Petitioners,vs.SOLIDBANK UNION and its dismissed officers and members, namely: EVANGELINE J.GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, ISAGANI P. MAKISIG, REY S. PASCUA, EVELYN A. SIA,MA. VICTORIA M. VIDALLON, AUDREY A. ALJIBE, REY ANTHONY M. AMPARADO, JOSE A.ANTEENOR, AUGUSTO D. ARANDIA, JR., JANICE L. ARRIOLA, RUTH SHIELA M.BAGADIONG, STEVE D. BERING, ALAN ROY I. BUYCO, MANOLO T. CABRERA, RACHEL M.CASTILLO, VICTOR O. CHUA, VIRGILIO Y. CO, JR., LEOPOLDO S. DABAY, ARMAND V.DAYANG-HIRANG, HUBERT V. DIMAGIBA, MA. LOURDES CECILIA B. EMPARADOR, FELIX B.ESTACIO, JR., JULIETA T. ESTRADA, MARICEL G. EVALLA, JOSE G. GUISADIO, JOSERAINARIO C. LAOANG, ALEXANDER A. MARTINEZ, JUAN ALEX C. NAMBONG, JOSEPHINEM. ONG, ARMANDO B. OROZCO, ARLENE R. RODRIGUEZ, NICOMEDES P. RUIZO, JR., DONA. SANTANA, ERNESTO R. SANTOS, JR., EDNA M. SARONG, GREGORIO S. SEECRETARIO,ELLEN M. SORIANO, ROSIE C. UY, ARVIN D. VALENCIA, FERMIN JOSSEPH B. VENTURA,JR., EMMANUEL C. YAPTANCO, ERNESTO C. ZUNIGA, ARIEL S. ABENDAN, EMMA R.ABENDAN, PAULA AGNES A. ANGELES, JACQUILINE B. BAQUIRAN, JENNIFER S.BARCENAS, ALVIN E. BARICANOSA, GEORGE MAXIMO P. BARQUEZ, MA. ELENA G.BELLO, RODERICK M. BELLO, MICHAEL MATTHEW B. BILLENA, LEOPE L. CABENIAN,NEPTALI A. CADDARAO, FERDINAND MEL S. CAPULING, MARGARETTE B. CORDOVA, MA.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt13


16/51

EDNA V. DATOR, PRANIEL C. DAYAO, RAGCY L. DE GUZMAN, LUIS E. DELOS SANTOS,CARMINA M. DEGALA, EPHRAIM RALPH A. DELFIN, KAREN M. DEOCERA, CAROLINA C.DIZON, MARCHEL S. ESQUEJJO, JOCELYN L. ESTROBO, MINERVA S. FALLARME,HERNANE C. FERMOCIL, RACHEL B. FETIZANAN, SAMUEL A. FLORENTINO, MENCHIE R.FRANCISCO, ERNESTO U. GAMIEL,15MACARIO RODOLFO N. GARCIA, JOEL S. GARMINO,LESTER MARK Z. GATCHALIAN, MA. JINKY P. GELERA, MA. TERESA G. GONZALES,

GONZALO G. GUINIT, EMILY H. GUINO-O, FERDINAND S. HABIJAN, JUN G. HERNANDEZ,LOURDES D. IBEAS, MA. ANGELA L. JALANDDONI, JULIE T. JORNACION, MANUEL C. LIM,MA. LOURDES A. LIM, EMERSON V. LUNA, NOLASCO B. MACATANGAY, NORMAN C.MANACO, CHERRY LOU B. MANGROBANG, MARASIGAN G. EDMUNDO, ALLEN M.MARTINEZ, EMELITA C. MONTANO, ARLENE P. NOBLE, SHIRLEY A. ONG, LOTIZ E. ORTIZLUIS, PABLITO M. PALO, MARY JAINE16D. PATINO, GEOFFREY T. PRADO, OMEGAMELANIE M. QUINTANO, ANES A. RAMIREZ, RICARDO D. RAMIREZ, DANIEL O. RAQUEL,RAMON B. REYES, SALVACION N. ROGADO, ELMOR R. ROMANA, JR., LOURDES U.SALVADOR, ELMER S. SAYLON, BENHARD E. SIMBULAN, MA. TERESA S. SOLIS, MA.LOURDES ROCEL E. SOLIVEN, EMLY C. SUYAT, EDGAR ALLAN P. TACSUAN, RAYMONDDD. TANAY, JOCELYN Y. TAN, CANDIDO G. TISON, MA. THERESA O. TISON, EVELYN T.UYLANGCO, CION E. YAP, MA. OPHELIA C. DE GUZMAN, MA. HIDELISA P. IRA, RAYMUNDMARTIN A. ANGELES, MERVIN S. BAUTISTA, ELENA R. CONDEVILLAMAR, CCHERRY T. CO,

LEOPOLDO V. DE LA ROSA, DOROTEO S. FROILAN, EMMANUEL B. GLORIA, JULIETE L.JUBAC, and ROSEMARIE L. TANG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 157506

SOLIDBANK UNION, EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, EVELYN A. SIA, TERESITA C. LUALHATI,ISAGANI P. MAKISIG, REY S. PASCUA, MA. VICTORIA M. VIDALLON, AUDREY A. ALJIBE,REY ANTHONY AMPARADO, JOSE A. ANTENOR, AUGUSTO D. ARANDIA, JR., RUTH SHIELAM. BAGADIONG, STEVE D. BERING, ALAN ROY I. BUYCO, MANOLO T. CABRERA, RACHELM. CASTILLO, VICTOR O. CHUA, VIRGILIO Y. CO, JR., LEOPOLDO S. DABAY, HUBERT V.

DIMAGIBA, MA. LOURDES CECILIA B. EMPERADOR, FELIX B. ESTACIO, JR., JULIETA T.ESTRADA, MARICEL G. EVALLA, JOSE G. GUISADIO, ALEXANDER A. MARTINEZ,JOSEPHINE M. ONG, EDNA M. SARONG, GREGORIO S. SECRETARIO, ARVIN D. VALENCIA,FERMIN JOSEPH B. VENTURA, JR., EMMANUEL C. YAPTANGCO, ERNESTO C. ZUIGA,ALVIN E. BARICANOSA, GEORGE MAXIMO P. BARQUEZ, MA. ELENA G. BELLO, MICHAELMATTHEW B. BILLENA, NEPTALI A. CADDARAO, FERDINAND MEL S. CAPULONG, MA.EDNA V. DATOR, RANIEL C. DAYAO, RAGCY L. DE GUZMAN, LUIS E. DELOS SANTOS,CAROLINA C. DIZON, JOCELYN L. ESTROBO, MINERVA S. FALLARME, HERNANE C.FERMOCIL, RACHEL B. FETIZANAN, SAMUEL A. FLORENTINO, JOEL S. GARMINO, LESTERMARK Z. GATCHALIAN, GONZALO GUINIT, FERDINAND S. HABIJAN, JUN G. HERNANDEZ,MA. ANGELA L. JALANDONI, MA. LOURDES A. LIM, EMERSON V. LUNA, NOLASCO B.MACATANGAY, NORMAN C. MAACO, CHERRY LOU MANGROBANG, EDMUNDO G.MARASIGAN, ALLEN M. MARTINEZ, ARLENE P. NOBLE, SHIRLEY A. ONG, LOTIZ E. ORTIZLUIS, PABLITO M. PALO, GEOFFREY T. PRADO, OMEGA MELANIE M. QUINTANO, AGNES A.RAMIREZ, RICARDO D. RAMIREZ, DANIEL O. RAQUEL, RAMON B. REYES, SALVACIO N.ROGADO, ELMOR R. ROMANA, JR., LOURDES U. SALVADOR, ELMER S. SA YLON,BENNARD E. SIMBULAN, MA. LOURDES ROCEL E. SOLIVEN, EMILY C. SUYAT, RAYMOND D.TANAY, .JOCELYN Y. TAN, CANDIDO G. TISON, MA. THERESA O. TISON, EVELYN T.UYLANGCO, MERVIN S. BAUTISTA, LEOPOLDO V. DE LA ROSA, DOROTEO S. FROILAN andJULIETE L. JUBAC, Petitioners.vs.METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt15


17/51

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The issues presented in these consolidated petitions have been squarely resolved by this Court in itsNovember 15, 2010 Decision in Solidbank Corporation v. Gamier,17The said Decision

constitutes res judicatain these consolidated petitions.

These petitions for review on certiorariassail the conflicting Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) inCA-G.R. SP Nos. 68054 and 68998. In CA-G.R. SP No. 68054, the CAs Second Division ruled thatthe public demonstration conducted by the employees on April 3, 2000 after the Secretary of Laborassumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute was a valid exercise of their constitutional rights tofreedom of expression, to peaceful assembly, and to petition the government for redress of theirgrievances and, hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal. Said division of the CA thus setaside the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRCs) Second Division andreinstated the Decision18dated March 16, 2001 of Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores (Labor Arbiter Flores).

In CA-G.R. SP No. 68998, however, the Special Third Division of the CA held that the employees

staged an illegal strike. It also held that Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) couldnot be held jointly and solidarily liable with Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) and First MetroInvestment Corporation (First Metro) because each of them have separate and distinct legalpersonalities.

Factual Antecedents

Solidbank Union (Union) was a legitimate labor organization and the duly certified sole bargainingrepresentative of all rank-and-file employees of Solidbank. On November 17, 1999, the Union andSolidbank negotiated for a new economic package for the remaining two years of the 1997-2001collective bargaining agreement (CBA). However, the parties reached an impasse. Thus, on January18, 2000, then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma (Secretary Laguesma) assumed

jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the parties from holding a strike or lockout or any activitywhich might exacerbate the situation.19

Thereaftter, on March 24, 2000, Secretary Laguesma issued an Order20disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby issued:

a. Directing Solidbank Corporation and Solidbank Union to conclude their Collective BargainingAgreement for the years 2000 and 2001, incorporating the dispositions above set forth;

b. Dismissing the unfair labor practice charge against Solidbank Corporation;

c. Directing Solidbank to deduct or check-off from the employees lump sum payment an amountequivalent to seven percent (7%) of their economic benefits for the first (1st) year, inclusive ofsigning bonuses, and to remit or turn over the said sum to the Unions authorized representative,subject to the requirements of check-off;

d. Directing Solidbank to recall the show-cause memos issued to employees who participated in themass actions if such memos were in fact issued.

SO ORDERED.21
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt17


18/51


19/51

Said counsel further pointed out that on August 31, 2000, Solidbank ceased its banking operations.Consequently, pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code,30all of its employees were terminated fromemployment on said date.

Rul ing of the Labor A rbi ter

On March 16, 2001, Labor Arbiter Flores rendered his Decision31declaring the disputed April 3, 2000incident not a strike but a mere expression of the employees displeasure over the Secretarys ruling;that the 24-hour deadline imposed by Solidbank within which the employees should submit theirwritten explanation was not sufficient to give them reasonable opportunity to refute the chargesagainst them; and that Solidbank was guilty of unfair labor practice for using union membership asone of the bases for recalling or terminating employment. Accordingly, he awarded full backwagesand attorneys fees in favor of the employees. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decisionreads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainantsdismissal as illegal and unjustified and ordering the respondents Solid Bank Corporation and/or itssuccessor-in-interest First Metro Investment Corporation and/or Metropolitan Bank and Trust

Company and/or Deogracias Vistan and/or Edgardo Mendoza to reinstate complainants to theirformer positions. Concomitantly, said respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and severally paythe complainants their full backwages and other employees benefits from the time of their dismissalup to the date of their actual reinstatement; payment of ten (10%) percent attorneys fees; paymentof ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P 150,000.00) each as moral damages and ONEHUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 100,000.00) each as exemplary damages which are computed,at the date of this decision in the amount of THIRTY THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETYFOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO PESOS and 80/100 (P 33,794,222.80), by theComputation and Examination Unit of this branch and becomes an integral part of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.32

Then on April 26, 2001, complainants filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of A Writ of

Execution33seeking the immediate enforcement of the Labor Arbiters Decision insofar as thereinstatement aspect was concerned.

Proceedings before the Nat ional Labor Relat ions Comm ission

Solidbank and Metrobank separately filed their appeal. In its Memorandum of Appeal,34Solidbankimputed to Labor Arbiter Flores grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the concerted action ofthe complainants was a mere expression of displeasure and not a strike in defiance of SecretaryLaguesmas assumption order. Solidbank likewise alleged that the Labor Arbiter erred in holding thatit was guilty of unfair labor practice; that complainants were denied due process of law; that the 21individual complainants who voluntarily settled their claims against the bank were still entitled to theavails of the suit; that complainants were entitled to damages and attorneys fees; and, that the

officers of the bank were solidarily liable with it.

Metrobank, for its part, argued that it had a separate and distinct personality from Solidbank andFirst Metro and, hence, could not be held solidarily liable with said entities. It also claimed that thelabor tribunal did not acquire jurisdiction over its person because it was not served with summons.Metrobank stressed that it never engaged the services of Sycip Salazar Hernandez and Gatmaitanand only learned of the pending case when it was informed by First Metro about it. For thesereasons, Metrobank contended that the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and voidinsofar as it was concerned.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt30


20/51

Metrobank likewise claimed that the complaint should have been outrightly dismissed for violatingthe rule against forum shopping, as six35of the complainants had earlier filed illegal dismissal cases.Moreover, each of the complainants failed to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. It alsoechoed the contentions of Solidbank contained in the latters Memorandum of Appeal.

On May 21, 2001, the Labor Arbiter issued a Partial Writ of Execution,36ordering the reinstatement

of the dismissed employees to their former positions. Whereupon, Metrobank filed aMotion37seeking to restrain the enforcement of said writ.

Solidbank likewise filed an Urgent Motion (to Quash or Recall Writ of Execution),38claiming that thepositions previously held by the complainants were no longer available because Solidbank hadalready ceased operations.

The complainants thereafter filed their Answer (To Respondents-Appellants MemorandaofAppeal).39

On July 23, 2001, the NLRCs Second Division rendered its Decision40finding the dismissal of thecomplainants valid. It opined that the mass action held on April 3, 2000 was a strike within the

contemplation of Article 212(o)41

of the Labor Code and in violation of the Secretary of LaborsJanuary 18, 2000 assumption order. Notably, however, the NLRC Second Division still awardedseparation benefits in favor of the complainants on equitable grounds.

The NLRC Second Division likewise ruled that Solidbank did not interfere with complainants right toself-organization and, hence, did not commit unfair labor practice. It also dismissed the complaintwith respect to complainant Jose A. Antenor for violating the rule against forum shopping, as well aswith respect to the 21 individual complainants who already executed Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.

The Second Division of the NLRC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby VACATED and SET

ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practicefor lack of merit. As equitable relief, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainants separationbenefits as provided under the CBA at least one (1) month pay for every year of service whichever ishigher [sic].

SO ORDERED.42

The banks and the complainants filed their respective motions for reconsideration but these were alldenied by the NLRC in its Resolution43dated September 28, 2001.

On November 29, 2001, Labor Arbiter Flores issued an Order and an Alias Partial Writ of Executiondirecting the banks to pay complainants their accrued wages and other employees benefitscomputed from the date of his Decision up to the date of the reversal thereof by the NLRC SecondDivision on July 23, 2001.

Incidentally, other similarly situated employees44filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissalagainst Solidbank, which were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Potenciano Canizares, Jr.(Canizares). On November 14, 2000, Labor Arbiter Canizares issued a Decision dismissing thecomplaints. In a Decision dated January 31, 2002, however, the NLRCs Third Division reversed theruling of the Labor Arbiter and ruled in favor of said complainants. Thus:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt35


21/51

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding therespondent Solidbank Corporation liable for the illegal dismissal of complainants Ernesto U. Gamier,Elena P. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Maria Ophelia C. De Guzman, and ordering therespondent bank to reinstate the complainants to their former positions without loss of seniorityrights and to pay full backwages reckoned from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time oftheir actual/payroll reinstatement. Should reinstatement not be feasible, respondent bank is further

ordered to pay in accordance with the provisions of the subsisting Collective Bargaining Agreement.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.45

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

From the conflicting Decisions of the Second and Third Divisions of the NLRC stemmed fiveinterrelated petitions for certiorariseparately filed by the parties before the CA.

CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67730 and 70820

CA-G.R. SP No. 67730 was a petition for certiorarifiled by Solidbank, Vistan and Mendoza seekingto nullify the July 23, 2001 Decision of the NLRCs Second Division insofar as it ordered Solidbank topay separation pay. CA-G.R. SP No. 70820, on the other hand, was another petitionfor certiorarifiled by Solidbank praying for the reversal of the January 31, 2002 Decision of theNLRCs Third Division. These cases were consolidated and assigned to the CAs Twelfth Division. Inits March 10, 2003 Decision,46the CA Twelfth Division denied both petitions on the ground that themass action staged by the complainants was a legitimate exercise of their right to free expression.Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the twin petitions are hereby DENIED. The dismissal of private respondents arehereby declared to be illegal. Consequently, petitioner is ordered to reinstate private respondents to

their former position, consonant with the Decision of this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 68054.

SO ORDERED.47

Solidbank then filed with this Court petitions for review on certiorariquestioning the above-mentioned Decision of the CA Twelfth Division. These petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 159460 and159461 were consolidated and raffled to the Third Division of this Court. On November 15, 2010, theCourts Third Division rendered its Decision which, as mentioned in our opening paragraph,constitutes res judicatain these consolidated petitions.

CA-G.R. SP No. 68054

In their petition for certiorariin CA-G.R. SP No. 68054, complainants, thru Atty. Potenciano A.Flores, Jr., assailed the July 23, 2001 Decision of the NLRCs Second Division. On August 29, 2002,the Second Division of the CA rendered its Decision48finding the April 3, 2000 mass demonstration avalid exercise of complainants right to petition the government for redress of their grievances.Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorariis GRANTED. The LaborArbiters decision, except with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages which areheretofore lowered to PhP 50,000.00 and PhP 25,000.00, respectively, is hereby REINSTATED.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt45


22/51

SO ORDERED.49

Solidbank and Metrobank separately moved for reconsideration,50which drew complainantsConsolidated Comment.51In a Resolution52dated January 30, 2003, the CA denied both motions.

The August 29, 2002 Decision of the CAs Second Division was assailed by Metrobank and

Solidbank before this Court in two separate petitions for review on certiorariG.R. No. 157169 andG.R. No. 157327, respectively.


Atty. Emmanuel R. Jabla (Atty. Jabla), in collaboration with Attys. Federico C. Leynes and Jose C.Espinas, and in representation of five individual complainants, initiated CA-G.R. SP No.68349.53However, on April 24, 2002, the CAs Special Tenth Division issued a Resolution54outrightlydismissing the petition on the following grounds: (i) there was no proof that the signatories in theverification and certification against forum shopping were authorized to sign the same; (ii) violation ofthe rule against forum shopping; and, (iii) non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules ofCourt.55

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied in a Resolution56dated October 16,2002.

Subsequently, said five complainants still represented by Jabla Damian and Associates filed withthis Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari,57only to withdrawit afterwards. Accordingly, on February 5, 2003, this Court declared the case terminated.58


CA-G.R. SP No. 68998 was a petition for certiorariwith prayer for injunctive relief filed by Metrobankseeking to nullify the Decision of the Second Division of the NLRC insofar as it awarded separation

benefits in favor of the complainants.

During the pendency of said petition, the NLRC issued on January 9, 2002 a Notice ofGarnishment59for the implemention of Labor Arbiter Floress March 16, 2001 Decision againstSolidbank, First Metro or Metrobank.

On January 14, 2002, the Fourth Division of the CA, thru Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, issued aResolution60granting Metrobanks request for a temporary restraining order. Then on February 20,2002, upon Metrobanks filing of a Supplemental Motion, the Special Fourth Division of the CAissued another Resolution61granting Metrobanks prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction. It enjoined the implementation of Labor Arbiter Floress Decision,62

November 29, 2001 Order and Alias Partial Writ of Execution, as well as the NLRC SecondDivisionsJuly 23, 2001 Decision63and September 28, 2001 Resolution.64

In view of this turn of events, and believing that they can no longer expect fair and impartial justice,complainants filed a Motion to Inhibit Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.65They averred that theissuance of the two resolutions granting Metrobanks prayer for injunctive relief was a blatant displayof Justice Abesamiss bias and prejudice, if not gross ignorance of the law. Complainants alsosought reconsideration of the above-mentioned resolutions on the ground that the reinstatementaspect of Labor Arbiter Floress Decision was immediately executory. 1wphi1
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_153799_2012.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/j

Documents

Strike cases in labor